Fachbereich Sozialwissenschaft

PATTERNS OF POST-CONFLICT GOVERNANCE
—TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF POST-CONFLICT POLITIES—

Dissertation
zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde
durch den
Promotionsausschuss Dr. rer. pol.
der Universität Bremen

vorgelegt von:
Christian Reisinger

Bremen, den 17. Mai 2011

Gutachter:
Prof. Dr. Bernhard Zangl
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Dieter Senghaas
## Contact Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author:</th>
<th>Christian Reisinger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B.A. International Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master of Public Policy (MPP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution:</td>
<td>Bremen International Graduate School of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Sciences (University of Bremen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Postfach 33 04 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28334 Bremen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email:</td>
<td><a href="mailto:christian.reisinger@gmail.com">christian.reisinger@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

To begin with, I want to express my gratitude for the support – financial and otherwise – the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS) has offered me throughout a period of more than three years, which has enabled me to write this dissertation. My special thanks goes to BIGSSS’s executive secretary, Werner Dressel, who has always been receptive to fellow’s concerns and who has constantly spoken up for their demands, and to all other BIGSSS staff which works behind the scenes and keeps the graduate school up and running. This dissertation greatly benefited from the warm and international atmosphere this graduate school embodies.

Next to that, I want to thank my two supervisors, Prof. Dr. Bernhard Zangl and Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Dieter Senghaas, who have had a great intellectual influence on this doctoral thesis and who have always helped me out when my thinking reached a dead end. I greatly benefited from their different backgrounds and methodological approaches to the study of social phenomena. While the former has constantly emphasized the necessity for greater analytical rigidity and encouraged me to be more daring when it comes to presenting results in a systematic manner, the latter has from the beginning on reminded me to focus on cases and the empirical phenomena which I was most interested in. Not least, his idea to write so called ‘short stories’ for each of the cases in my sample was the methodological breakthrough which I needed in order to finally start with the productive work on this dissertation (the results can be found in appendix A).

Furthermore, I want to express my gratitude for the innumerable comments I have received on outlines, draft chapters or earlier versions of this manuscript, most notably from Astri Suhrke, Stefano Guzzini, William Reno, Fritz W. Scharpf, Beate Kohler-Koch, Michael Pugh, Johanna Soderström, Stephan Hensell, Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, Rainer Baumann, Felix Gerdes, Meike Rodekamp, Christoph Roos, Luicy Pedroza Espinoza, Lena Laube, Judith Renner, Tine Hanrieder, Stephan Stetter and many others. They had a lasting impact on this work and helped me to clarify my main argument, improve many concepts and throw unnecessary digressions overboard.

Next to this ‘hard’ support, I highly enjoyed the social company in Bremen, for instance during the notorious tabletop soccer matches with Dörte Dinger, Andrea Schapper, Julia Gieseler, Çetin Çelik and others. The company with my office mate Çetin was a particularly valuable experience. Special thanks go also to my PhD group (Christof Roos, Meike Rodekamp, Luicy Pedroza Espinoza and Lena Laube) with which I not only discussed earlier drafts of this dissertation but also spent a great time (I have always highly enjoyed
our evening discussions and the marvelous food offered at these occasions). Special thanks also go to Sebastian Büttnner and Tine Hanrieder for the unforgettable sailing trip in the summer of 2008.

A special thank goes to my parents, who have supported me throughout the entire duration of my studies and during the work on this dissertation. I highly appreciate the trust they put in me – it will serve as a role model for raising my own children (see below). Special thanks also go to my sister Nina, who is possibly the person with the strongest single impact on my personal development and to whom I am highly grateful for being just the way she is. I also want to thank Wolfgang and Monika, now officially my parents-in-law, for their support and the holidays we spent together during the time of my Ph.D. And Felix, of course, whom I am happy to have as my brother-in-law.

Finally, a particularly warm ‘thank you’ to my wife Anna-Katharina. It has become nearly stereotypical that authors praise their partners in the acknowledgments as something like ‘my favorite intellectual partner and strongest critic’. Though there is a sense of truth to it also in my case, I want to express a different point here: I am inexpressibly grateful that we found each other. On a more prosaic note, I also want to use this occasion in order to thank you again that you read through the entire manuscript and gave me innumerable comments and suggestions about how to improve this dissertation. I also want to thank our daughter – still unborn at the time of this writing and yet alive and kicking – who has motivated me to significantly speed up my efforts to finish this dissertation. I am inexpressibly grateful that she does not have to grow up in circumstances of hardship and civil war as the children in those countries with which this dissertation deals.
Chapter Outline

1. Introduction
2. Patterns of Post-Conflict Polities
3. ‘Let’s Share’ Polities
4. ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities
5. ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities
6. ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polities
7. ‘You Stay Out’ Polities
8. Conclusion

Appendix

A. Characterization and Classification of the Cases
B. Detailed Overview of the Typification Process
C. Overview of Conflict Theories
# Contents

Acknowledgements iii  
List of Figures xiv  
List of Tables xvi  

1 Introduction 1  
1.1 Context and Research Problem 1  
1.1.1 Research Problem 7  
1.1.2 Main Arguments 11  
1.2 Methods and Research Design 15  
1.2.1 Research Process and Structure of the Dissertation 15  
1.2.2 Typification as a Research Method 16  
1.2.3 The Process of Typology Construction 22  
1.3 Operationalizing Key Concepts 25  
1.3.1 Operationalizing Armed Conflicts 25  
1.3.2 Operationalizing Post-Conflict Situations 27  
1.3.3 Operationalizing Post-Conflict Polities 28  
1.4 Cases and Case Selection 29  
1.4.1 Overview of the Case Material 30  
1.4.2 Criteria for Case Selection 32  

2 Patterns of Post-Conflict Polities 35  
2.1 Post-Conflict Situations as Post-Conflict Polities 35  
2.1.1 Polities and the Study of Fragmented Authority 36  
2.1.2 Framework of Analysis 38  
2.2 The Typology 43  
2.2.1 Distribution of Executive Power 45  
2.2.2 Relations Between the Former Belligerents 51  
2.2.3 Intervention by External Actors 56  
2.3 Overview of the Polity Types 61  
2.3.1 Power-Sharing Polities 62  
2.3.2 Domination Polities 65
Contents

2.4 Patterns of Interaction in Post-Conflict Polities .......................... 68
  2.4.1 Patterns adopted by the Warring Parties ............................ 70
  2.4.2 Patterns adopted by External Actors ............................... 72
  2.4.3 Dimensions of the Empirical Analysis .............................. 74

3 ‘Let’s Share’ Polities ........................................................................ 75
  3.1 A basic Model of ‘Let’s Share’ Polities .................................... 76
  3.2 Macedonia .............................................................................. 79
    3.2.1 Macedonia as a ‘Let’s Share’ Polity ................................. 81
    3.2.2 Polity Dynamics in Macedonia ....................................... 85
  3.3 Burundi .................................................................................. 94
    3.3.1 Burundi as a ‘Let’s Share’ Polity ..................................... 95
    3.3.2 Polity Dynamics in Burundi .......................................... 100
  3.4 ‘Let’s Share’ Polities: Conclusions ........................................ 111

4 ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities ................................................................ 115
  4.1 A basic model of ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities ............................ 116
  4.2 Democratic Republic of the Congo ......................................... 119
    4.2.1 The DRC as a ‘Doomed to Share’ Polity ......................... 121
    4.2.2 Polity Dynamics in the DRC ........................................ 126
  4.3 Sierra Leone ........................................................................... 140
    4.3.1 Sierra Leone as a ‘Doomed to Share’ Polity .................. 142
    4.3.2 Polity Dynamics in Sierra Leone .................................. 145
  4.4 ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities: Conclusions ............................... 160

5 ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities .................................................. 165
  5.1 A basic model of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities ............... 166
  5.2 Mozambique .......................................................................... 169
    5.2.1 Mozambique as a ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polity ....... 170
    5.2.2 Polity Dynamics in Mozambique ................................... 173
  5.3 El Salvador ............................................................................. 183
    5.3.1 El Salvador as a ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polity ........ 185
    5.3.2 Polity Dynamics in El Salvador .................................... 188
  5.4 ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities: Conclusions .................... 198

6 ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polities ..................................................... 203
  6.1 A basic model of ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polities .................. 204
  6.2 Liberia .................................................................................... 208
    6.2.1 Liberia as a ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polity .................... 210
    6.2.2 Polity Dynamics in Liberia .......................................... 213
## Contents

6.3 Côte D’Ivoire ................................................................. 227
6.3.1 Côte D’Ivoire as a ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polity .............. 228
6.3.2 Polity Dynamics in Côte D’Ivoire ................................ 232
6.4 ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polities: Conclusions .................. 244

7 ‘You Stay Out’ Polities .................................................. 249
7.1 A basic model of ‘You Stay Out’ Polities ............................ 250
7.2 Rwanda ........................................................................ 253
7.2.1 Rwanda as a ‘You Stay Out’ Polity ............................... 256
7.2.2 Polity Dynamics in Rwanda ........................................ 261
7.3 Tajikistan ..................................................................... 276
7.3.1 Tajikistan as a ‘You Stay Out’ Polity .............................. 278
7.3.2 Polity Dynamics in Tajikistan ...................................... 283
7.4 ‘You Stay Out’ Polities: Conclusions ............................... 298

8 Conclusion ...................................................................... 303
8.1 Summary of the Main Findings ...................................... 306
8.2 Caveats and Limitations ................................................ 317
8.3 Implications of the Findings .......................................... 319
8.4 Concluding Remarks .................................................... 323

A Characterization and Classification of the Cases .................. 325
A.1 Afghanistan ................................................................. 328
A.1.1 Country and Conflict Information ............................... 328
A.1.2 Post-conflict Situation ............................................... 331
A.1.3 Assessment ............................................................. 333
A.1.4 Map of Afghanistan ................................................. 334
A.2 Angola ........................................................................ 335
A.2.1 Country and Conflict Information ............................... 335
A.2.2 Post-conflict Situation ............................................... 338
A.2.3 Assessment ............................................................. 342
A.2.4 Map of Angola ......................................................... 344
A.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina ................................................ 345
A.3.1 Country and Conflict Information ............................... 345
A.3.2 Post-conflict situation: .............................................. 347
A.3.3 Assessment ............................................................. 349
A.3.4 Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina ............................... 350
A.4 Burundi .......................................................... 351
A.4.1 Country and Conflict Information ............................... 351
A.4.2 Post-conflict situation ............................................... 354
A.4.3 Assessment ............................................................. 357
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.4.4 Map of Burundi</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.5 Cambodia</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.5.1 Country and Conflict Information</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.5.2 Post-conflict situation</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.5.3 Assessment</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.5.4 Map of Cambodia</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.6 Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.6.1 Country and Conflict Information</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.6.2 Post-conflict situation</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.6.3 Assessment</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.6.4 Map of Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.7 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.7.1 Country and Conflict Information</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.7.2 Post-conflict situation</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.7.3 Assessment</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.7.4 Map of the DRC</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.8 East Timor</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.8.1 Country and Conflict Information</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.8.2 Post-conflict situation</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.8.3 Assessment</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.8.4 Map of East Timor</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.9 El Salvador</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.9.1 Country and Conflict Information</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.9.2 Post-conflict situation</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.9.3 Assessment</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.9.4 Map of El Salvador</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.10 Guatemala</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.10.1 Country and Conflict Information</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.10.2 Post-conflict situation</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.10.3 Assessment</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.10.4 Map of Guatemala</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.11 Haiti</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.11.1 Country and Conflict Information</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.11.2 Post-conflict situation</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.11.3 Assessment</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.11.4 Map of Haiti</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.12 Kosovo</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.12.1 Country and Conflict Information</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.12.2 Post-conflict situation</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.12.3 Assessment</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.12.4 Map of Kosovo</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.13 Liberia</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.13.1 Country and Conflict Information</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.13.2 Post-conflict situation</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.13.3 Assessment</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.13.4 Map of Liberia</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.14 Macedonia</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.14.1 Country and Conflict Information</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.14.2 Post-conflict situation</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.14.3 Assessment</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.14.4 Map of Macedonia</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.15 Mozambique</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.15.1 Country and Conflict Information</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.15.2 Post-conflict situation</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.15.3 Assessment</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.15.4 Map of Mozambique</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.16 Rwanda</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.16.1 Country and Conflict Information</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.16.2 Post-conflict situation</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.16.3 Assessment</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.16.4 Map of Rwanda</td>
<td>459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.17 Sierra Leone</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.17.1 Country and Conflict Information</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.17.2 Post-conflict situation</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.17.3 Assessment</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.17.4 Map of Sierra Leone</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.18 Tajikistan</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.18.1 Country and Conflict Information</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.18.2 Post-conflict situation</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.18.3 Assessment</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.18.4 Map of Tajikistan</td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Detailed Overview of the Typification Process</td>
<td>481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Overview of Conflict Theories</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.1 The Causes of Armed Conflict</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.1.1 Rationalism</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.1.2 Structuralism</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.1.3 Constructivism</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.1.4 Essentialism</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Figures

1.1 Armed Conflict and UN Peacekeeping, 1945-2008 .......................... 4
1.2 Overview of the Research Process .............................................. 17

2.1 Generic Model of Post-Conflict Interactions ................................. 42
2.2 Basic Patterns of Interaction ..................................................... 69
2.3 Possible Patterns of Post-Conflict Interactions ............................ 72

3.1 'Let’s Share’ Polities (simplified illustration) ............................... 77

4.1 'Doomed to Share’ Polities (simplified illustration) ...................... 117

5.1 'Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities (simplified illustration) ............ 167

6.1 'The Winner Took it All’ Polities (simplified illustration) ............... 205

7.1 'You Stay Out’ Polities (simplified illustration) .......................... 251

A.7 Map: Democratic Republic of Confo. Source: United Nations Carto-
graphic Division ................................................................. 383
A.10 Map: Guatemala. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division ..... 405
A.12 Map: Kosovo (Serbia). Source: United Nations Cartographic Division 422
A.14 Map: Macedonia. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division ..... 442
A.15 Map: Mozambique. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division ... 449
A.17 Map: Sierra Leone. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division ..... 472
List of Figures

# List of Tables

1.1 A Typology of Typologies .................................................. 22  
1.2 Criteria for the Universe of Cases ....................................... 30  
1.3 Overview of Post-Conflict Cases .......................................... 31  

2.1 Typology of Post-conflict Polities – compact view ................. 44  
2.2 Overview of the Polity Types ............................................... 62  

3.1 Dynamics of ‘Let’s Share’ polities ...................................... 112  

4.1 Dynamics of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities ............................... 162  

5.1 Dynamics of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities .................... 199  

6.1 Dynamics of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities ....................... 245  

7.1 Dynamics of ‘You Stay Out’ polities .................................... 302  

A.1 Cases and Classification Results ......................................... 327  
A.2 Basic Facts and Figures: Afghanistan .................................... 328  
A.3 Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Afghanistan .................. 330  
A.4 Basic Facts and Figures: Angola ......................................... 335  
A.5 Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Angola ....................... 338  
A.6 Basic Facts and Figures: Bosnia and Herzegovina ................... 345  
A.7 Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Bosnia and Herzegovina .... 347  
A.8 Basic Facts and Figures: Burundi ........................................ 351  
A.9 Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Burundi ....................... 354  
A.10 Basic Facts and Figures: Cambodia .................................... 359  
A.11 Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Cambodia .................... 362  
A.12 Basic Facts and Figures: Côte D’Ivoire ............................... 367  
A.13 Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Côte d’Ivoire ............... 370  
A.14 Basic Facts and Figures: DRC ........................................... 376  
A.15 Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: DRC ......................... 379  
A.16 Basic Facts and Figures: East Timor .................................. 384  
A.17 Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: East Timor .................. 386  
A.18 Basic Facts and Figures: El Salvador ................................. 391
List of Tables

A.19 Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: El Salvador . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
A.20 Basic Facts and Figures: Guatemala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
A.21 Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Guatemala . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
A.22 Basic Facts and Figures: Haiti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406
A.23 Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Haiti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
A.24 Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
A.25 Basic Facts and Figures: Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
A.26 Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
A.27 Basic Facts and Figures: Macedonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
A.28 Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Macedonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438
A.29 Basic Facts and Figures: Mozambique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443
A.30 Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Mozambique . . . . . . . . . . . . 445
A.31 Basic Facts and Figures: Rwanda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450
A.32 Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Rwanda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453
A.33 Basic Facts and Figures: Sierra Leone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
A.34 Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Sierra Leone . . . . . . . . . . . . 464
A.35 Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Tajikistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475
Chapter 1

Introduction

With the rise of civil wars since the end of the Cold War, dealing with post-conflict situations has become a major concern for policy-makers and analysts. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Burundi or Sierra Leone are among the large group countries affected by this upsurge of armed conflict. Libya, where an intense civil war erupted a few weeks before these lines were written, may become the most recent example. All of these countries have been subject to external stabilization attempts, guided by the assumption that they can be transformed into full democracies within a relatively short amount of time. However, plenty of empirical evidence suggests that only a small minority of them successfully makes the transition towards consolidated statehood, whereas the majority exhibits a strong resilience to externally induced change. Countries such as Kosovo, Afghanistan or Liberia illustrate that the legacy of civil war continues to have a strong impact on politics even in the so called ‘post-conflict’ phase. Furthermore, virtually all post-conflict countries have experienced a strong involvement of external actors into domestic governance, which generally continues for years after the conflict has officially come to an end. This often accounts for politics in these countries to differ significantly from ‘ordinary’ democracies.

Despite that, little efforts have been made for comprehending these differences in the past. Post-conflict countries are either simply treated as in-between-stages on the way to western-type statehood or as rather hopeless cases of failed statehood. The goal of this dissertation is to fill this gap in the literature by going beyond existing conceptualizations of post-conflict situations as either failed states or countries in transition to democracy. Comparing a broad set of countries affected by civil wars in the post-Cold War period, it attempts to answer the question how and by whom governmental authority is executed in post-conflict countries and what this implies for their dynamics and development prospects. This results in a focus on the permanent and idiosyncratic features of post-conflict situations rather than on their prospects for becoming established democracies. This shift in perspective is emphasized in this dissertation by the concept of post-conflict polities, which are understood as specific forms of political regimes. The dissertation is an attempt to take stock of the existing variety of post-conflict polities, and for this reason a typology of post-conflict polities is developed and empirically illustrated. Six types of post-conflict polities are distinguished, called ‘Let’s Share’ polities, ‘Doomed to Share’
polities, ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ politicies, ‘The Winner Took it All’ politicies, ‘You Stay Out’ politicies and ‘Benevolent Intrusion’ politicies. Before going into detail about what these politicies signify, this chapter places the topic of this dissertation into a broader context and sheds light on its relevance for either analysts or practitioners of peacebuilding.

1.1 Context and Research Problem

Dozens of countries have been drawn into civil wars since the end of the Cold War. The Balkans were torn apart by ultra-nationalist ideologies, East Timor was devastated by vagabonding Indonesian militias punishing the region for its pro-independence vote, West Africa experienced a series of complex armed conflicts ravaging Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, and Rwanda witnessed an unprecedented genocide killing nearly a million of its inhabitants – to mention only a few examples. All of these conflicts clearly differed from one another with regard to their characteristics and the underlying ‘root causes’, the broader cultural context in which they took place and the degree of international attention they could provoke, along with a multiplicity of other factors. However, in all these cases people sharing the same nationality – or the same passport, at least – were killing each other, more often than not precipitating their countries into chaos and destruction. In the majority of these cases, the international community was involved in bringing an end to the conflict, maintaining ceasefires, providing emergency aid or (re-)building political institutions.

These activities are generally subsumed under the heading post-conflict peacebuilding or statebuilding and can be defined as the effort to “design states that contain the threats to stability posed by arbitrary power and factional conflict and to encourage society to begin conferring legitimacy on the new institutions” (Barnett 2006: 89; see also Fukuyama 2005: 85; Schneckener 2007: 384). Since the end of the Cold War, becoming engaged during or after civil wars has become a frequent activity of the international community. This has been facilitated by at least three developments: a steep increase in the number of civil wars; a qualitative transformation of warfare; and a transformation of the international normative environment:

1 Note that the last type, ‘Benevolent Intrusion’ politicies, is not discussed in this dissertation in detail because it is for the most part identical with the well-established category of cases of transitional administration.

2 The terms peacebuilding and statebuilding are used interchangeably throughout this dissertation, unless explicitly stated otherwise. The reason is that peacebuilding and statebuilding, although analytically distinguishable, have in practice often converged to one dominant paradigm (see e.g. Call 2008; see also Jeong Barnett et al. 2007: 42–43; Barnett and Zürcher 2009; Jeong 2005: 12).

3 Aside from this ‘social engineering’ perspective, the term statebuilding is also used from a historic perspective, which views statebuilding as a long term and often contingent historic process that brought forward the modern nation-state (see e.g. Cramer and Goodhand 2002: 890–892; Krause and Jütersonke 2005). Different aspects of this state-formation process have been portrayed colorfully by Skocpol (1979); Tilly (1985), Spruyt (1994) and others.
First, the developments associated with the end of the Cold War have significantly challenged the world view previously upheld by scholars of International Relations (IR). Before, most of them equated war with *inter*state and in particular great with power wars. It was only after 1989 that IR scholars have begun to acknowledge the importance of *intra*state or civil wars (see Levy 2002: 351; Schlichte 2002). This is reflected in figure 1.1, which depicts the incidence of armed conflict and UN peacekeeping operations in the 1945-2008 period based on data from the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ (version 4-2009) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. A quick glance at the chart indicates that, overall, the incidence of armed conflict has reached its peak shortly after the end of the Cold War, with more than fifty armed conflicts occurring in the early 1990s. Since then it declined steadily to about thirty armed conflicts in early 2000 before exhibiting again a modest upwards trend. The chart furthermore confirms that civil wars have accounted for an ever higher proportion of total wars over time. There were even times in the early 1990s in which *all* wars that occurred were civil wars. We can conclude from this that classical wars have lost a great deal of importance whereas civil wars have become hard to ignore. In response to these developments, the international community’s attention has shifted more and more towards the prevention or resolution of intra-state wars.

Second, aside from the mere increase in the number of civil wars, scholars and policymakers throughout the 1990s increasingly came to the recognition that intra-state warfare poses a potential threat to transnational security in an increasingly integrated world (see Zangl and Zürn 2003: 224–245), accompanied by the perception that warfare has undergone a significant qualitative transformation. The general argument is that the end of the Cold War has altered the opportunity structures in which warfare is carried out, which has effectively fostered the participation of private actors in armed conflicts and eroded the state monopoly on the use of force in parts of the world (see Heupel 2005; Heupel and Zangl 2004: 346; Kaldor 1999; Münkler 2002). Unlike their historical precedents, these ‘new’ wars do not contribute in any sense to the formation of states (as hypothesized by Tilly 1985), but instead promote the emergence of collapsed states, in which violence becomes the dominant characteristic of all kinds of social exchange (Münkler 2002: 135–136; see also Schlichte 2003: 28).

Third, the normative and legal underpinnings that define if and how intervention may legitimately occur have significantly changed since the end of the Cold War (see e.g.

---

4 ‘Internal armed conflict’ and ‘internationalized internal armed conflict’ in the terminology of the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’.

5 The first to make this argument, independently from the end of the Cold War, was Martin van Creveld in his book ‘The Transformation of War’ (1991; see also 2002). For a critique of van Creveld’s interpretation of Clausewitz, see Gantzel (2001; 2002: 8).

6 Note that scholars are divided over the question whether or not the conceptualization of contemporary armed conflicts as new wars is adequate or not. For critical views, see e.g. Gantzel (2002), Schlichte (2006: 548–549) and Ferdowsi and Matthies (2003a: 17–18). Yet, it is undeniable that the ‘new war’ hypothesis had a strong impact on policy-makers and has elevated external actors’ inclination to engage in armed conflicts (see also Levy 1995: 35).
Senghaas 2008: 175–177). Under the leadership of the United Nations a far-reaching re-orientation process was initiated for which Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (United Nations 1992) and the ‘Supplement to an Agenda for Peace’ (United Nations 1995) are generally seen as the starting point (see also Richmond and Franks 2007: 28; Seibel 2008: 503–505). Boutros-Ghali’s call for a more pro-active engagement of the international community in armed conflicts yielded a spectacular echo and has frequently been used as the normative reference point for later attempts to expand the scale and scope of UN peace operations (see e.g. Debiel 2002; Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 10). These ideas were carried further by Boutros-Ghali’s successor Kofi Annan, which is most clearly reflected in the doctrine of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P). It proposes a shift away “from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and external duties” (ICISS 2001, par. 2.14, emphasis original) and implies not only a ‘responsibility to react’, but also a ‘responsibility to prevent’ and a

---

7The Responsibility to Protect was developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty – an independent body mandated by Kofi Annan. Its recommendations had a strong impact on Annan’s attempts to restructure the UN system as embodied most clearly in his 2004 report ‘A more secure world: Our shared responsibility’ (United Nations 2004a, see also Ozgercin and Steinhilber 2005).
1.1 Context and Research Problem

‘responsibility to rebuild’ (par. 2.19). This is the result of a fundamental re-interpretation of sovereignty as it has taken place in the past two decades.\(^8\) Once construed as a principle which clearly demarcates states from the ‘outside’ world (see Krasner 1999; 2001; Walker 1993), the granting of sovereignty is increasingly tied to certain minimum requirements of internal governance (see e.g. Senghaas 2004: 17–20; Zangl and Zürn 2003: 154).\(^9\) This paved the way for proactive and comprehensive external interventions and led the UN Security Council to adopt a “strikingly intrusive interpretation of UN Charter Chapter VII […]”, triggering a “radical expansion in the scope of collective intervention” (Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 1).

In conjunction, these developments gave rise to the emergence of complex peace operations combining civil, political and military components (see Durch 2006: 3). With the notable exception of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), missions going beyond traditional peacekeeping were virtually non-existent before the end of the Cold War (see e.g. Chesterman 2004; Durch 2006: 3; Rondinelli and Montgomery 2005: 16). Terms such as multi-dimensional peace operations, humanitarian interventions, peace enforcement missions, coercive missions, expanded peacekeeping missions or wider peacekeeping missions give a good illustration for the expansion of activities. This ‘new interventionism’ (Caplan 2005: 5–11; Doyle 2001; Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 6–10; Stedman 1992: 3) is clearly reflected in the frequency of post-conflict engagement since the end of World War II (see figure 1.1 on page 4).

More importantly still, it stands for a striking convergence of the goals and strategies that underlie post-conflict engagements. In theory, peacebuilders may dispose of a variety of different tools and strategies when attempting to restore peace in conflict shattered societies. The standard toolbox contains at least four fundamental approaches to post-conflict intervention: a ‘liberalization first’ approach, focusing on democratization, economic reform and world-market integration; a ‘security first’ approach, focusing on strengthening the monopoly of the use of violence; a ‘stateness first’ approach, focusing on strengthening political and administrative structures and the rule of law; and a ‘civil society first’ approach, focusing on improved opportunities for civil society participation (Fukuyama 2004a; 2004b; 2005; Schneckener 2007: 386).

In practice, however, these different strategies have often converged to one dominant peacebuilding approach: the paradigm of ‘liberal peacebuilding’ (or: ‘liberal internationalism’), which has served as the blueprint for all larger peace operations carried out

---

\(^8\)It also reflects a modified understanding of liberalism: away from a ‘liberalism of restraint’ towards the more demanding notion of a ‘liberalism of imposition’ – the latter implying that “comprehensive action is necessary in order to remove the grave obstacles to freedom” (Sørensen 2007: 367). It has also affected the legal position of individuals: by assigning international legal personality to them, the new interpretation of sovereignty has partly turned them into holders of rights, which – as an option of last resort – can be enforced by the international community (see Beck 2005: 9; Chandler 2006a).

\(^9\)As Dieter Senghaas argues, before the end of the Cold War the mere presence of a domestic monopoly of force has long been the sole condition for a state to acquire external sovereignty, regardless of its quality: it could be a “crude” one, as long as it was present (Senghaas 2004: 17–20; Zangl and Zürn 2003: 154).
Chapter 1 Introduction

since the end of the Cold War (see Barnett 2006: 88; Lyons 2004; Ottaway 2002; Paris 1997; 2004). In the formulation of Roland Paris, “[t]he central tenet of this paradigm is the assumption that the surest foundation for peace, both within and between states, is market democracy, that is, a liberal democratic polity and market-oriented economy” (Paris 1997: 56; see also Paris 2004). It is based on the premise that “[a]ll aspects of the state, society, and economy are to be rebuilt around liberal principles” (Barnett 2006: 89; see also Bertram 1995: 391; Chandler 2006a: 477). In particular in the context of weak or dysfunctional statehood, this often also requires to recreate state structures (in the sense of a ‘Weberian’ monopoly of force) in the target countries. In fact, the intervening parties view Western-type statehood as the ‘teleological’ or natural end-point of post-conflict interventions of all kind – based on the assumption that “an externally driven ‘social (re)engineering’ project can accelerate or substitute for a more ‘organic’ historical process of state-building” (Krause and Jütersonke 2005: 451) or that “in more or less short order, targeted states can function effectively on their own” (Krasner 2004: 86–87). In fact, the normative dominance of statehood as the ideal end-point has been so large that it is even considered an ideology (Schlichte 2004). This is reflected in the perception that post-conflict statebuilding processes automatically lead to consolidated statehood in the end. Thomas Carothers called this perspective the ‘transition paradigm’ (2002; see also 2007a; 2007b). Consequently, the paradigm of liberal internationalism also implies that wherever state structures are absent, weak or considered dysfunctional, attempts are made for restoring the monopoly of force and (re)installing a liberal state as the dominant social organization.

The liberal peacebuilding paradigm can hence be characterized by two major claims: that (a) external actors are able to build lasting peace by establishing liberal institutions and (b) that, once triggered, these processes of transition have a natural end-point: a liberal, democratic state. In line with this paradigm, some interventionist states have deliberately

---

10 The main assumption behind the liberal peace project is that liberal institutions foster peace, as emphasized by the democratic peace theory and the numerous empirical tests it brought forward (e.g. Doyle 1983; Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal and Russett 1999; Owen 1994; Russett 1994; Spiro 1994). The roots of this argument can be traced back to Woodrow Wilson (see Chandler 2006a) and to Immanuel Kant (see Doyle 1983; Huntley 1996; Mitchell 2002; Spiro 1994: 52).

11 Note that Paris proposes an alternative approach called institutionalization before liberalization (IBL), which works “by constructing the foundations of effective political and economic institutions before the introduction of electoral democracy and market-oriented adjustment policies” (Paris 2004: 179).

12 Max Weber argued that, due to the multitude of possible ends, a state can only be defined by focusing on the means it employs, and he believed one such means to be constitutive of a state: the monopoly on the legitimate use of force (see Weber [1918] 1988: 505–506). According to Markus Jachtenfuchs the monopoly of force is “not a field of state activity like any other”, but rather “penetrates the core of human existence […] since it has the potential to take away people’s life and freedom” (2005: 38).

13 In this context, Joel Migdal has pointed out that the strong focus on Max Weber has had the effect that scholars have taken his ideal type of statehood for the normal type, which has masked “situations where authority is fragmented and contentious” (Migdal 2001: 14; see also Schlichte 2000). Along a similar line, Klaus Schlichte has pointed out that Weber’s image has influenced theories of the state by “attribut[ing] it with a functional core, namely an apparatus of coercion and control with a capacity of extraction and an ability to set and enforce rules” (2003: 29).
portrayed themselves as liberators of suppressed regimes, although the attempt to mask other, more trivial interests was at times very obvious. For instance, unforgettable are George Bush’s numerous justifications of the Iraq war by the ‘evilness’ of the country’s regime and the duty of the United States to spread democracy, as in a speech entitled ‘End of Major Combat in Iraq’ held in San Diego, California on 1 May 2003:

“We’re helping to rebuild Iraq, where the dictator built palaces for himself, instead of hospitals and schools. And we will stand with the new leaders of Iraq as they establish a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people. The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done. Then we will leave, and we will leave behind a free Iraq.”

However, cases such as Iraq and Afghanistan also illustrate the inherent difficulties of liberal peacebuilding. More generally, whether one considers this paradigm as a success or a failure depends greatly on the standard one applies. Those who believe that maintaining a crude ‘negative’ peace (the end of mutual atrocities) is already a sufficient indicator of success will find that the track record of post-conflict interventions carried out since the end of the Cold War is modestly encouraging. It is often possible to disarm the belligerents and hold elections within relatively short periods. However, in the vast majority of cases, ‘success’ has not gone far beyond that. The establishment of stable, not to speak of accountable and democratic, states – the ultimate goal of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm – succeeded in very few cases. In many cases, the seeming achievements are more ‘virtual’ than real (see e.g. Heathershaw 2009b; Lidén 2009; Lidén et al. 2009; Richmond and Franks 2007). Therefore, those who derive their indicators of success from the actual promises of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm clearly need to be disillusioned by the track-record of post-conflict statebuilding efforts.

1.1.1 Research Problem

The tension described above is at the heart of the contemporary practice of reconstructing war-torn countries and builds the central background for this dissertation. Empirical evidence strongly pulls the success of the classical approach to post-conflict intervention into question. Although some partial achievements could be made in many cases – most often with regard to ending violence – a far-reaching transition to consolidated statehood

---

14 This and other presidential speeches can be found online at: http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/05.01.03.html. Downloaded on 2 January 2010.

15 The distinction between ‘negative peace’ and ‘positive peace’ goes back to Johan Galtung (1969; also 1985).

16 There is a persistent and highly influential myth that about half of all cases of post-conflict intervention relapse into violence within the first five years, which implies that efforts for restoring peace fail in about half of all cases. The figure mainly goes back to the work of Paul Collier (2003: 83). However, as Astri Suhrke and Ingrid Samset (2007) have shown, the actual risk of conflict recurrence is lower: 20 percent within the first four years and about 30 percent within the first five years after the end of a civil war. This puts the effectiveness of peacekeeping and peacemaking endeavors in a much better light.
Chapter 1 Introduction

hardly ever takes place (see e.g. Willett 2005). Most of these problems are not specific to post-conflict environments; they have also been widely discussed, for instance, in the literature on democratic transitions (see Carothers 2002; Diamond 2002; Elster et al. 1998; Linz and Stepan 1996; van de Walle 2002). But in post-conflict countries they are particularly problematic, in part because these countries are notoriously fragile, but in part also because external actors have tended to view them as something like a “blank slate” where new institutions can be built from scratch without caring too much about the historical pedigree of a particular case (Cramer 2006: 14). As Doyle and Sambanis put it, “[s]uccessful peacebuilding is the surprise, not the expectation” (2006: 19).

This indicates that external actors often sharply over-estimate their transformative capacity in the initial phase of post-conflict engagements, only to be surprised a few years later that the expected transition to democratic statehood is faulty and incomplete (see e.g. Krause and Jütersonke 2005). Even in those cases where supposedly legitimate formal-political institutions were ‘successfully’ imposed by outside forces, the conflict parties often continue pursuing goals that are detrimental to the official statebuilding agenda. Examples for this phenomenon abound. A good example are the peacebuilding efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The international community made tremendous efforts for stabilizing the power-sharing arrangement between Joseph Kabila and Jean-Pierre Bemba (along with various other rebel factions) and facilitating democratic elections. Though for years considered to be a comparatively constructive partner, Kabila showed his true face within weeks after the elections by ousting his political opponents, threatening the opposition and introducing a largely undemocratic, authoritarian leadership style (Autesserre 2009; see also sections 4.2 and A.7).

In Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Liberia and Burundi, to mention only a few examples, the problem is similar: besides the existence of a thin and largely powerless layer of democratic rule at the surface, closed networks or clans continue to dominate politics from below that surface. This phenomenon has been discussed under labels such as ‘hybrid regimes’ (Diamond 2002), ‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Schedler 2006), ‘neopatrimonial politics’ (Bratton and van de Walle 1994) ‘warlord politics’ (Reno 1999) or simply ‘failed states’. Although these terms describe slightly different phenomena, their common bottom-line is obvious: triggering processes of transition is tricky and often unsuccessful. At best, partial successes can be achieved, for instance by establishing

---

17 Tobias Debiel and Daniel Lambach come to a similar conclusion: “Experience from case studies confirms that ideal-type models of state-building are never implemented. Instead, we find a great variety of sociopolitical orders and very different development paths in the emergence or non-emergence of statehood” (2009: 22).

18 There was a tremendous wealth of literature of the topic of state failure in recent years (see e.g. Gros 1996; Joseph and Herbst 1997; Krasner 2005; Milliken 2005; Milliken and Krause 2002; Tetzlaff 2003; Yannis 2002). It has triggered a great deal of attention among policy makers, who have identified them as a central source of instability in an increasingly ‘de-nationalized’ world (see also Zangl and Zürn 2003: 172–206).
1.1 Context and Research Problem

new institutions or organizing popular elections. Often, these institutions remain heavily contested and lack a basic level of acceptance or support from the population.

In consequence, the transformational optimism on which the intervening parties have relied in the past is severely challenged by the processes and dynamics on the ground. Despite some attempts by scholars and practitioners to formulate alternative statebuilding models, there is currently no viable alternative in sight on which to base peace operations. For a long time, the international community has been unaware of or ignorant about this problem, which either resulted in lengthy commitments without clear exit strategies (as in Afghanistan or Kosovo), or to a hasty withdrawal amidst an incomplete statebuilding agenda (as in Angola or Liberia during Charles Taylor’s reign). For statebuilding pessimists, this is a proof that the allegedly ‘self-sustaining’ liberal peace is actually the opposite of what it claims to be: it is always at the brink of collapse unless heavy external support is guaranteed throughout the medium and long run. This has produced a vast body of critical literature on the practice of statebuilding, which has raised many important concerns and gave many new impetuses to the discipline.

Out of the conviction that it is necessary to “rethink several core concepts, such as state-building, security, development aid, civil society, sovereignty” (Schwarz 2005: 444), a rising number of works has addressed this problem in the recent past. One example is the conceptualization of post-conflict situations as post-conflict spaces, formulated by Daniel Lambach and David Heathershaw (Heathershaw and Lambach 2008; Lambach 2007). A post-conflict space, in their words, is “a field of power relations where multiple ‘sovereigns’ negotiate rule across multiple spaces of political authority” (Heathershaw and Lambach 2008: 278). Along the same line is Christoph Zürcher’s suggestion to think of post-conflict situations as representing specific “configurations of statehood”, in which different public goods are provided by a division of labor between domestic and external actors (Zürcher 2006: 14). Another set of suggestions is less specific in its focus in that it addresses more generally the study of political authority beyond classical models of statehood. Instead of concentrating on the dysfunctional characteristics of supposedly ‘failed’ states it focuses on the inner dynamics unfolding in these situations. This flows from the observation that

19 Michael Barnett, for instance, has formulated an alternative to the liberal statebuilding model: the paradigm of republican peacebuilding. It emphasizes the role of deliberation in order to allow “space for societal actors to determine for themselves what the good life is and how to achieve it” (2006: 92). A similar approach was also suggested by Carlos Yordán (2009). Another suggestion is to leave the question of institutional design entirely open. Drawing on the work of Karl Popper, Krause and Jütersonke have suggested a “piecemeal engineering” approach to peacebuilding, which confines itself to addressing the “greatest evils” threatening post-conflict societies (2005: 458–459).

20 Some critics are disappointed by the poor track-record of post-conflict statebuilding endeavors and argue in favor of more effective approaches to post-conflict intervention (e.g. Barnett 2006; Call 2008; Paris 2004; Paris and Sisk 2009b). Others raise more fundamental concerns about the practice of post-conflict intervention (for instance Chandler 2006a; 2006b; Duffield 2001: 31–34; Richmond and Franks 2007), and again others propose alternative approaches for achieving a more sustainable post-conflict peace (e.g. Barnett 2006; Lederach 1997; Paris 2004; Roeder and Rothchild 2005). It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to give a comprehensive account of these different branches of critique. For an informative overview see Oliver P. Richmond (2010).
Chapter 1 Introduction

these ‘Areas of Limited Statehood’ are not simply disrupted and anarchical units, but that in most cases there exists some form of governance beyond ordinary state structures, which can at times be unexpectedly effective and functional (Draude 2007; Risse 2007). This has prevented scholars from comprehending that their apparent indicators for success are capturing, at best, ‘virtual’ and largely superficial changes at the surface. Meanwhile, below that surface there is mostly little or no transition taking place.

However, much less has been written about the analytical implications entailed by these compromised statebuilding attempts: given that the goal to build ‘normal’ states often remains elusive, how should such incomplete statebuilding projects be treated analytically? This builds the starting point for this dissertation. It is primarily driven by the following question: If most post-conflict countries are neither phases of transition towards consolidated statehood nor can be regarded (with few exceptions) as the result of concluded processes of statebuilding, then how can we conceive of them at all? This question is primarily an analytical one, but one with direct practical relevance. In recent years, a sharply rising interest in the dynamics unfolding in post-conflict situations could be observed inside and outside academia. A number of policy initiatives during the last years were explicitly established with the aim of addressing the common challenges of post-conflict countries. This is reflected for instance in the creation of a post-conflict unit within the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), or the establishment of a post-conflict Peacebuilding Commission as a new intergovernmental body within the UN system. Inside academia, it seems that some form of reification of post-conflict situations has taken place, which can be observed by the widespread use of the prefix ‘post-conflict’ as an analytical category of its own right in terms like post-conflict countries, post-conflict states, post-conflict territories, post-conflict situations, post-conflict environments, post-conflict settings or post-conflict space(s). The problem of these conceptualizations is their lack of precision and substantive meaning. With the exception of the latter (which was introduced and defined by Heathershaw and Lambach 2008) they are typically used interchangeably and tend to lump different situations together into one large post-conflict category without drawing any further differentiations. This greatly hampers attempts to deal with post-conflict in an analytically adequate manner. As Brown et al. observe, “[t]here is a tendency […] to place countries into a single ‘post-conflict’ category […] [although] it is apparent that post-conflict countries differ in many important respects, and require different policies” (2008: 7). This dissertation attempts to figure out in which respects exactly they differ.

21This term is used by the Berlin-based ‘Collaborative Research Center 700’ in order to refer to territories in which statehood is significantly limited. Using a Luhmanian “equivalence functionalist” approach, the project aims at identifying “non-Western, non-modern solutions to problems in view of certain governance tasks” (Draude2007: 9).
1.1.2 Main Arguments

The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the gap in the literature described above by turning the attention to the phenomenon of hybrid political order\(^{22}\) in post-conflict settings. Countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Kosovo or Cambodia depict characteristics of ‘ordinary’ states but continue to be strongly influenced by their history of armed violence. They have in common that they cannot simply be understood as countries in transition to democracy or consolidated statehood – either because the conflict has produced deep societal wounds which are difficult to heal, or because their *modus operandi* differs markedly from that of more established democracies. However, simply calling them ‘post-conflict countries’ does not help much either because of the vast diversity these cases embody. At first glance, Mozambique – pacified for more than fifteen years and generally considered to be an established democracy – has little in common with the Democratic Republic of the Congo – a country that is by many considered to be the ‘epitome of a collapsed state’ (UCDP 2010a).

In an attempt to go beyond the democracy in transition vs. failed state dichotomy, I suggest to treat post-conflict countries as specific forms of *polities* – political systems that follow their own internal logic and that may be rather resilient to externally induced change. In a second step I suggest to shed light on the differences existing among the broad group of post-conflict countries by drawing a distinction between different *types* of post-conflict polities. In a third step, I analyze what it *implies* for a post-conflict country to belong to a specific post-conflict polity type. The focus here lies on determining how the basic constellation of a certain polity affects the interaction between different post-conflict actors on the ground (and thereby implicitly also their statebuilding prospects, although this is not the primary focus of this dissertation).

The polity-concept puts structural differences between post-conflict situations into the center of attention and then determines how these differences affect the dynamics and interactions between post-conflict actors on the ground. A post-conflict polity is defined as a *specific constellation of interactions and relations among diverse authorities that emerges after the settlement of a civil war*. The concept focuses on the interface between formal and informal structures of authority on the one hand, and between domestic and external claims to power on the other hand.\(^{23}\) For practical purposes, this requires to restrict the analysis to the elite level. Power-elites in post-conflict societies are almost always recruited from the

\(^{22}\)For a definition of this term, see Clements et al.: “‘[H]ybrid political orders’ combine elements of the introduced Western model and elements stemming from local indigenous traditions of governance and politics. Hybrid political orders differ considerably from the modern Western-model state. Governance is carried out by an ensemble of local, national and international actors and agencies. In this environment, state institutions are dependent on the other actors – and at the same time are restricted by them. Hybrid political orders can also be perceived as, or can become, ‘emerging states’” (2007: 50).

\(^{23}\)This perspective shares certain fundamental assumptions with the conception of post-conflict spaces suggested by Heathershaw and Lambach, most importantly as both of them are “guided by the argument that post-conflict spaces cannot be understood as a process (whether positive or negative)” – that is, as a sequence of steps with a clear beginning and a clear end-point (Heathershaw and Lambach 2008: 278).
former warring parties, that is, the former government-side and one or various rebel-groups. Once violence ends, these two antagonistic groups of elites typically continue to compete for political power. Who of them has access to formal governmental power (and who has not) is a crucial factor in the internal dynamics of post-conflict societies. External actors are often heavily intertwined with these dynamics, either because they are trying to impose a certain regime-type onto the target-countries or simply because they try to keep or build a sustainable peace between the belligerents. Thus, the focus lies on the former warring parties, their access to formal or de facto power and the engagement of external actors into these dynamics. Although this requires to fade out many other potentially relevant groups of actors (for instance civil society organizations) and conflates many of the actual dynamics taking place in post-conflict countries, such analytical restriction is necessary for the framework to be applicable to a broad set of cases. As a result, cases such as Liberia, Rwanda or Guatemala can then be understood as specific kinds of political systems rather than anomalies of the state system or deficient democracies.

This new analytical approach builds the basis for drawing a distinction between different types of post-conflict polities. In accordance with the above definition of the post-conflict polity concept, the typology aims at capturing structural differences in the manner authority is generated and executed in post-conflict polities or, in short, different patterns of post-conflict authority. The focus lies on the interface between local post-conflict elites, their struggle for political power and the effect external actors have on these dynamics. The typology developed here aims at offering a better description of the phenomenon of post-conflict situations but not at explaining why post-conflict statebuilding succeeds or fails. Though it relies on certain theoretical assumptions and analytical restrictions, the greater part of the construction process goes back to empirical case-work, most notably a ‘structured, focused comparison’ of 18 post-conflict countries with the aim of extracting different typification criteria. This amounted to a lengthy collection of material, which can be found in appendix section A starting on page 325 (for a detailed overview of the typification process, see also sections 1.2.3 and B). The typology that emerged as the result of this process consists of three analytical dimensions:

The first dimension addresses the distribution of formal authority between the former warring parties in a post-conflict polity. It encompasses two possible categories: sharing and domination. This distinction is generally used as an analytical category in works of comparative politics (for example Lijphart 1999), but it has also sparked a normative controversy about the most suitable distribution of governmental authority for ‘divided societies’ in general (Lijphart 1980) and for post-conflict countries in particular (see e.g. Mehler 2009; Rothchild and Roeder 2005; Spears 2000; 2002; Tull and Mehler 2005). Here, it is used as an analytical category. Sharing describes a situation in which the former opponents in a civil war share governmental power both formally and, at least to some extent, also in effective terms. In contrast, domination describes a situation in which one of the former warring factions (or a coalition of wartime allies) either
enjoys exclusive access to formal governmental authority, or in which it is de facto dominating all members of the government such that power-sharing becomes merely cosmetic (for a more detailed discussion of this dimension, see section 2.2.1). For instance, in Mozambique the government-side during the conflict, FRELIMO (‘Frente de Libertação de Moçambique’), won the first post-conflict elections in 1994 and has since then dominated the government, whereas its main opponent during the civil war, RENAMO (‘Resistência Nacional Moçambicana’), has been thoroughly excluded from access to formal power. In contrast, during the National Transitional Government established after the conclusion of the second civil war in Liberia the various conflict parties have all shared a fraction of governmental power in the post-conflict phase.

The second dimension captures the relations between the warring parties themselves. It is classified as either constructive or obstructive. A constructive relationship can be assumed when both parties appear ready to make concessions in the interest of finding a settlement. The clearest indicator for this is that the parties accept outcomes or stick to past agreements even though they turn out disadvantageous for them. In contrast, an obstructive relationship can be assumed if the major parties do not exhibit any disposition to subordinate their own goals or interest in the name of peace. For instance, in Macedonia the conflict parties adopted a particularly pragmatic stance in the settlement and post-settlement phase of the conflict. Despite persisting tensions both of them depicted a genuine interest in peace. In contrast, the notorious ‘Revolutionary United Front’ in Sierra Leone can at no time during the conflict be regarded as a constructive party. The fact that it has broken virtually all its promises indicates that its support of various peace agreements was merely the result of its pronounced opportunism. However, characterizing a party as obstructive does not necessarily imply that it is always opposed to settlements, but that it only commits to agreements that enhance its bargaining position or leave it unaffected. Clearly, constructive relations are likely to increase the chances for lasting peace, but it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for peace. There are cases where the recurrence of violence could be prevented despite clear signs that the relations are obstructive (for instance Liberia) and there are cases where commitments collapsed despite the presence of constructive relations (for instance Burundi) (for a more detailed discussion of this dimension, see section 2.2).

The third dimension has to do with the manner by which external parties intervene in post-conflict environments. The range of potential dimensions here is large. It could include, for instance, the level of ‘intrusion’ by external parties, organizational characteristics of the peace missions, or the amount of resources devoted to a post-conflict situation – to mention only a few examples. Here, the focus lies on the manner in which external parties (for instance UN peacekeepers, regional peacekeepers or foreign troops) position themselves towards the former warring parties. It comprises three possible categories: mediatative, partisan and supreme intervention. Mediatative intervention implies that external actors are, by and large, intervening in a non-discriminative manner, that is, they attempt to reconcile
between the former belligerents without openly taking sides. Partisan intervention is present when external systematically and intentionally take sides for one of the warring parties and discriminate against the other(s), in the extreme case by fighting them militarily. Supreme intervention implies that external parties become themselves the sovereign in a post-conflict polity, thereby positioning themselves above the warring factions (for a more detailed discussion of this dimension, see section 2.2). Cases such as Mozambique Macedonia, where external actors have no particular ties with any of the conflict parties and in which they would in general accept both of them as heading the government, are examples for mediative external engagement. By contrast, Afghanistan and – on a less extreme scale – Rwanda and Tajikistan are examples in which external actors have strong objections against some of the former conflict parties (the Taliban in the case of Afghanistan or the génocidaires in the case of Rwanda). In all of these cases, they systematically and intentionally support the incumbent regime and its efforts to keep the opposition out of the government. Finally, Kosovo or East Timor are the prime examples for cases in which external actors intervened in a supreme manner, i.e. by placing themselves above the conflict parties.

In conjunction, these three dimensions yield the aforementioned six types of post-conflict polities. First, cases in which the former warring parties share formal governmental power, maintain comparatively constructive relations and in which external actors are engaged in a mediated manner; so called ‘Let’s Share’ polities. Macedonia and Burundi fall under this category, discussed in detail in chapter three. Second, cases identical to the former type, with the only difference that a basic consensus between the former warring parties about the distribution of formal authority is lacking; so called ‘Doomed to Share’ polities. Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) fall under this category, discussed in chapter four. Then there are cases in which one of the former warring parties dominates the government while the other(s) are effectively excluded from access to formal authority. The third type are cases of formal-political domination in which the excluded parties gave their consent to the distribution of formal authority and in which external actors are engaged in a mediative manner, so called ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities. Mozambique and El Salvador fall under this category, discussed in chapter five. The fourth type differs from the third only with respect to the relations of the former warring factions. The excluded party contests its own exclusion from power; a basic consensus about the distribution of formal authority is lacking. This type is called ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities. Liberia (after Charles Taylor’s victory in the 1997 elections) and Côte d’Ivoire form part of this type, which is discussed in chapter six. The fifth type is identical to the fourth, with the only difference that external actors are engaged in a partisan rather than a mediative manner. Instead of trying to mitigate the tensions between the former warring parties, they openly take side for the party in power and – directly or indirectly – assist it in its attempts perpetuate the exclusion of its opponents. These cases are called ‘You Stay Out’ polities. Rwanda and Tajikistan are discussed as notable
1.2 Methods and Research Design

Examples of this type in chapter seven. The sixth type, finally, contains cases in which external actors themselves become the supreme authority in a post-conflict polity. They are called ‘Benevolent Intrusion’ polities in the context of this dissertation. This type is already well-established in the literature on post-conflict interventions; therefore it is not discussed in detail here. However, some cases that fall under this category, notably Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor can be found in the appendix.

Overall, the post-conflict polity perspective and the systematic classification of post-conflict polity cases into a typology of post-conflict countries has a number of advantages over existing conceptualizations. Most importantly, classifying a broad set of post-conflict cases into relatively few types of post-conflict polities allows analysts and practitioners to significantly reduce real-world complexity without necessarily oversimplifying. This enables readers to recognize commonalities between cases hitherto believed to be rather diverse. For instance, it might at first glance appear fruitless to compare post-genocide Rwanda with post-conflict Tajikistan. Yet, as argued in chapter seven, both of these cases fall under the ‘You Stay Out’ polity type, in which external actors are engaged in a partisan manner on behalf of the incumbent regime and in which the tensions between the government and the (thoroughly excluded) opposition remain relatively tense. In addition, the typology forces decision-makers to recognize the hybrid character of most post-conflict states. Analysts have emphasized in recent years that “[r]ecognising the hybridity of political order should be the starting point for any endeavours that aim at conflict prevention, development and security” (Clements et al. 2007: 50). Therefore, the shift in perspective advocated in this dissertation may, in turn, be the starting point for improving both the acceptance and the effectiveness of future post-conflict interventions.

1.2 Methods and Research Design

The remainder of this introduction deals with the ‘mechanics’ of this dissertation. The following two sections give an overview of the research process (1.2.1), the methodological background for the construction of the typology (1.2.2), the process of typology construction (1.2.3), the operationalization of some key concepts (1.3) and, finally, the empirical cases that form the background of this dissertation (1.4). This discussion clarifies many issues and answers many questions that may come up later in the dissertation. However, since it is not essential for following the main line of argument, the impatient reader is free to jump directly to the detailed discussion of the typology and its different dimensions in chapter two.

1.2.1 Research Process and Structure of the Dissertation

Using a broad brush, the research process consisted of six main steps: (1) defining and operationalizing the concept of post-conflict polities, (2) distinguishing the ‘universe of cases’ that matches these definitions, (3) selecting appropriate cases for the further empirical
Chapter 1 Introduction

(1) collecting relevant background information on these cases, (5) developing the
typology and classifying the cases, (6) characterizing the types and identifying empirical
regularities. For most of them, various sub-steps and sometimes even different research
methodologies can be distinguished. Figure 1.2 on page 17 provides a more detailed
overview of the different steps involved.

The definition of the post-conflict polity concept (step one) is based on a review of
theoretical literature about post-conflict situations and the practice of post-conflict recon-
struction contained in the introduction and the subsequent section. The insights gained
from this analysis contributed to the analytical framework for the analysis of post-conflict
situations developed in section 2.1. This analytical framework can be regarded as a sub-
stantive definition of the post-conflict polity concept. In the next step, this was transformed
into an operational definition of post-conflict polities – that is, concrete criteria for deciding
if a particular case should be included into the analysis or dropped (step two). The result of
this process can be found in section 1.3. These criteria were then applied to a quantitative
dataset on armed conflicts, the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’, for identifying rele-
vant cases (step three). The criteria and the resulting list of cases can be found in section
1.4. The next step (step four) was to characterize these cases on the basis of the analytical
framework. More specifically, it required collecting some basic information on the coun-
tries’ recent history, conduct a background research on the armed conflicts that occurred
in these cases in the period under investigation and to distinguish relevant post-conflict
episodes for each of the cases. The results of this process form the empirical background
for the typology and can be found in section A in the appendix. The construction of the
typology itself (step five) was a process that involved both deductive (finding suitable
analytical dimensions on which to base the typology) and inductive analysis (extracting
abstract analytical dimensions from the empirical material), as described in more detail in
the next section. This led to the final step in the research process: empirically illustrating
the different types and carving out regularities that can be attributed to the overall polity
constellation of a certain case. The results can be found in chapters three to seven.

1.2.2 Typification as a Research Method

This dissertation is based on various different social-scientific methods. Since a large part
of the work consisted of comparing different empirical cases, the ‘comparative method’
(Lijphart 1971) certainly played a central role for the writing of this dissertation. The
characterization and classification of the different cases contained in the appendix roughly
followed what George and Bennett (2004) call a ‘structured, focused comparison’. How-
ever, the central methodology was without any doubt ‘the method’ of typification. I used
quotation marks here in order to underline that there is hardly any method of typification
in the singular. Typification should rather be seen as an umbrella term for a broad and het-
erogeneous and sometimes even contradictory set of methods. The following sections shed
a brief light on typologies in general and some of the controversies revolving around their
## 1.2 Methods and Research Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Step</th>
<th>Research Activity</th>
<th>Location in the Book</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Puzzle/Research Question</strong></td>
<td><em>How can we understand this phenomenon?</em></td>
<td>Chapter 1&lt;br&gt;Chapter 2.1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Framework of Analysis</strong></td>
<td><em>Framework of Analysis</em></td>
<td>Chapter 2.1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>To which cases does that apply?</em></td>
<td><em>Defining Criteria</em></td>
<td>Chapter 1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Universe of Cases</strong></td>
<td><em>Taxonomy of selected Cases</em></td>
<td>Appendix B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>What are crucial differences between them?</em></td>
<td><em>Compression/ Expansion</em></td>
<td>Appendix B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preliminary Typology 1</strong></td>
<td>*Classifying 19 Cases (‘short stories’)</td>
<td>Appendix A&lt;br&gt;Chapter 2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>How can this be generalized to other cases?</em></td>
<td><em>In-depth characterization of the types</em></td>
<td>Chapter 2.3&lt;br&gt;Chapters 3–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preliminary Typology 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Appendix A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Which cases fit into which category?</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter 2.3&lt;br&gt;Chapters 3–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Heuristic Typology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter 2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>What is characteristic for the types?</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter 2.3&lt;br&gt;Chapters 3–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Empirically Grounded Typology</strong></td>
<td><em>Identifying empirical Regularities</em></td>
<td>Chapters 3–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>How does the polity-type affect the dynamics?</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chapters 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.2: Overview of the Research Process
Chapter 1 Introduction

use, before the specific goals of the typology constructed in the context of this dissertation are highlighted.

a) On the Use of Typologies in the Social Sciences

Typologies are a classical analytic tool for social inquiry. The probably best-known typology in the political sciences goes back to Aristotle’s distinction of various political regime types. More recent examples include Max Weber’s distinction between different types of leadership (Weber [1922] 2006), Arend Lijphart’s work on Patterns of Democracy (Lijphart 1999), or Peter Hall’s and David Soskice’s work on Varieties of Capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001). Despite being in use for so long, typification has remained a somewhat ambiguous methodology and typologies are frequently scrutinized as ‘unscientific’, overly simplifying or incomplete. Also, scholars aiming at the construction of typologies often are under high pressure to justify why they engage in the construction of typologies. Arend Lijphart calls this the ‘so what’ question, which he, as the author of his well-known typology of democratic systems (Lijphart 1999), faced himself.²⁴ Out of these reasons, it is necessary to discuss a few methodological issues related to the construction of typologies.

In the most general sense, typologies can be understood as attribute or property spaces (Bailey 1994: 9; Barton 1955; Lazarsfeld 1962), or more precisely as “the selection of a certain number of combinations of groups of variables” (Capecchi 1968: 9). Unlike ‘factor-centered’ research designs – which focus on individual explanatory factors – typologies always look at clusters of at least two dimensions or variables (see also Winch 1947). Ideally, the different types or classes emerging from typologies fulfill two conditions: they are both exhaustive and mutually exclusive. This means (a) that all instances belonging to the group of objects to which the typology refers – be it people, countries, fruits or cars – can be subsumed under one class of the typology (exhaustiveness), and (b) that the classes must not be overlapping (mutual exclusivity) (see Bailey 1994: 3). Following Bailey, any typology should further seek to maximize both internal homogeneity (i.e. the objects forming part of the same type should be as similar as possible) and external heterogeneity (i.e. the different types should be as different as possible) – always with regard to the dimensions measured (1994: 1–2; see also Kluge 2000). In other words, typologies can be understood as a combination of attributes that allows a meaningful distinction between different classes (types) of a particular phenomenon.

Typologies have unique advantages (but also some marked disadvantages) when compared with other methodological approaches.²⁵ As George and Bennett point out, the advantages lie in their “ability to address complex phenomena without oversimplifying, clarify similarities and differences among cases to facilitate comparisons, provide a comprehensive inventory of all possible kinds of cases, incorporate interactions effects, and

²⁴With respect to Lijphart’s work, this question is about the following: “[D]oes the type of democracy make a difference for public policy and for the effectiveness of government?” (1999: xii).

²⁵For a short discussion of advantages and disadvantages see also Bailey (1994: 11–16).
1.2 Methods and Research Design

draw attention to ‘empty cells’ or kinds of cases that have not occurred and perhaps cannot occur” (2004: 233). Typification further allows us to reduce real-world complexity, identify similarities and differences that were so far invisible and to conceptualize given phenomena in a new and more refined manner (Bailey 1994: 12–14, see also Lauth 2009: 154). However, the construction or use of typologies can also entail some marked dangers or disadvantages. Sartori pointed to the problems of ‘conceptual traveling’ (in how far can existing concepts be applied to new cases?) and ‘conceptual stretching’ (in how far can new empirical findings be associated with pre-existing types even if they do not perfectly match them?) that are particularly acute in the context of typologies (Sartori 1970: 1033–1036; see also Lauth 2009: 155). Associated with this are the risks of reification and ‘puzzle relabeling’ that may emerge with the use of typologies: it is tempting to impose the logic of certain theoretically derived or heuristic types on actual empirical cases and thereby ‘reify’ a theoretically formed concept, or to simply relabel an existing problem or puzzle by the use of seemingly new types (see Elman 2005: 320 and Bailey 1994: 16).

The use of typologies has given rise to profound mistrust among parts of the academic community against their application as a systematic research methodology. They persistently carry a reputation as being “rather mysterious” methodological tools (Bailey 1994: 1; see also Kluge 2000 and Elman 2005: 296). This is in part confirmed by authors of typologies themselves, who tend to highlight the poor methodological underpinnings of typification methods and sometimes portray them as ‘underdeveloped’ research tools (see e.g. Elman 2005). This stems, on the one hand, from the large diversity of tasks for which typologies are used, which contributes to a vast array of different kinds of typologies. Thinking only of ideal, real, empirical, explanatory, constructed, classificatory, descriptive, extractive, heuristic, existential or normative types – and this is not the end of the spectrum – gives a vivid illustration for the potential confusion stemming from the use of typologies. On the other hand, the seemingly primitive character of typologies in comparison to more ‘advanced’ methodologies is certainly also propelled by the fact that most typologies indeed are non-scientific. Organizing empirical phenomena into different types constantly occurs during everyday life, and most of the terms and concepts we naturally use are in fact the result of implicit or explicit typologies – so called ‘folk-typifications’ (McKinney 1969). Hence, typification is much less a method than a universal analytical activity that is implicitly or explicitly involved in all kinds of cognitive processes (see Bailey 1994: 1).

As a consequence of the mistrust and general confusion revolving around typologies in the social sciences, a self-imposed degree of analytical rigidity is particularly important for authors of typologies. As a starting point, researchers interested in their practical use typically begin by explicitly stating the purpose and nature of their typology, which often amounts the construction of yet another ‘typology of typologies’ in order to relate the own typology to other forms. The drawback, obviously, is that this “wastes time much better
Chapter 1 Introduction

spent on substantive research” (Elman 2005: 294). However, it indeed often helps to clarify (even for the researcher) what the ultimate nature of the typology is. Therefore, it appears necessary to ‘recreate’ some central thoughts on typologies here, too. This is done in the following section, where another ‘typology of typologies’ is presented.

b) A Typology of Typologies

In the context of this work, the necessity to formulate yet another ‘typology of typologies’ stems from a feeling of dissatisfaction about how different kinds of typologies are typically distinguished. As indicated above, typologies can fulfill many different purposes and can be constructed by different techniques. These two aspects – the manner in which a typology is derived and its actual purpose – are two distinct features that should be kept apart from one another but that are unfortunately often conflated.

Backing this claim requires some elaboration about the nature of these two dimensions. The first dimension deals with the way by which the typology is derived. In principle, this can be done either through empirical observation (inductive) or logical deduction (deductive) – a distinction that goes back to the so called ‘heuristic-empirical’ divide (Bailey 1973: 18) so prominently discussed in the methodological literature on typologies. A common vocabulary to differentiate these terms is lacking. Inductive typologies are referred to as empirical, descriptive, classificatory or extractive typologies and sometimes also as taxonomies (see e.g. Bailey 1994; Elman 2005; Lehnert 2007). In contrast, deductive typologies are referred to as abstract, ideal, heuristic or explanatory typologies (see e.g. Capecchi 1968; Elman 2005; Lehnert 2007; Winch 1947). The second dimension has to do with the purpose of the typology. Typologies in the social sciences often aim at either describing or explaining a certain phenomenon. This reflects the two fundamental goals of social sciences as they can, for instance, be found in King et al.: descriptive and causal inference (1994: 34). Descriptive inference, according to them, aims at “infer[ring] information about unobserved facts from the facts we have observed” (1994: 34). For instance, when we are able to classify someone we observe as, say, a choleric person by making use of a pre-existing typology, we can infer many more characteristics about him than the ones we have actually observed. Causal inference, in contrast, generally aims at establishing cause-effect relationships between independent and dependent variables (King et al. 1994: 76). Typologies can be used for causal inference when they establish a link between the type of a phenomenon (i.e. the box in which the phenomenon can be located) and a specific outcome. Unlike in factor or variable-centered research designs, where the aim is generally to isolate the independent effect of a specific explanatory variable,

26Capecchi’s ‘typology of typologies’, for example, is extremely helpful for mapping the varieties of existing typologies, but with its seven dimensions overly complex for researchers seeking guidance in the construction of a typology.

27For an informed review of different kinds of causal explanation see in particular Brady (2002).
1.2 Methods and Research Design

typologies can necessarily only demonstrate the combined effect of the different variables upon which it relies (see Lehnert 2007).  

The problem, now, is that many writings on typologies implicitly seem to assume that deductively derived typologies always aim at explanation, while inductively arrived typologies are limited to description.  

In other words, a typology’s purpose often is conflated with the way the typology is derived – although those are two entirely different things. Here, it is argued that it is necessary to distinguish these two aspects. In principle, nothing speaks against using an inductively constructed typology for explaining, or using a deductively arrived typology for describing something. In other words, a typology’s purpose depends on the logic of inference one is trying to establish and is not already determined by the way the typology was constructed. Combining these two dimensions into a small two-by-two matrix generates four possible types of typologies, as depicted in table 1.1. The cells on the left hand side contain those typologies that aim at establishing descriptive inference. Of these, the upper-left cell contains inductively derived typologies, which are simply called taxonomies here. They attempt to shed light on the question by which clusters of attributes a phenomenon is structured. The lower-left cell captures deductively derived typologies that aim at establishing descriptive inference. They are called property spaces (Elman 2005) here and aim at answering the question by which combinations of attributes a phenomenon could be structured. The right-hand side of the table contains those typologies that aim at establishing causal inference. These typologies generally are constructed for the purpose of explaining a certain outcome of interest and therefore typically contain at least one dependent variable. But, again, these typologies may be derived both inductively and deductively. The upper right cell contains inductively derived typologies aiming at establishing causal inference; they are called explorative typologies here. The relevant question is how different clusters of attributes are linked to the outcome of interest. The lower right cell captures typologies that aim at explanation and are derived deductively. They are called explanatory typologies and focus on the question what outcome we can expect from different combinations of groups of variables.

This distinction is relevant for the typology of post-conflict polities, because the construction of the latter involved various steps that each led to the creation of a different temporary typology. Locating these steps in the above framework helps to understand their distinct purposes and limitations. However, the four types of typologies outlined above implicitly suggest a clear-cut divide between inductive and deductive ways for deriving

---

28 The most well-known illustration of the practical use of this technique stems from Elman (2005; 2009). Using the example of Stephen Walt’s ‘balance of threat’ theory, John Mearsheimer’s theory of ‘offensive structural realism’ and Randall Schweller’s neoclassical ‘balance-of-interests’ theory, Elman intends to illustrate a number of techniques for refining explanatory typologies as well as some potentials perils and pitfalls associated with the use of typologies in the social sciences.

29 For instance, what Lehnert (2007) calls ideal (deductive) and extractive (inductive) typologies is synonymous to what Elman (2005) calls explanatory and descriptive/classificatory typologies, respectively. It is hence implicitly assumed that deductively arrived typologies always aim at explaining social phenomena and inductively derived typologies at describing social phenomena.
Chapter 1 Introduction

Logic of inference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method of Construction</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(more) inductive</td>
<td>Taxonomy</td>
<td>Explorative Typology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(more) deductive</td>
<td>Property Space</td>
<td>Explanatory Typology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1: A Typology of Typologies

A typology. In most cases, the construction of typologies is rarely completely inductive or completely deductive. The two categories must rather be seen as the end-points of a continuum. In practice these two procedures are almost always intermingled to some degree. Even the most inductive researcher necessarily has a system of concepts in mind (McKinney calls them ‘folk-typifications’) by which she structures reality. By the same token, most ‘pre-existing’ analytical categories are in some sense linked to prior experience. Thus, whether a typology is constructed inductively or deductively is a gradual rather than a categorical question, and sometimes both approaches can be combined fruitfully. In this sense, the types identified above can be regarded as ideal types – that is, types that can only be matched to a certain degree in reality, but never fully.

1.2.3 The Process of Typology Construction

As stated in the previous section, any researcher attempting to construct a typology should first of all make a choice with regard to the purpose of that endeavor: does the typology aim at describing or explaining a certain phenomenon? The purpose of the typology of post-conflict polities developed here is clearly about description. Since there is no systematic distinction with regard to different patterns of post-conflict authority, the aim is to construct one. As Bailey highlights, “[c]lassification is the premier descriptive tool” and the main advantage of typologies lies in their ability to “provide an exhaustive and perhaps even definitive array of types” by which cases can be classified (Bailey 1994: 12). The process of constructing the typology in this dissertation was multi-faceted and relied on both deductive reasoning and empirical research. The procedure roughly followed a four-stage model for constructing so called ‘empirically grounded’ typologies formulated by Susann Kluge. In an attempt to formulate a generic procedure for the construction of typologies, she proposes the following four steps: (1) establishing relevant analytical dimensions, (2) classifying cases and analyzing empirical regularities, (3) analyzing the context/ coherence of the classes and reducing them into materially relevant types, (4) characterizing the types in an empirically rich manner (1999: 260–288; see also Kelle

30In German: “Stufenmodell empirisch begründeter Typenbildung” (Kluge 1999).
1.2 Methods and Research Design

and Kluge 2010: 91–107; Kluge 2000). The procedure chosen here loosely followed this procedure:

1. **Deriving a taxonomy of post-conflict polities:** The first step involved in the construction of the typology of post-conflict polities was to identify relevant analytical dimensions on which the further work could be based. With this in mind, an empirical analysis on a subset of cases\(^{31}\) contained in the universe of cases followed (see 1.3). Based on the framework of analysis (see 2.1.2), the purpose was to identify clusters of cases depicting fundamentally different characteristics with regard to the interactions unfolding between the former warring parties, external actors and the formal government. The end-product of this process was, in the above terminology, a taxonomy of post-conflict polities containing a number of implicit analytical dimensions.

2. **Formulating a property space and classifying cases:** The goal of the second step was to extract those analytical dimensions implicitly contained in the taxonomy yielded in step one and rearrange them into a property space in the name of the above typology. This process was a truly retroductive\(^{32}\) activity that involved both inductive and deductive reasoning. The starting point was a study of theoretical literature on post-conflict settings with the aim of identifying possible analytical dimensions (an analytical toolbox) relevant for characterizing post-conflict authority. The end result of this step comes closest to what is called a property space in table 1.1 above. As required by methodological writings on the topic, this property space should ideally establish classes that are both mutually exclusive and exhaustive, that is, each potential polity case should fit into one (and only one) box of the property space.\(^{33}\) This property space was then used as the basis for classifying a broad set of cases contained in the universe of cases. However, the careful classification of the cases required a somewhat detailed knowledge of the respective conflict and post-conflict contexts that cannot readily be found in qualitative or quantitative databases. In an effort to make the classification of the cases as transparent as possible, a detailed analysis of the background of all cases was therefore carried out, amounting to hundreds of pages of empirical material. These reports can be found in appendix A, beginning on page 325.

3. **Formulating semantically meaningful types:** The property space formulated in step two is a map listing possible classes of post-conflict polities and associating different

\(^{31}\)It included the following cases (in alphabetical order): Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Côte d’Ivoire, East Timor, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone.

\(^{32}\)This term goes back to Charles Ragin (1994), who introduced it in order to denote research strategies that rely on a sequential application of both inductive and deductive methods. A similar concept underlies Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of progressive and regressive methods of phenomenology (see e.g. Smith 1979).

\(^{33}\)The result of this process is presented in section 2.2, for more information on the process of compression and expansion, see section B in the appendix.
empirical cases with them. However, this is not yet the same as deriving semantically meaningful types of post-conflict polities. It was hence necessary to condense the property space such that it contains (a) only those types that are internally coherent, and (b) those types that actually appear in the real world. This became possible through a process of both logical and empirical compression and expansion (Elman 2005) (or, in Lazarsfeld’s (1937) classical terminology, as a process of substruction and reduction). Logical compression implies erasing all cells that appear logically inconclusive, whereas logical expansion implies adding classes based on an abstract combination of the different analytical dimensions. By the same token, empirical compression means erasing cells that do not appear in the real world, while empirical expansion is about adding meaningful classes for those cases that are not adequately represented by an existing property space (see Elman 2005). At the end of this process stood a typology consisting of six types of post-conflict polities, which is depicted in table 2.1 on page 44. In the above typology of typologies, this would be located somewhere between ‘taxonomies’ and ‘property spaces’. (For more detailed information on the process of compression and expansion, see section B in the appendix).

4. Characterizing the types: The final step in the establishment of the typology aimed at a rich empirical characterization of the types. When looking only at the boxes of the refined property space, we do not learn much about the different types. The boxes tell us little about the common characteristics and specific dynamics of the cases they comprise. What does it mean for Côte d’Ivoire to be classified as a ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity? What can be inferred from this knowledge about other instances of this type? The interest here lies primarily on those common dynamics that can be interpreted as specific polity characteristics.

At the end of this chain stands a property space that consists of the three analytical dimensions described above: the distribution of executive power between the former belligerents (power-sharing vs. domination), the relations between the former warring parties (constructive vs. obstructive) and the manner by which external actors are engaged in a post-conflict polity (mediative vs. partisan vs. supreme). All of these dimensions are measured in a categorical manner, i.e. they only include two or – in one case – three categories. For the distribution of executive power, for example, this implies that the cases are put in one of the two boxes ‘power-sharing’ or ‘domination’, whereas the degree of power-sharing or domination is not measured. This, obviously, is a very rough measure that conflates many of the differences existing within the category of power-sharing itself (for instance: is power-sharing a constitutional requirement or an ad hoc measure imposed

34However, although these cases do not form part of the actual empirically grounded typology, the classes erased because they do not occur in the real world should still be retained in the property space since they could potentially occur at some point in the future.
1.3 Operationalizing Key Concepts

George and Bennett have pointed out that “the cases in a given study must all be instances [. . .] of only one phenomenon” (George and Bennett 2004: 69). This can be achieved by explicitly defining the ‘universe of cases’ before conducting any empirical analysis. In order to do so in the context of this dissertation, it is necessary to operationalize the key concepts on which this dissertation is based – most notably the post-conflict polity concept. This requires to address three separate but interrelated questions: what counts as an armed conflict, what counts as a post-conflict situation, and what qualifies any given post-conflict situation as a potential post-conflict polity case?

1.3.1 Operationalizing Armed Conflicts

‘What is a civil war and how do I recognize one if I see it?’ This question is not always easy to answer. In general, a civil war can be understood as a specific type of armed conflict. Not all conflicts are armed; the majority of conflicts proceeds peacefully and leads to constructive outcomes (Bonacker and Imbusch 2006: 67; Cramer 2006; Kriesberg 2002). Whether or not conflicts turn violent depends, among other things, on the existence of social institutions designed for mitigating them (see Koehler and Zürcher 2003). In the greater part of the world, and in the non-OECD context in particular, such institutions are only partially present or are lacking entirely, which increases the risk of conflicts becoming

---

35 On the aspect of dichotomous vs. continuous coding see in particular Collier and Adcock (1999).
36 As Dieter Senghaas reminds us, conflict is inherent to all kinds of human interaction – even if we apply a ‘best-case anthropology’ (1994: 18). Also Miall et al note that conflict is an “intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social change” (1999: 4). For a systematic comparison of different conflict definitions, see Putnam (2006).
Chapter 1 Introduction

Conflicts that become violent are classified according to their intensity. The highest level of intensity for an armed conflict is war, which is traditionally defined by International Relations scholars as “large-scale organized violence between politically defined groups” (Levy 2002: 351). Void of much substantive meaning, the understanding of this definition depends on the interpretation of the terms ‘large-scale’, ‘organized’ and ‘politically defined’. The Correlates of War (COW) project (Sarkees and Schafer 2000; Singer 1972; Small and Singer 1982) – the oldest and most widely used dataset on armed conflict – has originally defined war as “sustained combat between/among official military contingents involving substantial casualties” (see Sarkees and Schafer 2000: 124). Civil wars are defined by the same project as wars that are “fought against the regime of a state member” in which four additional criteria are met: “(a) military action was involved, (b) the central government at the time was actively involved, (c) effective resistance (as measured by the ratio of fatalities of the weaker to the stronger forces) occurred on both sides, and (d) at least 1,000 battle deaths resulted during the civil war” (Sarkees and Schafer 2000: 129). However, rigidly applying these criteria to existing cases is not always easy. As Nicholas Sambanis notes, “too many cases are sufficiently ambiguous to make coding the start and end of the war problematic and to question the strict categorization of an event of political violence as a civil war as opposed to an act of terrorism, a coup, genocide, organized crime, or international war” (2004: 815). In addition to that, the standard definition of civil wars has been considered unsatisfactory, since armed conflicts below the level of a war may still have far-reaching effects. This gave rise to a number of alternative datasets, most notably the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ (Gleditsch et al. 2002), which is by now the second most frequently used dataset on armed conflict. It generally defines armed conflict as

“a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” in one calendar year (UCDP and PRIO 2008: 1).

Modern, pluralistic and politicized societies as they first emerged in Western Europe dispose of a dense web of such institutions – for example a state monopoly of power, the rule of law or democratic participation – that interdependently support peaceful ways of conflict transformation (see Senghaas 1994: 17–30).

Thereby, they have effectively reproduced the discipline’s bias towards interstate wars (see Eberwein and Chojnacki 2001: 2; Levy 2002: 351; Sarkees and Schafer 2000: 124–135). This is striking, as wars taking place within states have by far outnumbered those taking place between states ever since the end of World War II (see also page 3).

This strongly resembles the definition used by Doyle and Sambanis, who additionally require that fighting is “relatively continual”, that it “takes place within the country’s boundaries”, and that “the rebels must recruit mostly locally, controlling some part of the country’s territory” (2006: 31).

In the UCDP/ Prio terminology, conflicts in which the number of battle deaths observed in one calendar year falls between 25 and 999 are called “minor armed conflicts” if the total number of battle deaths observed over the course of the conflict remains below 1,000 and “intermediate armed conflicts” if the total number of battle deaths lies above 1,000. Those conflicts in which 1,000 battle deaths or more were reached in one calendar year alone are called “wars” (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 619).
Lowering the threshold of violence from 1,000 to 25 has a number of advantages. Although it still is an arbitrary figure, the risk of excluding salient cases that fall short of the threshold is much lower. The conflict in Haiti is a case in point: although coded as a ‘minor armed conflict’ in the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’, it triggered tremendous international attention and led to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission (MINURCAT). The same holds true, for instance, for the conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire or Macedonia. Out of these reasons, the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ (in the version 4-2009) was used here as the basis for identifying relevant cases of civil wars, defined as *intra-state conflicts* in the dataset.

### 1.3.2 Operationalizing Post-Conflict Situations

Deciding what counts as a post-conflict situation is intimately linked to a prior definition of armed conflicts. However, a post-conflict situation is not necessarily synonymous with the absence of conflict but represents a significant reduction of conflict activity, mostly accompanied by some sort of settlement (a ceasefire, peace-agreements, secession, etc). Because of this ambiguous meaning of the term ‘post-conflict’, some scholars prefer the term ‘post-settlement’ instead (see van der Du Toit 2003; Miall et al. 1999). However, for pragmatic reasons it still makes sense to speak of post-conflict situations – most notably because this term continues to be widely used in academic and policy debates.

In general, the termination of an internal armed conflict is the starting point for any post-conflict situation. There are many reasons why an armed conflict can be considered terminated – including peace or ceasefire agreements and one-sided victories among the most important ones. But some conflict simply end by conflict inactivity. Since this does not delineate the conflict from the post-conflict period clearly enough, those cases in which the conflict ended out of a mere conflict inactivity were excluded from the analysis. Related to that, the question emerged how long (or based on which criteria) a country continues to be characterized as a post-conflict situation. For practical reasons, most analysts of post-conflict situations additionally use a five-year criterion in order to define the end of a post-conflict period (see e.g. Elbadawi 2008; Suhrke and Samset 2007; Zürcher 2006). Here, such an arbitrary criterion is not applied. The reason is simply that countries differ too strongly in their rate of post-conflict development. Some countries are able to leave the armed conflict behind relatively quickly, while in others the dynamics that gave

---

41 An additional distinction is drawn between *internal armed conflict* and *internationalized internal armed conflicts*, depending on whether they were purely internal or whether external parties were involved.

42 The main conflict table in the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ itself does not contain information about the manner of conflict termination; therefore, this information was taken from the ‘Armed Conflict Termination Dataset’ (Kreutz 2006) – a dataset that is based on and fully compatible with the main conflict table. It contains six possible categories of conflict termination: peace-agreements, ceasefire agreements, ceasefire agreements with conflict regulations, victory, ‘no or low conflict activity’, and ‘other’ (see Kreutz 2008; par. 3.1.2). Cases falling into category five (‘no or low conflict activity’) were excluded from the universe of cases.
rise to the armed conflict remain virulent much longer than only five years. Macedonia, for instance, is a country that experienced a low-intensity conflict and was able to get back to ordinary politics relatively quickly, although it certainly remained influenced by the preceding armed conflict (see 3.2 and A.14). The Democratic Republic of the Congo (see 4.2 and A.7) or Liberia (see 6.2 and A.13), in contrast, are countries that are still highly fragile, although the official settlement took place several years ago. As this indicates, deciding whether or not it is adequate to reduce a country to its characteristics as a post-conflict case depends on the concrete circumstances of a given case rather than any general criterion. Out of this reason, I avoid to define a general end-point criterion for post-conflict situations. The only exception is when a post-conflict situation is disrupted by the outbreak of a new war.

The ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ (in the version 4-2009) covers all armed conflict that occurred between 1 January 1946 and 31 December 2008. Here, the period of investigation is confined to the post-Cold War period – both for pragmatic and substantive reasons. As argued above, the end of the Cold War has clearly heightened external actors’ willingness and capacity to intervene in internal conflicts. Many of the core concepts and approaches that today shape external actors’ interventions, including the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding itself, were only established in the post-Cold War period (see page 2). Therefore, only those armed conflicts are taken into consideration that ended after 1989. In addition to that, since the April 2009 version of the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ was used, the cutoff-point for armed conflicts to be taken into consideration is 31 December 2008. Therefore, conflicts that were terminated after that date, like the civil war in Sri Lanka, are ignored here. Likewise, if in any given case the conflict activity recurred between the end of 2008 and the time of this writing, this development is not accounted for in this dissertation (unless stated otherwise). Combining these different criteria leads to the following operational definition of a post-conflict situation: A post-conflict situation can be defined as a period following the termination of an intra-state conflict episode as defined by the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’, which was terminated between 1990 and 2008 by any means other than conflict inactivity.

1.3.3 Operationalizing Post-Conflict Polities

Based on this definition of post-conflict situations, the post-conflict polity concept can now be operationalized. As noted above, it aims at capturing hybrid patterns of authority unfolding at the nexus between domestic actors on the one hand and between domestic and external actors on the other hand. This requires that for any given post-conflict situation to qualify as a post-conflict polity case, two additional criteria must be met. The first criterion requires that the preceding conflict was not limited to a sub-region of the country in question, unless it has successfully led to a secession and international recognition of the territory as an independent state. The reason for this criterion is simply to exclude situations like that in Russia, which is contained in the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict
1.4 Cases and Case Selection

Dataset’ as a civil war case because of the secessionist war in Chechnya. Although this case is fully in accordance with the conflict definition this dataset uses, it would seem absurd to treat Russia as a whole as a post-conflict polity because of the civil war in Chechnya; but it would be in contrast to the post-conflict polity concept to consider Chechnya as a case despite the fact that it remains a part of Russia. East Timor, in contrast, has successfully seceded from Indonesia and was recognized as an independent state by the international community (see A.8). In this case, it makes sense to consider East Timor alone as a post-conflict polity case. Kosovo is an in-between case. Though the country is currently not (yet) an internationally recognized state, it unilaterally declared independence in 2008. In addition to that, as a territory administered by the international community since 1999, Kosovo has depicted a degree of autonomy that justifies to include it as a de facto independent case (see A.12).

The second criterion requires that the country in question experienced a significant effort for post-conflict reconstruction during or after the settlement of the conflict. Since the post-conflict polity concept is targeted at the nexus of authority unfolding between external and domestic actors, it is obviously necessary that external actors were actually involved in the polity. The presence of a UN peacekeeping mission is the best indicator for that, since the UN is the organization most frequently involved in conflict and post-conflict settlements. Although there are cases in which the main peacekeeping responsibility rested on the shoulders of another agency – for instance the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia (see A.13) or NATO in Kosovo (see A.12) – the UN is almost always present through at least a small peace support mission organized by the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Therefore, the existence of a UN peacekeeping mission in a given post-conflict situation can be used as a proxy for determining the presence of external actors in general.43 In conjunction, these factors lead to the following operational definition of the post-conflict polity concept: A post-conflict situation (as defined above) qualifies as a candidate for a post-conflict polity case if the preceding conflict was not confined to a sub-region of the country and if a significant engagement of external actors in the post-conflict phase can be observed, determined by the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission. Table 1.2 on page 30 provides an overview of all case selection criteria.

1.4 Cases and Case Selection

Applying the above criteria to the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ and filtering them for the existence of a UN peacekeeping mission yields 22 countries that have experienced at least one post-conflict period between 1 January 1990 and 31 December, 2008. Of those, four countries were later excluded from the analysis upon closer qualitative investigation

---

43 This was determined on the basis of those missions listed on the website of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2010) as of 21 April, 2009.
Chapter 1 Introduction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict Type</strong></td>
<td>'Internal Armed Conflict’ as defined by UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong></td>
<td>The conflict was terminated by any means other than conflict inactivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict Termination</strong></td>
<td>The conflict was terminated between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intervention</strong></td>
<td>The conflict has led to the deployment of a UN Peacekeeping mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Territorial Spread</strong></td>
<td>The conflict was not limited to a sub-region of a state unless this region successfully seceded from the main state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2: Criteria for the Universe of Cases

because they could, overall, not be treated as true post-conflict situations.\(^4^4\) Table 1.3 on page 31 contains an overview of the remaining 18 countries and, for each of them, lists pre-conflict, during-conflict and post-conflict episodes. Note that the number of actual post-conflict polity-cases (28) is higher than the number of post-conflict countries.\(^4^5\) This is the case for two reasons. First, some countries (for instance Angola, Liberia or Haiti) experienced two conflict episodes in the period under investigation. The resulting post-conflict periods are regarded as different post-conflict polity cases. Second, there are also some cases in which, within one post-conflict polity period, two different post-conflict polity types materialized due to significant changes in the constellation of post-conflict authority (for instance in Côte d’Ivoire).

1.4.1 Overview of the Case Material

As table 1.3 illustrates, the countries included in the analysis represent a broad geographical variety. Most of them are located in Africa (Angola, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone). They are followed by four Asian cases (Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor and Tajikistan), three European countries (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo) and three countries located in the Americas (El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti).\(^4^6\) In addition to that, the countries differed with

\(^{4^4}\)These were the Central African Republic, Chad, Croatia and Somalia. For further reasons for their exclusion, see appendix A.

\(^{4^5}\)For an overview of the classification results, see table A.1 on page 327 in appendix A.

\(^{4^6}\)The distinction between these regions and the classification of the cases to them is taken from the ’UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ (version 4-2009).
### 1.4 Cases and Case Selection

| Year | 90 | 91 | 92 | 93 | 94 | 95 | 96 | 97 | 98 | 99 | 00 | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 |
|------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Afghanistan | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← |
| Angola | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← |
| BiH | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← |
| Burundi | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← |
| Cambodia | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← |
| Côte D’Ivoire | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← |
| DRC | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← |
| El Salvador | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← |
| Guatemala | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← |
| Haiti | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← |
| Kosovo | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← |
| East Timor | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← |
| Liberia | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← |
| Macedonia | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← |
| Mozambique | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← |
| Rwanda | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← |
| Sierra Leone | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← |
| Tajikistan | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← | ← |

Table 1.3: Overview of Post-Conflict Cases

regard to the intensity of the armed conflicts that took place. Of the 21 armed conflicts included in the sample, the majority (15) reached the intensity of a war (that is, they experienced more than 1,000 battle-related deaths in any year of the conflict) while the remaining six are classified as ‘minor armed conflicts’ in the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ (that is, they experienced between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths).

There are also various other characteristics based on which the cases can be differentiated. They are not contained in the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ itself, but can be inferred from the qualitative case characterizations contained in the appendix. By definition, in all of the cases some contender was fighting against the government. However, this happened for different motives. In the majority of cases, the civil wars had a strong ethnic or tribal component. This was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kosovo, Liberia, Macedonia and Rwanda. Though it
Chapter 1 Introduction

would be false to reduce the origins of the conflict to ethnic differences *per se*, ethnic or tribal factors clearly stood out as decisive factors in these cases. In the other cases, this ethnic component was either lacking or was overshadowed by other dynamics that proved more important. In some of the cases included in the sample the conflict was primarily about ideological differences between the conflict parties, as in Angola (during the first conflict episode), Mozambique and El Salvador and Cambodia. With some reservations, Afghanistan and Tajikistan can be added to this list, too. Another group of conflicts contained in the sample was more clearly about the control of a specific territory, most notably Kosovo and East Timor (although these conflicts were sparked by ethnic factors as well). Finally, the last group of conflicts was driven primarily by struggles over who controls the government, without large ethnic, ideological or territorial underpinnings. This group consists of the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Haiti.

The cases also differ greatly in the degree of third-party involvement they enjoyed. While all countries were subject to at least one UN peacekeeping mission in the period under investigation, the size, strength and mandate of these missions differed greatly. Some cases enjoyed more traditional peacekeeping missions (for example: Mozambique, El Salvador or Côte d’Ivoire); others hosted complex, multi-dimensional peace-enforcement missions based on a robust (*Chapter VII*) mandate (for example: Liberia or the Democratic Republic of the Congo); and again others even were subject to a direct involvement of third parties in their post-conflict governance structures (Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor and Kosovo).

### 1.4.2 Criteria for Case Selection

All of the cases mentioned above are discussed in the appendix. Of those, ten cases were chosen as the basis for the detailed characterization of the different polity types contained in chapters three to seven – i.e. two cases per polity type. In order to select those, two criteria were applied. First, the goal was to select *typical cases* (see e.g. Seawright and Gerring 2008), which are understood here as cases that can be unequivocally classified and match the characteristics of one type very closely. Although all cases could be subsumed under either of the different polity types, the classification was in some cases more clear-cut than in other cases. Because the goal of the empirical case studies was to demonstrate *typical* polity characteristics, it was necessary to choose cases which are most representative for the given polity types. The second criterion used for selecting cases derived from the goal of ensuring a broad geographical variety in the different case studies. It is the stated goal of the typology to identify differences which go beyond the historical

---

47 See also the discussion on conflict theories in section C in the appendix.

48 The term ‘typical case’ is mostly applied in the context of causal models. Seawright and Gerring describe it as a case which is “well explained by an existing model” and is representative for a specific “cross-case relationship” of interest (2008: 299). Here, the term is used in a descriptive sense. As case is typical or representative for a specific polity type if its main characteristics are well described by the theoretical dimensions of this type.
or geographical idiosyncrasies of the different cases. The best mechanism for ensuring this is to select two cases from diverse geographical backgrounds for each of the polity types (where possible). This strengthens the argument that the observed dynamics are not merely regional contingencies, but that they represent factors that can be attributed to the specific polity types. However, there are some occasions where the two selection criteria are in conflict – i.e. where ensuring a broader geographical variety would imply to choose a case that is less typical. In these cases, preference was given to the first criterion: identifying typical characteristics is considered more important than ensuring geographical variety (and risking that the results are overshadowed by a less than ideal fit between the polity types and the selected cases). This was mainly the case for ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities: both of the cases – Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire – are geographically located in West Africa and even share a long border. Yet, as argued in more detail in chapter six, these two cases promised the best fit to the overall polity characteristics and were therefore chosen instead of alternative, non-African cases (Cambodia after the elections in 1993 or Haiti in the post-Aristide period). A third factor that played a role for the case selection process was to avoid using countries twice for demonstrating the characteristics of different polities. Hence, those countries in which different polity types materialized in consecutive post-conflict phases – for instance Sierra Leone, Liberia or the Democratic Republic of the Congo – were each only used in one of the empirical chapters below.
Chapter 2

Patterns of Post-Conflict Polities

In the introduction it was argued that the end of the Cold War has brought forward a vast diversity of post-conflict countries which differ in many respects. Cambodia, a country where roughly one-fifth of the population was extinguished during the Khmer Rouge’s terror regime (see A.5), is rather remote from countries such as Macedonia (see A.14) or Haiti (see A.11), where not more than a few hundred people fell victim to internal violence. Sierra Leone, a country that became tragically known for a ruthless campaign of plundering and self-enrichment (see A.17), can hardly be compared with Mozambique (see A.15), which suffered from an ideologically adorned Cold-War conflict. Seemingly anarchic countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia that occupy bottom ranks on all development indicators obviously face different challenges than countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina or Kosovo, which are comparatively well-off and located in the center of Europe. While these examples illustrate the necessity to draw further differentiations within the broad category of post-conflict polities, they also highlight the inherent difficulty of this task.

This chapter presents the theoretical foundations and the actual, empirically derived typology for dealing with this problem. Section 2.1 develops the post-conflict polity concept as an alternative conceptualization and presents the analytical framework that was used for constructing the typology. This section also formulates a simple model of interactions in post-conflict polities, which provides the basis for the analysis of post-conflict interactions in the empirical chapters later in this dissertation. The final typology is presented in section 2.2. Most importantly, this section contains a theoretical discussion of the different dimensions of the typology. Section 2.3 provides an overview of the different polity types and points out some of their main characteristics. Finally, section 2.4 contains a discussion about the internal dynamics of the different polity types.

2.1 Post-Conflict Situations as Post-Conflict Polities

The introduction highlighted a profound dilemma of conceptually dealing with post-conflict situations: if most of them are *neither* phases of transition towards consolidated statehood *nor* can be regarded (with few exceptions) as the result of concluded processes
Chapter 2 Patterns of Post-Conflict Polities

of statebuilding, then how can we conceive of them at all? The post-conflict polity concept suggests analyzing post-conflict situations as instances of a very specific social phenomenon that can best be understood as political systems characterized by overlapping and multi-layered patterns of authority. This general idea is now spelled out in more detail and then converted to a general framework of analysis.

2.1.1 Polities and the Study of Fragmented Authority

The use of the polity-concept in the context of fluid and multi-layered systems of authority – as they are present in post-conflict situations – requires some justification. The discipline of comparative politics has developed several different concepts for capturing the nature of politics. In their “structural-functional system framework”, Almond et al., for instance, differentiate between systems, structures and functions as the basic underlying analytical categories. According to this framework, a system can generally be defined as an “object having moving parts, interacting with a setting or an environment”, whereas political systems are defined as “a set of institutions and agencies concerned with formulating and implementing the collective goals of a society or of groups within it.” Structures in the context of a political system are then understood as “specialized agencies” or institutions carrying out certain functions, which are in turn understood as the implementation of policies (2004: 34–36).

The last aspect, political structure, is the primary object of interest here. Political structures are about those elements of political systems that are most stable and resilient to change. A typical example are constitutional provisions – as opposed to, for instance, simple laws. For this, the term polity is often used, which needs to be distinguished from both politics (political processes) and policies (political programs or concrete decisions). The polity concept is generally taken to refer to those characteristics of a political community that determine the rules of the game, rather than the game itself (see e.g. Easton 1965). In particular during the post-World War II period, the term was equated exclusively with formal-institutional factors – for instance with regard to electoral systems or the role of the executive vis-à-vis the legislator – and was seen as the guarantor of stability in otherwise fluid political systems (see e.g. Hajer 2003: 182).

However, it has increasingly been questioned whether formal-institutional structures are really the sole determiner of the ‘rules of the political game’ in recent years. For the OECD world, this problem is reflected in the ‘de-nationalization’ debate (see e.g. Habermas 1998; Zangl and Zürn 2003; Zürn 1998) and the accompanying discourse about the ‘transformation of the state’ (see e.g. Leibfried and Zürn 2006), which stipulates a general loss of regulatory power for domestic state institutions in the face of increasingly transnational policy challenges. Marteen Hajer, for instance, is convinced that polities, understood in the classical sense as constitutional rules, “do not tell us about the new

---

1The conceptualization of politics as a system goes back to David Easton (1953; 1957: 383).
rules of the game [anymore]”, and he believes that the concept “thus becomes a topic for empirical analysis again” (Hajer 2003: 176). For the non-OECD world, the importance of informal factors in politics has been recognized much earlier. Unlike in Western Europe, the state there has generally not emerged through a process of historical evolution but is rather the product of an abrupt and inherently violent infusion of state-like institutions by imperial powers (see e.g. Senghaas 1998). This process of state-infusion clashed with pre-existing local traditions, which gave rise to a liaison of external and local traditions of statehood (see Schlichte 2000: 164). This resulted in states in which formal-institutional factors co-exist with informal and traditional modes of governance and in which the latter often play a more dominant role. Studies on post-colonial politics (in particular in Africa) have underlined the importance of (neo-)patrimonial networks based on clan affiliation or kinship and have underlined the hybridism of these regimes (see e.g. Bayart 2000; 2006; Bayart et al. 1999; Bratton and van de Walle 1994; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Jackson 1990; Migdal 2001; Reno 1999).

The recognition that an exclusive focus on the hierarchical, formal-institutional characteristics of political regimes is insufficient is one of the factors that has inspired the shift away from ‘government’ towards the more open and fluid perspective of ‘governance’ (Benz 2004; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Schuppert and Zürn 2008; Senghaas 1993). This has also fostered a broadening of the polity concept and has given rise to various attempts for reconciling this concept with the fluid, non-hierarchical modes of coordination that are generally subsumed under the heading ‘governance’. For instance, it has become rather common in recent years to speak of the ‘global polity’, either in a normative or in a descriptive-empirical sense (see e.g. Ougaard and Higgott 2002) and the polity concept is frequently applied in the context of the European Union (see Christiansen et al. 1999 and Balli 2009: 17). R.W.A. Rhodes, one of the pioneers of the governance concept, used the notion of a “differentiated polity”, characterized, among other things, by the “fragmentation of policies and politics” (Rhodes 1997: 33), and based on this Chris Ansell (2000) has introduced the notion of a ‘networked polity’ for describing the fluid character of the European Union. A more flexible use of the polity concept can also be observed in the discipline of comparative politics. Georg Tsebelis, for instance, has extended the notion of polities by including not only formal-institutional characteristics of political systems, but also configurations of actors. In ‘Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work’ he


\[^3\]Note that this alleged ‘polity turn’ in EU research is somewhat ambiguous. Following Volker Balli, there are two established perspectives on the EU as a polity: (a) as institutionalized political authority; and (b) as community of communication (Balli 2009: 24–33). While the former essentially replicates the formal-institutionalized understanding of polities as it is traditionally used in comparative politics, the latter conveys an understanding of polities that sharply deviates from formal-institutionalist understandings. It asks for the sociological underpinnings that are constitutive for polities (Balli 2009: 30).
suggests focusing on the number of veto players as the main criterion for distinguishing political systems, which includes both institutional veto players (determined by the constitution) and partisan veto players (determined by the political system) (Tsebelis 2002: 1–2). This suggests that the polity concept can potentially be applied to non-hierarchical, fluid, multi-layered or fragmented modes of coordination and that it is therefore applicable to post-conflict situations.

The post-conflict polity perspective as it is presented in the next section is a governance perspective. Rather than focusing on formal-institutional structures, it views structures as relations between actors. This is also the common denominator of the governance literature. Most of its core concepts – policy networks, advocacy coalitions, actor constellations, regimes – focus on relations between actors, rather than the actors themselves. Gunnar Folke Schuppert, for instance, understands governance as coordination among state and non-state actors within and through regulative structures (2008: 23). According to this definition, the essence of governance is coordination, and this is a concept that is distinctly relational – one cannot coordinate alone. This focus on relations allows for a tremendous flexibility of the governance perspective with regard to fluid and fragmented political structures, as they are present for instance in ‘Areas of Limited Statehood’ (see Draude 2007; Risse 2008) or, more generally, situations of fragmented authority (Migdal 2001).

2.1.2 Framework of Analysis

Frameworks of analysis serve as analytical lenses allowing the observer to look at the social world from a certain viewpoint. Charles Ragin describes them as “a detailed sketch or outline of an idea about some phenomenon” (Ragin 1994: 58). Here, the phenomenon of interest are post-conflict situations, and the underlying idea is that they can be conceptualized as specific political entities (polities) characterized by multi-layered and overlapping patterns of authority between external and domestic actors. More specifically, the argument emphasized here is that post-conflict situations can be understood as specific forms of fragmented authority in which the main dynamics unfold (a) at the nexus between formal (state-like) and informal (non-state) authority, and (b) at the interface between domestic and external authority. This puts a strong emphasis on the de facto exercise of political authority through a diverse set of actors that have a potentially strong role to play in the majority of post-conflict environments.6

4Own translation from the German original: “[…] Koordination staatlicher und nichtstaatlicher Akteure in und durch Regelungsstrukturen”.

5Along a similar line, Claus Offe remarks that governance is a peculiarly ‘subject-less’ process – it is not driven by subjects (or: actors) themselves. Though actors can coordinate, they cannot do governance, which is why the outcomes of the coordination process are always at least partially indeterminate and cannot be anticipated even by the participating actors themselves (2008: 61–62).

6The dichotomy between formal-institutional and substantive-material perspectives is also at the heart of most writings by the political philosopher Amartya Sen. In his recent book ‘The Idea of Justice’ (2009), he frames this dichotomy as one between arrangement and realization based positions in order to underline the inadequacies of political theories (or theories of justice, more specifically) that privilege
The main assumption behind the analytical framework is that the most important dynamics in post-conflict environments are those that are located at the interface between antagonistic domestic power-elites on the one hand and at the interface between these elites and external actors on the other hand. This implies to restrict the analysis to the elite level. There are good reasons for this analytical restriction. Elites have increasingly been recognized as a crucial yet underrated factor in post-conflict reconstruction processes (see e.g. Sesay et al. 2009). As, for instance, the literature on spoiler management (Greenhill and Major 2007; Stedman 1997) highlights, the characteristics, preferences or decisions of single individuals – the leaders of rebel groups or breakaway factions – often play a crucial role in the aftermath of civil wars. At the same time, a priori confining the analysis to elites undoubtedly conflates many of the actual dynamics taking place in post-conflict countries. In some situations Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), local civil society organizations, or certain informal authorities (religious leaders, local strongmen and the like) play a vital role that may only be insufficiently captured by the perspective chosen. For instance, the Roman Catholic Church has played the key role in brokering the General Peace Agreement in Mozambique (see e.g. Manning 2002). This is not denied here, but when attempting to develop a general framework for the comparative analysis of post-conflict situations, such analytical self-restriction (and the possible loss of information entailed by it) is unavoidable. ‘Blackboxing’ some complexity is necessary for establishing an analytical commonality between different historical cases. Otherwise, a typification is hardly possible because the number of possible categories would soon exceed the number of actual cases.

Two groups of post-conflict actors stand in the center of attention: the former warring parties and external actors. The former warring parties are often the dominant political forces in post-conflict environments. They are the ones who have fought the war and therefore can be held accountable for a possible recurrence of war in the future. By definition, the warring parties in civil wars can be divided into the government and the rebel side (see 1.3). The analytical framework takes up this distinction and divides the group of former warring parties into two poles, Side A and Side B, and each of them is construed as a post-conflict actor of its own. Of course, there are many situations in which there were more than two conflict parties, but often it is the case that the different factions align to loose coalitions, which allows to treat them as one single group.

---

7These analytical categories are certainly very broad. For instance, the category ‘external actors’ masks many of the differences and contradictions that usually revolve around external engagement in post-conflict environments. It certainly makes a difference whether the dominant external actors in a specific situation are the United Nations (and, if so, whether it is, for instance, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations – DPKO, or the Department of Political Affairs, DPA), the European Union, or the World Bank. However, this indeterminacy is necessary in order to use the analytical framework on a broad set of cases.
of them may either possess formal or de facto power, or a combination of both. *External actors*, in the most general sense, can be all those who have an influence on the governance of a post-conflict country and who are perceived as ‘outsiders’ by the conflict parties and/or parts of the population. The probably most frequent case is a UN peacekeeping mission that is engaged in a post-conflict country for various purposes. Other examples include regional peace operations, multinational military forces outside the framework of the United Nations (the NATO engagement in Kosovo, the multinational troops in Afghanistan and Iraq) or bilateral engagements (the role of the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone, France’s engagement in Côte d’Ivoire).

These parties are treated as *unitary actors* here, i.e. actors that are able to express coherent preferences and take intentional actions (see Walt 1999: 10–11). Though unitary actors are often equated with individuals (for instance individual rebel leaders), one can also construe different groups of people as unitary actors if we can assume that they may act *as if* they were single social entities (see e.g. Zürn 1992: 40). This is assumed for the different actors identified above. For instance, civil war factions are typically organized in a highly hierarchical manner and it can be assumed that, in the majority of cases, the actions taken by the leaders of these organizations are the ones that count most. By the same token, though the term ‘external actors’ denotes a rather diverse group of actors that often expresses contradictory preferences and opinions, there are always some more powerful actors who are able to thrust less powerful actors aside. When focusing on the overall effect of external actors on a given post-conflict country it is therefore reasonable to assume that power hierarchies among external actors makes it possible to analyze them as if they were unitary actors.

In addition to merely identifying the different actors, it is also necessary to formulate some assumptions about their respective roles in the post-conflict polity, their goals and preferences and the general constraints and opportunities affecting their actions and decisions. This amounts to a simple generic model of post-conflict interactions. A graphical illustration is found in figure 2.1 on page 42. This model serves as the basis for more specific models of post-conflict polities developed for each of the polity types.

---

8The term ‘external actors’ is preferred here over the term international community. The reason is simply that external actors may not necessarily be international, they may as well be single nation states or regional peace initiatives.

9The empirical discussions below contain many cases where the cohesion of certain rebel groups was rather poor and in which they split up into several splinter-groups – for instance in Liberia (see A.13). However, if this happens the various splinter-groups typically enter coalitions of convenience with other groups such that, in most cases, the number of splinter groups can be reduced to just a few coalitions. For instance, a rebel splinter-group may temporarily align with the government-side in order to defeat its old rival. This happened in Sierra Leone, when the ‘Armed Forces Revolutionary Council’ (AFRC), once an ally of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), broke with the rebel group and began to support the government in its efforts to capture RUF leader Foday Sankoh (see A.17).

10A model can generally be understood as a “simplification of, and approximation to, some aspect of the world” (King et al. 1994: 49). The model developed here is mainly descriptive and does not aim at explaining any statebuilding outcomes for the different polity types.
2.1 Post-Conflict Situations as Post-Conflict Polities

below. It is based on the following assumptions, which are derived from the theoretical discussions contained in this dissertation:

First, I assume that the former warring parties have an interest in increasing their share of power in the post-conflict phase and that none of them is likely to give away power voluntarily. This assumption is warranted on the ground that power is – despite the multitude of possible causes and driving forces of armed conflicts (see C.1) – often a necessary means for achieving all other goals. If parties in power nonetheless give away a fraction of their power, they must have good reasons. This may for instance be strong external pressure combined with a conditional threat in case of non-compliance, a power-imbalance relative to the contenders, or incentives/benefits by which their loss of power is compensated.

Second, I assume that parties constantly strive for enhancing both formal and de facto authority. Above, it was pointed out that informal powers and structures are often as important as or even more important than formal structures in post-conflict environments. The Taliban in Afghanistan possess de facto power in large parts of the country, while the formal government possesses little real power outside of Kabul (see A.1). UNITA, the Angolan rebel group, possessed little formal and no de facto power after the assassination of its leader Jonas Savimbi in 2002 (see A.2). Sometimes, de facto power can be used in order to obtain formal power. The Liberian rebel leader Charles Taylor won the elections in 1997 precisely because he could convince the electorate of his qualities as a spoiler with considerable de facto power in case another candidate won the elections (see 6.2). And often, parties in possession of formal power can use it to maintain or enhance their share of de facto power – in the crudest way through locking away opposition politicians and controlling the state media (as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo after Joseph Kabila’s electoral victory, see 4.2) and in the ideal case by implementing policies that enhance the legitimacy and acceptance of the regime among critics and antagonists (as it initially was the case in Macedonia, see 3.2).

Third, I assume that, in the most general sense, external actors affect the domestic constraints and opportunities through their engagement in post-conflict environments. This can be inferred from the above discussions about the dominant statebuilding practice as well as from pre-existing models of post-conflict intervention (e.g. Barnett and Zürcher 2009), which suggest that external actors do not confine themselves to conflict settlement

\[\text{More specifically: the discussion on the practice of post-conflict intervention (section 2.1), the discussion of the typology and its different analytical dimensions (section 2.3), and the discussion of theories about the origins and settlement of armed conflict (contained in section 11 of the appendix).}\]

\[\text{There are cases in which gaining control of the government and the benefits associated with it is the primary goal of rebel groups (and in these cases the rational model holds quite well), cases in which rebellions are motivated by certain grievances or ideologies (and in which controlling the government may be one way among many others to redress or realize them), cases in which ancient antagonisms between religious or ethnic groups are important driving forces (possibly propelled by ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’), and cases in which structural factors play a dominant role in explaining the outbreak or escalation of internal conflicts.}\]
or peacekeeping tasks. However, the degree of foreign ‘intrusion’ into the domestic affairs of states differs from case to case, ranging from a direct physical presence on the ground to an indirect influence on the polity exercised, for instance, through the loan conditionality of International Financial Institutions.

Fourth, I assume that external actors constantly look for exit options in post-conflict polities and prefer a more indirect (and less costly) engagement over long term, costly commitments. External actors not only set constraints for domestic actors, but they are themselves subject to various external constraints. The history of post Cold War engagement in conflict zones suggests that sustained external engagement in post-conflict environments is costly – in financial and sometimes also in political terms. As a result, many post-conflict interventions are driven by short-term agendas and aim at the realization of quick goals, while long or even medium-run engagements are rare.

Fifth, I assume that external actors constantly seek achievements which they can ‘sell’ as significant statebuilding successes to their respective constituencies. External actors have a preference for visible and easily identifiable success factors derived from the standard model of post-conflict statebuilding. These ‘milestones’ include popular elections, institution-building measures like capacity building, economic liberalization, the strengthening of the state monopoly of force and the like. Since, in external actors’ standard
interpretation, the route to consolidated statehood appears linear and uni-directional, they have an inclination to sell each of these achievements as a step that inevitably leads into the right direction.

Sixth, I assume that the warring parties strive for the benefits (or incentives) offered by external actors but seek to avoid the costs (or sanctions) associated with external influence. As noted above, external actors strive for influencing the constraints and opportunities of post-conflict environments. This generally takes place through a combination of both sticks and carrots. For instance, the disbursement of funds or other material benefits by external actors (or the avoidance of sanctions) is typically tied to fulfilling certain conditions. Often, they take the form of concrete policy prescriptions, for instance related to the acceptance of human rights standards, the fight against corruption or the implementation of other good governance principles. For instance, during the transitional government implemented in Liberia after Charles Taylor’s forced resignation, corruption played such an important role that the international community established the so called ‘Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme’ (GEMAP) that has “in effect put Liberia under a form of international supervision for three years” (Ellis [1999] 2007: xxvii; Reno 2008: 387; see also A.13). Since measures of this kind further constrain the scope of action for domestic actors, the parties in power are likely to sideline these forms of foreign influence where possible – though there are a few instances in which the policy priorities of the domestic parties are closely in line with external demands, as in El Salvador (see 5.3). As the case studies below highlight, this leads to very particular patterns of post-conflict interaction between domestic and external actors.

In conjunction, these factors lead to the generic model of post-conflict interactions as shown in figure 2.1 on page 42. It builds the basis for the systematic comparison of post-conflict situations contained in appendix A and is the major stepping stone for the typology presented in the next section.

## 2.2 The Typology

Now that the analytical framework has been presented, we can finally turn to the typology. This section confines itself to presenting the results of the typification process and to discuss its various analytical dimensions, but it does not give a detailed overview about the process of typology construction. It should suffice to underline once again that the typology is descriptive rather than explanatory and that it is the result of a combination of inductive and deductive methods of inquiry. The characterization and classification of 18 post-conflict cases contained in appendix A is the major empirical groundwork for the typology as it is presented here (see 1.2.3 and appendix B for a more detailed account).

The typology relies on three analytical dimensions: the *distribution of executive power* between the different post-conflict actors, the *relations between the former conflict parties* and the *manner of external intervention*, discussed in detail in sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3,
Chapter 2 Patterns of Post-Conflict Polities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution of executive power</th>
<th>Power-Sharing</th>
<th>Domination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention by External Parties</td>
<td>mediative</td>
<td>partisan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations of warring parties: Constructive</td>
<td>‘Let’s share’ polities</td>
<td>no cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations of warring parties: Obstructive</td>
<td>‘Doomed to share’ polities</td>
<td>no cases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: Typology of Post-conflict Polities – compact view

respectively. Table 2.1 depicts the entire property space that emerges when combining the three analytical dimensions and their different categories – i.e. all logically conceivable types. However, only for six of these types, actual empirical cases can be found in the sample of 21 potential post-conflict polities on which this dissertation relies (see 1.4). These are the dark-shaded boxes in table 2.1. The light-shaded boxes are those types which can be logically deduced from the abstract combination of the different analytical categories but for which no empirical cases can be found in the sample. This does not necessarily imply that they are irrelevant because they may be part of another sample of cases or may occur at some point in the future. However, the fact that this dissertation is based on a broad variety of post-conflict cases renders it relatively unlikely that these types play any significant role.13

The typology differentiates between four power-sharing cases and six cases of political domination. The first column depicts cases of power-sharing in which external actors are engaged in a mediative manner, i.e. where they do not systematically take side for either of the conflict parties and try to mitigate conflicts occurring between the former belligerents. These are ‘Let’s Share’ polities, in which the former warring parties maintain constructive relations (i.e. they engage in power-sharing in earnest), and ‘Doomed to Share’ polities, in which the former conflict parties maintain obstructive relations (i.e. they are highly reluctant to share power). Both of them can be found in the sample and are discussed in

---

13In addition, though all of the types are logically conceivable some of them are substantively inconsistent. For instance, it is not reasonable to assume that external actors would engage in an existing power-sharing arrangement in a partisan manner and take sides with only one of the conflict parties. On the contrary, the cases discussed in this dissertation highlight that power-sharing arrangements are often only established after significant external pressure and generally with the aim to accommodate both of the former warring factions.
2.2 The Typology

detail in chapters three and four. The second column contains those power-sharing cases in
which external actors are engaged in a partisan manner, i.e. in which they support one of
the conflict parties in a systematic and intentional manner. No empirical examples for the
latter two types were found in the sample of cases.

The rest of the table contains situations of political domination, i.e. cases in which one
group of actors enjoys exclusive access to formal authority, while the other(s) are politically
excluded. Column three shows those cases of domination in which external actors are
engaged in a mediative manner: ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ and ‘The Winner Took it All’
cases. In the former, the relations between the warring parties are constructive, that is, the
excluded party accepts its own exclusion from formal authority (constructive relations),
whereas in the latter a general consensus about who governs is lacking (obstructive
relations). Both cases can be found in the sample and are discussed in chapters five and six,
respectively. Column four depicts cases of domination in which external actors are
engaged in a partisan manner, i.e. in which they intentionally and systematically take side for one
of the former conflict parties. Cases in which the relations between the former belligerents
are obstructive, so called ‘You Stay Out’ polities, can be found in the sample of cases and
are discussed in chapter seven. However, no case was found where external actors have
intervened in a partisan manner despite the presence of constructive relations. The last
column contains cases in which external actors essentially become the sovereign of a post-
conflict polity themselves (‘supreme intervention’). This may theoretically happen despite
the presence of constructive relations between the former belligerents, but no evidence for
this was found in the sample. The more likely scenario is supreme engagement amidst
obstructive relations. These are called ‘Benevolent Intrusion’ polities, which are essentially
identical with the well-established type of international transitional administrations, as they
were established for instance in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina or East Timor or Cambodia.
As already noted, this type is not discussed in detail in this dissertation.

A more detailed overview of the different types is contained in section 2.3. In the
following sections, the three analytical dimensions of the typology are discussed in some
more detail.

2.2.1 Distribution of Executive Power

The first dimension of the typology captures the distribution of formal authority between
the former belligerents in post-conflict situations. Gaining access to formal governmental
power is one of the fundamental motivations to start rebellions – either because controlling
the government is associated with significant material benefits or because it is necessary
for abolishing grievances that affect certain parts of the population (see C.1). Knowing
who controls the government – and who does not – is therefore an important aspect of
post-conflict order.

Most peace agreements contain provisions about who is to control the executive. The
two general options are to share governmental power, or to allow one party to control
the executive alone – in most cases, this is either the winner on the battlefield or the prospective winner of post-conflict elections. These are also the two categories of the typology. **Power-sharing** describes a situation in which the former opponents in a civil war share governmental power both formally and, at least to some extent, also in effective terms. **Domination**, in contrast, indicates that one of the former warring factions (or a coalition of wartime allies) either enjoys exclusive access to formal governmental authority, or effectively dominates all members of the government such that power-sharing becomes merely cosmetic. These two options – sharing and domination – should be seen as the endpoints on a continuum describing the actual distribution of governmental power between the warring parties. They are widely discussed in the literature on post-conflict intervention as the two fundamental alternatives for designing post-conflict institutions (e.g. Crocker and Hampson 1996; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Mehler 2009; Rothchild and Roeder 2005; Schneckener 2002: 237–333; Spears 2000; 2002; Tull and Mehler 2005).

Scholars have disagreed over the question which strategy is more suitable for bringing lasting peace to conflict-ridden societies. In the following, both approaches are portrayed:

### a) Power-Sharing

Power-sharing is endorsed by the literature as an effective tool of conflict resolution (see e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie 2003 and Crocker and Hampson 1996). In general, power sharing institutions are concerned with defining “how decisions are to be made within a divided society and the distribution of decision-making rights within a state” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003: 318). Power-sharing generally differs from a mere division of power in that governmental authority is ideally distributed “across institutions and not specific groups” (Barnett 2006: 106). However, it is important to note that power-sharing can mean different things. There are at least two competing theoretical models for ideal power-sharing institutions: the so called **consociational model** formulated by Arend Lijphart and the so called **integrative approach** associated with Donald Horowitz and Seymour Martin Lipset (see Sisk 1996: 5).

Lijphart’s model (see Lijphart 1980, see also Lijphart 1999) has clearly been more influential both in the academic debate and as a normative reference point for the actual design of power-sharing institutions. He generally understands consociational democracy as “government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political

---

14 Most studies on power-sharing in the context of post-conflict countries look at three aspects of power-sharing: political power-sharing, military power-sharing and economic power-sharing. Here, only the first dimension (political power-sharing) is taken into consideration.

15 However, the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of power-sharing provisions is ambiguous. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) put forward the general and widely-cited argument that power-sharing provisions increase the duration of peace, but they do not distinguish between different forms of power-sharing (e.g. political, military or territorial). When they introduce this differentiation two years later, they find that only territorial and military power-sharing has a positive effect on the duration of peace, while political power-sharing has not (Hartzell and Hoddie 2005; see also Jarstad and Nilsson 2008).
2.2 The Typology

culture into a stable democracy” (Lijphart 1969: 216). Analytically, he developed this
notion out of a critique of Gabriel A. Almond’s typology of political systems by identifying
a group of countries that is stable despite being politically fragmented. He called them
‘consociational democracies’ and argued that they were characterized by “deliberate efforts
to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation” (Lijphart
1969: 212). The consociational model has been heavily promoted as a role model for
societies divided by deep-rooted cultural cleavages (see in particular Lijphart 1980; see also
It requires (1) a broad-based parliamentary coalition ensuring that “the minority is not
permanently excluded from political power”, (2) an institutionalized veto-right endowed to
the minority group on issues of “vital interest”, (3) the introduction of the proportionality
principle on all levels of decision-making with the aim of giving “minority groups power,
participation and influence commensurate with their overall size in society”, and (4) a high
degree of autonomy for the different segments of society (either territorial or non-territorial)
with regard to those issues that are predominantly intra-segmental concerns (Sisk 1996:
36–38).

The second branch of power-sharing literature takes a different stance. Donald Horowitz,
who stands behind the integrative approach to power-sharing, is a pronounced critic of
consociationalism, for the most part due to its elite-centric focus and because it recreates
or reifies societal cleavages (for instance by the mutual veto-power) rather than fostering
41). He is therefore interested in an approach to power-sharing in which more pronounced
incentives for cross-segmental cooperation are present and in which, as Sisk puts it,
“moderates must be rewarded [and] extremists sanctioned” (1996: 41; see also Horowitz
2002: 23). According to Horowitz, incentives are superior to constitutional provisions
because they offer ‘reasons’ for moderate instead of ‘obstacles’ against extremist behavior.
In Horowitz’s eyes, different institutions and practices may provide such reasons for cross-
segmental cooperation. Federalism, if well institutionalized, may help to ensure that some
conflicts are solved on the local or regional level and do not affect politics at the center; it
may also prevent majority parties to dominate the entire country. More importantly, inter-
ethnic bargaining may be encouraged by a well-designed electoral system, for instance by
requiring political parties to produce ethnically mixed lists (this happened for instance in
Burundi, see section 3.3 below) or by requiring a subsequent-preference voting system.
Furthermore, Horowitz believes presidentialist systems to be superior to parliamentarist
systems, since a strong president elected with cross-segmental popular support can play a
more unifying role than a Prime Minister voted by the majority coalition in the parliament
(see Sisk 1996: 42–44).

16Almond (1956) drew a threefold distinction between Anglo-American, Continental and ‘third kind’
political systems based on two characteristics of the political system (political culture and political
structure), and established a link to political stability.
Chapter 2 Patterns of Post-Conflict Polities

Power-sharing has become particularly influential in the context of post-conflict societies. Hartzell and Hoddie, for instance, find that “[t]he more extensive the network of power-sharing institutions contending parties agree to create, the less likely they are to return to the use of armed violence to settle disputes” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003: 330). However, not everybody shares the general enthusiasm for the conflict-resolving capacities of power-sharing. René Lemarchand argues that there is “every reason to entertain the strongest doubts about the virtues of a formula that proved sadly inadequate to prevent the eruption of violent conflicts in settings as diverse as Angola and Liberia, Somalia, and Ethiopia” – although he still believes that “if properly implemented, and given the ‘right’ conditions, the Lijphart formula could well provide the best chances for a successful sharing of power among competing groups” (2007: 2). Critics of power-sharing have pointed out a range of flaws and dangers associated with this approach to conflict settlement. Denis Tull and Andreas Mehler have raised the concern that the wide-spread application of power-sharing arrangements as a means to resolve civil wars may actually provide incentives for insurgents to fight. The reason is that examples of power-sharing “indicate that would-be leaders have some reason to conceptualize the organization of violence as a viable path to occupying at least parcels of state power” (2005: 376). A similar argument is put forward by Donald Rothchild and Philip G. Roeder. They do not generally question that power-sharing might work as a mechanism for conflict regulation, but have doubts with regard to its applicability in ethnically divided societies:

“The sad irony of power-sharing institutions is that when extended to ethnically divided societies they have created both motives and means for the ethnic elites empowered by power sharing to escalate ethnic conflicts. No matter whether the ethnic elites intended it or not, this escalation has tended to threaten the consolidation of peace and democracy” (2005: 36).

Ian Spears, another pronounced critic of power-sharing arrangements, is convinced that they “are inherently unstable or are contingent on long-term international commitments, and are therefore not always conducive to durable peace” (Spears 2002: 129). He points out a number of conceptual problems power-sharing is suffering from: First, the condition of a perceived external threat – which Arend Lijphart believed to be a favorable condition for the establishment of coalition governments in divided societies – is almost always lacking in most (African) post-conflict states. The threats rather have domestic roots and are therefore unlikely to promote cooperation among the different groups (2002: 125). Second, drawing on the South African case, Spears points out that consociationalism is often not the cause for tolerance between the belligerents, but the result of it. From this, he concludes that “power-sharing is most likely to succeed where it is least needed” (2002: 132). Critics of power-sharing offer several alternative approaches as ‘solutions’ to civil wars. Rothchild and Roeder, for instance, propose “power dividing” as an alternative and offer evidence for its superiority when it comes to “deterring the escalation of normal ethnopolitical conflict into ethnonational crises” (2005: 51). This approach seeks to
empower “multiple majorities, each construing the public interest somewhat differently, in separate, independent organs of government”, and by “balancing and checking a majority in one governmental organ against several majorities in other organs” it provides “more credible commitments to the rights of all minorities” than the consociational model does (2005: 52).

b) Domination

Aside from these rather moderate alternatives to power-sharing, there are also some who propose much more radical ‘solutions’ to civil wars. Convinced that power-sharing will fail in the long run, it is sometimes suggested that the strongest warring party should be given exclusive access to formal governmental authority. Domination of the executive by one of the former warring parties typically implies the total or near total exclusion of other groups from political power. In societies divided by a history of ethnic conflict (for instance Burundi, Macedonia or Rwanda), ethnicity becomes the sole pillar for political power and “provides clear lines to determine who will be included and who will be excluded” (Horowitz 1993: 18). In those cases where the dividing line was more ideological than based on ethnic factors (as in Angola or Mozambique), the dominant party typically controls access to political power based on party membership or based on personal loyalties and patronage networks, as it was vividly illustrated during the period of Charles Taylor’s presidency in Liberia.

Advocates of an essentialist or primordialist worldview are convinced that civil wars – in particular ethnic conflicts – are the result of deep-rooted hatred between antagonistic groups. They believe the enmity between the groups to be so large that political or institutional measures designed to bridge the tensions are doomed to failure (see e.g. Geertz 1963; Shils 1957; see also C.1). Chaim Kaufmann, for instance, is convinced that “restoring civil politics in multi-ethnic states shattered by war is impossible because the war itself destroys the possibilities for ethnic cooperation” (Kaufmann 1996: 137). He therefore proposes to physically separate the different (ethnic) groups into “defensible enclaves” because this reduces both the incentives and opportunities for future combat (Kaufmann 1996: 137; see also Kaufman 1996).17 His policy recommendation is rather sobering:

“This means that to save lives threatened by genocide, the international community must abandon attempts to restore war-torn multi-ethnic states. Instead, it must facilitate and protect population movements to create true national homelands. Sovereignty is secondary: defensible ethnic enclaves reduce violence with or without independent sovereignty, while partition without separation does nothing to stop mass killing (Kaufmann 1996: 137).”

17Nicholas Sambanis offers an empirically founded critique of this viewpoint. His starting point is that partition theorists offer little proof for their claims going “beyond a handful of self-selected cases”. Sambanis therefore conducts a large-n, quantitative analysis in order to test the effectiveness of partition as a solution civil wars. He comes to the conclusion that “partitions do not help prevent recurrence of ethnic war and that they may not even be necessary to stop low-level ethnic violence” (2000: 439).
Some essentialists and staunch realists even go beyond that. The most pronounced and cynical position views war not as an expression of political conflict, but as a way to resolve it. This leads to the proposition to ‘let them fight it out among themselves’ (see also Collier 2003). In his controversial essay ‘Give War a Chance’ (published in Foreign Affairs) Edward N. Luttwak makes precisely this argument. He mourns that “since the establishment of the United Nations […] wars among lesser powers have rarely been allowed to run their natural course” (Luttwak 1999: 36; emphasis added). For him, “the key is that the fighting must continue until a resolution is reached”, which can either be a stalemate or a decisive victory by one party (1999: 36). A somewhat similar argument was suggested by Jeffrey Herbst in his article ‘Let them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice’, in which he argues that state failure has many historical precedents and should again be seen as a “‘normal’ aspect of global society” (2004: 311–316). In accordance with these propositions, some civil wars in the past two decades indeed ended through a one-sided victory by one of the belligerent groups. In most cases, the winning party was the government-side already during the conflict, which means that it simply continued to dominate the government in the post-conflict era. (This was the case, for instance, in Angola after the effective defeat of the UNITA rebels, see section A.2). There are hardly any cases in which the rebel-side yielded control of the government through a military victory. Liberia under Charles Taylor comes closest to this constellation, but his rule was not based directly on a military victory, but rather on a peace-agreement struck after a military stalemate, followed by his successful showing in the national elections in 1997 (see 6.2). Cases in which the ‘winner’ is generated through elections rather than a military victory are far more frequent. Examples include Mozambique (see 5.2), El Salvador (see 5.3) or Côte d’Ivoire (see 6.3).

To sum up, the distribution of executive power is one of the crucial questions to address in post-conflict societies. The two options – power-sharing vs. domination – denote the two poles of a highly controversial normative debate about the right way to govern post-conflict societies. This normative controversy shall not be in the center here. ‘Power-sharing’ and ‘domination’ are rather viewed as analytical categories, depicting merely if and how governmental power is distributed between the former warring factions. However, it must be kept in mind that what we are interested in are not merely formal-procedural characteristics of power-distribution, but the effective distribution of power across the former warring parties.\(^{18}\) Often, parties engage in political power-sharing agreements without the actual will to share power with their opponents (see e.g. Jarstad and Nilsson 2008: 211) and sometimes power-sharing agreements become a mere facade to the continued domination of the government by one of the conflict parties. This was for instance the case in Rwanda (see sections 7.2 and A.16) or in Tajikistan (see sections 7.3 and A.18). Such situations are treated here as instances of political domination rather than of power-sharing.

\(^{18}\)As Florian Bieber reminds us: “When either devising a power sharing system or examining an existing case, it is important to make sure that the institution […] actually has power. Without power, there can be no power sharing” (2005: 86).
2.2 Relations Between the Former Belligerents

The second dimension captures the relations between the warring parties themselves and, contained therein, their commitment to peace. The key question here is the extent to which the former warring parties in post-conflict polities are able and willing to engage in true and honest cooperation. The literature on peacemaking distinguishes two groups of arguments that may account for a possible lack of cooperation: a) those claiming that “combatants do not want to reach a settlement”, and b) those claiming that “combatants cannot agree on a settlement” (Walter 1999: 130–131). Although both statements refer to pre and during-settlement phases, they are just as relevant in post-settlement environments where agreements are implemented.

The first group of explanations focuses on the belligerents’ motivations and attributes the failure to strike or implement peace agreements to a lacking willingness to commit to peace. The literature on the origins of armed conflict – which focuses on belligerents’ motivations for starting rebellions – is of great help here. In recent years, this literature has been dominated by a distinction between ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ as two competing explanations for the outbreak of civil wars (see e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2002; 2004).

19Greed-based theories explain the outbreak of insurgencies by the private gains they produce for the insurgents. In this logic, rebels start rebellions in order to gain control of valuable resources or because of the rents and benefits associated with the control of the state apparatus (see C.1.1 for further detail). The belligerents’ willingness to commit to peace depends on the overall opportunity structures offered by peace and war, respectively. Insurgents engage in peace negotiations if a) they promise to change the rebels’ payoff-matrix such that fighting becomes only the second-best option, or b) out of purely tactical considerations, for instance in order to deceive their enemies about their true intentions, gain international recognition, gain time to re-arm and the like. Any settlement is doomed to failure as soon as fighting, in the cost-benefit calculations of the insurgents, becomes more beneficial or ‘profitable’ than maintaining the status quo. As Isak Svensson puts it, “[f]uture incentives for exploitation will make it difficult for an actor […] to credibly commit to uphold mutually beneficial deals” (2007: 179). The general assumption of economic explanations, therefore, is that “[e]lites make agreements with their adversaries only when it suits their interests” (Spears 2000: 108).

20Grievance-based theories explain the outbreak of armed conflicts with reference to political grievances – injustice, discrimination, repression, social exclusion, etc. – that certain groups within a society are subject to and which they

---

19Note that this distinction is criticized for being reductionist and misleading. In the appendix, a more fine-grained distinction of conflict theories is contained that incorporates a greater variety of factors (see C.1). However, for the sake of simplicity I confine myself to these two perspectives here.

20Spears makes this argument with a specific focus on Africa, but, as the case studies confirm, it seems to hold true as a general statement about post-conflict elites as well. See on this aspect also Stef Vandeginste, who argues: “[D]es leaders politiques peuvent bien faire semblant d’accepter un arrangement consociatif, et même de souscrire formellement à une constitution un tel arrangement. En réalité, dans un contexte de méfiances et de craintes mutuelles entre ‘ennemis de longue date’, ils le font pour des raisons stratégiques et avec comme objectif ultime un contrôle au lieu d’un partage du pouvoir” (2008: 58–59).
want to redress by resort to armed force. Peace agreements, in this logic, are likely to be successful only to the extent that they promise to address these grievances, and the insurgents’ commitment to peace in the post-settlement phase depends on the degree to which these promises are met (see C.1.1 for further detail).

Aside from the greed/grievance dichotomy, the literature on armed conflict has identified many other factors which potentially determine whether belligerents behave constructively or obstructively. For instance, there is the argument, going back to I. William Zartman, that a certain level of conflict escalation is imperative for the parties to seek settlements and accept negotiated settlements in the first place. In this logic, the more hurting a civil war is perceived by both parties, the more likely they will stick to a negotiated settlement (see Zartman [1985] 1989; 1993; 2000b; 2001b, see also section 11.2.1 in the appendix).21 There is also the counterargument that the parties’ inclination for constructive relations declines with a rising level of conflict intensity and duration. This logic can also be found in the ‘conflict trap’ argument (Collier 2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; 2006), which basically states that the “characteristics or attributes of the previous war […] explain why a second or third war might occur” (Walter 2004: 372).

The second group of explanations addressed above stipulates that belligerents can often not agree to settlements despite the fact that all of them have a preference for peace, or they fail to meet their commitments in the implementation phase of agreements. The argument is that structural characteristics of settlement of post-settlement situations impede effective cooperation between belligerents although both of them have benevolent intentions. This aspect has become known as the ‘commitment problem’ in the literature (Fearon 1995; 2004; Gilady and Russett 2002; Mattes and Savun 2009; Powell 2006; Walter 1997; 1999). Rooted in the rational-choice tradition of conflict analysis – which conceptualizes armed conflict as “a continuous bargaining process” (Gilady and Russett 2002: 396) – the commitment problem arises because “the inability to make credible commitments under anarchy can make it impossible for disputants to locate a bargain that would avoid a costly fight” (Fearon 1995: 6). This problem often emerges with regard to the disarmament and demobilization of the factions. Although factions may be willing to disarm, they can never be sure whether their opponents actually fulfill their disarmament commitments as well. Since no party can be assured that the adversary fulfills its obligations, a considerable leap of faith from both parties is required. The lack of trust and the inability to make credible commitments prevent each side from making the first step. This problem is particularly pronounced in post-conflict environments because these suffer from “deeper societal cleavages, more fragile institutions, and greater temptations toward exploitation

21 This argument also matches the empirical evidence that shorter wars tend to recur more frequently than longer wars (see Walter 2004: 373). Note, however, that Walter relates this not only to a lack of commitment of the former warring parties, but also to the signaling effects wars have on other potential rebel groups: “Governments that fought a short war against one set of challengers and governments that ended a previous war in partition were significantly more likely to face a violent challenge from a new rebel group. […] One war does appear to provide important information to other potential combatants about the potential costs and outcome of their own contest” (2004: 385).
2.2 The Typology

than any other kind of state attempting to democratize” (Walter 1999: 139). Overcoming commitment problems requires security guarantees by third parties. Walter defines them as “any implicit or explicit promise given by an outside power to protect adversaries during the treaty implementation period” (1997: 345).22

When analyzing existing post-conflict environments, the key question is therefore to determine how honest and cooperative the former belligerents actually are or how the problems inhibiting successful cooperation can be overcome. Are post-conflict elites “easily brought into the opportunism of statesmanship and commitment to undertaking genuine reconciliation and peace building in the immediate post-war era” or do they “carry on with business as usual, hardly differentiating between warlordism and statesmanship” (Sesay et al. 2009: 6)? Two simple analytical categories are introduced here in order to capture this difference: constructive and obstructive relations. In the first case, both conflict parties accept the status quo of the post-conflict situation, whereas in the second case at least one of the conflict parties is interested in changing the status quo and improving its position – disregarding the fact whether this party is in a position to actually set this change in motion.23 Both dimensions shall now briefly be described.

a) Constructive Relations

Post-settlement situations are generally difficult environments to evoke cooperation among the former belligerents. The atrocities committed during the war or the benefits to be gained from continued rebellion may reduce the parties’ commitment to peace. There are nonetheless situations in which the warring parties switch to a conciliatory modus operandi in the post-conflict period, and in which they engage in true and honest cooperation. This is subsumed here under the category of constructive relations. The presence of constructive relations can be assumed whenever there is indication that all conflict parties a) seem to believe that maintaining peace is preferable to recourse to violence, and b) stick to past agreements even if they turn out as disadvantageous for them. This does not imply that the former adversaries suddenly have to ‘like’ one another, but simply that – for whatever reason – they are committed to maintain the post-settlement status quo.

Based on the discussion above, one factor that may explain this commitment are benevolent intentions. This may have several origins. There are situations in which the insurgents only had limited goals, which were effectively fulfilled by the provisions of the peace

22Concrete mechanisms for overcoming commitment problems are discussed in the next section on the manner of external intervention in post-conflict environments.

23A similar distinction is used by Barnett and Zürcher, who distinguish between four kinds of peacebuilding outcomes: cooperative, compromised, captured and conflictive peacebuilding (2009: 24–25). A similar distinction can also be found in Clements et al, who argue that “[t]he relationship between state institutions and other sources of social order may be constructive, but it might also be destructive or neutral” (Clements et al. 2007: 59). Here, the focus is on the former warring parties in general (which may or may not be part of formal state institutions), and ‘neutral’ relations (if this exists) are subsumed under the category of constructive relations.
agreement. Macedonia, where many of the ethnic-Albanian demands were accommodated in the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’, is a case in point (see 3.2). In such circumstances where the ‘root causes’ of the conflict are addressed, the relations of the rebels may be more cooperative than in situations where this is not or only partly the case. In addition to that, there are also situations in which one side – typically the rebels, but sometimes also the government – accepts being defeated. In ideological conflicts, the reason for this may lie in a change in the broader ideological environment – most importantly the end of the Cold War. This factor undoubtedly played a role in Mozambique (see 5.2).

Another possibility is that – with the help of third-party mediators – an arrangement is found that satisfies all participants to a degree that makes fighting an unattractive option. As highlighted in the next section, external actors have a number of opportunities to promote cooperation among civil war antagonists both during and after peace settlements, and some of these options also address the belligerents’ inclination to recourse to arms. By facilitating side-payments or other forms of compensations, rebel leaders may be accommodated such that cooperating becomes more attractive for them (see e.g. Gilady and Russett 2002). Or, the credible threat of coercion communicated by third parties impels them to give up their obstructive intentions.\(^\text{24}\) When applied as an analytical category for capturing the relationship between antagonistic elites in post-conflict environments, the actual causes behind rebel leaders’ constructive stance are secondary. What matters is the presence of relations that can be called constructive. The clearest indicator for this is when the warring parties make concrete steps for implementing the promises made during peace negotiations.

b) Obstructive Relations

Unfortunately, the adversaries in post-conflict situations do not always have good intentions. There are many cases in which “civil war combatants have no real desire to negotiate and simply go through the motions because outside pressure, military considerations, or reputational concerns encourage them to do so” (Walter 1999: 133). Among those, Ian Spears draws a distinction between “unreformable extremists who would profit from continued violent conflict […] and hard-liners who ultimately have an interest in peace even if they do not care for their power-sharing partners […]” (2002: 134). But even if they have good intentions, cooperation among the former belligerents in post-settlement situations may fail due to the impossibility to make credible commitments, as noted above. Independent of its origins, such limited levels of commitment or cooperation between power-elites in post-conflict societies are subsumed here as obstructive relations. Obstructive relations imply that the signatories of peace-agreements are in principle ready to go to war, and will do so whenever they believe it to be necessary or beneficial.

As highlighted above, obstructive relations may arise because self-seeking rebel leaders forestall the implementation of peace agreements or defect from past promises in order

\(^{24}\)For the theoretical underpinnings of this strategy of ‘coercive diplomacy’, see Alexander George (1991).
2.2 The Typology

to realize private gains. This problem is discussed most prominently in the literature on civil war spoilers (Greenhill and Major 2007; Stedman 1997). Stedman’s spoiler framework has been a significant contribution in that it shifted the focus to agents and their characteristics, and offered strategies for ‘spoiler management’. Spoilers are “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (Stedman 1997: 5). Spoilers, therefore, only emerge “when there is a peace process to undermine” (Stedman 1997: 7). Stedman distinguishes between limited, greedy and total spoilers, depending on their goals and commitments. Limited spoilers follow certain limited goals to whose realization they are nonetheless strongly committed. Total spoilers, in contrast, are driven by radical ideologies and are determined to realize their goals by all means. A medium position is occupied by greedy spoilers, whose goals are contingent upon cost-benefit calculations (Stedman 1997: 9–11). Greedy spoilers generally do not have a genuine interest in peace, but rather “participate in seemingly endless negotiations for the sake of material benefits […]” (Tull and Mehler 2005: 392). If an agreement is nonetheless reached, they constantly tend to undermine it in order to gain additional benefits that are otherwise unreachable.

However, as captured by the concept of total spoilers, we cannot assume that the conflict parties may always act rationally. Though there might be cases in which the parties’ “attachment to a political agreement is a function of one’s relative power, what one anticipates the power balance to be in future, and one’s observations of an opponent’s previous behavior” (Spears 2002: 128), such pure cost-benefit calculations are certainly not always the main driving force of post-war relations. Obstructive relations may, for instance, arise because the parties feel a deep-rooted contempt for one another and carry their mutual hatred into the post-settlement phase. The literature on the origins of armed conflict contains a number of arguments that go beyond rational or structural explanations, for instance those that conceptualize ethnic cleavages as arising from ‘ancient hatreds’ and unalterable (primordial) differences (Horowitz 1999: 346; see also Kaufmann 2005: 197). Since it is, after all, implausible to assume that armed conflict can be traced back to monocausal factors, the sources of obstructive behavior are likely to be multiple (for a systematic discussion of different conflict theories, see C.1). Which theory holds better depends on the characteristics and goals of the warring parties and the history of the underlying conflict.

25For a refined version of the spoiler framework, see Greenhill and Major (2007).
26See on this aspect in particular Christopher Cramer (2006). He reminds us that already Clausewitz, who is often reduced to an entirely instrumental understanding of warfare, was convinced that the initiation of warfare requires a multitude of different factors, and he explicitly included emotional factors.
27I. William Zartman for instance, who generally believed that belligerents follow cost-benefit calculations and only seek peace negotiations when a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ is reached, admitted himself that some conflicts are rather driven by “true believer” cultures, in which the conflict parties act largely irrational (2000b: 240).
Chapter 2 Patterns of Post-Conflict Polities

The more tragic (since avoidable) source of obstructive post-war relations stems from the structural environment in which conflicts and their settlements take place. Relations may be obstructive although none of the conflict parties actually wants this. The main reason here lies in the lack of guarantees to ensure that the other parties will fulfill their part of the deal. Following this logic, the greatest impediment to the implementation of peace agreements in post-conflict polities is the lack of security guarantees among the parties, which gives rise to a situation similar to the security dilemma in classical International Relations theory, the so called domestic or ethnic security dilemma (Kaufman 1996; Posen 1993; Roe 1999; Rose 2000). This becomes apparent with regard to the disarmament provisions contained in many peace agreements. Walter vividly illustrates the dilemma faced by parties willing to disarm:

“As groups begin to disarm, they create an increasingly tense situation. The fewer arms they have, the more vulnerable they feel. The more vulnerable they feel, the more sensitive they become to possible violations. And the more sensitive they become to violations, the less likely the are to fulfill their side of the bargain” (1999: 134).

In sum, the distinction between constructive and obstructive relations captures the warring parties’ actual commitment to civil war settlements. This distinction helps to distinguish between cases of actual commitment to peace and situations in which the parties’ commitment to peace does not go much beyond a mere lip-service. However, it should be noted at this point that this distinction potentially bears a great potential for misunderstandings, because it may easily be taken to be tautological if constructive relations are equated with peaceful and obstructive relations with conflicting outcomes. This objection is only partially valid. Clearly, constructive relations may increase the chances for lasting peace, but it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for it. There are cases where the recurrence of violence could be prevented despite clear signs that the relations are obstructive, and there are situations where commitments collapsed despite the presence of constructive relations. This will be illustrated more vividly in the case studies below.

2.2.3 Intervention by External Actors

The third dimension of the typology describes how external actors influence local dynamics. It captures the relations between external actors and the former warring parties. Is external influence targeted at both conflict parties equally or does it affect one of the conflict parties more than another? In other words, to which extent can external engagement be conceptualized as partial? Due to the large variety of external actors’ engagement in post-conflict environments, selectivity and abstraction are necessary when comparing external influence across a larger set of cases. As explained in the analytical framework (section 2.1.2), the focus here lies on the most influential external actors, i.e. those who have enough leverage in order to convince or coerce domestic actors to behave in a specific manner. UN missions, engagements by powerful state-like actors (for instance the engagement of
2.2 The Typology

the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone or of the EU in Macedonia), or regional alliances and initiatives (for instance the ECOWAS engagement in Liberia) certainly fall under this category.

As already argued in the introduction, the normative underpinnings of external engagements in post-conflict environments have been subject to significant transformation in the past decades. This has found its expression most notably in the altered standing of the neutrality principle. For many decades the guiding principle for the UN-led external engagements, it has clearly lost in importance in light of such developments as robust peace-enforcement missions and the emergence of new forms of interventionism (see e.g. Chesterman 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 1; Durch 2006: 3; see also page 5). New norms such as the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ require to go beyond neutrality because they are contingent upon the willingness to use force in a partial manner if necessary (see e.g. Doyle 2001; Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 1). The literature on third party mediation – which has for a long time embraced neutrality as its key value (see e.g. Bercovitch 1985: 739) – has also come to the recognition that partial forms of mediation are often more effective (see Kleiboer 1996: 369; Mayer 2004; Svensson 2007). This illustrates that neutrality can no longer be assumed as a guiding principle for post-conflict interventions. This is most vividly illustrated in Afghanistan or, more recently, Libya, but also in robust UN peace operations like the one in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

This has been reflected for instance in attempts by third parties to address commitment problems, which nowadays often require to abandon the neutrality principle. With regard to external security guarantees, a general distinction can be drawn between “fear-reducing” or “cost-increasing” provisions (Mattes and Savun 2009: 742). The deployment of traditional peacekeeping troops is the classical example for fear-reducing provisions. By monitoring the implementation of agreements and implementing, for instance, buffer-zones between the warring parties’ territories they can effectively reduce the concerns of both parties and hence induce cooperation. This may, depending on the situation, still count as a neutral manner of engagement. Cost-increasing provisions are present when third parties make credible efforts to deter spoiler behavior, for instance by deploying peace-enforcement missions backed by a robust mandate. By definition, this requires the willingness to engage in a partial manner. As Dennis Tull highlights, “robust peacekeeping requires more than rhetorical acrobatics by UN officials […]” (2009: 227). In particular with regard to peace spoilers (see 2.2.2), a consensus has emerged that it is sometimes necessary to “neutralize” them if buying off or accommodating turns put as insufficient (see Spears 2002: 134).

However, it must be noted that the degree of partiality is not something that external actors can control by themselves. It is “essentially a matter of perceptions of the parties in conflict” (Kleiboer 1996: 369). As perceptions in post-conflict environments are particularly sensitive, hardly any case of post-conflict intervention would count as entirely impartial in the eyes of domestic actors. Here, the focus is not on perceptions of the domestic parties but rather on external actors’ intentions. This is expressed by the categories
mediative and partisan intervention. Mediative intervention implies that external parties attempt to reconcile between the conflict parties without openly privileging either of the two conflict parties. This engagement may or may not be perceived by the parties as impartial. What matters is the extent to which external actors are truly interested in easing the tensions between the belligerents. Partisan intervention, in contrast, means that external actors intentionally and systematically privilege one of the conflict parties at the expense of others. Obviously, if this is the case, all parties will also perceive the intervention as being partial (this is discussed in more detail below).

Most cases of external engagement in post-conflict environments can be coded as either mediative or partisan, although there are some in-between cases which lie somewhere between the two categories. However, during the classification of the cases contained in appendix A it became clear that a third category of external engagement is necessary in order to capture those cases in which external actors position themselves above (and not only between) domestic actors. This is for instance the case when external actors establish transitional administrations in post-conflict countries, as in Kosovo or East Timor (see e.g. Chesterman 2004 and Caplan 2005). These are cases of supreme intervention in the terminology of the typology. Though, in effect, transitional administrations are often set up in order to support the cause of one specific group and in this sense are highly partisan (for instance the Albanians in Kosovo or the Timorese in East Timor), they are still of a different quality than other forms of intervention, and must therefore be subsumed under their own category. All three categories are now discussed in further detail.

a) Mediative Intervention

In most cases of post-conflict intervention, external actors attempt to mediate between the conflict parties and encourage mutual cooperation (though they often fail to achieve this goal). This can take many forms. Classical peacekeeping missions aim at ensuring that ceasefire and peace agreements are respected by the parties. In addition to that, external actors may promote institutions for reconciliation, establish institutions for transitional justice, promote the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, organize elections, or engage in activities of a similar kind. The ultimate aim of these different measures is to stabilize peace settlements and prevent the recurrence of violence in the future. However, as mentioned in passing above, mediative intervention does not necessarily imply that external actors never show any bias for either of the conflict parties, or that they are perceived by them as impartial. There are many situations in which mediation succeeds because external actors have a certain bias (see Kleiboer 1996 and Svensson 2007). Sometimes, a bias against certain parties is clearly necessary in order to discourage spoilers and prevent them from torpedoing settlements. The main difference to cases of partisan intervention is that this bias is merely tactical, but not systematic or strategic.

External actors can perform a number of other mediating functions in post-conflict societies below the threshold of direct military engagements. One of them is the construc-
2.2 The Typology

tive settlement of disputes that may occur between the conflict parties in the post-conflict period. This role is often performed by those parties that were already involved in the negotiation of the peace agreements, like the International Contact Group in Liberia (see A.13) or the ‘troika’ consisting of the US, the (former) USSR and Portugal in Angola (see A.2). There, too, the dividing line to partisan engagement is thin. As Ian Spears puts it:

“The international community can have an important role in pressuring local actors to abide by the terms of an agreement or in protecting uncertain and vulnerable partners in a peace process, but this pressure and protection can also obscure the actual character and intentions of local actors” (2002: 132).

This, once again, indicates that there may be important differences between the intentions and the effects of external intervention. Even if the intentions of external parties are mediative, the local parties may perceive it as an intrusion into their internal affairs. Especially when external actors intervene on behalf of minority groups, the majority population tends to perceive this as an illegitimate and unfair form of intervention. This was, for instance, visible in Macedonia, where a number of powerful external states significantly backed up the Albanian minority (see 3.2).

b) Partisan Intervention

Partisan intervention describes the other end of the spectrum of third party intervention. It implies that external actors’ behavior is partisan both in its effects and its intentions. In other words, it means that external actors do not even try to behave in a neutral manner, but that they openly support only one group of post-conflict actors at the expense of the other(s). Partisan intervention usually occurs whenever external actors conceive of one of the conflict parties as being illegitimate, mostly because their core values appear incompatible with those promoted by external actors. As noted above, external actors’ inclination to engage in a partisan manner has been increasing in recent years. Two factors have played a role here: First, the emergence of new forms of intervention has generated a new normative environment for all forms of external intervention, including post-conflict engagements. Second, the new security environment after 9/11 has generated a general mistrust against certain groups suspected of supporting international terrorism.

In cases of partisan intervention, external actors effectively impose their own agenda on the target countries and do not refrain from engaging in active and prolonged combat against certain groups declared as enemies of the values or the political system their were trying to impose. This may occur on different levels. The most obvious case is that of a military intervention, which explicitly aims at defeating one of the conflict parties. Afghanistan, where external actors have strategically supported the so called “Northern Alliance” in an attempt to gain the upper hand against the Taliban and other declared enemies of the western statebuilding projects, is a case in point (see A.1). A one-sided military intervention of this kind has little resemblance with ordinary peace operations,
and statebuilding efforts in such places must rather be considered post-invasion than post-conflict interventions (see e.g. Barnett and Zürcher 2009; Paris and Sisk 2009a). Due to its central importance in the statebuilding literature, Afghanistan is included in the group of cases discussed in the appendix, but other cases – most notable Iraq, are omitted.28

However, external actors may be highly partisan also below the level of direct military intervention. Especially during the Cold War, the ‘great powers’ have developed strong biases for or against certain groups that have sometimes persisted beyond the end of the superpower confrontation. In Angola for instance, the United States were reluctant to give up its support for UNITA – its former ally against the Marxist-Leninist MPLA – in the immediate Cold War period although UNITA increasingly acted as a peace spoiler. For a while, this prevented the US administration to recognize MPLA as Angola’s official government despite the fact that they were democratically legitimized (see A.2). In a similar fashion, a number of states – most notably Russia – still deny Kosovo official recognition and therefore prevent the country from reaching the required majority in the UN General Assembly that is necessary to become recognized as a new state (see A.12). Below, Rwanda and Tajikistan are discussed as examples for partisan forms of external engagement. In both cases, the engagement by external actors remained below the threshold of direct military engagement. As this shows, external actors have a number of different possibilities for acting in a partisan manner below the level of direct military intervention.

c) Supreme Intervention

The third category – supreme intervention – links back mainly to the debate about transitional administrations (see Caplan 2005; Chesterman 2004). Cases of transitional administration differ from ‘ordinary’ post-conflict interventions by the fact that external actors effectively become the primary sovereign authority in a foreign territory. This is not in itself a new phenomenon. As Simon Chesterman points out, historical precedents include the mandates system established on behalf of the Covenant of the League of Nations after the end of World War I, the administration of foreign territories by the League under the Treaty of Versailles (most notably: the Saar Basin, the Free City of Danzig, and Upper Silesia), the allied occupation of Germany between 1945 and 1949, the United Nations trusteeship system, and the administration of ‘non-self-governing territories’ by UN member states (2004: 12–47). In most contemporary cases, supreme external engagement is designed as a temporary measure to stabilize post-conflict countries, often in order to bridge the time until certain domestic actors have acquired enough capacity in order to take matters in their own hand. Chesterman views transitional administrations as a special (and less

28Iraq is not part of the sample of cases discussed in this dissertation since the US-led intervention was not preceded by a civil war. In this sense, Iraq is much more clearly a case of ‘post-invasion’ intervention than Afghanistan, which had suffered a long and bloody civil war between the end of the Cold War and the Western invasion.
2.3 Overview of the Polity Types

The typology presented in section 2.2 above consists of six different types of post-conflict polities for which actual empirical cases can be found (see also table 2.2 on page 62). Two of them are based on power-sharing and the others are characterized by the domination of the executive by one of the conflict parties. The aim of this section is to briefly characterize
Chapter 2 Patterns of Post-Conflict Polities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Polity Type</th>
<th>Chapter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing</td>
<td>mediative</td>
<td>Constructive Power-Sharing with mediative external intervention (‘Let’s Share Polities’)</td>
<td>Chapter 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Obstructive Power-Sharing with mediative external intervention (‘Doomed to Share Polities’)</td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domination</td>
<td>mediative</td>
<td>Constructive Domination with mediative external intervention (‘Let the Winner Take it All Polities’)</td>
<td>Chapter 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Obstructive Domination with mediative external intervention (‘The Winner Took it All Polities’)</td>
<td>Chapter 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partisan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Obstructive Domination with partisan external intervention (‘You Stay Out Polities’)</td>
<td>Chapter 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supreme</td>
<td></td>
<td>Obstructive Domination with supreme external intervention (‘Benevolent Intrusion Polities’)</td>
<td>Appendix, sections A.3; A.8; A.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2: Overview of the Polity Types

these polity types and to point out their general features and differences before they are described in detail in the ensuing five chapters. A general overview of the conflict and peacebuilding characteristics for these cases can be obtained from appendix A.

2.3.1 Power-Sharing Polities

As can be inferred from table 2.1 on page 44, two types of power-sharing polities can be empirically distinguished: cases of mediated, constructive power-sharing and cases of mediated obstructive power-sharing. Both are situations in which some effective degree of executive power-sharing is present and in which external actors attempt to mediate between the conflict parties. Cases of power-sharing in which external actors intervened in a partisan manner proved empirically irrelevant.

As already noted, the sixth polity type, ‘benevolent intrusion’ polities, is excluded from this detailed analysis because it exclusively comprises cases belonging to the category of transitional administrations (Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor). As this is already a well-established and well-studied analytical category (see e.g. Caplan 2005; Chesterman 2004), it is unnecessary to discuss them again in this dissertation.

Cases of power-sharing in which external actors intervened in a partisan manner proved empirically irrelevant.
between the former belligerents. Ian Spears – a pronounced critic of power-sharing – rightly pointed out that “power-sharing cannot be about coalitions between friends, but rather must be about reconciliation between enemies” (Spears 2002: 126). However, the case material reveals great differences with regard to the manner by which these ‘enemies’ treat one another. In some cases the former belligerents show at least a basic commitment to the provisions of the power-sharing arrangement and maintain a basic degree of cooperation. These constructive power-sharing cases are also called ‘Let’s Share’ polities here. Unfortunately, this basic level of cooperation is lacking in many other power-sharing cases. There, effective cooperation between the conflict parties fails, either due to a lack of trust or real commitment to the terms of the power-sharing arrangement. These obstructive cases of power-sharing cases are henceforth also called ‘Doomed to Share’ polities in order to underline the reluctant manner by which the parties commit to power-sharing.

a) ‘Let’s Share’ Polities

‘Let’s Share’ polities describe a situation in which the conflict parties cooperate constructively, share governmental power effectively (though not necessarily equally), and in which tensions, if they occur, are settled by external actors mediating between the conflict parties. Although this appears to be a rather idealistic account of post-conflict dynamics, there are a few cases that at least approximate this ideal, albeit often with major restrictions. Only two cases in the sample were classified as instances of ‘Let’s Share’ polities: Macedonia\(^3\) and Burundi (see table A.1 on page 327). Though both cases differ greatly with regard to their conflict and some of their post-conflict characteristics (among many other factors), they are both unusually constructive cases of power-sharing. The Macedonian insurgency – a minor armed conflict with not more than a few hundred casualties – ended with a broad-based power-sharing agreement struck, after considerable external mediation, between the ethnic-Albanian insurgents and the predominantly ethnic-Macedonian government (see 3.2 and A.14). In contrast to that, Burundi suffered a decade-long civil war fought between the Tutsi-dominated government and various Hutu rebel groups, which cost an estimated 200,000 lives. Despite that, the government and one of the main insurgent groups could agree on a wide-ranging power-sharing formula in 2002 that, initially at least, marked a promising and widely-hailed end to a bloody civil war (see 3.3 and A.4). (Over time, however, more and more tendencies for an increasing domination of the political system by the ruling party have become apparent based on which it could plausibly be argued that Burundi is in the process of switching to an authoritarian, domination-style system.) This polity type is discussed in detail in chapter three.

---

\(^3\)Note that, for pragmatic reasons, the name ‘Macedonia’ is used here instead of the official name FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).
Patterns of Post-Conflict Polities

b) ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities

Power-sharing is a frequent feature of peace-agreements, and it is often advocated for its qualities to resolve armed conflicts. However, the number of cases that can actually live up to this ideal is surprisingly small. Only two cases fell into the ‘Let’s Share’ type discussed in the previous chapter. Far more frequent are cases in which power-sharing is in fact applied, but where it deviates markedly from the ideal consociational polity advocated by the power-sharing literature. Analyzing the empirical material indicates that, often, wide gaps exist between the rhetoric of power-sharing and the actual implementation of it. While situations labeled power-sharing are frequent, its implementation is often hampered by a lack of cooperation among the former belligerents. This is expressed in the second post-conflict polity type, ‘mediated, obstructive power-sharing’ or ‘Doomed to Share’ polities, which stand for a particular kind of power-sharing situations in which the parties are only reluctantly engaged. In some cases, it becomes obvious that power-sharing is often not more than a pretext allowing one of the conflict parties to continue the concealed domination of the other. As the goal of this dissertation is to privilege the de facto characteristics of a political system over the formal ones (see 2.1.2), such polities are rather treated as situations of domination ‘in disguise’ than power-sharing cases. However, empirically distinguishing actual from ‘virtual’ situations of power-sharing is often not easy. There exists a considerable gray-zone of cases which could arguably be classified as both cases of power-sharing or cases of domination, depending on the standard one applies. The criterion used here is whether the power-sharing arrangement constitutes an effective check to the executive or whether it is merely an attempt to mask the latter’s exclusive hold on power. In total, five cases are treated as instances of this type here: the government of national unity (GURN) in Angola (1997 – 1998), the power-sharing arrangement implemented after the Lomé peace accords in Sierra Leone (1999 – 2002), the National Transitional Government (NTGL) in Liberia (2003 – 2005), the power-sharing arrangement implemented as part of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2003 – 2006), and the power-sharing mechanism implemented after the adoption of the Ouagadougou Accords in Côte d’Ivoire (2007 – 2010) (see table A.1 on page 327). Two of them – Sierra Leone and the DRC – are discussed in more detail in chapter four below; the others are discussed in appendix A.

\[32\] Obviously, all four cases are African cases, but this does not imply that this polity type is confined to the African continent. This outcome is rather the result of the large number of African cases relative to those in Asia, Europe and Latin America (which, in turn, is a direct consequence of the high incidence of armed conflict in Africa). In principle, ‘Doomed to Share’ polities can (and possibly will) emerge outside the African continent. That two cases (Liberia and Sierra Leone) are West-African cases is likewise a coincidence. Although the two conflicts were closely intertwined (see the respective case discussions), there was no systematic bias for power-sharing arrangements, and other settlement arrangements have been tried out at earlier stages in both conflicts.
2.3 Overview of the Polity Types

2.3.2 Domination Polities

Despite the dominance of power-sharing institutions as a normative role-model for civil war settlements, power-sharing cases are comparatively rare. In the majority of post-conflict situations, one of the former conflict parties effectively enjoys exclusive access to formal governmental authority. These cases fall in the category of domination polities. Domination polities may come into being for several different reasons. Sometimes, one of the conflict parties simply defeats all others on the battlefield and emerges as the uncontested governing authority in the new polity, as it recently happened in Sri Lanka. More often, it is the case that one of the parties wins a clear majority during post-war elections. If, at the same time, the political system is strongly centralized and does not contain any clear-cut rules for political power-sharing, the winning party becomes – at least in formal terms – the dominant authority of a post-conflict territory. Proponents of power-sharing conceive of domination polities as inherently conflict-prone, but there is significant variation with regard to its effect on the stability of peace. In some cases, the exclusion of one of the conflict parties from governmental power was accompanied by a relatively constructive post-conflict order (as in Mozambique), while in other cases it became evident that transferring power exclusively to one of the conflict parties was counterproductive (as in Angola after the 1991 Bicesse Accords, see section A.2 or in Liberia after Charles Taylor won the elections, see sections 6.2 and A.13). In the former case, the excluded parties more or less accept that they have lost the war and/or the electoral contest. Instead of rebelling against the dominant party, they rather seek to increase their influence through future electoral contest. These are situations of constructive domination. In contrast, in the latter case a basic consensus about the post-conflict order is lacking and the excluded parties resist their own expulsion from political power. These are cases of obstructive domination.

Furthermore, in the case of domination polities the distinction between the different categories of external intervention (mediative, partisan and supreme intervention) becomes relevant. In a number of cases, external actors are clearly trying to mediate between the conflict parties and make sure that conflicts emerging in the polity are settled in a constructive manner. This was the case for instance in Mozambique or Côte d’Ivoire (see sections 5.2 and 6.3, respectively). In other cases, it is evident that external actors collaborate with one of the conflict parties – typically the one controlling the government – and direct their actions against the other (excluded) party. This happened most notably in Afghanistan (section A.1) but, on a different level also in cases such as Rwanda or Tajikistan (sections 7.2 and 7.3, respectively). Finally, as noted above, there are situations in which external actors intervened in a post-conflict situation in a supreme manner, i.e. by becoming the central governing authority themselves. This leads to four different kinds of domination polities (excluding those for which no empirical cases were found): Two types in which external actors intervened in a mediative manner (‘mediated, constructive domination polities’ and ‘mediated, obstructive domination polities’, or ‘Let the Winner
Chapter 2 Patterns of Post-Conflict Polities

take it all’ polities and ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities, respectively), one type in which external actors intervened in a partisan manner (‘partisan, obstructive power-sharing polities’, also called ‘You Stay Out’ polities), and one type in which they intervened in a supreme manner (‘supreme obstructive domination polities’, also called ‘Paramount Intrusion’ polities). 33

a) ‘Let the Winner take it all’ Polities

Post-conflict polities that fall under the category mediated, constructive domination have in common that the former conflict parties maintain by and large constructive relations despite the fact that only one of them is actually participating in the government. Those parties not represented in the government accept the fact that they are effectively excluded from political participation and that one of their former enemies is now ‘running the show’ alone. This is why they are called ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities. External actors are engaged in this situation in a mediative manner, by attempting to settle conflicts that may – despite the presence of constructive relations – occur, and by running all kinds of supportive activities ranging from the delivery of aid to the maintenance of security. The reasons for the high level of constructiveness prevailing in this polity type may vary. It may for instance be the case that the rebels pursued limited goals which do not necessarily require being in control of the government, and that these goals were addressed by the peace agreement. Or it may happen that one side was thoroughly defeated on the battlefield and therefore effectively surrendered by accepting a peace-agreement (or the outcome of elections) although it is detrimental to the realization of its own goals. Although, at first glance, stipulating that the defeated parties will simply accept the fact that they are excluded from the governance of a polity about whose control they have fought a bloody civil war appears unrealistic, there is a number of cases that actually falls into this category. In total, four cases are subsumed under the ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ category: El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone after the elections in 2007 (see table A.1 on page 327). Mozambique and El Salvador are discussed in more detail in chapter five below, the others are discussed in the appendix.

33 Cases in which external actors intervened in a partisan manner while domestic actors maintained constructive relations make little sense, and no empirical cases for this phenomenon are contained in the sample of cases underlying this dissertation. However, when including historical cases of external engagement, one could subsume many colonial interventions under this class. Colonial powers frequently became engaged in a previously constructive situation and then decided to support specific local groups or tribes at the expense of others. The most tragic examples for this are clearly Rwanda and Burundi, where power-struggles propelled by this artificial distribution of power led to prolonged civil wars and even triggered genocides in both countries (see A.4 and A.16). The same holds true for cases of supreme intervention. In all cases contained in the sample, the warring parties maintained obstructive relations. However, the case of supreme, constructive intervention makes at least sense theoretically. It would denote a situation in which external actors, with the consent of domestic parties, agree to take on key government functions, for instance due to a severe lack of domestic capacity.
2.3 Overview of the Polity Types

b) ‘The Winner took it all’ Polities

Unfortunately, it happens rarely that parties excluded from participation in the government simply accept their own defeat, be it in on the battlefield or the ballot-box. More frequent are situations of domination amidst obstructive relations. The clearest indicator is when the excluded party rejects being dominated by any means that fall short of organized mass violence (otherwise we could not speak of a post-conflict situation). This can range from passive resistance to open hostility, with a lot lying in between. But it might also be that the governing party (ab)uses its authority in order to suppress the excluded party – obviously in this case the relations must be regarded obstructive, too. ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities subsume cases of obstructive domination in which external actors intervene in a mediative manner. Because the excluded parties typically do not give their consent to political domination, this polity type also carries the name ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities. This highlights the lack of consent and cooperation between the conflict parties. In total, nine cases are subsumed under this polity type: Cambodia (after the 1993 elections), Côte D’Ivoire (the period between the adoption of the ‘Linas-Marcoussis Agreement’ of January 2003 and the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement of March 2007), Sierra Leone (the period starting with the election of May 2002), the DRC (the period following Joseph Kabila’s election for president in 2006), Haiti (the period between Aristide’s downfall and the elections in 2006), Angola (since 2002), Tajikistan (between 1996 and 2001) and two Liberian cases (the period of Charles Taylor’s presidency and the situation after the elections in 2006) (see table A.1 on page 327). Liberia during the presidency of Charles Taylor and Côte d’Ivoire are discussed in detail in chapter six.

c) ‘You Stay Out’ Polities

The two cases of domination described above had one central communality: the fact that external actors intervened, in a mediative manner. Although they sometimes pressure the warring parties to commit to the terms of the respective peace agreements – and although a clear preference for either of the warring parties is often expressed – the ultimate goal of the engagement is to monitor or enforce a settlement between the parties. This is not always the case. There are cases in which external actors explicitly align themselves with one of the conflict parties and mostly act in their favor. This may be the case because they have a vested interest in the stability of the country in question (for instance due to security concerns or access to natural resources) or because they view the contending party as dangerous or illegitimate (for whatever reason). In the terminology of this dissertation, this is referred to as a partisan form of intervention. Afghanistan is the clearest contemporary example for this manner of external engagement, but it is strictly speaking not a classical case of post-conflict intervention. There, external actors have done more than trying to mediate between different groups of post-conflict actors. They have not only started a war, but have also systematically taken sides for certain conflict parties (most notably
Chapter 2 Patterns of Post-Conflict Polities

those from the so called ‘Northern Alliance’) in the post-settlement phase. This effectively
excluded the Taliban and other groups considered to be incompatible with their liberal
statebuilding project from political participation (see A.1). Next to Afghanistan, there
are a number of cases in which the partisan characteristics of external intervention were
less clearly visible: Haiti (after Bertrand Aristide was reinstalled in office), post-genocide
Rwanda and Tajikistan since 2001 (see table A.1 on page 327). The two latter cases are
discussed in detail in chapter seven.

d) ‘Benevolent Intrusion’ Polities

The last group of post-conflict polities comprises those situations in which external actors
not only intervene in a post-conflict situation in a mediative or partisan manner, but in which
they effectively become the supreme authority in the country themselves. By definition,
this is a situation of political domination; therefore the category supreme intervention
only exists for domination polities. In theory external actors can attempt to become the
sovereign in a territory despite the presence of constructive relations between the warring
parties. This situation would come close to what happened during the colonial period, but
(luckily) there are no cases fitting into this type in the post-Cold War period. Therefore, all
cases of supreme domination fall under the obstructive category. Typically, external actors
intervene in a supreme manner because they see this as the only possibility to enforce peace
between the conflict parties. At least the external actors themselves typically perceive their
engagement as benign, therefore this polity type can also be called benevolent intrusion.
Currently, there are three cases that fall under this polity type: Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo and East Timor, discussed in sections A.3; A.8; A.12, respectively.

2.4 Patterns of Interaction in Post-Conflict Polities

Next to constructing the typology and classifying the various cases, the second declared
goal of this dissertation is to identify differences in the interactions of the warring parties
in the different polity types. This requires identifying a) within-type similarities, i.e.
similar patterns of interaction for those types that fall within one type, and b) across-type
differences, i.e. differences in the interactions of post-conflict actors that can be attributed
to the structural characteristics of the various polity types. Ideally, this allows us to gain
further information about what being part of a certain polity type implies for a specific
post-conflict country. For instance, knowing that Macedonia is classified as a ‘Let’s Share’
polity, what implications does this have for the inner dynamics at work in this polity? Does
this tell us something about how ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians compete for
political power? Or about the prospects for promoting good governance in post-conflict
Macedonia? More generally the question is whether certain regularities can be identified
which allow observers to infer characteristics about a post-conflict country by knowing
that it forms part of a particular polity type. If so, the typology would have fulfilled its purpose of enabling *descriptive inference* (see 1.2.2).

In order to capture differences in the post-conflict dynamics of the various polity types, a common vocabulary is helpful which stretches through the different polity types. This section presents a number of possible *patterns of interaction* with which the heterogeneity of post-conflict interactions can be captured in a systematic manner. These are relatively abstract concepts by which a broader range of actual empirical modes of interaction can be subsumed. For instance, one of these patterns of interaction, ‘virtual cooperation’, describes a situation in which parties pretend to cooperate while, in reality, at least one of them tacitly but willingly undermines this cooperation. This can then be applied to interactions among warring parties (for instance between Joseph Kabila and various other rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) or to interactions between warring parties and external actors (for instance the attempts of the RUF rebels in Sierra Leone to make the international community believe that they are interested in peace). During the work on the cases it became apparent that all of the observed patterns of interaction can be ordered into a simple analytical matrix that consists of two dimensions: whether the parties’ interactions are based more on cooperation or confrontation, and whether the parties’ gestures and actions are more genuine or more virtual (see figure 2.2 on page 69). This matrix can be applied both to the interactions between the former warring parties themselves and to their interactions with external actors. This leads to the eight basic patterns of interaction discussed below. They can be used to complement the analytical framework developed above, as shown in figure 2.3 on page 72.
2.4.1 Patterns adopted by the Warring Parties

**Genuine Cooperation.** Genuine cooperation is a pattern the warring parties may adopt when dealing with each other or with external actors. It implies that the parties engage in true and honest cooperation and that there is a close match between their rhetoric and their actual behavior. Genuine cooperation is most likely the case when the relations between the belligerents are constructive, but it does not necessarily follow from the presence of constructive relations. There are cases where, despite the presence of constructive relations, the relations between the warring factions are more closely following the ‘virtual cooperation’ pattern described below. Burundi is a case in point. Though, overall, the relations at the beginning of the post-conflict polity can be described as constructive, genuine cooperation between the belligerents has been becoming rare over the course of the polity (see 3.3). Genuine cooperation strategies can find their expression in a number of specific gestures the parties may adopt. One of these gestures is called ‘demonstration of goodwill’. It denotes a strategy that is likely to be applied when parties want to underline their willingness to engage in genuine cooperation. Especially for parties that have a reputation as being a potential spoiler due to their past conduct, it may be important to demonstrate their commitment to the peace process in order to avoid sanctions or repressions from external actors. The parties’ demonstration of goodwill may be purely rhetorical (for instance by simply re-affirming the commitment to the peace process by making promises about future behavior), or it may require to make a number of real (and often painful) concessions. Obviously, the latter option is more credible and effective, but also more costly for the conflict parties.

**Virtual Cooperation.** The opposite of the above pattern can be called ‘virtual cooperation’. It implies that the warring parties pretend to cooperate with each other while in effect they covertly continue to follow their own, private agendas. This is a relatively common pattern of post-conflict interactions. Often, the preceding conflict history or the commitment problem (see 2.2) prevent the parties from engaging in true and honest cooperation. We can assume ‘virtual cooperation’ to be the case when there is evidence that the parties make false promises and merely pay lip service to the principles of the post-conflict settlement. Obviously, ‘virtual cooperation’ is much more likely in cases where the relations between the warring parties are obstructive than in situations where they are constructive, but especially in situations with great power imbalances between the parties it may be the case that the stronger party engages in a strategy of ‘virtual cooperation’ despite the presence of constructive relations. One frequent mechanism by which ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies become apparent are ‘foot dragging’ gestures. ‘Foot dragging’ is a strategy that the warring parties adopt towards external actors when they want to gain access to benefits or avoid sanctions without actually fulfilling external actors’ demands. The difference between ‘virtual cooperation’ and ‘foot dragging’ is that the former strategy is mainly applied among the warring parties themselves, whereas the latter
is addressed to external actors. ‘Foot dragging’ is a very frequent pattern of interaction, and as the case studies suggest, it is among the more successful strategies which the warring parties can choose when aiming at averting external pressure. It consists of a prolonged strategy of making promises and then seeking excuses why they cannot be met.

**Genuine Confrontation.** Genuine confrontation is a pattern of interaction that is characterized by confrontational measures which go beyond rhetorical or symbolic hostility. Genuine confrontation implies that a party intentionally adopts measures which interfere with the goals of other parties and which may lead to an escalation of the tensions prevailing between two parties. It can be adopted by a conflict party either with respect to their (former) enemies or with respect to other external actors. For instance, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone was strongly opposed to the enforcement of its disarmament obligations by the United Nations and therefore adopted a highly confrontational approach with regard to the international community. The rebel group took about 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers hostage and systematically seized weapons and ammunition from the UN peacekeepers. These gestures were clearly more than symbolic attempts to demonstrate their discontent against the extension of the disarmament efforts to its core areas (see 4.3.2). A more specific mechanism identified in the case studies that can be subsumed here are *calculated escalation* strategies. They imply that a party intentionally adopts confrontational means because it expects specific gain and benefits. For instance, some ethnic Macedonian hardliners in Macedonia repeatedly tried to torpedo the peace agreement struck with the ethnic Albanian minority in an attempt to gain more political support from the conservative electorate. By engaging in such attempts for political competition ‘on the cheap’ they took an escalation of the political tensions into account (see 3.2.2).

**Virtual Confrontation.** In contrast to genuine confrontation, virtual confrontation describes a pattern of interaction in which parties adopt various confrontational gestures which do not aim at bringing about an escalation of the relations. Instead, their goal is to underline their willingness and ability to obstruct the peace process if its demands are not met. One specific attempt to make use of virtual confrontation strategies are *Saber rattling* gestures in which one of the warring parties aims at underlining its ability to derail the peace process if certain demands are not met. The ability to credibly adopt ‘saber rattling’ gestures requires the party to possess at least a certain degree of *de facto* power. Such a strategy is generally chosen whenever a party is unable or unwilling to make the necessary concessions demanded by external actors or the other group of former warring parties. An example for the use of ‘saber rattling’ gestures is the former Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo, who orchestrated anti-UN riots in an attempt to protest against the UN’s attempts to clear the way for presidential elections (see 6.3.2). The success of ‘saber rattling’ gestures depends on many variables, including external actors’ willingness and
Figure 2.3: Possible Patterns of Post-Conflict Interactions

capability to constrain the spoilers. Another strategy that the warring parties may apply when interacting with external actors is called blaming and shaming. It is a strategy by which the conflict parties mutually try to marginalize and delegitimize each other in the face of the international community. The general idea is to convince external actors of one’s own virtues while pointing at the same time to the deficiencies of their enemies. Often, the ultimate rationale is to persuade external actors to switch from a mediative to a partisan manner of engagement to one’s own benefit.

2.4.2 Patterns adopted by External Actors

**Genuine Accommodation.** Genuine Accommodation is a pattern of interaction by which external actors seek to maintain peace or post-conflict stability through accommodating the wants and needs of one or more of the warring parties. An example for this is the attempt to bridge the asymmetry that may exist between the former belligerents by giving financial benefits to the weaker party and enable it, for instance, to successfully run an electoral campaign. This played a role for instance in Mozambique and El Salvador (see chapter 5). More general examples include external actors’ attempts to overcome
commitment problems by providing security guarantees to specific parties. This has played a role in many of the cases discussed below.

**Virtual Accommodation.** Virtual accommodation differs from genuine accommodation in that external actors’ only adopt symbolic attempts to accommodate the conflict parties’ wants and needs. It involves certain concessions awarded to the former belligerents but they often only fulfill the purpose of masking a more coercive strategy. Virtual accommodation strategies have played a role during the National Transitional Government in Liberia, which was established after Charles Taylor’s resignation in 2003. In order to accommodate the warlords’ hunger for political power, external actors enabled them to gain a fraction of governmental power by allowing them to participate in a transitional government. Although they bolstered themselves that they were heading “an administration for warring factions” in which civilians have nothing to say (International Crisis Group 2004f: 13), the international community at the same time adopted measures that “in effect put Liberia under a form of international supervision for three years” and greatly limited the warlords’ room of maneuver (Ellis [1999] 2007: xxvii). Hence, virtual accommodation strategies almost always imply a readiness to use more coercive measures in case the buying-off strategy fails.

**Genuine Enforcement.** Of course, there are also cases in which the international community does stand firm and is really willing to enforce its vision of post-conflict order. This can be called genuine enforcement. It implies that external actors are both able and willing to use coercive measures in an attempt to impose specific provisions on the former warring parties. Genuine enforcement often requires that external actors are willing to remain engaged in a post-conflict situation in the long run and not only for a short temporary period. Genuine enforcement can be observed for instance in present-day Liberia, where external actors have been engaged through the UNMIL mission since 2003 and where they continue to play a vital role for the maintenance of peace and security (see A.13).

**Virtual Enforcement.** Virtual enforcement occurs when external actors pretend to use coercive means while in reality they fail to effectively constrain the warring faction’s scope of action. This situation occurs because external actors lack the willingness or the ability that is necessary for genuine enforcement measures. The result is a halfhearted attempt for peacebuilding in which external actors’ official goals and actual achievements diverge drastically. There are various examples for virtual enforcement strategies. The attempts to stabilize the power-sharing government in the DRC are a case in point. Despite a robust peace-enforcement mission, external actors repeatedly failed to prevent the resurgence of combat activities or atrocities committed against the civilian population (see 4.2).
2.4.3 Dimensions of the Empirical Analysis

When trying to empirically illustrate the dynamics unfolding in the different polity types, it is warranted to confine the analysis to specific dimensions of interest rather than focusing on the interactions as a whole. This enables a better comparability of the different cases (both with regard to within-type and across-type differences) and allows to make more specific statements about the observed dynamics. Four such dimensions or overarching themes turned out as the most relevant ones during the empirical investigation: the prospects for overcoming commitment problems in the post-settlement phase, the manner of competition for attaining formal authority, potential threats to the stability of the polity, e.g. arising from imminent political crises, potential spoilers or other destabilizing elements, and the prospects for promoting good governance in the various post-conflict polity types. These four themes also provide the structure for the case studies below. They were chosen because they are widely discussed in the literature and because they are potentially relevant in all polity types, irrespective of their individual characteristics.

Dealing with commitment problems has been discussed above (section 2.2.2) as one of the core problems in the initiation phase of post-conflict polities, but it is also a problem that remains highly relevant in the implementation phase of peace agreements. Political competition is another core theme in the literature on post-conflict peacebuilding and plays a central role for instance in Roland Paris’s work (2004 and 1997). Given the highly diverse characteristics of the different polities, it can be suspected that the manner of political competition differs widely across polity types. Dealing with threats and imminent political crises, for instance due to the presence of spoilers, is a third core theme in the literature on post-conflict peacebuilding. Issues related to that are discussed at various places in this dissertation, most notably in section 2.2.2, but also in the appendix, section C.2.1. The promotion of good governance is possibly the most widely addressed aspect in the literature on post-conflict peacebuilding. Chapters one and two highlighted that promoting good governance has become the dominant goal of post-conflict interventions in the post-Cold War era but at the same time made clear that the shift from murky post-conflict situations to consolidated, democratic states succeeds hardly anywhere. It therefore makes sense to investigate how the promotion of good governance principles differs across post-conflict polity types.
Chapter 3

‘Let’s Share’ Polities

As highlighted above, power-sharing is a frequent feature of civil war settlements, but its actual qualities may differ drastically. Ideally, the belligerents in post-conflict situations are all committed to the idea of power-sharing and engage in at least a basic level of cooperation. Although this is what the proponents of power-sharing often assume in their models, a glance at actual cases suggests that such constructive examples of power-sharing are relatively rare. Only two cases in the sample fall into this category: Macedonia after the adoption of the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’, and the early period of the power-sharing agreement struck after the latest civil war in Burundi (see table A.1 on page 327). Admittedly, both cases are so different from one another in terms of their historical and socio-cultural backgrounds that comparing them might appear like an unfruitful exercise at first glance. To mention only a few differences: Burundi is a post-colonial country, whereas Macedonia has a post-communist background. They are geographically remote and at strikingly different stages of development.\footnote{In 2008, Macedonia was on the 68\textsuperscript{th} rank of the Human Development Index, Burundi on the 172\textsuperscript{th} rank (see UNDP 2008).} Although they are both slightly smaller than Belgium, Burundi has about four times as many inhabitants – around eight million – as Macedonia (see Coleman 2008j and Coleman 2008c). However, the cases also have a few important things in common. In both of them, the armed conflicts were terminated through the implementation of power-sharing arrangements. Compared to other cases of power-sharing (in particular those classified as ‘Doomed to Share’ polities, see chapter four), the warring parties maintained relatively constructive relations in the settlement phase and at the beginning of the ensuing post-conflict situation. Furthermore, external actors intervened in these cases in a mediative manner, i.e. with the overarching goal to mitigate tensions occurring between the belligerents.

In addition to that, there are a few commonalities that go beyond the typology itself. In both countries, the population is ethnically divided into a majority and a minority group. Two thirds of Macedonia’s population are ethnic Macedonians (and Roman Catholics), whereas about one fourth are ethnic Albanians (and Muslims) (see Coleman 2008j: 2). By the same token, in Burundi members of the Hutu ethnic group comprise around 85 percent of the population, while members the Tutsi ethnic group only represent about...
14 percent (see e.g. Uvin 1999: 256).\footnote{This is similar to Rwanda. In both countries the colonial powers capitalized on these differences through supporting centralized Tutsi rule as the means of administration. At independence, the Hutu seized power in Rwanda, but Burundi became a Tutsi monarchy (see Uvin 1999 and UCDP 2010a).} As will be argued below, these particular ethnic constellations mattered for the outbreak of both conflicts and constitute the background against which the major post-conflict dynamics unfolded. Also, both cases are examples in which power-sharing was not simply a transitional measure for bridging the time until national elections took place, but where power-sharing provisions became permanent features of the countries’ constitutions.

3.1 A basic Model of ‘Let’s Share’ Polities

Before going into detail about the two cases, this section aims at adapting the generic model of post-conflict interactions (see figure 2.1 on page 42) to the specific context of ‘Let’s Share’ polities. The goal is to specify the general assumptions made about post-conflict interactions in section 2.4 to this particular environment. For each of the four dimensions of interest (overcoming commitment problems, manner of political competition, threats from within, and promoting good governance), I develop stipulations about the dynamics and interactions that can be expected to occur in this polity type. These stipulations do not serve as hypotheses which I try to prove in the empirical chapters, but rather as a foil for the actual dynamics and interactions observable in the cases.

The basic features of ‘Let’s Share’ polities are schematically sketched in figure 3.1 on page 77. As the figure illustrates, the two groups of the former warring parties (called ‘Side A’ and Side B’ in the figure) are both part of the formal government and maintain constructive relations (illustrated by the two black arrows connecting them). At the same time, external actors have a mediative and non-discriminatory influence on the dynamics unfolding between the warring parties (as illustrated by the arrow connecting external actors and the dashed line around the former belligerents). What can be inferred from this basic constellation about the interactions between the different parties? In general, it seems fair to assume that the former warring parties engage in genuine (rather than merely virtual) cooperation and that they do not in principle refuse to share power with their former enemies. It is reasonable to assume that they accept the status quo and come to terms with the provisions of the power-sharing arrangement. External actors’ main goal is to stabilize the post-conflict situation by mediating conflicts occurring between the conflict parties as well as by trying to influence the domestic environment according to their own understanding of a ‘good’ post-conflict peace. It can be assumed that the constructive stance of the former belligerents requires a less costly and potentially also shorter engagement than it is the case in obstructive polity types. This potentially increases external actors’ inclination to engage in ‘genuine enforcement’ efforts. However, even ‘Let’s Share’ polities may confront external actors with unforeseen developments requiring
3.1 A basic Model of ‘Let’s Share’ Polities

![Diagram of 'Let’s Share' Polities](image)

Figure 3.1: 'Let’s Share’ Polities (simplified illustration)

a decisive reaction. It depends on the particularities of the cases whether external actors are able and willing to react to these challenges in an adequate manner. In the following, these assumptions are specified further with respect to the four polity dimensions on which the analysis focuses.

**Overcoming Commitment Problems.** Above, it was noted that commitment problems may arise either due to malevolent intentions held by the former belligerents, or due to problems in the structural environment of settlement and post-settlement situations (2.2.2). While both of these problems may arise in ‘Let’s Share’ polities, it is reasonable to assume that they pose less difficulties than it is the case in other polity types, for two reasons: First, the fact that both of the former belligerent groups hold a share of formal authority and thereby a certain control over the means of coercion (most notably the command of the national army) ensures that none of them will be entirely marginalized in the post-conflict polity. Second, a proven record of constructive relations (for instance with regard to the negotiation of a peace treaty) potentially increases mutual trust. Both factors favor the overcoming of commitment problems. In addition to that, the successful establishment of power-sharing is often a reflection of a strong external influence in the initiation phase of the polity, which is often accompanied by granting effective security guarantees (see 2.2). All this indicates that ‘Let’s Share’ polities offer a fruitful environment for overcoming commitment problems in the post-settlement phase.
Chapter 3 ‘Let’s Share’ Polities

Manner of Political Competition. One of the defining characteristics of ‘Let’s Share’ polities is that the parties do not generally contest the current distribution of formal authority. Both of them accept the status quo and are ready to share power. However, based on the assumption that all parties in post-conflict polities (even relatively constructive ones) in principle strive for increasing their relative share of power in the future (section 2.4), the parties are likely to engage in intense political competition after a certain while. In power-sharing cases, the incentive to squeeze one’s opponent out of the government in the future may be particularly high, which may account for the relations between the parties to become more confrontational. In this process, the power-sharing provisions are likely to not only regulate political competition, but to become themselves the subject of political competition over time. As the critics of power-sharing have pointed out, this may foster ‘centrifugal tendencies’ (see 2.2), the ‘reification’ of ethnic identities and the socio-cultural segregation of the different communities (see Sisk 1996: 39).

Threats from Within. In all post-conflict situations – whether constructive or obstructive ones – there is a heightened potential or ‘greater temptation’ for political hardliners or ethnic entrepreneurs to exploit political opportunities for realizing private gains than in other contexts (section 2.2.2). In particular in relatively constructive situations, political hardliners have strong incentives to engage in attempts for political mobilization ‘on the cheap’ by portraying constructive politicians as traitors of their cause. In power-sharing situations in divided societies, there is the constant possibility that influential individuals or radical parties use the allegedly ‘unfair’ power-sharing provisions as a pretext for triggering diffuse fears against the minority population. And even for moderate politicians, the temptation to employ sectarian policies in order to yield a better starting position in the future may be present. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that single parties fall back to some of the more detrimental maneuvers like ‘calculated escalation’ strategies (by which a party aims at artificially provoking a crisis from which it expects to gain politically) or ‘foot dragging’ strategies (by which a party takes a gradual undermining of the power-sharing principles deliberately into account). This may give rise to political crises with the potential to destabilize the polity over time. These crises potentially provide a slippery slope, causing the relations between the parties to become more confrontational over time. This makes it necessary for external actors to go beyond the role of passive bystanders. Most notably, they must be able and willing perform the role of a watchdog – i.e. to observe the political developments in the polity and be prepared for short-term, decisive interventions if the conditions on the ground call for it. Whereas external actors’ willingness is predominantly a political question, their ability mainly hinges upon their

---

Note that this is the main argument emphasized by Roland Paris (2004), i.e. that political competition is a potentially destabilizing factor in post-conflict environments.

4 See, on this aspect, the discussion about ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ in section C.1.4 in the appendix.
control of credible and effective sticks and carrots with which they can influence the situation on the ground.\(^5\)

**Promoting Good Governance.** One of the main assumptions made about the interactions between the various post-conflict actors in section 2.1.2 above is that external actors seek to affect local dynamics by influencing domestic constraints and opportunities, but that domestic actors have strong reservations against external attempts for promoting good governance. They strive for the benefits (or carrots) offered by external actors but seek to avoid the costs (or sticks) associated with external influence. In ‘Let’s Share’ polities this pattern of interaction could be particularly pronounced because external actors are likely to engage in a genuine (and not merely virtual) manner of enforcement. However, we can also expect them to hail ‘Let’s Share’ polities as show-cases for successful post-conflict peacebuilding. This potentially causes them to lose the critical distance necessary for a grounded assessment of the developments taking place on the ground and renders them incapable of sharply conceiving the shortcomings and dangers occurring in this polity. This problem is referred to as ‘euphemistic blindness’ in section 2.4 above and may induce external actors to interpret formal successes as real achievements without cross-checking whether they actually match the political realities on the ground. This, in turn, enables domestic actors to engage in extensive ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies with which they are able to keep external influence at arm’s length.

### 3.2 Macedonia

Macedonia\(^6\) was once one of the six constituent republics of the Yugoslav Federation until it declared independence in 1991. The country is an unusual post-conflict case, for the simple reason that it has not experienced any large-scale armed conflict at all. It was spared the tragic fate that some of its neighboring states on the Balkans went through. However, it

---

\(^5\)In IR theory, a similar theme is discussed in the context of theories on ‘coercive diplomacy’ (George 1991). Coercive diplomacy is a strategy which states use in order to compel other states to take specific actions or refrain from taking specific actions. It consists of a legitimate demand, backed by clearly communicated and credible threat that certain sanctions will follow if the target state does not comply. In this theory, the credibility of the threat depends on the demonstrated willingness and capability of the intervening state to implement the threat (see Craig and George 1995: 180). Although the theory of coercive diplomacy does not apply in this context, the criteria ‘willingness’ and ‘capability’ can be transferred as critical conditions for the credible disbursement of benefits and the imposition of sanctions in the context of post-conflict environments.

\(^6\)Note that the name Macedonia is ambivalent, as it refers at the same time to the larger historical area called Macedonia, a Greek province, and the nation-state officially called Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). After Macedonia declared its sovereignty, this triggered a name dispute with Greece, which prevented its recognition as a sovereign state by the European Community. Responding to Greek objections, Macedonia was recognized by the United Nations as a sovereign state under the name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 1993 (Coleman 2008j: 7–11). Unless otherwise stated, the term Macedonia (as in ‘Republic of Macedonia’) is used here for referring to the Macedonian nation-state.
was still the site of a six-months long insurgency (fulfilling the requirements for a ‘minor armed conflict’ in the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’) that left a few hundred people dead, and that could have turned into a larger armed conflict at any time (see Chivvis 2008: 144). Despite its low intensity, the armed insurgency left heavy marks in Macedonia’s political landscape and gave rise to an entirely different political framework than before the outbreak of the conflict.

Macedonia is an ethnically and religiously heterogeneous country. About 67 percent of the population are ethnic Macedonians of Roman Catholic belief, while some 23 percent are ethnic Albanians of Muslim belief. The remaining ten percent of the population consists of Turks, Serbs and Roma and other minorities (Coleman 2008j: 2).7 This makes Macedonia today “one of the last truly multi-ethnic states in the Balkans” (Chivvis 2008: 142). This plurality has not been without problems. As the International Crisis Group remarked, the different ethnic groups have “co-existed uneasily” since the country had declared independence in 1991, but nonetheless managed to maintain by and large peaceful relations (2001f: 1). The Albanian insurgency that erupted in 2001 suddenly ended this state of coexistence.8 The key driving force behind the conflict was the perceived political and cultural marginalization of the Albanian minority, which motivated the main rebel group – the NLA (‘National Liberation Army’) – to carry out attacks against government institutions (International Crisis Group 2001f: 1; see also Stanisevski and Miller 2009: 557 and Kim 2001: 4–5).9 What started as a single attack by the NLA against a police station in the town of Tearce on 22 January 2001 over time turned into an enduring insurgency driven by sporadic attacks against Macedonian security forces.

Unlike in most other cases discussed in this dissertation, the rebels had rather limited goals. Instead of trying to gain the control of the capital or following a secessionist agenda, the NLA’s main goals were to rectify the constitutional bias favoring ethnic Macedonians (referred to by Albanians as ‘constitutional nationalism’), to demand recognition for the Albanian minority as a “second official constituent nation”, and to eliminate a number of linguistic and educational disadvantages from which Albanians had been suffering for years (see Bieber and Keil 2009: 345–346).10 The NLA leadership underlined that it was

---

7Note that, unlike the Tutsi in Burundi, the Albanian minority geographically concentrated in the West (see Friedman 2005: 386).
8For a concise overview of the Macedonian conflict, see for instance Alice Ackermann (2002).
9Reducing this conflict to ethnic factors as such, however, would be wrong. As Stephen Hensell (2003) points out, the Albanian uprising should rather be seen as a resistance of excluded, mostly rural Albanians that were denied access to both ethnic-Macedonian and ethnic-Albanian patronage networks. The sources for these exclusion processes, he argues, can be found in the incomplete modernization process that Macedonia underwent both in the socialist and in the post-socialist period.
10The Macedonian constitution contains a number of ambiguous provisions that – either symbolically or in material terms – clearly is to the benefit of the Macedonian majority. In Bellamy’s words: “On one hand it guarantees the equality of all its citizens regardless of sex, race, nationality or religion (Article 9). […] However, the constitution also describes Macedonia as, ‘the state of the Macedonian people’ (preamble), suggesting to the country’s minorities that the ethnic Macedonians have a higher status” (Bellamy 2002: 124).
fighting to keep Macedonia together, not to divide the country. As its leader Ali Ahmeti stated, the main Albanian concern was about living “as equals in our land and be treated as citizens” (quoted in Bellamy 2002: 120). These limited goals, in conjunction with the absence of atrocities committed on a large scale, put Macedonia in a relatively good starting position to seek a quick resolution to the conflict.11

Although various measures to accommodate the Albanian insurgents were implemented soon after the outbreak of the rebellion, violence did not stop before August 2001, when the parties signed the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ after extensive international pressure. In the course of this, the Macedonian-dominated government agreed to address key Albanian concerns, while the NLA in turn accepted to be disarmed by an international force. The ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ underlined that “Macedonia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” as well as the “multi-ethnic character of Macedonia’s society must be preserved” (Government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2001; par. 1.2 – 1.3) and outlined a range of constitutional amendments to be adopted in the ensuing months (Annex 1). This marked the beginning of the post-conflict phase, in which many of the provisions of the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ were implemented.

3.2.1 Macedonia as a ‘Let’s Share’ Polity

The ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ was drafted as a “compromise that reflects the interests of the three major negotiating actors: the Macedonian government, the ethnic Albanians, and the international community (the United States and the European Union)” (Stanisevski and Miller 2009: 559). This gave rise to a political constellation that fulfills the requirements of a ‘Let’s Share’ polity: an effective degree of power-sharing between the parties, the prevalence of constructive relations between the former belligerents, and a mediative engagement by external actors.

Effective Power-Sharing. Macedonia is one of the few post-conflict countries with a history of pre-war power-sharing governments involving the belligerent parties. Since the country’s independence in 1991, Albanian parties had frequently been included in government coalitions (see e.g. Stanisevski and Miller 2009: 557). Despite that, “the political domination of the majority ethnic Macedonians was evident” and often led to a feeling of misrepresentation and suppression among ethnic Albanians (Stanisevski and Miller 2009: 557). Thus, the political participation of Albanian parties in the government prior to 2001 must not be seen as an expression for an equal political status of both ethnic groups but rather as a sign for the relative political impotence of the Albanian part.12 The

11Comparing Macedonia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Florian Bieber argues that “[i]t is considerably easier to make peace after 8 months of skirmishes with around 200 victims than after 3 1/2 years of war and over 100,000 dead” (2008b: 7).
12See on this aspect also Stephan Hensell, who argues that the Macedonian leadership was effectively forced to include Albanian parties in order to fulfill external expectations for democratization. However, as Hensell points out further, this process must be seen as a clientellistic inclusion of single Albanian parties.
Chapter 3 ‘Let’s Share’ Polities

‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ marked a clear break with the past and fundamentally raised the political status of the Albanian minority. It modified Macedonia’s political landscape according to the principles of consociational democracy, for instance by strengthening the principle of proportional representation of ethnic groups and introducing a minority veto in order to block decisions that threaten the Albanian cultural identity (Stanisevski and Miller 2009: 557–558). The ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ was widely credited for the wide range of power-sharing provisions it contained, and observers remarked that it came “as close as you can get to the ideal of a civic democracy in an ethnically divided society” (Nicholas Whyte, quoted in Trbovich 2008: 397).

Unlike in some other cases of power-sharing, the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ was not a temporary power-sharing instrument devised to bridge the time until national elections provide for a new stable (and possibly non-inclusive) government to take over, but that it triggered an ambitious political reform process requiring a number of constitutional amendments to be passed over the subsequent months and years. In late 2001 and early 2002 the Macedonian parliament adopted a number of amendments that, among other things, established Albanian as an official language, set up a system of equitable representation in the public administration, and implemented a number of decentralization measures (Bieber 2008b: 17; see also Friedman 2009: 216). However, the agreement did not contain formal provisions requiring at the establishment coalition governments. Power-sharing was targeted at other concerns, most notably regarding the use of the Albanian language in the parliament, public positions reserved for national minorities and the requirement to revise the constitution’s preamble, whose pro-Macedonian bias was at the heart of the Albanian uprising (see Bellamy 2002: 139). These provisions are well in line with consociational theory:

“The provisions of the Framework Agreement are generally based upon the elements of consensual democracy as devised by Lijphart: government comprised of multi-ethnic coalition (although this is not explicitly anticipated with the Framework, it does function as a tradition since the early 1990s); obligation to provide equal representation in the state institutions for the minority communities; special parliamentary procedures (the right to a veto) and devolution of power via decentralization” (Mehmeti 2008: 73).

In conjunction, they guarantee an institutionalized form of power-sharing to which the parties have to adhere. Macedonia’s political landscape in the post-Ohrid period can therefore safely be considered an example for genuine (and not merely virtual) power-sharing. It has “effectively transformed Macedonia from an uneasy nation-state with some elements of accomodation to a power-sharing system which has opened the state to the Albanian community […]” (Bieber 2008b: 9).

into a Macedonian-dominated patronage-regime controlled by the president (2003: 138). In the German original: “Weil die demokratische Regierung wie auch das sozialistische Regime davor wesentlich auf Patronagesystemen ruhte, vollzog sich die Integration der albanischen Minderheit als klientelistische Einbindung einzelner Parteien in ein vom Präsidenten dekretiertes Konsensregime.”
Constructive Relations. The ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ addressed a range of delicate issues regarding both symbolic and material aspects of ethnic cohabitation. From an ethnic-Macedonian perspective, this could have been perceived as a threat to long-established practices and privileges, triggering anti-Albanian sentiments and creating an obstructive and competitive atmosphere between Macedonia’s two largest ethnic groups. There was some indication for this to be the case. Parts of the ethnic-Macedonian majority believed the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ to be “imposed on them by ‘pro-Albanian’ Western powers” (Engström 2002: 2) and ethnic-Macedonian media has at times portrayed the agreement as “a fatal indulgence to ‘terrorism’ which would put the country’s future existence under threat” (Brunnbauer 2002: 8). A number of Macedonian parties – usually those in the opposition – also tried to capitalize on criticizing or rejecting the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ (see e.g. Hensell 2003: 138). Most notably, two years after the agreement was signed two of the agreement’s signatories – among them the former Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski – challenged the document as being impossible to implement, and formulated plans for a secession of the country in an influential newspaper article (see Bieber 2008b: 35).

However, these events are not representative for the Macedonian-Albanian relations as a whole – neither for the political elites nor for the population. Plans for a secession of the country gained little political leverage and were rejected by a majority of the population (see Bieber 2008b: 36). As Brunnbauer makes clear, “[o]pposition to the Ohrid Agreement was mostly aired by nationalist intellectuals, the Macedonian media and political hardliners who all should not be taken as representative of the whole ethnic Macedonian population” (2002: 17–18). The population clearly illustrated its preference for constructive relations by voting against the conservative VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity) and for the more moderate SDSM (Social Democratic Union of Macedonia) in the 2002 parliamentary elections. This strongly accelerated the implementation of key provisions from the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ (International Crisis Group 2003d: i). The overall relations between the former belligerents can therefore be considered constructive if one abstracts from the usual degree of political opportunism that all parties adhere to.

Mediative Intervention. Macedonia has experienced the engagement of numerous external actors before, during and after the conflict. It is widely credited that they have played a crucial role for preventing the escalation of violence and in bringing about a settlement to the conflict. As Chivvis remarks, “[i]t is highly unlikely that Macedonia would have remained stable without the political and security support provided by NATO and the EU […]” (2008: 154). This firm grip of third parties is no surprise given its proximity to some of the most conflict-ridden states on the Balkans and its geographical position in the center of Europe. Having learned from the experiences elsewhere on the Balkans, the focus of this engagement lay on conflict prevention. Between 1995 and 1999, Macedonia hosted
Chapter 3 ‘Let’s Share’ Polities

the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), the first preventive force ever deployed by the United Nations (Bellamy 2002: 127). Before the eruption of the 2001 violence, Macedonia was therefore often “paraded as a prime example of successful conflict prevention” since it “had managed, by and large, to address internal grievances peacefully” until then (Bellamy 2002: 127).

After the events in 2001, external actors played a key role for preventing the escalation of the insurgency into a full-fledged armed conflict and for enforcing a peaceful settlement on the parties. The EU and NATO took the lead in this regard, as both of them were highly concerned that Macedonia would turn into the site of another large-scale armed conflict on the Balkans. NATO forces were engaged at the time of the 2001 incident in neighboring Kosovo as part of the KFOR mission, and two years earlier NATO had initiated a large-scale bombing campaign in Serbia after the failed peace talks in Rambouillet (see e.g. Dziedzic 2006: 324–326). NATO’s potential force and its demonstrated willingness to use it if necessary clearly were important reasons to dispel a possible escalation of the violence in Macedonia. Immediately after the beginning of the clashes, NATO increased its control of the Kosovo-Macedonian border and deployed an emergency team in Macedonia (Balalovska et al. 2002: 21). Thus, even without the use of a strong actual force, the NATO presence in the region must be seen as a factor that prevented a further escalation of violence and that had mediative effects on the belligerents.

In the post-Ohrid period, the European Union played out its repertoire of carrots and sticks in order to support a quick and complete implementation of the provisions contained in the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ (see e.g. Balalovska et al. 2002: 34). As Stanisevski and Miller point out, the agreement was only “accepted under intense pressure from the international community (the European Union and the United States) and with the possibility of a bloody civil war looming in the background” (2009: 561). External actors also played a key role in managing a number of political conflicts that emerged in the newly created polity over time, most notably in 2004 and 2006 (see Chivvis 2008: 154; see below for more detail). In general, the opinion prevails that “the International Community played a positive role […] with its firm handling of the process of conflict management” (Atanasov 2006: 183). Thus, although determining whether external intervention is mediative or partisan is very much a matter of perspective – and ethnic Macedonians in particular resented “the international pressure that was put on their politicians to sign the peace accord and proceed toward the implementation of its terms” (Ackermann 2002: 79) – the overall impression is that external actors were mainly concerned with finding a compromise between the parties and that their agenda was not driven by a systematic bias for any of the two sides. All in all, external engagement in Macedonia is therefore regarded as mediative here.
3.2 Macedonia

3.2.2 Polity Dynamics in Macedonia

The case of Macedonia confirms the plausibility of many of the assumptions made about ‘Let’s Share’ polities above. This is illustrated below with regard to the four overarching themes: dealing with commitment problems, competition for power, threats from within, and external engagement for good governance.

a) Overcoming Commitment Problems

The general model of ‘Let’s Share’ polities suggests that this polity type offers a particularly fruitful environment for overcoming the commitment problems that often hamper the settlement of conflicts or the implementation of peace agreements. Three factors play a role here: First, the constructive environment that prevails in this polity type makes it easier for the armed groups to develop a basic level of trust that may lower their hesitations against handing in their guns. Second, the prospect to share a certain degree of formal governmental power in the post-settlement phase may elevate the rebels’ willingness to engage in DDR activities in earnest. Third, the relatively firm role typically played by external actors in the initiation phase of this polity type allows them to give significant security guarantees by which the rebels’ concerns can be further dispersed.

Macedonia generally confirms these assumptions, but it must also be noted that the case certainly offers a ‘most-likely case’ scenario that is unlikely to be present in all ‘Let’s Share’ polities. The short duration of the armed conflict in conjunction with external actors’ strong engagement offered an environment in which it was relatively easy to implement confidence building measures and create the level of trust necessary for the successful implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. NATO was responsible for the disarmament of the Albanian insurgents, contributing 4,500 forces as part of the ‘Operation Essential Harvest’ (Kim 2001: 1). This task was completed already by September 2001 – after only thirty days – and the mission collected even more weapons than originally agreed (Chivvis 2008: 150). However, it is also true that the number of collected weapons was only a small fraction of the total number of weapons circulating in Macedonia. There are estimates that up to 100,000 illegal arms (among them 50,000 military weapons) still circulate in Macedonia (see Atanasov 2006: 186). Macedonian hardliners attempted to use this as a pretext for declaring disarmament as a failure, but this missed the main purpose of the disarmament operation, which was “to build confidence in the framework and amnesty agreement with the rebels” (Chivvis 2008: 150). After that, NATO remained engaged only through a small follow-up mission, by which the observers of the ceasefire were to be protected.

As this suggests, overcoming the commitment problems that often hamper the successful conclusion and implementation of peace agreements was a relatively straightforward affair.

13 A ‘most-likely case’ is one in which “the independent variables posited by a theory are at values that strongly posit an outcome or posit an extreme outcome” (George and Bennett 2004: 121).
Chapter 3 ‘Let’s Share’ Polities

in the case of Macedonia. Though this outcome is certainly in good part the result of the positive ‘baseline conditions for peace’ present in Macedonia, it also supports the plausibility of the assumption that ‘Let’s Share’ polities in general offer a conducive environment for overcoming commitment problems. The case of Burundi, where the conditions were much less favorable but where the commitment problems were nonetheless effectively handled (see 3.3) adds further support to this argument.

b) Manner of Political Competition

The overall polity constellation also has an effect on the manner by which the former warring parties compete for political power. Due to the general consensus about the current distribution of governmental power between the parties, it is unlikely that they will constantly try to gain more power by booting their opponents out of the power-sharing arrangement. However, as they are still concerned about their share of power in the future – for instance after the next round of elections – a competition for future power is likely to set in. In this regard, ‘Let’s Share’ polities are not different from other functioning democratic states, and the very fact that political competition is directed at future power can be taken as an indicator for the progress these countries have made. However, since ‘Let’s Share’ polities are still countries that have experienced an armed conflict, there exists a heightened potential that even ordinary competition may aggravate the tensions between the belligerents and may give rise to centrifugal tendencies. In Macedonia, it can be shown that the sharpening competition before the 2006 parliamentary elections has fostered the societal cleavages between the two ethnic groups and has led to their increasing socio-cultural segregation.

In general, the constructive spirit of the Ohrid Agreement effectively altered the rules of the political game and was crucial for translating the confrontations between the formerly antagonistic parties into ordinary political competition. Although parts of the ethnic-Macedonian population were opposed to the far-reaching transfer of power to the Albanian minority, the compromise ultimately reached found the consensus among the vast majority of Macedonia’s political elite. In the initial years of the Ohrid Agreement, it is evident that the majority of the Macedonian population accepted power-sharing as a legitimate form of political rule. The clearest sign for this can be seen in the parliamentary elections that took place in 2002, one year after the adoption of the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’. Despite single attempts by political hardliners to capitalize on existing cleavages, the – more moderate – opposition parties won the majority of votes in the elections. This gave rise to a coalition between the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) (see International Crisis Group 2003d: i).

As in any other post-conflict country, a peaceful transition of governmental power from one party to another can per se be considered a sign for success, for the simple reason that politics in post-conflict environments tends to be inherently more conflict prone than elsewhere. However, more relevant in this case is the fact that the electorate voted for
a governmental coalition that was decidedly more moderate and constructive than the conservative VMRO-DPMNE ruling previously (see International Crisis Group 2003d: i). The SDSM was a signatory of the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ itself and “continued to give its full support in the post-conflict phase, both when it was in opposition (until 2002) and when it was in government (2002-2006)” (Ilievski and Taleski 2009: 359). Therefore, under its reign the implementation of the agreement progressed quickly, which is an important reason why today all key provisions have been translated into national law (Mehmeti 2008: 85). The share of ministries held by Albanians also significantly increased during the SDSM-DUI coalition, which is another indicator that the coalition was indeed willing to put the principles of power-sharing into practice (Bieber 2008b: 26–27).14

However, in the ensuing years the adverse effects of a sharpening competition for future political power soon became apparent. The outvoted VMRO-DPMNE was eager to return to power in 2006, and in order to achieve this goal it heavily capitalized on ethnic-Macedonian resentments and anxieties against the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ and “strengthened its public support by criticizing the agreement” (Mehmeti 2008: 85):

“Campaigning actively against the participation of former rebels 15 in electoral politics, the VMRO-DPMNE attempted to style itself as the guardian of Macedonian sovereignty, accusing the SDSM of collaborating with ‘the enemy’. The strategic shift away from the principles of the Ohrid agreement and towards a position of restrained hostility towards both the ethnic Albanian population and the international community coincided with a marked increase in violence and insecurity” (Grillot et al. 2004: 8).

Conservative politicians also attempted to gain politically by rejecting some provisions of the Ohrid agreement because they allegedly over-compensated the Albanian minority. Indeed, the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ allotted more powers and rights to the Albanian minority than it ‘deserved’ on the basis of its relative demographic strength. The clearest example for this is the requirement of a double-majority. It changed the legislative process in such a way that certain forms of legislation16 require not only a majority in the parliament, but also a majority among those representatives that form part of the ethnic minority group – or, in the words of the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’, among those “representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia” (Government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2001, Art. 5.2; see also Chivvis 2008: 149 and Bieber 2008a: 208). The same holds true for some Constitutional

14 Albanians held five out of 18 ministries, including health, justice, communication and education. “While these ministries are less sensitive than defense or internal affairs, they yield considerable financial resources and impact large parts of the public administration” (Bieber 2008b: 26–27). Albanians furthermore held post as deputy-ministers in all ministries held by ethnic Macedonians, just as Macedonians held deputy ministers in Albanian ministries (see Balalovska 2006: 25).
15 The DUI was the party formed mostly out of former NLA rebels.
16 More precisely: “Laws that directly affect culture, use of language, education, personal documentation, and use of symbols, as well as laws on local finances, local elections, the city of Skopje, and boundaries of municipalities” (Government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2001, Art. 5.2).
amendments, for which the consent of a majority of these minority-representatives is required next to a general qualified two-thirds majority in the parliament (Government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2001, Art. 5.1). The rationale behind these provisions is obvious and well in line with consociational theory: by giving the minority group (in this case Albanians) a veto-right against certain kinds of legislation, this group can be effectively protected against potentially harmful laws imposed on them by the majority group (in this case Macedonians). In Arend Lijphart’s phrase, this amounts to a guarantee for the minority group “that it will not be outvoted by the majority when its vital interests are at stake” (1977: 118).

These provisions effectively rectified some of the most pronounced forms of discrimination that ethnic Albanians were exposed to.\footnote{Prior to the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’, Albanians were underrepresented both in the private and public sector. With a share of 7.5 and 10 percent, respectively, they stood significantly below their share of the population (see Brunnbauer 2002: 13). This “cannot be explained only by their lower qualifications and their more rural life-styles but is more likely the result of ethnically discriminatory recruitment patterns” (Brunnbauer 2002: 13). Today, the number of ethnic Albanians working in the public administration is much higher than the pre-Ohrid level, and there is a more general trend that “the widespread discrimination many Albanians experienced has largely ended” (Bieber 2008a: 207; see also Stanishevski and Miller 2009: 559). Also a number of other grievances of the Albanian community – in particular the lack of higher education opportunities in Albanian language – have been addressed by now (Bieber 2008a: 207).} Yet, opportunistic politicians have successfully portrayed them as an unfair form of ‘over-compensation’ of the Albanian minority imposed by external forces. From a political standpoint, this strategy was not without success. The VMRO-DPMNE’s victory in the 2006 parliamentary elections can in part be explained by its successful mobilization of the electorate and an electoral campaign that was explicitly directed against the provisions of the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’. Albanian politicians – even moderate ones like DPA leader Arben Xhaferi – were, for instance, “usually portrayed by the Macedonian media as the devil who wanted to destroy Macedonia and employed ‘terrorists’ to achieve this aim” (Brunnbauer 2002: 16). This explains why “proposals to separate the Republic’s titular nationality from its largest minority may well continue to enjoy a degree of currency among the country’s major political figures, as well as among its citizens” (Friedman 2009: 217).

Such attempts for political mobilization ‘on the cheap’ left their marks in the country’s political culture. Even opportunistic attempts for capitalizing on societal cleavages for the sake of exploiting short-term benefits – like the anti-Ohrid referendum discussed below – may have detrimental effects in the long run. Analysts of the Macedonian case have observed a curtailing of cross-cultural communication and an increasing segregation of the two communities (see Holliday 2005: 154 and Bieber 2008a: 210).\footnote{But, as Bieber also argues, “most of the instances of segregation since 2001 are not a direct consequence of the Framework Agreement, but […] rather a corollary, resulting from the increased political power of the Albanian community and the polarized social climate as a consequence of the violence” (2008b: 39).} According to Stanishevski and Miller, there is some indication that the “two communities in Macedonia remain distinctly separated from each other”, which leads to a “continuing persistence...
of tendencies toward majoritarian democracy” (2009: 562; 568). More and more people also tend to view political competition as a zero-sum game whereby “the gain for one community inevitably must signify the loss for another” (Bieber 2008a: 208). A clear indicator for this is the perception prevalent among ethnic Macedonians that the Ohrid Agreement was generally too generous to the Albanian population and was by some even construed as a threat to the very core of Macedonian identity. To give an example, in a survey conducted in 2004 (i.e. after the implementation of the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’) two-thirds of the ethnic Albanians felt to have fewer rights than the majority population, whereas nearly half of the ethnic Macedonians in turn believed that ethnic Albanians had more rights than other citizens (see Stanisevski and Miller 2009: 562). In a similar fashion, Brunnbauer argues that one of the major political consequences of the Ohrid Agreement was a rising level of mistrust between the two ethnic groups, and, in particular, a general suspicion among ethnic Macedonians that “Albanians have a hidden agenda” (2002: 16). More discomforting, even, is the fact that more and more ethnic Macedonians and (to a lesser degree) also ethnic Albanians believe that another ethnic conflict might erupt in Macedonia in the near future (see Stanisevski and Miller 2009: 563).19 This confirms that one of the primary drawbacks of consociationalism, namely the reification of ethnic identity as the result of “reinforcing and entrenching ethnicity in the political system” (Sisk 1996: 39), indeed seems to take hold in the case of Macedonia. The sharpening political competition between the parties has not only triggered inter-ethnic, but also intra-ethnic rivalries and tensions. The ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ is associated with so many benefits to the Albanian community that the two largest Albanian parties (DPA and DUI) could not agree “which party contributed more to the concessions secured” (Ilievski and Taleski 2009: 359). This may lead to an increased (rather than a reduced) danger to frame political conflicts exclusively in ethnic terms, which may propel the further segregation of the two communities. It is for this reason that Bieber warns us that the Ohrid Agreement “remains a potent force in the political debates of the country”, since “many Macedonians consider the agreement as a ‘loss’ which was ‘won’ by Albanians” (Bieber 2008a: 207; see also Brunnbauer 2002: 16–17).

In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that the parties initially maintained a consensus about the status quo and took genuine efforts for implementing the provisions of the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’, in particular after the victory of the moderate SDSM/DUI coalition in the 2002 elections. However, the outvoting of the conservative VMRO-DPMNE exposed the manner of political competition to increasing centrifugal tendencies, which fostered the socio-cultural segregation of the two communities. This demonstrates that not even ‘Let’s Share’ polities are immune against the dangerous effects of political competition.

19Prior to the conflict, in 2000, only 14.4 percent of ethnic Macedonians and 22.9 percent of ethnic Albanians believed interethnic tensions to be a potential source of insecurity. In 2004, this figure rose to 76.6 percent and 38.8 percent, respectively, and in 2008 again to 82 percent and 60 percent, respectively see Stanisevski and Miller (2009: 563).
c) Threats from Within

As noted above, competition for future political power in ‘Let’s Share’ polities can have adverse effects on the prospects for peace and reconciliation. A related source of tensions are deliberate attempts by spoilers or hardliners to derail the peace process by triggering political crises that require an imminent (domestic or external) reaction. This falls within the range of what was called ‘calculated escalation’ strategies above: intentional attempts by one party to adopt confrontational means because it expects personal gains and benefits. In Macedonia such strategies indeed played an important role, but their harmful potential could be defused by external actors who – playing the role of a ‘watchdog’ – took immediate precautions.

The first attempt for provoking a rift in the governing coalition goes back to VMRO-DPMNE leader Georgievski during the time when his party was in opposition. In 2003, he published an influential newspaper article in which he suggested various theses about the ‘survival of the Macedonian nation and state’. Among other things, he claimed that “[t]he Ohrid Agreement definitively marked the end of a Macedonia which we recall from history and from the ideals of all the fallen Macedonian patriots” and suspected the Albanian population of attempting to ‘conquer’ a number of municipalities where they were in the minority (quoted in Friedman 2009: 214). Although the government coalition and large parts of the political elite rejected his position, the proposal had decomposing effects on the inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia (Friedman 2009: 214). As such, the newspaper article did not lead to an imminent political crisis that would require an immediate resolution, but it must be seen as the starting point for a series of other events.

One year later, in the wake of the implementation of the decentralization provisions provided for in the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’, the opposition carried its provocations one step further. The rationale behind the decentralization provisions was to “give the communities (municipalities) a great share of privileges and responsibilities towards public services, urban and rural planning, protection of the environment, local economic development, culture, local finances, education, and social and health care” (Atanasov 2006: 189). When the government acknowledged to realize these plans in 2004, the ethnic Macedonian opposition parties exploited this as an opportunity to evoke public resistance against the agreement. Through a group called ‘Citizens’ Movement for Macedonia’ they organized a plebiscite against the decentralization provisions. Although officially acknowledging that the referendum was not about the Ohrid Agreement in general but merely about “the manner by which the new law was negotiated and adopted” (Ilievski and Taleski 2009: 362), it did effectively become “a referendum on Ohrid itself, threatening to derail more than three years of progress” (Chivvis 2008: 152). The opposition parties nearly succeeded in their strategy, but ultimately the referendum failed – a fact that is generally attributed to well-timed external intervention. The EU and the US, worried that the referendum could reverse the progress already achieved, used their leverage in order to soften the referendum’s potentially harmful effects. The single most
3.2 Macedonia

influential factor was that the US announced to recognize Macedonia by its constitutional name just three days before the elections. The resulting public enthusiasm led to a very low turnout in the referendum – less than 25 percent – which caused it to fail despite the fact that 94 percent of the participants voted against the decentralization provisions (Ilievski and Taleski 2009: 362; see also Atanasov 2006: 189). External actors, therefore, were crucial in averting a crisis that may have had the potential to entirely derail the Macedonian peace process (Chivvis 2008: 152).

Another example was the parliamentary crisis that materialized after the 2006 elections. The winner of the elections, the conservative VMRO-DPMNE that was outvoted four years earlier, refused to coalesce with the largest Albanian party, the DUI, and instead chose the smaller Albanian party (the DPA) as their coalition partner. This was not in itself unconstitutional, since the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ lacks any rigid power-sharing formula and does not even require the formation of coalition governments. While this flexibility has some advantages – it allows, for instance, for a more flexible division of powers – it can become problematic once certain parties feel excluded from power. It also implies that there are little safeguards against parties willing to break with the power-sharing tradition (see Bieber 2008b: 28). Rejecting its own exclusion, the DUI argued that it had the right to join the government as the strongest Albanian party. As a consequence, it boycotted many decisions for which the double-majority requirement applied (Bieber 2008b: 25). This gave rise to a severe parliamentary crisis in January 2007, when the DUI left the parliament in order to protest against the fact that the coalition had passed a number of laws requiring the double-majority principle by relying on the votes of the DPA and those of a number of non-Albanian minorities, thereby circumventing the DUI and depriving it of its de facto veto power. As a condition for returning to the parliament, the DUI demanded to re-negotiate its rights and its position in the Macedonian polity with the government. External actors pressured the government to seek negotiations with the DUI by making Macedonia’s invitation to NATO accession conditional on the DUI’s return to parliament and threatening to prolong the start-date for the negotiations on EU accession. The government, therefore, had little choice but to comply, which culminated in a secret agreement with the DUI in which a number of sensitive issues were settled (see Ilievski and Taleski 2009: 362–363). This so called “May Agreement” was never published, but is generally seen as “an ‘unofficial and unconstitutional’ de-facto constitutional reform” (Goio and Marceta 2009: 5).

As this suggests, ‘Let’s Share’ polities do not offer any guarantee against the gradual erosion of the very constructive foundations on which they rest. In Macedonia, external actors play a particularly important role when it comes to mediating political tensions, taming hardliners and ensuring that politics continues to follow a constructive modus operandi. This supports the argument made above, i.e. that ‘Let’s Share’ polities may require a sustained effort by external actors to avert imminent political crises. Successfully playing this role of a ‘watchdog’ requires external actors to possess both the will and
the means – in terms of effective sticks and carrots – to prevent an escalation of political tensions. In other words, not even in ‘Let’s Share’ polities it is enough for external actors to confine themselves to the role of passive bystanders. This is vividly illustrated in Burundi, where external actors played a much more passive and ambiguous role.

d) Promoting Good Governance

Next to the intervention in imminent political crises, external actors are also more generally involved in post-conflict polities through their engagement for good governance, broadly conceived. It was stipulated above that, sufficient political will and effective leverage provided, ‘Let’s Share’ polities offer a conducive environment for the promotion of good governance principles. However, it could also occur that the seemingly ideal constellation this polity type embodies keeps external actors from recognizing potential threats and dangers in a timely manner or that they turn a blind eye to certain shortcomings in the realm of good governance which could undermine their success story.

Macedonia is an exceptional case with respect to the promotion of good governance principles because external actors had both the political will and determination to make sure that the parties stick to the principles set out in the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’. Unlike in many other cases, they disposed of unusually effective sticks and carrots: the prospect of a Macedonian membership in both EU and NATO. This enabled them to exert a strong influence on domestic dynamics over a rather long period. For this end, the carrot of an EU membership perspective was “sliced in small pieces – Commission progress reports, securing candidate status, securing a date for the start of accession negotiations” (Ilievski and Taleski 2009: 360). Macedonia was officially given EU candidate country status in December 2005, and since then five years have passed without much being achieved (see Ilievski and Taleski 2009: 360). The EU has made further benefits conditional on domestic progress. This was based on the Copenhagen Criteria, which require, among other things, “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (see European Commission 2009: 6). In addition to that, the European Commission regularly examined Macedonia’s ability to implement the Acquis Communautaire, which required a detailed assessment of Macedonia’s performance with regard to 33 different issue areas – among them such diverse issues as the free movement of goods, fisheries and education and culture (European Commission 2009: 31–75).

This enabled external actors to call for ongoing and far-reaching improvements in the realm of good governance on the basis of concrete criteria. However, there is also some indication that external actors’ willingness to commit to past promises is lower than what it initially looks like. In recent years, the membership process has severely slowed down. Although the EU Commission has proposed the initiation of membership negotiations in its progress report published on 14 October 2009 (see European Commission 2009), as of now not even an official start-date for the negotiations has been announced. Despite external actors’ rhetoric, there is some indication that a realistic perspective for an EU
3.2 Macedonia

Membership for Macedonia is still a long way off. Two factors propel such concerns. First, Greece has—due to the unresolved name dispute—already used its veto in order to block Macedonia’s NATO membership, and has threatened to do the same during the EU membership negotiations (see Ilievski and Taleski 2009: 364–365). Second, the EU is currently plagued by an undeniable “enlargement fatigue”, which makes a quick announcement of membership negotiations even more unlikely. This has created “an immense credibility problem for the EU” by removing “a major instrument for securing compliance from the EU’s toolbox” (see Ilievski and Taleski 2009: 365). As a consequence, even if external actors are willing to remain engaged in Macedonia’s domestic politics in the future, their ability to perform this role effectively may simply degrade over time.

In addition, external engagement for good governance may not always have the desired effects. There is some indication that external actors’ insistence on the Ohrid principles and on formal progress made in the realm of good governance has contributed to a further socio-cultural segregation of the two communities. By effectively being the guarantor of ethnic Albanian minority rights, external actors have generally risked being perceived by the ethnic Macedonian population as a foreign intruder that supports the Albanian cause in a one-sided (partisan) manner (see e.g. Engström 2002: 2). Out of this reason, “Macedonians view the Framework Agreement as an ‘internationally-induced’ arrangement that has rewarded violence and has increased the ethnic Albanian sense of security and identity at the expense of decreasing that of Macedonians” (Ackermann 2002: 79). Another problem that may generally hamper the promotion of good governance in ‘Let’s Share’ polities lies in external actors’ difficulties to recognize dangerous developments in a timely manner and take the necessary precautions. These difficulties are directly related to external actors’ focus on formal statebuilding achievements, most notably power-sharing, disarmament, elections and the like. Since all this worked relatively smoothly in Macedonia, the constructive features of this polity type may easily obscure the presence of slow-moving, long term threats. The various crises that emerged in Macedonia clearly were no isolated events, but must rather been seen as indicators of a general degradation process. But even when external actors became aware of more gradual developments below the level of an imminent crisis, they were unwilling to tackle them in a decisive manner so as to avoid undermining the remaining bits of constructive relations. This has, for instance, become visible with regard to corruption, which has become endemic in Macedonia in recent years (see e.g. International Crisis Group 2002b: i; Pettifer 2006: 3). As the International Crisis Group remarked in 2003: “Left to fester and spread, it will continue to erode Macedonia’s tenuous unity and send dangerous ripple effects throughout the Western Balkans” (2002b: i). Nonetheless, external actors have largely ignored this problem, mainly out of conviction that “if we push them on corruption, the government won’t cooperate on implementing Ohrid” (International Crisis Group 2002b: i–ii). However, as the International Crisis Group also made clear, “failure to do so undermines the very agreement on which diplomats have concentrated their energies” (2002b: i–ii).
Chapter 3 ‘Let’s Share’ Polities

In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that external actors made genuine efforts to enforce good governance standards in Macedonia. They exhibited an extraordinary willingness and ability to make sure that the polity works according to established principles of good governance as embodied by the Copenhagen Criteria. For this purpose, they made strategic use of their leverage, which consisted most notably of the country’s membership prospect in both the EU and NATO. Despite that, the phenomenon of ‘euphemistic blindness’ played a role and caused external actors to overlook some other dangerous developments, for instance with respect to corruption.

3.3 Burundi

The Burundian civil war was, in virtually all regards, the exact opposite of the minor armed conflict that took place in Macedonia. It lasted for more than a decade and caused the death of more than 200,000 and the displacement of an estimated one million people (see e.g. Daley 2006: 658). Understandably, this triggers questions about the comparability of the two cases: given their completely different backgrounds of the two cases, can they be meaningfully compared at all? This section demonstrates that they can, and that the post-conflict situations that emerged in Macedonia after 2001 and in Burundi after 2003 have more in common than what could initially be expected.

Just as Macedonia, Burundi can be considered a divided society, in which the two main ethnic groups – the Hutu and the Tutsi – maintained highly conflictual relations over most of the country’s post-colonial history. Although today generally perceived as two diverse ethnic groups, the terms Hutu and Tutsi were in former times used more as a signifier of social status, in principle allowing for Hutu to become Tutsi through social advancement (UCDP 2010a).20 However, the colonial powers – Germany and, in particular, Belgium – “capitalised on these existing societal divides, in essence exacerbating them through supporting centralised Tutsi rule as the means of colonial administration” – notwithstanding the fact that Tutsi constituted a clear demographic minority (UCDP 2010a; see also Daley 2006). Tutsi elites also remained in power in post-colonial times although today about 85 percent of the population are Hutu. This led to a high level of tensions between the ruling Tutsi minority and the Hutu population, which can be seen as a direct cause for the armed conflict that erupted in 1994. The war was triggered after Burundi, following the general trend for democratic openings in Africa in the early 1990s, held its first democratic elections in 1993. Not surprisingly, a Hutu party (FRODEBU, ‘Front pour la démocratie au Burundi’) yielded a sweeping victory, and its leader Melchior Ndadaye became the country’s first Hutu president in nearly three decades. Tutsi elites

20On this aspect, see in particular Patricia Dalay (2006), who sheds light on the social construction of the cleavages between Hutu and Tutsi. By the same token, she unveils how the genocide in Rwanda was “linked to how Hutu and Tutsi were constructed by the colonial state and the failure of Rwandan nationalism to transcend the colonial construction of racial difference and the ‘foreignness’ it bestowed on the Tutsis” (2006: 660).
were highly opposed to the outcomes of the elections, and Ndadaye was assassinated only three months after taking office and replaced by a Tutsi-dominated government (see Reyntjens 2006a: 117). As Stef Vandeginste remarks, “[t]he overwhelming electoral victory of the predominantly Hutu party Frodebu and its presidential candidate Melchior Ndadaye were too threatening for the vested interests of the incumbent elite” (2009: 67). This fostered the formation of various Hutu rebel groups initiating a fight against the government. The most important ones were the CNDD-FDD (‘Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces pour la défense de la démocratie’), FNL/ PALIPEHUTU (‘Forces nationales de libération’, formerly ‘Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu’, and FROLINA (‘Front pour la liberation nationale’) (Reyntjens 2006a: 117).

The armed conflict lasted for several years and witnessed various failed termination attempts. Of these, the most promising ones were the Arusha Accords, which began in 1998 and led to the adoption of a Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in August 2000. However, due to the failure to include the main rebel groups in the process, it did not lead to an end of fighting (see van Eck 2007: 117; McClintock and Nahimana 2008: 74). It took another three years until at least one of the main rebel groups, the CNDD-FDD, signed the ‘Global Ceasefire Agreement’ with the government in November 2003 (see Government of the Republic of Burundi 2003). This gave rise to a post-conflict polity that is treated here as an instance of a ‘Let’s Share’ polity, as justified in the next section.

### 3.3.1 Burundi as a ‘Let’s Share’ Polity

Classifying Burundi as a ‘Let’s Share’ polity. This implies that an effective power-sharing arrangement was implemented, that external parties intervened in the post-conflict environment in a mediative manner, and that the relations between the former belligerents were, by and large, constructive. The last aspect is possibly the most controversial one, since the degree of constructiveness is more difficult to locate than in the case of Macedonia. Nonetheless, there is reason to argue that at least one of the rebel factions – the CNDD-FDD – was a constructive partner since the 2003 ceasefire, and that this clearly distinguishes this case from the instances of obstructive power-sharing discussed in the next chapter.

**Effective Power-Sharing.** Burundi is one of the few African cases that witnessed a far-reaching implementation of power-sharing measures. As in Macedonia, several power-sharing features were formally amended to the country’s post-transition constitution. The latter was based on power-sharing negotiations held by the parties in Pretoria throughout

---

21Palipehutu was founded in 1983 in a refugee camp, and soon became known for its notorious anti-Tutsi ideology. The FNL was originally a breakaway faction of Palipehutu, but was soon recognized as its armed wing (see Lemarchand 2006: 22). The CNDD-FDD was founded in 1994 by the popular Hutu politician Leonard Nyangoma, and later developed into a “powerful politico-military organization” under the leadership of Pierre Nkurunziza (see Lemarchand 2006: 7).
Chapter 3 ‘Let’s Share’ Polities

2004, adopted by the parliament in October of the same year and approved by more than 90 percent of the Burundian voters in a referendum held in February 2005 (see Reyntjens 2006a: 119). This document contains a number of provisions aimed at facilitating the political participation of both Hutu and Tutsi parties in the government, parliament and other public institutions. In René Lemarchand’s assessment, “[n]o other state anywhere in the continent offers a more faithful image of the ideal consociational polity” (2007: 3). Or as he remarks elsewhere: “No other constitution in the continent enshrines the complexities of power-sharing with greater attention to minority and women’s rights than the Burundi constitution of 2004” (2006: 12).

This is a surprising result given the difficulties involved in negotiating a settlement to the conflict. Attempts to establish power-sharing started already in 1998 as part of the Arusha Accords. This culminated in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in August 2000 (Government of the Republic of Burundi 2000) according to which the two parties Uprona (Tutsi) and Frodebu (Hutu) were represented in a transitional government. However, the main rebel groups – most notably CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL – were left out of the agreement, and the conflict continued for six more years (see e.g. van Eck 2007: 116; McClintock and Nahimana 2008: 78). While the rationale behind this exclusionary character of the Arusha negotiations was to focus on the more constructive elements within the political elites, its effects were clearly counterproductive. As McClintock and Nahimana put it, the Arusha Accord “was an exclusionary process, in the sense that it was perceived to cater to the interests of the elite, rather than the interests of the entire population” (2008: 74). With hindsight, this is one of the main reasons for the prolongation of the conflict after 2000. Despite these difficulties, the Arusha Agreement provided the basis for the post-transition constitution and can therefore be held accountable for the wide range of power-sharing measures ultimately implemented (see also Vandeginste 2009: 72).

The post-transition constitution provides for the cabinet and the National Assembly to both consist of 60 percent Hutu and 40 percent Tutsi representatives, and for the Senate to comprise an equal number of Hutu and Tutsi. Moreover, there are provisions to maintain this balance against different electoral outcomes: “Should the poll fail to produce the required quota of 60/40, the constitution allows ‘the rectification of the imbalances through the co-optation mechanism provided by the electoral code’ (Article 164)” (Lemarchand 2007: 8; see also McClintock and Nahimana 2008: 79). Against this background, the power-sharing arrangement implemented in Burundi was clearly more than a facade for masking the CNDD-FDD’s dominance. It forced the parties to work together and it led to an effective application of executive power-sharing.


[23As Stef Vandeginste highlights, earlier peace agreements – most notably the Arusha Agreement and the Global Ceasefire Agreement with the CNDD-FDD – were crucial factors causing the FNL to “moderate its position and to enter into negotiations from early 2004 onwards” (2009: 80).]
Constructive Relations. All in all, there are signs that the post-transition period in Burundi initially unfolded in a comparatively constructive manner and “there were many reasons for optimism about the country’s future” (Falch and Becker 2008: 24). As the International Crisis Group remarked in 2007, “Burundi has made relatively rapid, substantial progress in democracy and easing of inter-ethnic tensions” (2007a: i). The high rate of approval for the post-transition constitution by the Burundian population in the 2005 referendum (see above) is in itself a sign for a broad-based consensus, but it is even more impressive if one recalls that the new constitution contained numerous provisions to protect the rights of the Tutsi minority.

But also on the level of political elites participating in the coalition government, there are clear signs for the existence of comparatively constructive and pragmatic relations. As noted above, the relations maintained by the warring parties in Burundi are decidedly more complex and contradictory than in Macedonia. However, there is evidence that at least one of the rebel groups, the CNDD-FDD, became a constructive element after it agreed to the terms of the 2003 ceasefire. This was also an important condition for the ‘Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement’ ultimately reached with the other rebel group, the FNL, in 2006 (see Government of the Republic of Burundi 2006). Some developments suggest that tensions were either settled by parties giving in, or by finding a broad-based compromise. This is confirmed for instance by the elections held in 2005 on the basis of the new constitution. They unfolded in three stages, with municipal elections held in June, elections for the National Assembly and the Senate in July, and presidential elections in August. Unlike during previous elections, the voters could this time choose among several Hutu and several Tutsi parties, which competed against each other (see Lemarchand 2006: 7). As Frey and Boshoff remarked, “[t]he whole process was carried out with far less intimidation and violence than many observers had predicted and turnout was generally high, indicating a considerable level of popular support for a peaceful outcome” (2005: 43). Interestingly, tensions during the electoral campaign occurred less between parties originally belonging to different ethnic groups (i.e. Hutu vs. Tutsi parties), but predominantly between parties associated with the same ethnic block. The most pronounced clashes occurred between the two Hutu parties Frodebu and the CNDD-FDD, who mutually tried to delegitimize each other by accusing themselves of fraud and treason (see Reyntjens 2006a: 122, see

---

24See on this aspect in particular Vandeginste (2006), who comes to the conclusion that elite cooperation is one of the crucial reasons that enabled the establishment of power-sharing – and with it a complete refurbishment of the political system in Burundi – in the first place. In the French original: “[L]e Burundi a mis fin à une transition politique par la voie négociée et en se servant de mécanismes et de stratégies typiquement consociatifs. Un partage de pouvoir est organisé à travers des quotas ethniques et autres équilibres contenus dans l’Accord de Paix et la Constitution. La coopération entre élites segmentaires a permis la mise en œuvre de cette ingénierie institutionnelle avant et après les élections de 2005. Le nouveau contexte politique et institutionnel reflète la pluralité de la société” (2006: 204). However, note also that two years later he revises his judgment for the subsequent period and attests a lack of elite cooperation in the implementation phase of the agreement (see Vandeginste 2008).
also International Crisis Group 2005c: 7–9).\textsuperscript{25} Aside from that, the elections proceeded peacefully and led to a landslide victory of the CNDD-FDD in all four stages:\textsuperscript{26}

“The CNDD-FDD’s triumphant march to victory came as no surprise given the solid support it received from the Hutu electorate, and the fact that it was able to attract the candidacies of not a few Tutsi who, on the eve of the elections, thought it wise to jump on the most promising bandwagon” (Lemarchand 2006: 15).

Their sweeping victory required the constitutional power-sharing provisions to be applied for the first time, since the composition of the National Assembly fell short of the 60/40 ratio between Hutu and Tutsi codified in the constitution (see below). Also, since the CNDD-FDD failed to meet the two-thirds majority necessary for passing legislation, it had to cooperate along ethnic lines (see Reyntjens 2006a).

A last indicator for the presence of constructive relations can be seen in the manner by which the CNDD-FDD chairman Pierre Nkurunziza was elected as the new president. As provided for in the constitution, the first post-transition president was to be elected indirectly through a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. The CNDD-FDD was the only party to propose a presidential candidate, its chairman Nkurunziza, but shortly missed the qualified majority required by the constitution. However, in the end he received many more votes than necessary, since nearly the complete National Assembly – 94 percent of the MPs – voted for him. This is a very clear indicator that the political elites were willing to put ethnic differences aside and act in a concerted manner when necessary, despite the deep cleavages and divisions that occurred during more than a decade of civil war. As Reyntjens remarks, “[t]his was a real plebiscite across party and ethnic lines: although the vote was secret, the results show that a number of members of Uprona and most or all those of Frodebu and the CNDD supported the candidate” (2006a: 129).

Finally, also the last remaining spoiler, the Palipehutu-FNL, took on a more constructive stance by agreeing to join ceasefire talks in early 2005 (see e.g. Falch and Becker 2008):

\textsuperscript{25}As Reyntjens remarks: “In a bid to discredit its rival, Frodebu drew attention to human rights abuses by the former rebel movement and, more dangerously, played the ethnic card by suggesting that the CNDD–FDD was a traitor to the Hutu cause because of the entry of many Tutsi into its ranks. The CNDD–FDD accused Frodebu of having enriched itself at the expense of the population during its 12 years of partnership in power in coalition with Uprona” (2006a: 122).

\textsuperscript{26}As the International Crisis Group remarked, “[t]he electoral victory of the CNDD-FDD was a shock for the PALIPEHUTU-FNL. [...] [T]he arrival in power of a Hutu rebel movement like the CNDD-FDD and the successful integration of the FDD into the National Defence Forces (FDN) deprived the PALIPEHUTU-FNL of much of its platform; that is, the liberation of the Hutu people and the dismantling of the Tutsi-dominated army” (2007a: 10).

\textsuperscript{27}Note, however, that the International Crisis Group came to a less optimistic assessment, since they saw it as an indicator for the beginning of a total dominance of the CNDD-FDD: “C’est la consécration de l’hégémonie totale du CNDD-FDD sur les principales institutions. [...] Cette trop grande domination du jeu politique et l’avantage de la légitimité des urnes pourraient peut-être amener le CNDD-FDD à vouloir prendre des libertés par rapport à certaines dispositions de la constitution et à ses engagements pris à Arusha, voire l’orienter vers une politique autoritaire” (2005c: 14).
All these are clear indicators that the relations between the former belligerents became moderately constructive after the CNDD-FDD put down its arms in 2003.

Mediative Intervention. As Macedonia, Burundi is an example for the comparatively important role that regional and international facilitators can play in bringing a settlement to an armed conflict. During the Arusha negotiations, regional powers played a key role. In Lemarchand’s assessment, “[i]t is no exaggeration to say that there would have been no accord signed, or else a very different one, without the combined pressures of Tanzania, South Africa, and the US” (Lemarchand 2006: 12). In the first years of the conflict, the main responsibility for peace in Burundi was purely regional, whereas international attention devoted to the conflict was virtually non-existent. Burundi witnessed the deployment of the first African Union Peacekeeping Mission, the ‘African Mission in Burundi’ (AMIB), which was deployed in April 2003 and was mandated for an initial period of one year. Its main tasks included monitoring the implementation of the then-existing ceasefire agreements, supporting the process of disarmament and demobilisation, and preparing the country for the establishment of a follow-up peacekeeping mission under the auspices of the United Nations (see Agoagye 2004: 9–10 and Murithi 2008: 75).

With the adoption of Resolution 1545 in May 2004, the UN Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), which was deployed on June 1 for an initial period of six months and endowed with a robust (Chapter VII) mandate (U.N. Security Council 2004b; see also Boshoff 2004: 57). However, ONUB already withdrew from Burundi in 2006, in part giving in to pressure exerted by the newly elected CNDD-FDD government, which began to insist on its own sovereignty (see S. Jackson 2006: 4). While this can be taken as another indicator that Burundi was – at least in the eyes of the international community – a relatively constructive case, it was also a risky strategy, since the Palipehutu-FNL had at that time barely begun to support the peace process.

Compared to this relatively firm external influence exerted on the Burundian parties between the beginning on the Arusha Accords in 1998 and the withdrawal of ONUB in December 2006, the external actors’ engagement in the ‘post-transition’ phase has been much more limited. Assessing the involvement of external actors in Burundi is complicated because there were considerable splits and divisions among the various groups of external actors, in particular among the regional heads of states that tried to facilitate a settlement between the CNDD-FDD and the FNL after 2005. Tanzania and South Africa, the most influential among the regional powers involved in the post-conflict polity, had slightly different priorities and had a different reputation among the local parties. The CNDD-FDD was skeptical towards Tanzania’s role, which they suspected of engaging solely to the benefit of the FNL, while in turn South Africa had strong hesitations against the Palipehutu-FNL, which they considered to be the main spoiler to the pace process (see International 28

28For a detailed background on the Arusha negotiations, see in particular Patricia Daley (2007).
Chapter 3 ‘Let’s Share’ Polities

Crisis Group 2007a: 14–16). As this indicates, deciding whether external involvement in general was mediative or partisan is a matter of perspective, as the CNDD-FDD would surely have accused Tanzania of a partisan involvement. However, given the relatively strict definition of partisan engagement as systematic and intentional support for one conflict party (see 2.2), it appears more plausible to argue that external engagement as a whole aimed more at bringing an end to the hostilities and to leave the conflict behind rather than unilaterally promoting the position of only one of the conflict parties.

3.3.2 Polity Dynamics in Burundi

As in Macedonia, the polity dynamics in Burundi support the plausibility of many of the hypotheses made about ‘Let’s Share’ polities above. This is illustrated below with regard to the four overarching themes: dealing with commitment problems, competition for power, threats from within, and external engagement for good governance.

a) Overcoming Commitment Problems

With respect to overcoming commitment problems, Burundi undoubtedly represents a more challenging environment than Macedonia. The civil war lasted for some ten years, was of much higher intensity, and Hutu and Tutsi could look back to decades of ethnic tensions and even genocide. One might therefore expect that overcoming the commitment problems was tremendously more difficult. Generally speaking, this was not the case – at least not after the adoption of the Global Ceasefire Agreement between the existing transitional government and the CNDD-FDD in 2003.

Getting to this agreement was difficult, and commitment problems were one reason why this process took three years. The Arusha Accords, which took place without the main rebel groups, called for an ex post approval of its terms from the warring factions. However, “Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza’s CNDD-FDD rejected these terms because it did not intend to join the existing institutions without prior political and military negotiations and refused to disarm, arguing that it should be treated the same as the FAB [Burundian Armed Forces, CR]” (International Crisis Group 2004c: 3). As a result, the rebel group entered into lengthy negotiations with the transitional government, which gained momentum after a presidential changeover in April 2003 (International Crisis Group 2004c: 4). This ultimately led to the adoption of the Global Ceasefire Agreement, which is not – like earlier agreements – merely an annex to the Arusha Agreement but formally takes precedence over the latter, and it grants the rebel group many more rights than earlier ceasefire agreements (see Vandeginste 2009 and International Crisis Group 2004c: 3).

Once adopted, the implementation of this agreement worked surprisingly smooth given the challenges the parties faced. This is most vividly illustrated by the successful integration of fighters from the CNDD-FDD faction – predominantly Hutu – into the Tutsi-dominated Burundian armed forces (see International Crisis Group 2007a: 1). The formation of
3.3 Burundi

Joint armies is typically one of the most foremost problems of peace implementations, as the case studies discussed in this dissertation illustrate. This adds further weight to the achievements made in this regard. Stef Vandeginste remarks on this aspect: “It is widely acknowledged that the successful power-sharing at the level of the defence and security forces […] constitutes the major cornerstone of Burundi’s transition towards peace” (2009: 78).

Attributing this outcome to the ‘polity characteristics’ alone would certainly be too shortsighted. However, it is evident that the prospect of sharing governmental power was of high importance for the CNDD-FDD during the negotiations. CNDD-FDD representatives were integrated in the transitional government immediately after the adoption of the ceasefire agreement (see Rothchild 2005: 263). The constructive stance of President Domitien Ndayizeye, who took office in April 2003, certainly helped to create the level of trust necessary for successful negotiations. Reportedly, CNDD-FDD combatants have already shared some of their food rations with government soldiers in late 2003 (see International Crisis Group 2004c: 8). What is most striking about the case of Burundi is that this not even required a decisive intervention by external actors to provide security guarantees. At the time when the CNDD-FDD joined the Burundian Armed Forces, only a small AU-led peacekeeping mission comprising some 3,000 soldiers was deployed in Burundi. Although it was mandated to support the demobilization process and provide security for the participants of the transitional government (see Murithi 2008: 75), full deployment was only completed by the end of the year, and the mission was certainly too small to effectively provide for the security of some 50,000 former combatants. One idiosyncrasy of the Burundian case might have helped here: the fact that there was competition taking place between different Hutu factions and that, by supporting a ceasefire agreement, the CNDD-FDD could gain a significant advantage over its competitors – most notably the FNL. As the International Crisis Group noted in 2004: “The CNDD-FDD would like to see the process succeed in order to appear to the Hutu community as the movement that restored security and, at the same time, to justify the abuses and mistakes it committed against this community” (2004c: 9).

The successful resolution of commitment problems also became apparent after the elections in 2005. The disarmament of former combatants “made notable progress” in the post-transition period, although “the reinsertion program has yet to meet the long term needs of the majority of demobilized combatants”, as Lemarchand noted in 2006 (2006: 23). In light of these achievements, the UN Secretary General complemented the Burundian parties for their achievements and particularly pointed out the “inclusive,

---

29Elsewhere, Vandeginste adds further support to this argument. In the French original: “La cohabitation entre les anciennes forces armées burundaises et les ex combattants de l’ancien mouvement rebelle FDD constitue sans aucun doute le pilier principal du nouveau climat de paix au Burundi. […] À aucun moment, il n’a été question de confrontations violentes entre anciens ennemis, aujourd’hui intégrés dans les nouveaux corps de défense (les FDN) et de sécurité” (2008: 63).

30The figure originates from a 2006 report by the International Crisis Group (see 2006a: 12). In 2003, the figure was probably lower.
Chapter 3 ‘Let’s Share’ Polities

conciliatory approach [President Nkurunziza] has demonstrated so far”. He also expressed his confidence that the latter will “continue to adhere to the principles of ethnic and political inclusivity in making further nominations for Government positions” (United Nations 2005d: par. 45). However, the UN Secretary General was also aware that “the sustainability of peace after elections will require the same, if not an increased, level of regional and international engagement […] than it was the case in the initiation phase of the Burundian post-conflict polity (United Nations 2005e: par. 77).

In sum, although Burundi constituted a much more challenging environment for overcoming commitment problems than Macedonia, significant progress was made after the adoption of the Global Ceasefire Agreement. This is most clearly illustrated by the sudden inclusion of former CNDD-FDD fighters to the Burundian army. More striking, even, is the fact that this happened in the absence of strong external security guarantees. This supports the argument that ‘Let’s Share’ polities constitute a favorable environment for overcoming commitment problems.

b) Manner of Political Competition

The general model of ‘Let’s Share’ polities stipulates that the former belligerents maintain a general consensus about the current distribution of power, but that all parties nonetheless strive for increasing the relative share of power in the future. In fragile post-conflict environments, this may give rise to political tensions with a potentially destabilizing effect on the polity as a whole.

The case of Burundi generally supports this assumption, although the manner of political competition was very different from what could be observed in Macedonia. Most notably, the power-sharing provisions implemented in Burundi had much more conciliating effects on the relations between the antagonistic groups in that they effectively moderated the incompatibilities that divided the two ethnic groups for several decades. Therefore, in the case of Burundi it would be unwarranted to insinuate that centrifugal tendencies led to an increasing segregation of the two communities. However, although the competition for future power has not fostered ethnic tensions, it gave rise to political tensions with equally destabilizing effects.

As in Macedonia, the power-sharing provisions in Burundi did not directly address the warring parties themselves, but rather the different ethnic groups which the warring parties claimed to represent. They led to a significant over-representation of the minority group (the Tutsi) in some of the country’s most important political institutions. This found its expression in a comparatively complex quota-system enforcing a minimum percentage of Tutsi representatives in various public bodies. In order to “remedy the disparity of size between Hutu and Tutsi the framers of the 2004 constitution have made allowance for a system of representation which more than doubles the demographic weight of the Tutsi minority” (Lemarchand 2006: 13; see also Falch and Becker 2008: 28). Next to provisions affecting the composition of the National Assembly and the Senate (see
above) the constitution also requires that at least one of the two vice-presidents must be a Tutsi. Constraints also exist on the local level, where not more than 67 percent of the mayorships must belong to one ethnic group (see Lemarchand 2006: 13–14). Thus, compared to its 14 percent share of the total population, the Tutsi minority is significantly over-represented in the country’s political institutions. These provisions were more than a simple lip-service but effectively altered the composition of the various government bodies. Applied for the first time after the elections in 2005, the electoral commission co-opted 18 MPs to the parliament – four Hutu, eleven Tutsi, and three Twa – in order to generate the constitutionally required quotas (see Reyntjens 2006a: 126–127 and Lemarchand 2007: 8). Unlike in Macedonia, these provisions for over-representing the minority group have not contributed to the segregation of the two communities, but served as a mechanism to bridge the cleavages between the different ethnic groups:

“Burundi’s experience seems to contradict the classical criticism that consociational power-sharing ‘freezes’ people’s identities and therefore deepens the segmental cleavages and divisions […]. Instead, the acknowledgement and institutionalisation of the segments’ political relevance may be seen as a first and necessary (though by no means final) step in the process of de-ethnicising political competition and of overcoming decades of politico-ethnic violence” (2009: 82; see also Vandeginste 2009: 76).32

Given the ferocity and long duration of the ethnic tensions in Burundi – not long ago, the country was subject to a genocide – this is a surprising result. One of the main reasons for this outcome can be found in the particular design of the power-sharing provisions in Burundi. Though the Burundian power-sharing arrangement has been hailed as a prime example for a consociational polity (see above), one crucial feature in its institutional design is decidedly anti-consociational: the constitutional requirement to have ethnically mixed party lists. The post-transition constitution requires that all parties have to be ethnically inclusive by adding members of all ethnic groups to their lists (see Reyntjens 2006a: 122 and Vandeginste 2009: 75).34 This implies that parties associated predominantly with the

---

31 Twa is the name of the third ethnic group living in Burundi next to Hutus and Tutsis. They comprise less than one percent of the total population (see Coleman 2008c).

32 As Vandeginste remarks elsewhere: “Après avoir été dominé par un discours ethniste et ethnisant pendant de longues années, les oppositions et mésententes au sein de la classe politique burundaise ont pris un caractère beaucoup moins ethnique” (2008: 64–65).

33 Article 168 of the post-transition constitution requires that the lists proposed by the parties for each electoral district must be ‘multi-ethnic in nature’, specifying that ‘[o]f every three candidates proposed one after the other on a list, only two shall belong to the same ethnic group, and at least one out of every four shall be a woman’ (see Reyntjens 2006a: 126). Vandeginste sheds further light on the rationale behind these provisions: “The reasoning behind this approach was that, while Burundi’s segmental cleavages must be explicitly and formally recognised at the political level, it was at the same time necessary to reduce the conflict potential of ethnicity by encouraging political parties to be ethnically inclusive” (2009: 75).
Hutu majority necessarily contain a significant number of Tutsi representatives, and vice versa. During the intense constitutional debates, it was even “agreed that Tutsi members of predominantly Hutu parties (such as the Frodebu or the CNDD-FDD) could indeed qualify as representatives of the Tutsi community, contrary to what Tutsi hard-liners advocated” (Lemarchand 2006: 13–14).35 This violates one of the central assumptions behind consociationalism, namely that the interests of different segments of society are to be represented by political parties (see Vandeginste 2008: 68). Instead, it is a suggestion embraced by proponents of an integrative approach to power-sharing, most notably Donald Horowitz (see 2.2.1).

However, the moderation of ethnic tensions as such does not imply that the competition for future power is inherently less conflict-prone than, for instance, in Macedonia. The case of Burundi illustrates that getting rid of the link between ethnic groups and political parties also entails a significant drawback: it reduces the importance of parties as consociational actors and therefore undermines the effectiveness of power-sharing per se (see Vandeginste 2008: 68).36 Hence, by untying ethnic representation from membership in a dedicated party, ethnic tensions give way to political tensions and pave the ground for a domination of the system by the politically most powerful actor. There is reason to argue that this has changed the form, but not the substance of the competition for political power in Burundi. There is plenty of evidence that Burundi is on its way to experience centrifugal tendencies of another kind: the replacement of ethnic by political conflict – with equally detrimental effects. Since ethnic cleavages ceased to be the main determinant of political affiliations, there were less opportunities (and a lower necessity) for mobilizing societal cleavages. Instead, the strongest party – the CNDD-FDD – more generally made use of its powers in order to outmaneuver its opponents and secure its hold on power in the future. As the International Crisis Group remarks, “[o]ld tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDD-FDD and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence” (2006a: 1). This supports the argument that political tensions in ‘Let’s Share’ polities are likely to revolve around distribution of future political power, which has put the CNDD-FDD under pressure to defend its position of dominance:

“Pressure from the Palipehutu-FNL and from within the party itself, along with a failure to reach compromises with the other political parties, have plagued the first three years of the government. In its efforts to deal with these cross-cutting forces, the government has exhibited what some observers refer to as an ‘authoritarian drift,’

35See on this aspect in particular International Crisis Group (2004b: 6–7), where the demands of Tutsi parties are portrayed in more detail. By and large, it confirms the pragmatic stance that major Tutsi parties have taken with regard to the constitutional issues.

36Vandeginste highlights this aspect in some more detail. In the French original: “Par contre, la logique consociative aurait été de favoriser plutôt le maintien de partis réellement segmentaires. Dans cette logique, le jeu des négociations, du compromis, de la concertation, du partage des postes, etcetera, se fait entre partis segmentaires, tandis que, dans le scénario burundais, il se fait surtout entre individus, y compris au sein des partis. Cela réduit l’importance des partis comme acteurs consociatifs” (2008: 68).
In sum, political competition in Burundi initially unfolded in a very constructive manner, and the specific power-sharing mechanisms (most notably the requirement for mixed party lists) turned out as effective instruments for reducing ethnic divisions and de-ethnicizing politics as a whole. However, this gave rise to an intense political competition between different Hutu-dominated parties over the dominance in the polity, inducing the CNDD-FDD to gradually establish a tighter grip to power.

c) Threats from Within

Whereas the power-sharing agreement in Burundi had conciliating effects on the tensions between the ethnic groups, it also facilitated a gradual undermining of the very principles on which it rests. In response to competition with other Hutu parties, which could threaten the CNDD-FDD’s position of dominance, the party leadership became eager to get rid of power-sharing immediately after their good showing in the 200 elections. They made use of two strategies: gradually hollowing out the power-sharing provisions (while, formally, still complying with them), and openly challenging the power-sharing provisions as unnecessary. In this vain, the CNDD-FDD increasingly made use of informal instruments of political competition.

The gradual hollowing-out of the power-sharing provisions in Burundi became visible in a number of ways. Given its strong role and the lack of effective opposition against its rule, the CNDD-FDD was able to neutralize a number of crucial power-sharing provisions. In theory, the post-transition constitution requires that the CNDD-FDD has to “develop partnerships across political and ethnic lines” in order to pass laws (Reyntjens 2006a: 127, see also Lemarchand 2007: 9). In practice, however, it never had to seek such cooperation actively. Due to the lack of a concerted opposition to challenge the CNDD-FDD, it could effectively proceed on its course without being much affected by power-sharing at all. As René Lemarchand remarked:

“Laws are rammed through parliament without any real debate. The state and the party are two faces of the same coin. The grand coalition principle – identified by Lijphart as the key to effective power-sharing – has morphed into a wobbly coalition of party blowhards, threatened to dissolve at any moment into internecine struggles and settling of accounts” (2006: 27).

In order to further strengthen its position, the CNDD-FDD has also “carried out sweeping personnel changes in state companies, local administration and the court system, with most positions going to its own members” – most notably at the expense of FRODEBU and UPRONA loyalists (International Crisis Group 2006a: 7). The placing of its members in the court system has turned out as a particularly useful mechanism for undermining
the post-transition constitution. This was of great help during a parliamentary crisis in 2007 and 2008, when the CNDD-FDD lost the loyalty of 22 MPs and risked losing its majority in the National Assembly. The crisis came into being after the party’s chairman and true strongman, Hussein Radjabu – he was the one to bring Nkurunziza to power – was expelled from his party and charged with a 13-year prison sentence for an alleged coup attempt against Nkurunziza. The 22 MPs expressed their loyalty to Radjabu and broke with Nkurunziza, which effectively deprived the CNDD-FDD of its two-thirds majority it previously held (see International Crisis Group 2008a: 2–4, Reyntjens 2008: 9–10). In order to avert the crisis, the party successfully used all tricks to ensure the continuation of its position of dominance. Due to the crisis, the CNDD-FDD was for a short time forced to form a coalition government with Frodebu and Uprona, but ultimately Nkurunziza was able to evoke a favorable court ruling allowing him to replace the 22 dissident MPs by loyal followers. As a result, the CNDD-FDD regained its majority in the National Assembly and “immediately broke off discussions with Frodebu and Uprona” (International Crisis Group 2008a: 7).

Unconstitutional or informal attempts to secure its hold on power have also become apparent with respect to the CNDD-FDD’s stance towards the PALIPEHUTU-FNL. It repeatedly refused to sign a ceasefire with this faction and rather tried to ‘solve’ the problem with the last dissident faction in Burundi through a military solution. Immediately after being inaugurated, the government launched a number of military campaigns against the Palipehutu-FNL and “imprisoned, tortured and even executed many suspected combatants as well as civilians accused of colluding with the rebels” (International Crisis Group 2006a: i). When, under the lead of South Africa, external actors threatened to impose regional sanctions against the Burundian government, they formally conceded and signed the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement with the FNL in 2007 (see van Eck 2007: 114). In substantive terms, however, the new agreement hardly fulfilled any of the demands of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL and remained silent on many pressing issues, including the integration of the movement into the country’s political institutions (see International Crisis Group 2007a: 6). In this sense, the ceasefire agreement “very much seems to be more an act of surrender than a peace agreement” (International Crisis Group 2007a: 6). It still took more than two years until key provisions of the agreement were implemented, and hence it was not before April 2009 that the FNL-Palipehutu was registered as a political party (under the name FNL) and actually laid down its arms (see Vandeginste 2009: 74).

Next to this, the CNDD-FDD openly began to question the legitimacy of and necessity for explicit power-sharing provisions in Burundi, in particular after the party could consolidate its powers in the 2005 elections. Leading CNDD-FDD politicians claimed that power-

---

37The ceasefire agreement mainly contains provisions for “an immediate ceasefire between the two parties; cessation of propaganda and other activities that could impede the implementation of the peace process; the establishment of a Joint Verification and Monitoring Mission with international participation; the assembly of combatants for eventual demobilization and reintegration; and oversight of the entire process by the region’s leaders” (McClintock and Nahimana 2008: 80).
sharing “has served its purpose and that ethnicity will no longer lead to renewed violent conflict in Burundi” (Vandeginste 2009: 83). Also, the CNDD-FDD leadership has on various occasions expressed its disregard for power-sharing and declared to feel “taken hostage” by it (Vandeginste 2009: 76). Thus, similar to Macedonia, the power-sharing provisions not only regulated political competition but became themselves the subject of political controversy. While the political hardliners in Macedonia sought an open confrontation or escalation of the crisis in order to capitalize politically on the effects, the CNDD-FDD used a subtler strategy: it highlighted the success of power-sharing in order to argue in favor of its abolishment.

As this indicates, the initial optimism attached to power-sharing in Burundi has – at least in part – been jeopardized by the ruling party’s increasing inclination to secure its position of dominance in the future by all means. This outcome is not surprising when recalling that the political system in Burundi has been authoritarian ever since independence. In fact, as Uvin argues, the political system that has emerged in Burundi since the termination of the war is not in any substantive sense new, but the result of deeply entrenched state-society interactions and therefore very much in line with peoples’ expectations and experiences as to what the state can and should deliver (2008: 113). However, as the International Crisis Group noted, “[a] contributory factor in the government’s authoritarian drift has been the failure of the country’s institutions to provide oversight of the executive. Courts and parliament are dominated by the CNDD-FDD, and the political opposition is divided” (2006a: 7). These developments shed an increasingly dubious light on the Burundian power-sharing experiment. Most importantly, there is a strong indication that ethnic and political tensions are not completely independent from one another. If the CNDD-FDD proceeds with its attempts to establish a one-party state, this may renew the potential for political tensions. It is only a matter of time until ‘political entrepreneurs’ pull out the ‘ethnic card’ again. As Stef Vandeginste argues, “ethnicity is indeed no longer the main determiner of political divisions and competition in Burundi, [but] it is very uncertain whether its conflict potential has been irreversibly wiped out” (2009: 83).

The elections held in 2010 can be considered a litmus test for the future of power-sharing in Burundi. Many observers looked with skepticism to the polls. Vandeginste, for instance, stated that “[i]t remains highly uncertain whether the 2010 elections will mark a next step towards democratisation or towards an increasingly (electoral) authoritarian political regime” (Vandeginste 2009: 64). Not surprisingly, the latter scenario became reality. Although the elections did not lead to a further manifestation of ethnic tensions, they in effect fostered the near-complete domination of the political system by the CNDD-FDD. In all five rounds of elections38 that took place between May and September 2010, Nkurunziza and the CNDD-FDD emerged as the uncontested winners (Krempel 2010: 5–6). As it was already the case before the elections, tensions unfolded more along party-lines than along

---

38These were: elections on the communal level in May, presidential elections in June, parliamentary and Senate elections in July, and municipal elections in September (see Krempel 2010: 2).
Chapter 3 ‘Let’s Share’ Polities

ethnic lines. Most enmity occurred after the main opposition parties – including the FNL, Frodebu and Uprona – boycotted the presidential and partly also the parliamentary elections after accusing the government of electoral fraud committed during the communal elections held in May. Although this triggered a campaign of violence against opposition members, international observers by and large declared most elections as being in accordance with international standards (Krempel 2010: 2–5).

In sum, the above episodes confirm the general argument made above: that power-sharing arrangements – even relatively constructive ones – depict an inherent tendency to become exploited by powerful parties as a vehicle to restore their position of dominance in the ‘next round’. This disposition is particularly high in ethnically divided societies, because parties aligned with the larger ethnic block will almost always have more power, despite attempts to reduce the asymmetry between the former belligerents.

d) Promoting Good Governance

Above, it was stipulated that ‘Let’s Share’ polities provide a favorable environment for promoting good governance principles as long as external actors are able and willing to set effective constraints and incentives for the domestic parties. This was in part the case in Macedonia, where the ‘carrot’ of EU and NATO membership was repeatedly used as a mechanism to ensure the compliance of the Macedonian parties with respect to a broad catalog of good governance principles. In Burundi, the willingness and ability to enforce good governance principles was much less pronounced among external actors. Most notably, they have done little to counter the CNDD-FDD’s attempts to neutralize the power-sharing provisions and reinforce the spirit of the constitution.

All in all, the CNDD-FDD’s attempts to undermine power-sharing and consolidating its power led to clearly recognizable authoritarian tendencies and a degeneration of good governance principles. As the International Crisis Group noted, “[t]he CNDD-FDD has used state institutions – including the security services, state companies and courts – to consolidate its power, often with scant respect for the rule of law and human rights” (2006a: 12). The country’s degrading human rights record became increasingly recognized as one of the most pressing problems during the CNDD-FDD’s reign. There is widespread evidence that the government, “instead of engaging its critics in dialogue, has resorted to large-scale repression and human rights violations” (van Eck 2007: 114). This became apparent for the first time in 2006, when the ruling party accused dissidents from within the army and the FNL to have planned a coup against the government and cracked down and tortured opposition members. Among the fifteen people accused were the former President Domitien Ndayizeye and the former Vice President Alphonse Marie Kadege (International Crisis Group 2006a: 3; see also United Nations 2006a; par. 15-18). In the International Crisis Group’s assessment, “[t]he alleged coup has been the clearest example of the deteriorating political climate” (2006a: 3). René Lemarchand, who initially was
rather enthusiastic about the Burundian power-sharing experience (see above), made no secret out of his disappointment over Nkurunziza’s conduct:

“Few African heads of state have come to power with a more impressive fund of good will and popular sympathy than Pierre Nkurunziza. In the eyes of many of his followers he stood as the man to spoke (sic!) truth to power, who fought tooth and nail to wrest power from the Tutsi oligarchs, and who did not shy from wrestling his internal enemies to the ground. Less than a year later, however, much of the early popular enthusiasm for Burundi’s new leader has all but vanished. The government is facing a major crisis of confidence within and outside his own party, in parliament, and in the society at large” (Lemarchand 2006: 16).

The role of external actors to counter these trends, however, is ambiguous. The strongest role they have played in Burundi was during the initiation phase of the power-sharing arrangement. Patricia Daley conceptualizes the Burundian peace process as a struggle “between different competing visions of peace; the neo-liberal one supported by western donors, and that of regional actors, seeking to establish a new mode of politics on the continent”, and contends that “without international political clout and financial resources, regional actors conceded to the imposition of a ‘liberal peace’ […]” (Daley 2007: 334; for a similar assessment see also Uvin 2008). As Vandeginste somewhat ironically remarked, Nelson Mandela clearly was a decisive force behind the adoption of the Arusha Agreement, but “indirectly, Arend Lijphart […] also held the pen when the Arusha Agreement and the Burundian Constitution of 18 March 2005 were drafted” (2009: 65). The end-result was highly shaped by Western ideas about the ideal features of a post-conflict society. This becomes apparent by the insistence of both regional and international facilitators to impose solutions on the antagonistic factions. As van Eck notes, “[d]uring the whole peace process, not a single peace agreement was signed by the parties of their own free will” (2007: 117). Reyntjens is even of the opinion that “on several occasions, the region put Burundi under a de facto trusteeship” (2006a: 121).

However, in the ensuing post-conflict phase, it soon became clear that external actors lacked both the will and ability to exert effective pressure on the former belligerents and promote good governance principles. After the basic features of the Burundian polity had been established, the engagement of external actors soon lacked the credibility and commitment necessary for securing them in the long run. The United Nations – understandably – argued that there has to be ‘a peace to keep’, and were therefore reluctant to become engaged in the absence of a ceasefire agreement. This implied that a large part of Burundi’s official ‘transitional period’ was already over when ONUB finally deployed in mid-2004 (see S. Jackson 2006: 10–11). However, at that time the UN’s engagement was seen critically by an ever more self-conscious CNDD-FDD. As Dennis Tull argues, at the time ONUB was fully deployed the peacekeepers had already “overstayed their welcome” (2010: 2). Soon after the 2005 elections took place – roughly eight months after ONUB’s deployment – the victorious CNDD-FDD began to pressure the United
Nations to withdraw, and they ultimately complied by the end of 2006 (Tull 2010: 2).

Two factors have contributed to this result: First, the CNDD-FDD perceived the UN as having “too much proximity to Uprona and Frodebu” due to its engagement in earlier peace processes, and was therefore skeptical towards its continued engagement on the ground (S. Jackson 2006: 11). Second, strengthened by its electoral victory, the CNDD-FDD believed that external engagement was no longer needed and saw its own political autonomy compromised by the presence of external actors (see Tull 2010: 3–4). The United Nations were reluctant to fulfill these demands, but ultimately they had little choice to respect the government’s will. As the UN Secretary General noted in a slightly disillusioned manner:

“It should be noted that the plan to withdraw ONUB from Burundi by 31 December 2006 […] has been developed in consultation with the Government, following its specific and strong request for the early disengagement of the United Nations peacekeeping presence” (United Nations 2006f: par. 86).

This backing-down has clearly reduced the resolve which would have been necessary in order exert continued influence on the statebuilding project in Burundi (see also Vandeginste 2009: 83–84). Rather than becoming actively engaged for the promotion of good governance, this reduced the international community’s role to that of a ‘passive bystander’. After ONUB’s withdrawal, external actors were effectively deprived of much of their leverage.

However, attributing this passive role entirely to a lacking ability to impose stronger leverage on the Burundian parties would be shortsighted. The international community’s passive stance was certainly also a matter of lacking political will. Ultimately, external actors have “more power than they are willing to admit – they can refuse to go along with all the excesses of the clientelistic state and can ensure that a multitude of mechanisms and processes that could allow Burundians to change their state remain open“ (Uvin 2008: 115). The International Crisis Group has repeatedly called upon external actors to take on a more pro-active stance against the CNDD-FDD. For instance, in a report drafted in November 2006, it called upon the ‘donor community’ to “[c]ondition further budgetary support on improvements in governance and human rights […]” and to “[f]und and otherwise support all institutions likely to provide a check on the executive […]” (2006a: ii). Unfortunately, this leverage was left largely unused. This becomes apparent against the backdrop of the government’s increasingly dubious human rights record, which – in the eyes of Jan van Eck, is “[t]he most serious challenge facing Burundi today” (van Eck 2007: 115). The first indicators for this became visible in late 2006, precisely when ONUB was winded down. At that time, the International Crisis Group observed a “marked deterioration in Burundi’s political climate (2006a: i). Subsequently, external observers have repeatedly criticized…

39 More specifically, in January 2006 the government called upon the UN to confine its involvement to development work, and in August 2006, it pressured ONUB’s interim head to leave, accusing him of having “overstepped his mandate” (International Crisis Group 2006a: 11).

40 For a detailed overview of the political violence and other human rights violations in Burundi, see in particular Human Rights Watch (2009).
the international community’s lax stance with respect to the Burundian government. For instance, in 2009 Human Rights Watch criticized that

“[i]nternational actors have focused on establishing a formal peace and are not paying adequate attention to current human rights violations and accountability for past abuses. European and US diplomats responded strongly to the arrest of a prominent opposition leader in November 2008, but have shown much less public concern about human rights violations affecting ordinary Burundians in rural and marginal urban areas – the most numerous victims of abuse” (Human Rights Watch 2009: 9).

In sum, this suggests that the challenges that have become apparent over the course of the polity induced external actors to switch from ‘genuine enforcement’ to a pattern of ‘virtual enforcement’, in which “the form is more or less there, but the substance is far removed” (Uvin 2008: 110). As a result, external actors have tacitly accepted “more authoritarian and less consensus and dialogue-based governance style, as long as this does not threaten short-term stability in Burundi and the Central African region” (Vandeginste 2009: 83–84). This has given the CNDD-FDD the opportunity to gradually undermine the principles of power-sharing and establish the foundations for a one-party state.

3.4 ‘Let’s Share’ Polities: Conclusions

The two cases discussed in this chapter helped to specify the abstract notion developed about ‘Let’s Share’ polities in section 2.3 above. Above all, they illustrate the important role that power-sharing can play when it comes to ending armed conflicts. There is no doubt that “[t]he Ohrid Framework Agreement has been a success story in ending an escalating conflict and banning the fear of a renewed conflict” (Bieber 2008a: 207). The same holds true for the power-sharing provisions implemented in Burundi after the ceasefire agreement signed in 2004. However, the chapters also made clear that the constructive relations on which ‘Let’s Share’ polities rest may erode over time – either as a result of ordinary political competition or specific attempts of spoilers and political hardliners to mobilize political opportunities. Table 3.1 on page 112 summarizes the observations made about the dynamics observed with regard to the four dimensions of interest (overcoming of commitment problems, the manner of political competition, attempts to deal with threats from within, and attempts to promote good governance). Though the dynamics and interactions were not identical in the two cases, a number of similarities can be identified which can clearly be attributed to the specific constellation embodied by this polity type.

This becomes apparent with respect to the commitment problems in the implementation phase. In Macedonia it is not utterly surprising that disarmament proceeded smoothly, since this case offers a best-case scenario for overcoming commitment problems: a low-intensity conflict, constructive relations among the post-conflict elites, the participation of both parties in the government and a demonstrated willingness and ability by external actors to
Chapter 3 ‘Let’s Share’ Polities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment Problems</td>
<td>Best-case scenario; disarmament proceeded better than expected and served as trust-enhancing mechanism; no strong external security guarantees necessary for inducing cooperation.</td>
<td>More challenging environment; significant progress after Global Ceasefire Agreement (formation of joined army and disarmament of factions); no strong external security guarantees necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Competition</td>
<td>Consensus about the status quo; sharpening competition for future power after VMRO-DPMNE coalition was outvoted in 2002 ('political competition on the cheap'); indication for centrifugal tendencies and socio-cultural segregation.</td>
<td>Consensus about the status quo; power-sharing helps to bridge ethnic divisions (due to ethnically mixed party lists); little evidence for centrifugal tendencies but strong competition for future power between different Hutu parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats from Within</td>
<td>Political hardliners torpedo power-sharing arrangement; attempts for ‘calculated escalation’ lead to political crises (referendum in 2004; parliamentary crisis in 2007); immediate external engagement necessary for defusing crises.</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD under pressure to defend its position as the dominant Hutu party; gradual hollowing-out of power-sharing and increasing use of unconstitutional and informal instruments of political competition; by 2010 effective creation of a one-party state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Governance</td>
<td>Genuine enforcement both during the initiation and implementation phase of the Ohrid Framework Agreement; pronounced political will and ability to promote good governance (Copenhagen Criteria) but effectiveness of sticks and carrots has eroded over time; tendency to turn a blind eye to corruption and other shortcomings that may threaten stability.</td>
<td>Strong external influence in the initiation phase of power-sharing but little engagement in the initiation phase; willingness and ability to engage in genuine enforcement significantly lower; little attempts to counter authoritarian drift; readiness to accept severe deficiencies as long as formal statebuilding achievements remain in place.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Dynamics of ‘Let’s Share’ polities

intervene if necessary. In Burundi, the baseline conditions were not as favorable, mostly because the decade-long armed conflict left much deeper wounds and societal cleavages and because a strong external force to induce cooperation among belligerents was lacking. Still, the CNDD-FDD integrated its factions into the national army soon after signing the ceasefire agreement with the government. This generally supports the assumption that ‘Let’s Share’ polities offer a favorable environment for overcoming commitment problems.

Macedonia and Burundi also support the argument that political competition in ‘Let’s Share’ polities mainly aims at gaining political power in the future through formal-constitutional means. However, not even ‘Let’s Share’ polities are self-reinforcing because they provide a strong incentive for political hardliners or other potential spoilers to mobilize public sentiments against the power-sharing provisions and engage in attempts for political mobilization ‘on the cheap’. However, the cases also depicted some marked differences in the manner of political competition, which can for the most part be attributed to the different design of the power-sharing provisions. Macedonia is fully in accordance with
the *consociational* model of power-sharing and has mainly confirmed what critics of this approach have repeatedly pointed out: that consociationalism may foster the segregation rather than the integration of the two communities. This illustrates one of the paradoxes of consociational power-sharing: On the one hand, allotting a large range of privileges to minority groups is the purpose of power-sharing *per se*, and is often necessary in order to make these groups agree to the terms of the agreement in the first place. On the other hand, after the adoption of agreements containing provisions for ‘over-compensating’ minority groups, there appears to be a high risk for power-sharing institutions to not only regulate political competition, but to become themselves the subject of political competition. As Burundi leans more towards the *integrative* model of power-sharing (which is most notably embodied in the requirement for mixed party lists), these dangers have become much less apparent. However, this gave rise to a new set of tensions creeping in by the backdoor: the re-emergence of political tensions and the enabling environment it provided for actors willing to wind down power-sharing in the long run. It allowed Hutu parties to formally fulfill the power-sharing provisions enshrined in the Burundian constitution while at the same time competing for the dominant role in the polity.

Furthermore, the cases support the argument that even ‘Let’s Share’ polities may easily fall prey to attempts by political hardliners or authoritarian parties to capture the polity and undermine the constructive foundations on which it rests. The constructive relations originally maintained by the political elites in ‘Let’s Share’ polities may become worn off over time by the intricacies of daily politics, and constructive politicians may have a hard time to defend themselves against opportunistic attacks by hardliners. This phenomenon could be observed in both Macedonia and Burundi, although the exact mechanisms through which this happened differed sharply. In Macedonia, political hardliners tried to trigger imminent political crises with the potential to derail the peace process, which has become apparent most notably through the 2004 referendum against the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ or the VMRO-DPMNE’s refusal to coalesce with the strongest Albanian party after the elections in 2006. This led to an increasing politicization of the power-sharing arrangement and transformed it into an instrument for political mobilization. In both cases, immediate external engagement was necessary for preventing these crises from unfolding their harmful potential. In Burundi, the continued refusal of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL to support the peace process as well as the sharpened competition with other Hutu parties posed a threat to the CNDD-FDD’s position of dominance in post-conflict Burundi. The party reacted by increasingly falling back to informal and unconstitutional ways of dealing with these perceived threats. This became apparent through its attempts to defeat the FNL militarily and seek its ‘unconditional surrender’ rather than a broad-based settlement or through its attempts to get rid of the power-sharing provisions almost immediately after the elections in 2005. Through these instruments the CNDD-FDD gradually transformed Burundi into a one-party state in which power-sharing is, at best, a facade to mask the ruling party’s exclusive hold on power.
Finally, the cases suggest a significant discrepancy between the effectiveness of external engagement in the initiation phase and the implementation phase of ‘Let’s Share’ polities. In both Macedonia and Burundi, external actors play a key role with respect to implanting power-sharing provisions and providing the foundations for the establishment of ‘Let’s Share’ polities. The cases suggest that a continued engagement is necessary in the implementation phase. Although ‘Let’s Share’ polities supposedly provide a conducive environment for promoting good governance principles, significant achievements require a heightened willingness and ability by external actors to become engaged over a relatively long period. Not surprisingly, external actors’ willingness was much more pronounced in Macedonia than in Burundi. The perspective of becoming a member in both the EU and NATO endowed them with long term leverage and provided strong incentives for the Macedonian parties to comply with a broad catalog of good governance principles. This helped to defuse the 2007 parliamentary crises already addressed above and can be seen as a major external factor influencing the interactions between the different parties. However, the EU’s credibility to follow up on its promises has eroded over time, which could gradually reduce external actors’ ability to enforce the promotion of good governance principles in the future. In Burundi, external actors’ willingness and ability to engage in the long term promotion of good governance principles was significantly lower. The case illustrates how powerless external actors may be when it comes to stabilizing the very structures they implanted. ONUB’s forced withdrawal after less than two years deprived them of the ability to control the Burundian government and intervene in a timely and decisive manner if necessary. The remaining leverage was miniscule and not used in a concerted or strategic way: “to the greater relief of those who benefit from the status quo, most foreigners [did] not use their power, preferring to hide behind vague notions of ownership, respect for local culture, public sector capacity building, and all kinds of good words” (Uvin 2008: 114–115). This illustrates that while establishing effective and constructive power-sharing arrangements in post-conflict situations is difficult (and rare) enough, maintaining the foundations on which these polities rest in the medium and long run may even be a lot more difficult. Also, in Burundi the tendencies to ‘gloss over’ these shortcomings and hail the formal achievements of the peacebuilding project has been very pronounced. As this illustrates, the seemingly ideal characteristics of ‘Let’s Share’ polities may provide a pretext for external actors to confine their engagement to cosmetic or symbolic aspects.
Chapter 4

‘Doomed to Share’ Polities

‘Let’s Share’ polities fulfill a number of requirements that make them quasi ideal cases of post-conflict settlement. Nonetheless, as the previous chapter illustrated, the post-conflict elites in ‘Let’s Share’ polities may nonetheless easily slip into a state of competition with the potential to undermine the constructive characteristics of this polity type in the long run. In consequence, even such promising cases require a long term engagement of external actors by which detrimental tendencies can be curtailed. Unfortunately, the greater part of power-sharing cases does not even possess such promising starting conditions. They even lack a basic degree of cooperation between the warring parties. Such cases are called ‘Doomed to Share’ polities here. In total, five cases are classified as instances of this type: The Government of National Unity (GURN) in Angola (1997 – 1998), the National Transitional Government (NTGL) in Liberia (2003 – 2005), the power-sharing arrangement implemented after the Lomé Peace Accords in Sierra Leone (1999 – 2002), the power-sharing arrangement implemented as part of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (2003 – 2006), and the renewed power-sharing implemented after the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement of March 2007 in Côte d’Ivoire (see table A.1 on page 327). Of those, the DRC and Sierra Leone were chosen as the cases to be discussed in detail in this chapter because they match the case selection criteria formulated in section 1.4.2 most closely. Since all countries are located in Africa, the goal of selecting cases from two entirely different regions of the world was not possible to fulfill in the case of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities. The DRC and Sierra Leone are at least located in different regions in African (Central Africa and West Africa, respectively). In order to avoid choosing cases from the same country twice, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia were dismissed because other post-conflict periods of these countries are discussed as instances of the ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity type below. The GURN in Angola was not selected because its power-sharing characteristics were at the low end of the scale and hence not necessarily representative for the ‘Doomed to Share’ type as a whole (see A.2.3).

Classifying cases as instances of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities requires that three criteria are met. First, all cases are cases of power-sharing, indicating that governmental power is effectively shared between the belligerents at some point in the process. Admittedly, this is not always easy to determine, as there are cases (for instance Angola) for which
it is unclear whether they are really cases of power-sharing or situations of domination in disguise in which power-sharing is merely cosmetic. Second, in all four cases the belligerents maintain obstructive relations, that is, relations characterized by widespread mistrust, deep personal animosities, and a low willingness to engage in truly cooperative efforts. Third, the cases are similar with regard to the manner of external engagement. They have in common that external actors are engaged in a mediative manner, i.e. without any systematic and intentional bias for one of the former conflict parties.

### 4.1 A basic model of ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities

‘Doomed to Share’ polities are identical to ‘Let’s Share’ polities, with the only exception that the former warring parties maintain obstructive instead of constructive relations. The basic level of consent that characterizes ‘Let’s Share’ polities is absent. The basic features of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities are schematically sketched in figure 4.1. As the figure illustrates, the antagonists (‘Side A’ and ‘Side B’) are both part of the formal government, but their relations are characterized by mutual mistrust, suspicion and pronounced opportunism. This is illustrated by the thick black line dividing the two sides. As in ‘Let’s Share’ polities, external actors have a mediative and non-discriminatory influence on the dynamics unfolding between the warring parties (as illustrated by the arrow connecting external actors and the dashed line around the former belligerents).

What can be inferred from this basic constellation about the internal dynamics of this polity type? In general, it can be assumed that the obstructive relations and the pronounced mistrust prevailing between the parties inhibits any efforts for genuine cooperation to take hold. Where cooperation occurs, it is likely to be virtual, i.e. marked by attempts of both sides to tacitly undermine past agreements. As the name ‘Doomed to Share’ suggests, neither of the belligerents is particularly fond of power-sharing for its own sake and both of them consider rather a necessary evil. At least one of the parties engages in power-sharing for tactical or, at best, for strategic reasons, but typically not because it seeks a genuine settlement of the conflict. In this context, a decisive engagement by external actors is necessary which ensures that the former belligerents maintain at least a minimal level of cooperation. It depends on the particular cases whether external actors are able and willing to devote the necessary time and resources that are required for stabilizing the situation. The assumption that external actors constantly refrain from costly engagement and seek exit-options (see 2.4) suggests that, often, they are not ready to fulfill this role to the extent warranted by the situation on the ground. This may give rise to a strategy of ‘virtual enforcement’ in which external actors confine themselves to achieve a few visible successes at the surface without having any significant influence on the real occurrences on the ground.
4.1 A basic model of ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities

Overcoming Commitment Problems. Due to the obstructive relations existing among the rebels at the time of the settlement, overcoming the commitment problems in the initiation phase of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities is likely to be troublesome. Even among parties endowed with substantial goodwill, successful disarmament is difficult enough to achieve (see 2.2.2). However, in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities there is no real commitment to peace. Mistrust between the parties is widespread and benevolent intentions are lacking. The motivation to share power goes back to tactical or strategic considerations – for instance in order to gain time for rearmament or in order to gain international recognition and access to external funding. Against this background, it is extremely unlikely that external actors are able to yield significant successes in areas such as disarmament and demobilization or the formation of a joined army. For rebel groups, agreeing to disarm typically implies to give the ultimate (and often the only) means of coercion out of hand. Now, if the parties not only suspect each other of having obstructive intentions but have obstructive intentions themselves, facilitating a comprehensive disarmament process is almost impossible unless external actors wield significant leverage on the parties. The only factor that may account for at least partial successes is the presence of executive power-sharing, because it ensures that all of the parties have a certain control of the means of coercion. This may facilitate some symbolic successes, for instance by handing in weapons of poor quality or maintaining secret arms caches. In addition, the belligerents may put forward pretexts against disarmament, for instance by accusing their opponents of failing to meet agreements (‘blaming and shaming’ strategies) or by seeking other excuses.
Manner of Political Competition. One of the crucial characteristics of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities is that a consensus about who governs is lacking. Both sides want to increase their relative share of power immediately. Hence, the competition for power is not only directed at increasing one’s own share of influence in the future, but at constantly tipping the balance of power in one’s own favor. Political competition therefore mainly takes place through informal channels. The parties are likely to employ various overt and covert strategies and tricks in order to improve their own position, which may give rise to highly conflictual relations arising between the warring parties over time. This may result in a combination of ‘virtual cooperation’ and ‘genuine confrontation’ measures. This is pronounced by the fact that, often, not even the ‘partners’ in power-sharing governments are on equal terms. In most cases, one of the parties has already controlled the government previously and this party often continues to hold the presidency in the power-sharing government.\(^1\) As a result the relations in power-sharing governments often are highly asymmetric, with the ‘junior-partners’ having less control of the state apparatus and/ or the means of coercion.

Threats from Within. Due to the obstructive relations between the power-sharing ‘partners’, managing spoilers and dealing with imminent political crises is a central feature of this polity type. In fact, the informal nature of political competition in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities is likely to lead to a situation where the boundaries to spoiler behavior become blurred. A likely behavior is that one of the parties in the power-sharing government attempts to blackmail the international community and its opponent by threatening to derail the peace process entirely, for instance through the use of ‘saber rattling’ gestures. In the highly obstructive environment posed by ‘Doomed to Share’ polities, there is a high likelihood for these maneuvers to escalate into military confrontations between the antagonistic parties. In addition, as in ‘Let’s Share’ polities it is conceivable that hardliners or splinter-groups mobilize against the power-sharing arrangement. How the parties in power react to these challenges is highly contingent upon the particular case, but as a general tendency it can be stipulated that the government responds to such challenges in a highly informal manner, possibly even by the use of force.

\(^1\)This was the case for instance in Angola, the DRC and Sierra Leone. Among the group of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities, the only exception is Liberia, where President Charles Taylor was pressured to go into exile before a power-sharing arrangement was established (see A.13).
Promoting Good Governance. The promotion of good governance in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities can be expected to be particularly troublesome. The highly obstructive relations between the former warring parties render it extremely unlikely that they will voluntarily adhere to good governance principles or care about external policy preferences. By the same token, setting incentives or promising ‘carrots’ is almost certainly not enough for persuading the domestic parties to adhere to external policy recommendations. The more likely scenario is that external actors need to impose constraints on domestic actors in order to prevent at least the most blatant violations of good governance principles. This can take the form a robust peace-enforcement mission or the imposition of sanctions against particular parties. However, it is questionable to which extent external actors are willing and capable to live up to this role in the long run. Their ability and willingness to tackle the challenges on the ground may be particularly compromised in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities, for two reasons: First, as stipulated in the generic model (see 2.4), external actors are unwilling to commit to costly engagements and constantly seek exit-options. Out of this reason, it is generally unlikely that they will devote the resources necessary for constraining the domestic parties in an effective manner. This may give rise to an inconsequential manner of external engagement in which external actors’ rhetoric is not backed by adequate enforcement measures. Second, under the assumption that external actors are under constant pressure to report successes in order to justify their engagement and satisfy their own constituencies, ‘Doomed to Share’ polities run a high risk of falling victim to a pattern of ‘virtual enforcement’ where the emphasis lies on easily attainable successes at the surface, which go at the expense of actual substantive achievements. Ultimately, by following a strategy of virtual enforcement, external actors effectively create an environment in which the promotion of good governance itself becomes a largely symbolic act.

4.2 Democratic Republic of the Congo

In light of its tragic colonial and post-colonial history, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is today often considered the ‘epitome of a collapsed state’ (UCDP 2010a). Since the country reached independence in 1960, it experienced no less than five different armed conflicts (see appendix section A.7). The fourth civil war erupted in 1998 and became known as the ‘first pan-African war’ or Africa’s ‘Seven-Nation War’ (International Crisis Group 1998a). With more than three million casualties, it generated the highest death-toll of all wars fought since World War II (see e.g. Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 229; Rogier 2003: 25). Recalling the history of this conflict becomes complicated because of the high number of participating parties and the fluidity of the coalitions they formed. The first phase of the conflict began as an attempt to oust the country’s long-time dictator

2The abbreviation ‘DRC’ and the term ‘Congo’ are henceforth used as synonyms.
Joseph Mobutu.\textsuperscript{3} It was led by a loose coalition of anti-Mobutu forces, which included the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and Laurent-Desiré Kabila’s ‘Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire’ (ADFL). The contenders also enjoyed massive support from a range of neighboring countries, including Uganda and Tanzania. This coalition successfully overthrew Mobutu on 17 March 1997, and Kabila subsequently declared himself president (see e.g. Olsson and Fors 2004: 324–325, Emizet 2000: 163).\textsuperscript{4}

Kabila, however, soon faced his own rebellion, especially after he expressed his desire to “shrug off his former Ugandan and Rwandan sponsors” and ordered Rwandan soldiers serving in the Congolese army to return home (International Crisis Group 1998b: i). This gave rise to an armed opposition against Kabila’s rule and initiated the second phase of the conflict. Due to the involvement of neighboring countries, the conflict soon turned into a regional war, as both Uganda and Rwanda maintained proxy forces in eastern DRC. The main rebel factions were the ‘Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie’ (RCD), which had initially been supported by Uganda and Rwanda and later disintegrated into various splinter factions, and the ‘Mouvement de Libération Congolais’ (MLC) backed by Uganda (Coleman 2008d: 14–15).\textsuperscript{5} The government-side, represented by Kabila, enjoyed support from Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and Chad (Tshiyoyo 2006: 25). The warring parties soon reached a stalemate, and the country was effectively divided into two parts, with the eastern part controlled by Rwanda and Uganda, and Kabila’s government controlling the west and the south (Kodi 2008: 10). The first concrete step for the termination of the conflict was the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (Government of the Republic of Angola 1999) signed on 7 October 1999. Although it suffered from many flaws\textsuperscript{6} and did not put an end to the violence, it established the framework for peace negotiations to be held in the subsequent years, the so called ‘Inter-Congolese Dialogue’ (ICD) (Koko 2007: 36–37).

\textsuperscript{3}Mobutu, who called himself ‘Mobutu Sese Seko’, seized power through a coup in 1965, and renamed the former Belgian colony into Zaire. Presenting the country as a “bastion of anti-communism”, Mobutu could count on significant support from the West. His reign lasted for more than thirty years, and was characterized by violence, political repression and gross Human Rights violations (see e.g. Olsson and Fors 2004: 323).

\textsuperscript{4}The proximate reason for this attack were ethnic tensions related to the inflow of an estimated one million Hutu refugees to Eastern Zaire after the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) seized power in Rwanda in 1994. The group of refugees included an indefinite number of genocidaires who participated in the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi population, and enjoyed Mobutu’s support (see e.g. Coleman 2008d: 13). When Mobutu increased the pressure on the Banyamulenge (Zairan Tutsi), essentially depriving them of their Congolese citizenship and essentially forcing them to escape to neighboring Rwanda, they formed an armed rebellion, which was later joined by Kabila’s ADFL (Olsson and Fors 2004: 324–325).

\textsuperscript{5}Next to supporting attempts for unseating Kabila, these foreign forces were also highly involved in the exploitation of the DRC’s vast natural resources, of which the most precious ones – including gold, timber, diamonds and coltan – are conveniently located near the eastern border (Grignon 2003; Miskel and Norton 2003: 2).

\textsuperscript{6}The greatest shortcoming of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement can be seen in the fact that it was exclusively signed by the various governments participating in the conflict or attempting to mediate it (Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe), but not by the various Congolese rebel factions. For an overview of other shortcomings see Koko (2007).
4.2 Democratic Republic of the Congo

The main goal set for the ICD was to negotiate a provisional constitution for the DRC (see e.g. Koko 2007: 36–37; Swart 2003: 38). Of particular importance – in fact even “the most contentious issue” during the negotiations – was the question how governmental power was to be divided between the belligerents (Apuuli 2007: 72; see also Anstey 2007: 47). Due to Laurent-Desiré Kabila’s stubbornness the ICD stagnated during the first year, but the talks were resumed after he was assassinated on 16 January 2001. His son and successor, Joseph Kabila, was widely credited for speaking a “far more peaceful language than that of his bellicose father” (International Crisis Group 2001a: i), and he soon brought the Lusaka peace process back on track (see Rogier 2004: 9; Tshiyoyo 2006: 25). After a lengthy phase of negotiations, a power-sharing agreement was reached according to which Kabila would remain president, and the leaders of the various factions would participate in the government as vice presidents (see e.g. Tshiyoyo 2006: 25–27). The transitional government was inaugurated on 24 July 2003 and lasted until national elections in 2006 confirmed Joseph Kabila in office (see Coleman 2008d: 26).

4.2.1 The DRC as a ‘Doomed to Share’ Polity

Treating the DRC between 2003 and 2006 as a post-conflict country may be considered misguided because violence remained widespread during the transitional period, in particular at the local level (see Autesserre 2007; 2009). During the official transitional period, fighting broke out in north and south Kivu and in the Ituri region in the east, on the border to Rwanda and Burundi. This was effectively “a proxy war between the government in Kinshasa and its eastern neighbours” (Tull 2009: 225–226), but it was also propelled by the blatant opportunism of self-seeking political elites (see below). The International Rescue Committee estimated in 2004 that more than 30,000 people were dying in the country each month from the direct and indirect consequences of the conflict (quoted in International Crisis Group 2005e: 1). Overall, the ‘baseline conditions’ for peace in the DRC were rather discouraging, suffering from “the high number of warring parties, combatants and spoilers, weak state institutions, the absence of a genuine peace to keep, notably in Ituri and the Kivu provinces, the availability of disposable natural resources which allowed warring factions to finance their war, and hostile neighbouring states (Rwanda, Uganda) that continuously and covertly intervened in the DRC” (Tull 2009: 223). However, the power-sharing arrangement that was implemented in this period prepared the country for the national elections held in 2006 and can therefore be seen as the first moment during the DRC’s turbulent post-conflict history in which the parties exhibited at least a modest inclination to cooperate. According to the UCDP/Prio Armed Conflict Dataset, the anti-Kabila war on which this chapter focused already ended in 2001 (see A.7). Out of these reasons, it is fair to treat this period as a post-conflict polity case. As argued below, this situation fulfills the requirements of a ‘Doomed to Share’ polity because an effective power-sharing arrangement was in place, the parties maintained obstructive relations and external actors were engaged in a mediative manner.
**Effective Power-Sharing.**  The basis for power-sharing in the DRC stems from the ‘Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC’ (Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2002a, also known as ‘Pretoria II’), signed in Pretoria on 16 December 2002, and the so-called ‘Final Act’ (Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2003) signed in April 2003, in which the participants of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue finally accepted “as binding” a number of key documents and agreements of the Lusaka peace process (Art. 1). It led to the creation of a transitional government in which Joseph Kabila remained president, but had to share power with four vice presidents: Jean-Pierre Bemba (MLC), Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi (‘People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy’; PPRD), Azarias Ruberwa (RCD-Goma) and Zahidi Ngoma, representing the unarmed opposition (the so-called 1+4 formula, see Lemarchand 2007: 13; Tshiyoyo 2006: 25–27; Tull 2009: 216). Next to the executive, other transitional institutions were set up, including a transitional parliament in which seats were allocated to all signatories of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue based on a quota system (Tshiyoyo 2006: 25–27). The Inter-Congolese Dialogue also set in motion the drafting of a new constitution, which was put to public scrutiny in a referendum on 18 December 2005, and provided for popular elections held in 2006 (Lemarchand 2007: 14).

Although far from perfect, the agreement effectively constrained the power of the president and put clear limits to his authority. In the International Crisis Group’s assessment, it “dramatically changed the country’s power structure” (2006b: 1) and “[i]ts success in uniting the former belligerents in a government is not insignificant” (2005e: 27). However, the arrangement also suffered from a number of serious flaws. First, rather than being an inclusive arrangement uniting all relevant stakeholders it exclusively focused on the warring factions. René Lemarchand described the underlying power-sharing formula as “a more or less improvised form of co-optation that left out of the accounting some key political actors” and remarked that “the DRC is where power sharing departs most conspicuously from Lijphart’s consociational model” (2007: 12–13). Second, the obstructive relations (see below) and the political impasse in the capital led to parallel command structures in the military as well as in the public administration, allowing many state officials to “operate outside the legal framework of the transitional administration to cultivate their financial networks” (International Crisis Group 2005e: 17). Third, with four vice presidents, 36 ministers in the cabinet and 500 deputies and 120 senators in the transitional parliament,

---

7These were, in particular: “The 36 Resolutions duly adopted by the Inter-Congolese Dialogue” listed in the Appendix to the Final Act (par. 1); “The Global and Inclusive Agreement signed in Pretoria on 17 December 2002, together with the Additional Memorandum on the Army and Security, signed in Pretoria on 6 March 2003” (par. 2); “The Constitution of the Transition adopted at Sun City on 1 April 2003” (par. 3).

8The final settlement was ultimately facilitated by a partial agreement signed outside of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue after talks held in Sun City, South Africa, in April 2002 – the Political Agreement on Consensual Management of the Transition in the DRC (PACMT) (Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2002b) – in which Jean-Pierre Bemba and Joseph Kabila agreed to cooperate, and based on which the post of Prime Minister was awarded to Bemba. This “heralded the end of the anti-Kabila coalition and confirmed the isolation of the RCD and its ally Rwanda” (Swart 2003: 38).
the transitional institutions led to the sprawling of bureaucracy (International Crisis Group 2005e: 15). As Filip Reyntjens remarks, “in a country where no competitive elections had been held since 1965, this plethora of political personnel was totally unrepresentative [...]” (2007: 310). This sharply reduced the effectiveness of the transitional institutions and clearly impeded their ability to decide on political reforms – not to speak of the ability for implementing them. In its first seven months of existence, the transitional parliament passed not more than one major law, which led to the establishment of the Independent Electoral Commission (International Crisis Group 2005e: 15). This has animated observers to argue that “the TNG was often more part of the problem than of the solution [...]” (Aust and Jaspers 2006: 13). Despite these shortcomings, it cannot be denied that the situation in the DRC forced Kabila to give away a portion of his governmental power, in particular to his main rivals Jean-Pierre Bemba (MLC) and Azarias Ruberwa (RCD-Goma). In this light, the transitional government can be regarded as a case of effective power-sharing.

Obstructive Relations. Although the establishment of the transitional government was regarded as a step forward in the stalled peace process that had been ongoing for several years by all external observers, no one was so naïve as to believe that the warring parties were genuinely committed to peace. In fact, the relations between the warring factions in the DRC were even more overtly obstructive than in the other ‘Doomed to Share’ cases. Few countries experienced such a large and heterogeneous group of warring factions as the DRC. The internal cohesion of these groups was very low, which contributed to the rise of various splinter-groups competing for power and resources. Already shortly after the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement had been signed, the various anti-Kabila rebels began to disintegrate and engage in inter-factional battles. The RCD split into two camps: the original RCD under the leadership of Emile Ilunga and Bizima Karaha based in Goma called ‘RCD-Goma’ (RCD-G), and a splinter faction formed under the leadership of Ernest Wamba called ‘RCD-Kisangani’ (RCD-K), later renamed into Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani/ Movement of Liberation (RCD-K/ML) (see Coleman 2008d: 14–15; Koko 2007: 36–37). Though initially united in their objective to overthrow Kabila, the different factions engaged more and more in factional battles, often aiming at gaining or extending access to the DRC’s natural resources. The fractionalization of the rebel groups and the rise of new insurgencies in the eastern DRC also prevented the notoriously weak MONUC mission to fulfill its mandate effectively (Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 255).

The same atmosphere of mistrust and obstruction accompanied the negotiations held in Sun-City (South Africa) in April 2002, in which the parties adopted the ‘Political Agreement on Consensual Management of the Transition in the DRC’ (PACMT) (see Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2002b). During the talks, the most contentious issue revolved around the future composition of the transitional government. The participants arrived with largely incompatible positions: while Kabila insisted that
own presidency was non-negotiable but otherwise appeared ready to make a number of concessions, the RCD-Goma “wanted to seize the opportunity offered by the Dialogue to unseat Kabila” (Rogier 2004: 11).\footnote{Rogier mentions two reasons for the RCD’s refusal to accept the renewal of Kabila’s presidency: The first reason was Kabila’s continuing support for Rwandan Hutu extremists based in the DRC; and the second reason was that “RCD-Goma was probably prevented from concluding a deal by the Rwandan government” (2004: 13).} However, the other main rebel group – Jean Pierre Bemba’s MLC – gave up its initial reservations and began to cooperate with the government. In a partial agreement\footnote{‘Political Agreement on Consensual Management of the Transition in the DRC’ (Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2002b)} struck with Kabila, the two parties agreed on a transitional arrangement according to which Kabila could remain president and Bemba received the post of a Prime Minister (see International Crisis Group 2002e; Swart 2003: 38). On the surface, this can be taken as an indicator that the relations between the government and the main rebel group were becoming more constructive, but in light of the subsequent developments (see below) it appears more plausible to argue that Bemba simply sniffed an opportunity to outmaneuver the RCD and to successfully advance its own position in the future transitional government. Kabila and Bemba were the main beneficiaries on this partial agreement, since it “heralded the end of the anti-Kabila coalition and confirmed the isolation of the RCD and its ally Rwanda” (Swart 2003: 38).

There is widespread evidence that virtually all parties involved in the transitional government undermined the peace process or obstructed the power-sharing deal whenever it proved beneficial for them. This contributed to the impression that the agreement “has been marked by intense political infighting, lack of accountability and corruption” (International Crisis Group 2006b: 1). Observers viewed the transitional government as an arrangement in which “[e]ach member […] seems to be wary of what amount of the cake will go his way” (Alusala 2004: 96). The belligerents’ interest in the arrangement was, at best, purely instrumental. Though Joseph Kabila was initially hailed for his more constructive attitude, he showed little enthusiasm for the arrangement. He was not present in person when the accord was signed, which many interpreted as a strong indicator for Kabila’s “blatant disregard for the peace process” (Swart 2003: 42). The greatest rupture in the transitional government involved Kabila and RCD-Goma leader Ruberwa, who were “barely on speaking terms” and were later involved in various military battles in Bukavu and Goma in the east (International Crisis Group 2005e: 13). The other parties involved were in no way more constructive and ruthlessly exploited the opportunities offered by the power-sharing arrangement in their own favor. According to the International Crisis Group, the “defining characteristic of the transitional government has been its weakness and the opportunism of its key members, who have little appetite for the approaching elections” (2005e: i). These are all clear indicators for the absence of truly cooperative relations.
4.2 Democratic Republic of the Congo

**Mediative Engagement.** Assessing external actors’ engagement in the case of the DRC is difficult because of the highly heterogeneous character of external influence in the Congo. The term ‘external actor’ necessarily creates confusion, since a large part of the warring factions were effectively foreign and maintained close links to neighboring countries. Their governments’ support of the Congo war was highly strategic, since they “calculated that the benefits of war […] outweighed the domestic and international consequences of flouting formal peace commitments” (Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 231). But even when concentrating on those external actors who supported the peace process, the list remains very long. The DRC witnessed not only a UN mission (MONUC) with four distinct phases of deployment, but also the French-led ‘Operation Artemis’ – an EU Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) authorized by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1484 and equipped with a *Chapter VII* mandate – and a number of civilian components, including a European Police Mission (EUPOL), a EU Security Sector Reform Mission (EUSEC), and a military operation in support of the UN’s MONUC mission (EUFOR) (see International Crisis Group 2004d; Morsut 2009: 262; Tull 2009: 218). In addition to that, there were various bilateral initiatives on the regional level, most notably the engagement of South Africa (first under Nelson Mandela and later under Tabo Mbeki), Botswana, the African Union, and the South African Development Community (SADC).

As highlighted below in further detail, these different peace initiatives suffered from many flaws and ambiguities. However, it is undeniable that external actors have played a crucial role in the DRC and that they took over many responsibilities throughout the settlement and post-settlement phase. At its height, MONUC was the most expensive of all UN peacekeeping missions and among the largest of all times. Although the mission had great difficulties in protecting civilians, observers agree that without MONUC’s presence the security situation in the DRC would be “significantly worse” (Mobekk 2009: 274). This induced Dennis Tull to a rather sober assessment about the mission’s performance: “MONUC will not enter history as a remarkable success story. But there is also little evidence that MONUC has performed much worse than peacekeeping missions elsewhere, especially in the light of the DRC’s difficult political environment and the scarce resources the mission had at its disposal” (2009: 226). With hindsight, its greatest single achievement certainly was the organization and logistical support of the 2005 constitutional referendum and the 2006 elections (Tull 2009: 221). In effect, the elections greatly benefited the incumbent, Joseph Kabila, who received a majority of votes in the runoff elections to the presidency and clearly beat his closest opponent Jean-Pierre Bemba (see Weiss 2007). Though external actors had an outspoken preference for Kabila to win the elections, there is little evidence for an intentional and systematic (hence: partisan) support for him. For this, external support for peace has been far too modest and international resolve far too weak (see below). Therefore, external support as a whole can be regarded as mediative in the case of the DRC.
4.2.2 Polity Dynamics in the DRC

The case of DRC confirms the plausibility of many of the assumptions made about ‘Doomed to Share’ polities above. This is illustrated below with regard to the four overarching themes: dealing with commitment problems, competition for power, threats from within, and external engagement for good governance.

a) Overcoming Commitment Problems

The widespread mistrust and suspicion that characterized the relations between the participants of the transitional government turned out as a major obstacle in the transition process (Autesserre 2007: 9). As noted above (2.2) mutual mistrust can impede the successful conclusion or implementation of peace agreements even under favorable circumstances. With the highly obstructive environment prevailing in the DRC, it became virtually impossible to implement even the most basic goals of the peace process. This became most apparent with regard to two aspects: the disarmament of the belligerents, and the formation of an inclusive army. In Article VI of the ‘Global and Inclusive Agreement’, the parties gave their consent to the establishment of a defense council whose tasks included giving advice on “the setting up of a restructured and integrated national army” and “the disarming of armed groups” (Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2002a: Art. VI). Both issues turned out as conflict-ridden from the beginning on.

Disarmament in the DRC was difficult because of the large number of warring factions in conjunction with the fact that not all of the belligerents were Congolese. A particularly obstructive element were the ‘Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda’ (FDLR), an insurgent group comprising some 10,000 Rwandan Hutu rebels who fled to the DRC after the 1994 genocide.11 Directed mainly against the Tutsi government in Rwanda, its strategy was to “destabilise the region in hopes of provoking another war between Rwanda and the Congo” (International Crisis Group 2005e). The group was “closely allied with the Congolese government [and] took a hard-line stance against DDR [. . . ]” (Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 272). Indeed, the presence of these forces in the DRC gave the Rwandan president Kagame a perfect pretext for maintaining his own troops in the country, and his willingness to repatriate them was therefore very small.12 MONUC was specifically mandated to disarm these foreign forces, albeit on a voluntary basis (Tull 2009: 217). The UN Security Council refrained from authorizing the forceful repatriation of the FDLR, which “left the mission with few other means than seeking to persuade foreign fighters to return to their countries” (Tull 2009: 219). This process was more than erroneous. Given its low numbers of military personnel, MONUC simply “lacked the capacity to

11 For a detailed assessment of the FDLR’s strategies, see in particular: International Crisis Group (2005d).
12 See in particular the assessment by Séverine Autesserre: “Keeping the FDLR out of Rwanda ensured that the movement could not become an official, recognized opposition to the Rwandan ruling party. Keeping the FDLR in the Congo also allowed Kagame to maintain a permanent quasi-state of war in Rwanda and therefore to restrict civil rights and clamp down on opposition parties” (2007: 7).
undertake the enormous task of disarming and repatriating these armed groups” (Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 273). As a result, DDR efforts stalled and the FDLR continued to pose a great security risk throughout most of the DRC’s official ‘transition’ period.

The disarmament of the domestic belligerents proceeded in an equally obstructive environment. The institutional set-up in which the efforts for disarmament and demobilization were carried out was relatively unusual. The main responsibility lay in the hands of a national agency, the ‘Comité National de Démobilisation et Réinsertion’ (CONADER), which was supervised by the transitional government (Mobekk 2009: 276). Formally, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had the final authority for coordinating and supervising the DDR efforts. MONUC’s role was limited to providing security at the demobilization sites (see Tull 2009: 220; Wolters 2005: 6). This particular institutional set-up clearly limited the effectiveness of the DDR efforts and, unlike in other cases, implied that the main tensions about disarmament were not to be found at the interface between the warring factions and external actors, but inside the transitional government. Two years after its establishment, nearly nothing was achieved with regard to disarming the combatants. As the International Crisis Group remarked in 2005, “[m]ost of the 300,000 combatants in the country are deployed in the same positions and are controlled by the same military hierarchies as before the transition” (2005e: 1). Charging the national disarmament commission for its mismanagement, donors even suspended funding for the disarmament program in 2006. This further distanced the DRC from the goal of a quick disarmament of its factions (Tull 2009: 220). The reasons for this poor track record can certainly be attributed to the lack of trust among the warring factions, in conjunction with the fact that external actors did provide too little effective security guarantees. MONUC was a very weak force in its initial years of deployment, comprising as little as 3,500 troops (see Tull 2009: 217). Suffering, additionally, from a lack of a strong mandate (see below), it is naïve to assume that the mission could disperse the combatants’ fears to any significant degree.

The poor track record with regard to the disarmament of the factions also impeded the formation of an inclusive army. Formally, with the adoption of the peace agreement, all warring factions subordinated their forces to the newly established ‘Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (FARDC). However, most of them ignored their commitments from day one of the transition phase (International Crisis Group 2006c: i; Mobekk 2009: 277). While this may have been a deliberate strategy adopted by some groups, others were obviously simply incapable of enforcing the necessary discipline among their base. The International Crisis Group believed that none of the participants of the transitional government had “strong control of either its military or political wing”, and has pointed to the existence of parallel command structures in the new national army (2005e: i; see also Autesserre 2007: 8). In their assessment, “the resistance of many belligerents to demobilise their armies and integrate them into one reformed national army […]” was one of the major obstacles to a successful security sector reform in the
DRC (2006c: 1). Tellingly, not even the president had trust in the new national army and instead reinforced the presidential guard to a strength of 12,000 to 15,000 troops and established parallel command structures in order to bypass the regular military command (see International Crisis Group 2006c: 3). This clearly impeded the formation of an inclusive army. As the International Crisis Group remarked, somewhat frustrated, in 2005: “It is unacceptable that, almost two years on, little has been done to unify the armies and the administrations of the former belligerents” (2005e: 27).

In sum, this confirms the assumption that ‘Doomed to Share’ polities pose a difficult environment for overcoming commitment problems between the belligerents. The previous chapter has shown that issues such as disarmament and the formation of an inclusive army can be relatively successful even in a difficult environment such as Burundi. The DRC illustrates the difficulties involved in overcoming commitment problems in an environment of severe mistrust and hostility. The main problems here arise from the fact that the parties are typically obliged to integrate their forces into a joint army, which – in an environment of deep-rooted mistrust – may create more tensions than it is supposed to solve.

b) Manner of Political Competition

The overall dynamics of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities are also reflected in the manner by which the former warring factions compete for power and influence. Unlike in ‘Let’s Share’ polities, where the general consensus about the distribution of current power initially directs competition for power into formal-constitutional channels, the lack of such a consensus in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities induces the parties to adopt informal and unconstitutional means by which they try to deceive and outmaneuver each other. The DRC gives a vivid illustration of this phenomenon. Not surprisingly, there was little genuine cooperation taking place between the warring factions throughout the period of the transitional government and nearly every cooperative gesture was accompanied by a more or less obvious attempt to undermine these very efforts.

As noted above, the conclusion of the Lusaka Ceasefire agreement in 1999, the initiation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in 2001 and the adoption of the various peace agreements can, on the surface, be interpreted as signs for an emerging cooperative behavior. In immediate response to these positive signs, the international community did not refrain from applauding Joseph Kabila for his pragmatic approach. His “willingness to share power with the rebels had made a positive, lasting impression among the donor countries […]” (Dizolele 2010: 150). However, upon closer investigation it quickly becomes clear that these were merely superficial gestures of cooperation that could hardly mask the belligerents’ hidden agendas and vested interests. Whenever the warring parties cooperated, it happened in an atmosphere of mistrust, ongoing hostilities and sizable external pressure. As Rogier remarks, the belligerents’ support of the peace process “was much more the result of opportunistic moves by each party than a reflection of a general commitment to reaching a political settlement of the conflict” (2004: 3). The transitional government
ultimately established was in the best tradition of this obstructive spirit. In the assessment of Dizolele, it “bestowed on the DRC its worst government yet” (2010: 147). Observers characterized it as a “deeply dysfunctional” arrangement in which “political elites focused on the upcoming elections and appropriating public resource” (Tull 2009: 220). As a result, the participants of the transitional government mainly concentrated on extending their relative share of de facto power rather than exercising authority within the legal confines of the power-sharing agreement. As Autesserre remarked, “[t]he government did not work as a team to manage the transition and lead the country, but rather as enemy factions bent on overtaking one another and on enhancing the political, military, symbolic, and financial position of their own parties” (2007: 9).

This became most clearly apparent with respect to the RCG-Goma, clearly the party with the least chances for a good showing in the elections (see below) and hence the lowest inclination to exert authority through formal-constitutional instruments. Due to its close affiliations with Rwanda, the RCD-Goma enjoyed very little legitimacy inside the Congo. From the beginning on, exploiting anti-Rwandan and in particular anti-Tutsi sentiments provided the main platform for Kabila’s party, the PPRD. As a UN analyst remarked: “In the absence of a solid popular base and public services, anti-Tutsi propaganda is one of the only things that can rouse the rabble in Kinshasa” (quoted in International Crisis Group 2005e: 12). However, this “Rwandophone-bashing” (Autesserre 2007: 11) significantly fueled the tensions with the RCD-Goma and contributed to the spiral of violence in the eastern DRC. The relations between Kabila and the RCD-Goma were therefore the most troublesome ones. Kabila tried to keep Ruberwa and the RCD-Goma from retaining genuine power in Kinshasa, which “resulted in the effective exclusion of Goma and its surrounding territories from the transitional administration” (International Crisis Group 2005e: 7). This gave rise to frequent tensions between the government and the rebel group and induced the RCD-Goma to fall back to a pattern of ‘genuine confrontation’ since the early stages of the transitional government. Already in May 2003, RCD-Goma representatives withdrew from talks about the implementation of the transitional government after “accusing the government of trying to keep the post of head of army for itself and seeking to control the majority of the military regions” (Swart 2003: 42; see also Alusala 2004: 94). Another source of hostility were Kabila’s attempts to restore central government authority in the entire Congolese territory. Kabila possessed a large portion of de facto power in about 60 percent of the country’s territory and tried to restore central government authority in to the eastern DRC, where it was still under the effective control of the rebel factions (International Crisis Group 2005e: 1). This gave rise to the “highly volatile situation in those territories that continued to be controlled by troops affiliated with different factions, and led to both small scale battles and several bouts of large-scale fighting” (Autesserre 2007: 9). In addition, the confrontation undermined the already fragile cohesion of the RCD-Goma, ultimately leading to a rift between Ruberwa
Chapter 4 ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities

and a number of hardliners from his own party. This has further reduced the RCD-Goma’s ability to play a more constructive role in the transition process:

“The RCD’s failure to influence the transition in a constructive way can be explained by two main phenomena: An increasingly ‘desperate’ RCD, weakened by internal divisions and power struggles, and the successful attempts of the presidential camp to ‘capture’ the transition process in an effort to realize its own aspirations for power” (Aust and Jaspers 2006: 89).

But the relations between Kabila and Jean-Pierre Bemba were not significantly different, despite the veil of cooperation that initially accompanied them. Bemba, too, used the transitional government as a means to increase his de facto share of power. Just a few months after the partial deal with Kabila in Sun City, he threw his peaceful aspirations overboard by striking an offensive against the city of Mambasa in the Ituri province: “Eager to regain territory lost […] and to seize the gold and diamond mines of Ituri”, he tried to use the confusion revolving around the acknowledged withdrawal of Ugandan forces from this region (International Crisis Group 2003b: 8). He was pushed back by the armed wing of the RCD-ML, an Ituri-based and Ugandan-backed faction that had split from the Rwandan-backed RCD-Goma in 1998 (van Woudenberg 2003: 198–199). Realizing that he was unable to re-establish its influence in Ituri, the MLC withdrew and almost immediately switched back to its constructive modus operandi by supporting a ceasefire between the RCD-ML and the RCD-National – another RCD splinter-group with few soldiers that until then relied on the MLC’s military force (International Crisis Group 2003b: 8). All in all, Bemba’s strategy can therefore more adequately be described as a ‘virtual cooperation’ strategy than a ‘genuine confrontation’ strategy.

The sharp competition for de facto power can also be attributed to the lack of future perspectives available for most of the rebel factions. Aside from Kabila, most of the parties had little hope for being represented in a future (post-transitional) government. Since no post-election power-sharing was agreed anywhere in the peace agreement, the elections meant that “only the allies of the winning party […] would be able to retain their positions of authority” – and the odds stood most favorably for the incumbent Kabila (Autesserre 2007: 10). This shifted their priorities away from managing the country’s transition process to prolonging the transitional period as long as possible and accounted for the extensive use of ‘foot dragging’ gestures. The rebel factions were, as the International Crisis Group puts it, “set on prolonging or disrupting the transition” by all means (2005e: i). They persistently “ignored the elections timeline and would have continued on indefinitely […]”

13 Ugandan forces had been present in Ituri for various years, but were forced to withdraw after an Angolan brokered bilateral agreement between Uganda and the Congolese government (‘Luanda Agreement’). The agreement was facilitated after Rwanda had signed a similar agreement a few weeks earlier (‘Pretoria’) due to rising international pressure for its support for the RCD-Goma (see International Crisis Group 2003b: 7). Bemba was already in control of the region for a short period in 2001 as the leader of a short-lived coalition with other Ugandan-backed factions, but lost this foothold in Ituri already a few months afterwards (see van Woudenberg 2003: 198 and International Crisis Group 2003b: 5).
had they not committed to a clear end-date in the Sun City Accords (Dizolele 2010: 148). This holds particularly true for the RCD-Goma, a party that has been “deeply unpopular beyond its narrow base among the Kinyarwanda speakers of North Kivu” and that “[m]ost Congolese regard […] as a puppet of Rwanda” (International Crisis Group 2005e: 2). As a result, the rebels primarily used the transitional government as a protected space allowing them to gain both time and money and prepare for their next offensive against Kabila. As a result, they “exploited […] Kabila’s] deficiency whenever they could […] [and] would often push him to the limit of his power until he had no recourse” (Dizolele 2010: 150).

Jean-Pierre Bemba was in a slightly better position, since he had a relatively large power-base in the western part of the country (including Kinshasa) and was the only candidate with enough money and organizational support to compete with Kabila (see Dizolele 2010: 151). However, since his chances for a victory were highly uncertain and he faced charges for war crimes from the International Criminal Court, prolonging the transitional period was the safest bet also for him since “a longer transition meant continued immunity from prosecution” (Autesserre 2007: 10).

Thus, virtually all of the rebel groups concentrated their efforts on prolonging the transitional period in order to retain their status as official members of the government and all privileges associated with it. For Séverine Autesserre, “the interests that most representatives had in stalling the transition process” were among the main reasons for the lack of success in the transitional process (2007: 9). The only exception was Kabila, who was the only one to gain from the transition. For him, who had never been formally elected prior to 2006, the transitional government offered an opportunity to finally legitimize his rule (Dizolele 2010: 150).

Kabila was therefore willing to sit out the transitional phase, counting on his democratic legitimation in the post-transition elections. As a result, he mainly engaged in ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies in order to preserve his image as a comparatively constructive element in the peace process and not lose international support, but at the same time he engaged in questionable military endeavors in order to keep the upper hand against his opponents.

The inclination to fall back to ‘foot dragging’ gestures rather than trying to engage constructively in the country’s transitional process was also fostered by the potential for

---

14 “Besides Bemba and Kabila, the main contender in the upcoming elections will be Etienne Tshisekedi, the veteran leader of the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS), who led the political opposition against Mobutu. […] He has the advantage of not being a member of the corruption-ridden transitional government and is still able to mobilise large numbers of supporters in Kinshasa and his home province of Kasai Oriental” (International Crisis Group 2005e).

15 This may also explain why, when Bemba failed to win the absolute majority in the first round of the elections, his camp was reportedly “shocked” about this fact (Human Rights Watch 2008: 16–17). When, ultimately, he lost against Kabila in the run-off elections – gaining an official 42 percent of the votes, as compared to 58 percent for Kabila (Booysen 2007: 13; see also Weiss 2007) – he had a tough time accepting this result. Shortly after the elections, Bemba announced that he “cannot accept these results which are far from reflecting the truth of the ballot box”, and that he would use “all legal means to ensure the will of our people is respected” (Gettleman and Mwassi 2006), but later accepted the Supreme Court’s rejection of his appeal (Booysen 2007: 13).
Chapter 4 ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities

self-enrichment offered by the participation in the transitional government. In order for ‘foot dragging’ strategies to be attractive for the warring parties, the status quo must offer better opportunities than all of its realistic alternatives. This condition was clearly fulfilled in the DRC. As Kodi remarks, “[t]he power-sharing arrangement created new opportunities for corrupt activities and guaranteed immunity to all the office-holders as long as they maintained good client relations with their leaders” (2008: 26). Government clerks on all levels of the hierarchy engaged in corrupt activities and made use of the opportunity for ‘extraversion’ (see International Crisis Group 2006b: 4). In 2005, aid made up approximately 25 percent of the country’s GDP, and aid inflows between 2002 and 2006 equaled US$10 billion (Matti 2010: 52). More than 50 percent of the Congolese state budget were financed by external actors during that year (Aust and Jaspers 2006: 32). This offered a large potential for funds being embezzled by corrupt political leaders (Matti 2010: 53). The faction leaders were not only bestowed with government posts, but also with lucrative jobs in state enterprises (see Dizolele 2010: 147). This potential for enrichment clearly contributed to the parties’ inclination to engage in extended foot dragging:

“For the many government workers (at the top and at the bottom of the hierarchy) who were utterly incompetent and owed their nominations to their affiliation with one of the components, a long transition meant more time to enrich their coffers” (Autesserre 2007: 10).

This momentum for self-enrichment is not surprising in a country where corruption and patronage have been deeply entrenched in the political culture for half a century (see e.g. Matti 2010: 50), but it contributed to eliminate what little was left of the transitional government’s legitimacy. The illicit exploitation of natural resources also was a crucial source of self-enrichment in the DRC. Minerals account for an estimated 60 percent of the DRC’s exports (International Crisis Group 2006b: 7). Their illegal exploitation assumed such alarming proportions that the United Nations appointed a panel of experts in order to shed light on the extent of this phenomenon (United Nations 2003a), and numerous UN Security Council Resolutions explicitly dealt with this problem (see e.g. U.N. Security Council 2003a; 2003f).

In sum, the transitional government in the DRC was certainly not an adequate mechanism for managing the conflict between the belligerents. Perceiving the transitional government more as a continuation of war by other means, the former warring factions mainly used it as a vehicle to extend their own share of power at the expense of their opponents. This was accompanied by various ‘virtual cooperation’ as well as ‘foot dragging’ strategies.

c) Threats from Within

The informal and confrontational manner of political competition accompanying ‘Doomed to Share’ polities almost certainly contributes to the emergence of threats to the stability

16For an overview of corruption in the DRC, see International Crisis Group (2006b: 4–13).
of the polity as a whole. Unlike in ‘Let’s Share’ polities – where incentives to engage in political mobilization ‘on the cheap’ causes politics to slide down a slippery slope – ‘Doomed to Share’ polities by definition face much more imminent threats by spoilers or political hardliners who oppose the settlement by recourse to armed force. Much more than in ‘Let’s Share’ polities, where a broader societal consensus about the fact of power-sharing exists, ‘Doomed to Share’ polities are focused on elite accommodation and co-optation. The DRC illustrates that this may erode the factions’ internal cohesion and provide an enabling environment for spoilers and hardliners to derail the peace process. As shown below, all of the warring parties had hardliners or dissidents in their ranks who were diametrically opposed to their leaders’ participation in the transitional government and instead sought a military solution. This highly conflictual environment requires external actors to intervene in a very resolute manner. However, given the costs and dangers associated with these forms of intervention, there is every indication to assume that external actors will shy away from engaging in ‘genuine enforcement’ strategies and will rather fall back to a pattern of ‘virtual enforcement’.

Since the very beginnings of the transitional period in the DRC, hardliners and spoilers represented a major potential for derailing the peace process. The main spoilers were dissident factions emerging as a result of internal divisions within some of the rebel groups. The three main rebel groups “were split between two sides: the legitimists, who wanted to play the game of the transition, and the warmongers, who either had everything to lose with the peace or had too much to gain from war to accept a settlement of the conflict” (Autesserre 2007: 10). According to the International Crisis Group, “the real obstacle to the transition is the reluctance of the spoilers to give up the power and assets they derive from the persistence of parallel chains of command in the military, the financial institutions and the administration and the corruption these have engendered” (2005e: 15). Some of them engaged in ‘calculated escalation’ strategies, which aimed at breaking up the transitional government in order to make room for a military ‘solution’.

The internal divisions were most pronounced in the case of the RCD-Goma. The rebel group was divided into a faction of hardliners located in Goma, which feared to lose its local power base if it supported central governing authority, and a more moderate faction centering around Ruberwa, which supported the transitional government and was “more preoccupied with securing their new privileges and […] establishing new political alliances” (Aust and Jaspers 2006: 89). As a result, the attempt by the transitional government to extend central authority to the rebel-held areas in the eastern DRC triggered a number of very serious military confrontations, most notably the 2004 Bukavu crisis. It was rooted in an armed skirmish between a commander from the Congolese army (Colonel Jules Mutebutsi) and the regional commander for South Kivu (Brigadier-General Prosper Nabyolwa) about the enforcement of central authority in the eastern DRC. What began

17 Following his mandate, Nabyolwa took decisive actions against a group of 300 RCD-Goma dissidents who had – allegedly with the help from Rwanda – secretly re-armed. Nabyolwa’s raids were condemned
as a “contest for control of the province between the transitional government and the elements of RCD-Goma supported by Rwanda” (International Crisis Group 2004e: 4) soon escalated into a major confrontation in the course of which the city of Bukavu was controlled for one week by a faction of RCD-Goma dissidents led by Laurent Nkunda. This caused the death of several hundred civilians and induced tens of thousands to flee to Burundi and Rwanda (see Beswick 2009: 340; Wolters 2007: 1). In the end, after signs for the deployment of a rapid intervention force substantiated, both withdrew their forces, which enabled the government to re-establish its control of the city (International Crisis Group 2004e: 4; Tull 2009: 218; Wolters 2007: 1). The crisis deprived the RCD-Goma of what little remained from its internal cohesion. After its end, most Congolese Hutu and Tutsi in the rebel faction sympathized with the dissidents and finally withdrew their support from the transitional government in Kinshasa. In July 2004, eight members of the transitional parliament belonging to the RCD-Goma suspended their cooperation with the government and pulled out of Kinshasa (International Crisis Group 2005e: 5–10). This put major pressure on the ‘legitimists’ within the RCD-Goma, who increasingly found themselves with their “back against the wall” and who were, as a result, even more unwilling to implement political reforms decided by the center (Aust and Jaspers 2006: 89). The Kabila camp used this as an opportunity to further marginalize the movement, arguing that its lack of leadership was a threat to the transition process (Aust and Jaspers 2006: 89).

As this shows, hardliners and spoilers have posed a significant threat to the transition process in the DRC. These incidents can therefore be seen as a litmus test for determining external actors’ willingness and capability to respond to threats from within. Already for ‘Let’s Share’ polities it was shown that the centrifugal tendencies associated with the competition for future power may require external actors to remain engaged in these polities for sustained periods. This holds all the more true for ‘Doomed to Share’ cases, where the adverse potential of spoilers is significantly higher – most notably since the disarmament of the ‘former’ warring factions in this polity type is often not effective (as shown above). However, this more challenging environment calls for robust peace-enforcement missions, which are expensive, dangerous and more difficult to push through politically. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that external actors’ capability and willingness to engage in ‘genuine enforcement’ is severely compromised.

The DRC strongly supports these assumptions. The International Crisis Group believed that “[n]either MONUC nor the wider international community has shown the ability or the will to address the Congo’s crises”, and that international donors have missed to take “serious action against the spoilers in the transitional government, who work against unification of the army and administration” (2005e: ii). International response to the crisis

by the RCD-Goma leadership as an attempt to undermine the party’s command structure in the Kivus, and Deputy Colonel Mutebutsi – a former RCD-Goma soldiers – intervened on behalf of his party by preventing Mutebutsi from continuing with his raids (see International Crisis Group 2005e: 5, for more details see also United Nations 2004g, par. 34 – 46).
in the DRC was from the beginning on struck by ambiguities and indecisiveness, with the main tension being that “the war in the Congo was too gruesome and devastating for the West to ignore, but too difficult and too low a priority to address seriously” (Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 253). The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement initially called for a decisive role to be played by the United Nations, explicitly requesting them (in partnership with the OAU) to “constitute, facilitate and deploy an appropriate force in the DRC to ensure implementation of the agreement” (Government of the Republic of Angola 1999, Annex A, Ch. 8). Next to more classical peacekeeping tasks, it called for peace-enforcement mechanisms. However, from the beginning on the international community had strong reservations against a decisive engagement in the DRC, and the initial phases of MONUC engagement were marred by a lack of resolve and political will. Ostensibly, deploying a strong peace-enforcement mission appeared “too risky and too costly” to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (Rogier 2004: 5). This led to an approach to peacekeeping in which virtually all efforts for a more decisive engagement were contingent upon the warring parties’ demonstrated willingness to cooperate, who were, in turn, “content to defy the United Nations because they faced almost no consequences for continuing to prosecute the war and loot the Congo of its riches” (Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 249). This accounts for MONUC’s small size of some 3,000 troops in the initial phase of engagement (see Tull 2009: 217).

External support was only significantly increased after the establishment of the transitional government and in light of the blatant human rights violations occurring in the eastern DRC, in the city of Bunia, in mid-2003. Acting, for the first time during the Congo crisis, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in the town of Bunia, where some of the most serious incidents took place (U.N. Security Council 2003d). Realizing that this was only a temporary measure, the UN Security Council significantly increased MONUC’s strength to 10,800 military personnel in July 2003 (U.N. Security Council 2003e). At its height, shortly before the elections, the mission reached a troop ceiling of 19,000 military personnel – seven years after its establishment (Tull 2009: 223). Although this was decisively more than before, it was still far too little in order to successfully tackle the challenges posed by the vast country hosting some 300,000 combatants: “In absolute terms, MONUC is one of the biggest missions ever deployed by the UN, but in relative terms it has been one of the smallest, be it in relation to the size of the DRC (one peacekeeper per 139 sq km), or its population (one soldier per 3,500 Congolese)” (Tull 2009: 223).

During the Bukavu crisis, this low-key peacekeeping profile severely backfired. Due to its lack of appropriate resources, the mission failed to prevent civilian suffering and was criticized for its inability to support the transitional government (Tull 2009: 218). According to the International Crisis Group, MONUC “could have done far more to prevent Nkunda’s advance on Bukavu, with the consequent looting, killing, and rape or wounding
of over 100 civilians” (2005e: 24). Its main shortcoming was that, instead of giving military backing to the government troops, “it negotiated with insurgents, who broke the deal and then proceeded to kill, rape, and loot without serious opposition” (International Crisis Group 2004e: 6). In this regard, the Bukavu crisis “was a major blow to MONUC’s credibility” (Tull 2009: 218). This was all the more true in light of the blatant failure to keep peace in Bunia one year earlier, where “700 blue helmets […] were bystanders to the massacres of 400 civilians” (Tull 2009: 217). However, the Bukavu crisis was also a focal event that elevated external actors’ awareness about the destabilizing potential of hardliners and spoilers, as a statement made by the UN Secretary General shortly after the events in Bukavu illustrates:

“Hardliners and spoilers who want to see the transitional process fail can be found in all the major components and will continue to disturb the process. […] Without the marginalization of such spoilers through effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and military integration, timely political agreements on nationality and amnesty and legitimization of the economic sector, the country will remain unstable and incidents such as those seen in Bukavu and Kinshasa in May-June 2004 are likely to recur” (United Nations 2004g, par. 51 and 57).

Despite these insights, external actors’ willingness to engage more decisively has remained low. As Dennis Tull noted, the “Security Council’s resolutions revealed the limited interests of its five permanent members in solving the conflict […]”, which clearly limited the mission’s effectiveness (Tull 2009: 223). There is some indication that this unwillingness is directly related to external actors’ meditative stance. As the International Crisis Group noted: “MONUC is often caught in the dilemma of not wanting to alienate the very parties it is trying to get to collaborate in the peace process. […] By not acting decisively, however, MONUC has further damaged its reputation and increased the likelihood that it will be targeted” (2005e: 24). This has specifically reduced its determination to decisively act against spoilers and hardliners who were keen on derailing the peace process. As the UN Secretary General carefully noted, “[t]he efforts of the international community could have more impact if its political goals and financial and material assistance were to be carefully calibrated and used as additional leverage to support the transitional process” (United Nations 2004g, par. 57). However, the existing leverage – external actors financed more than fifty percent of the Congolese state budget in 2005 – was largely left unused, and recommendations to use the financial assets in a more strategic manner were systematically ignored (see International Crisis Group 2005e: 25). All this contributed to the assessment that the UN has “adopted an overly cautious approach to peacekeeping, forcing MONUC to react hastily to contingencies rather than prevent them” (International Crisis Group 2005e: 24). Hence, external actors’ manner of engagement in the Congo crisis mainly
4.2 Democratic Republic of the Congo

suffered from sufficient political will, giving rise to a specific form of intervention by which external actors merely try to sit out the transitional phase until after the elections.\footnote{Some even believe that through their eagerness to establish a power-sharing deal in the DRC, external actors have set perverse incentives and have thereby contributed to the emergence of splinter-groups and peace spoilers. Tull and Mehler used the case of the DRC for illustrating that the institutionalization of power-sharing practices “demonstrates Western willingness to provide political pay-offs for insurgent violence and thereby creates incentive structures which turn the rebel path into an appealing option in the pursuit of otherwise blocked political aspirations” (Tull and Mehler 2005: 376). René Lemarchand, however, contests the applicability of their argument to this case. He contends that “[t]o detect a ‘Western willingness to provide political pay-offs’ behind the 2002 Agreement makes little sense” and underlines that “ethnic rivalries fuelled by greed, rather than strategic positioning through instrumentalization of violence, were largely responsible for the break-up of the original RCD into rival factions” (2007: 18). Hence, “contrary to what Tull and Mehler argue, greed has had a powerful multiplier effect on intra-ethnic as well as inter-ethnic enmities, and so, also, the intervention of external patrons – Uganda and Rwanda – on behalf of their preferred clients” (2007: 19).}

In sum, spoilers and hardliners who were opposed to the transitional government posed an imminent threat to its stability. The strong focus on elite accommodation at the center provoked dissent from those who did not benefit from the power-sharing government and caused the split of some of the rebel groups. This posed an additional threat to the transitional government and to the integrity of the country as a whole. Countering these threats effectively would have required external actors to commit significantly more resources to the DRC than they were willing to provide. Instead, external actors mainly reacted to those threats in a ‘virtual enforcement’ manner, i.e. by effectively ‘muddling through’ the transitional phase and risking that significant human rights violations and large-scale atrocities occur.

d) Promoting Good Governance

The engagement for good governance also was in line with the general expectations of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities. It was expected above that the obstructive environment of this polity type poses a severe challenge to the promotion of good governance principles. The faulty disarmament, the prevalence of spoilers and hardliners who gain from derailing the peace process, as well as the fierce competition for de facto power that characterize this polity type make the violation of basic principles very likely. This implies that strong external resolve is needed in order to counter these developments and in order to prevent at least the most blatant violations of good governance principles. Whether or not the capability and will for fulfilling this role is present certainly depends on the idiosyncrasies of the particular case, but as a general tendency it is plausible to assume that external actors will lack the necessary resolve in many cases. This stipulation can, by and large, be confirmed in the case of the DRC. External actors have played an ambiguous role here: Facing the twin challenge of enforcing the provisions of the peace agreement and not disrupting the fabric of the fragile post-conflict order, they often reacted in a halfhearted and contradictory manner. This has led to a specific form of engagement in which external
actors focus primarily on the standard ingredients of statebuilding while hardly ever cross-checking whether these formal achievements are actually matched by substantive achievements on the ground. This became apparent in two areas: external actors’ one-sided focus on the elections (accompanied by a pronounced reluctance to engage into daily politics), and their strong hesitation to counter blatant violations conducted by the transitional government with regard to corruption and human rights.

The DRC is a case in which external actors’ focus on elections as the panacea was particularly pronounced. Since the establishment of the transitional government in 2003, the international community has focused almost exclusively on the polls as the immediate goal of its engagement in the DRC. The UN Security Council considered them to be the “foundation for the longer term restoration of peace and stability, national reconciliation and establishment of the rule of law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” (U.N. Security Council 2003h). This came at the expense of other important aspects of the external statebuilding endeavor, most importantly in that external actors have paid “scant attention to promoting viable state institutions” (International Crisis Group 2006b: 1).

This one-sided focus is one of the main factors emphasized by Sévérine Autesserre in her critical analysis of peacebuilding dynamics in the Congo:

“Reconstructing a state entails many measures, including the (re)building of a bureaucracy, a justice system, effective and disciplined coercion forces, and the selection of appropriate leaders. In the Congo, the international peacebuilders focused disproportionately on one of these tasks: the selection of leaders, through elections. Apart from ad hoc action aimed at stemming crises or at ensuring that elections would proceed smoothly, the other tasks were postponed to the postelectoral period” (2009: 269).

This strong focus on the polls implied that external actors were unwilling to recognize the dysfunctional manner of the transitional government and scrutinized whether it provided an adequate basis for the elections. As Dennis Tull puts it, “[i]n the DRC the narrow focus on an elite-based transition process ignored the dynamics of war” (2009: 227). But the strong focus on the elections also hampered attempts for building strong – not to speak of democratic – institutions (Matti 2010: 53). Such important aspects as a thorough reform of the security sector were not viewed as long term statebuilding challenges, but rather as “means to other ends, notably the organization of elections, the key objective of the transitional process” (Tull 2009: 220).

All in all, this strong focus on accommodating the warlords has implied that external actors have “shied away from the more political aspects, such as strengthening parliament, courts and anti-corruption and auditing bodies” (International Crisis Group 2006b: i). This has greatly hampered the promotion of good governance in the Congo and contributed to the excessive violations that could be observed with respect to corruption or human rights. Unlike in Macedonia, where external actors exerted continuous pressure on the government in order to ensure that it complied with a broad range of good governance principles, a similar engagement was lacking in the DRC. Between 2000 and 2005, the
World Bank Group disbursed US $ 2.3 billion in loans and grants to the DRC but “[d]ue to the limits of its mandate […] it has refrained from involvement in the political arena, which has significantly hampered the impact of reform” (International Crisis Group 2006b: 18; see also International Crisis Group 2005e: 25). Though there are good reasons for an unconditional disbursement of aid money in an environment where about 1,000 people starve to death each day, it is also clear that by confining themselves to the role of a passive bystander, external actors contributed to the very outcomes they wanted to prevent. As the International Crisis Group noted, “[i]f the international community wants the transition to work, it must be more proactive in denouncing the blatant corruption and illegal manoeuvres of some of the main players and providing the resources for change” (2005e: 3). That this was not the case clearly had counterproductive effects in the realm of good governance, for two reasons: First, it meant that external actors’ hands were tied when it come to decisively countering violations of good governance principles, since they lacked the leverage necessary for levying pressure on the domestic parties. This eroded external actors’ capability to work against the complete undermining of the transitional phase by obstructive political elites. Second, it also implied that external actors were actively contributing to the self-enrichment efforts made by the participants of the transitional government. External actors not only failed to curtail corrupt activities, but they provided an enabling environment in which corruption may spread (see the paragraph on political competition above).

However, external actors’ apparent conviction that they could simply postpone their wider statebuilding efforts and deal with these shortcomings in the ‘postelectoral phase’ (as suggested by Autesserre) was misguided. After the polls in 2006, external leverage was even lower than before and external actors were even more reluctant to decisively tackle violations of good governance principles. This became apparent immediately after the polls. When the election results were announced, Kabila immediately began to harass his major opponent Jean-Pierre Bemba and subsequently became notorious for blatant human rights violations. Instead of doing something against these developments, the international community kept silent: “no foreign government criticized this interference with a fair electoral process” (Human Rights Watch 2008: 21). A MONUC official even admitted that “[n]o one was willing to say anything to Kabila about what had happened or about the threats to security” (quoted in Human Rights Watch 2008: 18).

\[19\] Election-related violence between Bemba and Kabila erupted on two occasions: On August 20, 2006 – the day when the official election results were announced – a skirmish between Kabila’s Republican Guard and Bemba’s personal guard emerged in which Kabila “struck a major blow against Bemba” (Human Rights Watch 2008: 16–17). A more serious incident happened in 2007, when Bemba – stating his unwillingness to rely on the state for his security – missed a deadline to disarm his personal guard (Deutsche Presse Agentur 2007). In the course of the event Bemba’s troops were defeated and Kabila issued an arrest warrant against him, charging him with ‘high treason’ and causing him to take refuge in the South African embassy and later flee out of the country. The International Crisis Group assessed this incident as the “most blatant example of democratic failure in the peace process” (2007c: 11).
Chapter 4 ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities

In sum, the above episodes illustrate that external actors have greatly overestimated the therapeutic effect of the elections on a fragile political environment like the one existing in the DRC. Kabila’s later conduct pulls the success of the elections even more into question, as he more and more tried to get rid of those very external actors who had facilitated his democratic legitimation. In 2009, he requested the UN to wind down MONUC, which caused “considerable irritation” in the international community. External actors did not fully comply with his demands – MONUC was renamed but its mandate remained largely in place (Tull 2010: 2–3). This shows that external leverage greatly depends on the goodwill of the host government once post-conflict elections have legitimized a new ruler – a factor that is discussed in more detail in chapter 6. Not surprisingly, external actors’ attempts to foster democratic rule and good governance in the post-electoral phase were doomed to failure. As Mvemba Dizolele noted in 2010, “four years after the country’s first multiparty elections since 1965, this nation […] still teeters on the brink of dictatorship” (2010: 148). This illustrates that the claim to postpone statebuilding to the post-electoral phase is self-deceptive and counterproductive when it comes to promoting good governance principles.

4.3 Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone experienced more than a decade of civil war between 1991 and 2003. It was initiated with an attack of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) against the All People’s Congress (APC) government of Joseph Momoh, who had ruled the country for the preceding twenty years (Wyrod 2008: 72–73). The RUF was heavily sponsored by Muammar al-Gaddafi of Libya and Charles Taylor of Liberia and was characterized by the nearly complete lack of a political program (Abraham 2001: 206–207). Instead, it clung to a vague rhetoric of the liberation of the masses compiled from “disarticulated and undigested ideological droppings drawn mainly from Gaddafi’s populist formulations about a ‘people’s revolution’” (Abraham 2001: 207), and its main constituency was constituted by an “unholy alliance of marginals, criminals, and social misfits – the lumpen proletariat” (Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 186). The rebel group was initially relatively weak and contributed little to Momoh’s downfall. Due to his abuse of power and his reluctance to introduce a multi-party system, he was overthrown by a group of military officers in 1992, who established a temporary government called ‘National Provincial Ruling Council’ (NPRC). Its leader Valentin Strasser became the country’s de facto president for

---

20 This presentation confines itself to a few core characteristics and events of Sierra Leone’s armed conflict. More detailed background information on Sierra Leone is contained in various other sources. A concise overview of Sierra Leone’s conflict history can be found for instance in Bøås (2001: 704–709).

21 As Berman and Labonte point out, Taylor’s support for the RUF was “an effort to distract and undermine ECOMOG, as Sierra Leone was a troop contributor and served as a logistical base for the mission” (2006: 144).

22 For an analysis of the origins and character of the RUF, see also Abdullah (1998).
the upcoming four years (Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 187; Berman and Labonte 2006: 145).

However, over the years the RUF’s military strength had grown significantly, mainly thanks to its control and systematic exploitation of the country’s diamond mines\(^{23}\) and its forceful recruitment of civilians – among them preferably children (see e.g. Wyrod 2008: 70). Lacking broader popular support, the RUF relied almost entirely on violence as its strategy, since “[t]rying to obtain the confidence and favour of the local population would have been irksome and prolonged” (Abraham 2001: 208). Just as it fought the Momoh government, the rebel group carried on with its attacks against the government after the NPRC had taken over. The latter could only counter its attacks by hiring the notorious company ‘Executive Outcomes’ – a Private Military Company (PMC) composed of former South African soldiers – which successfully prevented the rebels from capturing the capital Freetown (Berman and Labonte 2006: 145; Francis 1999: 326–327). The RUF were again not involved when the NPRC was overthrown in 1996 by a group of reform-minded officers, who wanted to clear the way for elections to be held. However, knowing that overthrowing a democratically elected government would further undermine its popular support, the RUF was strongly opposed to the elections and triggered an unprecedented campaign of violence against the civilian population in an attempt to blackmail the government. It systematically hacked off villagers’ hands – “both to terrorise them and to symbolically deprive them of the means of voting” (John 2007: 41).\(^{24}\) As the movement explained itself: “RUF fighters […] proceeded on a campaign to cut off the hands of innocent villagers as a message that no voting should occur” (RUF press release, quoted in Abraham 2001: 211). From this moment on, amputation became the main “hallmark” of the RUF (International Crisis Group 2001d: 15).

Despite this terror campaign, the elections took place in February 1996 and a new president, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected. Unable to defeat the government, the RUF entered into peace negotiations with the government and signed the Abidjan peace accord on 30 November 1996. It not only included a blanket amnesty granted to the RUF, but was only signed by the rebel movement on the condition that Executive Outcomes – the only effective deterrent against RUF atrocities – left the country (see International Crisis Group 2001d: 2). However, this merely served the purpose of distracting from its true aspirations. Soon thereafter, the RUF allied with a dissident army faction led by general Johnny Paul Koroma and overthrew the Kabbah government in May 1997. The factions formed a new de facto government called ‘Armed Forces Revolutionary Council’ (AFRC) (Berman

\(^{23}\)The trade with diamonds provided the financial backbone of the RUF and was a stimulating factor in – if not the main reason for – the conflict (see e.g. Maconachie 2009; Maconachie and Binns 2007; Olsson 2007; Reno 1999). As Berman and Labonte put it: “The people of Sierra Leone have had the great misfortune to reside in a country rich in diamonds that others needed to bankroll a war. The quickest path to those diamonds was large-scale armed robbery, fronted by an insurgency best known for its atrocities” (2006: 141).

\(^{24}\)For a detailed account of the RUF’s human rights violations, see in particular Human Rights Watch (1999b).
and Labonte 2006: 148–149; Francis 2000: 359). This triggered a peace-enforcement mission led by the Economic Community of West African States, which ousted the rebel government and reinstated Kabbah. In September 1998, RUF leader Foday Sankoh was arrested, charged with high treason and sentenced to death a few weeks later (see Abraham 2001: 218).

Despite that, the RUF continued to be a potent force, thanks to the backing it received from the Liberian ex-warlord Charles Taylor. In January 1999, it launched a new offensive against the capital that could be regarded “the most merciless offensive ever mustered in the war, taking the external peacekeepers from ECOMOG (‘ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group’) and government soldiers completely by surprise” (Abraham 2001: 219). This put it in a comfortable position to dictate the terms for a new peace agreement with the government. The rebels insisted that they would not enter any agreement with the government until Sankoh was released (Abraham 2001: 219; Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 94; John 2007: 43). The government had no choice but to fulfill the RUF’s demands, and Sankoh was released from prison and participated in peace talks with the government held in Lomé, Togo. In July 1999, they adopted a peace agreement (Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone 1999), based on which the government would share power with the RUF. It was the first peace agreement between the RUF and the government that was actually implemented. However, most observers considered the agreement a “deeply flawed platform” on which to base peace operations in Sierra Leone (Berman and Labonte 2006: 200). With hindsight, they were right, because it collapsed not even one year after its implementation.25

4.3.1 Sierra Leone as a ‘Doomed to Share’ Polity

The power-sharing arrangement that was established on the basis of the Lomé Agreement is classified as an instance of a ‘Doomed to Share’ polity. Although the conflict officially continued until 2003, a lot speaks for including this case. The Lomé Agreement constituted an important turning point after nearly a decade of war and contributed decisively to the actual settlement of the conflict in 2002 (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 88). As shown below, the following conditions were fulfilled: an effective sharing of government authority, obstructive relations between the former warring factions, and a mediative engagement by external actors.

Effective Power-Sharing. The Lomé Agreement in Sierra Leone endowed the RUF and its leader Foday Sankoh with a large range of privileges. Given its comfortable negotiating position, the rebels made bold requests from the government, demanding the

25The agreement ultimately collapsed when the RUF took 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers hostage, and RUF rebels shot a number of protesters in front of Foday Sankoh’s home in Freetown shortly thereafter. This led to the removal and arrest of leading RUF personnel, including Sankoh, and paved the way for presidential and parliamentary elections in 2002 (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 90–92).
vice-presidency along with 10 ministers (in a cabinet of 20). All in all, their demands looked “like a total surrender of the government to the RUF […]” (Abraham 2001: 220). In the end, they received four ministries, but Sankoh was granted the vice presidency along with the chairmanship over the ‘Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development’ (CMRRD) (see Berman and Labonte 2006: 200; Kandeh 1999). This gave him significant control of Sierra Leone’s resource-rich areas and, according to Binningsbø and Dupuy, was “probably the single most important element in convincing the RUF to sign the peace agreement” (2009: 96). By allowing a rebel group notorious for gross human rights violations to participate in a democratically elected government, the Lomé accord “shocked the conscience of the world […]” (Abraham 2001: 221). Most critique came from western human rights organizations, who were highly opposed to the granting of an amnesty to the perpetrators as well as to the fact that the agreement “rewarded the RUF aggression and intransigence” (Berman and Labonte 2006: 200). However, it were western powers – most notably the US and the UK – who pressured Kabbah to agree to the deal (see International Crisis Group 2001d: 2). Obviously, these external actors were acting on the assumption that this generous accommodation would transform the RUF into a more constructive partner and would “ipso facto behave like a civilised movement […]” (Abraham 2001: 221; emphasis in original). Given the RUF’s track record, this hope appears rather naïve. Yet, it cannot be denied that the Lomé Agreement, despite its numerous flaws and failures, was an attempt to buy off the rebel movement and thereby create, once more, the conditions for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Since the range of power and privileges allotted to the RUF were significant, it must be regarded as a power-sharing case.

**Obstructive Relations.** The relations between the warring parties at the moment when the Lomé Agreement was signed were unequivocally obstructive. They were characterized by deep animosities, an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion, and a lacking willingness to compromise and make concessions. The Lomé Agreement was signed amidst ongoing warfare between the two parties. The key event behind the power-sharing agreement were the impervious AFRC/RUF attacks on Freetown carried out in January 1999. In the attack, the rebel forces “killed an estimated 5,000 – 6,000 and injured, maimed, raped and abducted thousands more” (Francis 2000: 361). This clearly changed the power relations between the two parties as it only put the RUF into the position to demand a share of governmental power. As Binningsbø and Dupuy point out: “The RUF’s superior position by 1999 gave Kabbah little choice but to negotiate a peace agreement […] . [R]ejecting negotiations would have led to losing international and regional sympathy” (2009: 94). However, from the beginning on it should have been obvious to Kabbah as well as to external actors that the RUF was not genuinely interested in peace. Already in the past, the rebel group
Chapter 4 ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities

“has blatantly used negotiations for the purpose of rearming. It has consistently shown bad faith in the string of agreements it has signed in Abidjan, Conakry, Lomé and Abuja. [. . .] And, of course, the RUF has committed heinous atrocities qualifying as war crimes” (International Crisis Group 2001d: ii).

In the case of the Lomé Agreement, this behavior was particularly pronounced. Despite the RUF’s affirmation of goodwill, fighting continued and the rebel group repeatedly acted as the major spoiler to the peace process (see Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 90–91). The rationale that “in return for a share of power and other concessions [the RUF] would be willing to end the fighting and reinvent itself as a legitimate political movement ready to vie for power in a democratic context” (Abraham 2001: 221) was obviously misguided. The popular assessment that Sankoh was simply “a psychopath” (International Crisis Group 2001d: 2) seems to match the reality closer. However, he was also rather gifted in deceiving his negotiating partners and repeatedly evoking the illusion that he was this time interested in peace in earnest. Obviously, “Kabbah did not have sufficient appreciation of the chameleon-like character he was dealing with” (Abraham 2001: 213). All this unequivocally illustrates the obstructive relations that prevailed during the short-lived transitional government in Sierra Leone. With hindsight, there is little doubt that the RUF was never truly willing to cooperate with Kabbah. The privileges and material benefits associated with the participation in the government, and in particular with Sankoh’s position as vice president, constituted the true motivation for the RUF to participate in the deal.

Mediative Engagement. Aptly assessing the nature of external engagement in Sierra Leone requires some justification. At times during the history of the conflict, external actors intervened on behalf of the government in a highly partisan manner. This becomes best apparent with regard to ECOMOG’s role, on which the major peace-enforcement responsibility rested in the initial years of the conflict (see Berman and Labonte 2006: 150). Nigeria, the main driving force behind ECOMOG, was known for its affiliation with Kabbah, and by overthrowing the self-proclaimed government of the ‘Armed Forces Revolutionary Council’ in early 1999 – in which the RUF participated – it “took a lead role in restoring the Kabbah government to office” (Hirsch 2001: 151). In the International Crisis Group’s assessment, ECOMOG “effectively became Sierra Leone’s military” (2001d: 7).26 Thus external engagement before the Lomé Agreement must be considered partisan.

The focal point that triggered a wider international attention with respect to the case of Sierra Leone were the RUF attacks on Freetown in January 1999. “It was this awful event – coinciding with the Kosovo crisis – that finally compelled the broader international community to act” (International Crisis Group 2001d: 2). Roughly at the same time,

26In addition to that, there was the ‘external’ engagement by Executive Outcomes. However, these mercenaries acted by order of the government. Thus, it would be misleading to treat them as external actors. Note that the involvement of Executive Outcome in Sierra Leone triggered a lively debate about the morality of modern mercenaries. For a recent pragmatic assessment about the role of mercenaries, see Chesterman and Lenhardt (2007).
ECOMOG support was crumbling due to General Obasanjo’s victory in the presidential elections in Nigeria in February 1999, who immediately scaled down Nigerian support for ECOMOG (Berman and Labonte 2006: 151–153). The last ECOMOG troops departed about one year later, and the UN Security Council meanwhile decided to replace the small observer mission (UNOMSIL) with a significantly larger peacekeeping mission – the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in October 1999. The mission had an initial ceiling of 6,000 military personnel and was endowed with a Chapter VII mandate, authorizing it to “take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” (U.N. Security Council 1999b, par. 9 & 14). Also, as discussed below in more detail, external actors heavily pressured Kabbah into signing the Lomé Agreement. The international community obviously had great hopes in the treaty. As the UN Secretary General noted in July 1999: “The signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement […] is a great step forward for Sierra Leone. […] Both sides are to be congratulated for showing the flexibility that has made this agreement possible” (United Nations 1996b, par. 52). Thus, at the latest since mid-1999 external engagement must be considered mediative.

4.3.2 Polity Dynamics in Sierra Leone

The case of Sierra Leone confirms the plausibility of many of the assumptions made about ‘Doomed to Share’ polities above. This is illustrated below with regard to the four overarching themes: dealing with commitment problems, competition for power, threats from within, and external engagement for good governance.

a) Overcoming Commitment Problems

In Sierra Leone, overcoming the commitment problems prevailing between the signatories of the Lomé Agreement was a tremendous challenge. The parties mistrusted each other and regarded themselves with suspicion and hostility. In particular, the RUF’s motivation to actually follow up on its disarmament commitments was never trustworthy. All in all, the case confirms the stipulation that ‘Doomed to Share’ polities provide a difficult environment for commitment problems to be overcome. Although all parties share a fraction of governmental power (and hence also a certain control of the means of coercion), the parties were neither willing nor capable to comply with their disarmament and demobilization requirements. Most importantly, the case of Sierra Leone illustrates the difficulties involved in inducing reluctant parties to disarm. None of the guarantees spelled out in the Lomé Agreement could convince the RUF leadership to actually follow up on its disarmament commitments. In order to evade them, it initially employed a combination of ‘foot dragging’ and ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies by which it could stall the disarmament process for several months. However, when external actors’ patience came to an end by
early 2000, the rebel group increasingly turned to ‘saber rattling’ and ‘calculated escalation’ strategies that ultimately led to complete breakdown of the disarmament process.

As it was already the case in the DRC, external actors were crucial for the establishment of a power-sharing arrangement in Sierra Leone in the first place. The agreement was brokered by the UN in conjunction with the UK, the US and a number of regional states. As already noted, external actors heavily pressured Kabbah to sign the agreement. The humanitarian crisis that was triggered by the RUF seizure of Freetown in January 1999 “prompted concerted action from the United Nations and ECOWAS to bring the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone to yet another round of peace negotiations” (John 2007: 43). Kabbah was reluctant to share governmental power with those people that had removed him violently from office and that he had desperately been trying to defeat for various years (see e.g. Kandeh 1999: 349). Still, he ultimately “buckled under international (particularly U.S.) pressure” (International Crisis Group 2001d: 12).

However, the “international desperation to reach an agreement” clearly played in the hands of the RUF, who could negotiate very favorable terms for itself (International Crisis Group 2001d: 12). The Lomé Agreement contains several concessions and security guarantees to the RUF. The most important aspect was the question of a general amnesty for the RUF leadership irrespective of the massive war crimes it committed. The Lomé Agreement granted that “no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the opposition and rebel groups in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as a member of those organisations, since March 1991, up to the time of the signing of the present agreement” (Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone 1999, Art. IX, par. 3). This included Sankoh, who was guaranteed “absolute and free pardon” (Art. IX, par. 1) despite the fact that he had been arrested a few months after the attack on Freetown and charged with the death penalty (see also Francis 2000: 361–362). For the RUF leadership, this amnesty was the sine qua non condition for signing the agreement. The rebel movement was not unconscious of the atrocities and human rights violations it committed. At several occasions before, Sankoh was forced to apologize to the nation for the RUF’s merciless campaign of violence (see Abraham 2001: 207). It was obvious that, in the absence of a general amnesty, the RUF leadership would not get away unpunished. However, despite its generosity, the amnesty alone was not a sufficient measure for dispelling the RUF’s concerns. Reportedly, Sankoh only returned to Freetown three months after signing the Lomé Agreement. As Abraham comments, “[i]ronically, the self-proclaimed champion of the masses was afraid to be present in Freetown without sufficient security” (2001: 221–222).

The Lomé Agreement also contained provisions about the disarmament of the warring factions, determining that “[a] neutral peace keeping force comprising UNOMSIL and ECOMOG shall disarm all combatants of the RUF/SL, CDF, SLA and paramilitary groups” (Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone 1999, Art. XVI par. 1). Furthermore, it was agreed that ex-combatants of the warring factions “who wish to be integrated into the new
restructured national armed forces may do so provided they meet established criteria” (Art. XVII, par. 2). The effective disarmament of the rebel groups as well as the government militias can be regarded as the “real pillar for ensuring peace and the success of the whole agreement” (Abraham 2001: 222). Not surprisingly, however, it turned out as the most troublesome aspect of the peace agreement, for two reasons.

First, a lot of time was wasted in the initial weeks after the agreement had been signed. Although originally scheduled to begin six weeks after the adoption of the treaty, the start-date of the disarmament process had been delayed by two months – a result that Berman attributed to “tepid donor support, administrative shortcomings, delays in the deployment of peacekeepers, and the RUF’s disinterest in abiding by the terms of the agreement” (Berman 2000: 24). When it finally began, the disarmament process was “painfully slow”, and by December 1999 only slightly more than 10 percent of the total of 45,000 estimated combatants was disarmed (Abraham 2001: 222). In light of these developments, the UN Security Council decided to significantly strengthen UNAMSIL in order to enable it to better fulfill its core tasks. On 7 February 2000, it decided “that the military component of UNAMSIL shall be expanded to a maximum of 11,100 military personnel [. . . ]” and it slightly extended its mandate (U.N. Security Council 2000a, par. 9–10). After that, the effectiveness of disarmament improved, but the process nonetheless collapsed a few weeks later (see below).

Second – and more importantly – the disarmament efforts were forestalled by the continued reluctance on behalf of the RUF to abide by the terms of the agreement. As Abraham noted, “the RUF became caught in a vicious circle that has made it impossible to abandon terror and violence, and hence, one may add, to disarm” (2001: 208). Two patterns could be observed here: a) strategies of ‘virtual cooperation’ and ‘foot dragging’ by which the rebel movement tried to superficially meet its obligations without committing in any substantial sense, and b) more direct denials of its disarmament obligations, culminating in various ‘calculated escalation’ strategies. The first pattern of behavior became apparent during the initial phase of the disarmament operations. One week after his arrival in Freetown in October 1999, Sankoh declared that there should be “no rush” in the disarmament process and later began to question the legitimacy of UNAMSIL’s deployment, pointing out that the Lomé Agreement did not call for UN peacekeeping troops (see Abraham 2001: 222). In general, the Lomé Agreement contained relatively generous provision regarding the disarmament of the RUF, who “could withdraw from the process at any time without penalty and effectively stall or derail it” (Berman and Labonte 2006: 185). Aware of that, the rebel movement then went on to tacitly undermine the disarmament process by forestalling the disarmament process whenever possible. Although the national commission in charge of disarmament complained at many occasions about the lack of cooperation from the RUF, who “always found reasons for refusing to order his men to disarm” (Bright 2000: 39), the rebel group could successfully apply this ‘foot dragging’ strategy for various months. Apparently, Sankoh believed that “[a]s long as he kept making
political digressions and falsely assuring everybody that he was committed to peace, no sanction seemed possible against him” (Abraham 2001: 223).

When, in May 2000, the disarmament process came to a sudden end (see below), UNAMSIL had collected some 12,500 weapons and about 250,000 rounds of ammunition. The majority of them, however, were of rather poor quality or, as an observer of the disarmament process noted “absolute crap” (quoted in Berman 2000: 26). Reportedly, many rebels used the disarmament program as an opportunity to make money. All weapons handed in – regardless of their quality – were rewarded with an allowance of US$ 300, although many of them were worth much less. This has set perverse incentives, since it has promoted a ‘demand’ for inoperable weapons, of which many were reportedly imported from neighboring countries in order to ‘sell’ them to UNAMSIL with a comfortable margin (Berman 2000: 26). For the RUF, this ‘virtual cooperation’ strategy was an opportunity to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate with the disarmament program without suffering any significant reduction of its combat-readiness. The second pattern for avoiding to comply with the disarmament provisions relied on outright resistance. Already in November 1999, one of the RUF’s commanders told the press that “we will not disarm until total revolution is achieved in Sierra Leone” (quoted in Abraham 2001: 222). That this was meant literally, however, only became apparent during the second phase of UNAMSIL deployment, after the mission’s strength was significantly increased. Since the heightened international involvement made it more difficult for the RUF to simply simulate its compliance, they sought a strategy of outright resistance to the disarmament program – very much in vain of a ‘calculated escalation’ strategy. As this had effects going beyond the disarmament process as such, it is discussed in the paragraph on threats from within below.

In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that ‘Doomed to Share’ polities provide a very difficult environment for overcoming commitment problems. Arguably, in the case of the RUF it were both malevolent intentions and the aspects of the overall structural environment that prevented the rebels from complying with their disarmament and demobilization requirements. The international community could do little to change this fact. Every effort to pressure the RUF into cooperating was met by a ‘saber rattling’ or ‘calculated escalation’ strategy. Since this posed an imminent threat to the stability of the polity, these aspects are discussed in more detail in the paragraph on ‘threats from within’ below.

b) Manner of Political Competition

The competition for power during the transitional government was also in line with the assumptions made above about ‘Doomed to Share’ polities. As in the DRC, the parties were not involved in managing the country’s process of transition and never attempted to exert their powers in accordance with the principles set out in the Lomé Agreement. There was little genuine cooperation taking place between former belligerents. Instead, both Kabbah and the RUF used the transitional government as an instrument for outmaneuvering
its opponents and clear the way for dominating the political system in the future. The lack of future perspectives for the RUF in the post-transitional phase and the vast opportunities for self-enrichment that came with the participation in the government were critical factors accounting for this behavior. Since the prospects to attain power through popular elections were rather dull for the RUF, they attempted to use the transitional government as a protected space to prepare its next attack against the government. Kabbah’s prospects for winning the elections were much better. He mainly attempted to unmask the RUF as an irresponsible partner in front of the international community and the domestic population alike and wait for the elections to come. As a result, the rationale of the parties in Sierra Leone was virtually identical with the constellation as it emerged some four years later in the DRC: Whereas Kabbah wanted to ‘sit out’ the transitional phase in order to renew his legitimation as the democratically elected head of state, it was in the RUF’s interest to prevent the elections from taking place, use the transitional government as a protected space for re-arming and, ultimately, overthrow the president once again. However, for both parties it was occasionally necessary to demonstrate their goodwill, which resulted in a number of ‘virtual cooperation’ gestures adopted by both parties.

Participating in the power-sharing government endowed the RUF with exclusive privileges and benefits that may explain its cooperative facade in the initial phase of the power-sharing arrangement. There is plenty of evidence that Sankoh (mis)used the agreement in order to “protect RUF’s diamond deals with Taylor and other outsiders” (Reno 2003: n.p.). The ‘Commission for Strategic Mineral Resources, National Reconciliation and Development’ (CMRRD) which Sankoh officially headed was effectively created in order to accommodate his demands for power and material benefits. Ignoring the duties and responsibilities associated with his appointment, Sankoh interpreted the arrangement as an exclusive privilege allowing him the unaltered exploitation of the diamond mines in the Kono district for the sake of funding his military activities (see Bright 2000: 39). For a short period, this gave Sankoh’s exploitation of the diamond mines a veil of legitimacy and allowed him to re-arm and prepare for the next large insurgency against the government. This strategy would well be in line with the RUF’s past conduct. As the International Crisis Group noticed, “[f]or the most part the RUF has agreed to negotiations when it faces military disadvantage and has then broken the resulting agreements after rearming” (2001d: 13).

This behavior has also become apparent in the context of the Lomé Agreement. As the power-sharing agreement in the DRC, the Lomé Agreement was meant as a temporary arrangement to bridge the time until national elections took place. In the rationale of those external actors who persuaded Kabbah to sign the agreement, there was at least a glimmer of hope that the RUF could be transformed into an ordinary political party – sufficient sticks and carrots provided. In Article III, the Lomé Agreement determined that “[t]he Government of Sierra Leone shall accord every facility to the RUF/SL to transform itself into a political party and enter the mainstream of the democratic process” (Government
Chapter 4 ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities

of the Republic of Sierra Leone 1999; par. 1), and required that “[i]mmediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, the RUF/SL shall commence to organize itself to function as a political movement, with the rights, privileges and duties accorded to all political parties in Sierra Leone […]” (Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone 1999; par. 2). In this sense, the Lomé Agreement, for all intents and purposes, aimed at providing the conditions for future electoral competition between the antagonistic parties. Initially, Sankoh still relied on ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies by trying to raise the impression that he was devoted to his new role as the leader of a political party. Together with his then-ally Johnny Paul Koroma from the AFRC, he made a rhetorical commitment to peace and offered halfhearted excuses for the atrocities the RUF and other parties committed during the war, for instance during a speech held in July 1999:

“We are asking for forgiveness for all those who have committed these atrocities, be it RUF, Kamajors, ECOMOG, Sierra Leone army. As a leader of a political organisation I say we are sorry. We are ready to give peace a chance” (Reuters 1999).

However, even for naïve observers this flimsy confirmation of faithfulness must have appeared dubious and suspicious. It is obvious that his commitment to peace never significantly went beyond an all-too-obvious lip-service, and it was an illusion to believe that the RUF would transform itself into a political party in earnest. As the International Crisis Group noted, “[t]he RUF plays a long game and uses peace agreements as stepping stones towards its ultimate goal of power” (2001d: 3). Already after the Abidjan Agreement (Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone 1996) – struck between the RUF and the government in 1996 – “evidence surfaced that the RUF leader never intended to abide by the agreement and had decided to continue the armed struggle, using the accord to gain tactical advantage” (Berman and Labonte 2006: 148). Against this background, it was from the beginning on precluded that the transitional government could effectively facilitate the rebel group’s transition into a political party. At no time, the RUF was devoted to a fair electoral competition for gaining future power.

A major factor that accounts for the RUF reluctance to seek its chances through fair electoral competition was its lack of future perspectives as a political party. Just as the RCD-Goma in the DRC, the RUF leadership was aware that the party had little chances to win any significant share of power through public elections. Already its barbarous mutilation campaign before the 1996 elections was driven by the fear of being marginalized by a democratically elected government. The International Crisis Group noticed that the RUF had “no meaningful political constituency” (2001d: ii), and observed that “while there was some initial sympathy for the RUF’s aims[,] […] that has long since evaporated” (2001d: 14). In fact, the party was so unpopular among the population due to the atrocities it committed that it faced a high risk for retaliation in case it really laid down its arms. As the International Crisis Group noted that “[t]he 1996 elections were essentially a protest vote against the RUF and the Sierra Leone government of the day” (2001d: 14).
Abraham comments: “No amount of legal guarantees in any number of peace agreements will obliterate this fate. Sankoh knows this better than anybody else” (2001: 225). As a result, facing democratic competition was clearly not an option for the RUF, as it would have entailed the party’s political marginalization and, very likely, the physical annihilation of its entire leadership. This becomes apparent by the elections in 2002 (after the transitional period under investigation here), in which the remnants of the RUF campaigned as the RUFP (Revolutionary United Front Party). As Kandeh notes, “the RUF faced an uphill task convincing the public to vote for the very elements that had laid waste to the country” (2003: 199). This is reflected in its electoral performance: it gained a mere 1.7 percent of the votes and was not represented in the parliament (Coleman 2008m: 14–16). With hindsight, “[t]he RUF’s atrocious track record, lumpen character and lack of resources […] combined to account for its party’s dismal showing in the elections” (Kandeh 2003: 212). The AFRC, the other remaining rebel group, met the same fate. Although the group behaved much more cooperative than the RUF and ultimately even contributed to Sankoh’s capture in mid-2000 (see Abraham 2001), the party had little chances in the 2002 elections. Trying a similar strategy as Charles Taylor in Liberia (see 6.2), the party’s leader Johnny Paul Koroma tried to intimidate the electorate by threatening to make Sierra Leone ‘ungovernable’ in case he did not win in the elections. However, this “only succeeded in solidifying opposition to his candidacy and party among popular sectors”, and the party gained a meager three percent of the popular vote (Kandeh 2003: 198).

Kabbah was in a very different position. As the incumbent president, he had much less to fear from the elections than any of his competitors and it was in his best interest to sit out the period of the transitional government and wait for his re-election. Though he agreed to share power with the RUF only after external actors exerted significant pressure on him, the Lomé Agreement turned out as an effective instrument to secure a rising level of international attention, which significantly constrained the RUF’s room for maneuver. There is some indication that Kabbah may have used the Lomé Agreement from the beginning on as an instrument for “ending the war at the expense of the RUF” – as recently argued by Binningsbø and Dupuy (2009: 88). They argue that Kabbah had no choice but to over-compensate the RUF during the negotiation phase of the Lomé Agreement because it was at that time in a comparatively weak position, but that it subsequently under-compensated the rebel group in the implementation phase. In their eyes, this was at least partly a deliberate strategy: “even though excluding the RUF during implementation of the agreement was probably not a main purpose […] it was not completely accidental either” (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 103). For supporting their argument, they underline that Kabbah included AFRC leader Johnny Paul Koroma – who had been left out of the Lomé Agreement – informally in the government28 in an attempt to force the two rebel

---

28Koroma was offered the chair of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CPP) – an institution set up by the Lomé Agreement and charged with the authority to monitor the implementation of the agreement (Bright 2000: 38).
groups to engage in battles over government positions and other benefits and provoke a split between them (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 96–97). Another strategy was to tie the Lomé Agreement to the country’s constitution, which provided for the elections to be held within two years after the signing of the peace deal. This stood in stark contrast to the RUF’s demands for a four-year transitional period before elections were organized, and limited the RUF’s participation in the government from the outset (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 101). In conjunction, this greatly enhanced Kabbah’s chances for sitting out the transitional phase and re-legitimize his rule through the ballot-box. In addition, including the RUF in a formal power-sharing government ensured that the rebel group was under much higher international scrutiny than ever before, which enabled Kabbah to blame the RUF for the failure of the peace process and underline his own qualities as a responsible leader who tried everything to pacify the war-torn country. Accordingly, during the electoral campaign in 2002 he “never lost an opportunity to remind voters that they had delivered on their promise to end the war” (Kandeh 2003: 209).

In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that ‘Doomed to Share’ polities constitute an environment in which the political competition unfolds in a highly informal and unconstitutional manner. A basic consensus about the status quo is lacking, and both parties would prefer to rule alone. In Sierra Leone, the RUF initially adopted a veil of cooperation, but soon the same divergence of interests as in the DRC became apparent: whereas Kabbah had an interest in sitting out the transitional phase in order to renew his democratic legitimation, the RUF knew that they faced dull electoral prospects and therefore tried to extend their lucrative participation in the transitional government or evoke an escalation of the situation in case these efforts failed.

c) Threats from Within.

In Sierra Leone, spoilers posed an imminent threat to the stability of the polity. The RUF must be considered the prototype of a spoiler and, when the Lomé Agreement was signed, there was little reason to believe that this might change anytime soon. Nonetheless, the entire peace agreement was based on the presumption that an effective spoiler management is possible, i.e. that external actors have enough leverage in order to pressure the RUF to comply with the peace agreement. For two reasons, this strategy was doomed to failure: First, the RUF’s lack of genuine interest in the peace process (as noted above, it was even a threat to its own existence) left little scope for either sticks or carrots to really have an effect of its behavior. Second, as in the DRC external actors failed to respond to the RUF’s attempts to spoil the peace process in a decisive manner, which further reduced the chances for peace. It was only thanks to a last minute intervention by British Special Forces that external actors could prevent the RUF from capturing the capital and ousting Kabbah, but this at the same time entailed the end of the power-sharing experiment in Sierra Leone.

The RUF’s inclination to act as a spoiler to the Lomé Agreement became most clearly apparent with respect to the issue of disarmament of the rebels, since this was directly
threatening the rebels’ existence. Above, it was already shown that the rebels initially engaged in ‘foot dragging’ and ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies in order to forestall the effective disarmament of its troops. However, it was obvious that the RUF could not eternally postpone its disarmament obligations. Due to mounting external pressure, defying disarmament through a combination of ‘foot dragging’ and ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies increasingly became untenable. As a result, the RUF soon uncovered its true face to the world. Initially, the rebel group confined itself to a few ‘saber rattling’ gestures by which it wanted to underlie its own strength and demonstrate the impotence of the external forces. As Abraham puts it, “Sankoh decided to test the nerve of the UN troops who, under no orders to fight and hampered by bureaucracy and insufficient logistical and other support, were in no position to resist force” (2001: 223). In early 2000 for instance, the rebels created illegal roadblocks in order to deny the peacekeepers access to their territory and looted large portions of weaponry from an UNAMSIL reconnaissance unit (see Mutwol 2009: 309–310). This clearly amounted to disarmament in reverse:

“The unit was relieved of its weapons, which consisted of three armoured vehicles (each fitted with a 14.5mm and a 12.7mm machine gun), one 75mm self-propelled gun, one anti-tank gun, one anti-tank weapon, 485 AK-47 rifles, ten 82mm mortars, 24 light machine guns, 20 rocket-propelled grenades and 30 pistols. At least two tons of ammunition were also taken” (Berman 2000: 19).

Obviously, from this moment on it was hard to convince even staunch optimists that the RUF had a genuine interest in peace. However, Sankoh continued to deny his involvement in these incidents – “in contradiction with every evidence in possession of UNAMSIL”, as the UN Secretary General noted (see United Nations 2000b, par. 12). This behavior was very much in line with Sankoh’s past record of “distorting reality by a combination of half-truths and manipulation of facts including concealment, wild allegations, outright lies, exaggerations, and deception” (Abraham 2001: 222). Incidents similar to the one above recurred in the ensuing weeks. In February, for instance, “a large number of well-armed RUF fighters” stopped an UNAMSIL convoy and refused to let it proceed, despite earlier promises that the rebel group would respect the mission’s freedom of movement (United Nations 2000b, par. 13). For realistic observers it should have been evident at this point that hopes the RUF could still be convinced to cooperate were baseless. A straightforward assessment should have led to the conclusion that “the RUF will not willingly disarm especially as it has backers who provide weapons in return for diamonds” (Abraham 2001: 225). However, the international community still stuck to its ‘wait and see’ approach, which counted on the RUF to finally become constructive. Though the UN Secretary General noted that he was “very concerned about the often negative and confusing approach taken by Mr. Sankoh to key elements of the peace process […]”, he still called upon the rebel leader to “dispel these doubts in a tangible and unequivocal manner” (United Nations 2000b, par. 60). However, by failing to realize that these hopes were illusionary, the international community contributed to the RUF’s obstructive stance:
Chapter 4 ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities

“It has been the refusal to accept this reality that has enabled Sankoh and his RUF to pose a challenge and turn a small country like Sierra Leone into a serious problem for the world, humiliating the UN, embarrassing the West, and making a fool of regional and national leaders” (Abraham 2001: 225).

Shortly after these events, the tensions between the RUF and UNAMSIL escalated, and the peace process collapsed entirely. Trying to prevent the deployment of UN peacekeepers to its core areas, the RUF switched from a ‘saber rattling’ to a ‘calculated escalation’ strategy, and henceforth aimed at disrupting the peace process by force. This became apparent after UNAMSIL had finally begun to enforce the disarmament efforts in a number of RUF strongholds. In mid-2000, DDR centers were opened in Makeni and Magburaka and a number of RUF fighters began to hand in their weapons. However, their commanders requested the immediate closure of the sites and called on the UN to return their soldiers. Fighting between the RUF and UNAMSIL peacekeepers broke out when the UN, expectantly, refused to meet these demands. A Kenyan peacekeeper was shot, and the RUF abducted about 500 members from the Zambian UNAMSIL battalion (see e.g. Berman 2000: 12). This incident was a shock to the international community and “marked the culmination of RUF treachery” (Hirsch 2001: 146). Moreover, it vividly proved how far Sankoh was willing to go in order to demonstrate his own strength and independence. There is plenty of evidence that “[t]his RUF action was no random event but a carefully orchestrated plan […]” (Abraham 2001: 224).

It appears that the RUF used it as the first step for attempting to overthrow Kabbah a second time by running another attack on the capital. After the events in May 2000, the rebel army moved dangerously close to Freetown before they were stopped by a British emergency intervention team deployed to Sierra Leone in immediate response to the abduction of the peacekeepers (see Kandeh 2003: 193). This was critical for preventing the RUF from seizing the capital and ousting the president again:

“Britain’s military intervention saved Kabba’s presidency, rescued the UN from impending disaster, and forced the RUF and its allies to abandon the idea of taking power by force. Without the intervention of the British alongside the UN, it is doubtful whether elections would have taken place in 2002 or whether the country would be at peace today” (Kandeh 2003: 193).

After this event, there was no doubt that the “RUF was chiefly to blame” for the subsequent collapse of the Lomé Agreement (International Crisis Group 2001d: 3). Apparently, the motivation behind this show of force was to remind the international community of its own weakness and to signal that the RUF was not willing to subordinate to international pressure, in particular since its earlier attacks did not create strong opposition. However, with hindsight this move was clearly counterproductive for the RUF and facilitated its fragmentation and total marginalization. Immediately after the incident, Kabbah issued an
arrest warrant against Sankoh. He was caught and re-arrested on May 17, 2000 (Berman 2000: 12).\(^{29}\)

This escalation of the crisis was facilitated in part by the enduring good-will external actors had demonstrated to the RUF in the initial phase of engagement. During this stage, the international community had mainly relied on ECOMOG to do the job, apparently “trying to keep peace on the cheap” (Berman and Labonte 2006: 200; see also Boás 2001: 715 and Mutwol 2009: 284–289). Though formally mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNAMSIL’s mandate had been confined to “cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and the other parties to the Peace Agreement in the implementation of the Agreement”, to “assist the Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan”, and (most notably) to “establish a presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone, including at disarmament/reception centres and demobilization centres” (U.N. Security Council 1999b, par. 8). Its initial troop ceiling of 6,000 had not been not sufficient for countering the rebels’ continued attempts to spoil the peace process. In addition to that, a large part of the UNAMSIL troops had been “[p]oorly briefed, ill-equipped and unable to operate cohesively”, which contributed to the ease by which the RUF could abduct the peacekeepers in May 2000 (International Crisis Group 2001d: 20). Overall, UNAMSIL engagement was described by the International Group as a “softly, softly” approach (2001c: ii).\(^{30}\) However, the subsequent collapse of the power-sharing arrangement indicates that “the UN underestimated Sankoh and did not treat him as seriously as they should have done” (Abraham 2001: 223). As Julius Mutwol remarks, the “lack of any serious response from UNAMSIL encouraged the RUF to plan further attacks” (2009: 310).

This “[a]ll carrots and no stick” approach (Abraham 2001) came to a sudden end after the incident in May 2000. This crisis served as a focal event that made the escalation of the conflict impossible to ignore and that served as a catalyst for a more decisive external engagement. The UN Security Council immediately began to condemn this attempt to blackmail the international community and clearly signaled that the limits of its tolerance were reached. As a first response, it gave its consent to the deployment of an intervention force led by the United Kingdom – Sierra Leone’s former colonial power – within days of the attack. Its mandate was initially confined to protecting British citizens, but it was later expanded to include the defense of Freetown (Mutwol 2009: 311; see also Hirsch 2001: 153). Only about a week after the attack, the UN Security Council, “[c]onvinced that the deterioration in security conditions on the ground necessitates the rapid reinforcement of the military component of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to

\(^{29}\)Void of its leader, the RUF continued with its armed struggle for another few months and split into two factions – a dangerous development that could have forestalled efforts to revive the peace process (Coleman 2008m: 13). However, over time fighting lost in intensity, and a new ceasefire agreement could already be struck by November (see below).

\(^{30}\)Note that this statement was made in October 2001, roughly two years after the period under investigation here. However, since a significant stepping-up of UNAMSIL took place in the meantime, the quote fits all the better for the post-Lomé period.
provide the mission with additional resources to fulfil its mandate”, raised the troop ceiling for UNAMSIL to 13,000 (U.N. Security Council 2000b). In July, the UN Security Council adopted measures to stop the trade of so called ‘blood diamonds’, thereby effectively undermining the RUF’s primary source of income (U.N. Security Council 2000c). In August, the mission was given a more robust mandate explicitly directed against the RUF, which included the right to “deter and, where necessary, decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by responding robustly to any hostile action or threat of imminent and direct use of force” (U.N. Security Council 2000d; see also Berman and Labonte 2006: 164–165). Finally, in March 2000 the troop ceiling was, once again, raised to 17,500, which transformed UNAMSIL into the largest UN peacekeeping mission of its time (U.N. Security Council 2000f).

Although the International Crisis Group believed that the “Chapter Six and a Half” mandate on which the mission was ultimately based was not sufficient in order to prevent the RUF from spoiling the peace process further (2001d: 19), these steps were nonetheless a large improvement to the overly passive manner of intervention of the past and clearly demonstrated to the RUF where its limits were. With a larger presence of peacekeepers in the country the intensity of fighting slowly decreased, and by the end of the year the terms for a ceasefire improved. This led to the adoption of the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement in November 2000 (Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone 2000), which reaffirmed the government’s authority under the terms of the Lusaka agreement and provided for a more effective disarmament and demobilization process. (The emerging polity is discussed as an instance of mediated, obstructive domination in the appendix.)

In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that the RUF’s conduct during the power-sharing government in Sierra Leone posed the greatest risk to its stability. Its ongoing refusal to comply with its disarmament obligations caused the rebel group to switch from ‘saber rattling’ to a ‘calculated escalation’ strategy, which effectively led to the collapse of the polity. External actors turned out as unable to deal with the RUF’s ‘chameleon-like’ character effectively, which induced the latter to test external actors’ nerves more and more. This fits to the overall assumption that external actors in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities are unwilling to engage in a decisive manner because they do not want to disrupt the fragile foundations for peace. However, with the abduction of UNAMSIL peacekeepers, the rebel group clearly went one step too far, because it effectively provoked external actors to switch from a ‘virtual’ to a ‘genuine enforcement’ manner.

d) Promoting Good Governance.

When it comes to the promotion of good governance, Sierra Leone in the post-Lomé phase does not offer a particularly encouraging example. On the one hand, it was clear to the international community that “[i]mproving governance in Sierra Leone is the most difficult problem of all but it is essential if there is to be a lasting peace” (International Crisis Group 2001d: 27). On the other hand, it was obvious that the Lomé Agreement
constituted an adverse environment for promoting values such as human rights, democracy and justice, since the degree of obstruction was extraordinarily high and because the peace agreement set perverse incentives that rewarded rather than punished gross human rights violations. This ambiguity led to a manner of external engagement that is typical for ‘Doomed to Share’ polities. It was argued above that the obstructive environment of this polity type leads to a form of intervention in which external actors, while concentrating on the ‘milestones’ of their statebuilding agenda, often ignore the political developments on the ground. Elections often build the first element of the statebuilding agenda. In the DRC, this has effectively led to a postponement of good governance principles until the elections were over, although, after that, their ability for exerting influence on domestic governance was severely reduced. A similar result can be observed for the case of Sierra Leone.

To begin with, it is certain that the Lomé Agreement itself did not provide very favorable conditions for the promotion of good governance. The general impression is that “governance issues in the Accord were treated superficially and fundamental structural problems that had persisted in the country for more than two decades were barely addressed” (John 2007: 48). This has become apparent most notably with respect to the dismal human rights situation. Human Rights Watch prompted UN Secretary General “to disassociate the U.N. from any peace deal that compromises respect for fundamental standards of human rights and humanitarian law” (Human Rights Watch 1999a). Also, many members of the international community supported punitive justice for the RUF leadership (see Berman and Labonte 2006: 194). In addition to that, the Lomé Agreement ran counter to democratic principles, since it invited the rebels to join a democratically elected government and “attempted to elevate those responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians into statesmen” (International Crisis Group 2001d: 3 and Abraham 2001: 221). This clearly distinguishes the situation from the DRC because Joseph Kabila lacked the democratic legitimacy Kabbah possessed. As John remarks: “This could be interpreted to mean that power sought by warlords by every means could be granted in the name of peace at whatever cost. This was a challenge to democracy and set precedents for political developments in the country” (2007: 48). This explains why the adoption of the Lomé Agreement “ran contrary to the general mood in Sierra Leone […]” and triggered mass protests in the capital (Abraham 2001: 220).

However, external actors took these shortcomings into account in order to save their peace deal. This was accompanied by the refusal to realistically assess the prospects for successful statebuilding in Sierra Leone. While external actors were the primary forces behind the power-sharing arrangement, they willingly turned a blind eye to the realities on the ground once the agreement was in place. Above, it was argued that this has prevented external actors from cracking down on the RUF and counter its attempts to jeopardize the peace process. But it has also led to a highly ambiguous approach with regard to the promotion of good governance. Sankoh contributed to this outcome by adopting a rhetoric that charmed external actors: he “kept giving assurances that he was committed
Chapter 4 ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities

to democracy and the Lome agreement (sic!) [...]” (Abraham 2001: 223). Apparently, external actors took such statements literally, while they deliberately ignored the many signals that the RUF was not interested in power-sharing in earnest. Obviously, the rebel group “confused the signing of agreements with achieving peace” (International Crisis Group 2001d: 10). Yet, the ultimate collapse of the power-sharing arrangement in May 2000 was not an unforeseeable accident, but quite predictable under the loose conditions external actors imposed on Sankoh. As John notes, “power-sharing in any governance system presupposes trust and cooperation between those who will be sharing the power. In the case of the RUF and the government of Sierra Leone, trust was absolutely lacking” (2007: 48).

This ambiguous strategy was also reflected in the blanket amnesty granted to the RUF. Rather than sending a clear signal that the international community would not permit human rights violations like the ones committed by the RUF, the United Nations pursued an ambiguous strategy. As the UN Secretary General later explained:

“At the time of the signature of the Lomé Peace Agreement, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sierra Leone was instructed to append to his signature on behalf of the United Nations a disclaimer to the effect that the amnesty provision contained in article IX of the Agreement (“absolute and free pardon”) shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law” (United Nations 2000a; par. 23).

Hence, the United Nations sought a secret loophole in order to be able to indict the RUF leadership in case its atrocities are publicly marked as crimes against humanity. This can be interpreted as a ‘virtual accommodation’ strategy, according to which external actors make symbolic concessions without actually following up on their side of the agreement. However, since the international community still believed in the success of the Lomé Agreement, little was done in order to press the issue ahead. On the contrary: the amnesty undermined the credibility of all genuine efforts to contribute to a better human rights record and caused an outcry within the human rights community. Amnesty International, for instance, stated that “by granting sweeping amnesties to perpetrators of gross human rights abuses [the peace agreement] fundamentally undermines efforts to prevent further human rights abuses and to bring those responsible to justice” (Amnesty International 1999, also quoted in Omotola 2007: 41).

The culture of impunity came to an end after May 2000, when it became undeniably clear that the power-sharing efforts had collapsed. In August 2000, the UN Security Council requested the UN Secretary General to “negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent special court” (U.N. Security Council 2000e, par. 1). This ultimately led to the creation of an international tribunal for the atrocities committed in Sierra Leone, which was mandated to “prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law and crimes committed under Sierra Leonean law” (see The Special Court
for Sierra Leone 2001). By breaking with the culture of impunity had that characterized the Lomé Agreement, this certainly constituted a great step forward in the promotion of good governance. However, it came relatively late, and the long period of inaction had cost external efforts to promote good governance a lot of credibility. In the end, this sacrifice of good governance principles was not even effective, as “[n]either the amnesty offered to all combatants by the Lomé accord nor the deployment of what is already the UN’s largest current peacekeeping force has been sufficient to keep the peace process on track” (International Crisis Group 2001d: 3).

With the collapse of the Lomé Agreement, external actors’ attempt to simply muddle through the transitional phase until reaching the ‘anchor’ of the 2002 elections had obviously failed. Due to the daunting security situation in Sierra Leone, the prerequisites for addressing governance issues in earnest were only present after the 2002 elections. Throughout 2001, the RUF was finally disarmed and demobilized, and after its transformation into a political party it was nothing but a “pale shadow of the rebel outfit that terrorised the country for over a decade” (Kandeh 2003: 212). However, Kabbah’s sweeping victory in the elections – which led to the emergence of a “The Winner Took it All” polity (see A.17) – made the promotion of good governance principles not necessarily easier. Kabbah was re-elected with 70 percent of the votes, and his party – the SLPP – won 83 parliamentary seats, followed by 22 seats for his closest competitor. As noted above, the RUFP was crushed in the elections and not even represented in the parliament (see e.g. Kandeh 2003).

President Kabbah himself did little to foster more constructive relations with his former enemies. Once in power, he was soon criticized for the exclusionary system of rule he established. The elections essentially created a “one-party, dominant type of parliament” in which the opposition became largely marginalized (John 2007: 46). Also, Kabbah delegated the most important ministries to south-easteners, his traditional constituency (John 2007: 49). The International Crisis Group noted that Kabbah’s cabinet was “neither broad-based nor designed to promote reconciliation”, and it was furthermore charged with corruption allegations (2002d: 3). In this regard, Sierra Leone after the 2002 elections resembled the situation in after the 2006 national elections in the DRC very closely. However, the crucial difference is that the Sierra Leonean people expressed their contempt for the continued violation of good governance principles. Kabbah’s ignorance of good governance principles led to a quick alienation of the electorate with the SLPP. This accounted for its ultimate defeat in the 2007 presidential elections (Ohman 2008),

31 Nonetheless, the RUF still constituted a potential threat to security, in particular since there was the constant possibility that RUF hard-liners would ally with those RUF fighters who went into exile to Liberia (see International Crisis Group 2002d: 9).
32 Sierra Leonean politics suffers from a north-south divide, which reflects not only a political but also an ethnic split. The north is predominantly populated by Temne and the south mostly by Mende (International Crisis Group 2002d: 2). Temne and Mende are the two largest ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, each comprising about 30 percent of the population. They are followed by Krio (10 percent), “other African” ethnicities (10 percent), “Lebanese and Asian” (10 percent), Yimba (8 percent) and Maninka (2 percent) (see Coleman 2008m).
Chapter 4 ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities

making it known as “the first post-conflict elections in Africa in which an incumbent party was defeated” (Kandeh 2008: 607).\textsuperscript{33}

In sum, the above paragraph suggests an outcome that was already observed in the DRC: promoting good governance is virtually impossible in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities because the intricacies of daily politics preclude a systematic focus on good governance principles. It is questionable whether external actors were aware of this phenomenon (which would explain their careless engagement for good governance principles), or whether they were really so naïve as to believe that promoting good governance in an environment as adverse as the one present in Sierra Leone is possible. In both the DRC and Sierra Leone, external actors effectively postponed their engagement for good governance until the time after the elections, when the conditions were at least equally adverse and the legitimacy of external engagement had drastically declined.

4.4 ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities: Conclusions

The overall dynamics of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities are well captured by a quote from the International Crisis Group: ‘How can you force people to make peace who want war?’ (2005e: 25).\textsuperscript{34} The two cases discussed as examples for ‘Doomed to Share’ polities illustrate the tremendous difficulties involved in inducing reluctant parties to cooperate, but also the ambiguities revolving around power-sharing as an instrument of post-conflict order. Overall, the cases illustrate that power-sharing agreements can be a crucial instrument for putting an end to acute fighting even among adverse and largely obstructive elites. However, to expect that peace is self-sustaining once a power-sharing government is in place is highly naïve. Power-sharing itself resolves little of the ‘root causes’ of the war, in particular if it is not more than a transitional arrangement to bridge the time until competitive elections. On the contrary, it creates new tensions with the potential to derail the peace process entirely. This has become most clearly apparent in Sierra Leone, where “[t]he notion of bringing rebel groups into government […] has proved utterly misguided […]” (International Crisis Group 2001d: 3). Overall, the cases suggest the following conclusions with respect to the four analytical dimensions of analysis (for a short summary, see 4.1 on page 162):

First, both cases illustrate that it is virtually impossible to evoke an effective disarmament and demobilization of warring parties if they have no motivation to behave constructively. External pressure or security guarantees only have the chance to work in environments where the former warring parties depict at least a minimal degree of pragmatism and are

\textsuperscript{33}As the constitution only allows for two presidential terms in a row, Kabbah was not allowed to run again as a candidate. He chose Solomon Berewa as his hand-picked successor. In the elections, the SPLL lost nearly half of its parliamentary seats. The All People’s Congress (APC) turned out as the main winner of the elections, more than doubling the number of parliamentary seats, and their leader Earnest Bai Koroma beat Berewa in the second round of the presidential elections (Ohman 2008: 766–767).

\textsuperscript{34}The original quotation is in capital letters, therefore single quotation marks were used in the above quote.
ready to give peace a chance. Not even the prospect of participating in the government (and holding a certain control of the means of coercion) is likely to obliterate the parties’ obstructive stance. In the DRC, external actors were crucial driving forces behind the ultimate adoption of the power-sharing government, but in the implementation phase they turned out as both unwilling and incapable of providing the security guarantees necessary for overcoming the commitment problems. In addition, disarmament attempts were impeded by the large number of warring factions (of which some were considered to be proxy forces associated with the Rwandan Ugandan government) and the comparatively low level of international resolve. As a result, the progress achieved with regard to disarmament was cosmetic at best. Tellingly, not even President Kabila trusted the newly formed national army and instead relied on his presidential guard and other armed groups. The outcome was similar in Sierra Leone, where the RUF failed to meet any of the disarmament provisions contained in the Lomé Peace Agreement. Instead, the rebel group relied on extensive ‘foot dragging’ and ‘virtual cooperation’ gestures by which it tried to circumvent its disarmament obligations. However, over time its behavior became increasingly confrontational, which contributed to ‘saber rattling’ and ‘calculated escalation’ gestures and culminated in the abduction of 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers in May 2000.

Second, the overall constellation of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities has repercussions for the manner in which the parties compete for power. In both the DRC and Sierra Leone, the parties were highly reluctant to sincerely manage the countries’ transition processes and confine themselves to the division of power and authority laid out in the peace agreements that brought forward the power-sharing arrangement. Instead, they were in both cases attracted by the vast opportunities for self-enrichment offered by the participation in the transitional government. In addition, virtually all of the parties used the power-sharing arrangement as an instrument for increasing their relative share of power vis-à-vis their opponents through informal and unconstitutional means. This behavior was greatly propelled by the lack of future perspectives available to most of the rebel groups, which accounted for attempts to prolong the transitional process (‘foot dragging’) or evoke a total escalation that effectively impeded the timely organization of elections (‘calculated escalation’). In the DRC, the lack of post-elections perspectives for all candidates except Kabila led to a clash of interest among the participants of the transitional government: While Kabila’s goal was to ‘sit out’ the transitional phase in order to legitimize his reign, the other factions engaged inpronounced ‘foot dragging’ gestures and aimed at extending the transitional phase as long as possible. The potential for self-enrichment available to the warring factions in the DRC – to which external actors contributed through the disbursement of aid – contributed to this phenomenon. The same clash of interest has become apparent in Sierra Leone, where the RUF’s lack of future perspectives as a political party greatly propelled its obstructive stance. This added to its inclination to view the power-sharing arrangement as a temporary ‘safe haven’ for re-arming and gaining time for
Chapter 4  ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities

Table 4.1: Dynamics of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment Problems</td>
<td>Highly challenging environment; mistrust and suspicion impeded both the disarmament of the factions and the formation of an inclusive army; external actors were far too weak to provide security guarantees or enforce compliance from the parties.</td>
<td>Highly challenging environment; the RUF tried to evade its disarmament obligations despite security guarantees and a general amnesty; after initial reliance on ‘foot dragging’ gestures it increasingly reverted to ‘saber rattling’ and ‘calculated escalation’ strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Competition</td>
<td>Lacking consensus about the distribution of power; parties were mainly concerned with increasing their de facto share of power; unequal electoral perspectives led to different goals: Kabila wanted to sit out the transitional phase whereas the rebels wanted to prolong the transitional phase by all means (‘foot dragging’) or unseat Kabila by force.</td>
<td>Benefits of power-sharing induced the RUF to adopt a veil of cooperation; same divergence of interests as in the DRC: Kabbah wanted to sit out the transitional phase and legitimize his rule through elections, whereas the RUF faced dull electoral prospects and aimed at prolonging (‘foot dragging’) or disrupting the transitional government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats from Within</td>
<td>Imminent threat to stability by spoilers willing to use force; elite accommodation at the center led to the emergence of dissident factions in the periphery; external actors could not mobilize sufficient willingness and ability to contain the spoilers effectively (‘virtual enforcement’).</td>
<td>Main threat arose from the RUF itself; external actors failed to contain the RUF effectively and ipso facto counted on the rebel group to become more cooperative (‘wait and see’ approach); abduction of UNAMSIL peacekeepers provoked intervention by British Special Forces to protect the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Governance</td>
<td>Difficult environment for promoting good governance; external actors could do little against pervasive human rights violations; external actors postponed the promotion of good governance to the post-election era.</td>
<td>Difficult environment for promoting good governance; human rights violations remained pervasive; blanket amnesty for the RUF legitimized a culture of impunity; external actors focused one-sidedly on the elections.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

its final siege on Freetown. Kabbah, in turn, had great hopes in the 2002 elections, which contributed to his inclination to ‘sit out’ the transitional phase.

Third, the obstructive relations prevailing in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities imply that the polity is exposed to numerous threats from spoilers who have an interest in disrupting the peace process and torpedoing the power-sharing arrangement. In contrast to ‘Let’s Share’ polities, where such threats predominantly arise as a result of the ‘slippery slope’ of political competition, ‘Doomed to Share’ polities witness spoilers who have an interest in getting rid of the power-sharing arrangement and are willing to use armed force in order to achieve their goal. In the DRC, the RCD-Goma was the prototype of such a spoiler, mainly because it was the party with the least chances for being represented in a post-transition government. In addition, the strong focus on accommodating elites induced a split between
the rebel group’s leadership at the center and the Goma-based dissident faction led by Laurent Nkunda. This faction posed an imminent threat to the stability of the Congolese polity. In general, external actors were poorly equipped for responding to the destabilizing potential posed by spoilers and hardliners of all kinds. Lacking sufficient resolve and political will, they repeatedly failed to prevent severe political crises and gross human rights violations associated with it. In Sierra Leone, the RUF embodied the main threat to the transitional government, most notably after its ‘foot dragging’ and ‘virtual cooperation’ attempts became increasingly ineffective. In response to mounting external pressure, the RUF turned to ‘saber rattling’ and ‘calculated escalation’ strategies, trying to blackmail both external actors and Kabbah. In the end, this strategy was counter-productive, as it facilitated the complete isolation of the RUF and destroyed the last glimmers of hope that it would still stick to the Lomé Agreement. As Abraham noted: “Achieving peace in Sierra Leone has proved so elusive because of the elementary, yet difficult to perceive, reason that the RUF has never been interested in peace in the first place” (2001: 225).

Finally, the two cases illustrate that attempts to promote good governance in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities are marked by tremendous difficulties. By definition, this polity type is characterized by tensions which may include recourse to armed force. This greatly increases the likelihood for severe violations of good governance principles, most notably with respect to the aspect of human rights standards. In the DRC, external actors’ record in promoting good governance was highly ambiguous. Shying away from a direct involvement in the polity, they concentrated unilaterally on the elections as a panacea for their statebuilding project. One corollary of this strategy was that the international community turned a blind eye to gross human rights violations and widespread corruption during the transitional phase, mainly because they lacked the willingness and ability to exert significant pressure on the domestic parties. Their potential to counter these developments was even more eroded in the post-election phase. As this suggests, the plan to postpone the realization of wider statebuilding goals until after the elections turned out as self-deceptive. This attitude also hampered the promotion of good governance principles in Sierra Leone. Through pressuring the government into making far-reaching concessions to the RUF, external actors have contributed to an environment in which the promotion of good governance principles was particularly difficult. Reluctant to provide sufficient pressure on the parties, external actors have – just as in the DRC – postponed the promotion of good governance to the post-electoral phase – with minimal success.

All in all, the cases illustrate that unlike ‘domination’ polities, power-sharing polities rely to a greater degree on at least a minimal level of cooperation between the former warring parties. External actors are often afraid of disrupting the fragile foundations for cooperation through a decisive engagement and therefore shy away from engaging in genuine enforcement instruments. However, in environments where spoilers pose an imminent threat to the stability of the polity this ‘wait and see’ approach risks to undermine the entire peace process, as it happened in both the DRC and Sierra Leone. This suggests
that meditative engagement may come to its limits in such obstructive environments. It is virtually impossible to accommodate spoilers such as the RUF who have no genuine interest in peace and who react to nothing beyond the level of significant force. It is for this reason that the International Crisis Group, when remnants of the RUF in Sierra Leone still refused to disarm in 2001, at some point came to the conclusion that “stark, but we believe unavoidable […] [that] the international community must help Sierra Leone take decisive military action against the RUF” (2001d: ii).
Chapter 5

‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities

The two polity cases discussed in chapters three and four involved power-sharing. The remaining chapters deal with cases in which one of the conflict parties – either the pre-war government or a rebel group – has exclusive access to formal governmental authority and hence plays a dominant role in the post-conflict polity. The first of these types comprises cases of political domination in which the relations between the former warring parties are constructive and in which external actors are involved in a mediative manner – so called ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities. This polity type usually comes into being after one of the parties comes forth as the clear winner of national elections held in the post-conflict phase. As a result of the comparatively constructive relations prevailing between the former belligerents, the party that is excluded from participation in the government accepts its role as an opposition party. Four cases in the sample fall under this category: Mozambique, El Salvador, Guatemala and Sierra Leone after the 2007 elections (see table A.1 on page 327). Of those, the former two cases were selected as the empirical basis for this chapter. The goal of basing the empirical discussions on a broad geographical variety requires to select not only cases from the same region. It was therefore obvious to select one case from African and one case from Latin America. Mozambique was chosen instead of Sierra Leone because the case it is a more typical ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polity (see sections A.15.3 and A.17.3). In addition, the post-Lomé constellation in Sierra Leone was already discussed in the previous chapter, and I tried to avoid selecting the same country twice if there are alternative cases. By the same token, El Salvador was chosen from the Latin American cases because it provides a better fit to the overall characteristics of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities than Guatemala (see also sections A.9.3 and A.10.3).

Both Mozambique and El Salvador are cases in which the civil war started at the height of the Cold War and was terminated directly after the end of the superpower confrontation. This has a number of implications. First, in both cases the armed conflicts were driven by a classical ‘Cold War’ logic, i.e. characterized by ideological differences that roughly coincided with the ideological blocks of the Cold War. Second, these cases are the first examples for what is called the ‘second generation’ of UN-led post-conflict intervention efforts – i.e. peace operations that go beyond traditional (first generation) peacekeeping efforts merely aiming at securing ceasefire agreements (see Doyle and Sambanis 2006:
14–15). When compared to more recent (third generation) peace-enforcement missions, these operations had more limited goals and implied a lower degree of ‘intrusion’ into domestic affairs.

5.1 A basic model of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities

The generic model of post-conflict interactions presented above (2.1.2) spelled out a number of assumptions about the interactions between the various post-conflict actors. In addition, section 2.4 presented a set of possible ‘patterns of interaction’ which can potentially be observed in the different polity types. Now, the aim is to refine this model to the specific context of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities. The basic features of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities are schematically sketched in figure 5.1 on page 167.

The figure illustrates that only one party (‘Side A’) controls the government while the other is effectively excluded from access to government authority. Yet, both of them maintain constructive relations (illustrated by the two black arrows connecting them), which indicates that the excluded party accepts to remain outside of the formal government. At the same time, external actors have a mediative and non-discriminatory influence on the dynamics unfolding between the warring parties (as illustrated by the arrow connecting external actors and the dashed line surrounding the former belligerents).

Based on that, a number of assumptions can be made with respect to the internal dynamics unfolding in this polity type. In general, the constructive relations prevailing between the former belligerents suggest that they engage in genuine rather than merely ‘virtual cooperation’. Yet, the fact that one party is thoroughly excluded from access to governmental power may lead to new tensions if this form of political domination perpetuates itself and if the excluded party is deprived from political participation in the long run. How can we expect external actors to behave in this context? Their involvement generally aims at assisting the ‘transition process’ and settling conflicts that may, despite constructive relations, occur between the belligerents at any time. However, it can be expected that the presence of a stable government – which is considered legitimate even by the excluded side – leads to a different form of interaction than it is the case in ‘Let’s Share’ polities. The situation requires a less direct engagement because it is not necessary to closely monitor whether the parties maintain the distribution of power provided for in the peace agreement or constitution. This can potentially lead to an even more indirect and tacit engagement than it is the case for the other polity types. In the following, these assumptions are specified further with respect to the four polity dimensions.

**Overcoming Commitment Problems.** ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities are necessarily asymmetrical. The parties standing outside of the government are not only excluded from executing governmental authority, but also from the privileges and material benefits that are associated with official government positions. Since the government in most
cases also controls the security forces, the excluded parties’ physical security effectively depends on the government’s goodwill. Therefore, in all cases in which one of the former warring parties enjoys exclusive access to governmental power, the excluded parties are in a delicate position and are at least potentially exposed to one-sided violence committed by the government. These structural problems potentially pose a difficult environment for overcoming commitment problems and require more far-reaching security guarantees granted by external actors. Making the conflict parties agree to a peace-agreement in the absence of power-sharing provisions may be a difficult endeavor. Specific measures that address the asymmetry between the parties are necessary by which the weaker party can be convinced that it will not be crushed. By monitoring (or enforcing) ceasefire agreements, supervising or conducting elections or disarming and demobilizing the different factions, external actors can help to overcome the self-reinforcing cycle of mistrust that stems from the commitment problem (see e.g. Brown and Zahar 2008). This, in turn, implies that external actors’ role in the initiation phase of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities is a crucial condition for the successful establishment of this polity type.

**Manner of Political Competition.** ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities by definition imply the exclusion of one of the former conflict parties from political participation. Because the former belligerents maintain constructive relations, the current distribution of power between them does not lead to imminent political tensions. Both of them accept the status quo. However, just as in ‘Let’s Share’ polities it can be expected that the parties
Chapter 5 ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities

engage in political competition in order to increase their share of power in the future. The excluded party will almost always try to gain access to formal governmental power in the future, for instance during the next round of elections. By the same token, the dominating party is generally reluctant to give power out of hand since this would imply its own exclusion. This can be directly derived from assumption two above, which maintains that parties constantly strive for enhancing both formal and de facto authority. However, in order to compete against the government the excluded party needs realistic prospects for being able to improve its future position through the ballot-box – in other words, a realistic chance of winning future elections. Rather than seeking to overthrow the incumbent government immediately, the excluded parties’ rationale is that ‘patience pays off’, i.e. that they are able to acquire power through free and fair elections at some point in the future. This requires the excluded party to possess sufficient resources for running an electoral campaign and to appeal to the broader population and not only a certain minority segment in society – no matter whether it is ethnically, religiously or ideologically defined.\(^1\)

Whether or not this is the case depends not only on the party itself, but also on the actual characteristics of the political system – most notably its level of ‘inclusiveness’ and the general room for maneuver available to the opposition parties.

Threats from Within. Just as in ‘Let’s Share’ polities, we cannot assume that the presence of constructive relations at the time of the termination of the conflict automatically implies the end of political tensions for all times. This also holds true for ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, which may experience a deterioration of the former belligerents’ relations over time. This can stem from two directions. First, the excluded parties may become increasingly disillusioned about the prospect of gaining power through competitive elections. They could realize that patience sometimes does not pay off, which induces them to seek ‘shortcuts’ to power by falling back to informal means of political competition. Second, the government may deny the opposition’s legitimate requests for participation and try to strengthen its own hold on power. As the clear winners of the conflict – either on the battlefield or the ballot-box – the incumbent government has a lot to lose if elected out of office – ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities have little to offer for the ‘second winner’. Fearing to be excluded, the ruling party therefore has an incentive to abuse the state apparatus in order to curtail the opposition’s sphere of influence – for instance by establishing tighter controls of the media or by forging elections in order to make sure that it remains in power. This can potentially contribute to tensions between the former belligerents, including occasional outbursts of violence. However, the danger for the resurgence or civil war between the parties is low, most notably because the belligerents

\(^1\)In these cases, the parties associated with the minority group will almost always be excluded from participation in the government, since its share in the national parliament will simply be too small. They lack not only a realistic but even a theoretical chance for being represented in the government at some point in the future. We can therefore assume that disappointment of the minority group may translate into renewed tensions between the ethnic groups.
are in most cases thoroughly disarmed and because the organization of a new rebellion after several years is likely to pose tremendous problems of collective action. External actors cannot be expected to act as a safeguard of the excluded party’s interests. Since this polity type depicts many quasi-ideal features of post-conflict order like the successful holding of elections, external actors are likely to overlook many of the creeping developments taking place below the cooperative facade which characterizes this polity type.

Promoting Good Governance. External attempts to influence local dynamics and to promote good governance are likely to be somewhat ambiguous in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities. The presence of a stable government that enjoys the legitimacy of even the excluded parties may induce external actors to conclude that ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities are more self-reliant than other polity types. Instead of directly engaging into politics – for instance by closely monitoring the manner of political competition – external actors are likely to focus more on influencing the policies adopted by the government and concentrate more on technical issues necessary for implementing their statebuilding vision (e.g. engaging in capacity-building or triggering economic growth etc.). However, the strong interference on the level of policies may trigger resistance from the ruling party, which is likely to amount to specific ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies with which the government attempts to soften external actors’ influence. In addition, the problem of ‘euphemistic blindness’ potentially prevents external actors from sharply recognizing detrimental developments and shortcomings in the realm of governance. The successful holding of elections and the constructive stance of the parties are factors that tend to be interpreted as significant achievements. This could contribute to external actors’ inclination to overlook developments in the realm of politics, for instance attempts by the ruling party to outmaneuver the opposition and perpetuate its own hold on power.

5.2 Mozambique

Mozambique is a pronounced example for a ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polity. The country experienced more than sixteen years of armed conflict between two armed factions: FRELIMO (‘Frente de Libertação de Moçambique’), initially a Marxist-Leninist group that held the government since 1975, and RENAMO (‘Resistência Nacional Moçambicana’), an anti-communist rebel group sponsored from abroad (see Manning 2002: 38; Pitcher 2006: 92). A typical feature of the conflict in Mozambique was the high level of external support the parties enjoyed. FRELIMO received ideological and material backing from the Soviet Union and immediately began to implement a range of socialist policies after independence. RENAMO was systematically propped up by the two apartheid regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia as a counterweight to the communist influence in the region, which enabled it to transform into a tightly organized and (at times) well equipped military organization (see Costy 2004: 148–149; Morgan 1990: 610). Despite a furious sixteen
years of warfare, RENAMO never managed to overthrow the FRELIMO government. The civil war formally came to a close in October 1992, when the government and the rebel movement signed the General Peace Agreement (GPA) (Alden 1995: 107). Until today, Mozambique has not experienced any larger-scale recurrence of armed violence and the country is frequently cited as one of the prime examples for successful peacebuilding in Africa (see e.g. Costy 2004; Weinstein 2002). The elections that followed two years after the adoption of the GPA confirmed FRELIMO in office and led, due to Mozambique’s largely decentralized political system, to RENAMO’s far-reaching exclusion from political participation. This situation is most adequately described as a ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polity, as the following section underlines.

5.2.1 Mozambique as a ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polity

Classifying post-conflict Mozambique as an instance of a ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polity, Mozambique combines a number of characteristics. It implies that one of the former conflict parties has exclusive control of the government, that the former conflict parties maintain constructive relations, and that external actors are involved in a mediative manner in the polity. That this is the case is illustrated in the following paragraphs:

**Political Domination.** In the General Peace Agreement that put an end to more than sixteen years of armed conflict in Mozambique, FRELIMO and RENAMO agreed to hold both parliamentary and presidential elections within one year after the conclusion of the agreement (Government of the Republic of Mozambique 1992; Protocol III). Elections were originally scheduled to take place in fall 1993, but they were ultimately postponed by one year since the process of demilitarization and demobilization took longer than originally projected (see Alden 1995: 107). In the meantime, FRELIMO leader Joaquim Alberto Chissano – the ‘unelected president’ since 1986 – remained interim president. One particularity of Mozambique is the strong ‘the winner takes it all’ logic that accompanied the elections. Unlike in many other peace-agreements, the GPA did not contain any pre-election power-sharing provisions which would guarantee both parties a certain fraction of governmental power. Instead, the Mozambican constitution made it very likely for the winner of the elections to take exclusive control of the government. This was a result of the strongly centralized characteristics of the Mozambican constitution. Influenced by nearly 400 years of colonial rule, Mozambique inherited a strongly centralized political system that devotes much power to the leading political party (see Alexander 1997: 2–4; Manning 2002: 24–26; West and Kloeck-Jenson 1999: 461).

The elections had a close outcome, but nonetheless facilitated FRELIMO’s near-complete leadership role on all levels of the political system. The party won 129 out of 250 seats in the parliament – a surprisingly small margin – and confirmed Chissano’s role as president (see Hatton et al. 2001: 20). Although RENAMO performed surprisingly well in the elections, the polls manifested the wide-spread exclusion of the former rebel
group from political participation for a period of at least five years, until the next national elections were scheduled. Due to the highly centralist features of Mozambique’s political system, RENAMO did not even have the right to nominate its own governors in those provinces where it had gained the majority (Turner et al. 1998: 164). Thus, post-conflict Mozambique can safely be considered a case of political domination.

Constructive Relations. The distinguishing feature of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities lies in the constructive relations maintained by the warring parties. The presence of such constructive relations can easily be confirmed in Mozambique. Since the adoption of the General Peace Agreement, the country has not experienced any recurrence of armed conflict on a larger scale. Observers of the Mozambican case have therefore frequently cited it as an example for successful post-conflict peacebuilding (see e.g. Costy 2004). However, getting to this point was difficult and required significant external brokerage. Peace became conceivable for the first time after Joaquim Chissano had replaced Samora Machel as FRELIMO leader in 1984 and introduced far-reaching reforms of the party ideology, including a “formal retreat from Marxism” (Rupiya 1998: 14). Although this provided for a more constructive environment, RENAMO remained reluctant to engage in talks. The rebel group had some marked military successes, and some hardliners in its ranks “believed that victory lay within their grasp, if they just fought a little longer” (Weinstein 2002: 149). RENAMO carried on with fighting, which only changed fundamentally at the beginning of the 1990s when it became clear that South Africa would definitely end its support. This coincided with a severe drought, which significantly hampered the rebel group’s ability to feed its soldiers (see e.g. Zartman 2000a: 262). In conjunction with an effective third-party mediation (see below), the parties developed a more and more constructive stance over time, culminating in the adoption of the GPA in 1992.

The parties’ relations remained constructive also in the implementation phase of the agreement. Most observers agree that RENAMO’s transition from a rebel group to a political party was relatively unproblematic (see e.g. Weinstein 2002: 150). The party remained cooperative and refrained from recourse to armed force although its exclusion from political power turned out as far-reaching and permanent. FRELIMO has won all presidential and parliamentary elections since 1994, which has clearly marginalized RENAMO’s influence on the national level (African Elections Database 2007). As Brown and Zahar remarked: “RENAMO has not gained much from the peace. The party has few resources, it has no part in formal power sharing and has little say in managing state-owned enterprises” (2008: 82). Nonetheless, leaving momentary clashes aside, RENAMO has shown a genuine and deep-rooted preference for peace since the adoption of the GPA in the past years. Barbara Walter believes that this mainly stems from the settling of the main grievances underlying the conflict, most notably FRELIMO’s rejection of Marxism-Leninism that coincided with the end of the Cold War: “Since 1989, RENAMO had insisted
that its goal was ‘constitutional reform’, and its demands were fairly straightforward’ (1999: 147).

**Mediative Intervention.** External actors have played a key role at various stages of the peace process in Mozambique. Most notably, they had a decisive influence on the adoption of the GPA in 1992. One particularity of the Mozambican case is the strong influence of civil society organizations – most notably religious organizations – in the negotiation process leading to the GPA. In the eyes of Richard Jackson, Mozambique is “one of the very few cases where Track II or unofficial diplomacy supplanted official Track I diplomatic efforts as the primary site for negotiations” (R. Jackson 2006: 161). Religious organizations in Mozambique transcend existing societal cleavages and therefore have the potential to bridge differences between the conflict parties. In addition to that, some religious groups – in particular the Catholic church of Sofala – have maintained relatively good relations to the RENAMO leadership throughout the civil war and could therefore exert significant influence on the rebel group to seek a settlement with FRELIMO (see Costy 2004: 150–151). It was not least thanks to their influence that the agreement was ultimately signed by all parties in Rome on 4 October 1992.

In the implementation phase of the agreement, external engagement remained mediative and became more and more institutionalized. Within one week after the GPA was signed, the UN Security Council authorized ONUMOZ (Rupiya 1998: 15). Its mandate was confined to monitoring the ceasefire agreement and engaging in DDR efforts (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2010; United Nations 2001b; Vines 1998a); therefore ONUMOZ was still much closer to traditional peacekeeping missions than the more intrusive Chapter VII missions that became popular a few years later. External engagement in Mozambique can therefore be considered mediative in both its intentions and its effects.

---

2 ‘Track II diplomacy’ refers to diplomatic efforts that take place below the level of inter-governmental negotiations. They may involve lower-level bureaucratic contacts as well as attempts for conflict resolution facilitated by NGOs and other civil society organizations (see e.g. Miall et al. 1999).

3 Among the religious organizations, most credit goes to the ‘Community of Sant’Egidio’, which Richard Jackson describes as a “voluntary charitable Catholic organization based in Rome, but with 15,000 members world-wide and 300 local groups in Europe, Latin America, and Africa.” Engaged in Mozambique since the 1970s, it developed important relations with both FRELIMO and RENAMO and was therefore considered an honest broker by both sides (2006: 161). For a more detailed background about the role of Christian leaders for facilitating a settlement to the Mozambican conflict, see also Sengulane and Goncalves (1998).

4 According to Alex Vines, a similarly important role was played by a British businessman, ‘Tiny Rowland’, then CEO of the London-based company Lonrho. He had previously negotiated with RENAMO in order to protect his company’s assets in northern Mozambique. However, during the peace negotiations he turned out to be one of the few people that RENAMO leader Dhlakama trusted, and he invested significant private funds – including the repeated use of his company’s private airplane for flying the RENAMO leadership to the negotiations – in order to evoke a settlement between the parties. Vines believes that “[w]hile Rowland’s initial involvement in the peace process undoubtedly stemmed from commercial self-interest, it appears that Rowland quickly became personally engaged in the search for a settlement. By 1992, the time and resources he was spending far exceeded anything he could hope to recoup commercially” (1998b: 72–73).
5.2 Mozambique

5.2.2 Polity Dynamics in Mozambique

With the settlement of its conflict in 1992 and the successful elections held two years later, Mozambique has made a great leap away from conflict towards multi-party democracy. However, as this section aims to demonstrate, the country has continued to be dominated by specific post-conflict dynamics for many more years. As Giovanni Carbone describes it, “[t]he deep social and historical rootedness of Mozambique’s new party system is apparent from the fact that the main political cleavage – and thus electoral competition – is heavily shaped by past patterns of conflict” (Carbone 2005: 424). All in all, the case of Mozambique confirms the plausibility of many of the assumptions made about ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities above. This is illustrated below with regard to the four overarching themes: dealing with commitment problems, competition for power, threats from within, and external engagement for good governance.

a) Overcoming Commitment Problems

Above, I assumed that commitment problems can effectively be overcome in ‘Let the Winner take it All’ polities, sufficient external assistance and security guarantees provided. However, this polity type requires that the parties’ concerns about being marginalized in the future polity need to be specifically addressed by external actors. In Mozambique, this manifested itself in the strong role played by external actors in the initiation phase of the Mozambican post-conflict polity. Two aspects stood out with regard to the challenge of overcoming the commitment problems between the former belligerents: the disarmament and demobilization of the rebels, and the necessity to mitigate the strong asymmetry between the parties in the pre-election phase.

Disarmament and demobilization posed a significant challenge in Mozambique. On the one hand, the competitive nature of the elections required a thorough disarmament of the rebels in order to avoid replicating the disturbing outcome of the Angolan elections in 1992.\(^5\) On the other hand, the poor prospects available for the loser of the elections reduced the rebels’ willingness to engage in disarmament in earnest out of fear that this would leave them unprotected against retaliations by the government. As elsewhere, the Mozambican power-elites were highly skeptical about the prospect of demobilizing their forces, and both of the parties retained a “reserve military force” despite making gestures to comply with their disarmament obligations (Rupiya 1998: 16). Hence, external actors’ role mainly centered around “finding ways to reassure the rebels that they would not be attacked during demobilization […]” (Walter 1999: 144).\(^6\) In order to achieve this, the UN prioritized the quick demobilization of the fighters and their integration into a joint

\(^5\)In Angola, the UNITA rebels – still heavily armed – rejected their electoral defeat and continued their armed struggle (see Manning and Malbrough 2010: 149; see also 9.2).

\(^6\)Walter provides an insightful analysis of the background behind the Mozambican peace negotiations. In particular, she highlights how RENAMO’s sense of insecurity (and FRELIMO’s reluctance to address it) stalled the negotiations at various points in time.
Chapter 5 ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities

army while at the same time providing for the security of all parties through its physical force. The provision of these security guarantees was a necessary step for the beginning of the disarmament process (see e.g. Walter 1999: 149; see also Brown and Zahar 2008: 78). The whole process nonetheless took longer than originally projected in the unrealistic one-year plan provided for in the peace agreement, mainly because both parties initially mistrusted each other and “neither side wished to give strategic advantage to the other” (Rupiya 1998: 16).

Ultimately, however, the demobilization process went surprisingly smooth. By August 1994 – two months before the elections – nearly 90 percent of the registered voters were demobilized (Costy 2004: 153–155). This can primarily be contributed to the security guarantees that external actors could raise for both parties, but it was also facilitated by a certain ‘war fatigue’ of rank and file soldiers, which rendered the demobilization program relatively attractive in the eyes of many combatants (see Turner et al. 1998: 154–155). As this indicates, the international community played a strong role in the initiation phase of the Mozambican post-conflict polity. Its involvement was “key to clinching the deal and ushering in the transition from war to peace” (Brown and Zahar 2008: 78).

Next to disarmament, the second aspect external actors needed to address was the strong asymmetry that divided FRELIMO and RENAMO at the time of the peace agreement. During the entire duration of the war, the relations between the two parties could be characterized by a marked power asymmetry. FRELIMO had controlled the government since 1975, had access to external funds, controlled the army and possessed the capacity to use the state apparatus – including the media – to its own advantage. RENAMO, in contrast, had no experience as a political party when it entered the peace negotiations and lacked both the resources and legitimacy that its opponent naturally possessed. Therefore, “[a]fter years of guerrilla warfare, Renamo was poorly equipped for civilian life and for the transition to parliamentary politics” (Rupiya 1998: 14; see also Carbone 2005: 425–426). This asymmetry was a persistent source of mistrust on the side of RENAMO. As the inherently weaker side, RENAMO “needed guarantees of security and financial assistance before it would give up fighting” (Rupiya 1998: 14).

FRELIMO was reluctant to provide these guarantees, as any strengthening of its opponent might have caused a weakening of its own position. It neither provided RENAMO with funds for running an adequate electoral campaign, nor took steps to “reassure its leaders that they would remain politically relevant if they lost the elections” (Brown and Zahar 2008: 78). External actors were therefore the only forces who could potentially reduce the asymmetry between the parties. Due to the painful lessons learned during the failed peace accords in Angola, they were highly dedicated to fulfill this role successfully (Manning and Malbrough 2010: 149). Through establishing the so called ‘RENAMO Trust Fund’, international donors contributed $ 18 million in order to “help Renamo transform into a political party and to balance Frelimo’s access to public resources for elections” (see Turner et al. 1998: 157). This was instrumental for convincing the RENAMO leadership
that it could effectively compete with FRELIMO in the elections, which in turn was a critical factor for making RENAMO agree to the terms of the General Peace Agreement (see Turner et al. 1998: 157). Also, the international community almost entirely funded the elections, which were seen as the “capstone of a successful peace process in Mozambique” (Manning and Malbrough 2010: 158). All in all, the attempts to bridge the asymmetry between the parties and provide RENAMO with a solid platform on which to run for the elections can be considered successful. RENAMO had a relatively broad base of popular support and could be optimistic about its performance in the elections (see Turner et al. 1998: 154). Although FRELIMO, expectantly, won the elections, RENAMO’s good showing surprised many observers and gave rise to hopes for winning the next round of elections in 1999.

In sum, through their mediative efforts in the pre-election phase external actors can chiefly be held responsible for establishing a basic level of trust between the parties that was necessary for a settlement to the conflict (see e.g. Moran and Pitcher 2004: 511; Weinstein 2002).

b) Manner of Political Competition

Just as in ‘Let’s Share’ polities, competition for political power in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities is directed at gaining or maintaining political power in the future. Above, it was stipulated that ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities require that all parties need to feel at least a theoretical chance for winning the elections in order for this polity type to be initiated successfully. Arguably, this was one of the main reasons for RENAMO to retain its constructive stance after the elections in 1994. However, amidst accusations that FRELIMO engaged in electoral fraud the party became increasingly frustrated about its own exclusion.

The international community effectively contributed to such a sense by supporting RENAMO’s transition from a rebel group to a political party. This “gave the Renamo leadership a realistic chance of competing in the multiparty elections and provided its former military commanders with salaries, houses, offices, and vehicles to sweeten the deal” (Weinstein 2002). According to Barbara Walter, the concessions and security guarantees that were made available to RENAMO through the peace agreement and the international involvement meant that the party retained its constructive stance. She is convinced that “RENAMO accepted Chissano’s refusal to set up a coalition government and did not return to war because the Rome accord had allowed RENAMO to retain sufficient political power to challenge FRELIMO in the next elections” (1999: 149). However, it seems that Walter overestimates RENAMO’s political power in the post-election period. She argues that the GPA allowed RENAMO to remain the strongest authority in the provinces it controlled, which effectively gave rise to some sort of ‘dual administration’. This contradicts the assessment by other observers. In fact, Mozambique’s highly centralized political system has had the strange side-effect that the winner of the national elections may also appoint members of his own party as administrators of every locality. As a result, “control is excessively centralized and top-down everywhere, and even in
clearly had the purpose of accommodating the RENAMO leadership in order to ‘buy’ peace, but it also effectively boosted its chances for competing against FRELIMO during the elections in 1994. RENAMO’s good showing raised hopes that a victory was attainable in the next round of elections in 1999. Although, in effect, the 1994 elections facilitated FRELIMO’s undisputed position of dominance in the Mozambican post-conflict polity, they also signaled that attaining a victory was not altogether impossible for RENAMO. Though certainly frustrated about its electoral defeat, this contributed to RENAMO’s constructive attitude. The party tried to make the best out of the situation and “claimed credit for forcing the first democratic multiparty elections and for bringing democracy to Mozambique” (Turner et al. 1998: 162).

However, the 1994 elections can be considered the turning point for the manner of external influence in Mozambique. They were generally considered free and fair by the international community and, more importantly, endowed FRELIMO with a solid basis for executing authority on the national level. External engagement in the post-election phase was firmly based on the principle of accepting the elected government’s sphere of authority instead of continuing to mitigate the power asymmetry between FRELIMO and RENAMO and thriving to provide a level-playing field. FRELIMO clearly made use of this freedom in order to ensure its continued domination of the polity in the future. Without much interference from external actors, the party has established an increasingly tight grip on power in recent years, in part undermining democratic principles. There is some indication that FRELIMO’s ‘razor-thin’ victory in the 1999 elections was the result of electoral fraud, as some RENAMO supporters claim until today (see Weinstein 2002: 153). International observers confirmed that there were flaws in the elections. The Carter Center, for instance, criticized the lack of transparency in the tabulation of the final results, FRELIMO’s abuse of its exclusive access to state-run media, and the intimidation of RENAMO participants in a number of electoral districts. As their final report states, although the elections were based on a “successful registration exercise supported by both parties, and a generally satisfactory campaign period”, these flaws have “undermined the credibility of the process, fueling political suspicions and doubts about the final results” (The Carter Center 2000: 2).

The 2004 elections, in which FRELIMO again gained a comfortable majority, were accompanied by similar irregularities: the tabulation of the results was as flawed as in 1999, and despite a very low voter turnout (36 percent) there were provinces depicting 100 percent turnout (of which more than 90 percent voted in favor of FRELIMO), suggesting that blunt attempts for ballot-box stuffing took place (see Ostheimer 2005; Ruigrok 2005). The low turnout can also be taken as an indicator that Mozambicans have developed a strong sense of political apathy over time, apparently out of recognition that there is no real alternative to FRELIMO (see Ostheimer 2005: 125–126). All this indicates that FRELIMO, step by step, hollows out those very principles on which RENAMO’s constructive stance

---

Renamo strongholds it is exerted by Frelimo, which can hardly make the yoke seem lighter” (Weinstein 2002: 152).
5.2 Mozambique

was based – the perception of having a fair chance of gaining power through the ballot-box in the future. However, the international community does not appear particularly eager to address these challenges. As Brown and Zahar remarked, “the international community fails to recognise the capture of that state by the governing party, and aid donors actually provide FRELIMO with resources to strengthen its hold on the system. […] [They] do not raise governance problems forcefully even if they are aware of them” (2008: 80–82).

As a result of these developments, RENAMO’s sense of being a realistic alternative to centralized FRELIMO rule has eroded over time. In addition, after decades in power it has become questionable whether FRELIMO would accept a RENAMO victory given that this would imply its sudden and complete exclusion from power. According to Jeremy Weinstein “[t]he idea that Renamo might gain control of districts, provinces, and the national government – all at once, with unlimited control – makes Frelimo shudder” (2002: 154). This suggests that FRELIMO is simply not prepared for losing the elections, and some even believe that it might be willing to abuse the state’s security apparatus in order to secure its power in case it happened (see e.g. Brown and Zahar 2008). Allegedly, FRELIMO has already implemented measures aiming at perpetuating its hold on power in the past. It seems that Mozambique’s political system has quasi become a one-party system over time in which the boundaries between the party and the state have become increasingly blurry (Brown and Zahar 2008: 81), and the government “is said to pursue its policy of exclusion against Renamo on all political levels” (Linder 2010: 14). This further diminished RENAMO’s electoral opportunities and has given rise to renewed tensions between the former belligerents. Asked about their evaluation of Mozambique’s future prospects for peace, a number of RENAMO fighters underline that they have “forgiven but not forgotten the past”, and that they expect a deterioration of social peace between the parties (quoted in Linder 2010: 15).

In sum, the case of Mozambique shows that FRELIMO has used its position of dominance in the initial phase of the polity in order to secure its exclusive political influence in the long run. RENAMO had little choice but to accept this result. However, as the next section indicates, its calls for political reforms became increasingly louder, and it backed these demands with occasional ‘saber rattling’ gestures and appealed to the international community in order to exert more pressure on the government.

c) Threats from Within

The stipulations made above about attempts to deal with threats from within can also by and large be confirmed in the case of Mozambique. Despite the constructive attitude that initially characterized the relations between the former warring parties RENAMO’s sense of being marginalized has repeatedly given rise to tensions and political crises. With FRELIMO hollowing out democratic principles in Mozambique, RENAMO’s claim for attaining political power has become more and more unrealistic over time. This has eroded the main principle on which ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities rely. Brown and Zahar
even believe that “the prospect that RENAMO will ever win an election, coupled with the increased alienation of RENAMO supporters, make a reversion to civil conflict more probable” (2008: 80). If this should become true, Mozambique’s political system provides little safeguards and “possesses none of the levers that it would need to forestall a possible relapse into civil strife after the 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections” (Weinstein 2002: 150).

Imagining that nearly two decades after the end of the war RENAMO will transform back into a rebel group appears unrealistic. However, it can be observed that RENAMO has increasingly sought more informal channels of influence in the future in order to compensate for its wavering chances to win more formal power. One of them were ‘saber rattling’ gestures by which the rebel group tried to remind both the government and the international community of its own power. For instance, RENAMO has repeatedly threatened to boycott elections or withdraw from the parliament. This frequently happened after local and national elections, for instance in 1998, 1999 and 2004 (see Ruigrok 2005: 46). The earliest example is RENAMO’s announcement to withdraw from the 1994 elections just one day before they were scheduled, thereby threatening to derail the entire peace process. Knowing that the support from opposition parties is key to the legitimacy of the elections, RENAMO tried to improve its own bargaining position by threatening to withdraw. This strategy worked. The international community raised its financial support for Renam and “[a]lmost at once RENAMO announced that it was back in and the crisis was averted” (R. Jackson 2006: 169; see also Turner et al. 1998: 161; United Nations 2001b). The elections in 1999 can be considered a litmus test for RENAMO’s willingness to remain a constructive force. This time, RENAMO came even closer to victory than in 1994, as FRELIMO only won by a “razor-thin margin” (Weinstein 2002: 150). Many RENAMO supporters were convinced that FRELIMO engaged in electoral fraud in order to facilitate the election results (Weinstein 2002: 150) and RENAMO made use of what can be called rhetorical ‘saber rattling’. In an attempt to demonstrate its discontent about the elections, RENAMO “threatened to proclaim a separate government to preside over the six northern provinces where RENAMO obtained the majority of its votes”, and its leader Dhlakama began to set up offices in Beira, the country’s second largest city (Coleman 2008k: 12). This gave rise to fears that RENAMO MPs would refuse to take up their seats in the parliament which, ultimately, turned out as unfounded. Still, “RENAMO and Dhlakama […] continued to agitate against the government, and the country was rife with rumors of a return to armed conflict” (Coleman 2008k). However, these ‘saber rattling’ gestures came to a sudden end when Mozambique was hit by a serious flood in early 2000, which significantly increased international attention paid to Mozambique. Dhlakama realized that amidst “the presence of so many foreign humanitarian workers and military personnel, it was not the time for a show of political squabbling” (Coleman 2008k). After this, the party came back to its constructive stance, hoping that its patience would pay off at some point in the future. However, realizing that its chances for gaining power through
5.2 Mozambique

competitive elections were diminishing, RENAMO’s call for a constitutional reform grew louder.

After the elections in 2004 – in which FRELIMO’s candidate Armando Guebuza could acquire an absolute majority of 63.7 percent of the votes – RENAMO rejected the election results and filed an official complaint with the National Electoral Commission for accusations of fraud. It only withdrew its boycott after international observers declared the elections “free and fair” (see e.g. Freedomhouse 2006; Ostheimer 2005). In addition, RENAMO has repeatedly called for a greater degree of decentralization in the political system and it has on various occasions – typically after elections – requested FRELIMO to form coalition governments. This happened for the first time during the run-off elections for the presidency in 1994, when RENAMO leader Dhlakama requested the formation of a government of national unity. Afraid that RENAMO might spoil the peace process if its demands were rejected, the international community was initially still supportive of this idea and organized meetings between Chissano and Dhlakama with the aim of brokering a ‘pre-election deal’ between the two parties. Despite international pressure, Chissano rejected such a deal and instead offered his rival the status of ‘Leader of the Opposition’ – “complete with salary and benefits, including a diplomatic passport” (Rupiya 1998: 16; see also Brown and Zahar 2008: 78). In the end, Dhlakama had no choice but to give in and accept FRELIMO’s leadership role. After the dubious elections in 1999, RENAMO again called for power-sharing, but this time the international community clearly rejected its demands and called on RENAMO to accept the elections results (Weinstein 2002: 153).

The only issue-area in which RENAMO was able to record at least a partial success was in the realm of decentralization. Between 1994 and 1997, the government implemented a series of decentralization measures that led to the formation of so called ‘Autarquias’ – districts or cities in which a considerable degree of political autonomy is granted. Officially, there are 33 Autarquias in Mozambique, established between 1994 and 1997 (Linder 2010: 3–4). Due to its boycott of the local elections, RENAMO initially did not profit from the establishment of these provinces. It was only in 2003 that the party gained control of five of these districts (Linder 2010: 3–4). Given that RENAMO is otherwise nearly completely excluded from political participation on both the national and local level, this is obviously not more than a drop in the ocean. The accusations of fraud accompanying the elections in 1999 and 2004 illustrate that FRELIMO, too, may have made use of more informal and unconstitutional instruments in order to remain in power.

In sum, the above paragraph illustrates how important it is for the stability of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities that the excluded party continues to have realistic prospects for gaining power in future elections. After accusations of fraud regarding FRELIMO’s victory in the 1999 elections became louder, RENAMO made increasing use of ‘saber rattling’ gestures in order to demonstrate its discontent with the election results. However, five years after the end of the conflict, recourse to armed force was an unrealistic option.
for the former rebel group, which is one reason to explain why it by and large maintained its constructive stance.

d) Promoting Good Governance

Attempts to promote good governance have been the primary concern of external actors in post-conflict Mozambique, but their efforts to do so have been highly selective and ambiguous. Above, it was stipulated that external actors in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities tend to prefer more tacit and ‘technical’ forms of intervention over those which require direct interference with the interactions between the former warring parties. Since there is a legitimately elected government whose authority is accepted by all relevant domestic parties, external actors can be expected to refrain from getting involved into daily politics. Unlike in power-sharing situations, which require external actors to closely monitor the distribution of power between the belligerents and/or to continuously provide incentives or security guarantees, such direct forms of intervention are considered unnecessary or even counterproductive in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities. Instead, external actors are highly concerned with ensuring that the ruling party adopts the ‘right’ policies – those which are in accordance with external policy preferences.

In line with these stipulations, the case of Mozambique confirms that external influence was by and large disguised as a seemingly ‘technical’ and apolitical form of intervention. Observers have noted in the context of Mozambique that “the international community prefers to avoid overtly political issues” (Brown and Zahar 2008: 82). External actors have concentrated their efforts on two issue-areas: on providing an enabling environment for growth and a self-sustained economic development and on reconstructing the state “along lines more familiar and congenial to the agencies themselves” (Plank 1993: 424). This has become apparent with respect to the liberalization policies that external actors levied on the government through aid conditionality in the 1980s and 1990s. Inspired by the ‘Washington Consensus’ the World Bank had discovered Mozambique as a target for its structural adjustment program already before the termination of the conflict (see e.g. Juergensen 1998: 8; Pitcher 1996: 49; 2006: 93; Pfeiffer 2004: 362). The program aimed at inducing a far-reaching liberalization of the Mozambican society – Harry G. West (2008) even speaks of a “neoliberal revolution” – that included privatizing state-owned companies on a broad scale, fighting corruption, and transforming Mozambique into a competitive economy. According to Plank, the aim of these efforts was to build “a new kind of state – technically competent, economically rational, and politically dispassionate […]” (1993: 426). In accordance with this goal, external actors put a strong emphasis on capacity building. For instance, they undertook various parliamentary training programs “in an effort to build the skill base of Mozambican parliamentarians to manage and pass legislation in the national assembly” (Weinstein 2002: 154). Conveniently, external actors have, at the same occasion, also provided them with the polities to adopt. In an effort to ‘rationalize’ Mozambican politics, they have exerted a strong influence on the government
in order to adopt certain policies that were considered ‘appropriate’ (see e.g. Plank 1993; de Renzio and Hanlon 2007).

Overall, Mozambique has neatly complied with donors’ demands, contributing to its reputation as a ‘donor darling’ (see de Renzio and Hanlon 2007: 15). However, the government had little choice to do otherwise. In those few occasions in which it tried to resist external actors’ policy preferences, it faced tremendous pressure from international donors, who have repeatedly brought the issue to the negotiation table. For Renzio and Hanlon, this illustrates that “donors have been very inflexible in their imposition of specific policy prescriptions, creating an environment where the questioning of the predominant development paradigm is seen as a losing strategy for an aid-dependent country which needs to keep aid resources flowing into the economy” (2007: 20). The Mozambican case shows that what external actors subsume under technical assistance has in fact given them a tremendous influence on the content and direction of the policies adopted. Mozambique’s dependence on external funds has given external actors sizable leverage on the domestic political process (see e.g. Batley 2005; Manning and Malbrough 2010; Pitcher 2006; de Renzio and Hanlon 2007). In this environment, the government is unlikely to “engage in debates about policy alternatives which could call into question the predominant development paradigm” (de Renzio and Hanlon 2007: 10).

However, the seemingly apolitical manner of intervention favored by external actors had strongly political effects which often stood in stark contrast to the government’s own political goals. This form of external influence placed the Mozambican government under double-pressure because the FRELIMO leadership needed to meet external actors’ demands while at the same time ensuring the support from its various constituencies from both within and outside of the party. As Plank remarks, “the West’s policy prescriptions imply dramatic social and political consequences, including the exacerbation of social inequalities, the aggrandisement of local and expatriate elites, and the subversion of prevailing political arrangements” (Plank 1993: 428). As a result, “[t]he political survival of the Government requires a complex and perilous balancing act, which depends on ensuring the continued flow of aid while simultaneously maintaining the support of key domestic constituencies. These objectives are often in conflict” (1993: 418).

As a way out of this dilemma, the government made use of typical ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies. Realizing

---

8 In the past, most of the aid flowing into Mozambique bypassed the official government budget and went directly to specific donor-funded projects. In recent years – mostly in response to the general trend for increasing ‘ownership’ – donors have more and more tried to endow the Mozambican government with more responsibility regarding the disbursement of aid. However, as Richard Batley highlights, this has also invited donors “into the heart of the governmental process”, thereby increasing rather than reducing donors’ influence on the domestic policy process (Batley 2005: 415).

9 Plank gives the following example to illustrate this dilemma in the case of Mozambique: “[R]educing subsidies on food and other goods is one of the conditionalities commonly imposed by the I.M.F. in its structural adjustment lending, and compliance is frequently required by other donors as a precondition to their own disbursements of aid. At the same time, maintaining subsidies on food and other ‘essential’ goods is often required in order to gain or keep the political backing of soldiers and urban consumers, whose support is crucial to the survival of those in power” (1993: 418).

181
that it makes little sense to directly resist external policy prescriptions, the FRELIMO government made use of ‘foot dragging’ strategies in order to mitigate external influence on domestic policies. Agreements struck with external actors are “commonly accompanied by delays in or failures of implementation, variously attributable to legislative obstruction, bureaucratic inertia, or popular resistance” – a strategy which he calls “grudging compliance with conditionality” (Plank 1993: 418). In addition to engaging in ‘foot dragging’ strategies, the government also tried to avert some of the pressure by turning a blind eye to bureaucratic indiscipline and corruption. This allowed the government to “enter into formal compliance with awkward conditions while informally pursuing other ends” (1993: 418–419). Corruption has indeed been wide-spread in Mozambique ever since the settlement of the conflict (see e.g. Harrison 1999).

Though external actors could successfully enforce liberalization pressure on the Mozambican government, many other aspects of the good governance agenda remained unaddressed. For the main part, this becomes apparent with regard to external actors’ tacit acceptance of FRELIMO’s attempts to perpetuate its domination of the government and to undermine democratic principles. According to Brown and Zahar, external actors in Mozambique “prioritise economic reform over political reform and […] concentrate their resources on the strengthening of the state and its institutions without sufficiently empowering opposition parties or civil society” (2008: 82). This suggests a strong ambiguity about the seemingly ‘technocratic’ intervention of outside actors. It implies that external actors maintain a certain level of trust in the government’s goodwill and commitment to peace. Although they scrutinize the government’s actions, the degree of surveillance and control regarding its democratic performance is less direct than in other polity forms. Since they believe the government to be a legitimate, stable and largely uncontested domestic authority, democratic rule is simply assumed, but not actually enforced. As a consequence, the government has relatively large freedom in areas such as human rights, minority politics, freedom of the press, and their relations with the political opposition.

This outcome was reinforced by the phenomenon of ‘euphemistic blindness’, which also plays an important role in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities. After the sobering attempts to create the conditions for peace in Somalia and Angola, the international community was keen on presenting a success-case to the world and it is still convinced that Mozambique is an example for statebuilding success like few other cases (see Batley 2005: 417). This is in part justified. The Mozambican economy grew by high rates in the post-conflict period, with some years experiencing as much as 11 percent growth. GDP per capita roughly doubled between 1990 and 2005 and aid dependence decreased from a peak of above 80 percent in 1992 to below 20 percent in 1999.\(^\text{10}\) In conjunction with the relatively stable and constructive political conditions (see above), there was a certain ground for optimism throughout the 1990s. However, as Jeremy Weinstein warns us, “success breeds complacency” – a danger that he believes to be most pronounced “in cases where progress

\(^\text{10}\)Figures taken from World Development Indicators Online (2007).
5.3 El Salvador

is evaluated mechanically, as if one is checking off items on a simple list of indicators: ‘Economic growth, check; democratic elections, check; a functioning opposition, check; and a military out of politics, check!’” (2002: 150). He highlights that “a deeper look at Mozambique’s political and economic situation suggests a bleaker interpretation” (2002: 142). Nearly two decades after the end of the civil war, Mozambique is still one of the poorest countries in the world. Of all 169 countries ranked in the 2010 Human Development Index, Mozambique occupies the fifth-lowest rank – only three ranks above the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which continues to be struck by armed conflict until today (UNDP 2010; see also Fauvet 2000; Reisinger 2009a: 488–491). The international community, though, has focused one-sidedly on the achievements of the Mozambican statebuilding process, which it has interpreted as an indicator that Mozambique yielded a self-sustaining peace. This gave rise to the myth of Mozambique as representing an unprecedented success story or ‘poster child’ of post-conflict reconstruction (Moran and Pitcher 2004; see also Costy 2004).

In fact, one can argue that external actors have deliberately turned a blind eye to aspects like corruption or the hollowing-out of democratic principles in order to safeguard Mozambique’s political stability and its characteristics as a success case. Renzio and Hanlon describe this process as a ‘pathological equilibrium’ that has emerged between external actors and the government, resulting in “an environment where high aid dependence is coupled with limited pressure for accountability from civil society, parliament or the media, who lack political clout and technical capacity, and with substantial rewards for going along with donor demands” (2007: 10). This suggests that external actors are not only ignorant of reversals in Mozambique’s democratic performance, but that they effectively playing in the hands of FRELIMO. As Brown and Zahar argues: “[t]he close international involvement […] is contributing to the institutional decay of RENAMO” (2008: 82).

In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that external actors used the presence of a stable and democratically legitimized government as a reason for limiting their engagement to the realm of policies, but that they refrained from directly engaging in political issues. The phenomenon of ‘euphemistic blindness’ accounted for the fact that democratic governance was simply assumed, but not actually enforced. This prevented external actors from recognizing some of the dangers that crept in by the backdoor, including FRELIMO’s gradual attempts to hollow out democratic principles.

5.3 El Salvador

El Salvador experienced an armed conflict that is, in various regards, comparable to Mozambique’s civil war. The country has historically been ruled by authoritarian regimes with close affiliation to rich landowners. Opposition to their rule grew over time and culminated in a guerrilla war. In its course, the right-wing government was ousted in 1979, making room for a reform-minded revolutionary junta led by exiled opposition
leader José Napoleón Duarte (Christian Democratic Party, PDC). However, parts of the guerrilla movement demanded more radical changes and formed the left-wing rebel group ‘Farrabundo Morti National Liberation Front’ (FMLN) in 1980, which enjoyed support from Cuba and the Soviet Union. This gave rise to a decade-long civil war between the government and the FMLN in the course of which more than 70,000 people were killed (see e.g. Allison 2010; Call 2003; Karl 1992; Reiber 2009; Wantchekon 1999; Zinecker 2004: 9–10).

Just as in Mozambique, the Salvadorian civil war was highly ideological and clearly driven by a typical Cold War logic (see also Heupel and Zangl 2004: 350). The United States were concerned about a left-wing government emerging in its backyard and therefore heavily supported the PDC government. Throughout the 1980s, El Salvador – a small country with not even seven million inhabitants – was the fifth-largest recipient of US aid (see Reiber 2009: 199; see also Boyce 1995). Between 1980 and 1991, the United States provided the government with more than $ 4 billion of aid (one billion alone for the military), which made a victory of the left-wing rebels nearly impossible (see Call 2003: 831). However, neither side was able to yield a decisive victory and “[a]s early as 1984 observers had been keenly aware that the civil war had reached stalemate” (Munck 1993: 80; see also Karl 1992; Walter and Williams 1993). With the Cold War ending, it became increasingly clear to all participants (including the United States) that there was no military solution to the war (see Munck 1993: 89; Orr 2001). In April 1990, the conflict parties met in Geneva and decided to open formal peace negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations. The first substantive agreement in the peace accords was on human rights and gave rise to UN peacekeeping mission (ONUSAL) that was deployed even before a formal cease fire agreement was in place (Burgerman 2000: 68; Montgomery 1995: 142). In what became known as the ‘negotiated revolution’ (Karl 1992), the final peace agreement was adopted in Chapultepec, Mexico, between the FMLN and Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani on 16 January 1992 (see e.g. Hampson 1996b: 77).

In accordance with the country’s pre-war constitution, national elections were held in March 1994, enthusiastically called “elections of the century” by many observers (see e.g. O’Shaughnessy and Dodson 1999: 99). In the absence of any pre-election power-sharing deal between the belligerents, the elections were held in a ‘the winner takes it all’ spirit. ARENA, which had gained power by beating the PDC in the 1989 elections (see Stanley 2006: 104), won most seats in the national Assembly in 1994 (although falling short of an absolute majority), followed by the FMLN, which emerged as the second strongest force in the parliament. ARENA’s candidate Armando Calderón Sol outperformed the candidate nominated by a coalition of opposition parties (led by the FMLN), Rubén Zamora, in the runoff-elections to the presidency (see Lehoucq 1995; Seligson and Macías 1995).
5.3 El Salvador

5.3.1 El Salvador as a ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polity

Post-conflict El Salvador fulfills all requirements for a ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polity. The elections in 1994 gave rise to a situation in which one of the former warring parties (ARENA) dominates the executive and effectively excludes the FMLN from participation in the government. Despite that, the FMLN has accepted its electoral defeat and yet has remained a relatively constructive party throughout the duration of the Salvadoran post-conflict polity. Finally, external actors were engaged in El Salvador in a mediative manner. In conjunction, this allows classifying El Salvador as an instance of a ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polity type, as justified in more detail below:

Political Domination. In the 1994 elections, ARENA emerged as the clear winner in both the presidential and parliamentary elections. The party gained 39 out of 84 seats in the National Assembly, and their candidate Calderón Sol won more than two thirds of the votes in the runoff elections for the presidency (see Lehoucq 1995: 179–180). This outcome manifested ARENA’s position of dominance in the Salvadoran post-conflict polity and led to the effective exclusion of its former enemy, the FMLN, from governmental power. Since ARENA lacked an absolute majority in the National Assembly, the party frequently needed to collaborate with the opposition in order to pass new laws. There is plenty of evidence for how ARENA deliberately kept the FMLN away from virtually all kinds of decision-making power and rather engaged in deal-making with smaller opposition parties, thereby “ignoring or bypassing consultation or compromise” with the FMLN (Holiday 2005: 80). At the same time, the outcome of the elections confirmed the FMLN as the second-strongest party in Salvadoran politics. In its first elections, the rebel-group-turned-party emerged as the second strongest force in the Salvadoran political system, even outperforming the PDC (see Lehoucq 1995). This gave rise to a strongly polarized party system, in which there is a deep ideological divide between the government and the largest opposition party, with the former strongly supporting neoliberal policies and the latter being largely opposed to the government’s radical pro-market stance (Azpuru 2010: 112; see also Reiber 2009: 205). For the most of El Salvador’s post-conflict history, the incumbent party has contributed to a deepening of this divide by trying to marginalize the FMLN (Colburn 2009: 143). ARENA’s position of dominance has “enabled it to thwart the FMLN’s desire for more rapid and complete fulfilment of the remaining provisions of the Peace Accords” (O’Shaughnessy and Dodson 1999: 127). Therefore, the period between 1994 and 2009 can safely be considered a case of domination by one of the former belligerents.

Constructive Relations. Despite the bloody civil war fought by the parties in El Salvador, there is widespread evidence that they maintained comparatively constructive relations since it became clear that neither of them was able to win the war. According to Tommie Sue Montgomery, “the convergence of interests among all the major actors,
Chapter 5 ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities

which combined to push the peace process along despite serious problems and setbacks, is distinctive” (1995: 160). Since his election in 1989, the Salvadoran president Cristiani has made clear that his first priority was to end the civil war and he immediately made steps in that direction (see Burgerman 2000: 68). Initially, these attempts were hardly successful. The FMLN did not trust the government and instead of opening negotiations launched the largest military offensive of the entire war in November 1989. The offensive gave a good impression of the army’s incapability to contain the rebels, but it at the same time indicated that the FMLN was unable to “spark a popular insurrection” (Montgomery 1995: 141). In effect, it manifested the military stalemate between the parties and brought “both sides back to the negotiating table with a new resolution” (Montgomery 1995: 141; see also Colburn 2009: 145).

From that moment one, it quickly became clear that both sides had a true interest in finding a settlement to the conflict. According to Reiber, once the parties initiated negotiations there were little veto-powers left who were opposed to the peace process (2009: 226). The only exception is the military, who previously possessed a strong role in the Salvadoran polity and was consequently the party that had most to lose from the democratization process. Hence, the armed forces were “far from willing to give up their autonomy vis-a-vis the civilian authorities” (Munck 1993: 85). Nonetheless, due to significant pressure from external actors, the military’s resistance could be softened over time. According to Susan Burgerman, one of the success factors in El Salvador was the existence of “a pragmatic elite seriously concerned with international prestige and with the economic detriments of continued civil war and capable of exerting its influence over the military high command” (2000: 64).

The peace negotiations were opened with an agreement on human rights, leaving aside issues such as demilitarization, the division of powers in a future cabinet or other ‘hard’ issues that usually tend to characterize peace negotiations from the beginning on (see Reiber 2009: 198). This was clearly a novelty, as it was “the first instance in which human rights was made the focus of a conflict resolution process, and the UN for the first time approached the idea of including institutional reforms aimed at long term human rights protection in an accords package” (Burgerman 2000: 69). This can be interpreted as a further sign that the two sides began to develop constructive relations. The ceasefire agreement, adopted in 1992, was never violated, and both parties accepted the United Nations’ role as a mediator in the conflict (Montgomery 1995: 158; see also Call 2003: 832). Thus, at the time of the elections it was already evident that “all key political actors accepted the legitimacy of the elections and the constitutionality of the regime” (O’Shaughnessy and Dodson 1999: 99). As Montgomery writes, “[b]oth the agreements, as well as their implementation, could not have happened without the goodwill of the parties involved […]” (1995: 146). What matters most is that the FMLN accepted its defeat in the elections without hesitation (see Zinecker 2004: 134). Thus, we can generally consider the relations between the belligerents to be unusually constructive. The only
notable exceptions – the somewhat bumpy demobilization process and ARENA’s polemic electoral campaign – are discussed in more detail below.

Mediative Engagement. External actors in El Salvador have generally played an ambiguous role. This becomes most drastically clear in the case of the United States. It is beyond doubt that their support of the right-wing government during the conflict is one of the primary reasons for the long-lasting and bloody civil war (see also Munck 1993: 77). At the same time, they have contributed heavily to the settlement struck between the parties in 1992 and have generally supported El Salvador’s transition process. Whether or not their engagement in the post-settlement period was mediative or partisan is a matter of interpretation, but it appears reasonable to suggest that the ideological proximity with ARENA – a party that has been “a loyal ally of the United States on almost all relevant foreign policy issues” (Holiday 2005: 79) – did not vanish instantly. Nonetheless, the United States were key for facilitating a settlement between the parties and pressured ARENA to comply with a number of key provisions contained in the peace agreement (Holiday 2005: 79). In November 1990 for instance, the United States cut military assistance by half and tied the disbursement of the remaining funds to the condition that the military accepted UN mediation and showed good faith in the peace negotiations. Therefore, “[c]ontinued U.S. military support, which the armed forces had been able to take for granted for more than a decade, was suddenly insecure” (Burgerman 2000: 67). Thus, though the United States clearly were no neutral third party (if that exists at all), the engagement cannot be considered partisan either. The most appropriate interpretation seems to be that the United States simply needed to find a coherent stance towards the FMLN – a rebel group against which they supported a massive fight just a few years before.

The truly mediative force in El Salvador’s post-settlement history were the United Nations. As O’Shaughnessy and Dodson put it, “ONUSAL played an aggressive role, not only in facilitating negotiations but in working to assure compliance by all parties” (1999: 126). The United Nations have enjoyed a very good reputation among all major parties in El Salvador and their engagement is “now considered among the most successful instances of implementation of a negotiated peace agreement in the post-Cold War period” (Call 2003: 830; see also Reiber 2009: 230). Unlike in other cases of third-party mediation, all conflict parties generally perceived the UN as an impartial and trustworthy authority (Reiber 2009: 241). In their first meeting in Geneva in 1990 – which took place before a ceasefire was in place – the conflict parties already requested the United Nations to mediate the peace negotiations and to send human rights observers to El Salvador. This was the starting point for ONUSAL (Misión de Observación de las Naciones Unidas en El Salvador), whose mandate was initially limited to verifying the human rights agreement and which was deployed to El Salvador amidst ongoing fighting (see Burgerman 2000: 70).11

11For a detailed background on the United Nations’ role in El Salvador, see Fen Osler Hampson (1996b).
Chapter 5 ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities

ONUSAL was a small mission that remained below the level of a fully-fledged peacekeeping force. At no point (except for a temporary step-up during the elections), more than 380 military observers and some 600 police observers were deployed (see Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2010). Despite its small size and low level of physical resolve, the mission could exert effective pressure on the domestic parties to proceed along the lines of the peace agreement:

“As a mediator, the UN helped energize the negotiations by being a source of proposals, by reframing the meaning of concessions, and by creating a sense of urgency, imposing deadlines, and offering side-payments assurances […]” (Hampson 1996b: 95-95).

For instance, ONUSAL “successfully pressured the parties into backing away from a side agreement that threatened to corrupt the new civilian police force” (Burgerman 2000: 71). The authority stemmed in large part from the high reputation of two diplomats who were not formally part of ONUSAL, but who were mandated to mediate the peace process: Alvaro de Soto, mediator on behalf of the UN Secretary General, and Undersecretary-General Marrack Goulding. Though probably not anticipated, the two individuals “proved crucial to unblocking the implementation process when it was stagnant” and assisted the peace process until long after their official mandates ran out (Call 2002: 393). The successful organization of the elections in 1994 can in large part be contributed to external actors and the resources they invested (see Reiber 2009: 236). It is against this background that Boyce remarks: “External assistance unquestionably has contributed greatly to postwar reconstruction and to the consolidation of peace” (1995: 2101). Out of the above reasons, it is beyond doubt external actors as a whole played a mediative role in El Salvador.

5.3.2 Polity Dynamics in El Salvador

Together with Mozambique, the peace process in El Salvador is widely considered to be one of the most successful cases of post-conflict peacebuilding of all times (see e.g. Call 2003: 830). El Salvador has remained peaceful since the adoption of the ceasefire agreement in 1992 and the country has since then become profoundly de-militarized. Since the beginning of the peace negotiations in 1991, it has made huge progress on the way to becoming a consolidated state. El Salvador must today be considered a multi-party democracy in which different parties can effectively compete against each other, as it has been most impressively confirmed by the FMLN’s victory in the 2009 elections. This distinguishes El Salvador from Mozambique, where RENAMO’s influence has become more and more marginalized over time. Although the outcome in both cases was different – Mozambique’s political domination was self-reinforcing, whereas El Salvador’s was not – the political dynamics in the two cases have many things in common. Some of the general characteristics of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities that were confirmed for Mozambique in the previous section can also be found in El Salvador.
5.3 El Salvador

a) Overcoming Commitment Problems

As in Mozambique, overcoming the commitment problems in the *initiation phase* of the polity has been a central aspect of El Salvador’s route to peace. As stipulated above, ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities provide an environment where overcoming the commitment problems between the parties is possible as long as external actors provide sufficient security guarantees. In El Salvador, two aspects turned out as the most important ones in this regard: providing security guarantees in order to facilitate the disarmament of the warring factions, and providing a level playing field for both parties to compete in the upcoming elections.

In El Salvador, attempts to disarm the factions were characterized by the typical dilemma as it occurs in most settlement situations: “The guerrillas took the position that they could not agree to a ceasefire unless they were guaranteed a political role; the government said the FMLN could not have a political role so long as it remained armed” (Montgomery 1995: 144). Both sides feared that their opponents could fail to fulfill their part of the agreement, which nearly prevented a settlement to the conflict. As a result, the path to the negotiation table became a “long and checkered one” (Munck 1993: 80; see also Hampson 1996b: 91–92). But even after a ceasefire agreement was signed by the parties, the FMLN remained skeptical towards the prospect of disarming and demobilizing its forces. Knowing that this would have implied to give away its main source of bargaining power *vis-à-vis* the government, the FMLN was highly reluctant to comply with the disarmament provisions contained in the agreement: “Demobilization secured cooperation from the government, but drastically reduced the ability of the FMLN and other domestic groups to force the government to treat them seriously, reform its practices, and stick to the agreement” (Hampson 1996b: 97).

In what can best be described as a ‘foot dragging’ strategy, the party tried to postpone the demobilization of its forces as long as possible (see Zinecker 2004: 66–67; see also Munck 1993: 84). It was only after the United States provided the rebel group with the necessary security guarantees that the FMLN gave up its resistance (Munck 1993: 86). But even then, it retained a sizable number of weapons in secret arms caches, apparently as another safeguard in case the peace process derailed. This was only discovered after one of these secret storage spaces exploded in May 1993. After this incident, the former rebel group fully complied with the disarmament program: “An embarrassed FMLN […]” dissolved more than 100 arms caches in El Salvador and abroad and turned in tons of arms and ammunition (Call 2002: 394; see also Reiber 2009: 196). This behavior vividly illustrates how fears for giving away one’s only means of coercion can prevent even constructive parties from complying with their disarmament.

---


189
obligations. In ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, where one party has exclusive control of the security apparatus, this behavior is likely to be more pronounced than in ‘Let’s Share’ polities, where both have at least theoretically a certain control of the means of coercion.

The government-side was initially equally reluctant to comply with the disarmament and demobilization provisions. For instance, it was unwilling to dissolve the National Guard and the Treasury Police (Munck 1993: 84). However, in the end it gave in and the disarmament process could be finished two months behind schedule. On 17 December 1992, “the FMLN demobilized the last of its 12,362 combatants, officially bringing to a close the armed conflict” (Call 2002: 394). The actor most resistant to any sort of change were the armed forces, who potentially were to lose most from the adoption of the peace accords. High-ranking military officers involved in human rights violations during the civil war were the greatest obstacle to peace. A report published by the UN-led Truth Commission investigated 34 cases of severe human rights violations, and came to the conclusion that more than 90 percent of them could be ascribed to the military. The report “called for immediate removal of those implicated, together with a genuine assertion of civilian control over the military, including promotions and the military’s budget” (O’Shaughnessy and Dodson 1999: 105). ARENA and right-wing political parties were reluctant to comply with the recommendations, but after significant pressure from the United States and other external actors, “a purge of the military was carried out, the security forces were disbanded, and thus a major obstacle to democratic transition was reduced if not eliminated” – although those responsible for the crimes were never held accountable (O’Shaughnessy and Dodson 1999: 106–107).

The second crucial role external actors played in the initiation phase of the Salvadoran polity was bridging the asymmetry between the belligerents and ensuring that the FMLN could gain a realistic perspective for successfully competing against ARENA in the elections. As in Mozambique, the power relations between the former belligerents in El Salvador were highly asymmetric at the time of the peace negotiations. ARENA had formed the government since the elections in 1989 and therefore enjoyed all the benefits typically associated with holding office. In contrast, the FMLN was “a rebel army organized to fight a military, not an electoral, campaign” (Allison 2010: 110). The role of the United Nations was to provide a level playing field for both parties, and it “had to address [the] inequality in power between the two parties throughout its mission” (Hampson 1996b: 97; see also Munck 1993: 89). In this regard, one of the most crucial challenges was to design the FMLN’s transition from a rebel group to a political party. External actors generally

---

13 The Accords provided for the establishment of a Truth Commission, whose mandate was to investigate human rights violations committed by all parties. For a further background analysis of the Truth Commission in El Salvador, see in particular Margaret Popkin (2004).

14 Against the recommendations of the Truth Commission (but with the approval of the United States), a general amnesty was adopted by the Salvadoran parliament in March 1992. The government transferred many of the purged military officers to lucrative jobs in state-run companies and civil society (see Hampson 1996b: 87–88; Zinecker 2004: 70–71).
fulfilled this role successfully, as discussed in more detail in the next section on political competition.

In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that the Salvadoran elites were highly reluctant to comply with their disarmament obligations and that the army offered significant resistance against the reform of the security sector. Despite the constructive stance that had characterized the parties’ relations from the beginning on, the FMLN maintained secret arms caches as an insurance in case peace fell apart. This illustrates that the absence of power-sharing agreements may make it more difficult to induce an effective disarmament of the rebel groups even if they have benevolent intentions. The asymmetry between the FMLN and ARENA also turned out as a crucial factor that needed to be addressed in the initiation phase of the polity. Although external actors played a less vital role in this regard as in Mozambique, they greatly assisted the rebel group’s transition into a political party.

b) Manner of Political Competition

Regarding the manner of political competition in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, it was stipulated above that, in this polity type, both parties accept the status quo but at the same time strive for increasing their share of power in the future. Since only one of them can be represented in the government, the excluded party strives for gaining power in the next round of elections, which the incumbent government wants to prevent. The perception held by the excluded party of having a realistic chance to successfully compete against the government can be seen as an important factor for the maintenance of constructive relations (5.1).

This last aspect was a crucial factor in the case of El Salvador. As RENAMO in Mozambique, the FMLN needed to be propped up significantly in order to be able to compete in the elections against ARENA. Several problems existed that made this process difficult. For example, the FMLN consisted of different and largely incompatible ideological currents that made its registration as a single political party difficult (see Zinecker 2004: 124–125). In addition to that, the FMLN was, at the time of the 1994 elections, still in a much more precarious position than RENAMO in Mozambique because ARENA received by far the greatest share of campaign funds: 54 percent, compared to only seven percent received by the FMLN (see Wantchekon 1999: 815). A specific agreement with the international community to compensate this disadvantage (along the lines of the RENAMO Trust Fund in Mozambique) was lacking. Thus, it is not surprising that “ARENA’s campaign had better quality and more financial resources” (Azpuru 2010: 111).

Nonetheless, the FMLN could develop a sense of having a realistic chance of winning the elections at some point in the future. Despite the little campaign funding it could rely upon, public opinion polls conducted before the elections suggested that a large number of voters was still undecided and that ARENA’s presidential candidate Calderón Sol, though being the most popular candidate, would be unable to collect enough votes for an outright victory (see Lehoucq 1995: 181; see Allison 2010: 114). As a result of this, the FMLN
could be relatively confident that it would survive the elections without losing face. Its confidence was further raised when external actors – most notably the United States – signaled to take the rebel group seriously and engage in negotiations at eye level (see Thale 1997: 192). In addition to that, the United States were strong supporters of the land-reallocation program, which aimed at allocating land to ex-combatants (both from the government and the FMLN) in order to support the demobilization process: “The United States, through USAID, provided about 85 percent of the funding for the transfer of land to FMLN ex-combatants and their supporters, making the program relatively costfree to the Salvadoran government” (Thale 1997: 194). Though this cannot be compared to the millions of dollars handed over to RENAMO in Mozambique, the prospects offered for the FMLN were ostensibly encouraging enough in order to motivate it to overcome its internal cleavages and become a constructive political force. Partly as a result of these factors, the FMLN’s transition to a political party worked smoothly even in the absence of sizable financial compensations. Michael Allison calls the FMLN’s transition into a political party one of the “most enduring legacies” of the Chapultepec Accords (2006: 145). As a result, the elections took place in an environment of effective competition and endowed the FMLN with a real perspective for continuing as a political party and defeat the incumbent government at the ballot-box in the near future.

Overall, the FMLN’s exclusion from power was less pronounced than it was the case for RENAMO in Mozambique. The former rebel group maintained a strong base of popular support from left-wing and center-left voters (Azpuru 2010: 129) and could therefore hope to influence a number of core policies in its own favor. In the short run, it tried to use ARENA’s lack of an absolute majority in the parliament for engaging in political deals with the ruling party, but ARENA found ways to marginalize the FMLN’s influence in the parliament (see Holiday 2005: 79). However, in the long run the FMLN counted on the ballot-box as the vehicle to power (see e.g. Wantchekon 1999: 819). Unlike RENAMO in Mozambique, the FMLN could steadily improve its performance in the national and local elections in the years following the 1994 elections and therefore gained more influence in the polity over time (Azpuru 2010: 129). This strengthened its conviction of being able to gain power through formal-constitutional means at some point in the future. Already in the elections to the legislative assembly 2000, the FMLN gained a majority of votes although it failed to win the presidential race. This was a shock to ARENA, which subsequently tried to engage in “perverse political trade-offs” with the smaller opposition parties in order to reduce the FMLN’s influence to a minimum (Holiday 2005: 79). However, ARENA’s strategy of discrediting the FMLN and portraying it as a party that “simply cannot be reasoned with” (Holiday 2005: 80) has not worked out in the long run. Though ARENA could once again win the presidential elections in 2004, the FMLN’s candidate Salvador Sánchez Cerén won the 2009 presidential race (Azpuru 2010; Colburn 2009; Greene and Keogh 2009). This successful completion of what Samuel Huntington called the “two-turnover test” (1991) was widely considered a remarkable achievement whose “greatest
significance is likely to be that they mark the country’s first peaceful turnover of power since the nation-state became independent in 1821” (Colburn 2009: 144).

In sum, the case of El Salvador therefore confirms that patience in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities may pay off in the long run. Arguably, the FMLN’s constructive stance can be explained in great part by its improving electoral prospects. Though fifteen years have passed between the end of the civil war and the FMLN’s capture of power, its steady improvement of election results has certainly prevented the party from relying on more informal and unconstitutional means of political competition.

c) Threats from Within

Due to the parties’ constructive stance in El Salvador, the country was not exposed to direct political threats and has not faced severe political crises in the post-conflict phase. However, there have been a number of potentially destabilizing developments with the potential to threaten the stability of the polity as a whole, most notably the alarming crime rates and the rising political apathy associated with it.

In post-conflict El Salvador, ordinary (i.e. non-political) crime has become a major threat to the continued democratic consolidation. El Salvador is the country of origin for youth gangs like the ‘Mara Salvatrucha’, which are characterized by an extremely high level of violence and have spread over all large parts of Latin America in the past years (Zinecker 2004: 163). These gangs have contributed to an environment in which the use of deadly force has become ubiquitous over time. In the mid-nineties, the number of homicides was three times as high as during the civil war. El Salvador today still counts as the second most violent country in Latin America after Colombia (Reiber 2009: 256). Zinecker makes the argument that the threat of being shot is today much more present in the life’s of Salvadorans than it was during the civil war (2004: 163–165). This has turned out as a severe threat to democratic consolidation and, according to Reiber, has caused a retreat into private affairs that tends to hamper the ability for political interest articulation (2009: 206).

External actors have largely ignored this aspect or were at least unaware of its potentially dangerous effects on democratic consolidation. As Charles T. Call highlights, “[t]he crime wave underlies the most provocative aspect of El Salvador’s police and justice reforms: international observers consider them a success story, but Salvadoreans are far less enthusiastic.” For him, this is a clear indicator for the “divergent interests between international actors and citizens of post-conflict societies” (2003: 829). The long term effects of this crime wave on democratic consolidation may be detrimental. In a public opinion survey conducted in 1999, more than half of the respondents considered the high crime rates a reason for abolishing democracy and introducing a more rigid system of rule – more than twice as many as for any other reason mentioned (see Call 2003: 828). This

For a detailed characterization of youth gangs in Latin America, see in particular Huhn, Oettler, and Peetz (2010).
Chapter 5 ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities

gave rise to a growing political apathy among Salvadorans. Since the ‘elections of the century’ in 1994, voter abstention has frequently reached levels of 60 percent and more. This can be seen as an indicator for a low inclusiveness of the political regime, but also generally pulls the legitimacy of the election results into question (see Zinecker 2004: 132).

In sum, despite the constructive relations prevailing in El Salvador, the country faces a number of challenges with the potential to become threats to the process of democratic consolidation – most notably the pervasive crime rates. Already now, this has undermined both the meaning of democracy in the eyes of Salvadorans and its substantive importance. A closing of political space and a move towards more authoritarian politics – as favored by many Salvadorans – would certainly be the wrong signal to deal with this problem. Ultimately, the presence of electoral competition in which both of the former conflict parties face a realistic chance of winning future elections has been a major source for political stability in El Salvador in the past (see above). Gradually doing away with these opportunities would certainly create new political tensions as it would imply the effective diminishing of electoral opportunities for either of the two factions.

d) Promoting Good Governance

With respect to external attempts for promoting good governance in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities I assumed above that external actors are more likely to focus on the realm of policies rather than politics (‘apolitical intervention’) and that their obsession with the achievements in the realm of formal democracy prevents them from recognizing potential threats and dangers to democratic consolidation (‘euphemistic blindness’). The case of El Salvador generally confirms these two stipulations. By placing an overly strong focus on political stability and the adoption of the ‘right’ policies, external actors have overlooked a number of shortcomings in El Salvador’s democratization process. In addition, by concentrating exclusively on the positive aspects of El Salvador’s post-conflict reconstruction process, they were in part unable to recognize dangerous or detrimental developments and react accordingly.

The first aspect – the apolitical engagement by external actors – was as pronounced in El Salvador as in Mozambique. Broadly speaking, it can be argued that external actors (and, among them, the United States in particular) were less concerned about fostering a thorough democratization of Salvadoran politics than about ensuring that the government neatly complied with external actors’ policy agendas. As James K. Boyce suggests, international donors have “for the most part limited their purview to more conventional macroeconomic concerns [. . . ]” and have “not extended their conditionalities to the peace process, for example, by setting targets for greater reallocation of government spending to programs mandated by the Peace Accords” (1995: 2109). This has mainly expressed itself in the imposition of pro-market policies. The United States have invested billions of dollars throughout the 1980s in order to prevent El Salvador from being ruled by a
Socialist government, and even after the end of the Cold War they have exhibited little enthusiasm for the perspective of a left-wing government being in place that rejected its policy prescriptions. As David Holiday puts it, “[w]hat really seems to matter for US officials is less the redemptive idea of free elections than the electoral dominance of a conservative political project keenly attuned to America’s global priorities” (2005: 77).

With ARENA, such a ‘political project’ was in place. As Boyce writes, there has been “a close correspondence between the macroeconomic policy preferences of the Government of El Salvador and those of the donors […]” at least since ARENA took power in 1989: “Both parties favored government budget deficit reduction, low inflation, privatization of the financial sector and of agricultural exports, trade liberalization, and streamlining of the state” (1995: 2108). ARENA was extremely loyal to the United States and supported the country in key foreign policy issues, not least by deploying troops to Iraq (see Holiday 2005: 79). International Financial Institutions needed to apply little ‘strong-arm diplomacy’ (Holiday 2005: 78) (i.e. tying the disbursement of loans to tight conditions) in order to see its liberalization agenda implemented in El Salvador. For instance, the country was the first of the six signatory nations to both ratify and implement the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) (see Madrid 2009: 189). This fostered El Salvador’s reputation as “the clear leader in Central America in pushing for free trade initiatives” (Holiday 2005: 79). Hence, external actors could be highly satisfied with ARENA’s governance performance. Its neat compliance with the external policy prescriptions naturally induced the United States to develop a certain bias for the incumbent government, which undermined the democratization agenda. At times, it even proved questionable whether the US would “tolerate a leftist, or even a moderate, social democratic government that pursued policies somewhat more independent of Washington […]” (Holiday 2005: 81). The US themselves fueled such doubts when US officials, concerned about a possible victory of the FMLN, warned Salvadorians of the negative consequences for the bilateral relations with the United States. Roger Noriega, then Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs under president George W. Bush, addressed the Salvadoran people and underlined that the United States “[…] know the history of this political movement, and for this reason it is fair that the Salvadoran people consider what type of relations a new government could have with us” (quoted in Reiber 2009: 234). As Reiber comments, these threats stood in stark contrast to the

---

16 DR-CAFTA is a free-trade agreement modeled according to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which aims at fostering the free flow of goods and services between the signatory countries. According to Cori Madrid, the benefits for El Salvador, which has enjoyed a privileged access to the US market already before the agreement, are dubious. She shows that the agreement is likely to harm El Salvador’s agricultural sector and further increase its trade deficit with the United States, thereby risking to deepen rather than diminish poverty in El Salvador. She explains El Salvador’s strong support for the agreement because of the potential benefits to be expected for a small but influential fraction of society: the Transnational Capital Class (TCC): “Because of their interest in productive processes that take place on a global level, they serve to benefit from this agreement despite the fact that CAFTA-DR will likely destroy what little remains of a Salvadoran productive structure” (2009: 208).
democratic spirit of the peace agreement and the rhetoric of democratization put forward by external actors (2009: 235).\textsuperscript{17}

Another example can be seen in the fact that the United States strongly argued in favor of channeling the vast majority of aid through the government (instead of NGOs), dispersing fears that this may lead to a neglect of the population in formerly rebel-held territories (see Boyce 1995: 2107). It is questionable whether, in the case of an FMLN-controlled government, their preference would have been the same. However, it must also be noted that external actors’ ability for imposing ‘strong-arm diplomacy’ has eroded over time. Observers agree that since the 1994 elections, “[t]he international community’s ability to exercise influence and offer incentives has […] diminished” (Thale 1997: 199; see also Boyce 1995; Reiber 2009). This had the effect that external actors not only ignored shortcomings regarding the implementation of the peace agreement or El Salvador’s general democratization process, but that they were at times unable to induce change in the Salvadoran polity even if they wanted to (see Reiber 2009: 222). One blatant example is ARENA’s unwillingness to implement a series of electoral reforms that were suggested in order to prevent the occurrence of electoral irregularities in future elections. Although it would have been easy for ARENA to pass the required laws – it lacked only three votes in the National Assembly for an absolute majority – it refused to do so (see Thale 1997: 199).\textsuperscript{18}

As in Mozambique, the problem of ‘euphemistic blindness’ has additionally hampered the promotion of good governance principles also in El Salvador. Soon after the 1994 elections, international attention quickly moved elsewhere “although some important elements of the peace process were still unfinished […]” (Thale 1997: 198). External actors hailed the country as a clear success case of post-conflict peacebuilding. This enthusiasm does not come as a surprise when taking El Salvador’s encouraging post-conflict development into account. There is no doubt that El Salvador today is “far more democratic” than ever before (Stanley 2006: 112). However, external actors’ overly positive assessment of El Salvador’s achievements was sometimes exaggerated. For instance, the Bush administration hailed El Salvador as a role model for the democratization of Iraq and Afghanistan (Holiday 2005: 77). Aside from the fact that these cases are absolutely not comparable,\textsuperscript{19} this anecdote illustrates that external actors were unable or unwilling...

\textsuperscript{17}In the German original: “Diese Drohungen standen in völligem Widerspruch zu jahrelangen internationalen Bemühungen um eine Demokratisierung der salvadorianischen Politik, um eine Verbreitung demokratischer Praktiken und eine Förderung demokratischer Werte.”

\textsuperscript{18}In this context, Boyce speaks of a “reverse leverage” that ARENA could exert on external actors because the United States were keen on preventing a Socialist government by all means during the war (1995: 2112). All in all, ARENA’s neat compliance with external policy preferences speaks against generally stipulating that the government possessed strong reverse leverage \textit{vis-à-vis} external actors in the post-conflict period. As argued in chapter 7, reverse leverage plays a much stronger role in cases of partisan engagement, which was not the case in post-conflict El Salvador.

\textsuperscript{19}As Holiday comments: “That the Bush administration has consistently relied on El Salvador – an otherwise insignificant country in the United States’ ‘backyard’ – as a singular case of success might be interpreted as a sign of weakness for the administration’s argument” (2005: 77).
to recognize the dangers and potential threats that became apparent in El Salvador’s post- 
conflict development. Their inclination to conceive success in a rather one-dimensional 
manner (that is, focusing exclusively on elections and the subsequent implementation of 
liberal policies) caused them to overlook the deficits existing in other dimensions, for 
instance justice, poverty reduction, public security, inclusiveness of the regime, and the like. 
Critical observers maintain strong doubts about the success of the liberalization policies 
and the quality of Salvadoran democracy as a whole. As in Mozambique, the presence of 
high growth rates has had little effects with regard to alleviating mass poverty. As Holiday 
explicates:

“One of the lowest tax rates in the hemisphere and a growing fiscal and trade deficit, 
combined with the state’s overall underinvestment in public needs, have resulted in 
negligible gains on many social and economic fronts and leave formidable challenges 
for the near future” (Holiday 2005: 81).

A complete collapse of the Salvadoran economy is only prevented due to the vast volume 
of money transferred by emigrated Salvadorans to their families in the form of remittances, 
which by far overshadows the importance of foreign investment or official aid (see Reiber 
2009: 223). Therefore, it is fair to say that “[m]igration and remittances have arguably 
done more to ensure El Salvador’s economic stability than any measure taken by the state” 
(Holiday 2005: 82). In conjunction, these factors have the potential to erode some of the 
achievements reached since the adoption of the peace agreement in El Salvador. Already 
two years after the ‘elections of the century’ a majority of Salvadorans expressed the need 
for a ‘strongman’ to solve the country’s problems (see Call 2002).

Other problems arise as a result of the incomplete separation of powers, which becomes 
most evident with regard to the weak standing of the rule of law. During most of El 
Salvador’s history, courts have been highly politicized and have systematically played the 
role as the right hand of the incumbent regime. In the peace agreement, not more than 
half a page was dedicated to the reform of this sector, containing only vague provisions 
(see Zinecker 2004: 149–150). According to Charles T. Call, “[t]he judicial reforms in the 
accords were agreed upon in a hurried fashion during the final stales of negotiations […]” 
(2002: 407). Although, since the peace agreement, the members of the national court of 
justice are no longer elected by a simple majority but by a two-thirds qualified majority of 
the votes in the national assembly (and hence, in most cases, the approval of the opposition), 
ARENA could circumvent the effectiveness of this provision by effectively buying the 
support from the Christian Democrats (PDC) in return for positions in the government 
(Zinecker 2004: 150–151). This eroded Salvadorans’ confidence in this institution, which 
had ranked “near the bottom of public regard for state institutions” in public opinion polls 
conducted in 1996 and 1997 (see Call 2002: 408).

In sum, external actors’ hailing of achievements in the realm of formal democracy and 
their low priority for a deep-rooted democratization process have led to a blossoming of new
problems and challenges – among them the rising socio-economic exclusion of large parts
of the population and the weak standing of the judiciary vis-à-vis the other powers. This
has helped to create an environment that may turn out as a threat to democracy as a whole in
the long run. Though this aspect is much less pronounced than in Mozambique, observers
of the Salvadoran case frequently warn us that challenges such as the blatant deficits in
public security may erode the basis on which democracy rests. Call, for instance, reminds
us that “justice and security are tremendously important for the survival of democracy and
its relevance for everyday life” (2003: 828). Currently, democracy is certainly not very
much at risk in El Salvador. The FMLN’s recent victory in the elections is an important
turning point with the potential to break political apathy and renew Salvadorans’ belief in
democracy as a whole. However, whether or not these effects are short-term, temporary
measures or may have a long term effect will mainly depend on the FMLN’s ability to
address many of the country’s most blatant problems.

5.4 ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities: Conclusions

The two cases discussed as examples for ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities illustrate that
the optimistic attitude external observers often have with respect to this polity type is not
unfounded. Both Mozambique and El Salvador have remained peaceful for a period of
more than fifteen years by now. In both cases, recourse to large-scale organized violence
appears highly unrealistic. However, the case studies have also demonstrated that even this
polity type may become subject to ‘threats from within’ with the potential to lead to more
confrontational relations over time. Overall, the cases suggest the following conclusions
with respect to the four analytical dimensions of analysis (for a short summary, see 5.1 on
page 199):

First, both cases support the theoretical argument that ‘Let the Winner Take it All’
polities provide an environment in which overcoming commitment problems is possible
as long as external actors provide sufficient security guarantees and effectively bridge
the asymmetry that naturally prevails between the parties in this polity type. Unlike in
‘Let’s Share’ polities, where both parties have a certain control over the means of coercion,
complying with disarmament implies that one party entirely loses its means of coercion
and hence its bargaining power vis-à-vis its opponents. In Mozambique, this induced
the parties to retain ‘reserve military forces’ and caused the disarmament process to take
slightly longer than expected. However, the parties soon gave up these ‘virtual cooperation’
gestures. After the international community had taken decisive measures to bridge the
asymmetry by enabling RENAMO to successfully compete against FRELIMO in the
elections, the former rebel group became fully constructive. A similar outcome could be
observed in El Salvador. Although both parties had entered peace negotiations and agreed
to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force even before signing a formal ceasefire
agreement, they were reluctant to comply with their disarmament obligations and the
5.4 ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities: Conclusions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>El Salvador</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment Problems</td>
<td>Asymmetry between the parties caused problems in the disarmament process; security guarantees and ‘war fatigue’ induced the parties to comply with their obligations; external actors were key for bridging the political asymmetries by propping up RENAMO and giving it a realistic perspective in the upcoming elections.</td>
<td>Elites were highly reluctant to comply with disarmament obligations and the reform of the security sector; despite its constructive stance the FMLN maintained secret arms caches as a life insurance in case the peace falls apart; large public support for the rebel group reduced the necessity for external actors to bridge the asymmetry between the parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Competition</td>
<td>External actors were key for supporting RENAMO’s transition from a rebel group to a political party; close outcome of the elections encouraged RENAMO to seek its chances in subsequent elections; accusations about electoral fraud caused increasing tensions among the former belligerents and induced RENAMO to call for political reforms and closer external scrutiny; so far patience has not paid off for RENAMO.</td>
<td>Strong public support encouraged the FMLN to seek its chances in subsequent elections; ARENA tried to strengthen its position by keeping the FMLN out of all decision-making processes; FMLN won presidential elections after fifteen years in opposition, illustrating that patience may pay off in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats from Within</td>
<td>Relations between the former belligerents become tenser with RENAMO’s diminishing prospects of gaining power; occasional outbursts of election related violence; RENAMO makes use of rhetorical saber rattling gestures (‘virtual confrontation’) but always comes back to constructive stance.</td>
<td>No imminent threat to stability; FMLN has no reason to seek informal channels of political competition; creeping developments (youth violence and rising political apathy) have the potential to undermine the success of democratic consolidation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Governance</td>
<td>External actors maintain trust in popularly elected government; bias for seemingly apolitical forms of intervention (capacity building and liberalization policies); problem of ‘euphemistic blindness’ prevents external actors from reacting to the gradual hollowing-out of democratic principles.</td>
<td>ARENA was a ‘donor darling’ government that neatly complied with external policy prescriptions; external actors (especially US) had a tacit preference for ARENA and favored stability at the expense of democracy; problem of ‘euphemistic blindness’ induces external actors to overlook pressing problems in the realm of economics and justice.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: Dynamics of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities

provisions regarding the reform of the security sector contained in the peace agreement. In addition, the FMLN maintained secret arms caches, ostensibly as a life-insurance in case peace falls apart. However, after these were discovered the party became fully cooperative and committed to the disarmament program. External actors played an important role as facilitators of the agreement but there was less necessity for hard security guarantees (as embodied by a strong peacekeeping force) as in Mozambique.

Second, the cases support the argument that both sides need to have realistic chances for winning the elections in the initiation phase of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities. The
Chapter 5 ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities

central feature of this polity type is that the excluded party accept the status quo although it does not participate in the government itself. In order to maintain its constructive stance, it is necessary that the excluded party continues to have realistic chances of gaining power through the ballot box at some point in the future. The rationale of the excluded parties in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities is that ‘patience pays off’. It is therefore crucial for the establishment of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities that political competition is initially carried out on a level playing field. Ensuring this level playing field required a significant engagement of external actors in both cases. In Mozambique, they were key for endowing RENAMO with the ability to successfully compete against FRELIMO in the elections by supporting its transition from a rebel group to a political party. These efforts were generally successful, which is illustrated by the close outcome of the 1994 elections. Due to Mozambique’s centralized system of rule, FRELIMO’s victory manifested RENAMO’s total exclusion from governmental power. Yet, the former rebel group fared better than expected and faced realistic chances of gaining power in subsequent elections. However, throughout the ensuing years it became increasingly questionable whether political competition really took place on a level playing field. The 1999 elections took place amidst signs for electoral fraud, which clearly pulled FRELIMO’s close victory into question. The situation was similar in El Salvador, where the FMLN could compete against the government-side at eye level. Thanks to a less centralized political system, the former rebel group’s exclusion from governmental power was much less pronounced than in the case of Mozambique. Due to its strong degree of popular support and its good showing in the elections, the FMLN could be confident about its future perspectives as a political party. Though ARENA used all legal means in order to curtail the FMLN’s political influence and keep the party out of decision-making processes on all levels, it could not prevent the party from gradually gaining political influence. The former rebel group won a majority of seats in the parliament in 2000 and the presidential race in 2009. Hence, for the FMLN patience has really paid off in the end.

Third, the cases confirm that ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities may experience a worsening of political tensions if it turns out that patience may not pay off for the excluded party in the end. This has mainly become apparent in Mozambique, where RENAMO experienced a painful loss in the elections in 1999 and 2004 and accused the government of having forged the election results. For short periods, the party fell back to informal and unconstitutional means of political competition, which became most clearly apparent by RENAMO’s claim to establish a parallel government in the RENAMO-controlled areas. Ostensibly, these measures served the purpose of underlining its own power vis-à-vis the government, and possibly also of wielding concessions from the ruling party. However, the party never went beyond these ‘saber rattling’ gestures and generally remained a constructive force. In El Salvador, there was no need to engage in informal and unconstitutional means of political competition since the FMLN could steadily improve its electoral performance. Threats there have arisen mainly as a result of ordinary (non-
police) crime, which has reached alarming proportions. This has entailed the risk of gradually undermining the constructive foundations of this polity-type as more and more citizens appear willing to accept a more authoritarian system as long as it is capable to improve the situation. The next elections will show in how far a post-conflict country like El Salvador is able to deal with this problem.

Finally, the cases illustrate that ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities offer a good pretext for external actors to confine their engagement to apolitical aspects and to refrain from direct confrontations with the government. Although, overall, ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities offer a favorable environment for promoting good governance, this can potentially hamper actual attempts to push for stricter good governance standards. In Mozambique, external actors hailed the peaceful conduct of the 1994 elections as a show-case of successful post-conflict reconstruction and withdrew from the country within a few months after the elections. However, unlike in power-sharing polities, the presence of an elected government that was even accepted by its former enemies ostensibly induced external actors to conclude that the polity was instantly self-sustaining. As a consequence, external actors mainly concentrated on imposing liberalization policies and capacity building programs while at the same time overlooking some of the more fundamental developments taking place below the facade of the ‘poster child’ case. Most notably, they have done little to counter the gradual hollowing-out of democratic principles or the pressing poverty problems the country faces despite its tremendous growth figures. El Salvador offers a similar picture. More than in Mozambique, external actors (most notably the United States) maintained a clear preference for ARENA in the post-conflict phase, although this was clearly below the level of a partisan engagement. Their preference was fostered by the latter’s willful compliance with external policy preferences in the realm of economic liberalization. This seemingly ‘apolitical’ intervention often had tremendous political effects and put tremendous pressure on the government. At the same time, external actors have avoided to become involved in more political issues or call for a fair manner of political competition.
Chapter 6

‘The Winner Took it All’ Polities

‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, discussed in the previous chapter, are characterized by comparatively constructive relations maintained by former warring parties, despite the fact that only one of them is part of the government. This is a relatively uncommon constellation. Far more frequent are cases in which political domination by one of the warring parties occurs in an environment of mistrust, suspicion and sometimes even open hostility. Two different kinds of this constellation can be distinguished: Situations of obstructive domination in which external parties intervene in a mediative manner, and situations of obstructive domination in which external actors intervene in a partisan manner. The former type, called ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities, is discussed in this chapter, the latter type (‘You Stay Out’ polities) is discussed in the subsequent chapter.

The by far greatest share of all post-conflict polity cases in the sample (in total nine cases) fall under the ‘The Winner Took it All’ type: Cambodia (after the 1993 elections), Côte D’Ivoire (the period between the adoption of the ‘Linas-Marcoussis Agreement’ of January 2003 and the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement of March 2007), Sierra Leone (the period starting with the election of May 2002), the DRC (the period following Joseph Kabila’s election for president in 2006), Haiti (the period between Aristide’s downfall and the elections in 2006), Angola (since 2002), Tajikistan (between 1996 and 2001) and two Liberian cases (the period of Charles Taylor’s presidency and the situation after the elections in 2006) (see table A.1 on page 327). The reign of Charles Taylor in Liberia, and the case of Côte d’Ivoire are discussed in detail in this chapter because, in combination, they provide the best fit to the case selection criteria formulated in section 1.4.2. Sierra Leone, the DRC, Tajikistan and the second Liberian case were dismissed from the outset because other post-conflict periods of these countries were already used for illustrating the dynamics of other polity types. Angola after the assassination of Jonas Savimbi is not a typical case because the opposition much weaker than in the other cases (see A.2.3). As two non-African cases, Haiti or Cambodia could have been used in order to fulfill the criterion of ensuring geographical variety, but in comparison in turned out that Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire were more representative of the ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity type. ¹ Hence,

¹Although Cambodia is classified as an instance of the ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity type, certain doubts remained about the classification of external engagement as mediative; therefore the case cannot be used
in this case, the ‘typical case’ criterion took precedence over the principle of ensuring geographic variety.

6.1 A basic model of ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polities

The basic features of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities are schematically sketched in figure 6.1 on page 205. The figure illustrates that only one party (‘Side A’) controls the government while the other is effectively excluded from access to government authority. However, unlike in the case of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities discussed in the previous chapter, the former warring parties maintain obstructive relations, which indicates that a basic consensus among the parties about the distribution of formal authority is lacking and that the Side B contests the legitimacy of Side A governing alone. This is illustrated by the thick black line dividing the warring parties. External actors have a mediative and non-discriminatory influence on the dynamics unfolding between the warring parties (as illustrated by the arrow connecting external actors and the dashed line around the former belligerents).

Based on that, a number of assumptions can be made with respect to the internal dynamics of this polity type. In principle, the obstructive relations between the former belligerents suggest that the parties are unlikely to engage in genuine cooperation. We can expect the relations between the former warring parties to range from ‘virtual cooperation’ to outright hostility. The government-side is most likely eager to defend its position of dominance by all means, while the excluded parties usually conceive the government’s rule as illegitimate and therefore try to overcome their marginalization in the polity by all means. In this obstructive environment, external actors can be expected to face a similar dilemma as in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities. There, it was argued that this polity type requires significant external efforts for securing the post-conflict order, but it was also demonstrated that external actors are often unwilling or incapable of engaging in genuine enforcement efforts. Instead, their engagement is more adequately described as a ‘virtual enforcement’ effort, indicating that external actors concentrate on a few visible milestones of their statebuilding agenda without cross checking what occurs behind this seemingly democratic facade. In ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities we can expect a similar pattern of external engagement. The obstructive relations prevailing between the former belligerents in conjunction with the thorough exclusion of one of the former conflict parties from access to governmental power potentially leads to tensions which require a decisive intervention by external actors in order to prevent a relapse into violence or large-scale human rights abuses. Given the constraints external actors are exposed to themselves, it may often be

as an unequivocal ‘The Winner Took it All’ case (see A.5.3). The second post-conflict period in Haiti cannot be considered a typical ‘Doomed to Share’ case either because it was triggered by a political crisis rather than a large-scale armed conflict. Although there were riots which qualified the case as an instance of a minor armed conflict, this is not a typical constellation for ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities (see A.11.1).
the case that they lack both the willingness and the ability to successfully perform this role. Two reasons may account for this. First, the existence of a formal settlement between the parties and the existence of a formal government that, at least formally, enjoys international legitimacy and recognition gives external actors a pretext to reduce their support. Second, the ruling party puts additional pressure on external actors to withdraw or to refrain from infringing with domestic affairs. As a result, there is a strong impetus for winding down external support at a relatively early stage. These mechanisms are now illustrated in more detail for the four analytical dimensions.

**Overcoming Commitment Problems.** Just as ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities are necessarily asymmetrical. The parties standing outside of the government are excluded from all benefits and privileges associated with the control of the state apparatus. More importantly even, they have no control of the formal means of coercion, including the security forces and the army. Due to the obstructive relations prevailing between the former warring parties, this is likely to hamper attempts to overcome commitment problems entirely. Though external actors can potentially provide security guarantees for the excluded parties and hence can help to overcome some of the structural problems that tend to hamper a full cooperation between the belligerents, a thorough disarmament process is most likely doomed to failure because the excluded parties have no motivation to disarm. Knowing that external actors cannot remain engaged in the country eternally, the opposition must fear being exposed to one-sided acts of violence by the
Chapter 6 ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polities

ruling party. In addition, realistic prospects for gaining power through peaceful means (as it is the case in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities) are lacking. As a result, there is hardly any real perspective for commitment problems to be overcome in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities. The parties are highly unlikely to fulfill their obligations with regard to aspects such as disarmament, demobilization or the formation of a joined army. More than it is the case in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities, the parties – in particular those excluded from formal authority – are likely to openly resist their disarmament obligations because they do not even have to maintain a veil of cooperation. This may give rise to a pattern of ‘genuine confrontation’ to external disarmament efforts. However, it is also conceivable that the parties make use of ‘foot dragging’ and ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies, in particular if they count on mobilizing greater external support for their cause. This may give rise to attempts by which the parties try to meet part of their disarmament requirements without giving away any real share of power. For instance, the former rebel groups may decide to hand in spare weapons of poor quality and use the money of the disarmament program in order to acquire newer weapons elsewhere.

Manner of Political Competition. As noted above, the manner of political competition in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities is characterized by the perceived lack of a real perspective for the excluded party to gain power through democratic means and/or the impatience to attempt to do so. Unlike in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, where both parties accept the status quo and engage in competition for future political power out of the conviction that ‘patience pays off’, a basic consensus about who governs is lacking in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities. The excluded party perceives the government’s rule as illegitimate and its own exclusion from power as unfair. As a result, it strives for changing the distribution of power in its own favor as soon as possible. This almost necessarily amounts to the use of informal instruments of political competition, for instance attempts to mobilize public opinion against the government with which the excluded parties try to unmask the government’s authoritarian tendencies and by which they aim at underlining the government’s lack of legitimacy. These attempts ultimately address external actors in the hope that they decide to support the opposition’s cause. The government, in turn, can be expected to use its control of the state apparatus in order to constrain the opposition’s room for maneuver. However, although the government is in a strong position and does not necessarily need external actors’ ongoing support, it has to prevent external actors from identifying with the goals of the opposition and, most importantly, prevent them from switching to a partisan manner of engagement in favor of the opposition parties. Instead of openly devoting itself to an authoritarian mode of governance, the ruling party is therefore likely to symbolically adopt a number of democratic gestures with which it masks its exclusive hold on power. This may include farce elections or symbolic attempts to include opposition members into the government, but also ‘foot dragging’ strategies with which the government tries to appease external actors without complying with their
6.1 A basic model of ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polities

democratization requests. At the same time, the government can be expected to likewise make use of ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies with the aim of portraying the opposition as a source of instability and as a potential spoiler to the peace process. This ultimately serves as a pretext for justifying its strong hold on power and, in some cases, even to legitimize repressions or measures of one-sided violence against the political opposition.

**Threats from Within.** Since, for the opposition, the route to power through formal elections is a distant and uncertain perspective, we can expect them to fall back to other means for gaining power. This may range from peaceful means, for instance attempts to mobilize popular opinion against the government, to violent means, including preparations for another armed insurgency. For the government, the excluded opposition may easily become a threat to its hold on power. Its attempts to mobilize domestic and international opinion against the ruling regime could theoretically deprive it of its public support and spur resistance against its rule. Hence, from the perspective of the regime, a free press and an independent sphere of civil society may become a dangerous instrument of political mobilization with the potential to weaken its power. As a result, the government is likely to apply various measures to restrict the opposition’s sphere of influence and establish a tight control of the political space. However, with the frustration about its own exclusion rising over time, it cannot be ruled out that the excluded parties attempt to secretly re-arm and start another insurgency against the government. This gives rise to even more questionable and informal attempts to contain or even destroy the opposition and may generally lead to a (re-)militarization of politics.

**Promoting Good Governance.** With respect to promoting good governance principles, ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities pose a particularly difficult environment. Most importantly, the ambiguity between external actors’ claims and their achievements is likely to be significant. The following considerations can be expected to play a role. In general, given their mediative stance, we can expect external actors to have a genuine interest in the promotion of good governance and democracy. This distinguishes this polity type from ‘You Stay Out’ polities discussed in the next chapter, where external actors’ interest in stability overrides their preference for democracy. However, the far-reaching exclusion of the opposition parties in conjunction with the prevailing obstructive relations poses an imminent threat to stability and bears the potential for tensions to become violent. This requires significant stabilization efforts by external actors and potentially even a long-lasting military engagement. Based on the assumption that external actors shy away from costly and long-lasting engagements, it is questionable whether they are able and willing to commit the necessary resources that a thorough stabilization of the situation would require. In addition, we can expect the incumbent government to underline its sovereignty and to exert pressure on external actors to withdraw in order to avoid a too strong involvement into external affairs. This can facilitate many different outcomes, but as a general rule it seems
fair to assume that genuine successes in the realm of democratization are highly unlikely. In cases where external actors are reluctant to commit the necessary resources or where they give in to pressure to withdraw, the most likely result is a serious deterioration of domestic governance, possibly masked by thin veil of democratic politics. Where external willingness to remain involved is higher, a halfhearted peacebuilding approach may emerge in which external actors remain physically present but fail to address the main challenges in an adequate manner.

6.2 Liberia

Liberia is a country with an unusual history, because it is one of the few African countries that has never been formally colonized. It was founded by former slaves returning from the United States to the African continent and gained the status of an independent republic in 1847. Descendants of the initial American settlers formed a specific class, the so-called Americo-Liberians, which dominated the country’s political life for more than a century. Although being a small minority – today they comprise not more than four percent of the population – these settlers regarded themselves as a superior and more ‘civilized’ class, which found its expression in the establishment of an autocratic system that greatly benefited members of the Americo-Liberian elite and systematically excluded indigenous Liberians from political and economic participation (see e.g. Adeleke 1995: 572; Ellis 1995; [1999] 2007; Huband 1998; Outram 1999: 164). Their reign lasted until 1980, when a young army officer called Samuel Doe overthrew the last Americo-Liberian president, William Tolbert, in a violent coup and established an autocratic system that lasted for roughly one decade. Doe, who could neither read nor write, built a regime that benefited his own ethnic tribe, the Krahn, and violently suppressed dissent or opposition (see e.g. Ellis [1999] 2007; Huband 1998: 27–44; Reno 1999: 86; Sawyer 2004). His rule was “bathed in blood from the day it started” (Huband 1998: xvii).2

Doe’s rule constitutes the immediate context for the civil war that broke out in Liberia in 1989.3 Its main protagonist was Charles Taylor, a former member of Doe’s cabinet, who was exiled from Liberia after having allegedly diverted $900,000 of Liberian government funds in 1983 (Ellis 1999: 52–53).4 He returned to the region in the late 1980s and

---

2 Doe and his cronies immediately executed incumbent President William Tolbert and most of his ministers on Monrovia’s ‘golden beach’, broadcasting the massacre live on television (Huband 1998: xvii).

3 Liberia has experienced two civil wars since the end of the Cold War. The transitional government (NTGL) established after the termination of the second civil war is discussed as an example for a ‘Doomed to Share’ polity in the appendix.

4 As a consequence of his alleged diversion of government funds, Taylor was detained in the United States (where he had also studied), but was able to escape to Ghana and, later, Burkina Faso, where he joined a group of exiled Liberians and nationals of other West African countries formed around veterans of the failed coup attempt against Doe led by Thomas Quiwonkpa in 1985 (see Ellis 1999: 67–69). This multinational group formed the basis of the NPFL, kept together by the determination to finally defeat Doe (Ellis 1999: 67–69; see also Sesay 1996b: 395–396).
formed a rebel group, the ‘National Patriotic Front for Liberia’ (NPFL), which launched an attack against Doe’s government forces on Christmas Eve 1989 (see e.g. Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 180; Gershoni 1997: 55). Doe was overthrown and killed by a NPFL splinter-group in 1990, and Taylor was, from this moment on, celebrated as a liberator who freed Liberia from Doe’s illicit system of rule (Ellis 1995: 167; see also Harris 1999; Sesay 1996a: 36). However, since the NPFL failed to gain control of the capital, the civil war lasted for another six years. A decisive intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), led by Nigeria, prevented Taylor from seizing Monrovia (see e.g. Adeleke 1995; Berman and Labonte 2006). Nonetheless, he managed to establish control over large portions of Liberian territory in the following five years – an area that was popularly referred to as ‘Taylorland’ or ‘Greater Liberia’ (Reno 1999: 92). To counterbalance the fact that he was not head of state (and hence did not have access to official state resources), Taylor imposed a tight political and administrative system in the areas he controlled and engaged in various illicit activities in order to finance his war activities (see Reno 1999: 92–93; 2004).

There were numerous attempts to solve this war through power-sharing arrangements. Various transitional governments were established between 1990 and 1996, but none of them contributed to a settlement of the conflict (see Sesay et al. 2009: 39). Peace became for the first time conceivable with the adoption of the ‘Abuja Accords’ (see Government of the Republic of Liberia 1995) and the ‘Supplement to the Abuja Accords’ (see Government of the Republic of Liberia 1996) in 1995 and 1996, respectively. They cleared the way for national elections to be held in 1997. Surprisingly, the warlord Charles Taylor yielded a sweeping victory in the polls and became Liberia’s official head of state (see Harris 1999). However, he created an exclusive regime that soon raised resistance from opposition groups and, ultimately, triggered another armed insurgency in the country. Not more than two years after Taylor took office, Liberia found itself in the middle of its second civil war, driven by a newly formed rebel group called LURD (‘Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy’), which was later joined by a group called MODEL (‘Movement for

---

5 Doe was abducted by a group called INPFL (Independent NPFL) shortly after his arrival at the ECOMOG headquarters in Monrovia. A video tape of the later events shows how Doe, nearly naked and tied at his wrists, sits amidst numerous INPFL rebels on the floor, being interrogated by INPFL leader Prince Johnson. Johnson then gives order to torture his ‘prisoner’, which begins by his ears being cut off. He supposedly died from a loss of blood a few hours later (Ellis [1999] 2007: 9–11).

6 These were the Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia (IGNU), founded in August 1990 and led by Prof. Amos Sawyer as the country’s transitional president (Howe 1996: 154); the Liberia National Transitional Government (LNTG), established in the ‘Cotonou Peace Agreement of 25 July 1993 (S/26272), the Liberia National Transitional Government II (LNTG II), established by the ‘Abuja Accords’ of 19 August 1995 (S/1995/742); and the Liberia National Transitional Government III (LNTG III), established in the Supplement to the Abuja Accords, signed on 17 August 1996 (see International Crisis Group 2002a: 36–43 for a chronology of the events in Liberia between 1989 and 2002; see also Korte (1997) for a more detailed description).

7 The latter led to the implementation of a power-sharing government (Liberia National Transitional Government III) that was, compared to earlier agreements, relatively effective (see Outram 1999: 167–169).
Chapter 6 ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polities

Democracy in Liberia’). Taylor’s six years of rule as the Liberian president are discussed here as an instance for a ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity.

6.2.1 Liberia as a ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polity

The polity that emerged with Taylor’s election for president fulfills all characteristics of a ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polity. There is no doubt that his rule was autocratic, repressive and hardly inclusive. Resistance against his rule was pronounced, which accounts for clearly obstructive relations between the former belligerents. External actors’ engagement in this situation was rather ambiguous, since it was – with ECOMOG’s support for the government – highly partisan during the war, but has increasingly leaned towards a mediative manner in the post-conflict period. These features of Liberia’s post-conflict polity are now highlighted in further detail:

Political Domination. With his victory in the 1997 presidential elections, Charles Taylor was able to gain exclusive control of Liberia’s executive and administrative structures. His excellent showing during the polls came as a surprise to many observers, but many explained it retrospectively by his strong position and the relative weakness of all other candidates: A “destitute, starved, and traumatized population recognized that in these conditions it was preferable to vote for the strongman who could defeat the other factions, and perhaps leave Liberians to their own devices to survive” (Reno 2004: 125). This gave him a comparative advantage over other former warring parties, whom he systematically excluded from power. Already during the election campaign, he ran on the cynical slogan “He killed my Ma, he killed my Pa, but I will vote for him” (Outram 1999: 169), leaving no doubt that he was willing to act as a spoiler to the peace process in case Liberians voted for any other candidate (see also Smith and Wiesmann 2003: 2). Members of the Krahn and Mandingo tribes previously aligned with Samuel Doe were the first victims of his repressive policies (see e.g. Mehler 2010: 11; Outram 1999: 170). Taylor’s flimsy attempts to mask his strong hold on power, like his move to include opposition politicians in the government, were interpreted by critics “not as a gesture of reconciliation but as a device to incorporate and stifle the political opposition” (Outram 1999: 169). All in all, ‘Taylor-the-president’ was hardly different from ‘Taylor-the-warlord’ (see e.g. Reno 2002:

---

9The terms Krahn and Mandingo are used to refer to two out of Liberia’s official sixteen ‘tribes’. As the smallest tribe, the Krahn comprise about 5 percent of the population and there are “few political and cultural institutions that unite the various Krahn lineages […] other than the tendency of successive governments to lump them together for administrative convenience” (Ellis [1999] 2007: 33). The Mandingo tribe comprises predominantly Muslims who consider themselves “descendants from an ancient aristocracy of traders and warriors who migrated from the Savannah to the forest area, for whom their possession of Islam is a badge of high status” (Ellis [1999] 2007: 38). In present-day Liberia, “many Liberians persist in regarding Mandingo as outsiders, people who do not belong to Liberia, even when they have lived their for generations” (Ellis [1999] 2007: 39).
His rule was accompanied by marked human rights violations, targeted killings of opposition politicians, and systematic attempts for self-enrichment (see Gberie 2005: 61–62; Outram 1999: 169). As the International Crisis Group remarked:

“From 1997 to 1999 Liberian opposition figures were murdered or threatened into leaving the country, freedom of expression was restricted, the army was not reformed as promised and efforts at genuine reconciliation were half-hearted. Taylor has run the country as a personal fiefdom, and continues to take a cut from the operation of most major businesses” (2002a: 21).

The result was a quickly progressing centralization of the political system, as more and more opposition politicians were forced into exile. This also led to a radicalization of the opposition and gradually set the stage for the resurgence of violence (Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 76). As former interim president Amons Sawyer noted, “[w]ithin a year of targeting those who had fought against him, Taylor had created the conditions for the formation of an armed resistance group, LURD, that operated from bases in the south-eastern forest region of Guinea” (Sawyer 2004: 450). Therefore, Taylor’s six years of rule as Liberia’s official president can be regarded as a blatant case of political domination.

Obstructive Relations. Since the outbreak of the civil war in 1989, the relations between the warring factions had been highly complex and fluid. Unlike in many other armed conflicts where the number of armed factions was small and stable (e.g. Mozambique), the Liberian civil war was characterized by a large and heterogeneous group of factions of which some even changed sides during the war (see Reisinger 2009b). The main factions were Taylor’s NPFL, which initially comprised fighters from the Gio and Mano tribes, a splinter-group called Independent NPFL (INPFL) affiliated primarily with the Gio tribe and later turning against Taylor, and a group called ULIMO (United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy), which mainly comprised fighters from the Krahn and Mandingo tribes, among them many fighters from the disbanded ‘Armed Forces of Liberia’ (see Gershoni 1997: 59–62; Reno 1999: 105). ULIMO later split along ethnic lines, with most Mandingos joining the ULIMO-K (led by Alhaji Kromah) and most Krahn joining ULIMO-J (led by General Roosevelt Johnson) (see Howe 1996: 156; Korte 1997: 69). As the different factions were joined together less by ideological orientation or political goals than by a loose affiliation with certain tribes, it was extremely difficult to create a basic level of trust among the different groups. Moreover, all of them profited economically from participating in the civil war; therefore the incentive to defect constantly remained present. Most of the early peace agreements failed because they were “blatantly repudiated at one time or another by the different armed factions, but almost consistently by Taylor’s NPFL” (Sesay et al. 2009: 39). Also, none of the factions had been thoroughly disarmed at the time of the settlement (see Bøås 2001: 711; Tanner 1998: 138).

Against this background, it is no surprise that the warring parties continued to maintain highly conflictual relations at the time of the settlement. Taylor’s election as president
further fueled the mistrust and suspicion among the various factions and members of the Krahn and Mandingo tribes (who were the main beneficiaries of Samuel Doe’s patronage networks) rightly feared to become thoroughly excluded from political participation. The anti-Taylor factions had a hard time to accept that they had been defeated at the ballot-box, which is most clearly illustrated by their recourse to armed force within a period of only one year. The formation of LURD and MODEL, the two anti-Taylor insurgencies, is directly linked to Taylor’s oppressive style of government. LURD, until its emergence in July 2000 a largely unknown actor, can be described as “essentially a loose coalition of anti-Taylor forces, drawing upon a variety of militia factions and refugee groups [...]” (International Crisis Group 2002a: 4). It has its roots in Guinea, from where it launched its first invasion against Liberia. MODEL was founded in March 2003 in Côte d’Ivoire, and, just as LURD, appears to be mainly a coalition of convenience. For both groups, it “has been difficult knowing where they stand ideologically and many of their documents are vague along these lines” (Jaye 2003: 645). At the latest from this moment on, the relations have transformed from (passive) obstruction to (active) hostility. All in all, the relations between the warring parties can therefore safely be considered obstructive.

Mediative Engagement. A large number of external parties was engaged in Liberia’s first civil war and the ensuing post-conflict phase. Some francophone west African countries supported Taylor’s insurgency, including Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso (Jaye 2003: 646). ECOWAS played a key role during Liberia’s civil war since its very beginnings and certainly was the only factor that prevented Taylor from yielding an outright military victory. Upon its creation on 7 August 1990, ECOMOG (‘ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group’) was, in various regards, a novelty: It was the first regional peace enforcement mission deployed in any third world country and at the same time the first regional mission to which the United Nations were a secondary partner (see Howe 1996: 146). During the civil war, ECOMOG made extensive use of its peace enforcement authority – arguably to such an extent that it became a conflict party itself. Though their involvement effectively prevented Taylor from seizing the capital in 1990, some see this as the primary reason that the conflict continued for another six years:

“Had victory been obtained at this point, one would not be writing of a CPE [Complex Political Emergency, CR] but merely of one of the many military takeovers that have occurred in sub-Saharan Africa. What transformed the situation into a CPE was the intervention of the Economic Organisation of West African States (ECOWAS). The ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) [...] stalemated the military position and preserved the remnants of the collapsed Liberian state” (Outram 1999: 167).

Thus, in the early phase of its engagement, ECOMOG clearly was a partisan force. In order to achieve its goal, it even collaborated with different anti-Taylor factions and provided them with logistical, material and financial support (Howe 1996: 156). However,
there is reason to argue that after more than five years of engagement and 12 failed peace agreements, ECOWAS changed its strategy in 1995. Before, some of the crucial warlords had always been excluded from participating in peace talks and none of the crucial factions had been represented in the transitional government (Interim Government of National Unity, IGNU) that existed between 1990 and 1994. The factions, including Taylor, therefore rejected the legitimacy of the transitional body (see Korte 1997: 60–63). Matters began to change in August 1994, when the Ghanian president Jerry Rawlings was elected as ECOWAS chairman. He clearly put a new momentum to the peace process and “warned the warlords that unless they ‘talked peace’ quite seriously, the monitoring group would be pulled out of Liberia” (Sesay 1996b: 399). This change in leadership was of paramount importance for the ultimate adoption of the Abuja peace agreements. The UN Security Council viewed “with appreciation the diplomatic achievement of […] president Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, in bringing together the factions (sic!) leaders of Liberia to sign the Accra Agreement […]” (U.N. Security Council 1995). Already in December 1994, the Accra Peace Agreement was adopted, which included the formation of a five member governing committee, the so called “Council of State”, consisting of representatives from four major factions (NPFL, ULIMO, AFL, LNC) and one traditional chief leader (see Government of the Republic of Liberia 1994, part II). This was the first time in Liberia’s turbulent conflict history that warlords were accepted as participants of an official government body (Korte 1997: 62; see also Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 180). After the elections in 1997, ECOMOG’s role was reduced to training the new national army and, due to quarrels with Taylor, ECOMOC was forced to leave the country entirely by December 1998 (see International Crisis Group 2002a: 40; Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 73). Meanwhile, the greater part of the international community, including the European Union and the United Nations, was initially willing to “give Taylor a chance” (International Crisis Group 2002a: 21; see the discussion below for further detail). All this suggests that external engagement in the early phase of the Taylor regime must be regarded as mediative.

6.2.2 Polity Dynamics in Liberia

The case of Liberia confirms the plausibility of many of the assumptions made about ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities above. This is illustrated below with regard to the four overarching themes: dealing with commitment problems, competition for power, threats from within, and external engagement for good governance.

a) Overcoming Commitment Problems

In the basic model of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities presented above (6.1), it was argued that this polity type provides a particularly difficult environment for overcoming commitment problems. The exclusion of parts of the former belligerents from access to formal authority in conjunction with the prevalence of obstructive relations accounts for
the most difficult structural environment of all polity types discussed so far. At the same
time, it is fair to assume that the excluded opposition is unlikely to disarm even when
external actors provide sufficient security guarantees – in part out of fear that they might be
exposed to one-sided acts of violence by the government once external actors withdraw and
in part because recourse to armed violence represents a measure of last resort to contain
the government.

With respect to disarmament, Liberia is not an ideal case for illustrating the dynamics
of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities because the main efforts for disarming the warring
factions took place before the elections in 1997 – i.e. before this polity-type was formally
established. Most of the peace agreements adopted throughout Liberia’s checkered conflict
history contained provisions for the disarmament and demobilization of the factions.
Already the Cotonou Agreement of 1993 provided for a disarmament process conducted
by ECOMOG and monitored by the United Nations (see Government of the Republic of
Liberia 1993, Art. 6). Though it was never implemented, this agreement provided the
blueprint for all subsequent peace agreements, including the Abuja peace agreement of
1995, which cleared the way for the 1997 elections. Efforts for disarmament began in early
1996 but needed to be postponed to November due to the worsening security conditions on
the ground (see United Nations 2001a). However, as Victor Tanner remarks, “Liberia, with
its multiple factions, numerous ‘casual’ fighters, absence of regular armies and lack of
peacetime opportunities for ex-fighters, was a difficult candidate for demobilization” (1998:
136). Although, upon the conclusion of the program in January 1997, the UN observed that
it was initially met with “remarkable enthusiasm” by combatants of the various factions,
a closer look reveals that the process was characterized by significant flaws and that the
parties’ compliance with the disarmament provisions was mainly symbolical.

In total, UNOMIL reported that some 20,000 fighters had been disarmed and about
10,000 weapons (of which one fifth was unserviceable) and more than one million rounds
of ammunition surrendered by the end of the disarmament period on 9 February 1997
(see United Nations 2001a: n.p.). These are not insignificant numbers. The total number
of combatants from all factions was initially estimated at about 50,000 to 60,000, but
this figure was later revised by ECOMOG to 33,000 fighters (see Tanner 1998: 137).
This enabled UNOMIL to announce that more than sixty percent of all combatants had
been disarmed (see United Nations 2001a: n.p.). However, the total number of weapons
collected by UNOMIL did “not coincide with the expected figures before disarmament”
(Creative Associates International 1997: 20), and there is evidence that a considerable
number of those who pretended to be fighters were in fact civilians who got hold of a
weapon or sufficient rounds of ammunition (see Creative Associates International 1997:
16). Or, if they were real fighters, they certainly did not belong to the avant-garde: “As in
many demobilization operations, the weaker elements gravitate toward the demobilization
centres in order to secure access to the benefits, encouraged and often ‘sponsored’ by the
real fighting troops” (Tanner 1998: 137). In addition, roughly one fifth of the weapons
surrendered were unworkable, and the overall quality of the weapons handed in was poor (see Tanner 1998: 137). Reportedly, on one occasion ECOMOG troops accepted an “ornamental cannon, a tear gas canister, a bayonet and a grenade held together by duct tape as ‘warlike materials’” (Creative Associates International 1997: 16). UNOMIL took this as the reason to introduce a stricter definition of what counts an eligible weapon, but this immediately led to a slowing-down of the disarmament process (Creative Associates International 1997: 16). Despite that, witnesses reported that at the end of the disarmament process “would-be fighters were being processed regardless of whether they presented a weapon or not” (Tanner 1998: 137). All this raises significant doubts with respect to the seriousness by which the parties engaged in the disarmament process and the effectiveness of the program as a whole. Most importantly, it can be ruled out that the roughly 8,000 serviceable weapons ultimately surrendered significantly constrained the factions’ ability to fight in any significant sense. It is more likely that different factions ‘retained substantial caches as ‘life insurance’ in case the peace process fell apart’ – as Wolf-Christian Paes observed during the disarmament period in 2004 (2005: 257). There is every reason to believe that it was not the effectiveness of the disarmament program as such but rather “the faction leaders’ desire to ‘behave’ until elections […] that kept the guns off the streets” (1998: 137). All this suggests that the parties engaged in extensive ‘virtual cooperation’ gestures in an attempt to circumvent their disarmament obligations.

The reluctance to comply with the provisions of the Abuja Accords was squarely confirmed with regard to the reform of the security sector, which was supposed to take place after Taylor’s election as president. The Abuja Accords contained provisions for the reform of the national army on the basis of an equal representation of the country’s different ethnic groups. Obviously, for Taylor this would have implied a limited influence on the armed forces and a potential threat to his rule in case disloyal officers staged a coup against him. Out of this reason, one of the first things he did after being elected as president was to announce that “as a democratic leader he was not bound by the Abuja Peace Accords […]” (International Crisis Group 2002a: 13). Taylor maintained deep mistrust against the national army, which mainly comprised Krahn and was still strongly affiliated with some of his main opponents in the civil war. In his eyes, a much more secure strategy was to abolish the army as it existed at the time and replace it by a loose network of armed units loyal to him (see International Crisis Group 2002a: 13). Instead of pursuing a sincere reform of the country’s security forces, Taylor simply multiplied their number in order to make sure that no single unit or faction could threaten his power-base (Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 78). This stood in stark contrast to the provisions of the Abuja Accords: “Rather than attempt to eliminate partisanship among state security forces, he promoted it by retaining his wartime militia and slowly peeling away the army’s strength”

10Among the security forces controlled by Taylor were, next to the Armed Forces of Liberia and the police, an ‘elite’ Anti-Terrorist Unit, a Special Operations Division (SOD), a Special Security Services (SSS), special security or paramilitary units controlled by specific ministries, and “an array of militia groups including the ‘Marines’, the ‘Wild Geese’ and a host of others” (Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 78).
Chapter 6 ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polities

The Anti-terrorist Unit played the lead role among these factions and “embodies Taylor’s hunger for complete control over security [. . . ]” (International Crisis Group 2002a: 13). These measures certainly did not help to raise the level of trust among the former belligerents. Roosevelt Johnson, the former leader of the ULIMO-J faction and one of Taylor’s main adversaries during the civil war, criticized these developments and expressed concerns for his own security. More specifically, he accused Taylor of “recruiting and stuffing the army, national security agency, police force and other paramilitary agencies with former fighters of his defunct National Patriotic Front of Liberia militia”, as a press report pointed out (see Pan African News Agency 1998).

In sum, the above paragraph illustrates how the asymmetrical division of power among the former belligerents and the prevalence of obstructive relations may forestall the overcoming of commitment problems in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities. Neither Taylor nor the rebels had a real interest in complying with the provisions of the accords. The result was a halfhearted and incomplete disarmament process and security sector reform that was mainly symbolic and had hardly any substantive effects.

b) Manner of Political Competition

The manner of political competition in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities can be expected to differ significantly from ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities. In section 6.1 I argued that the obstructive relations of the belligerents are likely to lead to a highly conflictual pattern of political competition in which the excluded parties are disillusioned by formal routes to power. The party in power can be expected to make full use of its sovereign rights for controlling the political space and to tacitly tighten its hold on power by autocratic means. However, it stands under the watching eye of the international community, which is engaged in a mediative manner and will possibly not tolerate all autocratic excesses of the government. This is likely to result in a pattern of ‘virtual cooperation’ according to which the ruling party makes some symbolic concessions and pretends to cling to a democratic posture. The excluded opposition, in turn, will not be satisfied by trying its chances in a subsequent electoral contest because it is unwilling to wait until the term of the incumbent government is over and because the government’s privileged access to state resources and the media entails a high probability that the electoral contest would be unfair. As a result, it has little choice other than falling back to informal means of gaining power, which may include the use of violence as a measure of last resort.

These dynamics are by and large confirmed by the case of Liberia. In general, Charles Taylor’s legacy as a warlord left severe doubts regarding his capabilities as a civilian ruler. During his time as the de facto ruler of ‘Greater Liberia’, he was not only accountable for gross human rights violations, but he also engaged in illicit economic activities. He collaborated closely with some commercial firms operating in the NPFL areas, including the Firestone Tire and Rubber company, which allegedly provided logistical support for Taylor’s 1992 attack on Monrovia (Reno 1999: 100). The trade with illegally logged
Liberian timber played a particularly important role in these arrangements. By cooperating with a “clandestine network of predatory foreign firms” (Johnston 2004: 441), Taylor granted timber concessions to foreign companies in exchange for money or large shipments of small arms (Johnston 2004: 446). Originally, this was a strategy for sustaining warfare, but over time the exploitation of Liberia’s resources became an end in itself (see Reno 1995: 112–117; Sesay 1996b: 398). Taylor was also engaged in a number of regional conflicts, most notably by supporting the notorious RUF rebels in Sierra Leone and engaging in the unlawful trade with conflict diamonds originating from the RUF (see e.g. Chojnacki 2009: 187; Heupel 2006: 154–155; Reno 2003). All in all, Taylor is estimated to have gained as much as US $ 450 million through his illicit economic activities (see Adebajo 2004: 14).

Because his past records left doubts regarding his virtues as a civilian ruler, Taylor was keen on presenting himself as a responsible statesman who was truly interested in reconciling his war-ridden country. Already with the conclusion of the Abuja Accord in 1995, he began to orchestrate his public appearances by producing himself as a wholehearted politician with a genuine interest in peace. As Steven Ellis highlights:

“The way was now clear for Taylor to take part personally in Monrovian politics, and on 31 August 1995 he arrived back in the city for the first time since he had fled in 1983. He was greeted by cheering crowds who believed that his entry into the city meant peace at last. Dressed all in white and driving his own car, he made every effort to appear as a Messiah, like Christ arriving in Jerusalem on Palm Sunday” (2007: 105).

Since then, the white dress became Taylor’s trademark and he did everything to keep up the facade of being a responsible ruler after he was elected as president. However, his rule suffered from one central flaw: although he was now endowed with formal authority, there remained significant parts of the population who continued to question his legitimacy and who deeply mistrusted him. As the International Crisis Group remarked: “At the centre of Taylor’s problem with his political rivals is a desire for them to recognise his presidency. He seeks legitimacy, especially from political sponsors who were openly or quietly supportive of his war […] but some of these feel betrayed by Taylor’s conduct both during the war and afterwards” (2002a: 15). In an attempt to remedy this fact, he made efforts to boost his public image by adopting a conciliating language and by appointing some members from the opposition to his cabinet. Among them was Roosevelt Johnson, the former leader of the Ulimo-J faction, who became Minister of Rural Development (see International Crisis Group 2002a: 14). At his inauguration address on 2 August 1997, Taylor underlined that there would be no “witch hunts” against civilians or former enemies, promised to establish a human rights and reconciliation commission and stressed the need to forgive (see IRIN 1997).

Taylor’s careful orchestration served the purpose of creating the impression of him being a responsible ruler. Initially, this was not without effect. Despite this dull record as a warlord, the international community seriously seemed to believe that attaining peace and
reconciliation would be possible with Taylor as president. In a letter to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan welcomed the successful completion of the elections and underlined that the polls were “certified as having been free and fair” (United Nations 1997a). In a statement published a few days later, the president of the UN Security Council emphasized “the goodwill and cooperation demonstrated by the parties in the electoral process [...]” and expressed his hopes that it “provides a strong foundation for the people of Liberia to achieve a durable peace, the re-establishment of constitutional government, and a return to the rule of law” (United Nations 1997c). Finally, at the occasion of a special conference on Liberia held a few months later, Kofi Annan again commended Taylor “for the constructive and statesmanlike manner in which he has begun to lay the foundations for long-term peace, reconciliation and development in Liberia” and praised the formation of an inclusive government and the “expressed commitment of the new President to promoting the protection of human rights and respect for the rule of law” (United Nations 1997b).

Such bloomy statements indicate that the international community was initially highly willing to “give Taylor a chance” (International Crisis Group 2002a: 23). However, they could hardly obscure the fact that Liberia’s new president was the same warlord who had taken the country hostage for more than six years for his personal aspirations to power. It did not take long until Taylor’s statesmanlike facade exhibited the first cracks. The first tensions arose with ECOMOG at the occasion of Taylor’s denial to restructure the army, as provided for in the Abuja Accord (see above). Underlining his constitutional rights, Taylor argued that the peace agreement ceased to exist in August 1997, when he was inaugurated as president (see Pan African News Agency 1997). Hence, “[b]y the end of 1997, the honeymoon was over” (Tanner 1998: 140). Taylor’s stronger grip to power also led to a worsening of Liberia’s internal security situation. It did not take long until human rights violations became pervasive (see e.g. International Crisis Group 2002a: 21). His regime was perceived by outside observers as a “one-man show” (Aboagye and Bah 2005b: 99), and the general impression prevailed that he executed his powers “without the national consensus that was requisite for national cohesion” rather than truly cooperating with the opposition (Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 80).

As president, Taylor also continued to engage in systematic efforts to loot the country’s natural resources and augment his personal fortune. As Amos Sawyer puts it, his “ascent to the Liberian presidency [...] formalised the relationship between the underworld economy and the state” (2004: 449). This control of wealth was his most crucial source of authority, which was from the beginning on based on the conditional distribution of state revenues to patronage networks and “underwent little change, despite his shift from faction leader to president of the Republic of Liberia” (Reno 2004: 126; see also Reno 1999: 85–126). After his inauguration, Taylor’s first executive order provided for ten percent of the income from Liberia’s maritime registry – one of the country’s largest sources of income – to be put in a special account supervised by him personally (see Sawyer 2004: 447).
Also, the government formed a holding company, the ‘Liberian Resources Corporation’ (LIBRESCO), which collected the entire mineral resources of the country. It was put under presidential control, too (Outram 1999: 169). By far the largest share of the state budget was channeled into the armed forces and used for buying new government equipment, but hardly anything was invested into the country’s physical or social infrastructure (see Reno 2004: 128). Thus, there is every reason to suggest that Taylor “melded his official and personal interests almost perfectly” (Reno 2008: 389). These developments make clear that “Liberia is a democracy in name only” and that Taylor has “effectively used intimidation, patronage and corruption to hold power” (International Crisis Group 2002a: 13). All in all, Taylor’s ambiguous conduct confirmed his “highly mercurial personality, at times saying all the right things about good governance and economic reform, and at others carrying forth with unreasonable statements and brutally lashing out at opponents, real and perceived” (Tanner 1998: 142).

For the opposition, these were clear signals that hoping for an opening of the political space or a significant improvement of Taylor’s governance record was illusionary, which is reflected in the rise of armed insurgency groups discussed in the next section. However, Taylor’s exclusive hold on power was not the only factor that accounted for the opposition’s poor electoral prospects. The opposition as a whole was generally considered to be heterogeneous, poorly organized and occupied with turf wars and mutual accusations. As the International Crisis Group pointed out, “distrust and suspicion among key figures” was a significant problem, as “[m]any leaders discount one another as tainted by some past association or action, such as having been an early supporter of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia” (2002a: 18). In addition, the members of the former warring factions suffered from the fact that they predominantly belonged to the Krahn and Mandingo tribes, both of which were likely to enjoy little public support. As Steven Ellis highlights, “many Liberians persist in regarding Mandingo as outsiders, people who do not belong to Liberia, even when they have lived there for generations” (2007: 39). Krahns, in contrast, were mainly associated with Samuel Doe’s rule and hence “stereotyped as poorly educated and thuggish” (Itano 2003: 7). As a result, their prospects of faring well in future elections was dull, which explains that the Krahn and Mandingo based insurgency movements which facilitated Taylor’s downfall were unable to develop any political program other than unseating Taylor (see below). Though leaders of these warring factions were later represented in the transitional government that was established after Taylor’s removal from office, none of them “survived into the electoral arena” during the national elections that took place in 2006 (Harris 2005: 375).

In sum, the lack of a level playing field was a striking feature of political competition in Liberia. Charles Taylor adopted a few flimsy ‘virtual cooperation’ gestures in order to present himself as a democratic and responsible ruler, but at the same time thoroughly excluded the opposition parties from political participation. Most of the former anti-Taylor factions faced poor prospects for winning future elections, which reduced their
inclination to stick to formal-constitutional means of gaining power. The result was a highly confrontational manner as it is characteristics for ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities.

c) Threats from Within

As argued above, we can expect the leaders of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities to face a considerable dilemma with regard to the manner in which they deal with threats from within. Since their rule is per se perceived as illegitimate by parts of the population, they are likely to take measures for controlling the political space and curtailing civil society and the free press. However, these efforts are marked by the attempt to still maintain a veil of democratic rule, because the leaders of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities must be concerned about external actors giving up their mediative stance and supporting the opposition’s cause. This leads to a highly contradictory exercise of power in which brutal attempts to contain the opposition go alongside a symbolic endorsement of democratic principles.

In the case of Charles Taylor, such concerns clearly played a role. As an elected president who came to office under the promise to reconcile the country, depicting an overtly authoritarian stance entailed the risk of losing international support, which could undermine the president’s hold on power in the long run. For this reason, he has “avoided some excesses that usually characterise brutal authoritarian regimes” – for instance by refraining from systematically oppressing civilians (International Crisis Group 2002a: 16). Taylor still tried to maintain the illusion of heading a democratic and accountable regime. Most importantly, he tried to dispel the impression that he had anything to do with ongoing warfare in Sierra Leone because this was one of external actors’ main sources of criticism. For example, in a policy statement issued in December 1998, the Liberian government distanced itself from external actors’ allegations and tried to reinforce its reputation as a responsible regime:

“The Government of Liberia views with disappointment and indignation suggestions and allegations by the Government of Sierra Leone that Liberia is supporting former Junta/RUF forces in Sierra Leone. The government of Liberia reiterates unequivocally that it is not supporting in any form the forces of the AFRC or RUF in Sierra Leone. It is the policy of the Liberian government to welcome the restoration of constitutional rule in Sierra Leone under the leadership of the democratically elected government of president Tejan Kabbah” (Government of the Republic of Liberia 1998).

However, there is widespread evidence that the reality had little to do with these euphemistic statements. Observers overwhelmingly agree that Taylor had continued to play a key role for supporting the RUF after his election for president (see e.g. Global Witness 2005; International Crisis Group 2002a). Domestically, Taylor’s rule had equally little to do

11Note that Taylor’s involvement in the war in Sierra Leone was the reason for his indictment to the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 2003 (see e.g. Coleman 2008i).
with the standards of democratic and accountable regimes. Truly opening the political space to political opponents had never been an option for Taylor because he had deeply mistrusted many of the former warlords against whom he was engaged militarily throughout the war and because he had been unwilling to share the benefits associated with the access to governmental power with his former enemies. Immediately after taking office he made attempts to curtail civil society and the media and to harass political opponents. In October 1998, the Minister of Information stopped the independent radio station ‘Star Radio’ on accusations that it was operating without an adequate license. In 2001, the Catholic Station Radio Veritas suffered the same fate. However, reflecting Taylor’s inconsistent use of oppressive measures – the International Crisis Group pointed out that he “operates with changing rules, sometimes democratic, other times repressive” – both stations later regained the permission to reopen (see 2002a: 16). Civil society organizations were also targeted from the beginning on as part of Taylor’s attempts to curtail the public space. In October 1998, members of the local human rights organization ‘Justice and Peace Commission of Liberia’ (JPC) were intimidated and harassed after issuing a statement demanding more transparency and accountability (see Amnesty International 1998). According to the International Crisis Group, “[p]opular perception outside Liberia is that the independence and effectiveness of civil society has been virtually destroyed by Taylor” (2002a: 20).

Members of the political opposition – in particular those associated with one of the former warring parties – were suffering most from Taylor’s attempt to yield total control. They were systematically targeted by Taylor’s security forces and numerous opposition figures were murdered or forced into exile during the first two years of his presidency (see International Crisis Group 2002a: 21). Among the opposition politicians allegedly killed by the Taylor regime was Samuel Dokie, a co-founder of the NPFL who became opposed to Taylor already during the civil war. He was detained by Taylor’s “Special Security Forces” together with his wife, sister and cousin on 29 November 1997; their dead bodies were found a few days later, strongly suggesting that Taylor ordered their assassinations. Taylor denied any involvement in these killings, but this could not prevent public opinion from gradually turning against him (see e.g. Outram 1999: 169; Tanner 1998: 142). As the International Crisis Group remarked, “this episode sent a powerful message to foes that political inclusion was off the agenda” (2002a: 15). However, it should be noted that some of Taylor’s security forces acted autonomously, most notably because Taylor had increasingly been “struggling to keep order in his ranks” (Tanner 1998: 142). Arguably, this played in Taylor’s hands. Ultimately, the lack of clear command-and-control structures enabled him to deny his responsibility for acts of violence committed by his security forces.

12 However, given the country’s American heritage, the concept of civil society is less alien to Liberia than it might be to other African countries and more rooted in the country’s history. Liberia can look back to a vibrant civil society which has been active for several decades. In 2002, more than ten percent of all Liberians were members of some civil society organization (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 2004: 10). Despite Taylor’s tight control of civil society, it is generally acknowledged that it has played a “critical role” for fostering democratic consolidation (Toure 2002: 1–2).
It was precisely this unpredictability of the security apparatus that provided a “constant source of intimidation to ordinary Liberians and political foes” (International Crisis Group 2002a: 14).

Over the next months, tensions between Taylor and his former opponents had risen steadily. They culminated in a gun-battle between government forces and fighters loyal to Roosevelt Johnson in September 1998, which left between 50 and 200 people dead. A group of fighters, including Johnson, later took refuge in the US embassy (see e.g. Pan African News Agency 1999). This incident was the result of rising mistrust between the government and the former Ulimo-J leader Johnson. Over the preceding months, Johnson had gathered a large number of former fighters around his headquarters in the Liberian capital, claiming, as the International Crisis Group remarks, that “violence and intimidation by government forces had forced them together for protection” (2002a: 8). Taylor used this incident as an occasion to finally get rid of his opponents by accusing them of a coup plot and claiming that Johnson headed a group of about thirty people which had planned to overthrow the government. Thirteen suspects – all of them Krahn – were imprisoned, while 19 others fled the country before they could be arrested. A Liberian Jury found thirteen of the 32 suspects guilty, including Johnson, who was convicted in absentia while on exile in Nigeria (see e.g. Pan African News Agency 1999). This contributed to a climate in which most remaining opposition figures with serious ambitions were driven out of the country (see International Crisis Group 2002a: 15).

Rising frustration about Taylor’s abuse of governmental authority gave the impetus for the recourse to violence as a means to unseat Taylor. The opposition groups increasingly came to the recognition that “in the absence of military pressure from the rebel groups, no amount of dialogue would have caused a significant change in the style and governance of Taylor to accommodate Liberia’s political opposition and civil society organisations, so that they could pursue their political objectives without intimidation or fear of persecution” (Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 75). These considerations gave rise to the re-formation of an armed opposition against Taylor. The first attempts for an armed resistance against the president became apparent already in August 1998, roughly one year after had taken office, when a Guinean-based group called ‘Justice Coalition of Liberia’ launched an attack against government troops. Though the group was quickly pushed back to Guinea, this attack can be seen as the starting point for a whole series of armed engagements against Taylor. Similar attacks were launched by another Guinean-based rebel group, the ‘Organisation of Displaced Liberians’, which had become active since April 1999 (see International Crisis Group 2002a: 8–9).

In February 2000, the different anti-Taylor factions united and formed LURD, which was ultimately responsible for Taylor’s downfall (see International Crisis Group 2003e: 9). As the anti-Taylor factions during the war, LURD mainly comprised fighters from the Krahn and Mandingo tribes, who “[did] not trust one another but have formed pragmatic alliances against the common enemy” (International Crisis Group 2003e: 4). The group
was at no time more than a coalition of convenience, united in the objective to “seize power by deposing Charles Taylor” (Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 79; see also Harris 2005: 376). After having been defeated already at the polls in 1997, the rebels this time sought a final solution to the Liberian conflict. Consequently, they ignored all attempts for yielding a negotiated settlement and concentrated exclusively on the battlefield (see International Crisis Group 2003: i). Despite their small number, both LURD and MODEL had the advantage of their fighters being highly motivated. Many of the Krahn and Mandingo fighters who made up the bulk of the rebel movement were well-trained and disciplined former members of Doe’s national army (Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 79). This gave them a significant advantage over Taylor’s soldiers, many of whom were “badly trained, badly paid and sometimes forcibly recruited” (International Crisis Group 2003: 6–7). The conflict soon stalema ted and fighting continued for some two years. As the presidential elections – scheduled for October 2003 – moved closer, it became the immediate priority of the rebel groups (LURD and MODEL) to forestall the polls and prevent Taylor from being confirmed for a second term (International Crisis Group 2003: 6).

By mid-2003, Taylor was increasingly weakened by international sanctions (see below) and suffered a number of painful rebel advances (Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 74). He was forced to sign a ceasefire agreement (Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities, ACCH) on 17 June, and his fate was sealed with the deployment of a new regional intervention force (‘ECOWAS Mission in Liberia’, ECOMIL) in August 2003. ECOMIL was a humanitarian intervention mission comprising about 5,000 troops. Its deployment was based on a strong political consensus from West African heads of states – “a situation that starkly contrasts with the bickering that dogged earlier ECOWAS deployments in the 1990s” (Aboagye and Bah 2005: 284). One month after its deployment, ECOMIL transferred its authority to the ‘United Nations Mission in Liberia’ (UNMIL), which was mandated by the UN Security Council in resolution 1509 (2003) (U.N. Security Council 2003g; see also Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 94). In conjunction with the mounting pressure from within, this ultimately facilitated Taylor’s resignation. As argued in more detail below, this situation can be interpreted as a switch from mediative to partisan external engagement.

In sum, the confrontational manner of political competition gave rise to numerous threats to the stability of the polity and the incumbent regime. Taylor tried to counter these threats by exerting an increasingly tight control on the political space and by systematically targeting opposition politicians who could turn out as a threat to his rule. However, the outcome was counterproductive, because this has increased rather than reduced the opposition’s willingness to unseat Taylor militarily before he could legitimize his rule through popular elections.
d) Promoting Good Governance

External attempts for promoting good governance in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities are likely to be marred by significant challenges and profound difficulties. Above, it was argued that the conflictual nature of this polity requires a particularly intensive engagement by external actors but at the same time constitutes a profound obstacle for external actors to provide the necessary resources. In addition, external actors are likely to face pressure by the incumbent regime to withdraw. This may result either in a hasty withdrawal amidst an incomplete statebuilding agenda or a long-enduring engagement in which exit options are hard to conceive and in which the promotion of good governance principles remains external actors’ long run responsibility. The case of Liberia partly confirms these stipulations because external actors gave in to pressures from the Taylor regime for a quick withdrawal. However, Taylor’s subsequent abuse of power and his continued support for the RUF rebels made external actors reconsider over time and impose sanctions against the regime. In the end, it is no exaggeration to say that they openly aligned with the armed opposition against Taylor and at least indirectly supported its attempts to oust Taylor militarily.

Taylor’s sweeping victory in the 1997 elections put the international community in a significant dilemma. On the one hand, it implied that Liberia had a new and democratically legitimized head of state – a fact that is generally portrayed as a great achievement of post-conflict reconstruction processes. On the other hand, Liberia’s new leader was a former rebel leader known as a notoriously greedy and brutal ruler who hardly possessed any of the characteristics typically associated with democratic leadership. In other words, the democratic principle (accepting the outcome of democratic elections) clashed with the good-governance principle (ensuring that the new administration meets at least a minimal degree of accountability) in a particularly spicy way. Ignoring the former principle would have implied to ignore the will of the people and would have completely jeopardized external actors’ own rhetoric, while ignoring the latter principle was associated with a high risk of authoritarian rule and, ultimately, even the recurrence of armed conflict. As already argued above, external actors gave priority to the former principle by embracing the fact that a democratically legitimized government was in place in Liberia. Ultimately, no one could ignore the fact that he was elected with a large majority of votes and that, despite voter intimidation, the elections proceeded according to international standards (see Harris 1999: 437–438). Hence, external actors levied at best moderate pressure on the new regime to become more cooperative and accountable. They simply hoped that Taylor would “become more statesmanlike as he was forced to grapple with the demands of governance” (Reno 2004: 134).

This soft stance was to Taylor’s great benefit. His declaration made shortly after the elections that he was not bound by the Abuja Accords any longer clearly served the purpose of backing up his sovereignty and demonstrating his claim to power. Though considerations of sovereignty are also said to stand behind his refusal to allow ECOMOG to restructure...
the army, it may just as well have been based on fear that a representative army would not be loyal to him (see also International Crisis Group 2002a: 13). Whatever the reasons, in the end ECOMOG was “forced to leave Liberia after [an] embarrassing showdown with president Taylor over his rejection of the Abuja accord provision […]” (International Crisis Group 2002a: 40). After the last peacekeepers left by late 1998, Taylor “had the whole political-military theatre to himself […]” (Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 80). The wider international community remained remarkably silent about the withdrawal of the peacekeepers. Overall, external engagement in the initial years of Taylor’s rule depicts a lacking willingness to pose any significant constraints on Taylor. Despite the fact that a UN arms embargo levied against all parties to the civil war in 1992 was never lifted (see Itano 2003: 4), external actors did little in order to take influence on Liberia’s internal situation in the years between 1998 and 2000. Not a single report of the UN Secretary General to the UN Security Council was drafted in this period, not even to speak of Security Council resolutions which would condemn the deterioration of human rights standards and the spread of corruption in Liberia.13 This can certainly not be accounted for on the grounds of an improving security situation, because Taylor had faced armed skirmishes with dissidents at the latest since August 1998 and had essentially been at war with LURD since early 2000 (see above). In sum, Taylor’s insistence on his sovereignty as an elected president left external actors little scope of action, but they also demonstrated little willingness to make use of what was left of their leverage in the first three years of Taylor’s rule.

External actors might have left Taylor alone if his destabilizing rule would have been limited to his own country. However, Taylor’s ongoing refusal to end his support for the RUF in Sierra Leone and to stop the illicit trade with conflict diamonds led to significant discord with the international community (see e.g. McDonough 2008: 365–366). After several unsuccessful attempts for inducing Taylor to give up his support for the RUF, the UN Security Council imposed various measures against the Liberian government in its Resolution 1343 (2001), including a travel ban and ban on the trade with rough diamonds from Liberia (U.N. Security Council 2001; par. 5-7). It also called upon the Liberian government to establish a Certificate of Origin regime for the trade in rough diamonds (par. 15). In subsequent resolutions, the UN Security Council decided that the Liberian government “has not complied fully with the demands in resolution 1343 (2001)” and imposed further sanctions, including an embargo on the trade with Liberian timber (see U.N. Security Council 2003c; par. 1 and 17). The sanctions did not take immediate effect, but there is reason to argue that they “helped immensely to deprive Taylor’s forces of weapons that would have enabled him to perpetuate or prolong his retention of power” (Aboagye and Bah 2005a: 288). As such, the imposition of sanctions may still be in accordance with a mediative manner of engagement, as long as they aim at supporting the peace process (and not primarily at hurting the regime against which they were imposed).

13This can be confirmed on the UN website at http://www.un.org/documents/repsc.htm (visited at 15 October 2010).
This condition was clearly fulfilled in the case of the sanctions levied against the Liberian government. However, there is reason to argue that Taylor’s ongoing reluctance to comply with international demands led to an increasing recognition among external actors that he needed to be removed from office in order to secure lasting peace in Liberia and West Africa as a whole. The humanitarian crisis that came with the offensive against Taylor created a sense of urgency that had been lacking before, inducing external actors to become increasingly impatient with Taylor (Aboagye and Bah 2005a: 282). This clearly marked a turn in the international community’s approach towards Liberia.

LURD contributed to this change in public opinion by presenting itself as a responsible rebel group fighting for a legitimate cause with as little civilian victims as possible. In this vain, the rebel group repeatedly underlined that it supported a just cause and respected human rights standards. The rebel group keenly tried to avoid human rights violations. In order to underline these qualities, a LURD spokesman stated they deliberately avoided to raid towns and pro-government areas in order to protect civilians (see International Crisis Group 2002a: 10). The International Crisis Group believes that “LURD efforts to treat enemy combatants humanely has paid off, with many combatants and prisoners switching sides” (2002a: 11). Over time the international community increasingly sided with the insurgents, too. Switching to a “containment strategy” in dealing with Taylor, external actors essentially tried to isolate the regime internationally and wait for Taylor to be removed by hostile forces (see International Crisis Group 2002a: 23). ECOMIL was clearly more than a neutral peacekeeping force, as it allegedly cooperated with the LURD insurgents in order to force Taylor’s resignation (Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 79; see also International Crisis Group 2003c: 6). Although clear evidence is lacking, there is indication that the United States played a particularly important role in facilitating Taylor’s downfall. As the International Crisis Group pointed out in 2003:

“[It is becoming increasingly clear how central a part the U.S. government, especially the Department of Defence, took in orchestrating various aspects of Charles Taylor’s overthrow. [...] U.S. refusal to commit peacekeeping forces to Liberia in mid-2003 may have been due not only to strategic doubts and bureaucratic wrangling, but also to a desire to give LURD sufficient time to overthrow Taylor” (2003c: 13–14).

At the latest from this moment on, one must note that external intervention had switched from a mediative to a partisan manner of engagement. There is strong reason to argue that Taylor “miscalculated the will and determination of other member states to enforce their commitment to intervene when the civilian population was under threat” (Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 82). Had Taylor credibly signaled his willingness to comply with international requests to stop his illicit dealings with the RUF in Sierra Leone, it is questionable whether the UN Security Council would have imposed sanctions against him. But as Taylor became increasingly perceived as the main obstacle to peace in an entire region, pressure to remove him from office was rising sharply.
In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities provide a highly difficult environment for promoting good governance standards. Because external actors took an early exit option and withdrew from the country, they lost all leverage through which they could have induced Taylor to adopt a more cooperative stance. However, Taylor’s presidency also vividly illustrates that even leaders of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities may become subject to significant external limits and constraints if they exaggerate their hold on power, because this could encourage external actors to switch to a partisan manner of engagement in favor of the opposition.

6.3 Côte D’Ivoire

The history of Côte d’Ivoire, once a French colony, is tightly coupled to its former president Félix Houphouët-Boigny. After leading the country to independence in 1960, he became Côte d’Ivoire’s president for the next thirty years. He adopted a paternalistic leadership style that, despite privileging his own ethnic group (the Akan) effectively balanced the different ethnic groups living in the country (see Akindès 2004). During Houphouët-Boigny’s reign, Côte d’Ivoire achieved a high level of political stability and experienced tremendous economic growth rates. However, when the world market price for cocoa – the country’s primary export commodity – dropped sharply in the early 1980s, Côte d’Ivoire went through a painful cycle of economic decline, triggering tensions between the different ethnic groups (see Akindès 2004: 5; Dozon 1989: 136; Hofnung 2005: 8–9; Woods 2003: 641). The economic decline led to an increasing politicization of ethnic factors, which was dramatically fueled as a result of the power vacuum created by Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 1993. His successor, Henri Konan Bédié, continued with the questionable heritage of privileging the Akan, but he also tried to capitalize on xenophobic tendencies through introducing a highly dubious nationalistic ideology known as Ivoirité. The main rationale behind these policies was to prevent the predominantly Muslim dwellers from the north – who had felt “ostracized by the southern nexus of power” and were brand-marked as non-Ivorians (Coleman 2008e: 10) – to formulate their own claims to power (Akindès 2004: 20; see also Kipré 2005: 263; Ogunmola 2007: 118). As Abu Bah highlights, “[t]he tacit goal of this divisive ethnic politics was to marginalize northerners, lumping them...”

---

14 Contrary to what it sounds like, the independence did not diminish the influence of France in Côte d’Ivoire. During the reign of Houphouët Boigny, the country stayed France’s closest ally in Africa, what makes Hofnung even speak of a ‘pseudo-independence’ (“pseudo-indépendance”). He argues that to allow formal independence was a change that was perceived necessary by the former french leadership in order to maintain the French influence in Africa: “Tout changer pour que rien ne change: c’est, en substance, le chemin que va suivre le premier président ivoirien” (Hofnung 2005: 18).

15 Ivoirité draws a distinction between ‘true Ivorians’, ‘intermittent Ivorians’ and ‘Ivorians of convenience’. Though its initial purpose was to discredit the opposition candidate Alassane Dramane Ouattara, it eventually spread much further and was used to mobilize nationalist and xenophobic feelings on a large scale (Hofnung 2005: 9–10).
together with the immigrants from Burkina Faso, implying that they too are foreigners or at best Ivorians of immigrant ancestry” (2010: 602).

In accordance with the nationalist ideology of Ivoirité, Bédié passed a new electoral code before the elections in 1995, which was specifically crafted for the sake of preventing the promising opposition candidate Alassane Dramane Ouattara from participating in the elections. This led to a boycott of the 1995 elections by the main opposition parties and facilitated Bédié’s sweeping victory (see Akindès 2004: 20; Kipré 2005: 263; Toungara 2001: 67). The ensuing tensions pulled Côte d’Ivoire in a long period of political tensions, which escalated after Ouattara was again banned from participating in the polls in 2000. A southerner, Laurent Gbagbo, yielded a dubious victory, which triggered riots and tensions and led to a failed coup attempt against Gbagbo. The political tensions escalated in 2002, when a northern rebel group called ‘Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire’ (MPCI) initiated an armed rebellion against the government.16 It soon united with some other northern rebel groups to form the ‘Forces Nouvelles’. Headed by Guillaume Soro, its stated goal was to overthrow Gbagbo and clear the way for elections to take place (see Bah 2010: 604). The armed conflict between the government and the ‘Forces Nouvelles’ soon amounted to a military stalemate and an effective division of the country, with the government troops holding the Christian south and the rebel groups the Muslim north of the country. A peace agreement (Linas-Marcoussis Agreement) was hammered out in January 2003, providing for a buffer zone to be established between the rebel-held north and the government-held south (see Harris 2007: 182). France and ECOWAS dispatched 10,000 troops to Côte d’Ivoire, and one year later the United Nations deployed peacekeepers as part of the United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI) (Harris 2007: 182–183).

6.3.1 Côte D’Ivoire as a ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polity

The peace agreement provided for the establishment of a power-sharing government, but the implementation of these provisions was forestalled by continued quarrels between the different parties (see e.g. Mehler 2007: 4). Most importantly, Gbagbo was never committed to true power-sharing, which is why this situation is treated here as a de facto case of political domination. Matters only began to improve with the adoption of the Ouagadougou agreement in 2007, which led to a more effective implementation of power-sharing in Côte d’Ivoire (see International Crisis Group 2007e). As a consequence, this section concentrates on the period between the adoption of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement in 2003 and the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement in 2007. The following paragraphs justify Côte d’Ivoire’s classification as a ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity in more detail.

Political Domination. Formally, the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement led to a power-sharing arrangement – the Government of National Reconciliation – which was to be led by a

---

16 For a short overview of Côte d’Ivoire’s conflict history (in German), see also Andreas Mehler (2004).
“consensus Prime Minister who will remain in office until the next presidential election” (see Government of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire 2003, Art. 3c). Seydou Diarra, a northern Muslim, was appointed to this position, while Gbagbo was allowed to finish his presidential term until the next round of elections scheduled for 2005 (see Rothchild 2005: 252). However, little effective power sharing materialized in the implementation phase of the Accord. Rothchild describes it as a “shaky political and military deal from its outset” (Rothchild 2005: 252). Prime minister Diarra’s authority was deliberately undermined by both the president and the national assembly, depriving him of real political influence (see International Crisis Group 2004a: 2). Disillusioned, many rebel participants soon boycotted the government of national unity and power-sharing had effectively ceased to exist by March 2004 (see Rothchild 2005: 253). Meanwhile, Gbagbo used every opportunity to increase his own hold on power and resisted all attempts for reviving the original spirit of the power-sharing arrangement. When the UN Security Council, aware of Diarra’s impotence, requested the government to reinstate a prime minister endowed with real decision-making, suggesting that the former Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny assumed this position. Gbagbo heavily rejected these requests (International Crisis Group 2007e: 2; see also Chirot 2006: 74). He also violated his promise to hold presidential elections in due time. Originally scheduled for 2005, Gbagbo managed to postpone them for a total of five years. When they finally took place in November 2010, he refused to accept Ouattara’s victory.\footnote{This gave rise to armed tensions between Gbagbo’s and Ouattara’s supporters which lasted for more than four months. They only ended after Ivorian forces, assisted by French Special Forces, arrested Gbagbo – who had been hiding in a bunker below the presidential residence in Abidjan for several weeks – in early April 2011 (see Economist 2011).} Thus, despite the presence of a formal power-sharing arrangement the three years between March 2004 (the end of the conflict according to the ‘UCDP/Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’) and March 2007 (the adoption of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement) are more adequately described as a case of political domination.

**Obstructive Relations.** In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, it is obvious to see that the relations between the parties in the post-settlement phase were obstructive. The political crisis came into being precisely because a basic consensus about who governs was lacking. The International Crisis Group speaks of several measures of obstruction (“manœuvres d’obstruction”) that became evident during the implementation phase of the agreement (see 2005b: 2). The relations between Gbagbo and the rebel groups remained tense and uncompromising and both sides tried to undermine the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (Mehler 2007: 4). Three factors stand out in this regard.

First, Côte d’Ivoire has, despite the adoption of a peace agreement, effectively remained a divided country. The UN troops, though deployed with a clear mandate to mitigate the tensions between the different ethnic groups (see below), at the same time perpetuated the country’s partition. Without the presence of these external troops, it is very likely that the warring factions would have sought a military solution to the conflict, potentially leading
Chapter 6 ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polities

to a long and bloody armed conflict without any clear victor (see International Crisis Group 2005b: i). Second, Gbagbo has never been honest in his promises to share power and devote himself to peace. Four days after signing the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, he referred to the peace deal as being not more than a “proposition” and encouraged his followers not to worry about the implications (Agence France Presse 2003a). He jeopardized the power-sharing arrangement and dragged his feet on the promise to hold presidential elections. Also, he repeatedly tried to defeat the rebels militarily after signing the agreement (see e.g. Chirot 2006: 73). Third, the entire implementation period of the peace agreement was “badly compromised by a lack of good faith and political will” among all participants (International Crisis Group 2004a: i). As the International Crisis Group remarked, the government of national reconciliation ‘did not reconcile anyone’ (2005a: 1). Mistrust and suspicion remained widespread in both camps. Rather than taking a conciliating posture, well-placed rhetorical attacks from political hardliners – for instance from members of Gbagbo’s FPI, who suggested that the rebels should have been prosecuted rather than included in a civilian government (see Lamin 2005: 19) – further poisoned the atmosphere between the parties. This contributed to an atmosphere in which hardly any of the key provisions of the peace agreement were implemented. Hence, the peace process was stalemated before it actually started (see Bah 2010: 607). As a result, “violence continued, disarmament stalled, elections became elusive, and the government remained dysfunctional” (Bah 2010: 609). Against this background, the period between the adoption of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement of January 2003 and the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement of March 2007 can clearly be considered obstructive.

Mediative Engagement. When classifying external actors’ involvement in Côte d’Ivoire, a clear discrepancy between their own assessment of the situation and the impression their engagement made on the conflict parties becomes apparent. Felix Houphouët-Boigny, Côte d’Ivoire’s long-time president, maintained close links with France throughout his reign; therefore the country has remained under some sort of de facto patronage from its former colonial power during most of its post-colonial history. This has led to rising tensions throughout the past two decades. In an environment of sharply declining national income and painful economic reforms imposed by International Financial Institutions, more and more Ivorians viewed France as a neo-colonial power that is primarily interested in defending its own economic interests in the country (see e.g. Almås 2007: 53). The International Crisis Group described the country’s special relationship with France as a “love-hate relationship” (2004a: 3). During the coup d’etat in 2002, France immediately dispatched some 300 troops in order to evacuate French citizens and protect French business interests (see Mehler 2004: 7). Not surprisingly, French engagement in the conflict led to mixed feelings among Ivorians. On the positive side, “[f]earing that a rebel

18The original quotation is in French: “Le Gouvernement de réconciliation nationale (GRN) n’a réconcilié personne. Il a encore moins préparé le terrain pour une élection présidentielle crédible au terme du mandat constitutionnel du Président Laurent Gbagbo” (International Crisis Group 2005a: 1).
victory would produce another Rwanda, with hundreds of thousands killed [...]”, it can be argued that France’s quick and decisive intervention prevented an escalation of the military confrontation (Chirot 2006: 72). France’s strong role also certainly served as a catalyst for mobilizing additional external involvement, most notably from ECOWAS and the United Nations (see Harris 2007: 182–183). However, on the negative side accusations that the French government – in a neo-gaullistic spirit – was trying to go back to its interventionist policies of colonial times were difficult to dispel, in particular as some provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement were interpreted by Gbagbo’s supporters as privileging the rebels (see Mehler 2004: 7–8). The tension escalated after nine French soldiers were killed in an attack by an Ivorian aircraft in November 2004. In retaliation for the attack, France destroyed the entire Ivorian air force in a targeted attack, which triggered countrywide riots against French institutions and buildings (see Chirot 2006: 73; Hofnung 2005: 88–91). From this moment on, both parties in the conflict declared France to be their enemy. As Chirot comments, “[c]ombined with the deep-rooted resentment against the former colonial power for its high-handedness decades after independence, this made the continuing French presence as unpopular as it was necessary” (2006: 73).

The ‘special relationship’ with France makes it difficult to decide whether external engagement as a whole was mediative or partisan. Originally, there was some indication that France tended towards deposing Gbagbo through holding early elections, but Gbagbo had always insisted to continue his presidential term, which officially lasted until 2005 (see Agence France Presse 2003b). In the end, Gbagbo’s demands were fulfilled, obviously out of recognition that deposing an elected head of state might add instability to an already fragile situation. Since then, external engagement as a whole can be considered mediative. Three factors underline this point: First, although the buffer-zone, put in place by the French intervention and later institutionalized by both ECOWAS and the United Nations, effectively perpetuated the partition of the country, its immediate goal was to prevent an escalation of the armed conflict (see Harris 2007: 182). This goal was achieved quickly although the country has suffered from the consequences of its partition until today. Second, by calling for the establishment of a government of national unity and by deliberately avoiding a clear posture on the looming conflict over the citizenship question (see Bah 2010), the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement was written in a conciliatory spirit and avoided to openly take side against any of the belligerents. Third, after the difficulties with the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement had been realized, the international community increasingly relied on regional mediation under the auspices of the African Union (AU) in order to find a settlement to the conflict. This greatly helped to increase the legitimacy of the peace process and can be seen as a crucial impetus to finding a settlement. As a 2006 Report by the UN Secretary General on the progress of the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire expressed, “[t]he encouraging developments in Côte d’Ivoire during the reporting period would not have been possible without the untiring efforts of the regional leaders, in particular presidents Mbeki, Obasanjo and Tandja” (United Nations 2006e: par. 83).
Chapter 6  ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polities

Though the efforts to include regional leaders were not immediately successful – a 2005 peace agreement struck in Pretoria failed because it, too, avoided a satisfactory solution of the citizenship problem – the successful conclusion of the Ouagadougou agreement in 2007 can be attributed in part to the sense of ownership prevailing among Ivorians (see Bah 2010: 609–611). Out of these reasons, external engagement as a whole can, despite the controversies revolving about France’s role, be regarded as mediative.

6.3.2 Polity Dynamics in Côte D’Ivoire

The case of Côte d’Ivoire confirms the plausibility of many of the assumptions made about ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities above. This is illustrated below with regard to the four overarching themes: dealing with commitment problems, competition for power, threats from within, and external engagement for good governance.

a) Overcoming Commitment Problems

As argued above, the exclusion of parts of the former belligerents from access to formal authority in conjunction with the prevalence of obstructive relations turns ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities into difficult environments for overcoming commitment problems. The excluded opposition is unlikely to disarm even when external actors provide sufficient security guarantees, which is likely to result in ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies according to which the rebels may symbolically comply with the disarmament provisions without giving up any substantive degree of power.

Côte d’Ivoire closely matches these stipulations. The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement provided for a number of trust-raising measures between the parties to be adopted in the implementation phase. The most important one was a process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed combatants to be carried out by the Government of National Reconciliation under “ECOWAS and French force supervision” (see Government of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire 2003; Art. VII, par. 2-4). With the establishment of UNOCI by UN Resolution 1528 on 27 February 2004, the UN was specifically mandated to “help the Government of National Reconciliation implement the national programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the combatants” (U.N. Security Council 2004a, Art. 6 par. e). However, the disarmament process had been stalled from the beginning on, reflecting the pronounced mistrust prevailing between the parties. As Lamin highlights: “Fairly obviously, all parties, without exception, did indeed fail to live up to their commitment to disarm, and instead chose to accuse each other of bad faith. In such a situation, it is difficult to see what third parties could have accomplished” (2005: 20). In July 2004 – nearly one and a half years after the adoption of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement – a high-level meeting on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire took place in Accra, Ghana, in which the parties agreed to a “framework and timeline for the implementation of
the main provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement” (United Nations 2004d; par. 60). According to this plan, the disarmament process was to commence by mid-October 2004.

However, on 9 October the ‘Forces Nouvelles’ leader Guillaume Soro “declared that the disarmament process would not commence on 15 October” (United Nations 2004f; par. 8). According to the UN Secretary General, the reason for this refusal was that “the Forces nouvelles were not prepared to disarm in the absence of progress in the adoption of the key constitutional and legal reforms provided for in that Agreement” (United Nations 2004f; par. 38). Gbagbo’s camp likewise obstructed the disarmament process. The ‘young patriots’ militias associated with the president “ransacked the offices of the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration as well as those of the opposition parties, the Rally of the Republicans (RDR) and the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire-African Democratic Rally (PDCI-RDA)”, which led Soro to declare both the Accra III and Linas-Marcoussis Agreement as “null and void” (United Nations 2004f; par. 15). A new timetable for disarmament was agreed in mid-2005 at the occasion of the Pretoria Agreement and the Yamoussoukro meeting. At the latter occasion, the parties adopted a timetable providing for the disarmament and demobilization process to be concluded by 3 October 2005 (United Nations 2004e; par. 9). However, the implementation of this timetable was repeatedly obstructed by the parties to the extent that disarmament efforts had still not commenced by March 2007 (see e.g. United Nations 2007; par. 4). Hence, as a result of a pronounced ‘foot dragging’ behavior in which both sides engaged, virtually nothing had been achieved in the realm of disarmament in the period under investigation.

In sum, the above paragraph illustrates the tremendous difficulties involved in implementing disarmament and demobilization provisions in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities. This can clearly be attributed to the obstructive relations prevailing between the belligerents, and it was certainly facilitated by the power asymmetry prevailing between the parties. Security concerns constituted a constant obstacle throughout this entire period. Although UNOCI was specifically responsible for guaranteeing the security of ministers of the Government of National Reconciliation, of ‘Forces Nouvelles’ leader Guillaume Soro as well as members of the opposition who had left Côte d’Ivoire out of security concerns (see United Nations 2004e; par. 13), this engagement could not effectively dispel fears for being harassed or excluded. Aside from physically dividing the factions, there was little the international community could do to evoke any sort of cooperation between the parties: “In a situation where all sides played spoilers, the international community was hamstrung” (Lamin 2005: 20).

b) Manner of Political Competition

Because of the obstructive relations prevailing between the former belligerents in conjunction with the lack of even a basic consensus about who governs, I argued above that ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities are characterized by a highly conflictual pattern of political competition. Since the ruling party is likely to (ab)use its sovereign powers for controlling
the political space and extend its hold on power, the excluded parties are disillusioned by the prospect of gaining power through formal channels like competitive elections. As a result, they have little choice other than falling back to informal means of gaining power, which may include the use of violence as a measure of last resort. However, because external actors have a watching eye on the way the dominating party exercises its authority, the party in power is likely to engage in extended ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies in order to mask its authoritarian grip to power.

For Laurent Gbagbo, ‘virtual cooperation’ gestures were key to his long hold on power – arguably to a greater extent than it was the case for Charles Taylor in Liberia. For various reasons, Gbagbo was in a much weaker position than Taylor in his initial years after being elected president. First, although being head of state, Gbagbo did not possess control of powerful armed forces. Côte d’Ivoire had traditionally maintained a relatively weak military, primarily because Ivorian leaders had long trusted on the repelling effect of French troops (see Mehler 2004: 7). Second, although Gbagbo was head of state he only had effective control over half of the country, while the other half was occupied by rebel forces. Together with the fact that his assumption to power was the result of highly dubious elections (see above), his sovereignty and domestic authority was clearly infringed. Third, although external actors decided to engage in a halfhearted manner of intervention, Gbagbo was under much closer external surveillance than Taylor in Liberia. Finally, unlike Taylor – who possessed full sovereign rights – Gbagbo formally headed a power-sharing government and needed to maintain the impression of at least a minimal level of cooperation.

Despite this more challenging situation, Gbagbo has been remarkably successful in his attempts to stay in power. ‘Foot dragging’ and ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies became his main instrument for achieving this. Rather than facing an electoral defeat in the 2005 polls, he managed not only to postpone the elections, but his presidential mandate had repeatedly been extended (and hence legitimized) by both the African Union (AU) and the UN Security Council. For instance, in October 2005, the UN Security Council recognized the “impossibility of organizing presidential elections on the scheduled date […]” and reaffirmed “the decision of the Peace and Security Council […] that president Gbagbo shall remain Head of State from 31 October 2005 for a period not exceeding 12 months […]” (U.N. Security Council 2005a: par. 3). The ‘Forces Nouvelles’ openly rejected this decision and suspended their participation in the council of ministers. This created further tensions between the groups, as “[b]oth the opposition and the ruling party organized rallies in Abidjan to underscore their respective positions on the expiry of the president’s mandate” (United Nations 2006d: par. 8). However, in order to strengthen the transitional government and contain Gbagbo’s authority, the UN Security Council also supported the African Union’s attempts to install a new Prime Minister “endowed with real decision-making powers until presidential elections could be organised” (Chirot 2006: 74; International Crisis Group 2007e: 2). After several meetings of regional leaders,
they appointed Charles Konan Banny to assume that role, who was officially inaugurated on 7 December 2005. Gbagbo immediately rejected this decision and did everything to effectively “neutralize” Banny (International Crisis Group 2007d: 2). Hence, the international community’s strategy to ‘tame’ Gbagbo by assigning a strong Prime Minister blatantly failed.

However, there were various occasions in which ‘foot dragging’ strategies reached their limit. In January 2006, for instance, an international working group mandated by the United Nations officially suggested to dissolve the parliament in order to clear the way for presidential elections. The parliament’s official mandate had ended in December 2005, but the assembly remained in power upon Gbagbo’s personal request (see Voice of America 2006). Keen to avoid the dissolution of the parliament by all means, Gbagbo made use of a ‘saber rattling’ strategy with which he underlined his potential to act as a spoiler if necessary. He orchestrated anti-UN riots and militias loyal to the president even tried to seize the UNOCI headquarters (see Voice of America 2006). This bold move was a success: almost immediately the UN gave up their demands. However, Gbagbo’s confrontational stance required to quickly switch back from a ‘virtual confrontation’ to a ‘virtual cooperation’ strategy. In February 2006, he therefore accepted an invitation by the new Prime Minister for a meeting with main political leaders, including ‘Forces Nouvelles’ leader Guillaume Soro, which constituted their first personal meeting since 2002 (see United Nations 2006b: par. 11). This gave rise to hopes that the parties had, finally, switched to a more cooperative modus operandi and met the international community’s immediate approval. In July 2006, the UN Secretary General hailed the “working relationship between the tandem formed by president Gbagbo and Prime Minister Banny […]” and underlined that “[s]ince the beginning of the conflict, Côte d’Ivoire has never been as close to resolving the key issues that lie at the heart of the crisis […]” (United Nations 2006c: par. 51). In this environment of goodwill, it became easier for Gbagbo to obstruct once more the most important goal of the transitional government: preparing the country for the elections in October. As a frustrated UN Secretary General stated in October 2006:

“The manifest lack of political will by the main Ivorian political leaders, in particular their inability to transcend narrow personal and political interests […] have created yet another major stalemate. At every critical turn of the peace process, some of the main political leaders have resorted to calculated obstruction of the peace process, exploiting loopholes in the peace agreements, using legal technicalities and often inciting violent acts by their followers. Consequently, the second transition period, like the first, is coming to a close without elections” (United Nations 2006g: par. 70).

However, the international community’s willingness to learn from this episode was extremely limited. Rather than seeking more effective ways of dealing with Gbagbo, the international community essentially repeated the decision made one year earlier: extending both Gbagbo’s and Banny’s mandates, each for a period of twelve months, and postponing the elections by another year. These decisions were made at the African Union’s ‘Peace
Chapter 6 ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polities

and Security Council’ and later endorsed by the UN Security Council in resolution 1721 of 1 November 2006 (U.N. Security Council 2005b). For Gbagbo, this outcome was ideal: it again legitimized his de facto presidency and gave him another twelve months time for seeking a way out of his electoral dilemma. As it soon turned out, he did not even need so much time, as he swiftly pulled out a plan B for rescuing his presidency – to the surprise of the international community and his political opponents alike. On 19 December 2006, Gbagbo officially announced to open a direct dialogue with the ‘Forces Nouvelles’, mediated by the rebels’ main supporter, president Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso. The meeting took place in Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso in March 2007 and resulted in a new power-sharing deal, according to which Gbagbo would remain president and Guillaume Soro assumed the post of a Prime Minister (see e.g. Bah 2010: 613). The international community lauded the deal. Observers underlined the “surprising spectacle of a visibly cordial coexistence between the two former enemies […]” as the International Crisis Group remarked somewhat cynically (2007d: 1). The UN Secretary General congratulated the signatories for “mustering the necessary political will to assume full responsibility for resolving the crisis in their country” and underlined that the “advent of the Ouagadougou agreement […] takes the Ivorian peace process to a unique turning point” (United Nations 2007: par. 98-99). However, pleasing the international community certainly was not the only motivation of the two leaders for striking the deal. Both of them profited politically from the agreement:

“Gbagbo saved his presidency and gained a strong platform from which to launch another presidential bid. As a powerful Prime Minister, Soro has a strong position to shape the implementation of the agreement and deliver to northerners their citizenship documents. For Soro, this could be a vindication of the rebellion and a path to becoming a hero in the north” (Bah 2010: 613).

For Gbagbo, who was the main initiator of the dialogue, the gains clearly outweighed the costs. Although the agreement meant that, this time, he would need to engage in more faithful power-sharing than during earlier agreements, he bought himself time and political credit for preparing a successful presidential campaign. As the International Crisis Group remarked: “Everything is negotiable for the Ivorian president, except the extent of his powers and anything that could affect his chances of remaining president” (2007d: 3). The beginning of the new power-sharing agreement was indeed marked by a relatively close cooperation between Gbagbo and Soro, but their relations became more and more obstructive as the elections moved closer. In what had already been a familiar pattern by then, Gbagbo refused to hold elections in November 2009 and dissolved the government in February 2010 (see Bah 2010: 614; International Crisis Group 2010).19

19As mentioned above, the period beginning with the conclusion of the Ouagadougou agreement on Côte d’Ivoire is classified as a mediated, obstructive power-sharing polity. Therefore, the events taking place after March 2007 are not discussed here in detail.
Gbagbo’s false promises and repeated violations of agreements increasingly frustrated the ‘Forces Nouvelles’. After the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement they could still hope to gain power through the ballot-box within a two-year period. As it was the case in Liberia, this had a unifying effect on an otherwise heterogeneous and fragmented opposition. Though predominantly originating from the Muslim north of the country, the opposition against Gbagbo was both an ethnically and religiously heterogeneous group (Kirwin 2006: 49), which formed an electoral alliance in light of Gbagbo’s attempts for dominating the country’s political scene. In March 2004, seven different opposition groups coalesced against Gbagbo – the so-called G7 or ‘Coalition des Marcoussistes’.

The common goal of this coalition was to enforce the implementation of key provision from the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, suggesting to establish a transitional government without Gbagbo’s leadership (see International Crisis Group 2005a: 8–14). The formation of this coalition had tremendous effects on Gbagbo’s calculations to remain in power through public elections. According to Chirot, it “meant that Gbagbo would have no chance of winning a free election even if northerners were excluded, because he and his ethnic allies had become a minority in the south itself” (2006: 74). A major point of disagreement between Gbagbo and his opponents was over the legitimacy of the national electoral commission, which was charged with organizing the polls in 2005. Suspecting Gbagbo of controlling or manipulating the commission, the opposition groups called for a neutral third party (the United Nations) to organize the elections (International Crisis Group 2005b: 21). The International Crisis Group had recommended in due time that the international community should take the organization of elections in its own hands and guarantee their transparency (see e.g. 2005b: i–ii), but these recommendations were obviously overheard by the international community.

However, just as in Liberia, Gbagbo’s continued policy of effectively excluding (or: outmaneuvering) the opposition led to increasing doubts about the prospects of being able to compete against Gbagbo through the ballot-box. In light of Gbagbo’s extended pattern of ‘virtual cooperation’ they have soon become aware that participating in the fake power-sharing government would not clear the way for free and fair elections. As a result, the ‘Forces Nouvelles’ soon switched to informal means for remaining in power. Disillusioned by the power-sharing arrangement, they repeatedly suspended their participation in the transitional government. This happened for the first time in September 2003 after Gbagbo announced the appointment of the defense and internal security ministers. Complaining that the appointment procedure violated earlier agreements, the ‘Forces Nouvelles’ announced their suspension from the transitional government on 23 September (see United Nations

20 It comprised the PDCI-RDA, the Rally of the Republicans (RDR), the Union pour la démocratie et pour la paix en Côte d’Ivoire (UDPCI), the Mouvement des forces de l’avenir (MFA), the Mouvement patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), the Mouvement populaire ivoirien du grand ouest (MPIGO) and the Mouvement pour la justice et la paix (MJP) (see United Nations 2004b: par. 7). Some of them were powerful southern groups associated with Houphouet-Boigny’s former ruling party, who were disgruntled after Gbagbo broke with them (see Chirot 2006: 74).
For Gbagbo, this provided a pretext to blame the opposition for the failure of the peace process and to announce that he would unite the country by force if necessary. This led to a severe deterioration of the security situation and culminated in an attempt by government forces to cross the ceasefire line. Government soldiers also seized a national television station in order to broadcast an announcement prompting external actors to withdraw from the ‘zone of confidence’ in order to allow the government forces “to fight the Forces nouvelles and ‘reunite’ the country” (United Nations 2004c; par. 12-13; see also United Nations 2003b; par. 8). After the tempers cooled down, the ‘Forces Nouvelles’ returned to the power-sharing government in January 2004, only to again suspend their participation in October, after representatives of the former rebel group claimed to have discovered a secret transport of weaponry and ammunition to the rebel stronghold Bouaké (see United Nations 2004f; par. 12). At the latest from this moment on, power-sharing had been defunct, giving rise to ever more obstructive relations between the factions.

In sum, Gbagbo’s success in remaining in power despite the presence of highly obstructive relations is remarkable. When the elections ultimately took place in November 2010 he had already been in power five years longer than originally provided for in the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The use of ‘virtual cooperation’ gestures (backed by a few ‘saber rattling’ gestures where necessary) was key for achieving this goal. Blinded by a few conciliating gestures, the international community constantly seems to have hoped that Gbagbo would cooperate over time and make room for elections to take place.

c) Threats from Within

The dilemma faced by leaders of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities with regard to the manner in which they deal with threats from within also becomes apparent in the case of Côte d’Ivoire. Facing increasing resistance from the excluded parties through informal channels of political competition, they are likely to adopt similar measures, most notably by controlling the political space and curtailing civil society and the free media. This may over time amount to a pattern of genuine confrontation. However, these efforts are marked by the attempt to still maintain a veil of democratic rule, because the leaders of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities must be concerned about external actors giving up their mediative stance and supporting the opposition’s cause. The case of Côte d’Ivoire gives a good illustration of the dangerous potential that is entailed by the increasingly informal manner of political competition. It can be shown that, over time, both parties adopted more confrontational and coercive instruments of political competition.

Unlike Charles Taylor in Liberia, Gbagbo formally headed a power-sharing government and was therefore exposed to greater external scrutiny. As a result, he needed to use subtler means for extending his hold on power than Taylor, although the general logic was very similar. Both Taylor and Gbagbo relied on informal and coercive instruments for dealing with threats from within while maintaining a superficial veil of cooperation. Just as Taylor, who used the existence of a myriad of security forces as a pretext to
obscure his responsibility for attacks of opposition members, Gbagbo relied on so called ‘young patriots’ – a militia of young supporters armed with machetes and knives which repeatedly obstructed the peace process and which was held responsible for harassment and atrocities.\footnote{For a historical background of the ‘young patriots’ militias, see in particular Banégas (2006).} This militia had the advantage that Gbagbo could formally distance himself from its actions and could deny any responsibility for its atrocities. However, the ‘young patriots’ have always acted to the president’s advantage and have torpedoed the peace agreement since its very beginnings. Not more than one day after the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement was signed, they started a riot in the country’s largest city Abidjan, attacking French citizens and institutions. In an attempt to express their aversion against the power-sharing deal, “armed gangs looted and killed as they swept up so-called rebels in Abidjan districts inhabited by northerners” (Chirot 2006: 72). This was only the starting point for a whole series of attacks. In November 2003, for instance ‘young patriots’ militias joined with some 100 troops from the national army and attempted to “forcibly cross the ceasefire line […] with the aim of launching an attack against the Forces nouvelles” (United Nations 2004c; par. 12). All in all, the impression prevails that the ‘young patriots’ were “[o]ne of the key elements in the political-military struggle that has wrecked Côte d’Ivoire since 2002 […]” (Banégas 2006: 1). Though it is hard to prove that these militias acted on behalf of Gbagbo, the UN Secretary General was right to point out that the government has done “little […] to check the abuses by urban militias or youth groups, such as the Young Patriots, who have been responsible for attacks against and harassment of civilians […]” (United Nations 2004c; par. 30). But the government also made use of more direct means of coercion. It repeatedly tried to launch offensives against the rebel-held north in an attempt to weaken the rebels. In November 2004, for instance,

“government forces launched a series of poorly coordinated attacks against the rebels. They bombed northern cities, killing dozens of civilians, and attacked the Abidjan hotel that housed the rebel delegates to the powerless coalition government set up at Marcoussis. UN troops backed by the French blocked a government thrust toward the rebel capital of Bouaké, and UN guards protected the rebel delegates in Abidjan, who would otherwise have been killed” (Chirot 2006: 73).

Strategic use of the media was the other pillar on which the parties relied in their attempts to weaken their opponents. The media has from the beginning on been a key element in the parties’ attempts to mobilize public support for their course. As the International Crisis Group pointed out, “[t]he political elites’ skilled use of the media has led many to believe that the Ivorian crisis is really about deep-seated hatreds with a long history”, which has turned out as “a useful way to disqualify opponents in order to monopolise political […] power” (2004a). The UN Secretary General noted in 2004 that “the Ivorian media have unleashed a considerable amount of hate propaganda, which, coupled with the widespread lack of objectivity of most local news reports, has become a major destabilizing factor”
This can be interpreted as the systematic use of ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies by which both parties tried to delegitimize their opponents. In an attempt to counter these threats, the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement dealt explicitly with “the incitement to hatred and xenophobia propagated by certain media” and called upon the national transitional government to “restore free broadcasting of the international radio and television media” (Government of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire 2003; Art. V, par. 1-3). External actors also dealt with the destabilizing potential posed by media. In resolution 1572 (2004), the UN Security Council called for the Ivorian parties to “stop all radio and television broadcasts inciting hatred, intolerance and violence” (U.N. Security Council 2004c; par. 6). In accordance with its mandate, UNOCI set up an independent radio station, ONUCI FM, which “provide[d] its listeners with unbiased and non-partisan information” (United Nations 2004d; par. 45). The UN Secretary General has also regularly reported on progress yielded with regard to attempts for combating destabilizing media reports. For instance, in 2005 he reported that “incitements to violence, exclusion and intolerance and calls for a resumption of the armed conflict [. . . ] continued uninterrupted by the Ivorian media, in particular those associated with the ruling party” (United Nations 2004e; par. 41).

Overall, the role of the media in motivating militias like the ‘young patriots’ to engage in violent activities cannot be overestimated. It effectively gave the political leaders – most notably Gbagbo, who had enjoyed a privileged access to the media – an indirect instrument for ‘commanding’ violent attacks while at the same time denying every responsibility for their actions and maintaining the facade of (virtual) cooperation. This last aspect was crucial for Gbagbo, since he had to avoid the impression of being the main spoiler of the peace process. Standing under closer surveillance from external actors, Gbagbo occasionally needed to demonstrate his goodwill in order to be able to save his presidency, as demonstrated in the paragraph on political competition above. This strategy was generally successful. As the International Crisis Group noted in 2005, ‘the protagonists of the Ivorian crisis know how to please the international community by giving them the impression to cooperate’ – while, in effect, they have long shown little inclination to advance to peace in earnest (see 2005b: i).22 This strategy was particularly pronounced between the signing of the Accra III agreement in July 2004 and the renewed rupture of the relations between the government and the rebels in December 2004. In this period, the parties were engaged in their ‘favorite game, consisting precisely of bypassing the rules of the game, denying their obligations, mutually accusing each other of a lack of good will,

---

and of exploiting, with an undeniable bravery, the smallest room for maneuver resulting from the imprecision of the peace accords […]’ (International Crisis Group 2005b: 4).\textsuperscript{23}

In sum, both parties relied on informal and unconstitutional instruments for increasing their share of influence in the polity, most notably through relying on militias, which repeatedly tried to escalate the situation; this at the same time allowed the leaders to deny every responsibility for their attacks. This constituted a significant threat to the stability of the polity as a whole. An additional threat arose from the parties’ systematic use of the media as an instrument to circulate their hate rhetoric, which aimed at mobilizing public opinion against their adversaries.

d) Promoting Good Governance

External attempts for promoting good governance in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities are likely to be marred by significant challenges and profound difficulties. Above, I argued that the conflictual nature of this polity requires a particularly intensive engagement by external actors. At the same time, it constitutes a profound obstacle for external actors to provide the necessary resources. In addition, they are likely to face pressure by the incumbent regime to withdraw. This may result either in a hasty withdrawal amidst an incomplete statebuilding agenda or a long-enduring engagement in which exit options are hard to conceive and in which the promotion of good governance principles remains a responsibility for external actors in the long run. The case of Liberia partly confirms these stipulations because external actors gave in to pressures from the Taylor regime for a quick withdrawal. However, Taylor’s subsequent abuse of power and his continued support for the RUF rebels made external actors reconsider over time and impose sanctions against the regime.

In Côte d’Ivoire, the outcome was different. Unlike in Liberia, where Taylor’s election had ended the civil war, Gbagbo’s dubious victory in the polls gave the impetus for the civil war in the first place. This implied that Gbagbo’s authority was, in the eyes of external actors, less sacrosanct than Taylor’s had initially been, and external engagement has therefore been relatively intense from the beginning on. Although Gbagbo tried to reduce external pressure in order to clear the way for a military solution (see above), he had never been successful in achieving this goal. In addition, the historically strong role played by France implied that the international community as a whole possessed a greater willingness to remain engaged in the country. However, due to the tense Franco-Ivorian relations, France ran a high risk of undermining its own legitimacy by intervening in their

\textsuperscript{23}Own translation from the French original: “Entre ces deux dates, les acteurs du conflit ivoirien se sont livrés à leur jeu favori consistant précisément à contourner les règles du jeu, à renier leurs engagements, à s’accuser mutuellement de mauvaise foi et à exploiter avec un incontestable brio les moindres marges de manœuvre résultant de l’imprécision des accords de paix, qu’il s’agisse de ceux de Linas-Marcoussis ou de ceux d’Accra III” (International Crisis Group 2005b: 4).
former colony (see e.g. Mehler 2004: 6–8). This has raised the risk for charges of neo-colonialism to be transferred to the international community at large. In the eyes of the International Crisis Group, the international community therefore faced a dilemma of either forcing the Ivorian parties to comply with external engagement (which risks causing significant resistance) or to disengage and abandon the country to its fate (2005b: i).

In Liberia, the international community had initially chosen a soft-handed approach that gave Taylor exclusive control of the political arena and that effectively reduced external pressure to a minimum. This only changed after Taylor had effectively been drawn into another civil war and when external actors had to admit that hopes he would turn into a more statesmanlike leader turned out as illusionary. In Côte d’Ivoire, the international community chose neither of the two extreme options but instead a halfhearted middle-way. This had already been reflected in the faulty Linas-Marcoussis Agreement of 2003, which was quickly hammered under French leadership but which failed to address the most pressing issues of the conflict – most notably the citizenship issue that constituted the main grievance of the conflict (see Mehler 2007: 4). As Bah comments, “[e]ven when citizenship was addressed in the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, it was largely treated as a legal and administrative problem” (2010: 599). Not surprisingly, the implementation of the agreement was conflict-ridden from the start, as already illustrated above. Nonetheless, external actors had long clung to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement as the major point of reference for the peace process. Instead of acknowledging that it provided an ill-suited basis for the Ivorian peace process, additional agreements, adopted in 2004 (Accra III) and 2005 (Pretoria Agreement), followed the spirit of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement very closely. Using again a phrase of Bah: “Ironically, this blemished agreement became the cornerstone of the subsequent agreements negotiated by the international community” (2010: 606).

As shown above, Gbagbo dragged his feet in implementing the agreement. Making extensive use of ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies, he found various ways to circumvent the international community’s demands and break his own promises without facing any significant punishment. This effectively provided a context in which calls for maintaining good governance standards went unheard. As Chirot remarked in 2006, “[a] unitary and fair democracy is impossible at this point, and every effort to broker one will end up with the same stalemate and broken promises” (2006: 75). Human rights violations remained

24 According to Andreas Mehler, the self-declared goal of French policy in Africa lies in the protection of ‘legitimate authority’. However, given that President Jacques Chirac referred to Gbagbo as heading a ‘fascist regime’, Mehler concludes that Gbagbo had apparently ceased to be viewed as a legitimate ruler by French authorities (2004: 8).

25 The original text of the International Crisis Group Report (in French) is telling in this regard: “La communauté internationale fait face à un dilemme clair: elle peut soit contraindre les belligérants à respecter enfin leurs engagements, ce qu’ils n’ont encore jamais fait, soit se désengager et abandonner la Côte d’Ivoire à son triste sort” (2005b: i).

26 The International Crisis Group warned in this context that choosing a middle-way is doomed to failure: “[…] une position médiane, à mi-chemin entre la coercition et l’inaction, est promise à l’échec” (2005b: i).
pervasive throughout the entire period under investigation here, which can in large part be contributed to the indiscriminate killings committed by groups such as the ‘young patriots’, but also to continued violations by state organs and the rebels. A quotation from the UN Secretary General vividly illustrates the full extent of these human rights violations:

“Politically motivated and arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings, rape, confiscation of private property and the intimidation of opposition leaders and their followers were widely committed with impunity by elements of the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces and by the Forces nouvelles, and militias associated with both forces. Of particular concern were the incidents of ethnically motivated human rights abuses such as killings, rape and the destruction of dwellings, which were also committed by ethnic and community-based militias” (United Nations 2004e).

The climate of impunity that prevailed in Côte d’Ivoire made it very unlikely for the perpetrators to be held accountable. Elsewhere, the UN Secretary General noted that “the severely compromised administration of justice allows the perpetrators […] to operate freely” (see United Nations 2005a; par. 46). The international community could do little in order to improve the human rights situation on the ground. Although external actors intervened on some occasions in order to prevent large-scale human rights violations (see above), their halfhearted manner of intervention prevented them from taking a harder approach towards the perpetrators of human rights violations. Its actions were confined to documenting the human rights situation and criticizing the parties for their violations, but little was done to prevent them. According to its mandate, UNOCI documented the human rights situation in Côte d’Ivoire and published reports on the human rights situation in the country. In its third report, for instance, UNOCI criticized “egregious human rights violations and the reluctance of the authorities on either side of the zone of confidence to conduct criminal investigations into cases brought to their attention” (see United Nations 2006d; par. 61). However, other than engaging in awareness-raising programs and conducting investigations into those human rights violations brought to its attention, there was little UNOCI could do in order to improve the situation. The partition of the country additionally hampered the promotion of good governance principles and had negative repercussions for various good governance dimensions. In the realm of justice, for instance, the division of the country split the jurisdiction of some courts, with the effect that some areas had “no access to any judicial process” (see United Nations 2005a; par. 40).

In sum, the above paragraph suggests that external actors were incapable of having any significant effect on the compliance with good governance standards in Côte d’Ivoire. Undoubtedly, the zone of confidence prevented the recurrence of large-scale organized violence, but it contributed to an environment in which calling for good governance standards became illusionary. Ostensibly, external actors have since the beginning of their engagement in Côte d’Ivoire believed that elections were within reach, inducing them to postpone the promotion of good governance standards to the post-election era.
This outcome suggests that ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities constitute a very difficult environment for promoting good governance standards even if external actors remain engaged on the ground.

### 6.4 ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polities: Conclusions

The two cases discussed above illustrate the internal dynamics of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities. Overall, it has become apparent that this polity type differs significantly from ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities discussed in the previous chapter. The lack of constructive relations and a pronounced dissent about the distribution of formal governmental authority gives rise to interactions that are far more conflict-prone and confrontational. The following conclusions can be drawn from these cases (for a short summary, see table 6.1 on page 245):

First, it has become apparent that ‘The Winner Take it All’ polities provide a particularly difficult environment for overcoming commitment problems in the implementation phase of the polity. In section 6.1 I stipulated that the prevalence of obstructive relations in conjunction with the far-reaching exclusion of one of the warring parties from governmental power (and hence from the state security apparatus) impede attempts for an effective disarmament of the warring parties even if external actors are willing to provide significant security guarantees. The two cases by and large confirm these stipulations. Liberia is only partly suitable as a case for illustrating the dynamics of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities with regard to disarmament because the main efforts for disarming the warring parties had taken place before the elections in 1997, i.e. before a ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity was formally in place. At this point, it had still been unclear who would win the elections, which is one factor to explain why the parties fulfilled their disarmament obligations at least in part. However, the Liberian case also vividly illustrates that the belligerents tried to make sure that the disarmament process is not too painful and does not significantly curtail their military capacities. In what can be treated as a ‘virtual cooperation’ attempt, they handed in weapons of poor quality or tried to register civilians for the demobilization program. The mistrust prevailing between Taylor and his former opponents also prevented the newly elected president to integrate his forces into the national army, which had been dominated by members of the Krahn ethnic group. In outright violation of the Arusha Agreement, Taylor created parallel security forces, triggering a serious confrontation with the ECOMOG command. In Côte d’Ivoire, attempts for disarmament and demobilization were characterized by the outright resistance of all parties from the beginning on. Despite the presence of a zone of confidence which physically divided the former belligerents, none of them could be induced to comply with the disarmament provisions contained in the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The parties made extensive use of ‘foot dragging’ strategies with which they managed to forestall the disarmament process for more than three years. Militias associated with the warring parties (most notably the ‘young patriots’ associated
### 6.4 ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polities: Conclusions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Côte d’Ivoire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment Problems</td>
<td>Disarmament efforts were carried out before the 1997 elections; parties partly fulfilled their disarmament obligations but also engaged in significant ‘virtual cooperation’ behavior; suspicion against Krahn dominated national army induced Taylor to rely on parallel security forces for his own security.</td>
<td>Disarmament process stalled from the beginning on despite external security guarantees; parties engaged in extensive ‘foot dragging’ and ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies; parties (in particular ‘young patriots’) made use of ‘calculated escalation’ strategies in an attempt to circumvent their disarmament obligations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Competition</td>
<td>Pronounced ‘virtual cooperation’ behavior; Taylor tried to present himself as a responsible and accountable ruler in order to boost international support; no level playing field: opposition parties were thoroughly excluded and the former anti-Taylor factions lacked realistic prospects for competing against the president in popular elections; opportunities for self-enrichment strengthened Taylor’s grip to power.</td>
<td>Gbagbo secured his hold on power by engaging in pronounced ‘foot dragging’ strategies; he oscillated between ‘virtual cooperation’ and ‘saber rattling’ strategies in order to appease external actors; opposition became increasingly disillusioned by the prospect of gaining power through competitive elections and sought informal channels for gaining power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats from Within</td>
<td>Both sides fell back to informal and unconstitutional instruments of competition from the beginning on; Taylor exerted tight control of the political space and systematically targeted opposition politicians; lack of perspectives induced heterogeneous opposition to unite and re-arm in order to unseat Taylor militarily before he could legitimize his rule through popular elections.</td>
<td>Both parties fell back to informal and unconstitutional instruments of competition (‘genuine confrontation’); Gbagbo relied on militias (‘young patriots’) as an instrument of confrontation without officially taking responsibility; both parties made strategic use of the media and engaged in extensive ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies in order to mobilize public opinion against their adversaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Governance</td>
<td>Difficult environment for promoting good governance; external actors took early exit option by giving in to Taylor’s demand for an early withdrawal, which deprived them of every leverage to push for good governance principles; Taylor’s ongoing refusal to end his support for the RUF in Sierra Leone triggered increasing external pressure and induced a more and more partisan manner of external engagement.</td>
<td>Difficult environment for promoting good governance; Gbagbo was under closer external surveillance but external actors mainly adopted ‘virtual enforcement’ measures; partition of the country has impeded progress in the realm of good governance in many issue areas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1: Dynamics of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities

With Gbagbo) repeatedly relied on ‘calculated escalation’ strategies, contributing to an environment in which effective disarmament became impossible.

Second, the cases illustrate that political competition in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities is by definition highly confrontational. Competition for power in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities is unlikely to be carried out on a level playing field. Due to its exclusive control of
the state apparatus, the government-side has a comparative advantage over the excluded parties and is likely to use it in order to secure its hold on power. This deprives the excluded parties of a realistic perspective for gaining power through elections at some point in the near future. They are therefore likely to rely on informal means of political competition, which may include recourse to armed force as a measure of last resort. The case of Liberia demonstrates that Taylor was eager to gain exclusive control of the state apparatus immediately after his election for president and that he ostensibly viewed his control of the state apparatus as a formidable instrument of self-enrichment. However, knowing that external observers scrutinized his qualities as a civilian ruler, he made a number of flimsy attempts to present himself as a responsible statesman, for instance by including members from the opposition into his cabinet. This inclusive facade was soon overshadowed by the harassment of opposition politicians and an ever tighter control of the political space. The lack of future perspectives for the rebel groups was particularly pronounced in the case of Liberia because the anti-Taylor factions mainly comprised Krahn and Mandingo, i.e. members from those two tribes with the lowest level of popular support. In Côte d’Ivoire, the constellation was different, because Gbagbo and his opponents were formally part of a power-sharing government and because the former rebel groups faced much better electoral prospects. Rather than counting on a victory in future elections, Gbagbo did everything to prevent the polls from taking place in order to extend his de facto rule as long as possible. By oscillating between ‘virtual cooperation’ and ‘saber rattling’ strategies, Gbagbo could successfully postpone the elections for a total of five years until he felt ready for them. The former rebel groups became increasingly disillusioned by Gbagbo’s deceptive maneuvers and increasingly sought informal channels of political competition, for instance by suspending their participation in the transitional government.

Third, the parties in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities are particularly likely to engage in attempts to outmaneuver political opponents and exploit every opportunity to gain a relative advantage over them. Due to the lacking consensus about the status quo, the parties constantly try to gain more de facto power – either with the aim to inflict serious harm on one’s opponents or out of fear about being overthrown themselves. In Liberia, this has become apparent by Taylor’s attempts to control the political space and curtail opposition’s room for maneuver. Making use of his heterogeneous security forces, Taylor harassed political opponents and allegedly was responsible for targeted killings of key opposition figures. The vast number of security forces he maintained – some of which suffered from poor command and control structures – allowed Taylor to deny any responsibility for their actions. This repressive style of rule forced many opposition politicians into exile and constituted the main reason for the former rebel groups to rearm and unite against Taylor. In Côte d’Ivoire, the parties made use of various informal and unconstitutional instruments in order to increase their relative share of de facto power. At several occasions, Gbagbo tried to pass through the zone of confidence in order to provoke a direct military escalation with the rebel groups. He also called on external actors to withdraw in order to give him the
opportunity to ‘unite’ the country. However, his most important instrument of obstruction were not the official armed forces but the ‘young patriots’ militias who most likely acted on his order. The reliance on this heterogeneous militia group allowed Gbagbo to launch attacks against the rebels with officially having to take the responsibility for their actions. In addition to that, both parties made extensive use of ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies, i.e. deliberate attempts to delegitimize one’s opponents and manipulate public opinion in one’s own favor. Since the very beginnings of the conflict, the media has played a key role in this regard. Despite making use of such instruments, neither side could gain any significant advantage in the post-conflict period under investigation.

Fourth, ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities pose a particularly challenging environment for promoting good governance principles. Above, it was stipulated that the prevalence of obstructive relations between the former belligerents in conjunction with the constant possibility for resource to armed force contributes to a situation in which the prospects for transparent and accountable rule are dismal and in which human rights violations are likely to be pervasive. In addition, the existence of a stable (and sometimes democratically legitimized) government gives external actors a good pretext to seek early exit options. Some of these assumptions are confirmed by the cases, although the role played by external actors in the polities differed significantly. In Liberia, external actors respected Taylor’s sovereignty and were willing to give him a chance. After ECOMOG’s early withdrawal, there was little external power left to constrain Taylor. This gave rise to a situation in which external actors had little leverage to call upon the government to comply with good governance standards. Aside from the fact that Taylor came to power through free and fair elections, his manner of rule was diametrically opposed to the principles of good governance, as corruption, human rights violations, the curtailing of the media and abuse of public funds were widespread during his rule. However, the greatest source of concern for external actors was Taylor’s continued support for the RUF in Sierra Leone, which was increasingly perceived as the main obstacle to peace in this country. This induced external actors to lean more and more to a partisan manner of engagement and impose strict sanctions against Taylor’s regime. It also finds its expression in their tacit approval of and indirect support for the LURD and MODEL insurgents. In Côte d’Ivoire the constellation was different, because external actors had at no point withdrawn from the country. Despite their stronger presence, they turned out as unwilling or incapable of enforcing good governance standards. Buying into the parties’ ‘virtual cooperation’ and ‘foot dragging’ gestures, they had ostensibly believed that elections were within reach, as provided for by the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, and postponed the enforcement of good governance standards until after the elections. Meanwhile, the zone of confidence perpetuated the country’s partition into a rebel-held north and a government-held south. Among other things, this accounted for widespread human rights violations, propelled by a culture of impunity. Though UNOCI regularly called upon the parties to refrain from human rights violations, it could do little more than reporting and investigating past
atrocities. Its abilities to prevent large-scale human rights violations were significantly limited.
Chapter 7

‘You Stay Out’ Polities

All cases discussed so far were cases of mediative external engagement. The last polity type discussed here contains cases of partisan external engagement, i.e. cases in which external actors have a systematic and intentional bias for the incumbent regime. At the same time, all cases of partisan engagement contained in the sample depicted a strong executive dominance by one of the former warring factions as well as obstructive relations between the belligerents; therefore, they can all be subsumed under the ‘obstructive partisan domination’ or ‘You Stay Out’ polity type. In total, four cases from the sample fall under this polity type: Afghanistan since the US-led military intervention in 2001, Haiti (after Bertrand Aristide was reinstalled in office), Post-genocide Rwanda and post-conflict Tajikistan since 9/11 (see table A.1 on page 327). Of those, Afghanistan is undoubtedly the clearest contemporary case of partisan intervention, and the ever increasing proliferation of violence leaves little doubt that the relations between the government and the armed opposition are obstructive. Yet, it is argued here that the case is exceptional and unsuitable for demonstrating broader post-conflict dynamics, because it is strictly speaking not a post-conflict case.\(^1\) Haiti is also not the ideal case for demonstrating post-conflict dynamics. The country’s elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide was ousted in a military coup in 1991, and his reinstatement three years later can be exclusively attributed to a US-led military intervention. Thus, the case clearly fulfills the requirement for partisan external engagement. However, the case arguably suffers from the absence of a preceding armed conflict. The violence that accompanied the coup against Aristide in 1991 led to an estimated 4,000 deaths in the ensuing three years but lacked the existence of an armed opposition of any significant sort (see A.11). Since the case is contained in the ‘UCDP/Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ it nonetheless forms a legitimate case of post-conflict intervention; yet, in order to demonstrate the dynamics between the former warring factions the case arguably offers too little for being included in this chapter.

\(^1\)Although Afghanistan experienced a civil war in the post-Cold War period the invasion of the country by a US-led coalition in 2001 was not related to the civil war as such. Rather, the present civil war can be seen as a consequence of the external intervention. The scale and scope of external engagement by far exceeds the average level of outside intervention in post-settlement situations. Despite that, the case of Afghanistan tends to be subsumed under the broader literature on post-conflict engagements, and for this reason it is discussed in the appendix in section 9.1.
Chapter 7 ‘You Stay Out’ Polities

The two remaining cases, Rwanda and Tajikistan, are discussed below as examples for ‘You Stay Out’ polities. Both are cases in which partisan external engagement falls short from a large-scale military intervention on behalf of one of the conflict parties as it could be observed in Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, Haiti. In post-genocide Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which put an end to the genocide by conquering the Rwandan capital Kigali in 1994, established a strongly autocratic regime – initially under the veil of a broad-based power-sharing arrangement until its facade started to crumble. Due to the moral authority it gained by ending the genocide, the RPF was able to mobilize nearly unlimited international support for its policies and the international community ultimately even sanctioned or ignored large-scale human rights violations committed by the RPF. Tajikistan is an even subtler case of partisan external engagement. Although the case has never been prominently represented on international policy-makers’ agendas, the ruling government in post-conflict Tajikistan could successfully mobilize international concerns against a gradual takeover of the country by an allegedly ‘radical’ Islamic opposition. In particular after 9/11, the country possessed significant strategic importance for the United States and other Western nations and has been considered an ally in the war against terrorism. Despite the presence of moderate democratization pressure, this exploitation of Western fears has led to a blossoming of external support for the Tajik government, which has allowed the latter to further consolidate its hold on power. Before discussing these cases in more detail, the following section sheds a brief light on the dynamics of ‘You Stay Out’ polities in a more theoretical manner.

7.1 A basic model of ‘You Stay Out’ Polities

The basic features of ‘You Stay Out’ polities are schematically sketched in figure 7.1 on page 251. As the figure illustrates, only Side A holds control of the formal government, whereas Side B is excluded from access to governmental authority. As it is the case in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities, a basic consensus about this distribution of governmental power among the former warring parties is lacking. This is illustrated by the thick black line dividing the former belligerents. The major difference to ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities discussed in the previous chapter is the partisan engagement of external actors, which is illustrated in figure 7.1 by the arrow connecting external actors and Side A (and the absence a such a link between external actors and Side B). Based on that, a number of assumptions about the general dynamics of this polity type can be drawn. As in all other polity types characterized by obstructive relations, we cannot expect the former warring parties to engage in genuine cooperation. What is more, due to the fact that there is no external pressure for the parties to adopt a mediative stance and because there is no need for the dominating party to pretend to cooperate with the excluded party in order to secure external funds, we cannot even expect the parties to engage in ‘virtual cooperation’. Instead, one can expect the relations to range from unfriendly co-existence to outright hostility.
Nonetheless, the ruling party can be expected to adopt a few flimsy pluralistic gestures (e.g. ceremonial elections) in order to give its regime the semblance of democracy. External actors take a decisively different stance in this polity type than in all other types discussed so far. Because they either perceive the excluded party as illegitimate or develop – out of geopolitical considerations – a strong bias for the incumbent government, external actors are less interested in a deep-rooted democratization which might bring their opponents to power. In this context, the phenomenon of ‘virtual enforcement’ is even more pronounced than in other polity types. Rhetorical, external actors are likely to favor the same democratic principles as elsewhere but they will refrain from pushing for the implementation of these principles. In the following, these assumptions are specified further with respect to the four polity dimensions on which this dissertation focuses.

**Overcoming Commitment Problems.** Given the basic characteristics of ‘You Stay Out’ polities, attempts to overcome commitment problems in the post-settlement phase are a low priority for external actors and the prospects for convincing the excluded parties to disarm its forces voluntarily are particularly dull. Above, it was argued that external security guarantees are one of the main conditions for the parties to overcome their commitment problems. In ‘You Stay Out’ polities, we can expect that external actors are reluctant to provide significant security guarantees to parties which they consider to be illegitimate or a potential threat to security and stability. Because the excluded parties have no formal role to play in the polity, ‘overcoming’ the commitment problems in ‘You Stay Out’ polities...
Chapter 7 ‘You Stay Out’ Polities

effectively amounts to the unconditional surrender of the excluded party. This may give rise to a situation in which external actors either enforce the disarmament of the excluded party or induce them to turn a blind eye towards attempts by the ruling party to defeat its opponents militarily in case it refuses to subordinate to the state’s writ.

**Manner of Political Competition.** Political Competition in ‘You Stay Out’ polities suffers from one overarching tension: On the one hand, overall questions of legitimacy require that a veil of democracy is maintained. On the other hand, this commitment to democracy is by definition ‘virtual’ because neither the governing party itself nor external actors have an interest in truly democratic processes which could bring the unwelcome opposition to power. From this, a number of assumptions about the manner of political competition in ‘You Stay Out’ polities can be derived. In general, we can expect the governing party to establish a ‘symbolic’ democracy, i.e. a political system in which democratic features mainly fulfill a ceremonial function. This may find its expression in fraudulent elections or even cruder attempts to remain in power, for instance the intimidation or disappearance of opposition politicians. Because external pressure for democratization is mainly rhetorical, the regime’s authoritarian drift is likely to go further than in all other polity types. For justifying its own hold on power, the ruling party will also engage in attempts to delegitimize its political opponents and present itself as the guarantor for stability in the country. This, in turn, implies that the excluded opposition has hardly any realistic chances for being represented in the government by means of a fair political competition. As a result, it will make use of informal means of competition (potentially including violence), which provides the government with another pretext for de-legitimizing the opposition further. Hence, we can expect ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies to be of central importance for the government’s attempts to justify its hold on power.

**Threats from Within.** For the government in ‘You Stay Out’ polities, open political space may easily turn into a threat if the opposition is able to criticize the ruling party’s attempts for manipulating elections and maintain in power by all means. Since the route to power through formal means is largely precluded by the government’s authoritarian practices, the opposition has little other alternatives than using civil society or the media in order to unmask the incumbent regime’s democratic shortcomings and abuses. In order to prevent this from happening, the ruling party can be expected to take measures for an almost unlimited control of the political space and to effectively silence domestic criticism. Backed by its ‘stability credit’, the government is likely to portray political dissent as a strategy by sectarian politicians or outside forces to destabilize the regime.

**Promoting Good Governance.** Finally, with regard to promoting good governance standards we can expect ‘You Stay Out’ polities to differ significantly from the other polity
types discussed in this dissertation. In virtually all polity types discussed so far, the promotion of good governance standards was marred by ambiguities. In constructive polity types (‘Let’s Share’ polities and ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities) the problem of ‘euphemistic blindness’ prevented external actors from recognizing shortcomings and potential threats to the implementation of good governance principles. In the obstructive polity types discussed so far (‘Doomed to Share’ polities and ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities), external actors were often reluctant to commit the resources necessary for enforcing even basic good governance standards. In ‘You Stay Out’ polities, external actors’ willingness to promote good governance principles is relatively low because, as noted earlier, external actors do not want to risk the stability of the incumbent regime. As a result, they are likely to exhibit a strong tolerance towards the shortcomings and excesses of the incumbent regime. However, this has limits. External actors cannot afford to officially support regimes that systematically forge elections and commit severe human rights violations because this stands in severe contrast to their own good governance rhetoric. Despite their preference for the stability of the incumbent regime external actors can be expected to place pressure on the ruling party to do away with the most blatant (and most visible) violations of good governance principles. However, their ability to induce a significant change of behavior is likely to be particularly low in ‘You Stay Out’ polities. As argued above, external influence in post-conflict environments depends on the availability of credible sticks and carrots and external actors’ demonstrated willingness to use them. In ‘You Stay Out’ polities, the ruling party has an effective remedy against the imposition of external threats: the threat that they will empower those forces which external actors want to keep out of the government. This ‘reverse leverage’ has turned out as a crucial factor by which the ruling parties in ‘You Stay Out’ polities can avert unfavorable external influence.

7.2 Rwanda

Rwanda shares many features with Burundi in terms of its colonial history and its ethnic and cultural composition. Yet, the two countries took diametrically opposed paths in their post-colonial development. Whereas Burundi became a Tutsi monarchy (see 3.3), revolting Hutu groups in Rwanda swiftly facilitated the downfall of the ruling Tutsi elite after the country reached independence in 1962 (see e.g. Mehler 2006: 250; Uvin 1999: 256). “The result was a radical shift of power from Tutsi to Hutu” (Lemarchand 1995: 8). Hutu elites then dominated the country for more than three decades. In the thirty-two years between independence and the outbreak of the genocide in 1994, Rwanda witnessed not more than two rulers: Gregoire Kayibanda took power immediately after independence and remained in power until he was overthrown by General Habyarimana in an armed coup about a decade later (see e.g. Lemarchand 1995: 9; Mehler 2006: 253–256; Newbury 1995: 12–13). Habyarimana’s regime was highly autocratic and became notorious for the exclusion of opposition parties and human rights violations (see Traniello 2008: 37;
Chapter 7 ‘You Stay Out’ Polities

Uvin 1999: 257). In farce elections, the self-declared president regularly yielded about 95 percent of the votes. This “served as a facade to legitimise the president’s authoritarian rule, notably towards international donors” (Silva-Leander 2008: 1603). However, the regime faced a lot of internal resistance, mostly from exiled Rwandans – predominantly Tutsi – who had escaped to neighboring countries after the ‘social revolution’ and in the post-independence period. By the late 1980s, an estimated 400,000 to 600,000 Rwandan refugees were living in neighboring countries (Lemarchand 1995: 8 and Khadiagala 2002: 464). Arguing that the Rwandan livelihoods were already over-populated, Habyarimana refused to repatriate these ‘Rwandans abroad’ (see Newbury 1995: 13). This created tensions that, ultimately, amounted to a civil war.

On 1 October 1990, the government was attacked by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an insurgent group made up of exiled Rwandans residing in neighboring Uganda. This attack constitutes the immediate background for the unprecedented genocide that unfolded four years later, but “no one within the RPF had the slightest idea of the scale of the cataclysm they were about to unleash” (Lemarchand 1995: 8). Though predominantly a Tutsi movement, the insurgents also comprised Hutu (Reyntjens 2006b: 1110). Next to promoting democratic standards, its foremost political goal was the repatriation of the Rwandan refugees into their home country (see Khadiagala 2002: 464; Reyntjens 1996: 245). However, hardliners within Habyarimana’s regime used the insurgency as a pretext for mobilizing mass resistance against the Tutsi minority, and “extreme right factions in the government […] seized on the invasion to promote a significant expansion of the security forces, and to brand all Tutsi as internal supporters of the RPF” (Newbury 1995: 14). This was accompanied by the articulation of an “increasingly overt ideology of Hutu supremacy […]”, based on which it was easier to mobilize resistance against the Tutsi-dominated RPF (1998: 198). The confrontation soon escalated into an enduring civil war between the government and the RPF, which was characterized by marked atrocities, massacres and targeted killings. Next to the ‘Forces Armée Ruandaises’ (FAR), radical Hutu troops, known as the ‘Interahamwe militias’, soon joined the fight against the RPF and fueled the conflict by committing massacres among the Tutsi population (Mehler 2006: 261). However, the RPF turned out as an effective military force, and the Habyarimana regime could only counter the attacks due to French arms supplies and a small contingent of troops sent by the French government in support of the regime (see Clapham 1998: 199; Khadiagala 2002: 467).

After three years of fighting, mounting international pressure led to the adoption of a peace-agreement between the government and the rebel groups – the Arusha Accords (see Government of the Republic of Rwanda 1993). The agreement contained a number of far-reaching concessions to the rebel group. The most controversial provisions were about the establishment of a ‘broad-based transitional government’, in which the RPF would hold five cabinet seats (out of 21) and eleven seats in a transitional parliament (out of 70), and the restructuring of the army such that the RPF would hold 40 percent of the troops.
and 50 percent of the officer corps (see Lemarchand 1995: 9 and Khadiagala 2002: 477). In an additional protocol to the Arusha Accords, the parties also agreed on the deployment of a ‘Neutral International Force’ under the command of the United Nations, which should assist in the implementation of the agreement, provide security and support the formation of an inclusive army (Art. 52 & 53). This led to the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission for Ruanda (UNAMIR), comprising about 2,000 troops (see e.g. Mehler 2006: 265).

The Arusha Accords turned out as an ill-suited basis for guaranteeing lasting peace between the belligerents. Rather than implementing the agreement in earnest, the government effectively impeded the proper implementation of the Arusha Agreement (Barnett 1997: 551). Hutu hardliners within and outside of the government were utterly opposed to the compromises struck in Arusha. They rejected any compromise with the RPF and continued to mobilize popular emotions against the Tutsi. This led to the formation of a radical Hutu party, the ‘Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique’ (CDR) (see e.g. Mehler 2006: 256). In particular after the assassination of the first Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye by Tutsi elites in neighboring Burundi in 1993 (see 3.3) – which led to the inflow of hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees to Rwanda – these Hutu radicals became convinced that the cooperation with the Tutsi was to be prevented by all means: “the message conveyed by Ndadaye’s assassination came through clear and loud: ‘Never trust the Tutsi!’” (Lemarchand 1995: 10). They soon reverted to creating an image of the Tutsi in the Rwandan population as “both alien and clever, not unlike the image of the Jew in Nazi propaganda”, and to portray them as an imminent threat to the Hutu. This culminated in the drastic conclusion that “[n]othing short of physical liquidation can properly deal with such danger” (Lemarchand 1995: 9).

This conviction soon turned into reality. About half a year after the adoption of the Arusha Accords, on 6 April 1994, president Habyarimana’s airplane was hit by a missile and crashed. This was the focal event for the systematic genocide among the Tutsi and moderate Hutu that unfolded in the following 100 days (see e.g. Mehler 2006: 256). Although the final evidence who launched the missile that brought the plane down is still lacking, the view supported by most observers is that Hutu radicals within the government party MNRD were responsible, as they were also the ones who profited mostly from the plane crash. The president’s death “remove[d] once and for all the specter of Arusha […]”, and at the same time allowed Hutu radicals to point out the Tutsis as those responsible behind the attack, which they used as a justification for the genocide (Lemarchand 1995: 10). All in all, “the shooting down of Habyarimana’s plane […] seems entirely consistent

---

2 ‘Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties’. It builds an annex to the Arusha Agreement and is part of the same document indicated above.

3 Note that others speculate that RPF leader Paul Kagame ordered the shooting down of the plane, and two investigations by French and Spanish investigators concluded that the later president was involved (see Robinson and Ghahraman 2008).
with the overall strategy of MNRD extremists” (Lemarchand 1995: 10). In the three
months that followed, between 800,000 and over one million people – mostly Tutsi, but
also moderate Hutu deemed to be ‘traitors’ – were slaughtered with machetes or beaten to
death (see e.g. Hintjens 1999; Mehl 2006: 249). Understaffed and endowed with a weak
mandate, the UN peacekeeping force did nothing to prevent the atrocities. On the contrary,
giving up in the face of the challenges in Rwanda, the UN Security Council decided to
withdraw the larger part of UNAMIR and leave only a small observer force on the ground
(see e.g. Barnett 1997; 2002; Suhrke 1998). As Lemarchand comments: ‘That a carnage
of this magnitude could have been going on day after day, week after week, without
interference from the international community speaks volumes for its lack of resolve in
dealing with massive human rights violation” (1995: 11). The international community’s
failure is all the more tragic given that the genocide was neither simply a spontaneous
eruption of violence nor an unfortunate chain of events, but well-planned and precisely
orchestrated. At the latest since 1992, “members of ‘Hutu power’ militias were being
trained in techniques of hunt and destroy operations, rather than in open armed combat”
Thus, there was clear evidence that something was going on behind the scenes.

The genocide came to an end due to a military victory of the RPF, which invaded Kigali
on 4 July 1994. This led to a mass exodus of Hutu from Rwanda. In total, about two million
Hutu fled to neighboring states, most notably to DRC, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania, out
of fear for Tutsi retaliation (Traniello 2008: 38). The victors established a new government
in Kigali which was, at least formally, in compliance with the power-sharing formula
contained in the Arusha Accords (see e.g. Reyntjens 2006b: 1105). However, through
making unilateral amendments to the Fundamental Law, the RPF managed to undermine
the effectiveness of power-sharing to the extent that it merely became cosmetic (see the
paragraph on political domination below). Despite the formal presence of power-sharing,
post-genocide Rwanda is therefore classified as a case of political domination, as argued
below in more detail.

### 7.2.1 Rwanda as a ‘You Stay Out’ Polity

Post-genocide Rwanda first witnessed a transitional phase based on the Arusha Accords,
followed by popular elections in 2003, in which the RPF was confirmed in office. Although
the pre-election and the post-election phase are, technically speaking, two different periods
– the former involved cosmetic power-sharing, while the latter constitutes a clear case of
political domination – the degree of RPF domination was already so strong before the
elections that Rwanda can safely be treated as a case of political domination ever since
the RPF took power in Kigali. In addition to that, external engagement in post-genocide
Rwanda offers little ground for being regarded as mediative. Out of these reasons, the
7.2 Rwanda

case is classified as an instance of a ‘You Stay Out’ polity, as argued in more detail in the following paragraphs.

Political Domination. Post-genocide Rwanda is a case where the formal polity characteristics stand in stark contrast to the de facto distribution of power among the former belligerents. The RPF did its best to create the illusion that its commitment to the Arusha Accords was sincere. As provided for in Article 6 of the Accords, Faustin Twagiramungu (a Hutu) became prime minister (see Reyntjens 2006b: 1105). The RPF then nominated a Hutu, Pasteur Bizimungu, for the presidency, while RPF leader Paul Kagame “took a background position as minister of defence but retained the vice presidency” (Silva-Leander 2008: 1607). This gave “a semblance of multi-ethnicity to the regime” (Waugh 2004: 149).

In addition to that, all parties received the number of seats allocated to them by the accord, with the notable exception that those held responsible for the genocide (i.e. the former government party MRND and the Hutu extremist party CDR) were banned (Reyntjens 2004: 178). This was certainly warranted in light of the atrocities sparks by these parties, but by excluding the main signatory of the Arusha Agreement this decision reduced the effectiveness of power-sharing from the outset.

However, the “illusion of inclusiveness was soon shattered” (Reyntjens 2004: 180). The RPF swiftly demonstrated that it exercised near total control of the state apparatus. Rather than sticking to the original spirit of the Arusha Accords, the party influenced the provisions of the accords in its own favor by making unilateral amendments to the Fundamental Law which strongly modified the spirit of the power-sharing agreement. Most importantly, the RPF significantly strengthened the position of the presidency at the expense of the authority of the Prime Minister. This step can be interpreted as a “subtle piece of constitutional engineering which attempted to mask the consolidation of the RPF’s hold on political power” (Reyntjens 2004: 178). The RPF’s next move consisted of intimidating unwelcome politicians and forcing them into exile. After a number of moderate Hutu politicians accused the RPF of “monopolising power and betraying the spirit of the Arusha Accords” (International Crisis Group 2002c: 11), a number of influential Hutu politicians – including the prime minister – were forced to resign in 1995 (Debiel 2002: 414; Lemarchand 2007: 7). In the ensuing years, many more politicians suffered the same fate, and the RPF increasingly unmasked its unrestrained claim to power. Most importantly, after president Bizimungu, too, was forced to resign in 2000, the RPF’s military leader Paul Kagame finally became president, thus formally occupying “the position he already held de facto” (Waugh 2004: 154). At the latest from this moment on, all serious opposition against the RPF had evaporated. As the International Crisis Group noted in 2002: “[T]he political parties that exist today in Rwanda are only tolerated if they agree not to question the definition of political life drawn up by the RPF. Their existence serves to maintain the facade of compliance with the Arusha Accords on power sharing” (2002c: 2).
Fearing popular elections and the possible undermining of its power-base, the RPF was also able to significantly extend the transitional period. Originally, it was to last until 1999, but the RPF argued that “time is not ripe for democracy and elections” (Uvin 2001: 180) and unilaterally extended the transitional period to last for four more years until July 2003 (see also Reyntjens 2006b: 1106). This gave the RPF time to depose the most powerful opposition party – the MDR – just before the elections. Due to the RPF’s tight control of the National Electoral Commission in conjunction with the fact that the polls were public rather than secret, Kagame yielded an unrealistic 95 percent of the votes in the August 2003 presidential election (see Reyntjens 2006a: 1106–1108). At the latest from this moment on, it became clear even to benign observers that “Rwanda had become for all intents and purposes a single-party state” (Lemarchand 2007: 7). All this supports the argument that the Rwandan post-genocide period is most adequately classified as a case of political domination. As Uvin noted, despite the formal presence of power-sharing institutions, “there is no doubt in anybody’s mind that politics in Rwanda is dominated by the RPF and especially its military leader Paul Kagame […]” (Uvin 2001: 179). Reyntjens is even more outspoken about the RPF’s reign: “Rather than liberation, inclusiveness and democracy, the RPF has brought oppression, exclusion and dictatorship” (Reyntjens 2006b: 1103).

Obstructive Relations. The legacy of the genocide leaves little doubt that the relations between the warring factions have remained highly obstructive in post-genocide Rwanda. Above, it was already highlighted that the RPF seized the opportunity of its military victory to impose a repressive and authoritarian regime, which cracked down on opposition members and led to a further alienation between the ethnic groups. However, the greatest obstructive potential arose from the large number of Hutu refugees – many of them génocidaires – who escaped to the eastern DRC after the RPF had taken power in July 1994. The Congolese refugee camps in which they resided were a breeding ground for Hutu extremists of all kinds (see Mehler 2006: 267). This turned out as a severe security threat to the new regime in Kigali. The most notorious perpetrators of the genocide – members from the Rwandan government forces and the Interhamwe militia – mainly took refuge in North Kivu, and since autumn 1994 “carried out cross border raids into Rwanda, where they killed civilians, attacked villages, hospitals and schools, and ambushed vehicles” (International Crisis Group 1998b: 5). The RPF responded to this threat by maintaining proxy forces on Congolese territory, which were responsible for the “slaughter of tens of thousands of refugees in the Congo in 1998 and of thousands of Congolese civilians again in 2000” (Silva-Leander 2008: 1607; Uvin 2001: 183; see also chapter 4.2 above). In these two wars on Congolese soil, the RPF has committed “colossal” human rights abuses, directed at Hutu refugees and Congolese civilians alike (see Reyntjens 2006b: 1111). Against this background, the International Crisis Group aptly described the transitional phase as a “situation of almost permanent war, due to the ongoing military threat from
armed Hutu groups based in the region and the countries that backed them” (2002c: 6). However, the government’s human rights record in its own country is little better. The RPF was accused of having massacred “probably well over 100,000” civilians between April and September 1994 (see Debiel 2002: 415; Reyntjens 2006b: 1111). Since 1995, violence was increasingly targeted against Hutu elites, who became the “victims of harassment, imprisonment and even physical elimination” (Reyntjens 2006a: 1105). All this leaves little doubt that the relations between the former warring factions were highly obstructive in post-genocide DRC.

**Partisan Engagement.** All in all, there is reason to argue that external actors’ role in post-genocide Rwanda differs drastically from the mediative manner of engagement as it was present in all other polity types discussed so far. Under the impression of the genocide, the international community widely credited the new regime in Kigali for having ended the atrocities and for having liberated the country from the hordes of ravaging Hutu extremists. In addition to that, its disgraceful silence and inaction during the killings undermined the basis for strong moral arguments with respect to the characteristics of the new regime. This had the effect that external actors developed a strong bias for the incumbent regime and that they systematically and intentionally turned a blind eye towards the RPF’s excesses. Although large scale military support for the regime was lacking, the manner of external intervention can clearly be considered partisan. Three factors accounted for that:

First, the international community suffered from an acute sense of guilt for not having prevented or stopped the genocide. Instead of intervening at an early stage, a number of western states – France, Belgium and the US – evacuated their citizens from the conflict-ridden environment, which sent a clear signal to the génocidaires that they could proceed without facing much outside interference. In particular the decision by the UN Security Council to reduce the number of peacekeepers in the country from about 5,000 to a meager 270 observer troops served as a catalyst for the genocide (see Mehler 2006: 265). Thus, for not having stopped or at least contained the outburst of violence, the international community clearly bears part of the responsibility for what happened in Rwanda. Allison Des Forges was one among many to have made this point. Although she highlighted that “[t]he Rwandans who organized and executed the genocide must bear full responsibility for it”, she also made clear that “[t]o the extent that governments and peoples elsewhere failed to prevent and halt this killing campaign, they all share in the shame of the crime” (1999: 19). 5 The scale of the atrocities in conjunction with external actors’ “acute sense of guilt” (Reyntjens 2006b: 1114) contributed to a pronounced pro-RPF bias among the

---

5In addition to that, she points out that the UN as well as the governments of Belgium, France and the US “bear added responsibility: the U.N. staff for having failed to provide adequate information and guidance to members of the Security Council; Belgium, for having withdrawn its troops precipitately and for having championed total withdrawal of the U.N. force; the U.S. for having put saving money ahead of saving lives and for slowing the sending of a relief force; and France, for having continued its support of a government engaged in genocide” (Des Forges 1999: 19).

---
greater part of the international community. After they had taken power in Kigali, “a strong
feeling prevailed in the international community that some latitude needed to be given to a
regime facing the colossal task of reconstructing the country in human and material terms”
(Reyntjens 2004: 179). Reducing the complexity of the genocide to simple terms such
as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ guys (Reyntjens 2006b: 1114), the international community swiftly
made its choice as to where the new regime stood. The RPF’s seizure of power “was seen
by many as the succession of a bloody dictatorship by a decent government” (Reyntjens
2006b: 1103).

Second, the RPF skillfully promoted its cause among the international community and
mobilized significant external support. There is evidence that “[t]he regime understood the
moral weakness of the international community very well, and fully exploited the ‘genocide
credit’ which allowed it to acquire and maintain victim status […]” (Reyntjens 2006b:
1114). After having taken power, the government constantly criticized the international
community and has reminded it of its failure during the genocide (see Mehler 2006: 267),
which has effectively silenced all critique. As Schaller (2008) notes, the RPF has exploited
the international community’s bad conscience in order legitimize its dictatorial rule (see
Schaller 2008: 633). As a result, international goodwill towards the RPF and its charismatic
leader Kagame has from the beginning on been nearly unlimited. This has expressed itself
in a significant tolerance external actors have exhibited towards the RPF’s violations of
good governance standards. It also explains why Kagame has been viewed as a “respected
leader” in the West although he can be held accountable for crimes comparable to those
committed by Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe or Omar Hassan Al-Bashir in the Sudan (see
2008: 628). Although he fought several wars in the DRC and reportedly engaged in the
systematic exploitation of natural resources from the country’s eastern provinces,7 the
international community blatantly ignored the allegations against Kagame and continued
to view him as a “visionary, charismatic and optimistic man” (Uvin 2001: 179).

Third, the international community exhibited a systematic preference for stability as
opposed to democracy in Rwanda. When the first signs for the regime’s authoritarian
tendencies became apparent, “most thought it premature to question the good faith and
political will of the new regime” (Reyntjens 2004: 179). This gave the RPF nearly
unlimited room for maneuver, which it used in order to silence critics, undermine the
principles of power-sharing and perpetuate its rule. This became most drastically clear

---

6 A group of western countries, most notably the US, the UK and the Netherlands, formed a group called
‘Friends of Rwanda’, which “squarely supported” the RPF. As Reyntjens notes, “[t]hese countries were
not burdened by much knowledge of Rwanda or the region […]”, but had no doubt that the RPF were
the ‘good guys’ and worth supporting (2004: 179).

7 The international community’s silence was particularly pronounced in light of Rwanda’s involvement
in the Congo crisis. A 2001 report by a UN mandated panel of experts on the illegal exploitation
of natural resources in the DRC (United Nations 2003a) documented that the Rwandan government was
systematically engaged in the exploitation of valuable resources in the eastern DRC and that Kagame
and other members of the regime personally enriched themselves through these endeavors (see also Grignon
with respect to the extension of the transitional phase. Whereas in most other cases external actors pushed hard for early elections in post-conflict situations, the opposite was the case in Rwanda. There, international observers simply concluded that “Rwanda is not ready for democracy” (quoted in Silva-Leander 2008: 1612) and remained generously silent when the RPF announced to extend the transitional period by another four years in 1999. Unlike in many other post-conflict cases, external actors were also extraordinarily generous in their assessment of the fairness and transparency of the elections. The local elections in 1999 for instance suffered from a general lack of secrecy, as voters were “asked to line up behind those for whom they wanted to vote” (Uvin 2001: 180). In the polarized environment of post-genocide Rwanda, lining up in front of the wrong candidate can obviously be a threat to life and security for voters. However, for the international community, this was obviously not a huge problem. As Uvin notes: “[t]he UN Resident-Representative, who had headed an informal donor monitoring group, stuck his neck out remarkably far, publicly declaring the elections transparent and fair and, within the Rwandan context, a significant achievement” (2001: 180). A similar picture emerges in light of the national elections held in 2003, which confirmed the RPF in power with a highly unlikely 95 percent of the vote (see Waugh 2004: 205) – in a country where the Tutsi make up approximately 14 percent of the population. By and large, external actors failed to criticize the results of the elections and even endorsed them as a sign for progress (see Reyntjens 2006b: 1109). As these examples illustrate, external actors’ behavior in the case of post-genocide Rwanda can clearly not be regarded as mediative. As Reyntjens notes, by continuing to keep its eyes shut to the frequent violations of the Rwandan regime, the international community has in fact become “complicit in the consolidation of a new dictatorship” (2006b: 1114). Out of these reasons, external engagement in post-genocide Rwanda is regarded as partisan here.

### 7.2.2 Polity Dynamics in Rwanda

The case of Rwanda confirms the plausibility of many of the assumptions made about ‘You Stay Out’ polities above. This is illustrated below with regard to the four overarching themes: dealing with commitment problems, competition for power, threats from within, and external engagement for good governance.

#### a) Overcoming Commitment Problems

In ‘You Stay Out’ polities, overcoming commitment problems is generally no priority for the parties. Unlike in polities with mediative engagement there are no outside forces trying to work towards a constructive settlement of the conflict. Instead, together with the ruling party external actors impose their vision of a post-conflict peace and take measures to ensure that the defiant party subordinates to this vision. These measures may involve active combat (as in Afghanistan, discussed in the appendix), or subtler measures like
Chapter 7 ‘You Stay Out’ Polities

turning a blind eye to the ruling party’s efforts to contain its opponents. This was the case in Rwanda.

After the genocide had come to an end and the RPF had captured power in Kigali, there was obviously little common ground between the Hutu and the Tutsi. As Prunier comments: “Nobody was automatically innocent, and suspicion was everywhere. Worse, there was very little solidarity between Hutu and Tutsi survivors” (2009: 3).\(^8\) The exodus of approximately two million Hutu to neighboring countries posed additional security threats, because the refugee camps in eastern Zaire and elsewhere were notorious breeding-grounds for Hutu radicals, resembling “war machines built for the reconquest of power in Rwanda” (Prunier 2009: 25). Soon after the genocide, exiled Hutu radicals had consolidated their power and began cross-border raids in Rwanda targeting predominantly Tutsi civilians. In one incident in 1997, for instance, about 300 Tutsi were killed with machetes by ex-FAR soldiers and Hutu militias. The aggressors proceeded “as brutal and blatantly racist as ever”: “Busses would be stopped at roadblocks, emptied of their passengers at gunpoint, then Hutus separated from Tutsis. The Tutsis would be shot or hacked to death” (Waugh 2004: 122). This prompted Waugh to the conclusion that “the genocide had never really ended, and although more localized and on a lesser scale, the génocidaires were still able to continue in their mission to rid Rwanda of its Tutsi minority” (2004: 122). Tensions had also arisen among the Tutsi community, in particular between those who were repatriated after the genocide and the survivors of the genocide. The RPF has generally viewed the latter with suspicion for being potential collaborators of the Hutu militias (see Reyntjens 2010: 13).

The international community had done relatively little to stabilize the situation or induce the parties to engage in greater cooperation. Although UNAMIR II\(^9\) at that time comprised some 5,500 troops, the mission contributed little to overcoming the ‘commitment problems’ between Hutu and Tutsi in the post-genocide era and certainly did not contribute to a sense of security among the Hutu population. As Prunier remarks:

“In theory UNAMIR II could have stopped or at least detected some of the worst human rights abuses then being committed by the RPF-led government. But just as had been the case for UNAMIR I before the genocide, it was not supposed to engage in intelligence gathering. It clumsily tried once or twice to find out about some of

---

\(^8\)In a similar vain, Waugh notes that “the two communities restarted their existence together in a climate of distrust, denial and insecurity […] and the concept of ‘reconciliation’ was really only a word to be recited by RPF ministers and ambassadors at international meetings while at home it meant almost nothing” (2004: 123).

\(^9\)UNAMIR’s post-genocide mandate dates back to 17 May 1994, when the UN Security Council could finally bring itself to vote for sending a second UN force to Rwanda. The UN Security Council expanded UNAMIR’s mandate, authorizing it, among other things, to “contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda […]”, and increased the force level to 5,500 troops (U.N. Security Council 1994a; par. 3–5). However, “[t]he new force arrived too late to protect Tutsi from genocide” (Des Forges 1999: 498).
the most obvious massacres, but because it was always giving advance notice of its movements and ‘cooperated’ with the RPA, it never found anything” (2009: 33).

As a result, UNAMIR II was not able to restore the credibility and reputation which the UN had lost during the genocide. On the contrary, the peacekeepers were “despised by everybody in Rwanda as the embodiment of arrogant powerlessness” (Prunier 2009: 33). It possibly largest achievement was that it deterred an immediate attack by the radicals of the former regime against the RPF. There is reason to argue that “[i]f UNAMIR had not been present, it is likely that the forces of the old regime, some of which had escaped to the refugee camps in Zaire, would have counterattacked” (Vaccaro 1996: 399).

Although the UN presence hardly constrained the RPF’s room of maneuver, the new Rwandan government soon tried to get rid of the peacekeepers, arguing that there was no longer a necessity for mission of this size. In a first step, the Rwandan government called for a reduction of troops from 5,500 to 1,800. By deciding to reduce the troop level to 2,330, the UN Security Council nearly fully complied with the government’s demands (see Prunier 2009: 33). The difference of some 500 peacekeepers hardly made any difference. As Prunier notes: “UNAMIR II troops were, for all practical purposes, deaf, blind and lame. Whether there were 1,800 or 2,330 of them was irrelevant” (2009: 33). The UN’s reluctance or inability to set limits to the RPF’s room of maneuver also becomes clear with regard to the blatant human rights violations the government committed among the Hutu population in the post-genocide period. Aside from the killings of hundreds of thousands of civilians during and immediately after the genocide by the RPF, a first large-scale RPF massacre took place in April 1995 in a Hutu refugee camp in Kibeho under the watching eyes of the UN and numerous NGOs.  

In the eyes of the RPF, the existence of such UN administered camps on Rwandan soil was a major annoyance since it allegedly protected predominantly génocidaires and limited the RPF’s sovereignty over Rwanda territory. Out of these reasons, the RPA seized the camp in April, gathered the refugees on a mountain plateau and began to shoot at the crowd with rifles and mortars. It is estimated that up to 5,000 people had been killed, but an official investigation came to the conclusion that casualties numbered at 388. Since then, the figure “has never been officially questioned, although everybody knows it to be false” (Prunier 2009: 40–42). The massacre was carried out under the watching eyes of the UN blue-helmets, who did nothing to prevent the atrocities. When asked to stop the killings, a soldier of the Zambian UN battalion reportedly stated: “We have been ordered to co-operate with the Rwandan authorities, but not to shoot at them” (quoted in Prunier 2009: 40). This illustrates that external actors were ostensibly willing to turn a blind eye to the RPF’s attempts to defeat its opponents by force rather than giving security guarantees to those parties excluded from governmental power.

10Kibeho hosted a large refugee camp established by the French as part of the operation turquoise, which aimed at protecting Rwandan refugees and IDPs (mostly Hutu) in the post-genocide context. By April, the camps approximately contained 150,000 IDPs (see Prunier 2009: 40–42).
Despite its large degree of latitude, the Rwandan government exerted continued pressure on the peacekeepers to withdraw, and the international community swiftly complied. In March 1996 – less than two years after the end of the genocide – UNAMIR’s mandate came to an end, upon request of the government and against the wish of the UN Secretary General. In his final report on UNAMIR, The UN Secretary General again underlined “that the United Nations would still have a useful role to play in Rwanda after the expiry of the mandate of UNAMIR on 8 March 1996”, but also pointed out that any of the options for a post-UNAMIR engagement he sketched “would require the consent of the Rwandan Government and that consent has not been forthcoming”. He concluded the report by expressing his “regret […] that there appears to be no alternative […] to the complete withdrawal of all the civilian and military components of UNAMIR after 8 March […]” (United Nations 1996a, par. 43–46). The UN’s swift withdrawal from Rwanda is clearly exceptional given the vast challenges. It reflects the strong leverage the RPF could exert on the government – a topic that is discussed in more detail below.

In sum, the case of Rwanda illustrates that neither external actors nor the RPF had any interest in seeking to accommodate the excluded parties and inducing them to cooperate. External actors only provided marginal security guarantees to the Hutu and turned a blind eye to the RPF’s attempts to defeat its opponents militarily. The combination of the opposition’s widespread exclusion in conjunction with the partisan engagement by external actors made any effort for inducing the excluded parties to willingly disarm illusionary. Overall, this suggests that the room for accommodation is miniscule in ‘You Stay Out’ polities. ‘Overcoming’ commitment problems effectively amounts to the military defeat or unconditional surrender of the excluded warring parties.

b) Manner of Political Competition

Political competition in Rwanda follows a pattern that is very much in line with the general model of ‘You Stay Out’ polities. Although, as a post-genocide case, Rwanda certainly differs a lot from ordinary post-conflict countries, some of its dynamics were clearly facilitated by the specific combination of partisan external engagement, an obstructive domestic environment, and the RPF’s domination of the political space. The crux about ‘You Stay Out’ polities is that access to political power – or the political space more generally – is highly exclusive and regulated by both formal and unspoken rules and procedures. In the case of Rwanda, it can be shown that, in order to survive politically, the RPF’s only choice was to exert tight control on the political space. In so doing, it has made use of both overt and covert strategies to delegitimize and marginalize the political opposition, both in front of a domestic and an international audience. Through making use of ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies, the RPF gained substantial leverage over both domestic and external actors, which it used in order to incrementally put its authoritarian agenda into reality.
As a predominantly Tutsi movement, the RPF’s natural constituency in post-genocide Rwanda comprises only about 12 percent of the population (see Coleman 2008). As a result, the party has to fear popular elections more than anything else unless it is able to fully control their results. Any truly free and fair vote runs a high risk of replicating the outcome of the first democratic elections held in neighboring Burundi in 1993: a sweeping victory of a Hutu party (Frodebu) and the marginalization of the Tutsi party (Uprona) that had ruled previously (see 3.3). Bluntly put, “the RPF would simply lose power if it accepted a competitive political system” (Reyntjens 2010: 33). However, “[l]osing power as a result of free and fair elections in a context of political freedom is not an option for the military victor” (Reyntjens 2006b: 1109). It therefore has become a priority for the RPF to make sure that political competition is not carried out on a level playing field. Elections are rather seen as “an arena which must be intensively managed by the government to retain its dominance of political space” (Beswick 2010: 236). Until now, the RPF has been remarkably successful in ‘managing’ its access to power. This would not have been attainable without external actors’ indirect complicity with the regime in Kigali. Keen to avoid a relapse of the country into violence and driven by a sense of guilt and responsibility, external actors have effectively become one of the most important pillars on which the RPF’s power rests. This becomes most apparent with respect to the prolongation of the transitional phase by four years. Given the RPF’s grim chances of winning a fair electoral contest, this was the most secure way for the regime to remain in power. When the RPF announced that it would prolong the transitional phase, virtually no resistance from external actors could be observed. Instead, external actors were fully convinced by the argument that “time is not ripe for democracy and elections, as it would be a recipe for violence and ethnic division” (Uvin 2001: 179). Even the International Crisis Group, otherwise known for embracing political liberalization, noted in 2002 that “[c]ontrol over the activities of political parties was until now partly justified by the fragile security situation that Rwanda has experienced since 1994” (2002c: i). In all other cases, the attempt by any government to extend an already long transitional phase of five years (the constitution originally only allowed two years, see Prunier 2009: 8) by another four years would certainly have caused an outcry within the international community. However, in the case of Rwanda “the donor community in Rwanda has been most wary of pressing for elections” (Uvin 2001: 179). This illustrates that external influence in Rwanda was of a different quality than in cases of mediative external engagement and that external actors effectively apply double-standards in their approach towards post-conflict countries.

In addition to avoiding or manipulating elections, ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies have become the other backbone for the RPF’s hold on power. Its military victory over the perpetrators of the genocide endowed it with a universal degree of moral authority and effectively gave it “the monopoly of knowledge construction on the country’s past, present and future” (Reyntjens 2006b: 1114). The RPF skillfully used its monopoly on the interpretation of Rwandan history as a political instrument by imposing the “boundaries
Chapter 7 ‘You Stay Out’ Polities

of ‘political correctness’ in modern Rwanda […]” (2002c: 1). This has become apparent through a rhetorical commitment to ‘unity’ and a ‘consensual mode of governance’, which have at the forefront become the main principles for political competition in Rwanda. However, “in practice the doctrine and politics of unity directly contradict the exercise of political freedom and pluralism” (International Crisis Group 2002c: 2), since they have deliberately been used as an instrument for exerting tight control on the political space: 11

“[r]efferences to identities other than the officially sanctioned Banyarwanda identity are regularly met with informal public shaming campaigns, labelling the individuals uttering these propositions as génocidaires sympathisers and even negationists” […] (Zorbas 2004: 43).

This has culminated in the vague notion of ‘divisionism’ which the RPF introduced into Rwandan politics and based on which references to ethnicity are not only discouraged but declared illegal (Hintjens 2008: 10). On 18 December 2001, the Rwandan parliament adopted a law on discrimination and sectarianism, which aimed at forbidding individuals and political parties to poison the political climate by adopting a sectarian rhetoric (see e.g. Zorbas 2004: 44). The law, however, is “vague and […] leaves the door open to selective and politically motivated enforcement” (Zorbas 2004: 44). In the constitutional referendum held two years later, the concept of ‘divisionism’ was amended to the constitution (see Silva-Leander 2008: 1613). This turned out as the perfect tool for getting rid of political opponents and controlling the manner of political competition and has been “exploited by the RPF to delegitimize those who criticize them” (Beswick 2010: 236). In a similar vain, Silva-Leander notes that “[w]hile the measure is ostensibly aimed at preventing a resurgence of ethnically based politics of the pre-genocide period, it has been criticised for placing excessive restrictions on the freedom of the press and on the activity of political parties” (2008: 1613).

Constantly emphasizing the threat of divisionism to reconciliation and the consolidation of peace has become a perfect pretext for the RPF to postpone elections and justify a hard line against political opponents. The ruling party has repeatedly argued that “the transformation of political mindsets is a precondition for the exercise of civil liberties” (International Crisis Group 2002c: 1), and in an environment in which ‘divisionism’ and ‘sectarian’ politics prevail, the necessary mindset is obviously lacking. Accusations of divisionism and ‘genocide ideology’ were also “frequently levelled against critics of the RPF whose motives do not appear to be linked to such an offence” (Beswick 2010: 237).

11There are widely diverging discourses about the origins of Hutu and Tutsi cleavages – broadly speaking, an essentialist discourse, which sees the origins for the ethnic tensions in unalterable socio-historic differences between the two groups, and a social-constructivist discourse, which locates the origins of the tensions in strategic manipulation of ethnic identities by colonial power (see Uvin 2008). Whereas Hutu extremists have clung to the essentialist argument (which they have used as a justification for the killing), the RPF has embraced the social-constructivist discourse quasi as an official state ideology and has emphasized that Hutu and Tutsi are effectively one people – the ‘Banyarwanda’ (see Zorbas 2004: 42–43).
Most importantly, they served as the main reason for banning the MDR in the 2003 elections – the only party making at least “sporadic attempts to challenge the party line and counter the RPF’s growing power” (International Crisis Group 2002c: 10; see also Reyntjens 2006b; Silva-Leander 2008). Based on charges of divisionism, the RPF also got rid of president Bizimungu. Although himself a member of the RPF, he “represented a potential political threat to the position of the RPF” and was therefore forced to resign (see Beswick 2010: 235). The same happened to the former Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu when he returned from exile in Belgium shortly before the elections in 2003 in order to run as an independent presidential candidate (see Zorbas 2004: 43). Thus, the “Rwandan political opposition, unless directly aligned with the RPF […] faces a non-negligible potential threat in the nebulous definition of divisionism” (Zorbas 2004: 43).

The RPF has also used such ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies as an instrument to levy “freedom-destroying legislation” against civil society groups (International Crisis Group 2002c: 13) and confine, more generally, the boundaries of the political space (see Beswick 2010). One year after banning the MDR, the parliament “recommended the dissolution of the last autonomous civil society organisations for their alleged ‘genocidal ideology’” (Reyntjens 2006b: 1107). Therefore, it is fair to conclude with Beswick that the ideology of divisionism provided the “framework through which the RPF seek to dominate Rwandan politics and limit political space” (2010: 236). This illustrates that ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies were a key instrument for the RPF to bend the playing field in its own favor. Unlike its opponents, the RPF possessed the monopoly on the interpretation of the truth, or what Karl W. Deutsch called the “ability to afford not to learn” (quoted in Senghaas 2008: 180–181). The manipulation of the past was a particularly important measure to achieve this goal. As Reyntjens comments: “In Rwanda as in some other places, history is a highly political stake of the present and the future rather than a way of analysing and understanding the past. Its manipulation contributes to the structural violence so prevalent, yet apparently so invisible to outsiders” (2010: 33). Through their open or tacit acceptance of the RPF’s attempts to monopolize political power, it is no exaggeration to claim that external actors “may be assisting in the writing of a partial vision of the past and the present, in which genocide crimes are the only ones that are acknowledged and the need to combat impunity exists only for one side […]” (2001: 184).

In sum, the manner of political competition in Rwanda was shaped by a few symbolic commitments to democracy, which masked the RPF’s tight grip to power and its near total control of the political space. ‘Blaming and shaming’ strategies (most notably through charges of ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’) were the main instrument with which the RPF exerted control on the political opposition and justified its authoritarian manner of rule. In addition, since the RPF knew that it had no chances for winning competitive elections, it unilaterally extended the transitional phase, which met external actors’ immediate approval.
Chapter 7 ‘You Stay Out’ Polities

This illustrates that the notion of a level playing field is alien to ‘You Stay Out’ polities, because it is neither in the interest of the ruling party nor external actors.

c) Threats from Within

Aside from delegitimizing political opponents, the RPF has also engaged in murkier strategies for consolidating its hold on power, including the systematic use of violence against political opponents. Also in this regard, external actors have become tacit accomplices of the RPF. The international community has not only been incapable or unwilling to denounce the RPF’s actions, but has deliberately and systematically turned a blind eye to even the most serious violations committed by the RPF. In line with the general model of ‘You Stay Out’ polities, I argue that this is mainly a result of the ‘reverse leverage’ which the RPF could exert on external actors and by which it could effectively limit external actors’ influence in the domestic political arena.

In order to secure its hold on power, the RPF has made use of a number of highly questionable techniques by which it was to exert control on its political opponents. One of its preferred techniques was to force unpleasant individuals into exile. Instances of violence directed against opponents of the regime had clearly been on the rise throughout the transitional period, reflecting, in Uvin’s assessment, “the totalitarian and militaristic nature of the current government and its president, Paul Kagame” (2001: 184). Between 1995 and 2002 alone, forty Rwandan political leaders have taken the path of exile. The RPF has sold these exclusions as a “necessary stage in purging the political class of its corrupt or reactionary elements” (International Crisis Group 2002c: 12). Forcing opposition politicians into exile became relatively easy once the RPF had created an environment of fear and mistrust among the political class and the general population. Through disappearances, threats and intimidation, which Beswick describes as “shadowy affairs, difficult to attribute to the government and the subject of rife speculation among civil society activists and observers” (2010: 241), the RPF created an environment in which the use of actual force was often not necessary. Given the violence it was responsible for in the past, its threats certainly have not suffered from a lack of credibility. For instance, when, in 2004, a parliamentary commission recommended the dismantling of the last independent human rights organization Liprodhor, it was unnecessary to actually put the recommendations into reality: “After Parliament sent a list of a dozen Liprodhor cadres to the government with the request that they be arrested and prosecuted, in early July most of its leadership fled to Uganda and Burundi” (Reyntjens 2010: 12).

Short from direct intimidation and threats for arrests, the government’s strategy has also worked in a subtler way: through creating an environment of self-censorship, it caused Rwandans to “fear discussing sensitive political issues in general and fear challenging the government more specifically” (2010: 244). This helped to cripple both civil society and the media, which have been targeted by the RPF from the beginning on (see Reyntjens 2004: 185). Ostensibly, the regime views civil society as an extension of the state and not
as a counterweight to it, with the effect that “civil society activists can operate in Rwanda only if they are willing to forego work on politically sensitive issues” (Beswick 2010: 245). This included foreign NGOs, whose reports have regularly been picked apart by the regime if they were not favorable to the RPF. A critical Human Rights Watch report, for instance, was commented as “very mean-spirited, grossly prejudiced and shallowly researched” and described as a “shameless attempt to interfere in the internal politics of Rwanda and an immoral attempt to enhance the political agendas of certain opponents” (quoted in Reyntjens 2010: 5). The same was true for unwelcome scholars of journalists – whether Rwandans or from abroad. The French academic Gérard Prunier for instance, who has written several critical analyzes of the RPF, was attacked by the director of the Rwandan information office as a pseudo-academic who can be held “indirectly responsible for the 1994 genocide” (quoted in Reyntjens 2010: 4). Critical journalists “have been killed or maimed, have ‘disappeared’, or are in jail or in exile”, which has led to an environment of fear and a profound degree of self-censorship prevailing in Rwandan media (Reyntjens 2006b: 1113; see also International Crisis Group 2002c: 14). All this has resulted in a voluntary withdrawal from politics: “Rwanda is suffering not only from a politics of fear […] but also from what could be considered a fear of politics, or of occupying the political space that is, or may be, available” (Beswick 2010: 244). The international community has, by and large, ignored these indicators for an authoritarian drift and has remained “reluctant to challenge the RPF on its handling of political space” (2010: 246).

Aside from dealing with critics and political opponents in a dubious manner, the government has also committed severe human rights violations, accounting for its human rights record to have been “dismal from day one” (Reyntjens 2006b: 1111). The most disturbing outburst of RPA violence in the post-genocide phase was a massacre taking place between July and September 1994, documented in a report by a UNHCR team – the so-called Gersony report. It contains “evidence of alleged systematic killings of Hutu civilians by the RPF, totaling between 25,000 and 40,000 victims in all” (Waugh 2004: 151; see also Prunier 2009: 15–17). However, the UN later denied the existence of this report, arguing that it had only been given verbally. Des Forges highlights that “U.S. officials were aware of the U.N. decision not to make the report public and agreed with it” (1999: 555). This illustrates another striking example for the double-standards that external actors applied with respect to the Hutu and Tutsi. As Waugh notes, this “failed UN attempt to protect the RPF in the climate of post-war reconstruction later served only to diminish the credibility of the government that it sought to protect” (2004: 151). In addition to that, the RPF/RPA committed blatant human rights violations in neighboring Congo during which thousands of civilians lost their lives. These attacks were partly driven by the motivation to crush existing Hutu radicals which posed a threat to the stability in the country, but observers have agreed that control of the eastern Congo’s natural resources increasingly became an end in itself for the Rwandan government (see above). The government’s strategy was to play down these crimes in light of the much more furious level of violence that characterized the
Chapter 7 ‘You Stay Out’ Polities

Rwandan genocide (see Zorbas 2004: 32). For this end, it accused everybody criticizing the crimes as engaging in historical ‘revisionism’ (Beswick 2010: 237). This strategy fully worked and effectively silenced most domestic and international criticism. Buffeted by its sense of guilt for not having prevented the genocide, the international community did not want to expose itself to the reproach of engaging in ‘revisionist’ rhetoric itself. Instead, it simply turned a blind eye to the targeted killing of thousands of refugees and civilians in the Congo in 1998 and 2000. These instances of mass violence committed by the Rwandan government were “brushed under the carpet” by the international community, ostensibly out of a feeling “that it is very difficult to condemn a regime for murders when it has just been the subject of an un-condemned genocide” (Uvin 2001: 183). As a result, it was for a long time “not considered politically correct to acknowledge that the RPF has not brought liberation, inclusiveness and democracy, but oppression, exclusion and dictatorship” (Reyntjens 2006b: 1104). By charging external actors of a revisionist rhetoric, the RPF was therefore able to silence “those who challenge the simplistic ‘RPF good guys, Hutu bad guys’ vision of the genocide” (Beswick 2010: 237).

The gradual hollowing-out of civil society and the media and the frequent and systematic violations of human rights at home and abroad leave little doubt that “Rwanda is run by a dictatorship with little respect for human rights [and] little attention to the fate of the vast majority of its population […]” (Reyntjens 2010: 2). In Reyntjens’s own assessment, “Rwanda is an army with a state, rather than a state with an army” (2010: 2). Yet, donors to Rwanda have by and large “refrained from exerting significant pressure on the government over its failure to […] provide sufficient space for civil society, despite frequently identifying this as key for good political governance” (Beswick 2010: 246). The same holds true for instances of physical violence directed against opponents of the regime. Also here, donors “have chosen to look the other way or to minimise it, treating it as if it were the same as the other, more ‘understandable’ types of violence” (Uvin 2001: 184). As Reyntjens comments: “President Kagame, against whom there is overwhelming evidence of responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity, is given red carpet treatment on his frequent international visits […] and Rwanda is often presented as a ‘model’” (2010: 2). The crucial question is: why has the international community passively accepted these atrocities? The most compelling reason is the “genocide credit” (Reyntjens 2006b) or “victim’s license” (Monbiot 2004) that the RPF naturally possessed after having stopped the genocide and which the regime skillfully exploited in the post-genocide phase. This has “allowed the regime both to capitalize on the guilt feelings of the international community and to present itself as the victim of genocide” (Reyntjens 2010: 33). By repeatedly reminding the international community of its own wrongdoings, the RPF has successfully exerted ‘reverse leverage’ on external actors. This has enabled it to “limit donor attempts to influence its political development” (Beswick 2010: 232). External actors subscribed to the argument that the legitimacy of the government “probably extends beyond the natural constituency of the RPF […] because it has been able to restore order
and initiate some sort of development” (Silva-Leander 2008: 1614). In particular in US policy circles, the attitude has long prevailed that the transitional government was “multi-ethnic; has respected the spirit of the Arusha agreements; is trying to improve the quality of its governance; allows for a largely free press and broad-based civil society; and more generally, given the reality of the genocide and continued civil war, has been remarkably willing to try to live up to high standards of governance” (Uvin 2001: 179). The RPF could also control external leverage by strategically selecting the donor countries potentially most sympathetic to its rule. These were certainly not the supporters of the former Hutu regime, most notably France and Belgium, who remained highly skeptical towards the RPF’s rule. Therefore, the regime has “actively sought to encourage relationships with states that had little traditional involvement in Rwanda, particularly Anglophone donors” (Beswick 2010: 230; see also Schaller 2008). These countries were also more receptive to the ‘good guys – bad guys’ rhetoric officially endorsed by the Rwandan government. It was certainly no coincidence that the US, which heavily subscribed to these arguments, became Rwanda’s largest donor (Beswick 2010: 230).

Next to the ‘genocide credit’ as such, Reyntjens (2010) points out that the RPF’s success in monopolizing its hold on power under the watching eyes of the international community was facilitated by two additional aspects: the incremental manner by which it monopolized the political space, and its well-developed information management practices. With respect to the former, he remarks that the RPF’s “piecemeal approach has allowed the regime to avoid condemnation by the international community, which was faced by steps considered, each on its own, to be too small to warrant a robust response” (2010: 32). The second aspect was at least equally important. The presence of the genocide credit as such is not sufficient for convincing the international community of one’s own merits. It needs to be regularly communicated to the international community and used strategically for creating the ‘reverse leverage’ with which the regime could ultimately exert control on the international community. The RPF has been mastering this art skillfully so far. Waugh notes that “[t]he public relations campaign waged by Kagame on the international stage was becoming as successful as his military offensives” (2004: 148). Kagame was obviously aware of this when he stated that the RPF “used communication and information warfare better than anyone” (quoted in Reyntjens 2010: 26). According to Buckley-Zistel, the RPF’s primary toolbox consisted of “re-shaping the identity of the parties to the conflict through referring to a common past and future and it takes place, inter alia, at the level of national commemorations, the re-writing of history and its teaching, as well as through museums and memorials” (2008: 12; emphasis original). The overall impression therefore is that the RPF “displays exceptional skill at converting international feelings of guilt and ineptitude into admissions that the Front deserves to have the monopoly on knowledge construction” (Pottier 2002: 203).

In sum, the RPF made use of a number of informal and unconstitutional mechanisms in order to deal with perceived threats to its position of dominance. In order to discourage
the formation of any significant opposition against its rule, the RPF deliberately created an environment in which fear and mistrust prevailed and in which potential dissenters knew that they would face immediate punishment. The control of civil society and the media were crucial instruments in this regard, because they could have been used by the opposition as a way to mobilize public opinion against the ruling party. In addition, the RPF continued with its attempts to impose a military solution against the most dangerous threat to its rule: the members of the former regime residing in the eastern DRC. Although this was accompanied by large-scale human rights violations, external actors not only remained silent but actively helped to brush evidence against the RPF under the carpet.

d) Promoting Good Governance

It was stipulated above that the promotion of good governance is even more troublesome in ‘You Stay Out’ polities than in cases of mediative engagement because of the reverse leverage that the ruling party may exert on external actors. Although, at the surface, external actors endorse liberalization policies as strongly as elsewhere, both their willingness and their ability to influence domestic dynamics is significantly reduced. Cases of partisan engagement match more closely the argument made by Barnett and Zürcher (2009) that external actors often enter a ‘contract’ with ruling elites in post-conflict societies according to which they tolerate a large number of violations of good governance principles in exchange for political stability. Although there are almost always grand cleavages between external actors’ governance rhetoric and the implementation of actual strategies, the gap is even wider in ‘You Stay Out’ polities. External actors’ engagement for democracy is not only ambiguous and struck by conflicts of interests (as elsewhere), but to a large extent even virtual.

This becomes most clearly apparent with respect to external actors’ attempts for promoting post-conflict justice. Given the scale of the atrocities committed in Rwanda – about ten percent of the population was wiped out in the genocide – justice is one of the most important aspects of the entire post-conflict reconstruction effort in Rwanda. A number of international donors favored an approach to justice based on a truth and reconciliation commission, but the RPF expressed a strong preference for punishment. Ultimately, most donors subscribed to the RPF’s viewpoint and decided to devote significant resources into restoring Rwanda’s justice system (see Uvin 2001: 181). However, the challenges were horrendous. The legal system in Rwanda was desperately overburdened by the sheer number of genocide suspects and the striking lack of law processing capacities. The vast majority of lawyers either fell victim to the genocide or were living in exile, and it is estimated that there were only ten lawyers left in the country by mid-1994 (see Zorbas 2004: 34). Even after impressive investments in the justice system, it would take more than a century to process all suspects. In fact, more people were dying in the prisons each year than were convicted, and “[m]ost observers agree that the justice system is not able to work dramatically much faster than it has done until now” (Uvin 2001: 182; see
7.2 Rwanda

also Mehler 2006: 268). Therefore, the government ultimately adopted an approach to truth and reconciliation known as the Gacaca system in 1998. It allowed for a local-level approach to enforcing justice, combining “elements of conventional justice with mediation and reconciliation aspects” (Silva-Leander 2008: 1611). This led to a drastic speeding-up of the trials. However, before establishing the system the Rwandan government made sure that crimes committed by the RPF were exempted from the Gacaca system: “The government argues that crimes committed by the RPF should not be tried through the Gacaca system so as to avoid creating a moral equivalence between these crimes and the crimes of genocide” (Silva-Leander 2008: 1612). Therefore, the RPF was again able to bypass the adoption of good governance principles in one key area of concern.

However, the by far greatest problems in the justice sector became apparent with respect to the ICTR, which was established by the UN Security Council in November 1994 and “endowed with the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations in the territory of neighboring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 [...]” (U.N. Security Council 1994b, par. 1). By definition, this included crimes committed by the RPF before, during and after the genocide. However, the regime has made all efforts for preventing the ICTR from prosecuting war crimes committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army in 1994, “making the full execution of the mandate of the tribunal impossible” (Reyntjens 2006b: 1114; see also Silva-Leander 2008: 1612). Represented as a non-permanent member in the UN Security Council in 1994, the Rwandan government voted against Resolution 955 “because its Statute did not provide for the death penalty and because its seat was not located in Kigali” (Reyntjens 2010: 18). The regime was obviously unwilling to give the control over the delicate issue of punishing the perpetrators of the genocide out of hand. When the resolution was nevertheless adopted, the regime did everything for making sure that the ICTR stayed away from RPF crimes. The ICTR’s lead prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, soon became the main victim of the RPF’s obstructive maneuvers, in particular after she had expressed her confidence, in April 2002, to put forward the first charges against RPF members by the end of the year and complained about a lack of cooperation from the Rwandan government (see Reyntjens 2010: 19). Kagame reacted furiously, and he skillfully played out the ‘genocide credit’ once again by appealing to the moral superiority of the RPA’s crimes. In a 2003 BBC interview, Kagame asked: “How […] does the ICTR attempt to place the RPA, who actually put an end to the genocide, at the same level as the génocidaires, the very perpetrators of the genocide?” In another interview given to the BBC one year later, he added to this by asking provocatively: “Shouldn’t we be trying those people for allowing genocide to take place in Rwanda when they had full responsibility to prevent that, later on to stop it?” (quoted in Zorbas 2004: 34). Del Ponte clearly became a nuisance to the regime in Kigali and it therefore did its best to replace her by a prosecutor that was more loyal to the RPF. For this end, it exercised “discreet pressures on the UN Security Council
Chapter 7 ‘You Stay Out’ Polities

not to renew Del Ponte’s mandate’, which was due to expire by September 2003 (Reyntjens 2010: 20). Strikingly, the UN obeyed. In July, the UN Secretary General made a proposal to replace Del Ponte by another prosecutor and the UN Security Council followed these recommendations (Reyntjens 2010: 20; see also International Crisis Group 2003g: 6). This had the effect desired by the RPF: “Her successor, Gambian judge Hassan Bubacar Jallow, abandoned the investigations against RPF/RPA suspects” (Reyntjens 2010: 20). This, again, illustrates the effect of the ‘reverse leverage’ which the Rwandan government could exert on the international community, and how far the latter was willing to go in its support of the regime. By bluntly following the ‘orders’ of the Rwandan regime, the UN has clearly willingly thrown the last bits of leverage and authority overboard. This only enabled the RPF to continue its questionable policies. As Reyntjens remarks: “The RPF explored the limits of tolerance, and it realized there were none; so it crossed one Rubicon after the other” (2010: 32). In addition to that, the obvious use of double-standard clearly gave the already tarnished image of the ICTR – which Prunier calls a ‘justice disaster’ (2009: 12–13) – the final blow.

The promotion of democratic standards failed bluntly, too. As noted above, external actors willingly gave their consent to the prolongation of the transitional phase by four years. However, the regime was aware that it could not eternally postpone the holding of elections, and, after mounting donor pressure it decided to hold presidential elections in July 2003 – nine years after the genocide. The local elections held in 1999 had given a flavor of what could be expected from the presidential polls. Due to a significant lack of secrecy, ballot-box stuffing, the intimidation of voters and candidates and the ban on political parties before the elections prompted observers to view the polls as “mere window-dressing” (Reyntjens 2006b: 1106; Uvin 2001: 180). Signs that the 2003 elections could be equally compromised were omnipresent. The International Crisis Group noted in late 2002 that there were “no political signs that the July 2003 elections will take place in a context of genuine pluralism, or even that the main RPF opponents will be allowed to participate on an equal footing with the RPF” (2002c: 1), and recommended to the international community to “refuse to finance the 2003 elections and the establishment of post-transitional institutions unless they are preceded by the liberalisation of political activities and a marked improvement in respect for basic freedoms of association and expression” (2002c: iii). Nonetheless, the international community decided to ignore these signs and supported the elections financially (see Reyntjens 2010: 32). Not surprisingly, the elections suffered from numerous flaws, most notably the banning of the main opposition party MDR on the eve of the elections (see Rohde 2003; Silva-Leander 2008: 1613). Void of any significant degree of political competition, the elections provided the Rwandan government with the perfect opportunity to legitimate its rule and their outcome was predictable: Kagame was elected with a majority of 95 percent of the votes – a result that is highly unlikely to be the result of a free and fair competition in a country in which the RPF’s natural constituency only comprises about 12 percent of the population (see
e.g. Waugh 2004: 205). Rather than causing an international outcry, the polls endowed the regime with a heightened level of legitimacy. As Reyntjens remarks: “Although the international community was of course fully aware of the cosmetic nature of the whole exercise, it endorsed the outcome despite a few timid expressions of concern (e.g. from The Netherlands, the USA and the EU)” (2006b: 1109).

This reaction gives a good impression of external actors’ inability or unwillingness to challenge the Rwandan government reflects the international community’s “uncertainty about where the cause of barring ethnically based politically associations ends and where the rule by arbitrary authority begins” (2004: 205). Most scholars agree that the RPF’s intentions were clearly reflecting the latter of the two possibilities. Given the pronounced and far-reaching degree of manipulation, there is widespread evidence that the sole purpose of the polls was to “confer a layer of democratic legitimacy on what was in reality the gradual closing off of political space” (Reyntjens 2010: 32). As Beswick notes, elections are a “necessary exercise for the Rwandan regime […]”, since it allows both the government and its partisan supporters to maintain the veil of an ordinary process of transition to democracy (2010: 233). Objectively, however, the polls sanctioned the complete occupation of Rwanda’s political space by the RPF and completed the transition “from one dictatorship to another” (Reyntjens 2006b: 1113).

Remarkably, the international community by and large sanctioned this charade. Only one EU report voiced critique against the elections (see e.g. Zorbas 2004: 44). However, Kagame denied these charges and called the EU report ‘ridiculous’ (Waugh 2004: 199). To the delight of the president, most donors decided to see the matter less critically. Although most of them acknowledged that there were “significant ‘irregularities’ during the voting”, the vast majority at the same time praised Rwanda for having held elections and underlined that this constituted a “key stage in transition to democracy” (see Beswick 2010: 233). The same pattern could be observed in the 2008 parliamentary elections, which took place in an equally fraudulent environment. Silva-Leander remarks that “[a]s before, the donor community has effectively endorsed the outcome of the elections so as not to upset the delicate balance that has been achieved in recent years” (2008: 1616). This clearly illustrates the international community’s failure and ambiguity in promoting good governance. As Reyntjens highlights:

“The so-called international community bears overwhelming responsibility in allowing the RPF to deploy its skills successfully. It has been a willing hostage to Kigali’s spin, whether it be on political governance and human rights, on massive violations of international humanitarian law, on the aggression and plunder of the DRC, on its dangerous social and economic engineering exercise, or on the way it has injected structural violence across the country and the region” (2010: 33).

All in all, it can be followed from the above that the RPF as well as external actors have had a strong favor for stability at the expense of liberalization. As Beswick carefully puts it, there is at least the “possibility […] that there is no significant tension between the closed
political environment in Rwanda and the priorities of key donor states in their relationships with the country” (2010: 246). Evidence for this ‘possibility’ has become apparent since the very early stages of the transitional period. With unusual unity, a consensus existed between the government and the international community that “the restoration of security would have to take priority over the instauration of democratic rule” (Silva-Leander 2008: 1614) and that “democracy has to be traded off for stability” (Uvin 2001: 179). As Beswick notes, “given the history of genocide and subsequent destabilization of the Great Lakes region, both donors and elites within Rwanda have an interest in maintaining stability and security in the state” (2010: 233). Although this may bring stability in the medium run, it may just as well create the conditions for a relapse into violence in the long run. Observers agree that allowing the RPF to monopolize political power and suppress its opponents may give rise to “deep-rooted feelings of frustration, anger and despair”, which may pave the ground for the recurrence of violence on a scale similar to 1994 (Reyntjens 2006b: 1114). In a similar vein, Uvin underlines the possibility that donors are, in the long run, “condoning, if not strengthening, new dynamics of social exclusion and violence” (Uvin 2001: 181). Strikingly, it was exactly this “voluntary blindness” to apprehend the tensions and injustices present in pre-genocide Rwanda that has prevented external actors from apprehending the imminent threats and reacting accordingly (see Uvin 2001: 177). Silva-Leander contends that the potential for violence in Rwanda is self-reinforcing, since “the government’s survival strategies are more likely to lead it to undertake policies that could aggravate structural tensions [. . . ] rather than policies that work for long-term peace” (Silva-Leander 2008: 1614).

In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that ‘You Stay Out’ polities constitute an environment in which promoting good governance standards is not a priority for external actors, because they have a clear preference for stability as opposed to democracy. Despite clear evidence for electoral fraud, they sanctioned the outcome of the elections and generally turned a blind eye to the RPF’s authoritarian drift. In addition, the case illustrates that the ruling parties in ‘You Stay Out’ polities are able to exploit the partisan support they are enjoying for exerting ‘reverse leverage’ on external actors. This became most clearly apparent when the RPF successfully prevented the renewal of Carla Del Ponte’s mandate as lead prosecutor of the ICTR.

7.3 Tajikistan

Tajikistan is another example for a post-conflict case in which external actors have significantly contributed to the survival of the incumbent government. The country gained independence from Soviet rule in 1991 and soon thereafter lapsed into a civil war that cost an estimated 60,000 lives and led to approximately 700,000 people being displaced (see e.g. Karagiannis 2006: 3). The outbreak of the civil war was related to the strong sense of regionalism that has traditionally characterized the country. Tajikistan mainly consists of
mountainous territory which divides the country into different ‘natural’ provinces. Most of them have maintained little contact and communication in the past. In administrative terms, the territory can be divided into four different regions: Soghd (formerly Leninabad) in the north-west bordering Uzbekistan, the central province comprising the capital Dushanbe, the province Khatlon in the south-east bordering Afghanistan and comprising the city Kulob, and the autonomous province Bergbadakhshan in the west, sharing borders with Afghanistan and China (see e.g. Schmitz 2004: 13). The region around Kulob and the northern province of Leninabad constituted the pillars of Soviet rule in Tajikistan (see e.g. International Crisis Group 2009b: 2), but the power-vacuum associated with the end of the Cold War triggered sharp rivalries for political power among representatives of the different factions.

The civil war\(^\text{12}\) started in 1992 due to disagreement about contrasting visions of the role of the state in the post-Cold War era. Observers mainly describe it as a “struggle over the very definition of the new Tajik state – either as a secular and conservative state, dominated by former Soviet elites, or as a democratic and potentially Islamic-led new state, with wide regional representation” (Lynch 2001: 51; see also Matveeva 2009: 168). Resistance against the post-independence government under the Communist leadership of Rakhmon Nabiev from the Leninabad Province, who was elected amidst accusations of fraud in 1991, were the proximate reason behind the outbreak of the civil war. Nabiev’s greatest failure was “his inability to restore and maintain consensus between distinctive cultural regions of the country” (Nourzhanov 2005: 110). Over the course of the ensuing year, he faced increasing pressure from an alliance of nationalist, Islamic and democratic opposition parties, the so-called ‘United Tajik Opposition’ (UTO), whose declared objectives were “equal representation, human and civic rights, Tajik sovereignty and constitutional amendments to enshrine the rule of law” (Lynch 2001: 56).\(^\text{13}\) After attempts to crush the opposition failed, Nabiev was ultimately forced to include the opposition in a coalition cabinet in which they held eight out of 24 ministerial posts (International Crisis Group 2001e: 2). However, the inclusion of Islamic elements into the government triggered widespread resistance from elites originating in the Kulyobi region, which – with the help from Russia and Uzbekistan – launched a major armed insurgency against the de facto government (see Nichol 2009; Smith 1999: 243–244). In December 1992, the little known Imomali Rakhmonov from Kulob, member of a rebel group called Popular Front, seized the capital Dushanbe in December 1992 (see Iji 2001: 360; International Crisis Group 2001e: 2).\(^\text{14}\) The ensuing year witnessed the largest number

\(^{12}\)For a detailed overview of the conflict dynamics in Tajikistan, see e.g. John Heathershaw (2009a).

\(^{13}\)The UTO was a coalition of ethnic groups from the Garm and Gorno-Badakhshan regions, comprised of both liberal, democratic elements and Islamists. They were opposed to the political domination of the country by Kulyob and Leninabad groups, which Nabiev’s presidency embodied, and hence united in their goal of overthrowing the government (International Crisis Group 2003f: 13).

\(^{14}\)The PTF (Popular Front of Tajikistan) emerged in the Kulyob region out of opposition against Nabiev’s Communist government, and is seen as the “incubator of the civil war” (International Crisis Group 2009b: 2). The region had effectively seceded from the central government in 1992 and built up parallel state
of hostilities, with approximately 50,000 people falling victim to the armed confrontation (Matveeva 2009: 168). The civil war followed a pattern of guerrilla tactics in which “terror in all its manifestations, rather than combat engagements, was the main modality [...]” (Nourzhanov 2005: 112). Rakhmonov mobilized public support through selling his coup as an active resistance against the attempt to establish an Islamic state in Tajikistan, which secured him military support from both Russia and Uzbekistan (International Crisis Group 2009b: 3). Uzbekistan, in particular, perceived the Islamic opposition as a threat to its national security and “gave considerable military and political assistance to bolster the coalition behind the secular Tajik government” (Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007: 317).

Despite the large degree of external support, the government failed to defeat the UTO immediately and after about one year the situation became stalemated. The parties agreed on a ceasefire and, in December 1994, the UN Security Council established the U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) (see e.g. Nichol 2009). Despite that, the conflict continued on a low scale for another three years, during which Rakhmonov managed to consolidate his hold on power (see Lynch 2001: 57). By 1996 the warring parties as well as their external sponsors increasingly came to recognize the necessity for a negotiated settlement. Accompanied by significant pressure from Russia, UN-administered negotiations between President Rakhmonov and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), Said Abdullo Nuri, culminated in the June 1997 ‘General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan’ signed in Moscow (International Crisis Group 2001e: 2). Formally, the agreement provided for a power-sharing arrangement between the government and the UTO, promising a thirty percent share of government positions to the latter (see e.g. Smith 1999: 244; Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007: 312). Other parties were entirely left out of the agreement. Although Rakhmonov formally adhered to the terms of the agreement, he also made sure that the UTO would not gain any significant share of influence. For instance, he refused to grant any of the ‘power ministries’ to the UTO although the latter had been entitled to it by the agreement (see Lynch 2001). Since peace could by and large be maintained, UNMOT pulled out in 2000, but Russian troops have remained on the ground (Nichol 2009: 9).

7.3.1 Tajikistan as a ‘You Stay Out’ Polity

Despite the presence of a formal power-sharing agreement and although external engagement accompanying the 1997 settlement must overall be regarded as mediative, there is
reason to argue that matters had significantly changed throughout 2001 at the latest. As argued below, the power-sharing arrangement did not prevent Rakhmonov from accumulating a large portion of power and effectively establish an authoritarian state, which has triggered increasing tensions with the opposition parties. In addition to that, Tajikistan’s geopolitical importance was swiftly elevated after the US declared the ‘war against terrorism’ in September 2001, and the country was suddenly transformed from a low-priority post-Soviet republic to an ally in the fight against radical Islam. At the latest from this moment on, Tajikistan can be classified as a ‘You Stay Out’ polity, as argued below in more detail:

**Political Domination.** The power-sharing arrangement struck as a result of the peace agreement in 1997 was an effective mechanism to end the civil war since it co-opted various opposition members to lucrative posts in the government and administration. The General Agreement provided for members of the UTO to be co-opted “into the structures of the executive branch, including the ministries, agencies, local government, judiciary and law enforcement bodies in accordance with a quota” (Government of the Republic of Tajikistan 1997, Art. 3). As Matveeva puts it, the agreement empowered “an elite cartel which had agreed to end mutually harmful hostilities” (2009: 171). However, Rakhmonov had from the beginning on been the undisputed leader of this cartel and he left little doubt that he aspired to gain nearly exclusive control of the government. Observers generally agree that the government’s commitment to these provisions has never been genuine and hardly limited the power of the Rakhmon administration in any meaningful sense. Most importantly, the president never bothered to fulfill the thirty percent share granted to the UTO in the agreement, which has frustrated many of its members (see Schmitz 2004: 20). Ostensibly, “[t]he government and its strongmen feel they won the civil war and see little need to make more than cosmetic concessions on the power-sharing issue” (Smith 1999: 247). Rakhmon’s exclusive hold to power is also illustrated by the fact that all key positions in the government were controlled by his cronies, whereas “opposition commanders have gradually been removed from their positions” (Heathershaw 2009b: 1315; see also Heathershaw 2007: 220; Lynch 2001: 63). As most of Rakhmon’s supporters come from the Kulyob region, analysts speak of a ‘Kulyobization’ of Tajikistan in this context (see e.g. Heathershaw 2005; 2007).

In general, there is compelling evidence that Rakhmonov has since 1997 “steadily increased his authoritarian rule and marginalized the opposition” (Nichol 2009: 5). Constitutional amendments adopted in 1994 and 1999 greatly boosted the president’s authority, who was then not only head of state, but also head of government, supreme commander, guarantor of the constitution and head of the UN Security Council. In addition to that, he “controls the judiciary by virtue of his right to propose the judges of the Constitutional

---

16Rakhmonov has removed the Slavic suffix to his name in order to appear more ‘western’ (see International Crisis Group 2009b: 2).
Chapter 7  ‘You Stay Out’ Polities

Court, the Supreme Economic Court, and the Supreme Court, as well as the procurator-general and the military prosecutor” (Matveeva 2009: 164). Rakhmonov could further consolidate his power in the 1999 presidential elections, in which he won an “unlikely 97 per cent on an even more implausible 98 per cent turnout” (International Crisis Group 2001e: 4). Rakhmonov, hence, embodies an extremely centralized and personalized system of rule, in which “his presidential administration is the source of all power in the country, while most ministers are little more than channels of communication to the president, or implementers of his will” (International Crisis Group 2009b: 2). There are numerous indicators that he intends to remain president for life. A constitutional referendum held in 2003 enabled the president to run for two more seven-year terms, implying that he “can rule legally until 2020” (Matveeva 2009: 164). The International Crisis Group suspects that he “will find a way to extend his rule after that date if his health permits” (2009b: 4). Thus, it would appear wholly unfounded to treat Tajikistan as a power-sharing case. In the eyes of Matveeva, “Tajikistan is a mimicry of democracy: it is an autocratic state which maintains a democratic façade” (Matveeva 2009: 163). Out of these reasons, post-conflict Tajikistan is classified as a case of political domination here.

Obstructive Relations. Despite the strong hollowing-out of power-sharing by Rakhmon and his supporters, Tajikistan has generally remained peaceful since 1997. Observers overwhelmingly agree that post-conflict Tajikistan is comparatively stable and that the level of violence is generally low (see e.g. Heathershaw 2005; 2007; Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007). While this would generally speak for constructive relations between the belligerents, there is also enough evidence for the contrary. The relations between the ruling party and the opposition are described by observers as highly asymmetric, which allows Rakhmon to put significant pressure on the opposition parties and effectively force them to give their consent to whatever he decides (see Schmitz 2004: 21). The International Crisis Group remarked with regard to the opposition that the president “has gradually limited their powers and enforced the state’s writ […]” (2004g: 1). This sheds a different light on the seemingly conciliating stance of the UTO, suggesting that it has had little alternatives other than complying with the demands of the government. Many observers agree that this policy of pressure and exclusion contains the seeds for a renewed radicalization of members of the opposition (see e.g. Schmitz 2004: 39). In the eyes of Lynch, this widespread exclusion raises “the possibility of new challenges to the ‘idea’ of Tajikistan as it emerged after 1997” (Lynch 2001: 52). In this environment, it is questionable why the UTO has not chosen the path of re-armament. Arguably, this can be contributed to the presence of Russian troops in the country, which had for a long time been “the guarantor of the survival of the Rakhmonov regime” (Iji 2005: 192). This served as a strong deterrent against any attempts to take up arms again, which may explain why the exclusion has not led to a larger unrest among the excluded population. As Matveeva notes, “Russia is the only country that can
help the regime in case of civil disorder […] [and] it has been instrumental in pacification of anti-regime revolts” (2005: 152).

Aside from the UTP, the government’s strong grip to power has also triggered tensions with other members of the opposition, most notably those who have been excluded from the power-sharing arrangement from the beginning on. The government has deliberately excluded representatives from other provinces, most notably the elites from the former Leninabad province in the north, where 40 percent of the population live (see Smith 1999: 249). Many regional leaders have therefore challenged the legitimacy of the government and have sought to establish parallel structures of authority, often relying on paramilitary forces. These ‘warlords’ have often been under intensive pressure from the government, which has been eager to re-establish the state’s monopoly of violence (see e.g. Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007: 326). However, some of these regional leaders have enjoyed significant support from the population. In the eyes of Nourzhanov, a warlord in the Tajik context is not per se a disruptive element but often “a protector and provider who is accepted by a community under pressure from unrepresentative government as a legitimate leader” (Nourzhanov 2005: 126). However, the government’s policy of excluding whole regions from access to power has recently fueled concerns about a possible secession of both the Leninabad/ Soghd province in the north and the Mountainous Badakhshan region in the east (see e.g. Nichol 2009: 4). All this suggests that, although the relations are much less conflict-ridden as in other cases of obstructive domination, a basic consensus as to who governs (as it is the case in constructive cases) is lacking. Important parts of the population challenge the government’s authority, and the government has undoubtedly quelled potential unrest by its tight control of the state apparatus. Out of these reasons, the environment in post-conflict Tajikistan is considered obstructive here.

Partisan Engagement. The involvement of external actors in post-conflict Tajikistan requires a nuanced assessment before being able to classify the case. Unlike in some other cases where external engagement is more clearly mediative or clearly partisan, external involvement in Tajikistan has oscillated between mediative and partisan engagement since the beginning of the civil war. As noted above, neighboring states – notably Russia and Uzbekistan – had intervened in a highly partisan manner at the beginning of the civil war, until they realized that a military victory was not attainable. From this moment on, they mainly engaged in a mediative manner, and observers agree that external pressure was vital for facilitating the peace agreement adopted in 1997.17 The United Nations and the regional powers complemented each other in their attempt to establish peace in Tajikistan, with the former taking on the role as a ‘good cop’ in the negotiations and the latter playing the role of the ‘bad cop’, willing to use pressure if necessary (Iji 2005: 199).

17Russia and Iran had sizable leverage over the government and the UTO, respectively, and made use of their scope of action by pressuring the two parties into a compromise (see e.g. Iji 2005). It is widely acknowledged that this has contributed “significantly to the resolution of issues involved in the negotiation” (Smith 1999: 248).
This mediative stance also characterized the first years of Tajikistan’s post-conflict period, which is illustrated by external actors’ early withdrawal, compounded by the low rank the country has traditionally occupied on external actors’ agenda (see Matveeva 2009: 174 and International Crisis Group 2009b: 20).

This has changed significantly after 9/11. While Tajikistan had been a relatively remote post-Soviet republic before this event in the eyes of the West, the terrorist attacks immediately boosted Central Asia’s geopolitical importance. Tajikistan, which shares a long border with Afghanistan and is the country through which most drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Europe takes place, was suddenly particularly high up on the international community’s (and in particular Washington’s) agenda (see e.g. Schmitz 2004: 52). “Tajikistan is no longer a remote corner of the post-Soviet zone, but a key piece in the large jigsaw that makes up U.S. defense policy […]”, as Akbarzadeh noted (2006: 564). As a result, Tajikistan had suddenly become “the centerpiece of a booming peacebuilding industry”:

“Western diplomats, academics, and international nongovernment organizations (INGOs) flocked to Tajikistan, NGOs emerged, and an impressive flow of money streamed into the country, focusing on such issues as civil society and local government development, socio-economic development, and so on” (Matveeva 2009: 175).

The Tajik government responded immediately to the new geopolitical situation. Not more than one day after the United States had initiated ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, the Tajik government announced on 8 October 2001 to open its airspace to the U.S. Air Force – with immediate effects: “Less than a week later, the United States promised to donate $3 million to Tajikistan by way of assisting the drought-stricken agricultural sector, although U.S. authorities denied any connection between the committed funds and Tajikistan’s decision to join the war on terror” (Akbarzadeh 2006: 566).18 From a US perspective, the country “seemed to be willing to cooperate with the United States, but hesitated to do so without permission from Moscow” (Nichol 2009: 2). After a while, however, the Tajik government has learned how to use “its helplessness as a lever” (International Crisis Group 2009b: 19) and balance the influence of Russia and the US.19 This has guaranteed the Tajik government significant external support which, according to the International Crisis Group, has been “crucial to his regime’s survival” (2009b: ii). In sum, there is no doubt that both the US and Russia have had a strong interest in the stability and survival of the incumbent government. As Schmitz notes, external actors’ activities in Tajikistan

18In January 2002, the United States went one step further by lifting the ban on arms sales to Tajikistan which had existed for eight years – although “Tajikistan has a history of torture, suppression of political opposition and the media, and arrests based on religion”, as Human Rights Watch (2002) complained.

19Vis-à-vis Russia, the Tajik leadership could use the awakened interest in Central Asia for appealing to Russian fears that the United States were willing to take over its former sphere of influence for mobilizing additional concessions and support (see e.g. Akbarzadeh 2006: 564). This has secured the regime additional resources, because Russia – though initially approving of US engagement in Central Asia (see Akbarzadeh 2006: 567) – became increasingly unwilling to abandon the region to US influence.
7.3 Tajikistan

have been significantly shaped by economic and security interests rather than the mere motivation to help reconstruct a war-torn country (2004: 51). Although the United States formally adhere to the official formula for reconstructing post-conflict societies – which includes an emphasis on democracy, human rights and the free press – there is strong evidence that “the United States has edged toward a policy aimed at preserving the status quo for fear of destabilizing the region” (Akbarzadeh 2006: 563). Out of these reasons, external engagement in Tajikistan since 2001 can be considered partisan.

7.3.2 Polity Dynamics in Tajikistan

The case of Tajikistan confirms the plausibility of many of the assumptions made about ‘You Stay Out’ polities above. This is illustrated below with respect to the four overarching themes: dealing with commitment problems, competition for power, threats from within, and external engagement for good governance.

a) Overcoming Commitment Problems

Unlike in Rwanda, external actors initially took a mediative stance in Tajikistan’s post-conflict period. As in other cases of mediative engagement, they played a crucial role in the initiation phase of the post-conflict polity, which became most clearly apparent in the attempt to co-opt members of the armed opposition into the government. Despite Russia’s strong affiliation with the Rakhmon regime, the first three years of the post-conflict settlement are therefore more aptly classified as an instance of a ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity (see A.18). Since the attempts to overcome the commitment problems in post-genocide Tajikistan mainly took place during this period, the situation is certainly not comparable with Rwanda, where external engagement has from the beginning on been partisan. Although no clear lessons for ‘You Stay Out’ polities can be drawn from that, the following section nonetheless offers a brief summary of disarmament and related activities for overcoming the commitment problems in Tajikistan.

The main operational responsibility for conducting DDR activities in Tajikistan lay in the hands of UNMOT, UNHCR and UNDP (see Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007). With respect to the disarmament and reintegration of former combatants into the national army, Tajikistan is a special case. Unlike in most other cases discussed here – where the aim is to disarm and demobilize the rebels before integrating them into a joint army – “[r]eintegration was prioritised over demobilisation and disarmament in Tajikistan’s peace process” (Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007: 311). In this sense, the experience with respect to DDR in Tajikistan “runs counter to key elements of what has been termed the ‘post-conflict reconstruction orthodoxy’” (Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007: 311). In total,

---

20 This is also confirmed by the criticism from numerous civil society groups, which have criticized external actors for their reticence regarding the democratic shortcomings of the regime and argued that this may be interpreted by the regime as a confirmation of its policies (see Schmitz 2004: 53).
about 6,000 former UTO combatants were reintegrated into the national army and other security institutions, although many of them later left the service or were forced to leave (see e.g. Lynch 2001: 62). The majority of rebel combatants was integrated as whole and often fully-armed units, which “produced some level of trust in the peace process as well as a sense of security on the part of mid- and top-level UTO commanders” (Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007: 316). Why has this worked in Tajikistan? The most important reason for this was a strategy of co-optation of former militia commanders according to which “those who were prepared to sacrifice their political and military independence have been incorporated into the elite networks” while non-cooperative elements were crushed by the regime (Matveeva 2009: 166). This buying-off strategy has “deprived opposition field commanders of a single power base from which to mobilize against the president” (Matveeva 2009: 166) and may be seen as the primary reason why the security situation in Tajikistan has remained relatively stable (see also International Crisis Group 2004g: 1).

Another important mechanism for creating trust among the belligerents was the requirement to pass an amnesty law, which granted immunity against prosecutions for war-related crimes and atrocities to all former belligerents. It called for “criminal charges against former civil war combatants to be dropped, with the exception of certain serious crimes (such as the killing of non-combatants, rape, terrorism, and drugs smuggling)” (International Crisis Group 2004g: 6–7). This was a precondition for allowing the former belligerents to “enter legitimate politics and to be given state appointments in the security sector, which created incentives for them to side with the government and exploit the system rather than to contest it” (Matveeva 2009: 169). However, the implementation of the law was slow (see Smith 1999: 245) and the amnesty was in part ineffective because Rakhmon and his affiliates found other pretexts – most notably crimes not explicitly listed in the law – in order to get rid of disturbing former opposition members (see International Crisis Group 2004g: 6–7).

All in all, the case of Tajikistan indicates that the commitment problems could, thanks to the mediative engagement by external actors, be successfully overcome. However, the main reason for this outcome were not security guarantees but rather the rebels’ readiness to be bought off and effective agree to an ‘unconditional surrender’. This has contributed to a sense of security shared, most notably, by mid-level commanders. The way with which this was achieved was largely unusual, most notably the reintegration of entire and fully-armed rebel units into the state institutions. In addition to that, Rakhmon’s strategy of either buying-off top-level commanders or forcing them to cooperate has contributed greatly to the relative degree of stability that Tajikistan has experienced over the ensuing years. However, behind the facade of this reconciliating stance the regime has been able to entrenched itself more and more and has taken an increasingly coercive stance against potential rivalries over time (see the sections on political competition and threats from within below).
b) Manner of Political Competition

Competition for political power in Tajikistan has been very much in accordance with the situation in Rwanda. Two aspects stand out in this regard: the widespread use of ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies with which the Tajik regime tried to maintain a veil of democratic governance, and the regime’s attempts to exploit international concerns about a rise of religious fundamentalism in the region by de-legitimizing the Islamic opposition parties. Although observers argue that the crackdown on the Islamic opposition was counterproductive (it radicalized a religious scene that had until then been relatively moderate), these moves helped to bring the message across that Rakhmon is the only real alternative for political competition in Tajikistan. Anna Matveeva has argued that the government’s legitimacy “thrives on a lack of choice, as no viable alternatives to the current regime appear available” (2009: 167).

‘Virtual cooperation’ practices mainly became apparent in the regime’s efforts to adopt democratic gestures at the surface while tacitly creating an authoritarian regime. In the eyes of John Heathershaw, the Tajik government has “consciously incorporated the language of democracy into its legal framework and public pronouncements, [but] it is unconstrained by either democratic mechanisms or a pluralistic political culture” (2007: 224). Elsewhere, he describes the practices of the Tajik regime as “the simulation of ‘democratisation’, ‘opposition’ and ‘multiparty politics’ […]” (2009a: 93). Although the constitution formally guarantees basic rights and freedoms and the regime formally consults with opposition parties and civil society, these measures are, in Matveeva’s eyes, “devoid of political competition” and mainly serve the purpose of legitimizing the decisions made by the regime elsewhere (see Matveeva 2009: 163–164). Observers of Tajik politics have stated that members of the Rakhmon regime have little interest in a true dialogue with the opposition and contend that the regime only participates in these events in order to boost its outward appearance (see also Schmitz 2004: 22). Along a similar line, the International Crisis Group remarked that “much of this apparent pluralism has always been window-dressing” (2004g: 1). Behind the facade of these democratic maneuvers the government has taken measures to secure its exclusive hold on power in the long run, for instance through the constitutional referendum addressed above.

The elections regularly held since 1997 also fall under this pattern and were characterized by large-scale irregularities, as numerous international observers have confirmed (see e.g. Nichol 2009). During the first round of national elections held in 1999 and 2000 (on the parliamentary and presidential level, respectively), Rakhmon and his party gained a sweeping victory. Opposition parties and civil society groups criticized the elections as flawed and marred by irregularities, but external observers from the east and the west alike have generally welcomed them as a great step forward. Observers from the CIS even “sanctioned the poll as free of misconduct and endorsed its results” (Akbarzadeh 2006: 575). Though western observers were more critical, their overall conclusion was that the elections constituted “a great advance in pluralism” (Heathershaw 2009a: 89).
This gives rise to the impression that elections in Tajikistan “tend to function as a procedural exercise for approving outcomes already determined in advance by the executive” (Matveeva 2009: 164). External actors at least implicitly helped the government to keep up the illusion that the voting was part of a larger democratic process. However – maybe as a result of the heightened attention that Tajikistan has meanwhile enjoyed – international criticism during the 2005 parliamentary polls was somewhat louder. International observers generally agreed that the elections were worse than the previous ones and underlined that they did not meet international standards (see Heathershaw 2007: 221). Only the Russian embassy continued to praise the elections as a “considerable step forward towards the further democratization of society” (quoted in Akbarzadeh 2006: 575). Meanwhile, domestic opposition parties were deeply shocked by the irregularities and “accused the government of interfering with the electoral process and a deep-seated aversion to a genuine multiparty system” (Akbarzadeh 2006: 573). The presidential polls held in 2006 were not any better, as they were characterized by the lack of any effective opposition candidate. Instead of challenging the incumbent president and engaging in real political competition, the four candidates that ran besides the incumbent president “praised Rahmon and campaigned little”; not surprisingly, he received nearly eighty percent of the votes (Nichol 2009: 5). All in all, the widespread use of ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies have discredited democracy in the eyes of many Tajikistanis (see Karagiannis 2006).

In addition to that, the government has made use of ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies, aiming at delegitimizing the political opposition. The environment has been less polarized than in Rwanda, but the tensions between proponents of the secularist approach advocated by the ruling party and the Islamic approach advocated by some of the opposition parties provided a potential for political mobilization that Rakhmon and his supporters willfully exploited. Tajikistan’s heightened strategic importance after 11 September 2001 greatly played in the hands of the incumbent regime. Historically, Tajikistan had been the first country in Central Asia which experienced a resurgence of political Islam, most notably due to the influence of Pakistan in the 1970s and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s (see Karagiannis 2006: 2). According to Dov Lynch, these old networks “were important channels for popular mobilisation and organisation before and during the civil war” (2001: 54). However, observers of Tajik politics agree that Islamic influence in the country today is rather moderate and that the “heterogeneities of Islam in Tajikistan make it an unlikely vehicle for radical politics” (Heathershaw 2005: 23; see also Schmitz 2004: 38). Two major Islamic parties are active in the country: the Islamic Renaissance Party (IPRT), which has been included in the government since 1997, and Hizb ut-Tahrir, which views itself a pan-Islamic movement and aims at unifying all Muslim countries into a pan-Muslim state, the Caliphate. Both groups have officially denounced terrorism and distanced themselves from terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda (Karagiannis 2006). Hizb ut-Tahrir is undoubtedly the more radical of the two parties and has repeatedly criticized
the IPRT for betraying the Islamic heritage (Karagiannis 2006: 13), but it has done “little so far beyond recruitment of supporters and distributing leaflets” (Matveeva 2005: 144).

Despite these moderate underpinnings, Islamic fundamentalism has generally been “portrayed as the scourge of Central Asian societies”, most vehemently by secular governments like the one in Tajikistan (Heathershaw 2005: 23). The Tajik government has pictured Hizb ut-Tahrir as a terrorist organization, claiming that it aims at establishing an Islamic state (see Matveeva 2005: 143). It is estimated that about 500 alleged members of the organization were arrested between the years 2000 and 2005, although less than half of these cases were brought before court. The government has also taken measures to “restrict any Islamic group seen as a threat to national security” (Karagiannis 2006: 4).

The attempts to evoke the threat of Islamic fundamentalism in Tajikistan appealed not only to the domestic but also to the international audience. The partisan support for the government allowed it to present itself as the guardian of a secular state and the defender against Islamic fundamentalism. The government’s rationale is most clearly illustrated by the pace with which it has exploited the new political opportunities present since 9/11. After news reports in 2002 claimed that three detainees in Guantanamo originated from Isfara in northern Tajikistan, Rakhmon immediately exploited this opportunity in order to launch a strike against Islamic forces in general and the IPRT in particular. Immediately afterwards, Rakhmon held a speech in Isfara in which he denounced Islam as the main source of instability in the country and criticized local officials “for allowing ‘extremist’ groups to proliferate, citing the existence in Isfara alone of 152 mosques, as opposed to only 82 schools, serving a population of some 200,000” (International Crisis Group 2004g: 8). In the ensuing weeks, authorities dismissed some forty Imams and closed 33 mosques in Isfara (Schmitz 2004: 27).

John Heathershaw remarks that the rhetoric of threats that the government was using with regard to the Islamic opposition fitted well to the international community’s rhetoric of ‘perils’ and ‘promises’ that shapes the international peacebuilding discourse. Since both the government and external actors had a common enemy, Rakhmon was able to distract from “the resolutely illiberal political process ongoing in Tajikistan” (Heathershaw 2005: 21). In order to back its engagement against the Islamic opposition with credibility, the government has increasingly used sticks rather than carrots against members of the IPRT. Many prominent IPRT politicians were arrested and charged with serious crimes (Schmitz 2004: 27). In this way, the government could present itself as the guarantor of security in Tajikistan, which “remains the regime’s trump card, upon which much of its legitimacy rests” (Matveeva 2009: 166). Ostensibly, the strategy worked. Many external observers – including the US State Department – have come to believe that Rakhmon is “combating an influx of Islamic extremists from Afghanistan and Pakistan” (Nichol 2009: 6), which enabled the government to mobilize significant external support (see the paragraph on good governance below).
In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that the Tajik regime adopted some flimsy democratic gestures, which masked its attempts to establish an authoritarian regime below the surface. ‘Blaming and shaming’ strategies turned out as a crucial instrument for facilitating this outcome. Rakhmon mainly exploited diffuse fears for the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in the region as an instrument to curtail the opposition’s room for maneuver, and he used his control of the state apparatus in order to manipulate elections and perpetuate his rule. External actors largely remained silent about this creeping authoritarianism, which facilitated the complete lack of a level playing field in Tajikistan.

c) Threats from Within

In order to deal with threats from within – most notably with respect to warlords and potential spoilers, but also regarding public dissent voiced by members of the opposition – the Tajik government has established an increasingly tight control of the political space over the years. Although the human rights record of the government is not comparable to the daunting record of the RPF in Rwanda, the general mechanisms which the government applied in order to get rid of rivalries and potential spoilers were the same.

Warlords have posed the greatest challenge for the Tajik government in the post-conflict period. In order to deal with them, the government has mainly relied on two strategies: co-optation and coercion. During the civil war, the government “formed an alliance with about a dozen of warlords who had solid constituencies and/or military power behind them and used them to prop up the central authority of the victorious coalition” (Nourzhanov 2005: 121). In dealing with them in the post-election period, the Tajik government has mainly relied on a strategy of co-optation and has effectively bought off recalcitrant elites or warlords in order to secure their political support. For instance, the Tajik state has deliberately turned a blind eye to certain criminal activities, most notably with respect to drug-trafficking (see Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007: 328). Heathershaw contends that “control and co-optation strategies are central to Rahmonov’s management of both opposition parties and figures who were formally part of his ruling clique”, but also highlights that this went at the expense of a free civil society and truly democratic processes (Heathershaw 2005: 33). With the tacit acceptance of the regime, some powerful former commanders engaged in barely legal economic activities which allowed some of them to amass considerable fortunes. General Gaffor Mirzoev, a former member of the Popular Front, opened a large casino in the capital Dushanbe, while Ali Akbar Turadjonzoda, a former leading member of the United Tajik Opposition, gained control over the import of wheat from Kazakhstan – a very profitable business (see Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007: 321). Also, the Rakhmon regime initially left former regional commanders significant regional autonomy in their areas of control, most notably in the eastern Rasht Valley and the Pamirs (see International Crisis Group 2004g: 1). In fact, “[m]ost of the police and law-enforcement structures in these areas were initially composed of opposition fighters and
commanders and there was little direct involvement or control from the central government in local affairs” (Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007: 320).

Through such strategies, the government could successfully accommodate most opposition members. Over time, however, some of the regional warlords or commanders refused to subordinate to central authority and became a threat to the stability of the incumbent regime. The problem of “sub-national regionalism” continued to be a potential threat for the government’s pan-Tajik orientation (see Nourzhanov 2005: 126). Observers have repeatedly highlighted the secessionist tendencies in the regions Soghd (in the north) and Mountainous Badakhshan in the east (see Nichol 2009: 4). For dealing with these threats, the regime has adopted an increasingly confrontational strategy against these warlords (see International Crisis Group 2004g: 1). This partly worked through a strategy that was already used by the RPF in Rwanda: creating an environment of fear through a combination of arbitrary arrests and crackdowns on opposition members. Before ending up in prison or ‘disappearing’, many recalcitrant opposition members chose the path of exile in order to protect themselves from the government.

Arresting opposition members was unlawful because most of them were protected by the general amnesty law that was adopted as part of the peace agreement. However, the government has found a way to interpret the provisions in its own favor. Though, in theory, most crimes committed by former combatants were covered by the amnesty, the vagueness of some of the provisions and its incomplete coverage (it only included those who joined the military or entered the state service) left the law enforcement agencies significant latitude for arresting opposition members nonetheless. This resulted in former commanders or combatants being “summoned for interrogation [. . .], threatened with imprisonment, and released only upon paying a bribe” (International Crisis Group 2004g: 7). The International Crisis Group speculated that the authorities have been “using the threat of imprisonment to intimidate former opposition fighters who are not fully aware of their rights” – in clear violation of the amnesty law (2004g: 7). This has enabled the regime to depose of a number of prominent opposition figures, for instance Qurbon Rahimov, a senior IRPT member, who was charged with various offenses, including the rape of a minor (International Crisis Group 2004g: 6). Many other leading opposition politicians have been arrested on other “likely politically motivated criminal charges” (Karagiannis 2006: 13). Reportedly, Tajik security officials have systematically made use of “coercion to extract confessions during interrogations” (Nichol 2009: 6). Overall, as in Rwanda the threat of arrests has often already been enough to achieve the desired results. Reportedly, in 2004 “rumours of impending mass arrests by the ministry of internal affairs reportedly spurred former UTO fighters to flee from Tojikobod into the hills” (International Crisis Group 2004g: 8). This shows that the Tajik regime has relied on informal and unconstitutional instruments of political competition with the aim of bending the ‘playing field’ in its own favor.
In a similar vain, the government has systematically limited the sphere of civil society in Tajikistan. Traditionally, Tajikistan has a thin layer of civil society organizations. Most of them were founded only in response to a massive inflow of international aid money, are small and comparatively weak and “clearly no substitute for a civil society which can hold the state accountable” (Matveeva 2009: 165; see also Schmitz 2004: 47). Despite that, the government has – possibly warned by the successful revolutions in other countries – tightened its grip on civil society. A law on NGOs was passed that “placed greater bureaucratic burdens on a required re-registration process that greatly reduced the number of domestic and international NGOs in the country” (Nichol 2009: 6). This coincided with the attempts for “reducing political pluralism, eliminating political opponents […] and concentrating power in the office of the president […]” (Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007: 329). Journalists were not exempted from these attempts to exert exclusive control on the political space. Though less systematically than in Rwanda, journalists have occasionally been harassed through “warnings, prosecutions, and tax inspections”, and the state has made sure that opposition parties had little access to state-run media during campaigns (see Nichol 2009: 6). Just as in Rwanda, there is evidence that the international community has tolerated the government’s increasingly authoritarian way of dealing with warlords and spoilers, in particular after it has discovered Tajikistan’s geopolitical importance. As the International Crisis Group commented:

“Frequently the international community is too willing to go along with the official line which portrays the president as the sole guarantor of stability. The government is adept at using this argument when international organisations push for faster change, arguing that the priority is stability, and human rights and democratisation must be postponed until that is assured” (2004g: 16).

Human Rights Watch and other human rights organizations have repeatedly criticized the international community’s tendency to euphemize the human rights situation in Tajikistan. Human Rights Watch, for instance, criticized that the EU has “too often welcomed ‘positive signals’ by the Central Asian governments, without insisting on concrete improvements and results, even while the situation in many of the countries deteriorated” and has underlined that “[i]gnoring abuses will not bring reform” (Human Rights Watch 2007: n.p.). However, such appeals have not been particularly effective. Overall, the impression prevails that even the more critical actors like the OSCE and the UN have been “quite muted in their criticisms of the regime and have often directed their activities into less confrontational arenas” (International Crisis Group 2004g: 16). All in all, there is evidence that the international community has generally welcomed the government’s attempts to curtail the influence of warlords and restore central authority throughout the country. As Heathershaw pointed out, the international community had identified “Islamic fundamentalism, resurgent nationalism and reawakened tribalism” as the greatest threats to peace in Tajikistan (2009a: 43). It is plausible to assume that this convergence of preferences between the Tajik regime and the international community has heightened the latter’s inclination to turn a blind eye
to human rights violations associated with the decisive fight against spoilers and warlords. Against this background, the International Crisis Group contended that “quiet diplomacy has its merits but ignoring the problems of Tajikistan’s political development threatens to undermine the very stability that the international community is dedicated to protecting” (2004g: 19).

In reaction to this criticism, the international community has occasionally felt compelled to distance itself from accusations that it supported the ruling regime in a partisan manner. For instance, the chief of the mission of the US Embassy in Dushanbe stated that his country had a general interest in the support of democracy, but not of individual leaders of political parties (see Akbarzadeh 2006: 570). However, such rhetorical maneuvers have almost never been backed by concrete measures to improve the situation. The United States have been the largest bilateral donor to Tajikistan, donating nearly 800 million US dollar to Tajikistan between 1992 and 2008 (see Nichol 2009: 1). Although little of this money was channeled through the government and the majority was earmarked for humanitarian aid, this indirectly strengthened the legitimacy of the government, which in the eyes of most Tajikistanis mainly depends on outputs.

In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that former warlords and regional strongmen with competing claims to power posed the greatest risk for the Tajik regime. Rakhmon initially dealt with this threat through trying to accommodate these recalcitrant individuals, but he increasingly reverted to a strategy of coercion with respect to those spoilers who continued to challenge his rule. Creating an environment of fear and mistrust turned out as an effective instrument in this regard. In violation of the general amnesty granted in the peace agreement, he arbitrarily arrested members of the opposition and created bureaucratic obstacles for civil society and the media. Vis-à-vis external actors, he sold these activities as a measure to ensure the integrity and stability of the country, which caused them to generously overlook his dubious manner of dealing with threats from within.

d) Promoting Good Governance

The mechanisms for promoting good governance standards in Tajikistan since 2001 have been very similar to those in Rwanda. Due to the partisan engagement by external actors, their willingness and ability to promote good governance in earnest was significantly reduced. As in Rwanda, external actors held a strong preference for maintaining stability and the status quo, which was in part strengthened by the incumbent government’s ability to exert ‘reverse leverage’ on external actors. Hence, external actors were in part unwilling and in part unable to promote democracy and other good governance principles in Tajikistan, which has effectively legitimized Rakhmon’s increasingly authoritarian claims.

External actors’ unwillingness to promote good governance principles in Tajikistan became apparent through their strong emphasis on stability at the expense of democracy. Initially, certain international actors had still viewed the abrupt rise of international attention
Chapter 7 ‘You Stay Out’ Polities

since 9/11 as an opportunity to step up their engagement for democracy in Tajikistan. Tajik civil society groups welcomed this rise in international attention and hoped that it would boost democratic rule in their country (see e.g. Akbarzadeh 2006: 563). However, the effects of external democracy promotion in Tajikistan have from the beginning on been miniscule. Observers agree that it did not have “any great effect on Tajik political praxis” (Heathershaw 2005: 33). The resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan fostered international fears of Islamic fundamentalism spreading through the region and further disappointed hopes for a thorough democratization.

In general, external (in particular US) engagement in Tajikistan has been driven by two largely incompatible agendas: the democratization agenda, which has officially driven external engagement in Tajikistan since 9/11; and the stability agenda, which has been the true driving force behind external engagement and stands in stark contrast to the democratization agenda (see e.g. Akbarzadeh 2006: 564). In particular since the beginning of the international engagement in Afghanistan, there is evidence that “[t]he informal contract between interveners and local elites shifted in favor of the preferences of local elites, who prioritized authoritarian stability over democratic reforms” (Matveeva 2009: 184). The country’s sudden rise in strategic importance has “diverted Washington’s attention from Tajikistan’s democratic state building […]” (Akbarzadeh 2006: 563). Interestingly, the preference for stability was shared by Russia, which had always been a strong supporter of the Rakhmon regime. Unwittingly, Russia and the United States have therefore effectively been pulling on the same rope – despite their alleged rivalry over influence in the region: “At face value, this preference for the status quo places Moscow at odds with Washington and its democratic vision for Tajikistan” (Akbarzadeh 2006: 571).

As in Rwanda, this has expressed itself in the use of double-standards by external actors, who have turned a blind eye to even the most blatant violations of good governance principles. There are numerous examples for this. In Tajikistan, external actors have generally been satisfied with interpreting minuscule achievements as steps into the right direction. For instance, the head of the UN Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding ipso facto stated in 2002 that “there is a wish and will in the leadership of the country to introduce democratic principles of governance and development in the society, in an effort to create a vibrant civil society” (quoted in Heathershaw 2005: 26). Anna Matveeva argues along a similar line: “Fascination with the formal attributes of democracy, such as elections, overshadowed more meaningful notions, such as inclusive representation of the regional interests and minorities” (2009: 181). In a similar vain, Schmitz contends that, in the eyes of local observers, many donor organizations have confused the government’s lip-service with actual commitment and have tended to overlook that the regime’s seemingly cooperative stance is mainly driven by special interests and attempts to polish the regime’s outwards appearance (see Schmitz 2004: 22). This explains why “there was little more

---

21 Heathershaw contrasts the western notion of peacebuilding with the Russian term ‘mirotvorchestvo’, which “implies a much more hands-on approach than that authorized by most UN peacekeeping mandates” (2007: 225).
7.3 Tajikistan

than symbolic peacebuilding when the preferences of state elites diverged from those of the internationals” (Matveeva 2009: 175). The unwillingness also expressed itself in the very soft stance external actors have exhibited towards imposing conditionality on loans and grants. As Matveeva points out, “political rights and freedoms in Tajikistan grew increasingly restricted while aid increased” (2009: 180). She argues that this was also a problem of wrong timing and that the international community “missed a window of opportunity”, which was present in the short period between the signing of the peace agreement in 1997 and the increased engagement in 2001. However, precisely at this stage “there was only low-key external involvement” (2009: 184).

Next to a reduced willingness by external actors to promote democracy in earnest, the case of Tajikistan confirms that ‘You Stay Out’ polities may also reduce external actors’ ability to exert leverage on the incumbent regime. Two factors have played a role here: a general lack of effective ‘sticks’ with which external actors could have exerted pressure on the regime, and the latter’s ability to exert reverse leverage on external actors. All in all, this has allowed Rakhmon to “cooperat[e] with peacebuilders when there was a convergence of preferences, but when the president’s agenda moved forward and opposition forces no longer presented a serious challenge, he favored his own ideas for managing the political process over international recipes” (Matveeva 2009: 175). External actors’ ability to exert leverage on the Tajik regime has been relatively low from the beginning on. Although promoting democracy was a declared preference for many international NGOs active in Tajikistan, the international community had “few tangible means to persuade the government to pursue these objectives” (Matveeva 2009: 177). There is evidence that since the adoption of the peace agreement in 1997 (which was mainly the result of strong external pressure) external leverage has steadily declined. In this context, Anna Matveeva points out that democracy “is a hostage to the reputation of those who promote it” and argues that the weight of the West’s “moral message” in Central Asia has generally declined in the past years (2009: 185).

This was accompanied by the regime’s ability to exert reverse leverage on external actors, which is a particular feature of ‘You Stay Out’ polities. In Rwanda, it was the ‘genocide credit’ which has allowed the RPF to play out its moral superiority and exert reverse leverage on external actors. In Tajikistan, two factors played a role: the regime’s ability to sell itself as an anchor of stability in the region, and its ability to play off the two most powerful external actors, the US and Russia, against one another. The first aspect is relatively straightforward: As noted by many observers, Washington’s push for democratization has been “constantly tempered by security calculations and the risks entailed in a speedy transition to democracy […]”, which has placed “tangible restraints

---

22 Already in 1999, Smith highlighted that while external leverage still constituted a significant reason behind the adoption of the peace agreement in 1997, it has since become less effective in the implementation phase: “other than persuasion and appeals to both sides to consider the future of the country, the international community has few resources with which to persuade the government and the UTO and their component parts of the benefit of peace” (1999: 247).
Chapter 7 ‘You Stay Out’ Polities

on Washington’s approach to the ruling regime in Tajikistan” (Akbarzadeh 2006: 577). This was already highlighted above in detail.

The second aspect requires further elaboration. There is evidence that the regime was able to exploit the rivalry between the US and Russia for influence in the region in its own favor. Before the international engagement in Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11, western powers have generally accepted that the country was within the domain of Russia. This has changed significantly after 2001, when the West and Russia began to compete over influence in the region in general and Tajikistan in particular. The Tajik regime has been the main beneficiary of this rivalry since it was able to play the different external actors off against one another. The sudden growth of Western interest in the region was viewed by the regime as a welcomed counterweight to Russian influence. Indeed, in the initial years after 9/11, Russian influence in Central Asia has been systematically undermined by the West. Rather than including Russia in diplomatic circles and initiatives dealing with Tajikistan, the country was deliberately left out of the equation even though it was initially still “keen to join” (Matveeva 2009: 186). This was to the great benefit of the Tajik government, because the “decision not to work with Russia deprived international actors of credible sticks, while providing to the Tajik government a comfort zone against international pressure” (Matveeva 2009: 181). Although the West generally adopted a democratization rhetoric with regard to Tajikistan, the government has not regarded these developments as a threat since it believed them to have too little resonance in Tajik society (see Matveeva 2009: 179).

The revolutions in Georgia (2003), the Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005) have “made the government reconsider” (Matveeva 2009: 179). External support for civil society organizations with “agendas alternative to that of the ruling regime”, although never pursued in earnest by external actors, were still interpreted as a serious concern for Tajikistan’s political leadership (Matveeva 2005: 151). Almost immediately, the regime sought to balance external influence more carefully by re-activating the ties with its long-time supporter Russia. Just as the Tajik government could exploit Western attention in order to reduce Russia’s sphere of influence, it attempted to turn the tables when US influence became too strong over the ensuing years. In 2004, the Tajik government signed a 10-year basing agreement with Russia which gave the Russian army the right to establish its “second-largest foreign military presence after the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine” (see Nichol 2009: 4 and Matveeva 2005: 153). This has created a strong counterweight to growing external pressure for democratization, which stemmed most notably from international NGOs active in Tajikistan. From the regime’s perspective, the move was straightforward: “either provide for Russia’s security interests in Tajikistan and obtain some tangible benefits and security backing for the regime internally, or face uncertain prospects of Western support tangled with demands for reforms and level-playing field for opposition” (Matveeva 2005: 152–153). All in all, this strategy was a complete success as it effectively made the regime more independent from one-sided US influence. At the same
time, Rakhmon knew that abandoning Tajikistan to Russian influence was not an option for the United States because of Tajikistan’s heightened geopolitical importance. Putin’s visit to Tajikistan was immediately followed by a visit from NATO’s Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, which illustrates that the West feared its sphere of influence to become marginalized (see e.g. Matveeva 2005: 153).

A few years later, the government again turned the tables around. After the Rakhmon-Putin agreement, the Tajik regime became concerned that Russian influence in its country now became too strong and took measures to balance the Russian influence by again strengthening its ties with the West. Rakhmon announced an ‘open-door policy’, according to which Tajikistan would cooperate “with any entity of international relations which has good intentions and aims towards our country”, explicitly mentioning that this measure would prevent Tajikistan from becoming a ‘puppet’ of certain unnamed “powerful countries” (quoted in Nichol 2009: 3). All this can be interpreted as a skillful attempt to play external actors off against each other. This underlines the highly strategic approach the government adopted with respect to its dealings with external actors. Ostensibly, “[t]he president understood the need to maintain good relations with the international community for developmental and diplomatic reasons, and for the continuation of the flow of resources to enable the outsourcing of key government functions in the social sphere (from which the state had withdrawn almost completely) to external actors” (Matveeva 2009: 175).

By deliberately creating ‘reverse leverage’ for use against both Russia and the West, the Tajik government could greatly enhance its scope of action. As Matveeva notes, the “[r]eal or perceived competition between Russia and the West for influence in Tajikistan […]” tends to undermine external actors’ main objectives, most notably the promotion of good governance principles (2005: 154).

Rakhmon even used his own aid-dependence as a lever for creating additional external support. The country suffers from significant external debt totaling more than 1,300 billion US $ in 2009 (see Matveeva 2009: 177). By constantly reminding the international community of the anarchical situation that would follow a collapse of the Tajik regime, Rakhmon could mobilize further external funds that were vital for the survival of his regime. This has had a lasting effect. Despite clear violations of good governance standards and hardly concealed authoritarian tendencies, the United States have repeatedly endorsed the regime and disappointed opposition groups. For example, the U.S. Ambassador to Tajikistan, Richard Hoagland, “praised preparations for the February 2005 parliamentary election and implicitly dismissed criticism by opposition parties that had rejected the new Law on Parliamentary Elections as favoring the ruling party” (Akbarzadeh 2006: 569). On many other occasions, the United States gave rhetorical support to the incumbent regime. In 2009, for instance, the Obama administration declared that Tajikistan was “on the frontline of our ongoing military stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, [is] a strong supporter in the war on terror […] and plays a key role in counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism.”
He also underlined that the country was “key to improving Tajikistan’s role as a bulwark against regional threats” (quoted in Nichol 2009: 1).

All in all, there is evidence that the combination of a reduced willingness and ability to promote democracy has significantly hampered the promotion of good governance in Tajikistan. As Akbarzadeh notes: “[The] concern with preserving stability seriously undermines Washington’s democratic vision for Tajikistan […]. As a result, despite early hopes for an external boost for democratization, geostrategic considerations appear to have tempered the democratic experiment” (2006: 577). The spread of authoritarianism in Tajikistan has also been accompanied by other problems of good governance. The Tajik state has on various occasions been described as a ‘virtual state’ that is struck by corruption, rent-seeking and patronage. John Heathershaw for instance points out that “[h]ierarchical authority structures and submissive attitudes towards the state mean that corruption, abuse of power, and a lack of political pluralism are more likely to be tolerated” (2005: 34). The International Crisis Group recently contended: “It is no coincidence that the wealthiest people are almost all in the government: access to state funds, including through the misappropriation of budgetary allocations, is a key source of enrichment” (2009b: 15). In accordance with the government’s widely practiced co-optation and accommodation of political opponents, president Rakhmon has done little to prevent corrupt practices. Hardly any lawsuits were filed against individuals suspected of large-scale and systematic corruption, except when the government wished to get rid of a political opponent. Stina Torjesen and Neil MacFarlane speak of a “wilful and uneven neglect of corrupt practices” in this context (2007: 321).

However, it should be noted that the failure to promote good governance in Tajikistan can certainly not only be attributed to the specific factors of ‘You Stay Out’ polities. Critics of international peacebuilding efforts are generally not surprised by this outcome. John Heathershaw, for instance, argues that it “may, to speak counterfactually, never have been possible to create a vibrant party system, fair elections, decentralized government, or a reformed security sector over the course of several years or even decades of peacebuilding in Tajikistan” (Heathershaw 2007: 233). Anna Matveeva has argued that external actors’ operational capacity in Tajikistan has been greatly reduced by their “[p]oor historical understanding, lack of established relationships and networks in the region, and limited language skills” (2009: 178). Despite the presence of some pro-democracy civil society groups, Tajikistanis are not overtly obsessed with democracy for its own sake. To many Tajikistanis, values such as stability (‘stabilnost’) and authority (‘avtoritet’) are of greater importance. As John Heathershaw highlights, “[t]he belief in stabilnost and avtoritet is not simply the strategy of power hungry elites; it has a cultural resonance which to a certain degree is shared by many citizens in the region, in particular those who hold positions within state structures, including so-called reformers” (2007: 227). This suggests that Rakhmon’s strategy of playing the “stability card” and portraying himself “as Tajikistan’s
best guarantee of stability and prosperity [...]” indeed had a certain appeal to many Tajikistanis (Matveeva 2009: 176).

This also becomes apparent against the background of the issue of drug trafficking, which has become a major source of destabilization in post-conflict Tajikistan. Sharing a long border with Afghanistan, Tajikistan is the major hub for the opium trade with Russia and the West. Until now, this has not led to a resurgence of armed conflict in Tajikistan apart from occasional clashes between drug traffickers and Tajik or Russian border troops (see Matveeva 2009: 166). External actors have regularly pushed the Tajik government to take measures against drug trafficking. On the initiative of western donors, a “Drug Control Agency” (DCA) has been set up in June 1999 and placed under the direct authority of the president (Matveeva 2005: 140). The US State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement has labeled Tajikistan as a “frontline state in the war on drugs” and “a major center for domestic and international drug trafficking organizations” (quoted in Nichol 2009: 1). This created a significant dilemma for the Tajik government, because a decisive fight of drug trafficking routes stands in stark contrast to the regime’s strategy of accommodating and co-opting potential rivalries. As a way out, the government confined itself to symbolic attempts for fulfilling external actors’ demands without actually following up on its commitment: although small-scale drug couriers are regularly arrested, “there have not been any police campaigns or court trials against the main organisers of the drugs trade in Tajikistan – except for allegations of drug dealing made during seemingly political trials against Rakhmonov’s opponents” (Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007: 321). There is widespread agreement that by imposing a stricter policy against domestic and international drug traders active in Tajikistan the government would have faced growing political pressure and resistance. In addition to that, any serious attempt to deal with international drug-trafficking cartels would most likely fail because of the widespread corruption among Tajik law-enforcement agencies. Due to extremely low salaries paid to the police, corruption is a normal and necessary means for many Tajikistanis for ensuring the survival of their families (see Matveeva 2005: 139).

Summing up, the above paragraph suggests that external actors exhibited a clear preference for stability as opposed to democracy. All in all, their engagement was characterized by a low willingness to enforce good governance standards. However, their ability to evoke a significant improvement of domestic governance was limited, too. The Tajik regime successfully used its ‘helplessness as a lever’ and skilfully exploited the competition between Russia and the United States for influence in the region. Hence, as in Rwanda, the regime’s ability to resist external demands for democratization so formidable stems from the ‘reverse leverage’ which the government could exert.

23Note that drug consumption in Tajikistan itself is low and the country does not grow or produce drugs in any significant degree. The drugs trafficked through Tajikistan are mainly destined to Russia and the European market. This, however, has only elevated international attention on the Tajik drug trafficking problem (see Matveeva 2005: 139; Schmitz 2004: 15).
7.4 ‘You Stay Out’ Polities: Conclusions

The two cases discussed as examples of ‘You Stay Out’ polities above exhibited significant differences with respect to their general backgrounds and conflict histories. As a post-genocide case, Rwanda differs significantly from all other post-conflict cases discussed in this dissertation. The indiscriminate killing of an estimated one million Tutsi within three months in conjunction with the international community’s inactivity during the killings accounted for an environment in which the RPF could fully dictate the terms of peace and impose its vision of post-genocide Rwanda without paying attention to external or domestic criticism. The international community’s feelings of guilt (which the RPF skillfully exploited) gave the impetus for the emergence of a partisan form of external engagement. In Tajikistan, the sources for a partisan external engagement can mainly be seen in the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and the ensuing ‘war against terrorism’, in which Tajikistan became an important partner. The country’s sudden rise in geopolitical importance has given the Tajik regime the ability to guarantee ongoing support from external actors, who fear a surge of Islamic fundamentalism in the region. Overall, the cases suggest the following conclusions with respect to the four analytical dimensions of analysis (for a short summary, see table 7.1 on page 302):

First, with regard to overcoming commitment problems, I stipulated in section 7.1 above that ‘You Stay Out’ polities offer an environment in which neither domestic nor external actors have an interest in ensuring that commitment problems are overcome. In ‘You Stay Out’ polities, a consensus exists between external actors and the ruling party that the excluded party should not have any significant say in the polity. This leaves little room for accommodating the opponents and inducing them to cooperate. Because the excluded parties have no formal role to play in the polity, ‘overcoming’ the commitment problems in ‘You Stay Out’ polities effectively amounts to the unconditional surrender of the excluded party. This potentially induces the government to enforce peace through a military solution and makes it likely for external actors to turn a blind eye to the government’s attempts to defeat the unwelcome opposition parties. The case of Rwanda by and large confirms these stipulations. The perpetrators of the genocide posed a significant security threat in post-genocide Rwanda after they had consolidated their power in Congolese refugee camps. Through frequent cross-border raids from the DRC, they continued their attacks against Tutsi civilians on Rwandan soil. Obviously, the génocidaires were highly unwelcome in Rwanda from the perspective of both the government and external actors and there was no room for accommodating them or inducing them to cooperate with the Rwandan government (which the latter would never have accepted). As a result, the government attempted to defeat the rebels militarily by launching attacks against Hutu residing in both Rwanda and the DRC. External actors were even reluctant to provide security guarantees for displaced Hutu refugees residing in refugee camps on Rwandan soil. When the RPF seized the UN administered camp in Kibeho and committed a massacre among thousands of Hutu civilians under the watching eye of UNAMIR peacekeepers, the latter did nothing
to stop the RPF. Tajikistan does not offer any specific lessons for overcoming commitment problems that are applicable to ‘You Stay Out’ polities because the first three years after the settlement were still characterized by a mediative manner of external engagement. Unlike in Rwanda, the government relied not only on coercion but primarily on co-optation strategies in order to induce members of the UTO to subordinate to the state’s authority. One idiosyncrasy of the Tajik case was that whole units of the rebel group were integrated into the national army without enforcing their disarmament in the first place. This effectively deprived the rebels of a common command and control structure and reduced their ability to challenge the government militarily.

Second, it was assumed above that the manner of political competition in ‘You Stay Out’ polities is characterized by the complete lack of a level playing field and marked by attempts from the ruling party to exert tight control on the political space. In order to ensure the continued support from external actors, de-legitimizing the political opposition through ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies is a key instrument for the government to justify its strong hold on power. Because external actors side with the ruling party and passively or actively support their attempt to stay in power, the excluded party cannot hope to gain power through fair electoral competition and is likely to make use of informal means of competition, which potentially includes resource to armed force. In Rwanda this has become apparent by the RPF’s quasi-totalitarian manner of exercising power. Despite the presence of a formal power-sharing agreement and a flimsy demonstration of inclusiveness by inviting Hutu members to participate in the government, the RPF has from the beginning on exerted tight control on the political space and public opinion. As a result of its moral superiority as the party that put an end to the genocide, the RPF has been in the position to impose its own reading of the Rwandan genocide – which effectively portrays the RPF as the ‘good guys’ who stopped the genocide and ousted an authoritarian regime – as the dominant public discourse and charge those who deviate from the official party line of ‘divisionism’ or ‘genocide ideology’. This turned out as an effective instrument for getting rid of unwelcome individuals or banning opposition parties. In addition, since the RPF had no realistic chance for winning competitive elections, it declared to postpone the elections and systematically manipulated the outcome of the elections. Both of this failed to attract external criticism. Similar dynamics could be observed in Tajikistan, where Rakhmon’s authoritarian regime has become more and more entrenched under the surface of a ‘symbolic’ democracy. The government exploited diffuse fears for a surge of Islamic fundamentalism as an instrument to delegitimize its political opponents and boost external support. Though his prospects to win an electoral contest have been better than in the case of the RPF in Rwanda, Rakhmon likewise manipulated the outcome of elections and used its control of the state apparatus in order to push through a referendum which enables him to remain in power until 2020.

Third, the cases by and large confirm that attempts to deal with threats from within in ‘You Stay Out’ polities can be expected to unfold in a highly confrontational manner.

299
Chapter 7 ‘You Stay Out’ Polities

Because the excluded opposition parties have no prospects for gaining power through formal-constitutional means, they have no choice but to fall back to informal ways of gaining influence in the polity. In order to prevent this from happening, the ruling party can be expected to exert a near total control on the political space and to create an environment which discourages to challenge the official line of the government. Because external actors do not have an interest of the excluded party to gain power, they are likely to become tacit accomplices of the ruling party by turning a blind eye to the latter’s attempts of dealing with the political opposition. In Rwanda, the RPF created an environment of fear and mistrust by cracking down on opponents, intimidating critics and forcing opposition politicians into exile. Charges of ‘divisionism’ were used as a universal instrument for discrediting and delegitimizing for keeping external criticism at arm’s length. In addition, the RPF launched several attacks against Hutu refugees in neighboring DRC in order to preempt cross-border raids by members of the ancient régime. This caused thousands of civilian victims. External criticism with respect to these human rights violations was moderate and at some occasions external actors helped to brush the RPF’s excesses under the carpet. In Tajikistan, the government’s control of the political space was less extreme, but the general mechanisms were very much comparable. The greatest threat to the stability of the Rakhmon government stemmed from warlords and regional leaders who opposed the authority of the central government and formulated their own claims to power. The government tried to deal with these disobedient elements through a combination of co-optation and coercion. At the same time, it tried to discourage the emergence of new strongmen by creating an environment in which arbitrary arrests of opposition politicians (in clear violation of the general amnesty) remained a constant threat. As in Rwanda, external actors remained silent about the government’s abuse of power.

Finally, the cases illustrate the specific dynamics with regard to attempts to promote good governance standards in ‘You Stay Out’ polities. It was stipulated above that external actors are likely to maintain a strong preference for stability and maintaining the status quo, which clearly goes at the expense of democracy and fair political competition. As a result, their willingness to promote good governance standards in earnest is likely to be lower than in other polity types. At the same time, external actors’ bias for the incumbent government enables the ruling party to exert ‘reverse leverage’ on external actors, allowing it to fence off external pressure and depriving external actors of their ability to trigger significant changes in the realm of good governance. In Rwanda, external actors’ preference for maintaining the status quo and their inclination to turn a blind eye to violations of ‘good governance’ standards has been obvious from the beginning on and found its expression for instance in the explicit approval of the face elections in 2003. The influence of the RPF’s ‘reverse leverage’ on external actors has become apparent with regard to the issue of promoting post-conflict justice in Rwanda. Exploiting the ‘genocide credit’ and constantly reminding external actors of their responsibility for the genocide, the RPF effectively achieved that the mandate of the ICTR’s lead prosecutor Carla Del Ponte was not renewed,
causing charges put forward against the RPF committed during and after the genocide to be dropped. As Reyntjens argues, the RPF’s skillful exploitation of the genocide credit “has made the regime nearly unchallengeable for the international community” (2010: 33). In Tajikistan, external actors’ preference for stability at the expense of democracy has become apparent after the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Although, for a short time, opposition groups hoped that the unexpected influx of western NGOs would trigger an opening of the political space, their hopes were soon disappointed by external actors’ strong support for the incumbent regime. Rakhmon was quite successful in presenting himself as the sole anchor for stability in the region. In addition, he could exert reverse leverage on external actors by playing Russia and the West off against each other. This has secured the regime support from both sides, which had effectively been competing for influence in the region since 2001 (despite claims for the opposite). In effect, this undermined external actors’ ability to push for reforms and the maintenance of good governance standards.
Chapter 7 ‘You Stay Out’ Polities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment Problems</td>
<td>External actors provided only marginal security guarantees to the Hutu and turned a blind eye to the RPF’s attempts to defeat its opponents militarily; génocidaires continued to play a highly disruptive role in post-genocide Rwanda and made efforts for disarmament illusionary; consensus between the RPF and external actors that the Hutu radicals should stay out of the government left no room for accommodation and made the unconditional surrender the only option for peace.</td>
<td>First post-conflict period was characterized by mediative external engagement, therefore results cannot be generalized to ‘You Stay Out’ polities; accommodation and coercion were crucial for overcoming commitment problems: constructive members of the UTO were ‘bought off’ and co-opted into state institutions whereas recalcitrant members were crushed; ‘voluntary surrender’ deprived the former rebels of their power base and reduced their ability to challenge the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Competition</td>
<td>RPF made flimsy attempts for adopting a ‘symbolic democracy’ while authoritarianism became more entrenched; Charges of ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’ (‘blaming and shaming’) were the main instrument for delegitimizing the political opposition and provided a perfect pretext for banning political parties; knowing that it had no chance to win competitive elections, the RPF extended the transitional phase and manipulated elections, but this triggered little criticism from external actors.</td>
<td>Rakhmon made flimsy attempts for adopting a ‘symbolic democracy’ while authoritarianism became more entrenched; government exploited diffuse fears for Islamic fundamentalism as an instrument to delegitimize the opposition and present itself as the only alternative for ruling Tajikistan; Rakhmon used his control of the state apparatus for manipulating elections and perpetuating his rule (for instance through the constitutional referendum enabling him to remain in power until 2020).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats from Within</td>
<td>In order to discourage political opponents, the RPF exerted an almost total control of the political space; it created an environment of fear and mistrust through disappearances, threats and intimidation of unwelcome individuals, allowing it to cripple civil society and the media and to discourage external criticism; continued military engagement in the DRC led to large-scale human rights violations, which external actors have brushed under the carpet.</td>
<td>Warlords and regional strongmen posed greatest threat to the regime; Rakhmon mainly used a strategy of co-optation and coercion in order to deal with them; government exerted a tight control of the political space through creating an environment of fear and mistrust through arbitrary arrests of opposition members and creating bureaucratic obstacles for civil society and the media; external actors have remained silent about the government’s abuse of power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Governance</td>
<td>External actors have had a clear preference for stability as opposed to democracy; they sanctioned the outcomes of elections despite clear evidence for systematic fraud; RPF’s ‘reverse leverage’ reduced external actors’ ability to exert any significant influence on the Rwandan government, which allowed the RPF to push through its demands.</td>
<td>External actors exhibited a clear preference for stability as opposed to democracy; external engagement characterized by a low willingness and ability to enforce good governance standards; government could hold external pressure off itself: by using its ‘helplessness as a lever’ and by playing the West and Russia off against each other, the Tajik regime could exert ‘reverse leverage’ on external actors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1: Dynamics of ‘You Stay Out’ polities
Chapter 8
Conclusion

This dissertation dealt with a problem that has become ever more pressing since the Cold War ended: how can the international community address the rising problem of armed conflict and how can it help war-torn societies to heal the wounds caused by civil wars? Many countries have been subject to tremendous external statebuilding efforts in the past two decades, guided by the assumption that they can be transformed into full democracies within a short amount of time. This transformational optimism stands in stark contrast to the actual statebuilding achievements in most post-conflict countries. Critical observers have pointed out for a long time that only a small minority of these countries successfully makes the transition towards consolidated statehood. In most post-conflict countries, the legacy of civil war continues to have a strong impact on politics long after the has shooting stopped. Unfortunately, this insight has so far not translated into innovative ways of dealing with post-conflict countries. They continue to be treated either as in-between-stages on the way to western-type statehood or as rather hopeless cases of failed statehood.

I offer a new approach for dealing with post-conflict environments: the notion of post-conflict polities. It provides an answer to the research question that stood at the beginning of this dissertation: If most post-conflict countries are neither phases of transition towards consolidated statehood nor can be regarded (with few exceptions) as the result of concluded processes of statebuilding, then how can we conceive of them at all? Through the post-conflict polity concept, I suggest to turn the attention to the phenomenon of hybrid political order in post-conflict settings and to focus on the permanent and idiosyncratic features of post-conflict situations rather than exclusively on their prospects for becoming established democracies. The argument advocated in this dissertation is that post-conflict situations should be understood as specific forms of fragmented authority in which the main dynamics unfold at the nexus between formal (state-like) and informal (non-state) authority, and at the interface between domestic and external authority. A post-conflict polity was defined above as a ‘specific constellation of interactions and relations among diverse authorities that emerges after the settlement of a civil war’. In this perspective, post-conflict situations are neither conceived as transitional arenas on the way to liberal statehood nor as failed states, but as a specific regime type that is driven by its own, specific logic.
Chapter 8 Conclusion

The construction of the post-conflict polity concept is based on a number of analytical shifts. First, it implies a rather unfamiliar usage of the polity concept; therefore some effort was made in chapter two in order to justify its applicability to fluid and unstable environments as they are present in the context of post-conflict countries. In short, it was argued that while the polity concept has traditionally been used for describing formal-constitutional characteristics of political systems (‘the rule of the game rather than the game itself’), this understanding is not particularly helpful in the context of post-conflict countries. Although most of them possess constitutions, the latter are often not more than pieces of paper which are only remotely related to the actual dynamics taking place on the ground. Post-conflict countries are environments where the characteristics of the political system are rather determined by the de facto distribution of power among the various post-conflict actors. I argued above that the polity concept is applicable to these contexts if one extends the notion of structures as consisting of relations between actors. Second, the post-conflict polity concept conceives of relations among post-conflict actors as structural features of post-conflict situations rather than short-lived and fluid phenomena (see 2.1). This forces us to acknowledge that relations between post-conflict actors are more than a temporary mood that can change instantly. Until today, external actors seem to conceive of the relations between the former belligerents in post-conflict situations as being as unstable and fluid as weather phenomena. Even during periods of heavy rain, to speak metaphorically, external actors constantly seem to hope for sunshine to come back day on the next day – i.e. for obstructive relations to turn into constructive ones over night. The post-conflict polity concept treats relations more as long term climatic trends rather than short term weather phenomena.

Overall, this has a number of advantages over existing approaches. The cases discussed in this dissertation confirm that the perspective of post-conflict countries as either transitional stages on the way to consolidated statehood or simply failed states is unsatisfactory. This is clearly demonstrated by the situation in Côte d’Ivoire (see 6.3 and A.6) – a case where the inadequacies of the transition paradigm have become most clearly apparent. When the United Nations dispatched a peacekeeping mission to the war-torn country in 2004, this happened in the expectation that democratic elections would take place within a period of one year. Yet, it took five years longer than originally projected for the elections to take place (they only took place in November 2010), and rather than being the starting point for a democratic polity, they brought the country once more to the border of collapse. From the perspective of the post-conflict concept, the period between the deployment of the peacekeepers and Gbagbo’s final resignation is viewed as a specific polity type that follows a certain internal logic. Recognizing this logic (rather than hoping for the parties to finally stick to their promises) would help external actors to develop more realistic assessments of the overall statebuilding prospects in these cases.

The shift in perspective of viewing post-conflict situations as specific forms of polities almost automatically turns the attention to differences existing within this category, and
gives the impetus for the attempt to differentiate between them. The vast profusion of post-conflict countries that has come about in the past two decades makes clear that there is a significant need for greater differentiation between different kinds of post-conflict situations. Existing distinctions between post-conflict situations are mostly *ad hoc* and partial and have so far failed to take stock of the variety of post-conflict situations in a systematic way. No attempt has been made to look at the whole variety of existing post-conflict cases in order to discover systematic differences between them. This lack of a systematic distinction between post-conflict situations provided the ultimate motivation behind this dissertation. Significant efforts were made in order to construct a systematic, empirically grounded and intuitive differentiation between different types of post-conflict polities. The most extensive step was the characterization and classification of 18 post-conflict countries, which can be found in appendix A. The resulting typology is based on three analytical dimensions: the distribution of executive authority among the former belligerents (power-sharing or domination), the relations between the former warring factions (constructive or obstructive), and the engagement of external actors in the post-conflict polity (mediative, partisan or supreme). This led to the distinction between the six types of post-conflict polities discussed in detail above (‘Let’s Share’ polities, ‘Doomed to Share’ polities, ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities, ‘You Stay Out’ polities and ‘Benevolent Intrusion’ polities).

The cases discussed in this dissertation illustrate that the distinction between these six types of post-conflict polities is plausible and meaningful. All post-conflict polity cases contained in the sample can be subsumed under either of these categories. In addition, the typology offers a clear-cut distinction between different post-conflict polity cases without running the risk of developing overlapping categories. Therefore, the two main criteria for judging whether a typology is meaningful – whether the identified types are *exhaustive* and *mutually exclusive* (see 1.2.2) – are fulfilled by the typology. Beyond these technical criteria, the more important question is whether the typology is substantially meaningful – i.e. whether the differentiation between the types indeed leads to a meaningful distinction between different cases. The chapters three to seven demonstrated that this is the case. The distinction between ‘Let’s Share’ and ‘Doomed to Share’ cases, for instance, makes clear that these two types are entirely different post-conflict situations. In ‘Let’s Share’ polities, the parties have an interest in the power-sharing arrangement that goes beyond a mere tactical opportunism. They are of the opinion that sharing power with their opponents brings with it lasting benefits for both sides. The case of Macedonia demonstrated that this enables the quick translation of power-sharing provisions into national law. By contrast, a basic willingness to share power for its own sake is lacking in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities; the DRC and Sierra Leone were illustrative examples in this regard.

However, the classification of different post-conflict cases is more than an intellectual exercise that satisfies the curiosity of social scientists. A huge effort was made in the ten case studies above in order to demonstrate that each of the post-conflict polity types...
follows its own internal logic – despite the fact that it may subsume cases from diverse socio-historical backgrounds. In other words, the empirical chapters illustrated that polity types ‘matter’ and that the structural constellation embodied by a certain polity type plays a role for how the different parties interact. In order to get to this point, I first made a number of assumptions about the interactions between post-conflict parties (see 2.1.2), which culminated in a generic model of post-conflict interactions. This served as the basis for developing a refined model of post-conflict interactions for each of the five\(^1\) polity types discussed in detail above, which allowed to make more specific arguments about the dynamics of each polity type. In a second step, section 2.4 presented a toolbox of eight possible patterns of interactions which was derived from a preliminary comparison of the different post-conflict cases. It turned out that most of the observed patterns can be analytically captured by a two-by-two matrix, which draws a distinction based on the question whether the interactions between the parties are genuine or virtual and whether they can be characterized by a cooperative or a confrontational logic of action. This provided the common vocabulary for the empirical analysis by offering terms such as ‘genuine cooperation’, ‘virtual cooperation’, ‘virtual enforcement’ and the like.

8.1 Summary of the Main Findings

The empirical analysis concentrated on four dimensions of interest: the prospects for overcoming commitment problems in the implementation phase of post-conflict polities; the manner of competition for political power; the prospects for dealing with threats from within; and the prospects for promoting good governance standards (see 2.4.3). In the following, the main findings of this dissertation are summarized for each of these dimensions.

Overcoming Commitment Problems. The first dimension for which the role of specific polity dynamics was demonstrated is about the prospects for overcoming commitment problems in the implementation phase of post-conflict polities. This was mainly analyzed with respect to the disarmament of the former warring factions and the formation of an inclusive army. The theoretical discussion in section 2.2.2 suggests that commitment problems may arise either due to malevolent intentions held by the former belligerents or due to problems in the structural environment of settlement and post-settlement situations. The cases demonstrated that the prospects for overcoming commitment problems are highly influenced by the overall characteristics of a certain post-conflict polity case. It could be shown that the prospects for overcoming commitment problems are better when the relations between the former warring parties are constructive, when both of them hold

---

\(^1\)To recall, the sixth polity type (‘Benevolent Intrusion’ polities) is not discussed in detail in the dissertation because it mainly overlaps with the existing category of transitional administration cases, which is already sufficiently researched.
a share of formal authority and thereby a certain control over the means of coercion (most notably the command of the national army), and when external actors are able and willing to provide sufficient security guarantees for the parties by which to insure them against a possible defection of their opponents.

Out of these reasons, the two constructive polity types provide the most conducive environment for overcoming commitment problems. In ‘Let’s Share’ polities, all three of the above conditions are fully met. The two cases – Macedonia and Burundi – generally confirmed these stipulations. As a ‘best-case scenario’ – a low-intensity conflict, constructive power-sharing and a demonstrated willingness and ability by external actors to intervene – it is no surprise that the disarmament proceeded smoothly in Macedonia. However, the formation of a joined army succeeded also in Burundi, despite the fact that the conflict left much deeper wounds and societal cleavages. It therefore appears plausible to argue that ‘Let’s Share’ polities offer a favorable environment for overcoming commitment problems.

‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities are also a comparatively conducive environment for overcoming commitment problems because the constructive relations among the former belligerents make it easier to create trust among the different parties. Yet, the inherent asymmetry of this polity type – only one of the parties is part of the government (and hence gains exclusive control of the security apparatus) while the other parties is excluded – potentially constitutes an obstacle for successfully overcoming commitment problems in the end. This requires significant attempts by external actors to bridge the divide between the parties. This became most clearly apparent in the case of Mozambique, where the parties maintained a ‘reserve military force’ in case peace fell apart but where the disarmament process nonetheless succeeded in the end. An important aspect for inducing RENAMO to cooperate were external attempts for enabling Renamo to successfully compete against FRELIMO in the elections. A similar outcome was also observed for El Salvador, where the FMLN initially even had maintained secret arms caches as a ‘life-insurance’ but ultimately became cooperative.

Because benevolent intentions are lacking, the obstructive polity types generally provide an environment where overcoming commitment problems is likely to be marked by significant difficulties. The cases suggest that if the former belligerents have no real interest in peace, there is little external actors can do in order to induce them to greater cooperation. Beyond this general insight, it became apparent that the polity type matters for the manner in which the parties react to their disarmament obligations in obstructive polity types. From a theoretical perspective, ‘Doomed to Share’ polities constitute an environment in which the prospects for overcoming commitment problems are better than for other obstructive polity types because both parties at least formally hold a fraction of governmental authority and hence a certain control of the security forces. However, in the case studies no evidence was found that disarmament proceeded significantly better in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities than in other polity types. Instead, it became apparent that efforts for overcoming commitment problems were characterized by pronounced ‘virtual
cooperation’ and ‘foot dragging’ gestures with which the parties tried to circumvent their disarmament obligations, backed by ‘saber rattling’ and ‘calculated escalation’ strategies in case this strategy failed. This became most clearly apparent in the case of the RUF in Sierra Leone, which failed to meet any of the disarmament provisions contained in the Lomé Peace Agreement. Instead, the rebel group initially relied on extensive ‘foot dragging’ and ‘virtual cooperation’ gestures but made increasing use of more confrontational measures (‘saber rattling’ and ‘calculated escalation’ gestures) over time. In the DRC, the conduct of the parties was from the beginning on marked by an even more confrontational manner, most notably because external actors turned out as both unwilling and incapable of providing the security guarantees necessary for overcoming the commitment problems and because the large number of warring factions (many of which came from abroad) impeded an effective disarmament.

In ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities, the excluded parties do not participate in the government and have little prospects for gaining governmental power in the near future. Due to the obstructive relations prevailing between the belligerents, the excluded parties must fear being exposed to one-sided acts of violence by the ruling party. As a result, efforts for disarming the rebel factions can be expected to be highly confrontational and to lack even a symbolic commitment. Liberia did not offer a suitable empirical basis for supporting these stipulations because the main efforts for disarming the warring parties took place before the elections in 1997, i.e. before a ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity was formally in place. After the polity was established, Charles Taylor’s refusal to restructure the army (as provided for in the Arusha Agreement) and his decision to maintain parallel security forces demonstrates how mistrust and suspicion may impede the implementation of core provisions from peace agreements. The case of Côte d’Ivoire illustrates that not even extensive external security guarantees can induce the parties in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities to cooperate, since they managed to forestall the disarmament process for more than three years.

In ‘You Stay Out’ polities, a consensus exists between external actors and the ruling party that the excluded party should not have any significant say in the polity; therefore none of them has a real interest in overcoming commitment problems. Instead, the excluded parties are expected to agree to an unconditional surrender, which the ruling party is willing to enforce if necessary. This became very clearly apparent in Rwanda with respect to the RPF’s attempts to crush potential génocidaires and throw them out of the country, which took place under the watching eyes of the international community.²

Manner of Political Competition. The second dimension analyzed was the manner of political competition among the former belligerents. As the case studies illustrate, the polity types differ greatly with respect to the manner in which the parties compete for

²Attempts for disarmament in Tajikistan are not directly applicable in ‘You Stay Out’ polities because the first three years after the settlement were still characterized by a mediative manner of external engagement.
8.1 Summary of the Main Findings

political power and influence. Using a broad brush, it can be argued that constructive polity types are generally marked by more formal-constitutional ways of political competition than obstructive polity types and that the future prospects for the parties are a key factor for determining how political competition unfolds in the different polity types.

One of the defining features of constructive polity types is that the parties do not generally contest the current distribution of formal authority and that both of them accept the status quo and are ready to share power. In ‘Let’s Share’ polities, this has become apparent in a genuine commitment to power-sharing, which seemingly makes this case a quasi-ideal environment for post-conflict settlements. However not even ‘Let’s Share’ polities are self-reinforcing because they provide a strong incentive for political hardliners or other potential spoilers to mobilize public sentiments against the power-sharing provisions and engage in attempts for political mobilization ‘on the cheap’. The case studies have confirmed what critics of power-sharing have long pointed out: that power-sharing arrangements are likely to being eroded by centrifugal tendencies or that they foster the segregation rather than the integration of the different communities. This was generally confirmed by the two cases discussed above. The case of Macedonia – which is an example for the consociational model of power-sharing – was initially characterized by a highly cooperative manner of political competition (as illustrated by the quick implementation of the key provisions from the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’), but the competition for power intensified after the conservative VMRO-DPMNE was outvoted in 2002. The case offers reasons for assuming that the incentive for political hardliners to exploit the harmonious situation by selling themselves as the real parties (political mobilization ‘on the cheap’) exposed all parties to a ‘slippery slope’. Burundi, which leans more towards the integrative model of power-sharing, was exposed to a similar ‘slippery slope’ because other Hutu parties accused the CNDD-FDD of betraying the Hutu cause by collaborating with the Tutsi. Strikingly, however, the requirement for mixed party lists has indeed reduced many of the tensions that had characterized the relations between the Hutu and the Tutsi for several decades.

In ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, the prospect for both parties to have a realistic chance for competing against each other in popular turned out as a crucial aspect for inducing the reluctant parties to maintain their obstructive stance. For the excluded party a feeling that ‘patience pays off’ – i.e. that they have a realistic chance for gaining power through formal-constitutional means at some point in the future – was a crucial factor for explaining its cooperative stance. This requires that political competition continues to be carried out on a level playing field. In Mozambique, RENAMO’s chances for successfully competing against FRELIMO in the elections mainly go back to external actors’ attempts to bridge the asymmetry between the two parties and its good showing in the 1994 elections. However, with accusations of electoral fraud accompanying subsequent elections, its calls for political reforms grew increasingly louder. In El Salvador, the FMLN’s exclusion from the government was less extreme, and although ARENA used all legal means in order to
Chapter 8 Conclusion

curtail its opponent’s political influence, it could not prevent the former rebel group from improving its electoral performance more and more. When an FMLN candidate won the presidential elections in 2009, it was clear that its patience over the preceding fifteen years had paid off.

In obstructive polity types, the manner of political competition is significantly different. Most importantly, a basic consensus about the status quo is lacking and the parties are willing to increase their individual share of power immediately rather than waiting for their chances in future elections. In ‘Doomed to Share’ polities, this has mainly manifested itself in a highly confrontational manner of political competition in which the parties constantly attempt to tip the balance of power in their own favor through making use of informal and unconstitutional ways of political competition. However, since participating in the government is often associated with benefits and privileges, the parties may also revert to ‘foot dragging’ and other ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies in order to make sure that they continue to have access to these benefits. This could be confirmed in both the DRC and Sierra Leone, where the opportunities for self-enrichment embodied by the power-sharing arrangements accounted for extended foot-dragging gestures applied by the parties. At the same time, the power-sharing arrangements were in both cases marked by a significant conflict of interest between the presidents (Kabila in the DRC and Kabbah in Sierra Leone) and the ‘junior partners’ (MLC and RCD in the DRC and the RUF in Sierra Leone) in the transitional government: while the former had an interest in sitting out the transitional phase in order to legitimize their rule through democratic elections, the latter knew that they had little chances in competing against the government in competitive elections. As a result, they conceived of the power-sharing arrangement predominantly as a temporary ‘safe haven’ for re-arming and collecting resources for launching their final blow against their opponents.

The lack of consensus about the status quo also steers the manner of political competition in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities to informal and unconstitutional means. The excluded party perceives the government’s rule as illegitimate and its own exclusion from power as unfair and has little hopes for gaining power through formal-constitutional means. The ruling party, in turn, fears that the opposition might become a threat to its rule; therefore, it is likely to use its control of the state apparatus for constraining the political space for the opposition. This accounts for the relations between the warring parties to be genuinely confrontational. Despite that, the regime is likely to make some flimsy attempts to mask its hold on power in order to prevent external actors from identifying with the goals of the opposition and switching to a partisan manner of engagement. This was confirmed by the cases. Although the Liberian president Taylor came to power through democratic elections, he knew that the international community had doubts about his qualities as a civilian ruler. As a result, he initially adopted a few conciliating gestures but almost simultaneously reverted to exerting a tight control on the political space. The Krahn and Mandingo opposition parties knew that they had little prospects for winning against Taylor
8.1 Summary of the Main Findings

in competitive elections and hence increasingly made use of violent means of political competition. The situation was different in Côte d’Ivoire, where Gbagbo faced poor prospects for gaining power through competitive elections and hence tried to perpetuate his de facto rule. By a combination of ‘virtual cooperation’ and ‘saber rattling’ strategies, he managed to prolong the transitional phase by a total of five years.

In ‘You Stay Out’ polities, finally, the manner of political competition is even more openly confrontational. Because neither the governing party itself nor external actors have an interest in truly democratic processes which could bring the unwelcome opposition to power, attempts by the regime to control the political space and wind down democratic standards are less likely to meet external actors’ scrutiny. External pressure for democrati-
zation is mainly rhetorical, which gives the ruling party significant latitude to control the political space, accounting for the complete lack of a level playing field. In order to secure ongoing external support and to underline its qualities as an anchor for stability, the ruling party also engages in attempts to delegitimize the political opposition through ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies. The RPF’s totalitarian manner of exercising power in Rwanda closely matched these stipulations. The moral superiority it gained over its opponents because it put an end to the genocide allowed the ruling party to get rid of unwelcome individuals or banning opposition parties. At the same time, it implied that external actors sanctioned its unilateral prolongation of the transitional phase and the fraudulent elections it organized during the transitional period. This was similar to the situation in Tajikistan, where the president’s claims to constitute a safeguard against Islamic fundamentalism secured him significant external support and induced external actors to turn a blind eye to the quickly progressing authoritarian drift.

Threats from Within. The third dimension analyzed in the case studies dealt more generally with threats that may arise in post-conflict polities and with the parties’ attempts for countering them. Because the nature of threats differs significantly with the polity types, it was more difficult to formulate clear-cut assumptions about the possible interactions observable in this dimension. On the most general level, it can be argued that the threats to the stability of the polity become more imminent the more obstructive the relations between the rebel groups are. Whether or not this leads to a collapse of the polity depends at least in part on the polity type. The cases also suggest that power-sharing polities run a greater risk of collapsing as a result of ‘threats from within’ than domination polities, because they are inherently more fragile. Domination polities, in contrast, often deal with threats in a highly authoritarian manner, mostly by harassing opposition members and exerting a tight control of their activities.

Already among the two constructive polity types, the nature of the threats differs significantly. In ‘Let’s Share’ polities, the main threats seem to arise from the aforementioned temptation for spoilers and political hardliners to mobilize ethnic or ideological cleavages for political gains. Their likelihood for success is particularly high in ethnically divided
Chapter 8 Conclusion

societies (as embodied by both Macedonia and Burundi), because they allow influential individuals or radical parties to use the allegedly ‘unfair’ power-sharing provisions as a pretext for triggering fears against the minority population. This entails a high risk of undermining the constructive foundations on which this polity rests and hence for the stability of the polity as a whole. This requires external actors to perform the role of a ‘watchdog’ – i.e. to observe the political developments in the polity and be prepared for short-term, decisive interventions if the conditions on the ground call for it. This became apparent in both Macedonia and Burundi, although in slightly different ways. In Macedonia, conservative politicians engaged in attempts to trigger imminent political crises with the potential to derail the peace process – e.g. the referendum against the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ in 2004 or the VMRO-DPMNE’s refusal to coalesce with the strongest Albanian party after the elections in 2006. Both instances required immediate external engagement, which external actors were able and willing to provide. In Burundi, the main threat arose from the refusal of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL to support the peace process, which stemmed from its rejection of striking a compromise with the Tutsi. This caused the CNDD-FDD to revert to an increasingly confrontational manner in dealing with the recalcitrant rebel party, who sought to defeat them military in order to avoid making concessions to them.

In ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, the observed threats were more moderate, which may have its reasons in the broader contextual conditions rather than the polity constellation as such. On the one hand, threats to the stability of the polity may arise in case the excluded party realizes that its prospects for winning future elections evaporate and they come to the conclusion that patience does not pay off any longer, inducing them to seek ‘shortcuts’ to political power. On the other hand, threats may also arise from the ruling party if it fears to lose power against its opponents in competitive elections, inducing it to curtail the political space for the opposition. In the worst case, this is likely to cause the relations among the former belligerents to become obstructive over time. This outcome could neither be observed in Mozambique nor in El Salvador. They nonetheless demonstrate the potential for this to be the case. In Mozambique, RENAMO’s ongoing electoral losses in conjunction with accusations that FRELIMO’s victory was the result of electoral fraud mounted in a rising frustration and induced the party to adopt a few timid ‘saber rattling’ gestures in order to express its protest against these results. In contrast, the prospects for winning elections had improved rather than decreased for the FMLN in El Salvador, which made it unnecessary to make use of more confrontational strategies.

Obstructive polity types obviously face more imminent threats, but also more extreme ways for dealing with them. In comparison to constructive polity types, there is a higher likelihood for ‘saber rattling’ gestures and other confrontational maneuvers to escalate into military confrontations between the antagonistic parties – in particular because the disarmament process is often faulty and incomplete in these polity types. In ‘Doomed to Share’ polities, the obstructive relations of the parties and the informal manner of political
competition make it difficult to draw a clear line between power-sharing partners and spoilers. Confrontations between the power-sharing ‘partners’ can potentially arise from various different directions, for instance from splinter-groups who have an interest in getting rid of the power-sharing arrangement and are willing to use armed force in order to achieve their goal. This potential is vividly demonstrated by the RCD-Goma in the DRC: while the leadership benefited from participating in the power-sharing government in Kinshasa, the grass roots in Goma had little to gain from the transitional phase. Laurent Nkunda’s dissident faction which emerged as a consequence of this dissatisfaction posed a significant threat to the stability of post-conflict DRC. Afraid of disrupting the fragile foundations for peace and unwilling to commit the necessary resources for a ‘genuine enforcement’ mission, external actors failed to contain these spoilers. The RUF in Sierra Leone effectively embodied the prototype of a spoiler. The main threat to the stability of the polity arose from its repeated attempts to assert itself through ‘saber rattling’ and ‘calculated escalation’ strategies. Afraid to disrupt the fragile foundations of the Lomé Agreement, external actors initially let the rebel group proceed and only found back to a ‘genuine enforcement’ strategy after the RUF’s provocations had reached an unbearable level.

In ‘The Winner Take it All’ polities, threats to the stability of the polity are likely to arise from confrontations between the former belligerents about the unequal distribution of authority. Because a consensus about the status quo is lacking, the parties adopt confrontational means, which either aim at inflicting serious harm on one’s opponents or are motivated by fears about being overthrown themselves. The incomplete disarmament process enables the parties to revert to armed force relatively quickly. This constitutes a serious security risk for the government, causing it to outmaneuver the political opponents and exploit every opportunity to gain a relative advantage over them. This caused the incumbent presidents in both Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire to curtail their opponents’ room for maneuver by exerting a tight control on the political space and maintaining unofficial forces which harassed recalcitrant opposition figures. These forces – Taylor’s heterogeneous group of security forces and Gbagbo’s unofficial ‘young patriots’ militia – allowed the leaders to deny their responsibility for their actions and maintain a veil of cooperation vis-à-vis external actors.

In ‘You Stay Out’ polities, the ruling parties are likely to face threats emanating from opposition politicians who are trying to gain influence through informal routes because they have no prospects for gaining power through formal-constitutional means. This may either consist of continued military operations or attempts to spur public resistance against the government by engaging in ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies, which aim at unmasking the shortcomings of the regime. In order to curtail these activities, the government exerts a tight control on the political space. In the two ‘You Stay Out’ polity cases analyzed in detail, this happened primarily through creating an environment of fear and mistrust which discouraged any activities directed against the regime. In Rwanda, the RPF achieved this
by cracking down on opponents, intimidating critics and forcing opposition politicians into exile. This harassment was backed by charges of ‘divisionism’ or ‘genocide ideology’, which turned out as an effective measure for keeping external criticism at arm’s length. External actors even kept silent on blatant human rights violations committed by the Rwandan government at home and abroad. The mechanisms were similar in Tajikistan, although the government’s control of the political space was much less extreme than in Rwanda. Attempts for accommodating recalcitrant elites played an important role in Rakhmon’s attempts to contain spoilers and hardliners, but the government increasingly reverted to more confrontational means, mostly by trying to discourage the emergence of new challengers through creating an environment of fear and suspicion (e.g. through arbitrary arrests of opposition politicians). External actors largely remained silent about these abuses of power.

**Promoting Good Governance.** The last dimension addressed by the case studies was about the prospects for external attempts to promote good governance standards. Also in this dimension, great variety could be observed with regard to the different polity types. Not surprisingly, the cases confirmed that more constructive polity types offer a more favorable environment for promoting good governance standards than obstructive ones, but they also highlighted that constructive relations as such are not sufficient for good governance principles to take hold. All cases furthermore suggest decisive and long-term external engagement is necessary for good governance principles to materialize even in constructive polity types. Often, the necessary external engagement was lacking – either due to a lacking willingness or a lacking ability to exert the necessary leverage on the domestic parties.

The constructive polity types in principle confirm the conducive environment embodied by these polities. However, they also suggest that external actors’ engagement is much stronger in the initiation phase of these polities than in the implementation phase. The cases suggest that external actors appear to fall into the ‘euphemistic blindness’ fallacy whenever they deal with constructive polity types – i.e. the tendency to commit too little time and resources to these polities out of the conviction that they are self-reinforcing polities. With respect to ‘Let’s Share’ polities, it became apparent that external actors are likely to hail them as show-cases for successful post-conflict peacebuilding, which can cause them to lose the critical distance necessary for a grounded assessment of the developments taking place. In this polity type, many of the formal success factors are in place: constructive relations, a genuine cooperation by the former warring parties and an honest commitment of all sides to share power. These cases are therefore suitable to be presented as success cases to the world which require hardly any ongoing involvement from external actors. This may give rise to a significant discrepancy between the effectiveness of external engagement in the initiation phase and the implementation phase of ‘Let’s Share’ polities. In both Macedonia and Burundi, external engagement was key for the establishment of power-
8.1 Summary of the Main Findings

sharing arrangements, but both cases differ significantly with respect to the degree of external engagement in the implementation phase of these arrangements. Not surprisingly, Macedonia – which is located in the center of Europe – was subject to a much greater external willingness to promote good governance standards than Burundi. In addition, by exploiting Macedonia’s perspective of becoming a member in the EU, external actors were both able and willing to exert a strong and long-enduring influence on the domestic parties. These were crucial factors for facilitating the implementation of good governance standards across the board. In Burundi, external actors’ willingness and ability to engage in the long term promotion of good governance principles was considerably lower. The CNDD-FDD used the constructive features of the Burundian power-sharing arrangement as an excuse for booting external actors out of the country after a relatively short period of engagement. This deprived external actors of their ability to exert leverage on the Burundian government and call for the compliance with good governance standards. This outcome was in part also facilitated by external actors’ inclination to hail the country’s formal peacebuilding achievements (as embodied in the constructive power-sharing arrangement) and the resulting tendency to overlook or ‘gloss over’ existing shortcomings and dangers.

In ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, the phenomenon of ‘euphemistic blindness’ plays out in a similar way. Because of the presence of a stable government which enjoys the legitimacy of even the excluded parties, one is tempted to draw the conclusion that this is a relatively self-reliant polity type. This provides a good pretext for external actors to confine their engagement to apolitical aspects and to refrain from direct confrontations with the government, which potentially allows violations of good governance standards to creep in by the backdoor. In Mozambique, this mainly became apparent through the seemingly apolitical manner with which external actors engaged in these contexts by pushing for the implementation of capacity building and liberalization policies, which have diverted the attention away from more fundamental problems arising in other dimensions – most notably FRELIMO’s attempts to hollow out democratic principles or the quickly progressing poverty that has coexisted alongside strong growth rates. Similar observations were made in El Salvador, where external actors failed to acknowledge the unfair manner of political competition in which ARENA had at times engaged and instead concentrated on imposing strong liberalization policies on the government. This illustrates that although constructive polity types offer a favorable environment for promoting good governance principles, they require ongoing external engagement. The latter may fail either due to a lacking willingness of a lacking ability of external actors.

In obstructive polity types, the conditions for promoting good governance standards are even less promising. The confrontational manner of political competition and the pervasiveness of internal threats are factors that hamper the effective promotion of good governance principles from the outset. The obstructive environment prevailing in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities accounts for a very high likelihood that the antagonistic parties ignore external actors’ policy preferences or good governance recommendations. In a context
where political competition is characterized by an informal and unconstitutional manner of engagement, attempts for promoting good governance cannot be more than rhetorical commitments that fail to account of the realities on the ground. In this environment, the best external actors can do is trying to prevent the occurrence of large-scale human rights violations, which requires a significant willingness and ability to constrain the belligerents’ room for maneuver. The two cases – the DRC and Sierra Leone – confirm that external actors are at best partially willing to fulfill this role. In both cases, they shied away from engaging in ‘genuine enforcement’ strategies which would have been necessary in order to prevent at least the most blatant violations of good governance standards. In a ‘virtual enforcement’ manner, they mainly ‘muddled through’ the transitional phase and hoped to reach the save anchor of elections before the polity fell entirely apart, thereby taking into account that good governance standards became entirely eroded.

In ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities, external actors’ willingness to promote good governance principles is even lower because the presence of a stable (and sometimes even legitimately elected) government makes it more difficult for external actors to justify ongoing involvement in the polity. Although – unlike in ‘You Stay Out’ polities – external actors have a genuine interest in promoting good governance standards, this per se reduces their ability to fulfill their own claims. This mainly became apparent in Liberia, where external actors gave in to Taylor’s attempts to boot them out of the country despite entertaining strong doubts about his qualities as a civilian ruler. Hence, after ECOMOG’s withdrawal in 1998, there was no power left in the country which could contain Taylor and his attempts to dominate the political system. This significantly hampered external actors’ ability to call for good governance standards or to prevent even the most pervasive human rights violations. Only Taylor’s continued support for the RUF in Sierra Leone triggered a change in external actors’ behavior, which expressed itself in the ultimate imposition of sanctions against Taylor’s regime. The situation in Côte d’Ivoire was different, because external actors had played a crucial role in putting an end to the armed conflict (by establishing a zone of confidence) and never withdrew from the country. They still turned out as incapable of enforcing good governance standards because they were increasingly fooled by the parties’ ‘virtual cooperation’ and ‘foot dragging’ gestures.

‘You Stay Out’ polities, finally, constitute an altogether different environment for promoting good governance standards. External actors’ willingness to engage in the promotion of good governance is low because they do not have any interest in inducing the government to implement measures (free elections) which could threaten its own survival. They have a demonstrated preference for stability and maintaining the status quo, which also implies a strong tolerance towards the shortcomings and excesses of the incumbent regime. However, because it violates external actors’ own rhetoric if they openly support an autocratic or dictatorial regime, they are likely to levy modest (mainly rhetorical) democratization pressure on the incumbent government and expect it to exhibit at least a symbolic commitment to democracy. This is demonstrated by the two cases – Rwanda and Tajikistan – discussed
above. Although the ruling party’s commitment to democracy was in both cases not more than a shallow facade, external actors largely remained silent about these abuses of power. In addition, the cases illustrate that external actors’ ability to secure even this minimal say in the polity may become eroded by the ‘reverse leverage’ which the ruling parties in ‘You Stay Out’ polities can exert on external actors. In Rwanda, the ‘genocide credit’ gave the regime in Kigali significant leverage over external actors, which it used in order to forestall the latter’s attempts to extend the ICTR’s jurisdiction to war crimes committed by the RPF. In Tajikistan, Rakhmon skillfully exploited the fact that Russia and the West were competing for influence in the region, which secured him support from both sides and allowed him to limit the pressure exerted by each of them individually.

8.2 Caveats and Limitations

In larger research projects, it is often the case that the goals a researcher sets for himself (or herself) cannot always be met to his full satisfaction. There are almost always practical limitations that require to draw compromises or alter the goals in the middle of the process. This dissertation is no exception. I encountered a number of limitations throughout the research process which should be mentioned here in order to give the reader the ability to evaluate how they might affect his interpretations of the results. In addition to that, a number of caveats and restrictions should be noted that may not become apparent at first glance but that nonetheless could have an influence on the generalizability of the conclusions.

First, it should be noted that it is no coincidence that this dissertation is called ‘A Typology of Post-Conflict Polities’. Next to the typology presented here, other researchers may (or, certainly, will) come up with different distinctions between post-conflict situations. During the process that led to the construction of the final typology, several intermediary typologies were drafted and later discarded. The analysis of the cases showed, I believe, that the typology ultimately yielded is both plausible and meaningful. However, the six polity types identified above are not carved in stone. Therefore, it is not problematic if further empirical evidence should convincingly suggest that the types need to be refined or additional types added.

Second, despite the broad variety of cases that provided the basis for this dissertation, the empirical basis for identifying the dynamics of the different polity types was not in all cases ideal. In particular in those types where few cases are available (like ‘Let’s Share’ polities), one has to live with certain limitations that are inherent to case material as such. Whether by coincidence or not, the two power-sharing polity types not only differed with respect to the characteristics contained in the typology, but also with regard to one additional aspect, which certainly affected the observed results: the two ‘Let’s Share’ polities are cases in which the power-sharing provisions became firmly entrenched in the countries’ constitution, whereas in the ‘Doomed to Share’ cases power-sharing was not
Chapter 8  Conclusion

more than a transitional mechanism to bridge the time until elections took place.\(^3\) This is not utterly surprising, because one can easily imagine that it is intricately more difficult (and possibly also pointless) to codify power-sharing provisions in an environment where a basic consensus about the status quo is lacking. However, the lack of a real perspective for former rebel groups to gain power through free and fair elections in the future was identified as a major destabilizing factor of these polities. In cases where power-sharing is more than a spontaneous and temporary form of elite co-optation, it can be expected that this factor plays a less important role. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the conclusions drawn above about these polity types.

Third, although it could be demonstrated that the three analytical dimensions of the typology have an influence on the dynamics and interactions taking place in the post-conflict phase, I do not claim these are the only factors that matter, nor that they are necessarily the most important ones for predicting whether external statebuilding attempts will be successful or not. There are numerous contextual factors which potentially have an effect on the manner in which the parties interact, too. The case of Macedonia offers a telling example. The presence of constructive relations and the parties’ demonstrated willingness to engage in power-sharing in earnest were important preconditions for the country’s ultimate success in maintaining peaceful post-conflict relations. However, it was just as important that external actors exhibited an exceptional willingness and ability to remain engaged in the polity in the long run and to ensure that the constructive spirit of this polity did not become undermined by spoilers who engaged in attempts for political mobilization ‘on the cheap’. This pronounced willingness and ability are contextual factors that are exogenous to the theoretical framework itself and which cannot necessarily be expected to be present in other ‘Let’s Share’ polities. In Burundi, external actors’ willingness and ability to exert a long-term influence on the domestic parties was much lower, which enabled the ruling party to gradually undermine power-sharing and establish an authoritarian system. Hence, the polity type itself does not determine which contextual factors are present. However, as the case studies illustrated, they may determine how these exogenous factors affect the post-conflict dynamics. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the above results.

Finally, it should be stated that not all of the different patterns of interaction identified in section 2.4 actually turned out as equally relevant. Although all of these patterns of interactions are logically conclusive and are likely to be applied by the parties in any of the different polity types, not all of them could be verified as equally important in the cases investigated. ‘Virtual accommodation’ strategies for instance – according to which external actors make concessions to the belligerents without making any specific attempts to follow up on their promises – did not play a particularly important role in any of the case studies discussed above. The only instance which could be subsumed under a ‘virtual

\(^3\)This does not only hold true for the two ‘Doomed to Share’ cases discussed in detail in chapter four, but also for the remaining ‘Doomed to Share’ cases contained in the appendix.
8.3 Implications of the Findings

Beyond the topics directly addressed in this dissertation, the above findings allow to draw some more general conclusions about the contemporary practice of intervening in post-conflict societies and the prospects for building the foundations for a lasting peace. The goal here is to focus on the bigger picture and to present those key insights that become apparent when taking one step back. Although none of the below implications can be directly interpreted as policy recommendations, some of them contain lessons which are of direct relevance for the future conduct of post-conflict intervention.

**There is no self-reinforcing Peace.** The first lesson to be drawn from this dissertation has already been pointed out by numerous critics of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm: that it is hardly possible for external actors to trigger a process of self-reinforcing peace after the end of civil wars. To recall, the liberal peacebuilding paradigm is based on the assumption that establishing democratic state structures creates incentives for the former belligerents to commit to peaceful goals and strategies and to enjoy the ‘peace dividend’ (see chapter one). The evidence presented in this dissertation confirms once more that skepticism with respect to this general claim is warranted. Little evidence could be found anywhere in the cases that peace processes are self-implementing. In almost all of the cases analyzed, an ongoing and often lengthy external engagement in the post-conflict period was necessary in order to avert imminent threats to the stability of the polity or to ensure that the parties comply with basic good governance standards. This holds true for constructive and obstructive polity types alike. Not even the ‘most likely case’ scenarios (‘Let’s Share’ polities and ‘Let the Winner Take it All’) polities can be exempted. In Macedonia for
instance, external actors’ role of a watchdog was crucial for preventing an early collapse of the polity, and the lack of such an engagement in Burundi can at least in part be held accountable for the tacit establishment of a one party state by the CNDD-FDD. The two ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ cases are arguably closest to the ideal of a liberal peace, and a fair assessment should lead to the result that these countries have made significant achievements in the past two decades. But even in these cases, tensions arose that may turn out as a threat to the stability of these polities in the future. In obstructive polity types, the notion of a self-reinforcing peace turned out as grossly misguided. All cases in which the relations between the former warring parties were obstructive were either characterized by pronounced authoritarian tendencies or led to the relapse into civil war. This suggests that the theoretical foundations on which the liberal peacebuilding paradigm rests are faulty and should urgently be revised. External actors should become acquainted with the idea that rebuilding war-torn societies requires much more external engagement than what they are currently able and willing to provide.

Obstructive Parties remain Obstructive. The second key insight of this dissertation is that obstructive parties are very unlikely to switch to a constructive modus operandi without any significant change in the broader structural environment taking place. The peacemaking logic generally advocated by external actors seems to be based on the assumption that obstructive parties instantly become constructive as soon as they sign peace agreements. Whether in the case of Charles Taylor, Foday Sankoh or Laurent Gbagbo – external actors based their peacemaking efforts on the assumption that even the most gruesome despots would become more “statesmanlike” as soon as they have to “grapple with the demands of governance” – as William Reno aptly put it with respect to Charles Taylor (2004: 134). A look at the track record of these rulers illustrates that these expectations are highly naïve. In fact, in none of the cases covered in this dissertation, obstructive parties became truly constructive unless they were defeated militarily and forced to agree to an unconditional surrender. Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh were subject to a military defeat and later ended up in prison (where Sankoh died), whereas Gbagbo refused the outcome of the elections of November 2010, which he had managed to postpone in the preceding five years. This illustrates that if political leaders in post-conflict countries want to behave obstructively, there is little external actors can do in order to induce them to cooperate. This may be ‘bad news’ for external actors, who have until now invested significant time and resources into hammering out peace agreements with political leaders who did not exhibit the slightest inclination to follow up on the promises they made. The lesson to be drawn from this insight is that external actors should stop the self-deception that has until now accompanied their efforts for crafting peace. Expecting leaders like Taylor, Sankoh or Gbagbo to discover a genuine commitment to peace is unrealistic. The crucial question is: what is the alternative? Should external actors stop to seek settlements among obstructive parties and simply abandon the respective countries to their own fate? The answer is a
clear no. A settlement among obstructive leaders is still better than no settlement at all. Even if the emerging polity turns out as unstable or if it amounts to the establishment of an autocratic regime, it is arguably still preferable for the affected population than a continuation of the war to the bitter end.

**External actors are easy to deceive, even by notorious despots.** The third main insight of this dissertation is that external actors are very easily deceived by the tricks and ‘virtual cooperation’ gestures of parties who are unwilling to commit to the terms of peace and who simply pretend to cooperate. ‘Virtual cooperation’ strategies could be observed across all polity types and were used by the parties for various different purposes. The most blatant cases, however, were those in which external actors were fooled by parties whose conduct was marked by a flimsy commitment to peace. Again, Laurent Gbagbo is the best example for this phenomenon, whose oscillation between ‘virtual cooperation’ and ‘saber rattling’ gestures seems to have confused external actors to the extent which prevented them from constraining his actions in any substantive way. After each obstructive maneuver, external actors were easily convinced that, this time, he was interested in peace in earnest. This allowed him to make a fool out of the international community and get away with false promises and broken agreements without facing any negative consequences. This suggests that external actors seem to be endowed with a sheer endless degree of goodwill in their dealings with recalcitrant parties. When considering their aversion against engagements which are costly both in a political and in a substantive sense, this outcome is not utterly surprising. Standing firm against these leaders and engaging in a ‘genuine enforcement’ strategy is more costly in the short run than showing these leaders where their limits are. However, the long term costs of not doing so are much higher, in particular if these ‘virtual cooperation’ gestures only postpone a complete collapse of the peace process. The lesson to be drawn from this is that external actors should stop to judge post-conflict actors by their lip service and should instead become aware that ‘virtual cooperation’ gestures are a normal characteristic of certain post-conflict polity types. Rather than meeting this by a combination of accommodation and ‘virtual enforcement’ strategies, they should be prepared to mobilize sufficient resources in order to switch to a strategy of ‘genuine enforcement’ if necessary. If the ‘deceiving parties’ understand that repeatedly breaking agreements and undermining the foundations for peace will be met by sanctions from external actors, their inclination to test the latter’s nerves to the very end might decline.

**Substance is more important than form.** The fourth main insight is that external actors put too much emphasis on the form or outward appearance of statebuilding processes and ignore the substantive processes going on below the surface. The cases gave vivid proof that external actors are too much obsessed with the formal ingredients of their statebuilding agendas – most notably elections – which causes them to overlook or fade out the much more imminent dynamics that really drive post-conflict dynamics. The cases illustrate...
that elections as such do not matter very much – even when they take place in a relatively free environment. In the DRC, the international community concentrated exclusively on organizing the polls in 2006, but rather than bringing democracy they gave the impetus for establishing a firmly authoritarian system characterized by crack-downs on opposition politicians and a tight control of the political space. In Liberia, they legitimized the rule of Charles Taylor, who had been the de facto ruler of large parts of the country before and who made little difference between his role as a warlord and his conduct as a president. In many other contexts, elections are not more than carefully orchestrated acts of democratic semblance. In Rwanda and Tajikistan, the fraudulent elections fulfilled the double purpose of legitimizing the incumbent parties and of endowing external actors’ support for them with a veil of legitimacy. Elections played a more promising role in Mozambique and El Salvador, where they were accepted by the former warring parties as a neutral arbitrator to decide who governed. However, it lies outside of external actors’ sphere of influence to make sure that elections fulfill this more promising role. In addition, the preoccupation with elections and other elements of the liberal statebuilding project diverts attention away from more pressing problems that may become apparent in the post-conflict phase – for instance systematic human rights violations or the emergence of parties who lose an interest in peace and turn into spoilers. The cases illustrated that once an elected government is in place, external actors have difficulties justifying their ongoing engagement and often have to withdraw involuntarily. This was the case in the DRC, Liberia, Rwanda and Burundi. This stands in stark contrast to external actors’ attempts to postpone their efforts to promote good governance standards to the post-election era. Once external actors withdraw, there ability to make sure that the polity continues to work according to established principles of good governance becomes significantly reduced. This dilemma is well captured in a quote by Peter Uvin: “[D]onors really only control the form, but not the substance, of the institutions they help build. […] What they cannot ensure – or in any case not easily, and not with the usual tools of the development system – is that these formal institutions also effectively, substantively, act in the way donors expect or desire” (2001: 186). The lesson to be drawn from this is that external actors should give up to view elections as a panacea for the success of statebuilding projects. In many post-conflict polity types, they do not really matter for the distribution of authority between the former warring parties. Informal and unconstitutional instruments of political competition are by far more important. Recognizing that a symbolic commitment to democracy is an ordinary feature of many polity types would help external actors to concentrate on more constructive ways of dealing with this fact.

External engagement often amounts to ‘Impotence in Denial’. The fifth main insight of this dissertation is that the external actors’ ability to exert leverage on the former warring parties is sometimes severely curtailed. While it was mostly the case that external actors lacked sufficient willingness for a decisive intervention in the first place, there were also
cases in which a more decisive engagement failed because external actors lacked sufficient ‘sticks and carrots’ in order to exert significant influence on the domestic dynamics. Modifying Chandler’s phrase that contemporary statebuilding attempts reflect what he calls “empire in denial” (2006b), post-conflict interventions are sometimes marked by an ‘impotence in denial’ – i.e. the inability to recognize that external actors sometimes have little leverage for inducing parties to cooperate. This may not hold true for those prominent countries on which external actors levied tremendous influence and in which there was sufficient political will to remain engaged in the long run – for instance Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo or Macedonia. But it holds true for the much larger group of countries with respect to which external actors’ leverage was too small: the DRC, Burundi, Liberia (until Taylor’s resignation), Sierra Leone (until the UK intervention) or Côte d’Ivoire, to mention only a few. Recognizing this from the outset would make it easier for external actors to become more modest in the statebuilding goals they advocate.

8.4 Concluding Remarks

The above implications underline that the current manner of external intervention suffers from a number of flaws and ambiguities. All in all, they illustrate that a lot goes wrong with regard to contemporary attempts to rebuild war-torn societies and that the potential for improvements is tremendous. As illustrated above, the analytical shift advocated by the post-conflict polity concept can be helpful in order to identify some of the main shortcomings and derive a set of recommendations about how the effectiveness of externally-led statebuilding attempts could be improved if the right goals were pursued. The typology of post-conflict polities can help decision-makers to get a better idea of what they will have to expect if a specific post-conflict constellation begins to materialize. The lessons explicitly stated above only address a limited set of broader implications; more specific lessons can certainly be drawn from the wealth of empirical material upon which this dissertation relies. All in all, they suggest that if the international community sets certain goals for itself, it should exhibit both a greater will and determination to actually pursue them. Seeking excuses and early exit options might be a good strategy for saving face and – in the case of military engagements by the west – accommodating the electorate at home, but it often enables despots to terrorize their populations for years or decades. However, it should also be noted that a new analytical shift as such is not a panacea for improving the contemporary manner of post-conflict intervention. Many challenges will remain for which no immediate solutions are available and for which there is no real perspective that they will be transformed into anything resembling democratic states. The question is how the international community should deal with these cases: become involved despite the risk of giving birth to a new autocratic regime or stay out? The policy recommendation here is certainly not to ‘let them fail’ or ‘let them fight it out among themselves’ – as some people continue to argue (see 2.2.1 above). Civil wars are more than an annoyance; they
cost tens of thousands of lives each year\footnote{According to conservative estimates, the total number of direct battle-related deaths between 1989 and 2008 lay between 750.000 and 1.5 million (see Wischnath and Gleditsch 2011). This figure includes both inter-state and intra-state wars; however, since most wars experienced in this period were civil wars (see chapter 1), it can be followed that they accounted for the vast majority of the victims. The number of people dying from the indirect consequences of armed conflict (hunger, disease, resource depletion) is estimated to be much higher.} and often throw countries back for decades in their economic development. In effect, they often continue to ‘kill and maim people long after the shooting stops’ (Ghobarah and Huth 2003). Rather than fearing to support authoritarianism (which external actors are doing anyway without admitting it), they should make all efforts to protect the populations of war-torn societies, most notably by not shying away from taking sides in the post-conflict phase. Taking sides is often better than muddling through.
Appendix A

Characterization and Classification of the Cases

Applying the case selection criteria formulated in section 1.3.3 to the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ (version 4-2009) results in a list of 22 post-conflict countries, of which four cases (The Central African Republic, Chad, Croatia and Somalia) were later exempted from the analysis because it turned out that they are not suitable as potential post-conflict polity cases.\(^1\) The remaining 18 cases are characterized and classified in this chapter. A brief overview about the different cases and the results of the classification process can be found in table A.1 on page 327. For each of them, it contains information about their general background, their conflict and peacekeeping histories as well as their overall post-conflict constellation. This last aspect is the most important one, since it allows to distinguish different post-conflict periods and enables to classify them as specific post-conflict polity types. Each country report is structured in three parts:

Country and Conflict Information. At the beginning of each case some very basic background data is presented, taken from the 2008 ‘Countrywatch’ reports for the respec-

---

\(^1\)The following considerations played a role for the decision to exclude them: The Central African Republic and Somalia are cases which, despite the presence of a formal settlement, lack any effective governmental order. The International Crisis Group described the Central African Republic in 2007 as being “worse than a failed state: it has become virtually a phantom state, lacking any meaningful capacity at least since the fall of Emperor Bokassa in 1979” (2007b: 1655). Kenneth Menkhaus described Somalia as the “longest-running instance of complete state collapse in postcolonial history” (2007: 187). Due to the effective absence of any real formal government, these cases are ill-suited as typical post-conflict cases. In Chad, no clear end-point for the civil war could be identified: the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ lists ‘other’ as the outcome of the first armed conflict, whereas the second armed conflict ended through conflict inactivity. This accounts for the absence of any specific post-conflict dynamics in the case of Chad. Croatia, finally, was excepted because the armed conflict there should more adequately be seen as a secession war with other countries from the former Yugoslav Republic than a real intra-state conflict. Though the country certainly is a post-war country, it does not fulfill the conditions for an intra-state armed conflict as presented in section 1.3.3. The UN Transitional Administration established in Eastern Slavonia on Croatian territory between 1996 and 1998 (UNTAES) is also not considered a post-conflict polity case because it was later integrated into Croatia rather than becoming an independent state (see Chesterman 2004: 70–72).
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

tive cases. 2 This is followed by a very short summary of the historical background and a brief overview of the conflict history, which are based on the qualitative information contained in the ‘UCDP Database’ (UCDP 2010a). These summaries are shaded in light gray in order to allow the reader to inform himself about the countries’ historical backgrounds at a glance. The information is complemented by more detailed information taken from other sources – mainly the 2008 ‘Countrywatch’ reports for the respective cases in combination with additional sources (book chapters, articles and policy reports). After this historical background, an overview of the countries’ conflict and peacekeeping characteristics is provided, which is taken from the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ and information available from the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Post-Conflict Situation. After the historical overview, the post-conflict situation is characterized. This fulfills two main purposes: First, it allows to distinguish different post-conflict phases which provided the basis for identifying different post-conflict polity-cases within one post-conflict countries. While there are some cases – for instance Mozambique or Macedonia – where there was only one armed conflict in the period of interest (and therefore only one clearly identifiable post-conflict period), there are other countries in which either several conflicts occurred simultaneously or where armed conflict recurred during the period of investigation (1990 – 2007). In addition to that, there are cases where a fundamental change of the conditions on the ground requires a re-classification of the polity even in the absence of renewed conflict. Second, it sheds light on the three dimensions derived from the analytical framework presented in section 2.1.2: the role of the formal government, the role of external actors, and the role of the former warring parties. These descriptions are based on a variety of sources, including secondary literature (books, book chapters and journal articles), Country Watch Country Reports, UN Security Council Resolutions or Reports of the UN Secretary General to the Security Council, and policy reports from the International Crisis Group and other institutions.

Assessment and Classification. The last two sections contain the assessment and classification of the different post-conflict phases, based on the dimensions of the typology presented in section 2.2. It is decided here whether the situation must be treated as a case of power-sharing or a case of political domination, whether the relations between the warring parties in the post-conflict episode under investigation were constructive or obstructive, and whether external actors were involved in this situation in a mediative, partisan or supreme manner. This provides the basis for the selection of cases discussed in detail in the empirical chapters above. A map can be found at the very end of each country chapter.

2There are a few cases where these reports were not available; in this case the information is left out. In some cases, the 2008 Countrywatch reports were either incomplete or not available; in these cases reports from other years were used.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Post-Conflict Period</th>
<th>‘Let’s Share’</th>
<th>‘Doomed to Share’</th>
<th>‘L. t. W. Take it All’</th>
<th>‘T. W. Took it All’</th>
<th>‘You Stay Out’</th>
<th>‘Benevolent Intrusion’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>since 2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola II</td>
<td>since 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>since 1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>since 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia I</td>
<td>1992–1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia II</td>
<td>since 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire I</td>
<td>2004–2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire II</td>
<td>since 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC I</td>
<td>2003–2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC II</td>
<td>since 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>1999–2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>since 1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>since 1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti I</td>
<td>1993–2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti II</td>
<td>since 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>since 1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia I</td>
<td>1997–2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia II</td>
<td>2003–2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia III</td>
<td>since 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>since 2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>since 1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>since 1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone I</td>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone II</td>
<td>2000-2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone III</td>
<td>since 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan I</td>
<td>1996–2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan II</td>
<td>since 2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Occurrences (Total=28)**  

| 2 | 5 | 4 | 9 | 4 | 4 |

Table A.1: Cases and Classification Results
Appendix A Characterization and Classification of the Cases

A.1 Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>27,089,593 as of 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Area</td>
<td>647,500 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land</td>
<td>647,500 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastline</td>
<td>0 km (Landlocked)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Pashtu (Indo-European language) and Dari (Afghan Persian) are the major languages; other Indo-European, Indo-Aryan and Indo-Iranian languages, such as Balochi, Pashayi and Eastern Farsi, are also spoken; Turkic and Altaic languages, such as Uzbek and Turkmen, are present; Arabic and Tajiki are also used. Note: There are approximately 45 living languages in total and a large degree of bilingualism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>Pakistan: 2,430 km, Tajikistan: 1,206 km, Iran: 936 km, Turkmenistan: 744 km, Uzbekistan: 137 km, China: 76 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>38% Pashtun, 25% Tajiks, 19% Hazara, 7% Baloch, 6% Uzbek, 2% Turkmen, 1% Qizilbash, 1% Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>84% Sunni Muslim, 15% Shia Muslim, 1%.Other (including Zoroastrian, Jewish, Hindu, Baha’i and Christian)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A.2: Basic Facts and Figures: Afghanistan

A.1.1 Country and Conflict Information

a) General Background

The territory of present-day Afghanistan comprises a large diversity of ethnic, religious and tribal identities. In the 19th century, rivalries between the different ethnic groups were fueled by the competition between Russia and Great Britain for influence in the region. The country became a British Protectorate, reached independence in 1919 and became a monarchy. Since then, members of the Pashtun ethnic group have dominated political life. The monarchy was abolished in 1973 as a result of a rising degree of Socialist influence in the country. A Soviet-sponsored coup in 1978 installed a Socialist government, which triggered great resistance from anti-secular groups, referred to as the ‘Mujahedeen’ (see UCDP 2010b).
Afghanistan’s population is religiously very homogeneous, with 80 percent being Sunni Muslims and 19 percent Shi’a Muslims. Yet, it is ethnically fragmented, with many of the country’s borders dividing “coethnic populations”, most significantly so in the case of the “largely independent, tribalized Pushtun population” (Thier 2006: 470). After reaching independence, Afghanistan experienced a number of home-grown modernization movements. First, the rule of King Amanullah, later of Mohammed Daoud and, finally, the rule of communists from the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) all strengthened the central state and the army, developed the educational sector, and “strikingly – all appropriated the rights and visibility of women as the central symbol of modernity” (Suhrke 2007: 1295). However, from the beginning on, these modernization movements were highly contested and, ultimately, all of them were defeated at some point. Although the country has experienced violence of various sorts throughout its entire history, it only reached the intensity of an armed conflict in 1978.

b) Conflict History

After the establishment of the Soviet-backed government, an intrastate conflict between the government and the Mujaheddin broke out. The Mujaheddin revolt was mainly organized by exiled Islamic groups. After one decade of massive armed conflict, the Soviet Union withdrew its forces in 1988. However, their withdrawal created a power vacuum that gave rise to a highly fragmented pattern of authority relying mainly on local warlords. The chaotic situation gave rise to a new actor that emerged in the mid-1990s, the Taliban. They managed to re-install central authority and imposed a strict sharia law. Their reign lasted from 1996 to 2001, until they were ousted by a US-led multinational coalition in the course of the ‘war against terrorism’ (see UCDP 2010b).

The mujahideen did not only comprise Islamic groups; they were “led by a mixture of traditional and Islamist leaders”. They were supported by the United States, which saw an opportunity to fight the spread of communism while “giving the Soviet Union its Vietnam” (Thier 2006: 471–472). After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1988, a conflict between the different mujahideen groups broke out largely along ethnic-regional lines, dividing the country into six to seven semiautonomous regions (Thier 2006: 473). This status lasted until the Taliban was formed with support from Pakistan in 1994 as an attempt to resolve the chaos. Suhrke describes the Taliban as a “socio-religious movement committed to anti-modernity in all its aspects” (2007: 1296). Within two years they controlled some 90 percent of the country and installed a fundamentalist regime. After initial ignorance from the international community, the events of 11 September 2001 gave rise to ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, initiated on 7 October 2001, in which the Taliban collapsed within only five weeks (Thier 2006: 474–477).
In late 2001, a large-scale statebuilding project was set in motion in Afghanistan. However, this moment cannot be seen as the end-point of the civil war, although suggested otherwise by the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ (where it officially lasted from 1978-2001; see below). The case certainly is an example for the external reconstruction or ‘overhaul’ of state structures and is prominently discussed in collected volumes on post-conflict peacebuilding (see e.g. Call 2008), but is precisely not a case of ‘post-conflict’ intervention. It must, together with Iraq, rather be treated as a case of post-occupation intervention, which certainly is a special analytical category (see also Paris and Sisk 2009a). Since 2006 at the latest, however, armed insurgents have been on the rise in Afghanistan (see e.g. Jones 2008), and from this moment on at the latest, the situation becomes too complex in order to be captured by the analytical framework advocated throughout this dissertation. The following characterizations and assessments therefore refer exclusively to the period starting with the Bonn agreement struck in December 2001 and the resurgence or armed conflict in mid-2006.

c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict parties</th>
<th>Various organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Conflict ID</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Episode ID</td>
<td>1371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>1978 – 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>One-sided victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victorious side</td>
<td>Non-gov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>UNGOMAP (May 1988 – March 1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Mandate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGOMAP</td>
<td>“UNGOMAP was established in May 1988 to assist in ensuring the implementation of the Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan and in this context to investigate and report possible violations of any of the provisions of the Agreements” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009c).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Table A.3: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Afghanistan
A.1 Afghanistan

A.1.2 Post-conflict Situation

Afghanistan is a case in which the challenge lies in “executing a peace operation in parallel with ongoing warfare” (Sherman 2008: 303). It is therefore questionable to which extent the country is truly a post-conflict country, but arguably it fulfills many important characteristics: decades of warfare (including a civil war preceding the Taliban regime), a multi-national intervention, a peace-process along with a large-scale state-building process. In the following paragraphs, the role of the formal government, the warring parties and external actors are briefly discussed, before the case is classified in the next section.

a) The Formal Government

The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 laid down the principles of post-war reconstruction in Afghanistan. In Astri Suhrke’s assessment, the document was “basically a script for transition to a liberal, constitutional democracy, served by an effective state apparatus […] and a single army, with a commitment to ‘social justice’, respect for human rights, and ‘sensitivity’ to the rights of women” (2007: 1298). One of its core functions was to nominate a new government that would rule the country in lieu of the ousted Taliban movement for an interim period of six months. Hamid Karzai, then 44 years old, was chosen as the interim head of state. Six months later, he was confirmed by an Emergency Loya Jirga (a Grand National Assembly) held in accordance with the Bonn Agreement (see Coleman 2008a: 21).

The new government was, in effect, an artificially crafted construct comprising a carefully selected number of constructive elements. Though Karzai himself was a Pashtun, the Interim Administration mainly comprised members from the Panjshiri Tajik armed faction from the north which had already coalesced with the United States in order to overthrow the Taliban regime. Thus, the government’s composition stood in stark contrast to the Pashtun’s historic position of dominance, and consequently many Pashtuns were disappointed both by the decisions made in Bonn and the outcome of the 2002 Loya Jirga (see International Crisis Group 2003a: 8–10). Most importantly, the Taliban themselves were excluded both from the Bonn conference and from participation in the interim government.

As a result of this and other factors, the Afghan government has enjoyed little legitimacy from the population and has had only limited outreach: “In much of Afghanistan, there is little, if any, state presence whether for delivery of security, justice, or other services” (Sherman 2008: 314). The legitimacy of the government greatly depends on outcomes: Afghans are likely to abandon the state if it is unable to provide basic public goods, above all security (Sherman 2008: 314). The central government is still far from self-sustaining; it depends primarily on international forces to protect state institutions and to fight the insurgents (Sherman 2008: 316). Presidential and parliamentary elections took place in Afghanistan in 2004 and 2005, respectively (see Burwitz 2007; Reynolds 2006). They
confirmed Karsai in power and, after some time, also led to the incorporation of moderate Taliban elements into the government.

b) The Role of External Parties

In Afghanistan at least three groups of external actors have been engaged simultaneously: The ‘Coalition Forces’, the ‘United Nations Mission in Afghanistan’ (UNAMA), and the UN-mandated ‘International Security Assistance Force’ (ISAF), established through SC Res 1368 on 20 December 2001 (see Thier 2006).

**United Nations**  With regard to UN involvement, Afghanistan is widely known for the “light footprint” approach developed by SRSG Lakhdar Brahimi, indicating that the United Nations tried to “work through the Afghan government, relying on as few international – and as many Afghan – staff as possible” (Sherman 2008: 307). This approach is uniquely different from post-conflict approaches in Bosnia, East Timor or Kosovo. Yet, the success of the approach is questionable. In the words of Thier, the light footprint approach “led not to a blossoming of Afghan-run government institutions […] but a critical lack of qualified personnel” (2006: 553).

**ISAF and Coalition Forces**  Militarily, two missions have been engaged simultaneously: the coalition forces with the mandate to fight the insurgents, and the ISAF troops with a mandate to support the statebuilding process (Sherman 2008: 318). The main decisions for restructuring Afghanistan were made at the Bonn Conference, which set “two simultaneous processes in motion: a state-building process and a peace process” (Thier 2006: 482). However, external actors had a strong interest in security, “subordinating, at least in the short term, other principles such as broad representativeness in government and human rights accountability” (Thier 2006: 485). Strikingly, the international community was unwilling to contribute sufficient resources in order to achieve these goals: “The number of U.S. Troops per capita in Afghanistan was significantly less than in almost every state-building effort since World War II” (Jones 2008: 24). In addition, the “U.S. Assistance to warlords weakened the central government”, thereby again undermining this goal (Jones 2008: 26).

c) The Role of the Conflict Parties

The group of contenders and potential spoilers is very fragmented: On the one side there are the Taliban, al-Qaida, and Hizb-i-Islami as the main insurgent groups, all inspired by different schools of radical Islam (see Jones 2008: 27–29). “Together, the leaders of these groups aim at overthrowing Hamid Karzai’s government and replace it with a regime that adopted an extremist version of Sunni Islam” (Jones 2008: 29). Although the Taliban enjoy wide-ranging support from the rural population, this support derives mainly from
the fact that in many rural areas the Taliban were the only power able to establish some sort of order (Jones 2008: 26). The Taliban, although quickly militarily defeated during the 2001 offensive, continue their armed struggle mainly through insurgency techniques and managed to control large portions of the country along with other local commanders and factional leaders who largely bypass the central government. However, it is difficult to assess how much support the Taliban actually enjoy. Although some support stems from the disappointment of some Pashtun groups due to their initial marginalization in the political process, support does not follow clear ethnic lines (see Jones 2008: 11–12). By the same token, Al Qaeda, obviously, “had no stake in the peace process and would continue seeking to derail it at all costs” (Thier 2006: 486). On the other side there are numerous factional militias and local commanders and the fragments of the “Northern Alliance” which was instrumental for the US-led military engagement (Thier 2006: 476).

The international community deliberately adopted measures to incorporate the more moderate of these potential spoilers in the formal government institutions (Sherman 2008: 304). Over time it has realized that “as the Taliban are excluded from the state, they will have no reason to support it” (Sherman 2008: 315). Since 2004, the government has therefore attempted to trigger a dialogue with moderate Taliban, leading to the integration of two former Taliban officials to the parliament in 2005 (Sherman 2008: 315). Yet, in the initial years, “Karzai still found himself forced to accommodate rather than disarm factional leaders” (Thier 2006: 486). Many of the different “commanders, warlords, and regional power brokers” (Thier 2006: 489–490) (including the Shura-i-Nizar, Hezb-i-Wahadat and Junbesh-i-Milli factions as well as Ismael Khan) have continued to undermine the official role of the state:

“Few factional leaders have rejected the Bonn process outright, and so the goal of keeping these leaders in the tent, and off the battlefield, has been accomplished. But the transition to ‘peace’ has not been accompanied by a transition to the rule of law. Even as these leaders have participated in political processes and disarmament, they have entrenched themselves in opium trafficking, politics, and government, which will have long-term ill effects” (Thier 2006: 539).

A.1.3 Assessment

The main contenders in the post-conflict situation clearly are the Taliban, which have from the beginning on taken all efforts to destabilize and delegitimize the central government. Although some moderate elements could be included in the country’s formal institutions along with some other faction-leaders and local commanders, power-sharing in Afghanistan is limited: The main contender, the Taliban, stands outside the government institutions and will continue to act as a spoiler of the statebuilding process. Inclusion of moderate Taliban elements into the government was merely instrumental. The formal government is hence in a position of domination. Like in few other post-conflict cases besides Iraq, external parties have clearly and openly intervened in a partisan manner in the conflict. In
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

particular in recent years, their role has shifted from that of an ‘external’ party to that of a genuine conflict party. The relations between the conflict parties – government supporters on the one hand and the radical Islamic elements (Taliban and al-Qaeda) on the other hand are obviously obstructive. Despite fulfilling many aspects of a post-conflict country, the civil war is still ongoing with high intensity; therefore it is not a post-conflict polity case in the strict sense. For these reasons, the case of Afghanistan can be classified as an instance of the Partisan Obstructive Domination or ‘You Stay Out’ polity type.

A.1.4 Map of Afghanistan

![Map of Afghanistan](image)

Figure A.1: Map: Afghanistan. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
A.2 Angola

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>13,313,553 as of 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Area</td>
<td>1,246,700 Sq. Km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land</td>
<td>1,264,700 Sq. Km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastline</td>
<td>1,600 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Luanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Portuguese; various African languages from Niger-Congo, Atlantic-Congo, Volta-Congo, Benue-Congo, Bantoid, Bantu, Southern, Central, and Khoisan linguistic families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>Congo (DRC): 2,511 km; Namibia: 1,376 km; Zambia: 1,110 km; Congo (RC): 201 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>37% Ovumbundu; 25% Kimbundu; 22% Other; 13% Bakongo; 2% Mestico; 1% European</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>47% Indigenous beliefs; 38% Roman Catholic; 15% Protestant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A.4: Basic Facts and Figures: Angola

A.2.1 Country and Conflict Information

a) General Background

Angola had been a Portuguese colony for centuries. Independence of the Congo spurred pro-independence movements (FNLA, MPLA; UNITA). Portugal left in 1975 without handing over power to any particular group (see UCDP 2010c).

Angola is the result of arbitrary borders drawn at the Berlin Conference 1884-5, leading to an ethnically composite nation. The main ethnic groups are Bakongo, Mbundu and Ovimbundu, together comprising three-quarters of the population (Pereira 1994: 4). Compared to other colonial nations, Portugal was more reluctant to “build national institutions […] and inculcate a national language in its colonies” (Pereira 1994: 6). What is special about Angola – and what directly matters for its conflict – is the country’s resource wealth, most notably with regard to oil and diamonds: “Ranked the fifteenth most underdeveloped country with the second worst level of under-five child mortality, Angola is also the second
largest sub-Saharan oil producer and the fourth world diamond producer by value” (Le Billon 2001a: 57). Oil production is concentrated in the north, in particular in the enclave of Cabinda, which is separated from the rest of the country through a small strip of land belonging to DRC.

### b) Conflict History

The power struggles that were triggered by Portugal’s withdrawal quickly amounted to a civil war. The Marxist MPLA was challenged by the FNLA and UNITA. While the FNLA was defeated in late the 1970s, UNITA continued its fight. When elections took place in 1992, UNITA lost and continued its struggle. Only the assassination of UNITA leader Savimbi in 2002 enabled a negotiated settlement (see UCDP 2010c).

The FNLA (‘Frente Nacional de Libertaçâo de Angola’) represented mainly agrarian Bakongo people in the north. The MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertaçâo de Angola) initially clung to a Marxist-Leninist ideology, representing urban Mbundu, mesticos (a mixed race) and assimilados (descendants of a non-white 19th century bourgeoisie). Challenging MPLA’s cosmopolitanism, UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) adopted an “ethno-populist view of the nation based on the language and identity of the Ovimbundu” (Pereira 1994: 7–8). The FNLA was defeated in late the 1970s and hence ceased to be a warring party in the Angolan conflict. Upon its withdrawal in 1974, Portugal initially hammered out a power-sharing agreement between the three nationalist groups (Alvor accord), but it soon broke down, paving the way for a massive civil war (Pereira 1994: 9, see also Ajayi 2006: 251). MPLA, supported by the Soviet Union and Cuban troops, gained control of Luanda and oil-rich provinces in the north and announced the creation of the ‘People’s Republic of Angola’ in 1975, which was recognized by most other governments and the United Nations but struggled to establish full control of its territory (Pereira 1994: 9). UNITA was heavily supported by South Africa for two ‘strategic reasons’: to destabilize MPLA and hence the threat of communism in its region of influence, and to prevent the Angolan example fueling anti-apartheid emotions. Likewise, the US supported UNITA as part of its anti-Soviet reflex (Pereira 1994: 11). This enabled UNITA to engage in a prolonged and intense battle against MPLA with external support for UNITA continuing well into the 1990s.

Meanwhile, the Angolan state developed into a Soviet-type party-state, fostering the provision of services primarily to privileged persons or those considered ‘strategically important’ (Pereira 1994: 12–13). After the inability to reach a military success was realized, the parties agreed to participate in the 1991 Bicesse Accords, which took place exclusively between MPLA and UNITA and an international troika of the US, USSR and Portugal, with little involvement of the United Nations (Pereira 1994: 14). The Accords failed due to UNITA’s refusal to accept MPLA’s electoral victory, and the conflict
continued with very high intensity (see below for more detail). A second chance for a peaceful settlement were the Lusaka Accords, signed in 1994. They led to a short period of conflict inactivity and facilitated the establishment of a Government of National Unity (Governo de Unidade Nacional) established in 1997, but it soon collapsed and the conflict continued for another four years. It only ended when Savimbi “died in an ambush by the government army” (Ajayi 2006: 251). This led to the signing of the ceasefire agreement in April 2002.

c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict parties</th>
<th>UNITA, FNLA, MPLA faction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict ID</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episode ID</td>
<td>1311 &amp; 1312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Conflict inactivity (1st); Peace Agreement (2nd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victorious side</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Peacekeeping**


**Mission Mandate UNAVEM I**

“UNAVEM I was established in December 1988 to verify the phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of Angola. The withdrawal was completed by 25 May 1991. On 6 June, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that UNAVEM I had carried out, fully and effectively, the mandate entrusted to it” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2000f).

**Mission mandate UNAVEM II**

“UNAVEM II was established in May 1991 to verify the arrangements agreed by the Government of Angola and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, for monitoring the ceasefire and the Angolan police during the ceasefire period, and to observe and verify elections, in accordance with the Peace Accords” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2000b).

**Mission mandate UNAVEM III**

“Established to assist the Government of Angola and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) in restoring peace and achieving national reconciliation on the basis of the Peace Accords for Angola, signed on 31 May 1991, the Lusaka Protocol signed on 20 November 1994, and relevant Security Council resolutions” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2000a).
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

Mission mandate
MONUA

“MONUA was established on 30 June 1997 to assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence-building and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability, democratic development and rehabilitation of the country” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2001c).

Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Table A.5: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Angola

A.2.2 Post-conflict Situation

a) The Role of the Formal Government

Since the outbreak of the conflict, the MPLA has constantly been the government-side in the conflict. UNITA was only officially part of the government during the GURN, established in 1997. This power-sharing arrangement did not lead to peace, but was established in a period of lower conflict intensity (between 1995 and 1998, the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ records a break of conflict activity). The Bicesse Accords of 1991 failed, but are nonetheless worth to discuss briefly.

The failed Bicesse Accords (1991). The Bicesse Accords of 1991 were the first serious attempt to resolve the conflict since the end of the Cold War. In the accords the parties agreed to hold presidential and parliamentary elections in September 1992, which took place as scheduled despite the fact that a range of pressing issues remained unsettled, including the demobilization of UNITA fighters. After it became clear that the MPLA would be the clear winner of the elections, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi refused to accept the elections and continued its armed struggle (see Küppers 1998: 2–3). As a consequence, the civil war continued, and the “ensuing two years of warfare led to more devastation than had occurred throughout three decades of the independence struggle and Cold War Conflict” (Le Billon 2001a: 59). The reason why UNITA took up arms again is that it had “no negotiating power other than its military force”, since the Bicesse Accords allotted all governmental power to the winner of the elections (Messiant 2004: 19). In addition to that, UNITA still enjoyed US support in 1991 and had no doubt that this would translate into an electoral victory now that the USSR had disintegrated. Thus, its electoral defeat clearly came as a surprise, which might explain the intensity with which it resorted to violence (Messiant 2004: 19–20). Nonetheless, the elections were declared relatively free and fair by the international community and officially confirmed the MPLA in power (Messiant 2004: 20).
Government of National Unity (GURN). After the failed Bicesse Accords of 1991 and the widespread suffering and devastation caused by UNITA’s subsequent show of force, the next serious attempt to establish peace was the Lusaka Protocol. It was signed by the UNITA in November 1994 after a series of military setbacks and after the United States had withdrawn their support had and officially recognized the Angolan government (that is, the MPLA), thus clearing the way for UN sanctions imposed against UNITA (Messiant 2004: 20). The main provisions of the Lusaka Protocol can be described as follows:

“Among other things, the agreement called on UNITA to accept the results of the 1992 elections, to disarm and demobilize its forces, and to hand over territory it controlled to the government. In return, the government would open a new ‘political space’ in which it would share political power with the UNITA rebels in a government of unity and national reconciliation (GURN). Outside the formal agreement, a pact was negotiated which would allow both parties to share in Angola’s economic wealth. The protocol would be overseen by the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), a force of 7,000 United Nations peacekeepers” (Spears 1999: 566).

The power-sharing arrangement that was set up on the basis of the Lusaka Protocol incorporated a number of leading UNITA officials into the government, but did not offer any real position to UNITA leader Savimbi. Instead, he obtained the dubious ‘special status’ as the leader of the main opposition party (Spears 1999). The GURN was an extremely inclusive power-sharing arrangement, which included seven other parties next to the UNITA and the MPLA. Of those, the MPLA clearly was the most powerful and dominant one, holding 25 out of 29 ministerial posts; UNITA held four, and the remaining seven parties held various deputy ministerial posts (Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 4). In addition to that, UNITA was allotted seven deputy ministers, three provincial governors, more than 70 administrators on the district and community level, and two ambassadors (Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 4). Hence, MPLA retained a dominant position in the government, and UNITA was not more than a junior-partner. This clearly limited the effectiveness of the power-sharing arrangement. However, the terms of the Lusaka agreement differed markedly from that of the Bicesse Accords, and some effective sharing of power took place; therefore it makes sense to treat the short period between the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and the recurrence of war (1997 – 1998) as a power-sharing case.

The 2008 Parliamentary Elections. The first post-conflict parliamentary elections (since the elections in 1992) took place on 5 September 2008 and unfolded peacefully. They led to a wide-ranging success for the MPLA, which gained some 82 percent of the vote, while UNITA gained 10 percent. Although large-scale manipulation had not taken place, a number of constraints on the electoral fairness could be observed (Oesterdiekhoff and Büning 2008: 6–7). Overall, the elections worsened UNITA’s political marginalization: while it was still part of the GURN government, its role has since then completely been reduced to that of an opposition party. The elections fostered the further consolidation
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

of a de facto one-party system that works according to a neo-patrimonial logic. Through its command over tremendous oil rents, the MPLA was able to foster the ‘opportunistic’ production of public goods while at the same time satisfying its clientellistic networks – a constellation that allows only minimal influence for the opposition party (Oesterdiekhoff and Büning 2008: 12–13).

After the end of the conflict UNITA had been militarily demobilized and transformed into a political party. It announced its support of the Government of National Unity (GURN) that was founded in 1997 and in which the non-military arm of UNITA had already been involved as a junior partner to the MPLA, but where it did “not have any real power” (Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 28). Yet, today UNITA is politically ever more marginalized, with both the political system and the economy being dominated by the MPLA (Rimli 2005: 1–2). Angola currently has a presidential political system (not a semi-presidential one as sometimes claimed), the constitution dates back to communist times and was amended in 1991. Consequently, the system is very centralized with many powers concentrated in the hands of the president and a limited role for the parliament (Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 3–4).

b) The Role of External Parties

The role of external parties in post-conflict Angola can be characterized by three aspects: First, the case exhibits a weak engagement of the international community. Although four UN-Missions took place (UNAVEM I-III; MONUA), no UN troops have been engaged on the ground since 1999, although one can only speak of a true post-conflict situation after the assassination of Savimbi in 2002. Likewise, the United Nations only played a marginal role during the Bicesse accords in 1992. Second, a number of states were directly involved in the conflict and in attempts to make peace. The Soviet Union, the United States and South Africa directly contributed to the conflict during the Cold War (see Ajayi 2006: 251), like in many other Cold War conflicts (Mozambique, El Salvador). However, there was no truly neutral arbitrator present during the peace negotiations, as for instance the Catholic Church in Mozambique (see A.15). Christine Messiant attributes the failure of both the Bicesse and the Lusaka Accords to external actors’ strong influence throughout the peace process and their constant pursue of vested interests at all times in the process (2004). Finally, external powers continue to have vested interests in Angola’s stability that are partly contradictory to the goal of building an accountable and transparent state. Through trying to secure access to Angola’s oil endowments (it is by now the largest producer of crude oil in Africa), they are adopting many (overt and covert) measures to get into business with the regime (see especially Reno 2000: 224).
c) The Warring Factions

Savimbi and his UNITA clearly were the main contenders, contesting a formal government recognized by most other countries. Yet, this is not to say that the MPLA government was a legitimate one given that it made its way to power through armed conflict and had never been legitimized through elections before 1992. Savimbi, therefore, was also the main obstacle to peace, which is vividly illustrated by the quick settlement following his assassination in 2002. The killing led to an “unconditional surrender” of the remaining UNITA leadership and greatly bolstered the position of the MPLA, which is now controlling the government alone, with virtually no elements of power-sharing being implemented (Ajayi 2006: 252). Yet, the crucial question is why the UNITA could continue to challenge the government militarily until well after the end of the Cold War despite crumbling external support – unlike RENAMO in Mozambique where the structural conditions were very similar? This clearly has to do with the country’s resource wealth: unlike in Mozambique, both parties could rely on an independent source of income, with MPLA controlling the oil revenues and UNITA controlling the diamond mines in the hinterland (Le Billon 2001a: 58). Kelly Greenhill and Solomon Major make the same point, arguing that the UNITA managed to get control of the diamond mines in the north just before the Bicesse accord was signed, which shifted the balance of power towards UNITA (they make this argument in the context of their reformulation of the spoiler framework to include changing opportunity structures) (Greenhill and Major 2007: 19). This can be seen as a crucial factor explaining the rebel group’s ability to continue its armed struggle: “Diamonds kept UNITA going, but rapidly increasing oil production determined the final outcome” (Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 2).

Transformed into a political party after 2002, the UNITA can be seen as a cooperative party which refrains from the use of violence:

“With peace settled in 2002 through the Luena Memorandum, the decapitated and militarily defeated UNITA entered a completely new phase by joining the second GURN government and by taking up their 70 seats in Parliament, for real. The party held its 9th Congress in 2003, and appeared as renewed, transparent, and democratic with its new leader Isaías Samakuva” (Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 28).

Despite its dramatic performance in the parliamentary elections, it quickly accepted the election results (Oesterdiekhoff and Büning 2008: 2). This can be read either as an indicator of its powerlessness relative to MPLA or its full transition to a democratic party. However, it should also be noted that the UNITA had little other choice: it has been financially dependent on contributions from the government and the political climate for opposition parties has been tense, marked by intolerance, threats and occasional physical assaults by supporters of the MPLA and its Youth Organization JMPLA (Rimli 2005: 2).
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

A.2.3 Assessment

Government of National Unity (1995 – 1998).  Characteristic for Angola’s post-conflict polity is the strong centralization of the political system, which devotes governmental authority exclusively to the strongest party. Despite that, the GURN devoted some power to the UNITA, and some constructive UNITA elements made use of their room for maneuver. Although this hardly constrained the MPLA’s exercise of authority, the agreement led to a split between moderate UNITA members who wanted to cooperate with the government, and radical UNITA elements who rejected the power-sharing arrangement and refused to cooperate with the government. This qualifies the GURN as a border case between power-sharing and domination. Here, it is argued that the GURN is still more appropriately treated as a power-sharing case, despite the fact that the concessions made by the MPLA to UNITA were clearly limited. It is also frequently included a case of power-sharing in most of the relevant literature (see e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). At the same time, the relations between the parties were clearly obstructive, because the hardliners around Savimbi had continued to challenge the government militarily. This is most clearly reflected by the country’s relapse into armed conflict by 1998. The involvement of external actors must be considered mediative, because they were key for negotiating the power-sharing agreement in the first place. This classifies the period of the GURN in Angola as a case of ‘mediated, obstructive power-sharing’ or a ‘Doomed to Share’ polity case.

2nd Post-Conflict Period (since 2008).  The second post-conflict period begins with the official end of the conflict in 2002, which was facilitated by Savimbi’s assassination. In this period, the domination of the political system by the MPLA has been undeniable. In particular since the devastating election results in 2008, the UNITA has essentially been reduced to an opposition party which depends financially on contributions from the state. Its weak position was reflected in its quick acceptance of the election results. The power-balance between the warring factions is therefore very unequal: MPLA is dominant in all respects. As a result, the MPLA has been able to entrench itself more and more and external powers have had little incentive to change this situation due to their own interest in the regime’s stability. Hence, there is little doubt that Angola since 2002 must be considered a case of political domination. External actors have by and large continued to exert a mediative influence in post-conflict Angola, but they have also refrained from openly criticizing the government’s attempts to dominate the political system and outmaneuvering the opposition. All in all, this is too little in order to consider the case as a case of partisan engagement, because there is little evidence that external actors have supported the government in a systematic and intentional manner. The relations between the warring parties since Savimbi’s assassination are also difficult to classify, because the UNITA had effectively been defeated militarily. Concluding from that the relations turned instantly constructive would be misleading, because the UNITA had no choice but to accept the MPLA’s terms. The period between the UNITA’s defeat and the parliamentary elections
therefore lies somewhere between constructive and obstructive relations; here, they are tentatively coded as *obstructive*. The parliamentary elections in 2008, after which the UNITA quickly declared that it accepted its defeat at the ballot-box, are a clear indicator that the relations between the warring parties had become more constructive. (However, since the period of investigations on which this dissertation is based ends in 2008, this period is not classified here). Out of these reasons, Angola between 2002 and 2008 is classified here as an instance of a ‘mediated, obstructive domination’ or ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity.
A.2.4 Map of Angola

Figure A.2: Map: Angola. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
### A.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>4,672,165 as of 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Area</td>
<td>51,233 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land</td>
<td>51,233 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastline</td>
<td>20 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Sarajevo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>Croatia: 932 km; Serbia: 302 km; Montenegro: 225 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>44% Bosniak; 31% Serb; 17% Croat; 6% Yugoslav; 2% Other; 2% Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>40% Muslim; 31% Orthodox; 15% Roman Catholic; 10% Other; % Protestant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A.6: Basic Facts and Figures: Bosnia and Herzegovina

### A.3.1 Country and Conflict Information

**a) General Background**

Bosnia-Herzegovina exhibited a heterogeneous ethnic composition in 1991: 43% were Bosniaks (Muslim), 31% were Serbs and 17% were Croats. This gave rise to growing nationalism after 1991, which soon triggered inter-ethnic tensions. Both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats proclaimed their own states, called the ‘Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ and the ‘Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, respectively. In the north, rebellious members of the state presidency proclaimed an autonomous region (Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia) (see UCDP 2010d).

Bosnia and Herzegovina had been one of the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under Tito. The country declared independence in 1992, and was recognized as an independent republic. The country has always been ethnically heterogeneous, with about 44 percent comprised of ethnic Bosniaks, 31 percent of ethnic Serbs, and 17 percent of ethnic Croats (Coleman 2008b: 9–10). This ethnic heterogeneity is one of the proximate causes of the civil war that emerged in 1992; as “each community sought to ensure that it
would not be a minority in a state dominated by any of the others” (Cousens and Harland 2006: 54).

b) Conflict History

Separatist tendencies led to fights against the government, which lasted from 1992 to 1995 and included the large-scale use of one-sided violence. The autonomous region in the north was defeated. The other conflicts were settled by peace agreements (‘Washington Agreement’ and ‘Dayton Agreement’). These agreements led to the creation of a new state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, comprising two entities: The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (created from Croatian and Bosnian Territories); and the Republika Srpska (created from Serb Territory) (see UCDP 2010d).

The civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was triggered after a 1992 referendum held by the government on the country’s independence. This sparked an armed resistance by the Bosnian Serbs, supported by neighboring Serbia, with the aim of partitioning the republic in order to allow for the Serb parts to join ‘Greater Serbia’ (Coleman 2008b: 9–10). As it could be expected, given the country’s ethnic composition, 62.68 percent of the population voted for independence – pretty much the equivalent of the combined Bosnian and Croat percentage of the population. This triggered “by far the largest and bloodiest of the wars of Yugoslav succession” (Cousens and Harland 2006: 55). The Croats soon initiated their own fight for independence, but this conflict could be settled through the 1994 Washington Agreement, which created a joint Muslim/ Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The conflict with the Serb part of the country was concluded by the 1995 Dayton Agreement, signed by the Bosnian President Izetbegović, the Croatian President Tudjman and the Serbian President Milošević. It effectively divided the country into two autonomous regions: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (created from Croatian and Bosnian Territories); and the Republika Srpska (created from Serb Territory) (Coleman 2008b: 9–10).

c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict parties</th>
<th>Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Croatian irregulars; Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian irregulars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Conflict ID</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Episode ID</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>war (both)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Peace Agreement (both)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victorious side</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Mandate</th>
<th>UNPROFOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Initially established in Croatia to ensure demilitarization of designated areas. The mandate was later extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina to support the delivery of humanitarian relief, monitor “no fly zones” and “safe areas”. The mandate was later extended to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for preventive monitoring in border areas” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2002b).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Mandate</th>
<th>UNMIBH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Set up in 1995, UNMIBH exercised a wide range of functions related to the law enforcement activities and police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Mission also coordinated other UN activities in the country relating to humanitarian relief and refugees, demining, human rights, elections and rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction. Following the successful conclusion of its mandate, UNMIBH was terminated on 31 December 2002” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2002a).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Table A.7: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Bosnia and Herzegovina

A.3.2 Post-conflict situation:

a) The Role of the Formal Government

The Bosnian post-conflict polity is effectively an instance of transitional administration, although this is less visible when compared to Kosovo or East Timor. A decisive amount of power is embodied in the ‘High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina’, which is the highest political authority in the country. The High Representative (formerly Paddy Ashdown, since 2006 Christian Schwarz-Shilling) holds the position of a leading civilian official endowed with the power to “overrule domestic authorities, impose laws, and ban individuals” (Cox 2008: 250). External Parties thereby followed what Cox calls a “heavy footprint” approach, with Bosnia essentially becoming a “protectorate of the international community” (Cox 2008: 250).

At the same time, Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement outlined “an elaborate architecture for power-sharing” between the different ethnic groups (Cousens and Harland 2006: 62). It provided for 51 percent of the territory to belong to the Bosnian-Croat Federation and the remaining 49 percent to belong to the Bosnian Serbs (Republika Srpska). Both parts of
the country were joined together in an “extremely loose federal structure with a minimum of authority at the central level” (Cox 2008: 253–254).

The result is a complex structure which formally can be characterized by a unique mixture of power-sharing under international supremacy, but de facto has amounted to two highly autonomous and partly antagonistic republics being kept together by external pressure and domination. Observers have therefore characterized Bosnia and Herzegovina as “a paradoxical combination of a flawed democracy and a semi-international protectorate, in which international actors often appeared reluctant to use their powers effectively” (Chesterman 2004: 131).

b) The Role of External Parties

During the civil war, the international community was mainly engaged through UNPROFOR (‘United Nations Protection Force’). The mission had originally been deployed to Croatia in order to monitor the ceasefire of January 1992, but its headquarters were based in Sarajevo (Cousens and Harland 2006: 54). It was a largely passive mission, refraining for a long time from actively supporting the weaker Bosnian sides in the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only in late October 1995 UNPROFOR “for the first time, was able to function as a true peacekeeping force” (Cousens and Harland 2006: 61). After the adoption of the Dayton Agreement, NATO-led IFOR (‘Implementation Force’) troops had been dispatched on 20 December 1995 in order to implement the agreement (Cousens and Harland 2006: 61). With a strength of more than 60,000 troops, IFOR was a force so overwhelming “that it never needed to be used” (Cox 2008: 255). It was renamed later into Stabilization Force (SFOR).

External actors remained heavily engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the post-conflict period. The Bosnian peace process has been supervised by the Peace Implementation Council, which has been endowed with the authority to override domestic decisions (Cox 2008: 255). Cox argues that the heavy involvement of the High Representative in domestic politics has at least in part been detrimental to the goal of statebuilding: “The international mission has pursued its own policy agendas so aggressively that it has displaced the domestic political process” (2008: 265). In 2008, the Peace Implementation Council decided to prolong the protectorate indefinitely, “making the closure of OHR [Office of the High Representative, CR] conditional on a number of open-ended conditions” (Cox 2008: 267).

c) The Warring Factions

The former conflict parties in Bosnia are still clearly visible in today’s political system and used the new federal structure mainly as a playing field for continuing their animosities. According to Cox, the central institutions “served mainly as venues for political gamesmanship: boycotts and symbolic disputes to impress hard-line constituencies” in the
first years after the Dayton Agreement (2008: 259). Today the former warring parties are more willing to participate and engage constructively in the constitutional order: “a set of incentives has been created for them to pursue their interests inside the new constitutional order” (Cox 2008: 267).

### A.3.3 Assessment

Several things appear characteristic for Bosnia’s post-conflict polity: First, the strong division of the conflict parties along territorial lines, fostered by the international community. The creation of a loose federation with a comparatively weak center led to a situation in which the conflict parties were at the same time separated and joined together in a common political entity. Especially in the initial years of the federation, this status did not go beyond a mere coexistence, with little *de facto* elements of power-sharing. Yet, this ambiguous character of power-sharing and coexistence places Bosnia somewhere between the two categories, possibly starting out with coexistence and gradually turning towards power-sharing as the central government becomes more established. Second, the role of the international community is clearly different from that of many other cases. The international community at large contributed heavily to the settlement struck between the belligerents in 1995. At the same time, the military intervention of NATO forces were clearly directed against Serbian troops. Before the settlement, the international community’s involvement therefore depicted both mediative and partisan elements. However, in the post-settlement phase external actors have so strongly shaped the character of the Bosnian polity that their engagement is best described as an instance for *supreme* intervention. Out of these reasons, the case is classified as an instance of the ‘supreme obstructive domination’ or *Benevolent Intrusion* polity type.
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

A.3.4 Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Figure A.3: Map: Bosnia. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
A.4 Burundi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>8,075,188 as of 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Area</td>
<td>27,830 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land</td>
<td>25,650 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastline</td>
<td>0 km (Landlocked)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Kirundi (Official), French (Official), Swahili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>Congo (DRC) 451 km, Tanzania 451 km, Rwanda 290 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>85% Hutu (Bantu), 14% Tutsi (Hamitic), 1% Twa (Pygmi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>62% Roman Catholics, 23% indigenous beliefs, 10% Muslim, 5% Protestant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A.8: Basic Facts and Figures: Burundi

A.4.1 Country and Conflict Information

a) General Background

The territory that was to become Rwanda and Burundi fell under the colonial control of Germany in the 19th century and was taken over by Belgium after the end of WW I. Its population had been relatively homogenous in terms of linguistic and cultural issues, but nonetheless had been divided into three distinct social groups: the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa. Originally the distinction was rather a social than an ethnic one; Hutu could, for instance, become Tutsi through social advancement. The colonial powers capitalized on these differences through supporting centralized Tutsi rule as an instrument of exerting authority (although they constituted a clear minority). This was deepening the divide between the different groups. At independence, the Hutu seized power in Rwanda, but Burundi became a Tutsi monarchy (although about 85 percent of the population are Hutu). This was violently challenged in Burundi since 1965. After some coup attempts, military (Tutsi) regimes were dominant between 1966 and 1993, committing massacres among the Hutu population (UCDP 2010e).

Burundi is an exception in the sense that it was a “political and geographical entity already in pre-colonial times, and its people share a common socio-cultural and linguistic heritage”.
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

(Daley 2006: 658). Historically and culturally, it has close links with Rwanda: “No other two states in the continent are more alike in their ethnic map, and none are more unlike each other from the standpoint of their emergent polities after a decade of bitter civil strife (Burundi) and one of the most appalling bloodbaths of the last century (Rwanda)” (Lemarchand 2007: 4; see also Uvin 1999: 253). Ethnic distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi were of minor importance in pre-colonial times, and the sharp differences in ethnic identity existing today are to a large extent socially constructed (or: “superimposed” by the colonial powers – see Uvin 1999) and exploited as an instrument for gaining political control (Daley 2006: 663). Unlike Rwanda – where a ‘social revolution’ overthrew the monarchy – Burundi became a Tutsi monarchy (though the country is predominantly populated by Hutu), and the royalist UPRONA party (Union pour le Progrès National) won the post-independence elections. Yet, the party’s leader, prince Rwagasore was soon killed by the opposition, leading to competition for state power between three groups: the Tutsi-Hima, the Tutsi-Banyarugugu, and “a small emerging Hutu elite” (Uvin 1999: 256).

Uvin attributes this to the high stakes associated with the control of the state, arguing that “state control became the sole vehicle for Tutsi to retain their privileges, while conversely it was the sole means of rapid social advancement for Hutu” (1999: 256). These tensions increasingly expressed themselves in ethnic terms, triggering a massacre in 1972 in which Hutu revolted against Tutsi domination, in the course of which an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 Hutu were killed. This event was largely ignored by the international community, who simply denied the extent of the assaults (Coleman 2008c: 7).

b) Conflict History

A process of democratic openings commenced in the early 1990s, which led to the election of Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu to become president in Burundi. However, Ndadaye was assassinated soon after taking office, which led to the outbreak of mass violence between the Hutu and the Tutsi in the years since 1994. In 2006, one of the main Hutu rebel groups, the CNDD-FDD, agreed to enter a peace process, while a second Hutu faction – the Palipehutu-FNL – continued its armed struggle. Peace negotiations (Arusha process) led to a power-sharing agreement between the government and the CNDD-FDD (Hutu) (see UCDP 2010e).

Following the general trend for democratic openings in the 1990s, presidential and parliamentary elections took place in Burundi in 1993. After nearly three decades of Tutsi rule, the Hutu opposition party FRODEBU (‘Front pour la démocratie au Burundi’) decisively beat the formerly dominant party UPRONA, and its leader Melchior Ndadaye became both the first democratically elected and the first Hutu president. He was killed already some three months later when the army staged a coup on 21 October 1993 (Reyntjens 2006a: 117). The violence following his assassination led to the outbreak of mass vio-
lence, in which an estimated 25,000 to 50,000 people were killed already in the first year. Despite its intensity, the conflict initially triggered little attention from the international community: “There was no official recognition of the violence, and no Western country intervened” (Coleman 2008c: 8). The new regime took attempts to delegitimize Frodebu and attempted to consolidate its rule – a strategy that “increasingly radicalized political life and handicapped the search for a peaceful solution” (Reyntjens 2006a: 117). While some Frodebu members preferred negotiations with the Tutsi government, some of the more radical elements initiated an armed rebellion against the government. Two main rebel groups were involved in this fight: the FDD (‘Forces pour la défense de la démocratie’), which was the armed wing of a political party formed by the former Minister of the Interior Léonard Nyangoma, called CNDD – ‘Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie’), and the FNL-Palipehutu (‘Parti pour la liberation du peuple Hutu – Forces nationales de libération’) (see e.g. Vandeginste 2009).

In the aftermath of the 1993 military coup, several counter-coups took place. A successful putsch in 1996 gave rise to the presidency of Pierre Buyoya (a Tutsi). His exclusive rule and his decision to ban public gatherings in 1999 led to new tensions, organized mainly by the Hutu-led FDD and triggering harsh reactions from the regime. Peace talks were held, led by former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere (in the process of which the FDD was banned from the negotiation table) and were continued in 2000 (after Nyerere’s death) by Nelson Mandela, who invited the FDD and the FNL back to the table. An agreement was signed (Arusha Accord) on 28 August 2000 by 19 factions, but was refused by the FDD and the FNL (Coleman 2008c: 11–12). The conflict continued, but international attention had gradually begun to rise. Belgium – the former colonial power – became engaged on 2 July 2000 in an attempt to resolve the conflict. In the years between 2000 and 2005, the conflict continued. The FDD became more cooperative over time and signed a peace agreement in November 2003, but the FNL continued its fight until it finally signed a framework accord in June 2006 in order to bring an end to the hostilities (Coleman 2008c: 11–12).

c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict parties</th>
<th>Palipehutu, CNDD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Conflict ID</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Episode ID</td>
<td>903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>1994 – 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victorious side</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix A Characterization and Classification of the Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peacekeeping</th>
<th>ONUB (United Nations Operation in Burundi); June 2004 – December 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission ONUB</td>
<td>“Having determined that the situation in Burundi continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its resolution 1545 of 21 May 2004, decided to establish the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in order to support and help to implement the efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore lasting peace and bring about national reconciliation, as provided under the Arusha Agreement. ONUB successfully completed its mandate on 31 December 2006. It was succeeded by the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), established by Security Council resolution 1719 of 25 October 2006” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009h).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Table A.9: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Burundi

A.4.2 Post-conflict situation

a) The Role of the Formal Government

In total, there were three power-sharing arrangements in Burundi: the 1994 ‘Convention de Gouvernement’ (CG); the ‘Arusha Accords’ of 2000, and the post-2005 arrangement.

Pre-Arusha Power-Sharing. The earlier power-sharing arrangements were relatively flawed. The CG, which was installed in the wake of Ndadaye’s assassination, “carried the logic of power sharing to an extreme” – with even embassy staff being distributed along ethnic lines – and was hence dysfunctional from the beginning on. It already collapsed long before the July 1996 military coup (Lemarchand 2007: 9).

Arusha Accords. The Arusha Accords began in June 1998 and culminated with the ‘Peace and Reconciliation Agreement’ of August 2000 (Government of the Republic of Burundi 2000). It, too, had “too many flaws to be called a success”, but Lemarchand considers it an important process that paved the ground for a successful power-sharing arrangement being implemented five years later. Observers widely agree that this agreement “would not have materialized without the long-drawn-out preliminary negotiations that went on in Arusha […]” (Lemarchand 2007: 9–10). The Hutu-led CNDD-FDD had initially not joined the peace process; it was only in 2003 that it could be convinced to take part in the negotiations due to the relentless efforts by the South-African mediators and join the existing government (Lemarchand 2007: 9–10).
**Post-2003 Period.** In the post-2003 period, Burundi is considered the clearest example of true power-sharing in Africa: “No other state anywhere in the continent offers a more faithful image of the ideal consociational polity” (Lemarchand 2007: 3; on this aspect see also Falch and Becker 2008: 22). Lemarchand describes the characteristics of the government as provided for in the ‘post-transition constitution’:

“The president is to be assisted by two vice-presidents, a Hutu and a Tutsi, and the government will include 60 percent Hutu and 40 percent Tutsi. The same proportion will hold in the National Assembly, whereas the Senate will have an equal number of Hutu and Tutsi. The security forces, likewise, will include as many Hutu as Tutsi. At the communal level, no more than 67 percent of the mayors are to belong to either group. Women are expected to represent at least 30 percent of the members of the National Assembly. Should the poll fail to produce the required quota of 60/40, the constitution allows ‘the rectification of the imbalances through the co-optation mechanism provided by the electoral code’ (Article 164)” (Lemarchand 2007: 8).

On the basis of the new constitution, elections were held in 2005, leading to a sweeping victory for the CNDD-FDD. This required the power-sharing provisions to be applied for the first time, causing the electoral commission to “co-opt 18 deputies, four Hutu, 11 Tutsi and three Twa” (Lemarchand 2007: 8). Despite a clear victory for the CNDD-FDD in the 2005 elections, it fell short from a two-thirds majority necessary for passing legislation. Hence, it has to cooperate along ethnic lines in order to govern (Reyntjens 2006a).

**b) The Role of External Parties**

Various sorts of external actors were involved at different stages during and after the civil war. This had been crucial for the ultimate success of the negotiations. As Lemarchand writes, “in the end much of the credit for bringing the dissident Hutu factions on board goes to the South African facilitator, ex-Deputy president Jacob Zuma” (2007: 11). This assessment is shared by Reyntjens: “The regional leaders and South Africa have played a major role in forcing the Burundian political and military players into finding an accommodation that would not have been achieved without considerable pressure. Indeed, on several occasions, the region put Burundi under a *de facto* trusteeship and imposed solutions” (2006a: 121).

After the CNDD-FDD signed the ceasefire with the government, the African Union became involved through deploying the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in April 2003. It contained a contingent of 3,000 troops from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique and was mandated to “monitor the peace process and provide security […]” (Murithi 2008: 75). Overcoming security problems in the implementation phase of the agreement became a major concern for the mission: “One of the tasks of the AU force was to protect returning politicians who would take part in the transitional government. Other peacebuilding tasks included opening secure demobilisation centres and improving the ability of AMIB to
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

reintegrate the former militia into society. These demobilisation centres supervised the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process that is a fundamental pillar of peacebuilding” (Murithi 2008: 75). The United Nations were initially reluctant to become engaged in Burundi. Peacekeepers from the African Union were present since October 2003 and from the United Nations since 2004. The United Nations closed their peacekeeping mission in early 2007, despite warnings that “the fragile sense of stability gained from the peace process” could easily be undermined (Coleman 2008c: 19).

From the above, it can be inferred that external parties were by and large engaged in a mediative manner, since they took great efforts to ensure that the CNDD-FDD took part in the negotiations. As Reyntjens summarizes: “The wider international community has supported the regional Burundi peace initiative, e.g. by offering financial and diplomatic backing and by turning the AU force into a UN one (ONUB), but has consistently subcontracted leadership to the region” (2006a: 121).

c) The Warring Factions

The relations between the rebels and the government were clearly following ethnic lines – no matter how constructed or ‘superimposed’ they may have been. During the initial years of the civil war, when the fighting was intense, three rebel groups were fighting against the government: The CNDD-FDD, the FNL (‘Front national de libération’), an armed faction of the PALIPEHUTU (‘Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu’), and FROLINA (‘Front pour la libération nationale’) (Reyntjens 2006a: 117). The initiation of the Arusha Accords in 1998 was the starting point for the reconciliation of the two parties Uprona (Tutsi) and Frodebu (Hutu). After 2001, they were represented in a transitional government. However, the main rebel groups – most notably CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL – refrained from participating in the peace talks. But this was also because the CNDD-FDD had split from the CNDD (the political wing) and its leader Nyangoma. While the ‘old’ CNDD did take part in the Arusha negotiations, the CNDD-FDD, then under the leadership of Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, was still engaged in combat activities, launching attacks on Burundi from DRC – allegedly with support from Kabila (McClintock and Nahimana 2008: 78). A ceasefire between the transitional government and the CNDD-FDD – now led by Pierre Nkurunziza – could only be reached in 2003, paving the way for the 2005 elections. “A fragile peace was achieved, but it was far from complete because PALIPEHUTU-FNL was not a signatory to those agreements” (McClintock and Nahimana 2008: 80). Thereby, the FNL became “the remaining Hutu group to have resisted the peace process for several years” (Coleman 2008c: 18). After the 2005 elections, CNDD-FDD became the dominant political party, but the power-sharing provisions have effectively forced it to collaborate with other parties (Reyntjens 2006a: 132).
A.4 Burundi

A.4.3 Assessment

Of the three power-sharing arrangements discussed above, only the post-2003 situation, beginning with the CNDD-FDD’s support of the peace process, can be considered a true case for post-conflict power-sharing. (Formally, this may not be exactly true because the FNL’s resistance to join the agreement meant that the conflict was still ongoing, but the settlement between the government and the main rebel group is widely appreciated as the starting point for peace in Burundi.) The detailed power-sharing provisions contained in the post-transition constitution provided for an extensive degree of power-sharing, despite the CNDD-FDD’s decisive victory in the elections. Out of this reason, post-2005 Burundi can be considered a case of power-sharing – although, as the case study above illustrates, some marked tendencies for political domination have become apparent over the course of the polity. External actors in Burundi were greatly involved in facilitating a settlement in Burundi and also contributed heavily to the ultimate addition of power-sharing principles to the country’s post-transition constitution. Although the international community was initially hesitant to devote attention to the civil war in Burundi, it ultimately became engaged and effectively supported the peace process. In the post-election phase, ONUB’s sudden withdrawal appears like a risky strategy, but at the same time confirms that external actors did not maintain a systematic bias for either of the conflict parties which would fulfill the relative strict requirement of a ‘partisan’ engagement. Out of these reasons, it seems safe to classify external actors’ engagement in Burundi’s post-conflict phase as an instance for mediative engagement. The relations between the warring parties in Burundi are somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, since the CNDD-FDD’s support of the peace process, the tensions between one of the main Hutu rebels and the former Tutsi-dominated government began to improve significantly. After initial hesitations, they began to support the peace process and became increasingly devoted to the principle of power-sharing. On the other hand, another major Hutu rebel party, the FNL-PALIPEHUTU, had continued to resist the peace process until 2006 and had portrayed the CNDD-FDD’s constructive stance as a betrayal of Hutu interests. While the former aspect would speak for the presence of constructive relations, the latter aspects would suggest the opposite: obstructive relations. However, all in all there are good reasons for giving greater weight to the former argument, for the simple reason that the origin of the conflict was about unsettled political tensions between Hutu and Tutsi – and not between different Hutu factions. When the largest Hutu faction began to support the peace process, this automatically meant that some of the underlying root causes of the conflict could ultimately be addressed. Therefore, it makes sense to describe the relations between the former warring parties since 2003 as constructive. A few years after the settlement, the FNL-PALIPEHUTU gave up its armed resistance and signed a peace agreement with the government. For the reasons stated above, Burundi is classified as an instance of the ‘mediated constructive power-sharing’ or ‘Let’s Share’ polity type.
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

A.4.4 Map of Burundi

Figure A.4: Map: Burundi. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
A.5 Cambodia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>15,017,110 as of 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Area</td>
<td>181,040 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land</td>
<td>176,520 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastline</td>
<td>443 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Khmer (Official); French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>Vietnam: 1,228 km; Thailand: 803 km; Laos: 541 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>90% Khmer, 5% Vietnamese, 4% Other, 1% Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>95% Theravada Buddhism, 5% Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A.10: Basic Facts and Figures: Cambodia

A.5.1 Country and Conflict Information

a) General Background

Cambodia had been a French protectorate since 1863. After independence, political power was transferred to King Sihanouk. Both right- and left-wing opposition against Sihanouk’s rule grew in the mid-1960s and the “Khmer Rouge” (Red Khmer) initiated an armed struggle in 1967. After a coup was staged against Sihanouk in 1970, he joined forces with the Khmer Rouge against the new government (see UCDP 2010).

French rule in Cambodia initially lasted until 1945 when it was overthrown by Japan, but after the end of WW II, France returned to Cambodia, making it an autonomous state within the French Union. Cambodia reached independence in 1953 with King Sihanouk as its king (Coleman 2007: 7). His rule is described as “paternalistic and authoritarian” (Peou 2005: 109). Political conditions in Cambodia became complicated as a result of the intensification of the Vietnam war since 1965, which led to the rise of a communist-dominated guerrilla movement that was associated with the Viet Minh of Vietnam. Fearing US domination, King Sihanouk broke with the US and sought an alliance with China, triggering significant resistance from various opposition groups in the National Assembly,
which formed an insurgent group led by the Communist Party of Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge. The king was overthrown in a coup led by pro-US General Lon Nol when the king was abroad for medical treatment in January 1970, abolishing the monarchy a few months later. With support from the United States, the Lon Nol government fought against the Khmer Rouge, but with little success: “By the end of 1973, the Lon Nol government controlled only Phnom Penh, the northwest and a small number of provincial towns, while the Khmer Rouge controlled nearly 60 percent of Cambodia’s territory and 25 percent of its population” (Coleman 2007: 7–9).

b) Conflict History

In 1975 the Khmer Rouge took power and established a highly totalitarian regime in Cambodia. It is estimated that some 1.5 to 3 million people were executed or starved to death during the 1975 – 1979 Khmer Rouge government. The group continued to target civilians in opposition, especially focusing on ethnic Vietnamese. With support from Vietnamese troops, a new Communist government was installed in 1979 and the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk, and another opposition group soon formed a new alliance, FUNCINPEC. The conflict temporarily ended with a 1991 UN-sponsored peace agreement which was followed by UN-administered elections. The implementation of the agreement was difficult and the Khmer Rouge remained active until the last political leaders surrendered in late 1998 (see UCDP 2010f).

The history of conflict in Cambodia is complex and unusual since it was driven neither by ethnic nor tribal motives, but rather by a “simple struggle for political power by different factions” (Heininger, quoted in Richmond and Franks 2007: 31). The Khmer Rouge took power in 1975 and carried out radical social and economic changes that led to approx. 1 to 3 million people being executed (Peou 2005: 110 and Amer 2007: 732–733). Sihanouk collaborated with the Khmer Rouge and was installed as the president of the regime, but was soon deposed and put under arrest. Khieu Samphan became the new head of state and the notorious Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot became head of the government. The latter aimed at realizing his vision of agrarian socialism through carrying out a genocide among urban people, bourgeois and all other potential enemies of his agenda (see Chandler 1998; International Crisis Group 1999: 19). The Khmer Rouge stayed in power until 1979, when a Vietnamese military intervention overthrew them and gave rise to the formation of a new government. At this occasion, the country was also renamed into ‘People’s Republic of Kampuchea’ (PRK).

The new government was supported by Vietnam and the Soviet block, but failed to gain international recognition. Domestically, the new regime triggered widespread opposition from three different groups: the overthrown Khmer Rouge regime (‘Party of Democratic Kampuchea’, PDK), the ‘Khmer People’s National Liberation Front’ (KPNLF) led by for-
A.5 Cambodia

mer Prime Minister Son Sann, and the ‘Front uni national pour un Cambodge indépendant, neutre, pacifique et coopératif’ (FUNCINPEC) led by Sihanouk (Amer 2007: 733). After three years of guerrilla warfare against the government these three parties established an exile government in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia that gained the recognition of the United Nations. Vietnamese troops withdrew in 1989, and Sihanouk returned to Phnom Penh, which weakened the position of the government. A UN-brokered ceasefire agreement was signed in 1991, leading to a transitional government led by Sihanouk called the ‘Supreme National Council’ (Amer 2007: 735–736). In the course of the peace accords that followed in Paris in 1992, the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm, which caused the civil war to break out again (Richmond and Franks 2007: 34). On 16 March 1992, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established; elections took place in May 1993 and a new constitution was adopted by September (Coleman 2007: 11).

The new government was continuously challenged by the Khmer Rouge (=PDK), and after negotiations in 1994 with them failed they were declared illegal. The PDK nonetheless formed the ‘Provisional Government of National Unity and National Salvation of Cambodia’ (PGNUNSC). It failed to gain international recognition, and after a large number of PDK guerrillas surrendered in response to an amnesty, the party had become significantly weakened. Yet, this did not imply peace, as now the factions in the government became more divided, with Hun Sen’s Cambodia’s People’s Party (CPP) and royalist FUNCINPEC forces exchanging fire and challenges between deposed Prime Minister Ranariddh and Hun Sen escalating. The international community withdrew its support. Elections to the national assembly in 1998 led to a victory of Hun Sen’s party (the CPP) receiving 41.4 percent of the vote, followed by FUNCINPEC (31.7 percent). Both parties formed a coalition government with Hun Sen as prime minister (Coleman 2007: 12).

c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict parties</th>
<th>KR, FUNCINPEC, KPNLF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Conflict ID</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Episode ID</td>
<td>1032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>1978 – 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>One-sided victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victorious side</td>
<td>Gov</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Peacekeeping     | UNAMIC (United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia); October 1991 – March 1992  
                 | UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia); March 1992 – September 1993 |
Appendix A Characterization and Classification of the Cases

Mission mandate: UNAMIC

“UNAMIC was established to assist the Cambodian parties to maintain their ceasefire during the period prior to the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and to initiate mine-awareness training of civilian populations. Later, the mandate was enlarged to include training in mine-clearance and the initiation of a mine-clearance programme. The Mission and its functions were subsumed by UNTAC in March 1992” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2003a).

Mission mandate: UNTAC

“UNTAC was established to ensure implementation of the Agreements on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, signed in Paris on 23 October 1991. The mandate included aspects relating to human rights, the organization and conduct of elections, military arrangements, civil administration, maintenance of law and order, repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons and rehabilitation of Cambodian infrastructure” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2003e).

Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Table A.11: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Cambodia

A.5.2 Post-conflict situation

It is difficult to decide when the post-conflict situation actually started in Cambodia because the conflict had continued despite the existence of peace agreements and the presence of a UN transitional administration. In this context the term ‘post-settlement’ may be more adequate, but since the Khmer Rouge withdrew its support from the Paris Accord one can argue that it was not even a real settlement. Yet, although the conflict is coded to have continued until 1998 in the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ and ended through a one-sided victory by the government, a lot still speaks for choosing 1993 as the starting point of the post-conflict situation: this is the point when Cambodia for the first time in 20 years had an elected government, and it marks the end of UNTAC’s deployment in Cambodia. But there is no doubt that ‘peace’ remained elusive for another five years after the elections. Here, the period of the UN transitional administration (1992 – 1993) and the period following the elections in 1993 are treated as two distinct post-conflict phases.

a) The Role of the Formal Government

Since the UN-brokered elections in 1993, there are concerns that Cambodia has effectively become a one party system. “Hun Sen’s State of Cambodia (SOC) [the provisional government established before the elections and comprised mainly of Hun Sen’s CPP, CR] used the elections to legitimize its monopoly on power” (Richmond and Franks 2007: 34). Although the royalist party FUNCINPEC (and not the CPP) won most votes
in the elections, Hun Sen “never relaxed his hold on the reigns of governmental power” (Richmond and Franks 2007: 34). In 1997, he led a coup against the government and defeated FUNCINPEC in the 2003 elections (Richmond and Franks 2007: 35). Against this background, McCargo concludes that “elections have become little more than a side-show, helping to bolster the electoral-authoritarian regime that Hun Sen has built” (McCargo 2005: 98). These characteristics have inspired Richmond and Franks to speak of a ‘virtual liberal peace’, in which “institutions may exist without being adopted by those they are intended for […]” and in which “democratization, human rights, the rule of law, freedom of the press, development and economic reform are deferred for an uncertain period […] [and where] [t]here is little way of knowing whether this deferral will become permanent or is indeed temporary” (Richmond and Franks 2007: 30). According to McCargo, the parties have mainly been interested in gaining power and enjoying the benefits of controlling the state apparatus: “Both parties [CPP and FUNCINPEC, CR] are now effectively postideological; the pursuit of wealth and power forms the main concern of each” (2005: 99). His assessment of the post-war Cambodian polity appears to be well in line with the ‘virtual liberal peace’ argument:

“The nonprogress of this nontransition has gone largely unnoticed by an international community eager to detect signs of improvement, and happy to view the holding of virtually any elections as a step forward” (McCargo 2005: 107).

b) The Role of External Parties

Cambodia has always been influenced by its neighboring countries, in particular Thailand and Vietnam, which have both played a strong historical role in Cambodia (see Chandler 1979). In the post-settlement phase, the United Nations were the most dominant external actors. It was engaged through the UNTAC peacekeeping mission, which comprised 22,000 peacekeepers and was mandated to implement the Paris Agreement (Richmond and Franks 2007: 28). UNTAC’s authority went way beyond a traditional peacekeeping mission, since it possessed the power to overrule domestic decisions:

“UNTAC would be given powers to implement a comprehensive settlement. In order to ensure a neutral political environment, conducive to the holding of free and fair elections, Cambodian administrative units that could influence the outcome of elections would be placed under direct United Nations supervision” (Amer 2007: 735).

Overall, the role of the UN was really critical in facilitating a settlement to the conflict (although only a temporary and flawed one): “Without the UN intervention that led to the election in 1993, the Cambodian factions would have not signed the Paris Agreement and the country would not have seen its first multi-party election since the early 1970s” (Peou 2005: 113). But this also indicates that UNTAC was not based on a ‘light footprint’
Appendix A Characterization and Classification of the Cases

approach: “The nature of peace that UNTAC intended to introduce in 1992 […] was to be achieved by force and diplomacy, and would represent a constitutional peace, conceived, instituted and imposed on Cambodia entirely from the ‘outside’” (Richmond and Franks 2007: 32). There is a general consensus that the mission was a success (e.g. Doyle 1995), but it is highly debatable whether it really laid the groundwork for a self-sustaining peace in Cambodia. Its main failure, according to Richmond and Franks, was the inability to obtain a complete ceasefire and fully disarm the belligerents (2007: 33–34). McCargo sees the 1993 elections only as a success if considered in narrow technical terms (they were secret), but not in substantive terms, since they did not lead to a real transfer of power despite FUNCINPEC’s victory (2005: 99). Long after its departure in 1993, the UN initiated attempts that would eventually lead to a trial for some 20-30 of the remaining Khmer Rouge leaders. Despite resistance from the Hun Sen government, this measure was approved by the UN General Assembly in 2003 (Peou 2005: 111). After UNTAC’s departure, a multitude of UN specialized agencies, international donors, financial institutions and NGOs became engaged in Cambodia, and the international community disbursed some $4 billion dolor in funds between 1992 and 2001 (Peou 2005: 112).

c) The Warring Factions

While the Khmer Rouge still fought a guerrilla war against the CPP in the phase between 1991 and 1998, they essentially disappeared as a political and military force after 1998 altogether. Arguably, after 1998 there was no true contender present any longer in Cambodia since FUNCINPEC had proven too weak (and Sihanouk too opportunistic) to truly challenge Hun Sen’s CPP.

A.5.3 Assessment

UNTAC (1992-1993). The UN Transitional Administration (UNTAC) exhibited all characteristics of a case of transitional administration, in which external actors have the authority to override domestic decisions. Most of the literature on this subject (e.g. Caplan 2005; Chesterman 2004) include the case of Cambodia. In the context of this dissertation, such cases are treated as instances of supreme external intervention. Because the environment has clearly remained obstructive (the parties had continued to engage in armed combat), the period of UNTAC is subsumed here under the ‘supreme obstructive domination’ or ‘Benevolent Intrusion’ polity type.

Post-1993 Phase. What is characteristic about Cambodia since the elections in 1993 is the strong role of the CPP, which has essentially dominated the government. Little true sharing of power has been present since the elections in 1993. There seem to be two critical questions to answer for an adequate classification: 1) Was the international community partisan or meditative? This is not (yet) altogether clear, but the tendency is
more towards the latter. It did try to bring the parties to the negotiation table and made large compromises to accommodate the Khmer Rouge in order not to threat the peace process. Further, it stuck to its role as a peacekeeper and swiftly winded down UNTAC although the Khmer Rouge acted as a spoiler. So, there is reason to argue that the international community was taking a mediative stance. 2) Who is the real contender? Until 1998 this clearly were the Khmer Rouge, but then they disappeared, and their remnants became cooperative. How can we account for this in the analytical framework? I suggest that the late cooperation of Khmer Rouge elements with the CPP is merely opportunistic: They were defeated militarily and had no other chance than to cooperate. All in all, it seems to make sense to confine the analyze to the period between 1991 and 1998, when it was clearly an obstructive relationship. For the reasons stated above, Cambodia is classified as an instance of the ‘mediated obstructive domination’ or ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity type.
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

A.5.4 Map of Cambodia

Figure A.5: Map: Cambodia. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
A.6 Côte D’Ivoire

A.6 Côte D’Ivoire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>20,169,352 as of 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Area</td>
<td>322,460 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land</td>
<td>322,460 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastline</td>
<td>515 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Yamoussoukro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>French (official); there are also over 70 native languages spoken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>Liberia: 716 km; Ghana: 668 km; Guinea: 610 km; Burkina Faso: 584 km; Mali: 532 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>42% Akan; 18% Voltaiques or Gur; 16% Northern Mandes; 11% Krous; 10% Southern Mandes; 3% other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>34% Christian; 27% Muslim; 21% no religion; 15% animist; 3% other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A.12: Basic Facts and Figures: Côte D’Ivoire

A.6.1 Country and Conflict Information

a) General Background

Côte d’Ivoire gained independence from French colonial rule in 1960 and subsequently became the richest country in West Africa. Between 1960 and 1993, political life had been dominated by the ‘Parti démocratique de la Côte D’Ivoire’ (PDCI-RDA), led by president Felix Houphouët-Boigny. Côte d’Ivoire’s population comprises some 60 ethnic groups, with Christians and animists living in the South and Muslims living predominantly in the North. The president managed to avoid ethnic rivalries by balancing their appointment to government positions. In the 1980s, a sharp recession set in that began to threaten the economic miracle, and tensions forced Houphouët-Boigny to establish a pluralist political system. Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 1993 triggered ethnic rivalries and competition for political power, coupled with nationalist tendencies directed against the migrant population. They were fueled by the introduction of a nationalist ideology called ivoirité into Ivorian politics (see UCDP 2010h).

Côte d’Ivoire officially became a French colony in 1893. Since 1958 it was an autonomous republic within the French community and was granted full independence in 1960. Its fate
for the next 30 years was nearly completely determined by the country’s first president and leader of the ‘Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire’ (PDCI), Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who had represented the country in the French National Assembly since 1946 and was a close ally of François Mitterand. His political system can be described as a ‘paternalistic autocracy’, with his PDCI being the sole party permitted in the country until democratization efforts took place in the early 1990s. The ‘Front Populaire Ivorienne’ (FPI) became the largest of the opposition parties, winning a mere 10 out of 175 possible seats in the National Assembly (Coleman 2008e: 7–8; see also Akindès 2004: 5; Dozon 1989: 136; Hofnung 2005: 8–9; Woods 2003: 641).

After Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 1993 he was succeeded by his constitutional successor, National Assembly President Henri Konan Bédié. Bédié took measures to control public opinion and the opposition and eliminate his main opponent Alassane Ouattara (a high-ranking officer at the IMF) through introducing a new electoral code built on the ideology of ivoirité. This led to a boycott of the 1995 elections by the main opposition parties (the FPI and ‘Rassemblement des Républicains’, RDR) (see Akindès 2004: 20; Kipré 2005: 263; Toungara 2001: 67). Bédié gained 95.2 percent of the vote, which triggered accusations of electoral fraud and gave rise to public protest, which was particularly pronounced among the students and university scholars organized in the ‘Federation of Scholars and Students of Côte d’Ivoire’ (FESCI) – arguably one of the groups that suffered most severely from the economic decline (see Almås 2007: 10–12). Bédié continued to suppress opposition parties, leading to the arrest of several members of the RDR, while Ouattara escaped to exile in France. This triggered unrest and ultimately led to a successful military coup in 1999 carried out by army General Guei. He subsequently installed the ‘National Council for Public Salvation’ – a power-sharing government in which power was shared between the FPI and the RDR. However, despite democratic promises Guei centralized power under the military, installed military leaders in the government, and limited the freedom of press (Coleman 2008e: 9–10).

While Guei had drafted a new constitution which had been put to a referendum in 2002, the country has suffered increasingly from the north-south divide: “Northerners view themselves as long ostracized by the southern nexus of power, while southerners look at northerners as of dubious nationality” (Coleman 2008e: 10). The constitution aimed at institutionalizing the ideology of ivoirité through limiting the candidacy for the presidential elections to descendants of ‘true’ Ivorians, thereby excluding large parts of the North and in particular Ouattara from running for the presidency. Guei was ousted in a public outrage after he had declared himself to be the winner of the October 2000 elections, and power was transferred with support from parts of the military to the true winner, Laurent Gbagbo (see Hofnung 2005: 27–35). After Ouattara was again banned from the parliamentary elections, riots and violence followed. A failed coup was staged against Gbagbo in January 2001, which the government attributed to ‘foreign involvement’,
and specifically to Ouattara supporters, triggering violence against immigrants and causing many of them to flee (Coleman 2008e: 12–13).

b) Conflict History

Political riots and tensions followed the series of coups, counter-coups and electoral manipulation. In 2002, an insurgency by a rebel group called MPCI (‘Coalition of Northern Soldiers’) against the government started, which later united with other northern rebel forces to form the ‘Forces Nouvelles’ (FN). This led to intense armed conflict and a division of the country which lasts until today (see UCDP 2010h).

After the unrest triggered by the elections in 2000, Côte d’Ivoire had for a short period become relatively stable and peaceful. In early 2002, matters began to look more promising, as Gbagbo adopted a few conciliating gestures and had agreed to meet in person with Bédié, Guei and Ouattara. He even considered to review the question of Ouattara’s nationality, which prevented the latter from running for the presidency. However, stability had been short-lived, since another attempt for a coup by ‘disgruntled military officers’ in September 2002 gave the impetus for a larger civil war emerging between the government and the northern rebels from the MPCI. In the course of these events, the former military ruler Robert Guei was killed (Coleman 2008e: 14). In response to the new unrest, French troops arrived in Côte d’Ivoire in order to launch emergency evacuations of French citizens (Willett 2005: 591). By late 2002, the government had consolidated control of the Christian south of the country, while rebels controlled the Muslim north. A peace agreement (Linas-Marcoussis Agreement) was hammered out in January 2003, providing for a buffer zone to be established between the rebel-held north and the government-held south (see Harris 2007: 182). France and ECOWAS dispatched 10,000 troops to Côte d’Ivoire, and one year later the United Nations deployed peacekeepers as part of the United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI) (Harris 2007: 182–183). However, peace remained precarious and the power-sharing arrangement turned out as dysfunctional. It took four years until the parties could agree on a new peace power-sharing agreement, the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (see Government of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire 2007). It was signed in March 2007 in the capital of Burkina Faso between Gbagbo and rebel leader Soro, aiming among other things at removing the existing buffer zone that had divided the country and establishing a power-sharing government with former rebel leader Guillaume Soro as prime minister (Coleman 2008e: 18–20).
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict parties</th>
<th>MPCI, MJP, MPIGO, Forces Nouvelles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Conflict ID</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Episode ID</td>
<td>2251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>2002 – 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>minor armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victorious side</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>UNOCI (United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire); April 2004 – present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mission mandate

“Having determined that the situation in Côte d’Ivoire continued to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its resolution 1528 of 27 February 2004, decided to establish the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) as from 4 April 2004. UNOCI replaced the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI), a political mission set up by the Council in May 2003 with a mandate to facilitate the implementation by the Ivorian parties of the peace agreement signed by them in January 2003” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009i).

Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Table A.13: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Côte d’Ivoire

A.6.2 Post-conflict situation

Deciding from which moment on it makes sense to speak of a post-conflict situation in Côte d’Ivoire is ambiguous. According to the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’, the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire ended in 2004, and in April of that year the United Nations deployed the United Nations mission in United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI) (see Harris 2007: 182–183). However, the situation remained highly conflictual after 2004, with the United Nations supervising a buffer-zone between the rebel-held north and the government-held south. All in all, the situation can be described as resembling “neither peace nor war” (International Crisis Group 2004a: i). The situation changed after the adoption of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement in 2007, when the leader of ‘Forces Nouvelles’ was suddenly invited to participate as Prime Minister in a new power-sharing government. Here, the post-2004 and the post-2007 periods are treated as two distinct post-conflict polity phases.
a) The Role of the Formal Government

The outbreak of the conflict was triggered by Laurent Gbagbo’s dubious electoral victory in 2000. The next presidential elections were scheduled for 2005, and the eligibility to participate in the polls was one of the main incompatibilities between the different parties. In the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement struck in January 2003, the parties agreed that the issues of the eligibility to the presidential elections would have to be solved before the presidential elections in 2005, but the parties failed to fulfill this goal (see International Crisis Group 2004a: i). The Accords also provided for the establishment of a Government of National Reconciliation, led by a “consensus Prime Minister who will remain in office until the next presidential election” (see Government of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire 2003, Art. 3c). However, the transitional government was a “shaky political and military deal from its outset”, since it “split power at the top between Gbagbo, who stayed on as president, and Seydou Diarra, a Northern Muslim who became prime minister charged with heading the government of national reconciliation” (Rothchild 2005: 252). Dissatisfied with the process of power-sharing, the rebels soon left the power-sharing government. In March 2004, power-sharing effectively ceased to exist (Rothchild 2005: 253). Presidential elections, originally scheduled for October 2005, were re-scheduled twice. The UN Security Council extended Gbagbo’s mandate until presidential elections finally took place, but at the same time requested that the management of the crisis should be placed “in the hands of a prime minister endowed with real decision-making powers until presidential elections could be organised”, trying to reinstate former Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny (Chirot 2006: 74; International Crisis Group 2007e: 2). Gbagbo immediately made clear that he would not respect the latter and tried to postpone the elections as long as possible. In sum, despite the formal existence of a ‘Government of National Reconciliation’, the three years between March 2004 (the end of the conflict according to the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’) and March 2007 (the adoption of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement) can therefore not be considered a true example for power-sharing between the belligerents.

The adoption of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement in March 2007 brought an urgently needed new impulse to the stalemated peace process in Côte d’Ivoire, as it led to the renewal of power-sharing in Côte d’Ivoire by making the rebel leader Guillaume Soro Prime Minister. As the International Crisis Group explicates:

“The Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (APO) signed on 4 March 2007 was a recognition of the military and diplomatic stalemate in which the two parties to the conflict were locked. It was also, to a certain extent, an agreement between victors. Gbagbo

3 Rescheduled each year between 2005 and 2009, the presidential elections finally took place in November 2010. However, Gbagbo refused to accept Ouattara’s victory, bringing Côte d’Ivoire at the brink of renewed armed conflict as of this writing.

4 In fact, power-sharing was not directly agreed in the Ouagadougou agreement but was agreed in a separate document adopted shortly after the agreement was signed (see Bah 2010: 613).
Appendix A Characterization and Classification of the Cases

fought off the violent attempted coup of 19 September 2002 and succeeded in bypassing all the international agreements and decisions that sought to compel him to give up some of his power [. . .]. Guillaume Soro is also on the winning side, even though his position may turn out to be precarious. During the last four years, he has shown himself to be a skilled politician, capable of leading an armed movement, maintaining control over more than half of the country without provoking an outright and massive rejection from the people in ‘his territory’ and gaining international credibility, which is rather unusual for a rebel leader. [. . .] However, the two victors are not equal: one is president of the republic and the other is ‘his’ prime minister” (2007e: 3).

Most importantly, the agreement also contained provisions for the settlement of the citizenship problem that had never been resolved satisfactorily before (see Bah 2010). The International Crisis Group lauded the agreement as “a major turning point in resolving Côte d’Ivoire’s armed conflict”, but also made clear that it was “only a first step in the right direction” (2007e: i). Despite initial signs for improvement, implementing the provisions contained in the agreement proved difficult and failed due to Gbagbo’s grip to power. Gbagbo obstructed the holding of elections again in November 2009 and dissolved the government in February 2010 (see Bah 2010: 614; International Crisis Group 2009a). Despite this disruptive attitude, the period between March 2007 and early 2010 has closer resemblance to power-sharing than the faulty power-sharing arrangement adopted on the basis of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.

b) The Role of External Parties

The history of Côte d’Ivoire has been characterized by a close involvement of external actors ever since. Its former colonial power France has played a particularly dominant role in the post-colonial period. The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, adopted in January 2003, called upon the international community (more specifically: France, ECOWAS and the United Nations) to provide forces for the establishment of a buffer zone between the rebel-held north and the government-held south (see Harris 2007: 182). In immediate response, France and ECOWAS dispatched a total of 10,000 troops to Côte d’Ivoire in February 2003, and the UN Security Council subsequently authorized their use of force (U.N. Security Council 2003b). One year later, the United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI) was established and incorporated the ECOWAS troop contingent, while the French mission continued in parallel (Harris 2007: 182–183). The mission originally had a one-year mandate, but has since then been repeatedly extended. The UN mission mainly aimed at enforcing a ceasefire between the belligerents, but also provided security guarantees for the rebels. For instance, in 2004 UN troops prevented an attempted government siege against the rebel capital Bouaké and UN forces also protected rebel delegates in Abidjan “who would otherwise have been killed” (see Chirot 2006: 73). However, French troops have become increasingly drawn into the conflict and France’s involvement certainly went beyond a traditional peacekeeping role, which became most vividly clear at the end of 2004.
In November, nine French soldiers were killed after an attack by an Ivorian aircraft. In an attempt to retaliate this attack, France launched an air strike itself, which destroyed the entire Ivorian air force at once. This attack clearly had de-stabilizing effects and triggered countrywide riots against French institutions and building (see Chirot 2006: 73; Hofnung 2005: 88–91).

c) The Warring Factions

After his dubious election in 2000, Laurent Gbagbo remained president during the entire duration of the political crisis, representing the ‘government-side’ in the conflict. The rebellion was originally driven by the ‘Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire’ (MPCI), whose stated goal was to overthrow the Gbagbo government. It also launched the initial coup attempt against him in September 2002. Shortly thereafter, two other rebel groups emerged: the ‘Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix’ (MJP) and the ‘Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest’ (MPIGO). The rebels soon regrouped and formed the ‘Forces Nouvelles’ (FN) under the leadership of Guillaume Soro in late 2002 (Bah 2010: 604). From this moment on, the FN were the main rebel group in Côte d’Ivoire.

The relations maintained by the warring parties during the first and second post-conflict period differed drastically. During the first post-conflict episode, which lasted from 2004 to 2007, the relations between Gbagbo and the rebels were tense and uncompromising. Despite the introduction of a shaky power-sharing arrangement and the adoption of various peace and ceasefire agreements between 2002 and 2007, the parties (in particular Gbagbo) showed no inclination to follow up on their promises. Gbagbo’s frequent re-scheduling of the elections clearly aimed at prolonging his own hold on power. And, as mentioned above, while being formally head of the ‘Government of National Reconciliation’, Gbagbo still tried to defeat the rebels militarily. The parties’ mutual mistrust also becomes evident when considering that the rebels had at no point in time been committed to their disarmament obligations (Chirot 2006). The relations drastically improved after the adoption of the Ouagadougou Agreement in March 2007. As Bakarr Bah argues, the agreement “was predicated on assumed mutual trust among the belligerents and the facilitator, a spirit of dialogue, and parity between the government and FN” (2010: 610). But this did not imply the end of mutual deception and mistrust. Gbagbo continued to impede the holding of elections, and the rebels continued to block their full disarmament (International Crisis Group 2009a).

A.6.3 Assessment

The Post-2004 Episode. The first post-conflict phase in Côte d’Ivoire begins with the UNOCI mandate of 2004. At least during the three years until the signing of the Ouagadougou accords in 2007, the country had been divided into two geographical entities, with the North controlled by the rebels and the South by the government, while a buffer-
zone was maintained by the United Nations. Although there were several power-sharing arrangements in Côte d’Ivoire, the executive power firmly remained in the hands of the government, with the rebels (and partly also the opposition parties) being systematically excluded from formal governmental power. The relationship between the former belligerents clearly was obstructive as armed struggles continued in the post-conflict phase and little actual will to make serious commitments to peace became apparent. Despite the strong role of France, external actors were by and large engaged in a mediative manner. For the reasons stated above, the post-2003 period is classified here as an instance of the mediated obstructive domination or ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity type.

The Post-2007 Episode. The post-2007 episode is different from the earlier arrangement. At the time when the agreement was adopted, Gbagbo and his main opponents agreed on an arrangement that led to the effective participation of the rebels in the government to a degree that went far beyond the earlier ‘power-sharing’ arrangement. Although, in retrospect, it turns out that Gbagbo only used this arrangement as a means to deepen his grip on power in the long run, at the time of the adoption it looked like an honest commitment to finding an end to Côte d’Ivoire’s political crisis. Nonetheless, describing the relations between the rebels as ‘constructive’ would certainly go too far, which is most vividly illustrated by the fact that the rebel groups never disarmed. The role of external actors during this second post-conflict episode has not changed significantly. They have worked for achieving a settlement between the belligerents and have openly lauded the adoption of the Ouagadougou agreement in 2007, but at the same time their leverage on the antagonists was severely limited. Out of these reasons, this situation is classified as an instance of the mediated, obstructive power-sharing or ‘Doomed to Share’ type.
A.6 Côte D’Ivoire

A.6.4 Map of Côte d’Ivoire

Figure A.6: Map: Côte D’Ivoire. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

A.7 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>60,226,717 as of 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Area</td>
<td>2,345,410 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land</td>
<td>2,267,600 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastline</td>
<td>37 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>French (official); Lingala; Kingwana (a dialect of Kiswahili or Swahili); Kikongo; Tshiluba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>Angola: 2,511 km; Congo (RC): 2,410 km; Zambia: 1,930 km; Central African Republic: 1,577 km; Uganda: 765 km; Sudan: 628 km; Burundi: 451 km; Rwanda: 217 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>n/a Luba; n/a Kongo; n/a Mangbetu Azande; n/a Other (more than 200); n/a Mongo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>50% Roman Catholic; 20% Protestant; 10% Kimbanquist; 10% Muslim; 10% Other syncretic sects and traditional beliefs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A.14: Basic Facts and Figures: DRC

A.7.1 Country and Conflict Information

  a) General Background

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) gained independence from Belgian colonial rule in 1960, during which it had suffered from the notoriously brutal and exploitative regime of King Leopold II. Since then, the country has been torn by internal armed conflict and decades of repressive rule by post-independence predatory regimes. This today accounts for its reputation as the ‘epitome of a collapsed state’ (see UCDP 2010g).

Congo was a Belgian colony that stood under the heavy personal influence of King Leopold II. After independence in 1960, the country slipped into a state of anarchy until Colonel Joseph Mobutu – who later called himself ‘Mobutu Sese Seko’ – seized power through a coup and renamed the country into Zaire. During the Cold War, Zaire was a ‘bastion of anti-communism’, which secured Mobutu significant support from the West (see Olsson and Fors 2004: 323). Soon, the new regime managed to take control of the country’s
A.7 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

rich natural resources. The end of the Cold War led to decreasing support for Mobutu’s regime from the west, but the situation changed when Mobutu tolerated large inflows of Hutu refugees from Rwanda into Zaire/DRC in the aftermaths of the Rwandan genocide (Olsson and Fors 2004: 324).

b) Conflict History

Intrastate conflict erupted on five occasions. First, two provinces (Katanga and South Kasai) declared themselves sovereign directly after independence, which triggered an armed conflict against the government. The conflict ended in 1962 with UN peacekeeping forces who managed to gain back control. Second, in 1964-1965 the ‘National Liberation Council’ (CNL) fought in the Eastern part of DRC in order to remove the government. It proclaimed a revolutionary government in 1964 after controlling half of DRC, but lost its territories again in 1965. Third, in 1977, a group called FLNC (‘Front for the National Liberation of the Congo’) launched a military campaign from Angola trying to topple the Mobutu regime. They were pushed back between 1977 and 1978 by French and Belgian forces. Fourth, in 1996-1997, an armed rebellion led by a group called ADFL (‘Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo’), which was supported by Rwanda and Uganda, managed to overthrow Mobutu. But the new regime was soon at war with three parties: the RCD (‘Congolese Rally for Democracy’), the MLC (‘Congolese Liberation Movement’), and the RCD-ML (‘RCD-Liberation Movement’). Years of negotiations led to a peace agreement in 2003 and democratic elections in 2006. Fifth, a repeated conflict activity occurred in Ituri and Katanga, inspired by ethnic tensions. Hema and Lendu fought each other in Ituri, leading to massacres in the 2000s (see UCDP 2010g).

Of the many conflicts that took place in the DRC, one conflict is of primary importance here: the conflict that started in 1996 as the anti-Mobutu struggle and that – after the latter’s defeat – continued as a rebellion against the de facto rule of Laurent-Desiré Kabila and later Joseph Kabila. After the inflow of the Hutu refugees from Rwanda, Mobutu soon increased the pressure on the Banyamulenge (Zairian Tutsi) traditionally populating the eastern part of Congo, ultimately depriving them of their Congolese citizenship and essentially forcing them to escape to neighboring Rwanda. At the same time, parts of the Hutu militias who had committed the genocide in Rwanda and who came together with the refugees to DRC used the Kivu region as the basis for their continued attacks on the newly established Tutsi government in Rwanda. This triggered counter attacks by the ‘Rwandan Patriotic Army’ (RPA), joined by a number of other rebel groups, including Laurent Kabila’s ADFL (see Olsson and Fors 2004: 324–325).

5The first three conflicts were concluded before the end of the Cold War and therefore do not fall into the period under investigation here. The fifth conflict was limited to certain regions within the DRC and therefore goes against the operational definition of a post-conflict polity case formulated in section 1.3.3.
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

In the subsequent conflict, Kabila successfully managed to overthrow Mobutu’s army and seized Kinshasa on 17 March 1997, forcing Mobutu to escape abroad where he soon died of cancer. In this process, it is estimated that up to 200,000 Hutu refugees might have been killed (Olsson and Fors 2004: 324–325, see also Emizet 2000: 163). The Kabila government, however, was unable to grant stability to the country and establish effective control of the eastern parts, which is the region with the most precious natural resources – primarily timber, gold, diamonds, coltan. This triggered a long-lasting battle between the different factions for the control of these resources, partly on behalf and under direct participation of neighboring Uganda, Rwanda and Angola, who had effectively turned the conflict into a regional war. Fighting between the different factions continued for about one year, until a ceasefire agreement was brokered in 1999 – the Lusaka Agreement (see Government of the Republic of Angola 1999). Rather than bringing an end to the fighting, it triggered a lengthy negotiation peace process known as the ‘Inter-Congolese Dialogue’. This process culminated in the ‘Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC’ (see Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2002a) signed in 2002. Since peace had again remained elusive, all previous agreements were again endorsed by the parties in another agreement known as the ‘Final Act’ (see Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2003). This finally gave rise to the establishment of a transitional government, in which power was shared between president Joseph Kabila (the son of Laurent-Desiré Kabila, who had been assassinated in 2001) and a number of key rebel leaders. It was inaugurated on 24 July 2003 and remained in power until national elections in 2006 confirmed Joseph Kabila in office (see Coleman 2008d: 26; Koko 2007: 36–37; Miskel and Norton 2003: 2–5).

c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict parties</th>
<th>AFDL, RCD, RCD-ML, MLC, Rwanda, Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Conflict ID</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Episode ID</td>
<td>864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>1996 – 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victorious side</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>ONUC (United Nations Operation in the Congo); July 1960 – June 1964 MONUC (UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo); November 1999 – present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A.7 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

**Mission mandate**

**ONUC**

“ONUC was established in July 1960 to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. The function of ONUC was subsequently modified to include maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2001e).

**Mission mandate: MONUC**

“The Democratic Republic of the Congo and five regional States signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999. To maintain liaison with the parties and carry out other tasks, the Security Council set up MONUC on 30 November 1999, incorporating UN personnel authorized in earlier resolutions” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009j).

Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Table A.15: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: DRC

A.7.2 Post-conflict situation

According to the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’, the anti-Kabila conflict in the DRC officially lasted until 2001. However, at this stage the peace process had hardly been in place and the parties had not yet agreed on a number of key issues. Therefore, it appears more reasonable to take the year 2003 as the starting point of the DRC’s post-conflict period. (Even then, using the term ‘post-conflict’ may be grossly misleading, as both factional violence and violations of Congolese territorial sovereignty by Uganda and Rwanda were continuing – see Coleman 2008d: 22). The three years of the Congolese power-sharing government are treated here as the first post-settlement episode in the DRC. A second post-conflict episode can be identified for the post-2006 period, since it entailed a fundamental change of domestic governance structures and reinforced Kabila’s position of domination in the DRC.

a) The Role of the Formal Government

Since the downfall of Mobutu in 1997, the government-side was first represented by Laurent Kabila and, since his death in 2001 by his son, Joseph Kabila. Laurent Kabila had never been elected and he essentially established a dictatorship after overthrowing Mobutu. As the pressure from the rebel groups grew stronger, his way of governance became more and more oppressive and violent, “ruling by fear rather than inspiration” (Coleman 2008d: 16). Kabila-the-son initially seemed to differ from his father in many ways. His more conciliating stance led to the completion of the ‘Inter-Congolese Dialogue’ (Coleman
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

2008d: 16) and, ultimately, the creation of the transitional government. It was agreed that Joseph Kabila remained president but had to share power with four vice-presidents, including the rebel leaders Jean-Pierre Bemba (MLC) and Azarias Ruberwa (RCD) (Tull 2009: 216). The composition of the government changed after the conclusion of peace agreements in 2002 and 2003, which led to the creation of a transitional government. The power-sharing arrangement lasted for three years, until national elections scheduled for 2006 nominated a new president. Kabila won the elections and subsequently re-established a relatively centralized system of rule that was characterized by a tight grip on the opposition parties. This implied a serious regression of democratic principles in the country, accompanied by a tightening human rights situation (see Human Rights Watch 2008: 16–17; International Crisis Group 2007c: 11). As Mvemba Dizolele explicates:

“President Kabila, rather than taking steps to strengthen the country’s nascent democracy, is now posing the biggest threat to it yet – a brazen constitutional revision. […] Political developments over the past four years, such as Kabila’s efforts to consolidate all powers in his hands give ample reason to worry about a return to dictatorship” (2010: 148–149).

Along a similar line, Englebert and Tull argue that the transition in the DRC “merely ushered in an authoritarian and corrupt political and economic system similar to that of the late president Mobutu Sese Seko […]” (2008: 112).

b) The Role of External Parties

External forces have played a central role in the DRC before, during and after the conflict. Between independence and the end of the Cold War, Mobutu’s Zaire enjoyed the support from many western nations, including the US and France. France allegedly even hired mercenaries in order to stabilize Mobutu’s regime and prevent the total collapse of the DRC/ Zaire. Neighboring countries, most notably Uganda and Rwanda, were directly involved in the conflict and enriched themselves selfishly from DRC’s natural resources (see e.g. Olsson and Fors 2004: 324).

In the period following the ceasefire and in the post-settlement phase after 2003, the United Nations became involved in two ways: through MONUC, a clear peacekeeping mission unable to prevent the escalation of violence following the withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan troops in 2002/ 2003, and later through mandating an EU staffed multinational force (U.N. Security Council 2003d). With 18,343 uniformed personnel in 2008, MONUC counts as one of the “biggest and most expensive missions ever deployed by the UN” (Tull 2009: 215). It unfolded in four phases: During phase one (1999-2002) it was a classical peacekeeping mission which aimed at verifying and securing the ceasefire, employing 5,037 soldiers. Phase two (2003-2004) commenced after the Pretoria accords in 2002 and aimed at supporting the transitional government in Kinshasa. During this period, the UN was unable to prevent the escalation of violence in Bunia (Ituri district) and Kivu,
leading to the deployment of the EU-staffed Artemis mission. Phase three (2004-2006) was mainly about the organization of elections; phase four (since 2006) about the completion of “daunting core tasks” (see Tull 2009: 218). The EU involvement had both military and civilian components, making use of the full range of instruments the European Security and Defense Policy offers: *Artemis* was an interim emergency multinational force staffed by the EU and equipped with a *Chapter VII* mandate, *EUPOL* the European Police Mission, *EUSEC* the EU Security Sector Reform Mission, and *EUFOR* the military operation in support of the UN’s MONUC mission (see Morsut 2009: 262).

In the post-2006 period, external actors have largely remained silent on Kabila’s attempts to wind down the democratic facade and establish an ever more authoritarian regime. This has “emboldened Kabila and his associated in their dangerous grab for power and sent a negative message to the parliamentary opposition” (Dizolele 2010: 150).

c) The Warring Factions

A big problem posed by the case of the DRC is to differentiate the different warring factions from each other because of their large number and factionalization. During the war that brought down Mobutu, the dominant contender was Laurent Kabila’s AFDL (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire). The various anti-Kabila opposition groups from the eastern part of the country that were formed after Laurent Kabila’s rise to power became known as the ‘Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie’ (RCD), led by Emile Ilunga and Bizima Karaha and were supported by Uganda and Rwanda. Later, a splinter faction was formed under the leadership of Ernest Wamba (‘RCD-Kisangani’). In November 1998, a new anti-Kabila rebel group was formed under the leadership of Jean-Pierre Bemba, called “Mouvement de Liberation Congolais” (MLC), again backed by Uganda (Coleman 2008d: 14–15). Though united in their objective to overthrow Kabila, the different factions greatly engaged in factional battles, not least aiming at gaining or extending access to the DRC’s natural resources. They continued to break ceasefire agreements or were unwilling to sign peace agreements at various occasions. The factional battles were particularly severe in the Ituri region after the withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan troops, leading to gross human rights violations reaching genocidal proportions. The withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan troops, was not fully completed because both countries continued to cross the border, often under the pretext that they aim at limiting the influence of rebel troops operating from within DRC (Coleman 2008d: 21–26).

A.7.3 Assessment

**Post-2003 Episode.** The DRC’s first post-conflict period, starting with the establishment of a transitional government in 2003, is generally subsumed as a case of power-sharing. Although the power-sharing arrangement suffered from many flaws and political tensions, it led to an effective participation of various rebel leaders in the government. Throughout
the three years of the power-sharing government, the various armed factions maintained highly obstructive relations and at times even engaged in open combat. The parties were at no time genuinely committed to power-sharing as such, but mainly used it as a temporary means to secure their share of power in the long run. Therefore, the relations between the warring parties can safely be considered obstructive. The role of external actors is highly ambiguous in the case of the DRC. The country has historically always been a case where external powers – Belgium, the United States, or, more recently, Rwanda, and Uganda – have been strongly engaged and often ruthlessly pushed through their interests. At the same time, a number of less self-seeking players has become engaged in the DRC’s conflict and post-conflict phase, for instance the United Nations or the European Union. Only the latter group deserves the name ‘external actors’, because the former were essentially parties to the conflict itself. Through the deployment of MONUC or the EU-led Artemis operation, these external actors have tried to keep the shaky peace and stabilize the chaotic situation on the ground. This engagement is considered here as a case of mediative engagement. Out of these reasons, this situation is classified as an instance of the mediated, obstructive power-sharing or ‘Doomed to Share’ type.

**Post-2006 Episode.** The elections in 2006 were not accompanied by a thorough pacification of the country. The DRC has remained a hotspot of civil strife and instability even after the conclusion of post-conflict elections. Therefore, the post-2006 constellation continues to be characterized by highly obstructive relations. The role of external actors has not changed significantly. MONUC has remained deployed even after the upholding of elections, but has been largely unable to decisively constrain the behavior of external actors (see the case study in chapter 4.2). The only real difference to the situation described above lies in the role played by the government. Immediately after being confirmed in office, Joseph Kabila took attempts to curtail opposition parties and get rid of his main opponents. He successfully forced Jean-Pierre Bemba into exile and took a number of other measures to secure, for himself, a position of dominance in the DRC. Out of this reason, the post-2006 polity can be considered a case of political domination, characterized by a widespread exclusion of Kabila’s former opponents. Out of these reasons, the DRC in the post-2006 period is classified as an instance of the ‘mediated obstructive domination or ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity type.
Figure A.7: Map: Democratic Republic of the Congo. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
A.8 East Timor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>980,84</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Area</td>
<td>14,874 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land</td>
<td>14,874 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastline</td>
<td>1,035 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Dili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>12 Timorese languages of which Tetun is the most widely used; Portuguese is the other major language; (both of these are official languages). Indonesian and English are spoken within certain segments of the population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>Indonesia: 200 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>78% Timorese including Austronesian sub-groups, Papuan sub-groups and Mestizos; 19% Indonesian; 2% Chinese; 1% Portuguese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>92% Roman Catholics; 3% Protestants; 3% Other; 2% Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A.16: Basic Facts and Figures: East Timor

A.8.1 Country and Conflict Information

a) General Background

Note: East Timor is discussed in the UCDP Database as a part of Indonesia, therefore the following paragraph first focuses on general issues related to Indonesia before turning more specifically to the case of East Timor below. Indonesia consists of more than 17,000 islands and is culturally diverse. At independence, its exact borders were uncertain: The political elite claimed some territories which had not been controlled by the Dutch, while several local leaders rejected the Indonesian concept and favored self-governance. The expansionist policies of Indonesia became more proclaimed over time and eventually led to interstate conflict in 1962 against the Netherlands, which at the time controlled territory in the western part of the island New Guinea (see UCDP 2010l).

East Timor had been a Portuguese colony for some 400 years until the withdrawal of its colonial power in 1975. The pro-independence party Fretilin took power and unilaterally
A.8 East Timor

proclaimed the country’s independence, but Indonesia brutally occupied the territory only a few weeks later in December 1975. This led to “a twenty-four-year brutal occupation, costing between 108,000 and 180,000 Timorese lives” (Bowles and Chopra 2008: 273). Different groups resisted the Indonesian occupation, joined together in 1987 under the umbrella of the ‘Conselho Nacional de Resistência Maubere’ (CNRM) [whose name was changed in 1998 into ‘Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense’ (CNRT)] and represented militarily through Falintil (Bowles and Chopra 2008: 273). During the occupation, it has been “reliably assessed that a third of the East Timorese population died as a direct result of Indonesia’s administration” (Smith and Dee 2006: 394).

b) Conflict History

Internally, the Indonesian government had been challenged by Islamic movements as well as breakaway factions from the armed forces, leading to intrastate conflict over the control of the government in 1953 and 1958-61. The country also experienced several intrastate conflicts over territory, starting in South Moluccas in 1950, and eventually followed by on-and off fighting in West Papua in 1965-78, in the former Portuguese colony of East Timor in 1975-89, 1992, 97-98, and in the territory of Aceh in 1990-91 and 1999-05. During the second episode of the conflict in Aceh, the rebel group GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement), made use of one-sided violence (see UCDP 2010).

After the resignation of Indonesia’s long term dictator Suharto in 1998, a window of opportunity opened for the United Nations to address the East Timorese status question. After talks about offering autonomy and assigning a ‘special status’ to East Timor throughout 1998, the new Indonesian president B.J. Habibie surprisingly offered to hold a UN-monitored referendum in East Timor, which should give the impetus for decoding whether East Timor should remain an autonomous region within Indonesia or whether it should become independent – a decision that may have been “in part a reflection of his unpredictable and eccentric personality” (Smith and Dee 2006: 395). In tripartite talks between Indonesia, Portugal and the United Nations, the conduct of the UN supervised ballot – with Indonesian authorities maintaining security – was agreed on 5 May 1999 (Smith and Dee 2006: 396–397). Administered by the United Nations Mission to East Timor (UNAMET), the referendum took place on 30 August 1999 and yielded a 78 percent pro-independence vote (see e.g. Suhrke 2001: 2–5). The referendum was followed by an orchestrated campaign of destruction, which could only be stopped by the arrival of an Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) (Bowles and Chopra 2008: 273). This was followed by UNTAET assuming authority over the territory between October 1999 and May 2002.
## Appendix A Characterization and Classification of the Cases

### c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict parties</th>
<th>Fretilin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Conflict ID</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Episode ID</td>
<td>1343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>1997-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>minor armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Conflict inactivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victorious side</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Peacekeeping
- **UNTAET (October 1999 – May 2002); UNMISET (May 2002 – May 2005); UNMIT (August 2006 – present)**

**Mission mandate:**

**UNTAET**

“UNTAET was established on 25 October 1999 to administer the Territory, exercise legislative and executive authority during the transition period and support capacity-building for self-government. East Timor became an independent country on 20 May 2002. Also that day, UNTAET was succeeded by the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) […]” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2001f).

**Mission mandate:**

**UNMISET**

“East Timor became an independent country on 20 May 2002, marking the end of a three-year process towards independence under the guidance of the United Nations. On that day, the Security Council established UNMISET to provide assistance to East Timor over a period of two years until all operational responsibilities were fully devolved to the East Timor authorities. Subsequently, the Council extended mission’s mandate for another year to permit the new nation, which had changed its name to Timor-Leste, to attain self-sufficiency. UNMISET successfully completed its mandate on 20 May 2005” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009g).

**Mission mandate:**

**UNMIT**

“Expressing its concern over the still fragile security, political and humanitarian situation in Timor-Leste, the Security Council, by its resolution 1704 of 25 August 2006, established a new, expanded operation – the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) – to support the Government in consolidating stability, enhancing a culture of democratic governance, and facilitating political dialogue among Timorese stakeholders, in their efforts to bring about a process of national reconciliation and to foster social cohesion”. UNMIT took over from the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009d).

*Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations*

| Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations |

---

Table A.17: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: East Timor
A.8.2 Post-conflict situation

a) The Role of the Formal Government

The role of the formal government in East Timor greatly depends on the moment of analysis. Two periods can be identified: the pre-independence period, the period of the UN transitional administration (1999-2002), and East Timor’s period of independence starting in 2002. Until the referendum of 1999 that triggered the violent campaign, East Timor was de facto under Indonesian sovereignty, although no country except for Australia had accepted the Indonesian claim for legitimate sovereignty. De jure, the country was still under the sovereignty of Portugal as it was its former colonial power. Yet, as this period is strictly speaking not part of the post-conflict situation, it can be safely ignored. The period starting with UNTAET assuming responsibility on 25 October 1999 and ending with Timorese independence on 20 May 2002 is the actual episode of transitional administration by the United Nations. During that time, East Timor’s entire civilian administration was run by the United Nations. After 2002, the country is difficult to classify as a post-conflict case because the contenders (the Indonesian militias) had not been present in the country any longer. Therefore, the classification confines itself to the period of the transitional government.

b) The Role of External Parties

External parties were involved mainly in two ways during and after the conflict: through the multinational military intervention that was staged following the post-referendum violence (INTERFET), and through the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET):

Multinational Intervention (INTERFET). The violence that succeeded the referendum made it impossible for the United Nations to immediately establish their authority in the territory of East Timor. Instead, it was necessary to design a peace enforcement mission, endowed with a significant level of resolve, within a relatively short period of time. INTERFET was led by Australia and, at its peak, reached a strength of 11,500 troops (Chopra 2000: 28). It was an intervention in which the “humanitarian aim of bringing violence against the East Timorese to an end was matched by the military means to achieve that goal” (Philpott 2006: 144; see also Wheeler and Dunne 2001).

Transitional Administration (UNTAET). East Timor is a special case as it represents the “most comprehensive transitional administration undertaken by the UN during the 1990s” (Suhrke 2001: 2). The status of East Timor before the referendum and the UN intervention was relatively unclear:

“Indonesia had de facto but not de jure control, Portugal had de jure authority but none de facto, and the East Timorese independence movement, Conselho National
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

da Resistencia Timorense (CNRT), had a wide international solidarity network and a Nobel Prize winner among its leaders, but no formal international standing and only a one-man lobby at the UN” (Suhrke 2001: 3).

Out of these reasons, East Timor had been considered by the United Nations – together with Portugal – a ‘non self-governing territory’ already for decades, which in part explains the direct responsibility they assumed for the territory (Suhrke 2001: 3). Overall, the Transitional Administration in East Timor was very much modeled after the similar mission in Kosovo. The common challenge in both cases was that the missions were established “following military conflicts that produced acute administrative vacuums in their wake” (Caplan 2005: 93). As in Kosovo, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) dominated the planning and conduct of the operation, which marginalized the role of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), although the latter had been the “principal unit in the Secretariat to handle East Timor” and had developed significant local expertise (Suhrke 2001: 6). According to Suhrke, this had detrimental consequences for the mission as it essentially imposed the principles of a classical peacekeeping mission to a challenge that went far beyond that (Suhrke 2001: 6–11). The central belief in the principle of neutrality also led to an exclusion of local parties in the process, including the CNRT, which had not been considered a legitimate independence movement, but rather a ‘faction’ or party to the conflict (Bowles and Chopra 2008: 276, see also Suhrke 2001: 8). Together, these factors greatly reduced the legitimacy of the mission in the eyes of the population, which demonstrated that “the legitimacy of an international transitional administration rapidly erodes if it is not based on local ownership” (Bowles and Chopra 2008: 299). It is for these reasons that UNTAET has been criticized from many sides as being an “exercise in benevolent colonialism” (Traub 2000: 75) and that it was “absurd and extraordinary” to exclude the local population (Chopra 2002: 981).

c) The Warring Factions

East Timor differs from many other post-conflict situations in that the ‘government side’ of the conflict – that is the Indonesian political elites and the militias acting on their behalf – left the territory after the INTERFET mission had been initiated (see e.g. Traub 2000: 75). As argued above, the ‘rebels’ in this conflict – the Timorese independence movement CNRT and its armed wing Falintil – were effectively excluded from the political process during the transitional administration. Historically, Falintil had been the armed wing of the Fretilin political party (‘Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor’), but its former leader Xanana Gusmão (president of East Timor from 2001 to 2007) distanced itself from the party and transformed it into the armed wing of the unified resistance movement already in the 1980s. Unlike in other cases, the former rebel-movements did not form one coherent political movement in East Timor after the country had reached independence, but remained largely divided and factionalized. The united resistance movement CNRT
East Timor

was dissolved in June 2001 – six weeks before the election – following UNTAET’s request for forming individual political parties. Fretilin had left the CNRT already in 2000. Many former CNRT members gathered under the umbrella of the Partido Democrático (PD), a party Gusmão sympathized with but with which he had not formally aligned. This left no serious competitor for Fretilin in the parliamentary elections of 2001 as the party could successfully sell itself as “the main resistance organization that had fought […] against the Indonesian occupation” (Bowles and Chopra 2008: 279–280). Gusmão – the central Timorese figure of the independence movement and during the UN transitional administration – successfully ran as an independent for the presidency and was endorsed by all parties except Fretilin, which won a majority in the parliamentary elections in that same year.

A.8.3 Assessment

The period of the transitional government in East Timor can be treated, together with Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a case of supreme intervention by external actors. The far-reaching exclusion of local stakeholders from decision-making processes within the UNTAET administration makes clear how blatantly the United Nations overrode local authority. By definition, this also classifies East Timor as a case of domination. What is more difficult to assess are the relations between the warring factions, since the Indonesian militias were largely disbanded after the INTERFET intervention in 1997. However, the relations with Indonesia as a whole remained conflictual, and occasional clashes have occurred on the ground both during and after the deployment of UNTAET. Therefore, the relations between the warring factions as a whole can be considered obstructive. Out of these reasons, this situation is classified as an instance of the supreme, obstructive domination or ‘Benevolent Intrusion’ type.
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

A.8.4 Map of East Timor

Figure A.8: Map: Indonesia. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
A.9 El Salvador

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>6,672,218 as of 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Area</td>
<td>21,040 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land</td>
<td>20,720 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastline</td>
<td>545 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Spanish, Nahua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>Honduras: 342 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guatemala: 203 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>90% Mestizo, 9% White, 1% Amerindian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>86% Roman Catholic, 14% Protestant and other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A.18: Basic Facts and Figures: El Salvador

A.9.1 Country and Conflict Information

a) General Background

El Salvador had been colonized by Spain before it became a member of the United Provinces of Central America. It was declared independent in 1856. Post-independence politics was largely controlled by an oligarchy known as las catorce, which had enjoyed significant support from the military. After about one hundred years of autocratic rule, radical leftist groups expanded rapidly in the 1970s (see UCDP 2010i).

El Salvador reached independence after the dissolution of the United Province of Central America. After a coup d’état in 1932, politics were dominated by the military for the upcoming 50 years, with authoritarian governments limiting freedom and employing political repression (Coleman 2008f: 7–11). Opposition to their rule had grown sharply in the 1970s, which eventually gave rise to guerrilla warfare in 1979. Although a reform-minded group within the military ousted the right-wing government already in the same year and formed a revolutionary junta with formerly exiled opposition leader José Napoléon Duarte (Christian Democratic Party, PDC) leading the provisional government, parts of
the guerrilla movements had not been satisfied by the reforms and demanded more radical changes (Coleman 2008f: 7–11).

b) Conflict History

In 1979, a number of these groups initiated an armed fight against the government, and later united into a rebel group called FMLN (‘Frente Farabundo Marti para la liberación nacional’), named after Farabundo Marti, the communist leader of the peasant revolution in 1932. The FMLN fought the government between 1980-1991. With the conclusion of the UN-brokered Chapultepec Peace Accords signed in 1992, the conflict was terminated (see UCDP 2010i).

The FMLN insurgents initiated a fight against the government in 1980. The group enjoyed support from Cuba and the Soviet Union (Coleman 2008f: 7–11). This gave rise to a decade-long civil war between the government and the FMLN in the course of which more than 70,000 people were killed (see e.g. Allison 2010; Call 2003; Karl 1992; Reiber 2009; Wantchekon 1999; Zinecker 2004: 9–10). Amidst an ongoing civil war, El Salvador held its first democratic presidential elections in 1984. The former head of the revolutionary junta, Duarte, won the elections, but his powers were greatly compromised by the military’s continued say in domestic politics. Parties to the left of the PDC were effectively excluded from participation in the elections (see Munck 1993 and Reiber 2009: 192). The United States, determined to prevent a second Nicaragua in the region, heavily supported the military-controlled government in El Salvador (Munck 1993: 77). With rising levels of US support totaling US $ six billion throughout the duration of the war, the FMLN realized that it was unable to win the armed conflict and changed its strategy to some form of ‘low intensity warfare’ in 1984 (Reiber 2009: 192). The next elections took place in 1989, which gave rise to a peaceful governmental turnover. Alfredo Cristiani from the right-wing ARENA party (Nationalist Republican Alliance) won a majority of votes. This event marked the first peaceful transferal of executive power from one elected president to another. Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War altered the external environment in which the war was carried out, and in early 1990 the government and the FMLN met in New York upon the invitation of the UN Secretary General. In September the parties signed the New York Accord, which established the conditions for a peaceful settlement. The final agreement (Chapultepec Accord) was signed on January 16, 1992, establishing a nine-months cease fire. A ceremony held on 15 December 1992 marked the official end of the conflict (Coleman 2008f: 7–11).
c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict parties</th>
<th>ERP, FAL, FARN, FPL, PRTC, FMLN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Conflict ID</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Episode ID</td>
<td>1202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>1979-1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victorious side</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>ONUSAL (United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador); July 1991 – April 1995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mission Mandate:**

“ONUSAL was established in July 1991 to verify implementation of all agreements between the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional, including a ceasefire and related measures, reform and reduction of the armed forces, creation of a new police force, reform of the judicial and electoral systems, human rights, land tenure and other economic and social issues” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2003c).

*Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations*

Table A.19: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: El Salvador

---

**A.9.2 Post-conflict situation**

El Salvador’s civil war was relatively ideological and highly influenced by the dynamics of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War, therefore, played an important enabling environment for the settlement of the civil war in El Salvador (see Burgerman 2000: 68). The post-conflict period that emerged with the settlement of the conflict in 1994 neither led to a power-sharing arrangement nor to a transitional government. Instead, the incumbent government simply remained in power until new elections were held in 1994, which confirmed the incumbent regime in office. 1992 can therefore be used as the starting point for El Salvador’s post-conflict situation.

**a) The Role of the Formal Government**

During the conflict, the government-side in the Salvadorian conflict had mainly been dominated by the military. Duarte was therefore unable to exert significant influence on
the outcome of the civil war. Clearly, the ‘government’ must therefore not be equated with the president, who was considered a communist by many of the right-wing military leaders and possessed close to no bargaining power (Munck 1993: 78). This changed after Cristiani was elected president in 1989, who was in a better bargaining position towards the military and the conservatives. It was the starting point for a long period of ARENA dominance in Salvadoran politics. In the 1994 elections, ARENA was confirmed in office, gaining 39 out of 84 seats in the National Assembly, and their candidate Calderón Sol won more than two thirds of the votes in the runoff elections for the presidency (see Lehoucq 1995: 179–180). However, also the FMLN was relatively successful in its first elections as a political party: it emerged as the second-strongest force and even outperformed the PDC\(^6\) (see Lehoucq 1995). Nonetheless, the election results caused the FMLN’s effective exclusion from political participation: although ARENA lacked an absolute majority in the National Assembly, the party refused to cooperate with the FMLN and instead engaged in deal-making with smaller opposition parties, thereby effectively bypassing the FMLN (Holiday 2005: 80). This resulted in a strongly polarized party system and also fostered the ideological divide between the government and the largest opposition party (Azpuru 2010: 112; see also Reiber 2009: 205).

Despite that, the FMLN has been able to steadily improve its results. It gained a majority of seats in the Legislative Assembly in 2000, causing ARENA (which still held the presidency) to engage in even more absurd political tradeoffs in order to continue its boycott of the FMLN (Holiday 2005: 79). In the end, this strategy has not worked out: while an ARENA candidate (Elías Antonio Saca González) could once more win the presidential elections in 2004, the FMLN’s candidate Salvador Sánchez Cerén won the 2009 elections (Azpuru 2010; Colburn 2009; Greene and Keogh 2009). This event marked the “first peaceful turnover of power since the nation-state became independent […]” (Colburn 2009: 144).

b) The Role of External Parties

External actors in El Salvador have played an ambiguous role throughout the country’s history. The United States have been by far the dominant external actor. During the Cold War, El Salvador was of significant strategic importance and its civil war soon turned into a proxy-war between the former super powers. The Reagan administration was determined to prevent a victory of the Marxist FMLN insurgents and consequently supported the Salvadoran government with significant resources (see Munck 1993: 78, see also Reiber 2009). Consequently, the implementation of peace was “contingent upon the USA itself abandoning its support for a military solution”, which eventually took place with the end of the Cold War and the change of the American presidency from Reagan to Bush (Reiber

---

\(^6\)The PDC (Partido Demócrata Cristiano) was for a long time one of the most important Salvadoran parties. Their candidate José Napoleón Duarte held the presidency between 1984 and 1989, before handing over power to the ARENA candidate Alfredo Cristiani (see Stanley 2006: 104).
2009: 89). Subsequently, the United States have contributed significantly to finding a
settlement between the parties and have since then generally supported El Salvador’s
transition process. At times, the country has used its leverage against the Salvadoran
government in order to speed up the implementation of the peace agreement (see Holiday
2005: 79). This indicates that the United States have over times managed to overcome
their partisanship for the government side.

Next to the United States, the United Nations have played a key role for facilitating the
settlement between the parties and contributing to an environment of mutual trust. They
have enjoyed a very good reputation among all major parties and their engagement is
generally considered a success (see Call 2003: 830; Reiber 2009: 230). Through providing
a level playing field during the peace negotiations, the UN were “central to the success of
the peace process” (Munck 1993: 83). ONUSAL had already been fully deployed by July
1991, even before a ceasefire agreement was negotiated. Its mandate was initially limited to
verifying the human rights agreement (see Burgerman 2000: 70). It was a relatively small
mission, employing not more than 380 military observers and some 600 police observers
(see above), but it nonetheless had important effects, for instance in that it “successfully
pressured the parties into backing away from a side agreement that threatened to corrupt
the new civilian police force” (Burgerman 2000: 71). ONUSAL was also responsible for
observing the 1994 elections (see Reiber 2009: 236).

c) The Warring Factions

In their opposition against the (military-led) government and driven by their Marxist
agenda, the FMLN had initially been convinced that it was able to overthrow the regime
relatively quickly. At the end of 1980, the FMLN launched a first big offensive that
marked the beginning of a decade of civil war, misleadingly called ‘final offensive’ by the
contenders (see Munck 1993: 77). Yet, the FMLN convincingly demonstrated that it was
not easily to defeat militarily either. It launched its largest military offensive in 1980, at
a time when external support had already started to crumble (Montgomery 1995: 141).
This offensive “made two things indisputably clear: the army’s lack of competence and
the FMLN’s inability to spark a popular insurrection” (Montgomery 1995: 141). Yet, it
is evident that the FMLN had developed a clear interest in peace at the end of the 1980s.
Once the peace accords were in place, the FMLN was quickly and smoothly transformed
into a political party, and has since then refrained from the use of violence.

A.9.3 Assessment

The post-conflict situation that emerged in El Salvador after the conclusion of the 1992
peace agreement resembles the situation in Mozambique (see A.15). The elections in 1994
gave rise to a situation in which one of the former warring parties (ARENA) dominated the
executive and effectively excluded the FMLN from political participation. Despite that, the
FMLN accepted its electoral defeat and has since then remained a relatively constructive party throughout the duration of the Salvadoran post-conflict polity. External actors were engaged in El Salvador in a mediative manner. Out of these reasons, this situation is classified as an instance of the ‘mediated, constructive domination’ or ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ type.

A.9.4 Map of El Salvador

Figure A.9: Map: El Salvador. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
A.10 Guatemala

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>12,714,458 as of 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Area</td>
<td>108,890 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land</td>
<td>108,430 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastline</td>
<td>400 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Guatemala City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Spanish; Indigenous languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>Mexico: 962 km; Belize: 266 km; Honduras: 256 km; El Salvador: 203 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>56% Mestizo; 44% Indigenous or predominantly indigenous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>Roman Catholic; Protestant Sects; Traditional Maya Religions (percentages not available)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A.20: Basic Facts and Figures: Guatemala

A.10.1 Country and Conflict Information

a) General Background

The territory that today constitutes Guatemala had been conquered by the Spanish already in the 16th century, who created the kingdom of Guatemala, which comprised several other of today’s Latin American states. Guatemala (the country) reached independence in 1838. The landholding class soon established a ruling autocracy, which led to an unstable political environment (coup, etc) continuing well into the 20th century. The conservative governments and anti-communist regimes of the 1950s to the 1980s spawned resistance from leftist organisations, which culminated in armed rebellions beginning in the 1960s (see UCDP 2010j).

Guatemala gained independence from Spanish colonial rule in 1838. The greater part of its post-colonial history was characterized by coups and counter-coups, which gave rise to different authoritarian regimes. A notorious example was Gen. Jorge Ubico, who had ruled the country in an authoritarian manner between 1930 and 1944 until he was overthrown by the ‘October Revolutionaries’. This paved the way for elections held in 1945, in which Juan José Arevalo was elected president. He quickly initiated social reforms, which were carried
forward by his successor, Col. Jacobo Arbenz. The latter also enabled the legal registration of the Guatemalan Labor Party in 1952 and enacted a land reform that raised the opposition from foreign land owners, in particular the US-owned United Fruit Company (UFCO) (Coleman 2008g: 8–9). After a significant portion of its territory was expropriated, the company turned to its contact in the U.S. Government, which triggered a CIA sponsored armed resistance against Arbenz from Honduras, led by Col. Carlos Castillo Armas in 1954. He reintroduced highly repressive measures, but was assassinated and replaced by a military opponent, Gen. Ydigoras Fuentes, who was little better (Coleman 2008g: 8–9). This triggered resistance from a group of junior military officers who revolted against the president in 1960. Although their coup failed, this group “became the nucleus of the forces that were in armed insurrection against the government for the next 35 years” (Coleman 2008g: 8–9).

b) Conflict History

From 1965 until the mid-1990s, the government of Guatemala faced an intrastate conflict with leftist groups who wanted to bring down the government. They joined together to create the URNG (Unidad revolucionaria nacional guatemalteca, Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity) in 1982. The government made use of one-sided violence. The conflict was active until 1995, when negotiations that had begun in the late 1980s entered their final stage. A concluding peace agreement was signed in the last days of 1996 (see UCDP 2010j).

In the early 1960s, armed conflict erupted after a range of revolutionary movements – the EPG (Guerrilla Army of the Poor), OPRA (Revolutionary Organization of Armed People) and FAR (Rebel Armed Forces) – targeted government institutions through armed attacks. In 1982, they were joined by a fourth group, URNG (Guatemala National Revolutionary Unit), which had emerged out of the outlawed communist party. The rebels were repelled in several counterinsurgency campaigns – made possible through US training for the Guatemalan armed forces – between 1966 and 1974: “The government’s military forces adopted a brutal, low technology approach to counterinsurgency, using ground forces and draconian measures against civilian populations to deprive the guerrillas of support and limit their area of operations” (Stanley and Holiday 2002: 426). Repression against the population had been particularly severe during the presidencies of Col. Romero Lucas Garcia (1978-1982) and Gen. Efrain Rios Montt (1982-1983). Montt was deposed by the military, a new constitution was drafted, and general elections held in 1985, leading to the presidency of Vinicio Cerezo from the Christian Democratic Party, who established a civilian government. However, the civil war against the government and the counterinsurgency campaign led by the army continued. In the next elections in 1990, Jorge Serrano from the ‘Movement of Solidary Actions’ (MAS) was elected president. In a move that became
known as an ‘autogolpe’, Serrano attempted to circumvent the Congress and re-establish a more authoritarian system of rule, but failed and was replaced by the civilian interim president Ramiro De Leon Carpio. In March 1994, the URNG signed a number of human rights agreements with the government, and MINUGUA (‘United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala’) was established in November 1994. In the 1995 elections, the left wing party FDNG (Guatemalan New Democratic Front) was allowed to take part in the elections. In the runoff elections, Alvaro Arzú (from the ‘National Action Party’ – PAN) narrowly defeated his competitor Alfonso Portillo (from the right wing party ‘Guatemalan Republican Front’ – FRG). Arzú re-initiated the peace process, and signed a number of agreements with the rebels in 1996. By 1997, the URNG was demobilized, and the country slowly returned to peace (Coleman 2008g: 9–14). Guatemala’s civil war had wide-ranging consequences. In total, more than 150,000 people were killed and some 50,000 ‘disappeared’ in the course of the war (see Stanley and Holiday 2002: 421).

c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict parties</th>
<th>MR-13, FAR, EGP, PGT, ORPA, URNG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Conflict ID</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Episode ID</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>1965 – 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>minor armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victorious side</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>MINUGUA (United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala); January 1997 – May 1997</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations*

Table A.21: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Guatemala
Appendix A Characterization and Classification of the Cases

A.10.2 Post-conflict situation

Together with Mozambique and El Salvador, the civil war in Guatemala had started at the height of the Cold War and was largely affected by general Cold-War dynamics. The settlement of the conflict in Guatemala took longer than in these other cases – a ceasefire was only signed in March 1996, at a time when El Salvador and Mozambique had already successfully completed their first post-conflict elections – but it can still be attributed to similar dynamics, with the URNG having greatly lost ideological support and military capacity after 1989 (see Stanley and Holiday 2002: 447).

a) The Formal Government

In Guatemala, the composition of the government had changed several times during the 36 years of the civil war. As outlined above, Guatemala had been ruled by various military governments in the early phase of the conflict. This only changed in 1985, after the military rule had become increasingly unstable and a group of reform-minded military officers had paved the way for a reform of the constitution and national elections. They led to the election of the Christian Democratic candidate Vinicio Cerezo for president (see Lehoucq and Wall 2004: 487; Stanley and Holiday 2002: 427).

However, the military still continued to exert tight control of the policy process and greatly influenced the government’s agenda. Cerezo only managed to stay in power “by accepting the demos-constraining conditions set out by the military leadership” (Sánchez 2008: 137, emphasis original). The next elections five years later gave rise to the presidency of Jorge Serrano Elías from the Movement of Solidary Action (MAS) party. This event was the first transfer of power from one democratically elected government to another in Guatemala’s history. Despite some marked achievements, Serrano attempted a ‘self-coup’ (autogolpe) by trying to dissolve the Congress and Supreme Court, allegedly in order to fight corruption. Due to immense internal and external pressures, Serrano had to resign and flee in 1993. The human rights ombudsman Ramiro De Leon Carpio stepped in as an interim president and made significant progress towards restoring peace (Coleman 2008g: 9–14). Runoff elections to the presidency in January 1996 again gave rise to another president: Alvaro Arzú, who narrowly defeated Alfonso Portillo – a “stand-in for former dictator Jose Efrain Rios Montt, who opposed the peace process” (Jonas 2000: 13). Though Arzú successfully brought the peace agreement on its way, he failed to push through important reforms and implement key provisions from the peace agreement (see Jonas 2000 and Reiber 2009: 113–114). As all his predecessors, he was already outvoted after his first presidential term in 1999, when he ultimately lost against Alfonso Portillo (see Sánchez 2008: 128). In what were their first elections after being transformed into a political party, the URNG participated under the name ‘New Nation Alliance – Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union’ (DIA-URNG) and nominated their own presidential candidate, Álvaro Colom Caballeros. He won about 12 percent of valid votes...
in the presidential elections, and the party/coalition as a whole was able to secure 9 out of a total of 113 legislative seats only (Lehoucq 2002). Since then, the party has become even more marginalized. During the last round of elections, held in 2007, its presidential candidate gained a meager 2.1% of the valid votes, and the party’s representation in the parliament dropped to not more than two seats (see Azpuru 2008: 564).

As a result of this extremely high level of volatility, speaking of ‘the’ government-side in the context of the Guatemalan conflict is misleading. Rather, the armed conflict took place between a military acting relatively autonomously from the government and a number of left-wing rebel groups. In comparison to the military, civilian governments have always been relatively weak actors, and this has not changed immediately with the adoption of the peace agreement. Since the introduction of an electoral democracy in 1985, all Guatemalan presidents have “failed miserably in the attempt to get their respective parties re-elected” (Sánchez 2008: 128). Parties generally play a subordinate role in politics:

“Twenty years after the onset of electoral democracy, Guatemalan parties have yet to acquire centrality in the distribution of power in any meaningful sense. Simply put, they have not emerged as autonomous institutions that wield genuine political clout, enough to be able to effect economic or political change on their own. The center of political gravity and power continues to lie outside of parties” (Sánchez 2008: 144).

The weakness of virtually all civilian governments in Guatemala has also been compounded by the difficulties of the Guatemalan political system and the blossoming political apathy of Guatemalans. The Congress is a particularly troublesome institution, as it is “notoriously corrupt, divisive, and incapable of producing well-drafted legislation in a timely way” (Stanley and Holiday 2002: 427; see also Reiber 2009: 115). This has prevented the implementation of some key provisions from the peace agreement (see Jonas 2000: 30), and frustration with the Congress is also seen as one reason behind Serrano’s autogolpe in 1993 (see Stanley and Holiday 2002: 433).

b) External Parties

Compared to other typical Cold War conflicts, external parties have played a less strong role in Guatemala than elsewhere. Most importantly, the United States have drastically scaled back their support for Guatemala’s military governments already in 1977—in the wake of President Jimmy Carter’s human rights policies—and have since then only provided “sporadic assistance under various anti-terrorism and anti-narcotics waivers [. . .]” (Stanley and Holiday 2002: 426).

The United Nations played a key role for facilitating the 1996 peace agreement, though. Peace negotiations had been ongoing in El Salvador already since the end of the 1980s, but only became fruitful after the United Nations took on the role as the mediator. The UN’s chief contribution during the negotiation phase was “to help the government to translate its proposals into terms acceptable to the URNG” (Stanley and Holiday 2002: 426).
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

Guatemala also experienced the deployment of a UN mission. The ‘UN Verification Mission in Guatemala’ (MINUGUA) had already been established by November 1994, two years before the final settlement. As ONUSAL in El Salvador, it had initially been a human rights mission, but after the adoption of the peace agreement its mandate was extended to include the verification of the ceasefire and the demobilization of the combatants. A particularity of MINUGUA was that the mission lacked an authorization from the UN Security Council, and instead ran under a mandate from the General Assembly (and on the General Assembly’s budget). This “resulted in an operation much smaller than ONUSAL at its full force” (see Burgerman 2000: 78).

c) The Warring Factions

As argued at length above, the civil war in Guatemala took place only formally between the government and an insurgent movement. At least since the reforms introduced in 1984, a closer look at the case reveals that the true driving force of the conflict on the side of the state was not the government but the military. The insurgents have formed an equally heterogeneous and fluid group of actors. Throughout three decades of civil war in Guatemala, the composition of the main insurgent groups changed significantly. Initially, the rebels consisted mainly of three groups: the ‘Revolutionary Armed Forces’ (FAR), the ‘Guerrilla Army of the Poor’ (EGP), and the Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA). Only in 1982, nearly two decades after the beginning of the war, these groups unified and formed the ‘Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity’ (URNG) (see Stanley and Holiday 2002: 425). Despite this reunion, the Guatemalan insurgents never came close to the level of military leverage that similar movements, for instance in El Salvador, could exert:

“The guerrillas, though resilient, never achieved sufficient military strength to pose an imminent threat to the state. […] Their equipment was eclectic, and of variable and generally poor condition. […] While obviously a threat to the individuals and businesses that it attacked, the URNG was little more than a nuisance to the state by the late 1980s” (Stanley and Holiday 2002: 425; see also Holiday 2000: 78).

This has also mattered greatly for their role during and after the peace process. As David Holiday argues, “[t]he often-overlooked key to understanding the Guatemalan peace process is that the two parties to the peace agreement – the ruling National Advancement Party (PAN) and the URNG guerrillas – were relatively weak actors with minority support within society” (2000: 78).

The newly elected PAN government seems to have used the quick completion of the peace process as an opportunity to boost its domestic and international political standing. After Arzú’s inauguration, the peace process “moved at a rapid pace”, with five different agreements signed within not more than one year (Stanley and Holiday 2002: 436). The URNG accepted Arzú as an honest broker, but was – due to its lack of leverage – unable to wield noticeable concession from the government. At the same time, its effective degree
of political support had been highly uncertain, because leftist parties were expelled from participating in elections since the mid-1950s (Holiday 2000: 79). Against this background, it is questionable why the party had still supported the peace process. There are good reasons to argue that the URNG counted on a satisfactory performance during the first post-conflict elections in 1999. The elections in 1995 were the first occasion in which a party from the left – the New Guatemala Democratic Front (FDNG) – participated. Despite a “hastily organized campaign and little money”, the party managed to gain six congressional seats (Stanley and Holiday 2002: 435). After this positive example “[t]he guerrilla leadership certainly gambled on the possibilities for greater electoral gains under more peaceful circumstances” (Holiday 2000: 79). As it turned out, this expectation was mistaken, as the URNG is today a marginalized political force without much remaining leverage or political support. It has accepted its defeat in the elections, but obviously without having any viable alternative.

A.10.3 Assessment

As highlighted above, the civilian governments have historically always been relatively weak actors, and this has changed only slowly since the adoption of the peace agreement in 1997. The PAN government was the strongest force in politics between 1996 and 1999, but at the same time it had been incapable of implementing key provisions of the peace agreement or pushing through urgently needed reforms. This makes it difficult to adequately place Guatemala into one of the categories offered by the typology. While power-sharing can be ruled out at the forefront, the case is no example for an outright situation of domination either. Most importantly, PAN is no warring party and cannot be taken as a representative of the same government that the URNG has targeted with its insurgency. Thus, when focusing exclusively on formal politics, Guatemala is difficult to classify. However, when taking a somewhat broader look at the real balance of power between different societal forces in Guatemala, it becomes apparent that the military and former elites continue to exert a crucial influence on politics and ‘dominate’ politics behind the scenes. Whether these rather conservative forces would accept an URNG still remains to be seen, but one can only speculate that their resistance would be stronger than what could be observed in El Salvador after the FMLN won the 2009 presidential elections (see 5.3).

The contribution of external actors to the peace process in Guatemala was certainly important, but their engagement was relatively modest in both scale and scope. In general, it appears that external actors’ stakes in Guatemala’s development have been much more moderate when compared, for instance, to the strong degree of US involvement into the post-conflict polity in El Salvador. The United Nations mainly contributed to the peace process by addressing some of the most pressing issues of the conflict, mostly with regard to the blatant human rights violations committed by the belligerents in the course of the 30
year long war. In this sense, the engagement of external actors can be considered a modest case for mediative engagement.

The parties that negotiated the peace agreement – PAN and URNG – were relatively weak forces. This clearly is an unusual environment for conflict settlements, since, in most cases, at least one party tends to possess extensive political power and leverage. Out of this reason, the opponents had little to lose from the peace agreement, but their gains were – in retrospect – also relatively modest. PAN did not manage to secure a second electoral turn for itself, and the URNG has become increasingly marginalized in the political system. Meanwhile, the old elites, certainly closely affiliated with the military, could at least temporarily benefit from the peace process they had rejected to support, which is most vividly demonstrated by the FRG’s victory in the 1999 elections. Though this was certainly a frustrating situation and can be taken as an indicator for Guatemala’s “precarious” peace (Holiday 2000), it also underlines that the parties have maintained, by and large, constructive relations since the adoption of the peace agreement in 1996. For the above reasons, the case of Guatemala is classified as an instance of the ‘mediated, constructive domination’ or ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polity type.
A.10.4 Map of Guatemala

Figure A.10: Map: Guatemala. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

A.11 Haiti

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>8,429,006 as of 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Area</td>
<td>27,750 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land</td>
<td>27,750 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastline</td>
<td>1,771 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>French (Official); Creole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>Dominican Republic: 275 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>95% African descent; 5% European and Mulatto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>80% Roman Catholic; 16% Protestant Sects; 3% Other; 1% None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A.22: Basic Facts and Figures: Haiti

A.11.1 Country and Conflict Information

a) General Background

Haiti, once a French colony, gained independence already in 1804. The post-independence environment was highly unstable and characterized by political tensions between the blacks and the ruling ‘mulattos’. In 1915, the United States invaded the country in order to restore order, followed by nearly two decades of rule by an authoritarian military government. In 1957, the notorious reign of “Papa Doc” Duvalier began, who was a nationalist intellectual who established a tight grip to power. His son, “Baby Doc” Duvalier, was appointed president for life in 1964. Violent opposition against his rule erupted more than twenty years later, and Duvalier was flown out of the country by the United States in 1986. Power was then transferred to civilian Junta. (see UCDP 2010k).

Since Haiti gained independence, the country has been struggling to establish an accountable political system. Authoritarianism and personal rule became most drastically apparent during the reign of the “notoriously brutal Duvalier dynasty” between 1957 and 1986 (von Einsiedel and Malone 2006: 154). Hopes for an improvement of the country’s democratic record rose high with the December 1990 presidential elections, which brought to power
the young Roman Catholic priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Though he made serious attempts to tackle some of the country’s most pressing challenges, his increasingly personal system of rule triggered opposition from within the military, and he was eventually overthrown in a bloody coup by Colonel Raoul Cédras on 30 September 1991 (Malone 1997: 127). The coup and the subsequent military regime had disastrous effects on the country: “Estimates are that over 1,000 Haitians were killed in the days following the September coup, and 3,000 more were killed in the following three years” (Coleman 2008h: 12).7

b) Conflict History

In 1991, a military coup took place in Haiti, ousting the popularly elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The coup sparked an intra-state conflict. After some hesitation, the United States intervened on Aristide’s behalf and helped to reinstall the president, deploying a 20,000 strong US-led multinational force to Haiti in 1994. In 2000, Aristide was re-elected, but he was subsequently accused of electoral fraud and lost popular support. An armed insurgence group, the FLRN (‘Front pour la Libération et la Reconstruction Nationales’) removed him from office in 2004. After that, René Préval was elected president (see UCDP 2010k).

After the coup and the accompanying unrest, the UN Security Council approved the deployment of 700 military and 600 police personnel as part of UNMIH (‘United Nations Mission in Haiti’) (Malone 1997: 129–130). Yet, the transport of Canadian and US peacekeepers by a US warship was forestalled by the “de facto regime’s notorious henchmen – launched into a noisy dockside demonstration, screaming ‘We are going to turn this into another Somalia’” (Malone 1997: 131). Surprisingly, the strategy worked, and the ship was ordered back by Washington. The next year the UN authorized a US-led multinational force with a robust (Chapter VII) mandate, marking the “first time the United States had sought UN authority for the use of force within its own hemisphere” (von Einsiedel and Malone 2006: 156). In a deal brokered by Jimmy Carter, the United States achieved the consent from the de facto regime in Port-au-Prince for the deployment of the mission in exchange for an amnesty. To the irritation of many (including Aristide), the military regime was flown out of the country in a US airplane at the time the mission was deployed in September 1994, and Aristide returned to Port-au-Prince (Malone 1997: 133). In January 1995 – after the US force commander had certified a ‘secure and stable environment’ – the mission was handed over from the multinational force to UNMIH. After two follow-up missions – UNSMIH (‘UN Support Mission in Haiti’) and UNTMIH (‘UN Transition Mission in Haiti’) – the only UN personnel remaining in the country by 1997 were civilians forming

---

7 For a more detailed analysis of Haiti’s colonial and post-independence history, see in particular Fatton (2006).

Meanwhile, the country’s newly reinstalled democracy experienced severe backdrops, culminating in the rise of political violence and President Préval’s (Aristide’s hand-picked successor as he himself was not allowed to run for the presidency again by the constitution) decision to rule by decree and suspend the country’s lawmakers and mayors (von Einsiedel and Malone 2006: 158). In 2000, Aristide was re-elected. But during his reign the political tensions worsened and finally escalated in 2004, at the occasion of the 200-year celebration for the independence of the country, when well-armed anti-Aristide militias initiated an armed conflict. Aristide’s forces were unable to keep the riots under control, and France and the US exerted pressure on Aristide to step down, just ten years after they had reinstalled him in office (Coleman 2008h: 19).

c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict parties</th>
<th>Tonton Macoute, Engine Lourd (1st), RARF, OP Lavalas (2nd)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Conflict ID</td>
<td>186 (both)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Episode ID</td>
<td>1862,19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>minor armed conflict (both)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>One-sided victory (1st), other (2nd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victorious side</td>
<td>Non-gov. (1st), n/a (2nd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission mandate UNMIH</td>
<td>“UNMIH was established in September 1993 to help implement provisions of the Governors Island Agreement of 3 July 1993. The mandate was later revised to enable the Mission to assist the democratic Government to sustain a stable environment, professionalize the armed forces and create a separate police force, and establish an environment conducive to free and fair elections” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2003b).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Mission mandate UN-SMIH

“UNSMIH was established to assist the Government in the professionalization of the police, maintenance of a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of efforts to establish and train an effective national police force, and to coordinate activities of the United Nations system in promoting institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2003d).

### Mission mandate UNTMIH

“Established to assist the Government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police (HNP). Tasks of UNTMIH’s police element included training HNP specialized units in crowd control, the rapid reaction force and Palace security, areas considered to be of distinct importance” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009l).

### Mission mandate MIPONUH

“Established to assist the Government in the professionalization of the National Police. The mission placed special emphasis on assistance at the supervisory level and on training specialized police units. Other tasks included mentoring police performance, guiding police agents in day-to-day duties and maintaining close coordination with technical advisers to the Police funded by the United Nations Development Programme and bilateral donors” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009b).

### Mission mandate MINUSTAH

“Having determined that the situation in Haiti continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its resolution 1542 of 30 April 2004, decided to establish the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and requested that authority be transferred from the Multinational Interim Force (MIF), authorized by the Security Council in February 2004, to MINUSTAH on 1 June 2004” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009k).

Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Table A.23: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Haiti

### A.11.2 Post-conflict situation

The case of Haiti is a somewhat unusual case of externally-led intervention because external actors’ interference was not closely linked to a civil war in the classical sense. While, in most cases, external actors try to facilitate a compromise between two warring parties, external actors in Haiti intervened in order to re-install a president who enjoyed international legitimacy and US-backing. While Aristide’s ousting was accompanied by riots and tensions that can formally be considered a (minor) internal armed conflict, external intervention aimed at a regime change and not primarily at reaching or implementing a peace agreement. In this sense, the term post-conflict situation is misleading in the case of Haiti – one would rather have to speak of a post-intervention situation that began with the
Appendix A Characterization and Classification of the Cases

US-led re-installment of Bertrand Aristide and ended, at the latest, with his second ousting in 2004. (Nonetheless, in order to ensure the comparability of the different cases, the term post-conflict situation I continue to use the term post-conflict also in the case of Haiti.) After the riots in 2004, a second post-conflict situation emerged that can be considered a post-conflict polity type of its own.

a) The Role of the Formal Government

Aristide’s Reign. Between 1994 and 2004, the government in Haiti had continuously been ruled by Aristide – either directly as president or indirectly from the background. Although he could not run for the 1995 presidential elections as “stepping down was one of the conditions set by the international community for his return” (Mobekk 2001: 176), René Préval – the elected president between 1995 and 2000 – was Aristide’s “hand-picked successor” and was “largely dependent on him for his political legitimacy” (von Einsiedel and Malone 2006: 157). Aristide never truly reduced his claims to executive power: “constitutionally barred from succeeding himself in 1996, [he] had waited out one term while his political ally René Préval held the presidency” (Coleman 2008h: 15). In the next presidential elections on 26 November 2000, Aristide won with more than 90 percent of the vote. However, the elections were “boycotted by much of the opposition, and it was not observed in any official capacity […]” (Coleman 2008h: 15). The opposition was no clear-cut, well-organized movement, but rather “a motley collection ranging from former allies of Aristide to right-wing figures with ties to Haiti’s dictatorial past – promised to form a shadow government” (Coleman 2008h: 16). Hence, forming a government proved problematic.

Aristide’s ongoing grip to power and his refusal to enter a political dialogue with the opposition forms the background for the unrest and the eventual ousting of Aristide in 2004. One of the triggers were the legislative and municipal elections of May 2000:

“Although the balloting itself was judged to be free and fair, subsequent tampering with election results allowed Aristide’s Lavalas party to further consolidate its sweeping victory over Haiti’s helpless opposition groups” (Erikson 2005: 84).

This had triggered strong resistance both from within the country and from external actors: “When the results were released showing a sweeping Lavalas win […] the OAS and most Western democracies condemned the results as fraudulent” (Coleman 2008h: 15). Although the international community – on the initiative of the US administration – severely cut foreign aid, Aristide remained uncompromising and his relations with the opposition parties severely worsened, and “for three long years, their positions remained mutually exclusive”, thereby jeopardizing all democratic progress that had been achieved in the past years (Erikson 2005: 84).
Post-Aristide Period. After Aristide had gone into exile for the second time in February 2004, an interim government was formed – led by Gérard Latortue, a former Foreign Minister and long-time professional in the UN system. He “quickly assembled a cabinet of principally nonpartisan technocrats, although several opposition figures landed key posts” (Erikson 2005: 89). However, Lavalas, Aristide’s party, was not represented in the interim government (Erikson 2005: 89). Elections, originally scheduled to take place in 2005, were postponed several times and ultimately took place in 2006. In the runoff elections to the presidency, Lavalas candidate Réné Préval won a majority of votes and continued the legacy that began with Aristide’s re-installment as president more than a decade before (see Coleman 2008h: 25).

b) The Role of External Parties

External actors (including certain states) have always held strong stakes in the development of the country throughout the past century. However, their roles and affiliations have greatly changed over the course of Haiti’s political crisis that had been triggered by Aristide’s ousting in 1991. Initially, this period was characterized by a strong sense of disagreement within the international community about how to react to the new challenge, with the UN favoring a US-led multinational intervention. However, “[t]he US government was initially not keen, believing the UN flag to be essential for wide participation in multilateral action and also because Aristide was wary of a US-dominated mission” (Malone 1997: 132). In the end, in part due to Aristide’s ability to organize substantial political support in the United States, the US government changed its position. The US-led operation yielded quick successes, and the Haitian army collapsed within days (Malone 1997: 132). The United Nations, too, took a firm stance against the de facto regime in Haiti and strongly supported Aristide’s cause. In mid-1993, the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions against the Cédras government, and the UN Security Council openly called for a military (Chapter VII) solution under US leadership in Resolution 940 in order to solve the Haitian crisis. After it temporarily lifted the sanctions in order to induce the regime to cooperate, it not only reimposed them when it realized that the Haitian regime was not cooperative, but additionally imposed a naval blockade against Haiti (see von Einsiedel and Malone 2006: 155–156). All in all, this implied a number of novelties:

“The adoption of Resolution 940 was groundbreaking in several respects. It marked the first time the United States had sought UN authority for the use of force within its own hemisphere. The resolution was also unprecedented in authorizing force to remove one regime and install another within a member state” (von Einsiedel and Malone 2006: 156).

After the successful regime change, external actors increasingly shifted their attention to institution-building and preparing the countries for the elections scheduled for 1996. In March 1995, external responsibility was handed over from the multinational force
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

(MNF) to UNMIH, and the latter’s responsibility was extended to include a civilian police component (see Malone 1997: 134). UNMIH remained deployed until shortly after the elections and – ironically – was dismantled at the very moment when the security situation began to intensify again. It was replaced by three follow-up missions whose mandates became increasingly narrow over time, and since November 1997 the UN’s presence has been exclusively civilian (see von Einsiedel and Malone 2006: 156–157). At this very moment, however, political tensions began to deteriorate. The parliament was unable to agree on a successor government after Réné Préval was elected as president and, ultimately, dissolved, “leaving Preval (sic!) to govern without a legislature, pending the scheduled parliamentary elections of 2000” (Coleman 2008h: 14). This created a highly unstable political environment.

After Aristide had been ousted for a second time in 2004, external actors’ behavior differed greatly from before. Just as the international community had been in agreement to support the ousted president in the 1990s, it commonly rejected his grip to power in the course of the 2004 accusations of electoral fraud and openly called upon him to step down. The United States, now under the reign of the Bush administration, stopped the support for Aristide:

“It was clear that Aristide’s polarizing politics had cost him the significant support he had once enjoyed during the Clinton administration. While US Republicans were always skeptical of Aristide’s leftist politics, his government’s record of poor management and lack of accountability increasingly alienated the broader international community” (Erikson 2005: 86).

Under increasing domestic pressure, Aristide called for a renewed international engagement in his own favor in order to ‘prevent the flow of blood’, but the international community called for a political solution. In mid-February 2004, the Bush administration’s support for Aristide still went as far as calling upon the main opposition candidate Andy Apaid to accept a power-sharing deal with Aristide, but the latter clung to his presidency and exhibited no willingness for compromise (Erikson 2005: 87). Meanwhile, France took behind the scene preparations for Aristide’s departure, and within days the United States had taken the necessary measures. On 29 February 2004, Aristide was escorted by US Marines to an aircraft that carried him into political exile to the Central African Republic and later to South Africa. “Aristide said that he never resigned voluntarily from office but, rather, he was compelled by the United States forces to do so” (Coleman 2008h: 19). In the course of these events, the UN Security Council authorized another multinational force to be deployed in Haiti for an initial period of 90 days in order to restore law, succeeded by a UN mission (MINUSTAH) endowed with Chapter VII authority (Erikson 2005: 87–88).

c) The Warring Factions

Unlike in other civil wars where a clear ‘government-side’ and a clear group of ‘rebels’ can be identified – as in Mozambique or El Salvador – clearly identifying the warring parties
is trickier in the case of Haiti. What is characteristic for Haiti is that the contenders are not stable groups that have emerged over time, but rather ad hoc groups of contenders whose formation had been triggered by the increasingly intolerable conditions that emerged as democratic rule crumbled. It is therefore worth quoting a longer passage analyzing how the anti-Aristide rebellion came about:

“The first clue that the endgame had begun in Haiti came on February 5, 2004, when a group calling itself the Revolutionary Artibonite Resistance Front torched the police station of Gonaïves. [...] Almost simultaneously, former Haitian police chief Guy Philippe opened up a second flank, crossing over the eastern border from the Dominican Republic. Philippe soon emerged as the cherubic public face of an uprising that rolled with surprising ease through northern Haiti. [...] Youthful and charismatic, Philippe became an unlikely and controversial folk hero as his campaign progressed, with hundreds of recruits joining his ‘rebel army’” (Erikson 2005: 85).

The rebels, therefore were a loose “group composed of various factions, such as former gang members, convicted criminals, and disgruntled ex-soldiers from the old Haitian army” (Coleman 2008h: 20). Yet, this movement was been directly aligned with the political opposition, although there clearly were strong unofficial links between the two (Coleman 2008h: 20). Overall, the radicalization of the opposition movement is attributed to two factors that have become most apparent since the flawed legislative and municipal elections of 2000: “The deteriorating economic situation [worsened by the cessation of aid payments, CR] and the lack of political dialogue with non-Lavalas members led to calls by opposition forces for Aristide to step down” (Coleman 2008h: 20).

A.11.3 Assessment

Haiti experienced two distinct political crises in the post-1989 era, both of which are listed in the UCDP Database as cases of minor armed conflicts. Analytically, we can therefore distinguish two different post-conflict situations: The first starting with the deployment of UNMIH in 1993 and lasting until the renewed unrest in 2004, and the second starting after the deployment of MINUSTAH in 2004 and lasting until the 2006 presidential elections replaced the interim government. In the following, these post-conflict situations are briefly assessed and then classified.

Aristide’s Reign (1993-2004). Aristide’s Lavalas party controlled the presidency for roughly a decade between 1994 and 2004, without any measures for power-sharing being implemented. The dissolution of the parliament in 1997 greatly fostered the Lavalas party’s position of dominance. Once in power, Aristide’s (or his proxy Préval’s) record of governance was mixed. It was marked by dubious human rights record, with several opposition politicians being shot dead or imprisoned (see Coleman 2008h: 14–17). Out of these reasons, the reigns of Préval and Aristide can safely be recognized as cases of
political domination. The role of external actors during the first political crisis in Haiti clearly differed from their role during the second crisis. The main difference lies in the strong support that external actors – the United States in particular, but also the United Nations – initially mobilized in favor of Aristide. Their engagement effectively amounted to an externally-induced regime change, imposed by the use of considerable military force. When ignoring for a while the important fact that Aristide possessed the legitimacy of an elected president, this manner of engagement closely resembles the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan. External actors did more than simply mediating a crisis between two political opponents. Out of this reason, their engagement must be considered partisan. The (former) warring parties in the case of Haiti were a rather vague group. Before Aristide was re-installed in power in 1994, his main opponent clearly was the military who had violently removed him from power three years earlier. However, after the US-led intervention this group was effectively dissolved. Aristide’s main opponents then consisted of supporters of the former regime who were opposed to his return to politics. The relations between Aristide’s party and the political opposition were clearly tense during the decade of his rule, which is vividly illustrated by the aforementioned crackdowns of opposition members or the inability of the national parliament to form a new government after Préval won the presidential elections. Therefore, the relations between the opponents can safely be considered obstructive. Out of these reasons, Haiti’s first post-conflict period is classified as a case of the ‘partisan obstructive domination’ or ‘You Stay Out’ polity type.

Post-Aristide Politics (since 2004). The second post-conflict situation, beginning with Aristide’s involuntary departure, can likewise be considered a case of political domination, though in reverse direction. The interim government effectively excluded Aristide’s party Lavalas from participation in the government, which triggered considerable resistance from among Aristide supporters (see above). Ultimately, however, this form of reverse-domination was short-lived, since Réné Préval managed to re-gain the presidency for himself in the 2006 presidential elections. The same holds true for the relations between the warring parties in the second post-conflict period. After Aristide’s departure, the interim government’s exclusion of Lavalas representatives triggered occasional clashes between supporters of Aristide and security forces. For instance, in late 2004 riots broke out on the occasion of the anniversary of the military coup that had overthrown Aristide in 1991 (see Erikson 2005: 89). Due to the worsening security situation, the United Nations have remained in the country until long after the election in 2006, although the UN Security Council had initially envisioned a deployment for six months only (Coleman 2008h: 24). This, too, is an indicator for the tense situation in Haiti’s second post-conflict polity. Hence, we can assume the presence of obstructive relations also for the second post-conflict situation. The engagement of external actors was different in the case of the second post-conflict period. After external actors dropped the partisan support for Aristide, their role was confined to restoring public order in a country struck by an ongoing political
crisis. Thus, external engagement in the second case can be considered mediative. Out of these reasons, Haiti’s second post-conflict period is classified here as an instance of the ‘mediated obstructive domination’ or ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity type.

A.11.4 Map of Haiti

Figure A.11: Map: Haiti. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
A.12 Kosovo

A.12.1 Country and Conflict Information

a) General Background

Note: Kosovo is officially part of Serbia, but enjoys widespread autonomy and unilaterally proclaimed independence in 2008. Because official recognition by the UN General Assembly is pending, Kosovo is still treated as a Serbian province in the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’. The following general discussion therefore focuses on Serbia, before turning more specifically to Kosovo below. The Republic of Serbia was proclaimed in June 2006 after Montenegro (the other remaining part of the Yugoslav Federation) opted for independence. (Before, the country was named ‘Serbia and Montenegro’). The Republic of Serbia is the successor entity of the former Yugoslav Federation, which dissolved in 1991, after both Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence, leading to intra-state conflict. It ended with the territories’ international recognition in the same year. Bosnia and Herzegovina also declared independence and was recognized in 1992, but the Yugoslav government intervened in the intra-state war on Bosnian territory on the side of Bosnian Serbs. Macedonia seceded peacefully in 1991 (see UCDP 2010s).

Kosovo is of central importance to Serbian culture and history, as it is the location of major Orthodox monasteries and the site of the “mythic Serb defeat by the Ottomans in the Battle of Kosovo Polje (1389)” (Dziedzic 2006: 322). Although Kosovo’s population is predominantly Albanian, it is regarded by Serbs as the “cradle of their civilization” (Dziedzic 2006: 322). While Kosovo formed part of the Ottoman Empire until 1912, it has since then had a turbulent history: it was annexed by Serbia in the First Balkan War, formed part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in the inter-war period, fell under Italian control and was annexed to Albania during World War II, and held the status of an autonomous province within the Serb Republic under Tito (1945-1980) – one of the six republics that formed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) (Dziedzic 2006: 321–322). This autonomy lasted until 1989, when Slobodan Milošević imposed direct rule from Belgrade following his vision to unite all Serbs under ‘Greater Serbia’. While Albanian resistance had initially been peaceful under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the movement began to radicalize after the Dayton Agreement had failed to address Kosovo’s status, fostering the formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) [also known as the UCK] (Dziedzic 2006: 323).
b) Conflict History

Kosovo-Albanian resistance to Serb dominance had sparked its drive for independence since 1996. The conflict escalated in 1998. Yugoslav security forces battled with the UCK. The conflict ended in 1999 with the NATO bombing campaign, forcing the Yugoslav government to sign a peace agreement and withdraw its forces from Kosovo (see UCDP 2010s).

When Albanian resistance against Serb rule accelerated by 1998, the Serbs responded with increased force, eventually aiming at the exodus of ethnic Albanians in the province through a systematic ethnic cleansing campaign carried out by Serb security forces and paramilitaries (see e.g. Posen 2000: 43). While international attention had already heightened after the Srebrenica massacre in 1995, the international community first reacted with a strategy of coercive diplomacy (see U.N. Security Council 1998a and U.N. Security Council 1998b), but initially lacked a credible threat. Consequently the Serb campaign in Kosovo continued “unconstrained by an effective deterrent” (Dziedzic 2006: 324). Although the UN Security Council had been resistant to legitimize the further use of force due to Russia’s hesitation, NATO began to prepare for the use of force, issuing an ‘activation order’ on 13 October 1998. In accordance with Resolution 1199, the ‘Kosovo Verification Mission’ (KVM) under the aegis of the OSCE was deployed with a mandate to monitor the ceasefire called for in the resolution, but it was “quickly sabotaged by the KLA’s exploitation of its presence to recoup territory lost” (Dziedzic 2006: 325). In early 1999, the discovery of forty-five Albanian bodies in the village of Racak fostered international concerns for a renewed Srebrenica (Posen 2000: 43).

In February 1999, the international community (more precisely: the ‘contact group’ consisting of the USA, the EU and Russia) organized peace talks in Rambouillet with the aim of restoring Kosovo’s autonomy, but the agreement failed due to the Serbian refusal to accept the NATO presence and solving Kosovo’s final status within three years time (Posen 2000: 46–47). The failure of the talks had not come as a surprise to many informed observers, as deliberately withdrawing from Kosovo would have implied “a crushing nationalist loss that would delegitimize any Serbian government that accepted it” (Hagen 1999: 59). From this perspective, it appears “hard to imagine why the U.S. Government or the other NATO powers really expected to acquiesce” (Hagen 1999: 59). The Serb refusal culminated in the NATO bombing campaign (‘Operation Allied Force’), which commenced on 24 March 1999. It was expected that a few days of bombing would be enough to persuade Milošević to surrender, but this was a miscalculation: the Serbs continued their ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo largely unimpressed. Only two months later – now facing the credible threat of a NATO invasion – Milošević was persuaded by the Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin to accept the condition of a total Serb withdrawal from Kosovo. He complied on 2 June 1999 (Dziedzic 2006: 324–326).
Another UN Security Council Resolution (U.N. Security Council 1999a) authorized the establishment of a NATO-led multinational military force, KFOR (‘Kosovo Force’), under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It also called for the establishment of an interim civilian administration, UNMIK (‘United Nations Mission in Kosovo’), which was authorized to exercise “sovereign prerogatives of a state for the first time” (Dziedzic 2006: 334; see also Chesterman 2004: 80). However, although initially aiming at preventing the continued use of violence against Albanians by Serb security forces, the situation on the ground was quickly reversed: “The power vacuum left by departing Serb forces was quickly filled by returning KLA members, who unleashed a wave of violence against the Serb population, other minorities, and their perceived rivals within the Kosovo Albanian community” (Dziedzic 2006: 350).

c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict parties</th>
<th>UCK (KLA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Conflict ID</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Episode ID</td>
<td>2181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>1998 – 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victorious side</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo), (June 1999 – present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Mandate:</td>
<td>“In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244, UNMIK established an international presence in Kosovo. Over the eight years since, as Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) were established and gained capacity to assume more responsibilities, UNMIK has moved back from an executive role to one of monitoring and support to local institutions. UNMIK, in its present form, is now into its final chapter before status resolution. Under the leadership of SRSG Lamberto Zannier, UNMIK’s structure currently comprises the Democratization and Institution Building Pillar (OSCE), where Ambassador Tim Guldimann is the head of the OSCE Pillar” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009a).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Table A.24: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Kosovo

8Resolution 1244 “demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo […]” (U.N. Security Council 1999a, par. 3).
A.12.2 Post-conflict situation

The NATO bombing campaign that ended the Serb engagement against Albanians in the province of Kosovo was followed by an unprecedented transferal of authority to the international community. The ‘post-conflict’ situation that emerged is special in two regards: First, Kosovo was formally still part of Serbia when the international community established its interim authority and has remained so for nearly one full decade (until the unilateral declaration of independence in 2008). The international community has deliberately left the question of Kosovo’s independence open (see Chesterman 2004: 80). Although this formally stands in contrast with one of the case selection criteria (see 1.3), the case is nonetheless included because its level of de facto autonomy has been tremendous, unlike, for instance, in Chechnya. Second, the degree of international authority in the case of Kosovo is extremely large, which accounts for post-conflict dynamics that are entirely different from those that can be observed under the condition of ordinary peacekeeping mission. Therefore, the post-conflict period that began with the deployment of UNMIK in 1999 is considered a potential post-conflict polity case here.

a) The Role of the Formal Government

Pre-independence Kosovo (1999-2008). With Serb troops leaving after the conclusion of the NATO bombing campaign and the deployment of KFOR in June 1999, the province was without any sort of government. Hence, UNMIK was established amidst an “acute administrative vacuum”, despite attempts by the KLA to swiftly establish itself as the de facto authority by attempting to create informal political and administrative structures (Caplan 2005: 93). The extent of responsibilities taken by external parties in Kosovo had until then been unprecedented, and the number of international bodies and nations involved accordingly large. The international community obtained its authority for the military and civilian components of its engagement through UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and UNMIK’s first regulation (UNMIK 1999). It has from the beginning on interpreted its authority as “unrestrained by considerations of sovereignty” (Yannis 2004: 69). Hence, it “totally excluded Yugoslav authorities from any administrative role in the territory”, thereby effectively reducing the latter’s sovereignty to a “mere fig leaf signifying nothing more than that UNMIK could unilaterally change the status of the territory and its internationally recognized borders” (Yannis 2004: 70). But UNMIK was not the only administrative authority on the ground. On 17 November 2001, elections for new self-government institutions took place in Kosovo. Already one year before, municipal elections had taken place. Though the elections constituted a landmark in Kosovo’s post-conflict environment, the International Crisis Group noted that “[t]he powers of the new institutions will be limited, and, despite the devolution of responsibility for the day-to-day running of affairs
in many areas of government, the ultimate powers of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) are undiminished” (2001b: i).

Between 1999 and 2005, the international community had been largely neutral with regard to Kosovo’s status question. Former SRSG Michael Steiner, the leader of the UNMIK mission since 2002, proclaimed ‘standards before status’ as the leading operational paradigm for UNMIK. His successor, SRSG Søren Jessen-Petersen, changed this strategy by announcing that the question of status must no longer be ignored. The final decision to begin status negotiations was made after the escalations of 2004, when an Albanian mob attacked and murdered Serbs and representatives of other minority groups after media reports about alleged killings of Albanian children (Džihić and Kramer 2009: 3; International Crisis Group 2007f: 2–3). The former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari was appointed as UN Special Envoy at the Kosovo status process in 2005. In 2007, Ahtisaari submitted two documents to the Secretaty General: (a) a four-page “Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s Future Status” (‘Ahtisaari Report’, S/2007/168), and (b) a 63-page “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement” (‘Ahtisaari Proposal’, S/2007/168/Add.1). In the former, he gave a clear recommendation for Kosovo’s independence “under international supervision”, while the proposal “can be read as a blueprint for state formation, but is based on a delicate balancing between an internationally supervised entity and an independent state” (International Crisis Group 2007f: 2–3). The Ahtisaari plan was never formally approved by the UN Security Council, but effectively served as the basis for Kosovo’s independence process (International Crisis Group 2008b: 1).

Post-independence Kosovo (since 2008). Initially, it was planned that the European Union’s EULEX (‘European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo’) mission would take over UNMIK’s tasks already in July 2008, but this was postponed to December 2008 because of Serbian opposition. Another major concession made by the international community to Belgrade lay in the acceptance to continue using Resolution 1244 as a legal basis for the EULEX, which implied that EULEX formally accepted Kosovo’s undeclared status despite its declaration of independence (Džihić and Kramer 2009: 2). EULEX was finally deployed on 8 December 2008. Despite the agreement with Belgrade, Kosovar Serbs were opposed to its deployment.

b) The Role of External Parties

The major external parties involved include NATO (through the bombing campaign and the deployment of KFOR), the United Nations Peacekeeping Department (responsible for UNMIK, together with various sub-organizations like UNHCR), OSCE (responsible for Pillar III of UNMIK – Democratization and Institution Building) and the European Union (responsible for Pillar IV of UNMIK – Reconstruction and Economic Development)
(Dziedzic 2006: 347–348). UNMIK’s role is discussed in the above paragraph about the role of the formal government.

d) The Warring Factions

As in other cases, determining who constitutes the contenders depends on the time of the assessment. At the time of the NATO bombing campaign, the true contender were Serb security forces and paramilitaries committing atrocities in Kosovo. Yet, Serbia (or: Yugoslavia) enjoyed de jure sovereignty over the territory, which is why these events must be considered ‘one-sided violence’ in the classical civil war terminology. With the deployment of KFOR, the situation changed, as the KLA now emerged as the main contender, committing violent acts among the Serb minority population.

A.12.3 Assessment

The post-conflict situation in Kosovo is one of the most clear-cut cases of a transitional administration. Yet, as noted above, what distinguishes it from other cases – and East Timor most visibly – is the fact that during most of its post-conflict phase Kosovo was not an independent state. The formal government in Kosovo has effectively been constituted by the international community from the beginning on, which clearly plays a dominating role. Its overall degree of authority clearly went beyond more traditional forms of involvement. Though the engagement of external actors clearly was to the benefit of the Albanian side, it goes beyond typical cases of partisan engagement; it must rather be seen as a case of supreme intervention. The relations between the Albanian and Serb population of Kosovo have remained contentious. Although none of the parties is likely to resort to arms on a larger scale, there have been instances of armed conflict – most notably in 2004 – and especially after the declaration of independence tensions and mistrust between Serbs and Albanians remain. The relationship is therefore considered an obstructive one. Out of these reasons, this case is classified as an instance of the supreme, obstructive domination or ‘Benevolent Intrusion’ type.
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

A.12.4 Map of Kosovo

Figure A.12: Map: Kosovo (Serbia). Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
A.13 Liberia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Area</td>
<td>Total Area: 111,370 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land</td>
<td>Total Land: 96,320 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastline</td>
<td>Coastline: 579 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Monrovia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>English (official), 20 local languages of the Niger-Congo language group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire: 716 km, Guinea: 563 km, Sierra Leone: 306 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>41% Other indigenous groups, 17% Kpelle, 10% Bassa, 10% Kru, 6% Gio, 6% Mawe, 6% Mawe, 5% Buzi, 5% Americo-Liberians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>40% indigenous beliefs, 40% Christian, 20% Muslim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A.25: Basic Facts and Figures: Liberia

A.13.1 Country and Conflict Information

a) General Background

Liberia was never formally colonized, but founded in 1847 by former slaves returning from the Americas with the help of the government of the USA. Liberia adopted the US constitutional model. From the beginning on, the country’s political life had been dominated by the so-called Americo-Liberians whereas ‘indigenous’ tribes were excluded from state power. Although their civic rights were later acknowledged, the state continued to be dominated by an Americo-Liberian elite. This elite was toppled by a military coup in 1980, when Samuel Doe took power, becoming Liberia’s first indigenous president. Doe ethnicised the politics of Liberia and exacerbated the tensions between Liberia’s ethnic groups (see UCDP 2010m).

The Americo-Liberians only make up a small portion of the population, but dominated the country’s political scene for centuries. They formed a small ruling elite that systematically exploited Liberians with non-American roots (see Adeleke 1995: 572; Outram 1999: 164). The last president belonging to this Americo-Liberian elite was William Tolbert, who
was overthrown and executed by the young military officer Samuel Doe. He was the first president without American roots, but this also implied that he lacked access to traditional patronage networks and had to rely on other means for maintaining the loyalty of his supporters (Reno 1999: 86). With support from the United States, Doe established a strong hold on power and soon became notorious for his ruthless exercise of authority. The list of atrocities he can be held accountable for is topped by an ethnic cleansing campaign that he launched in revenge for a failed coup attempt in 1985, led by his fiercest enemy Thomas Quiwonkpa. Next to executing those directly responsible for the coup and demonstrating their triumph (after Quiwonkpa was killed, parts of his body were reportedly publicly eaten by Doe’s troops), people belonging to the same ethnic tribes as the rebels (mainly Gio and Mano) were indiscriminately massacred, leading to an estimated 3,000 deaths (Huband 1998: 40). Doe’s regime was equally exclusive as the Americo-Liberian regimes before him, with the only difference that the beneficiaries of his patronage system changed. His regime mainly benefited his own ethnic tribe, the Krahn, and violently suppressed dissent or opposition (see e.g. Ellis [1999] 2007; Huband 1998: 27–44).

b) Conflict History

Armed conflict erupted in 1989, to some extent along ethnic lines, when the Gio and Mano-dominated National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) attacked the Krahn-dominated government. Two episodes of armed intra-state conflict followed, 1989-1996 and 2000-2003. During these armed conflicts, a number of factions made use of one-sided violence, such as the NPFL, the two factions of the United Liberian Movement for Democracy (ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K), the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). Conflicts in Liberia since 1946 have included the intra-state and one-sided categories of UCDP organized violence (see UCDP 2010m).

Liberia experienced two civil wars between 1989 and 2003. The first civil war was initiated by Charles Taylor – leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) – when he launched an attack against president Samuel Doe’s government forces in Nimba County in December 1989 (Gershoni 1997: 55 and Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 180). Taylor was once himself a member of the cabinet under Doe but later was persecuted after having allegedly diverted US $ 900,000 of Liberian government funds in 1983 (Ellis 1999: 52–53). After only six months of fighting, the NPFL succeeded to cover nearly 90 percent of the Liberian territory, but had been unable to seize the capital Monrovia (see Gershoni 1997: 55; Outram 1999: 167). Fighting continued for six more years during which Taylor had consolidated power in the territories under his control through establishing his own patronage-system, becoming the de-facto ruler of a large part of Liberia (Reno 2004: 118). A peace agreement in 1996 finally paved the way for national elections and, ironically, it was Charles Taylor who won them. This facilitated a provisional termination of the
conflict, but due to Taylor’s selfish style of (mis)governance, it also set the stage for the renewed outbreak of armed conflict.

The second civil war commenced in 2000, after an offensive against Charles Taylor’s government forces led by a group called LURD (‘Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy’). Determined to defeat Taylor, LURD rebels launched an attack against Monrovia in which more than 10,000 people lost their lives. Finally, this led to Taylor’s resignation in 2003, paving the way for a power-sharing arrangement called the NTGL (‘National Transitional Government of Liberia’), which consisted of representatives from all major factions that have fought during the civil war (see Pham 2006: 43–45). Taken together, the two civil wars had disastrous effects. In total, between 65,000 and 150,000 people lost their lives after the first civil war alone (see Ellis 1999), and nearly half of the population had become displaced. The conflict led to the total collapse of the country’s economy and the widespread destruction of its physical infrastructure (see Gershoni 1997 and Sesay 1996b: 395).

c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict parties</th>
<th>NPFL, INPFL; LURD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Conflict ID</td>
<td>146 (both)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Episode ID</td>
<td>1462; 1463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>war (both)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victorious side</td>
<td>Victorious side: n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Peacekeeping**


**Mission mandate:**

“UNOMIL was established to exercise good offices in support of the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States and the Liberian National Transitional Government to implement peace agreements; investigate alleged ceasefire violations; assist in maintenance of assembly sites and demobilization of combatants; support humanitarian assistance; investigate human rights violations and assist local human rights groups; observe and verify elections” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2001b).
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

Mission mandate: UNMIL

“The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established by Security Council resolution 1509 (2003) of 19 September 2003 to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process; protect United Nations staff, facilities and civilians; support humanitarian and human rights activities; as well as assist in national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009e).

Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Table A.26: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Liberia

A.13.2 Post-conflict situation

a) The Role of the Formal Government

Various different government constellations and arrangements can be identified in Liberia:

Transitional Governments prior to 1997.  As part of the multiple initiatives for restoring peace in Liberia it was at several times attempted to establish transitional governments. In total, four such arrangements were established between 1991 and 1997:

1. The ‘Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia’ (IGNU) was founded already in August 1990 on the initiative of the All Liberia Conference – a meeting of 17 Liberian political groups and parties initiated by ECOWAS’s Standing Mediation Committee (SMC). It elected Prof. Amos Sawyer as the country’s transitional president (Howe 1996: 154).

2. The ‘Cotonou Peace Agreement’ of 25 July 1993 (S/26272) provided for the establishment of a new transitional government, the Liberia National Transitional Government (LNTG).

3. The ‘Abuja Accords’ of 19 August 1995, signed by all major warring factions, contained provisions for the establishment of a new transitional government (LNTG II), a six-member ‘Council of State’ in which all major factions would be represented as co-chairs with equal status (S/1995/742).


By and large, all these arrangements were rather fragile, and most of them operated at a time when the war clearly had been ongoing. The first three arrangements may therefore
safely be dismissed as instances of post-conflict polities. The last transitional government (LNTG III) might be taken into consideration, as the overall situation was becoming more peaceful at that time, and because it prepared the country for the 1997 elections.

**Taylor’s Presidency.** In 1997, Taylor was elected for the presidency with 75 percent of the votes – in an election considered relatively free and fair by international observers (see Harris 1999; Reno 2004: 125). His victory might in part have to do with the pressure he could exert on the voting population, because a “destitute, starved, and traumatized population recognized that in these conditions it was preferable to vote for the strongman who could defeat the other factions, and perhaps leave Liberians to their own devices to survive” (Reno 2004: 125).

**The National Transitional Government (NTGL).** Taylor’s resignation from the presidency paved the way for a transitional power-sharing arrangement named NTGL (National Transitional Government of Liberia). It “consisted of an executive, a legislative assembly, a judiciary, and a number of commissions whose senior officials were selected through a formula of power sharing among armed groups, political parties, and civil society” (Sawyer 2008: 179). It was headed by Gyude Bryant, a Monrovian businessman with no prior links to any of the warring factions, who was highly welcomed by the international community. The NTGL was inaugurated on 14 October 2003 for a period of two years, until the 2005 national elections brought forward a democratically elected government. Its main task was to implement the provisions of the Accra Peace Agreement (International Crisis Group 2004f: 12–14). The transitional government was heavily supported by the so called ‘International Contact Group for Liberia’ (see below). Its main task was to ensure that the different conflict parties adhered to the provisions of the peace agreement, and in that role it effectively “exercised sovereign authority and was the driver of the transition process” (Sawyer 2008: 180). A similar viewpoint was expressed by the International Crisis Group in 2004, when they contented that Liberia “has become in effect a UN protectorate” (2004f: i).

The NTGL, however, quickly began to disintegrate, mainly because it was seen as a “license to plunder” by most participants (Sawyer 2008: 180). Considerable tension arose from the warring factions’ rejection of Bryant as true head of the state. Rather, they considered him as an outsider to the NTGL, while the true power rested with the three warring factions that negotiated the Accra Agreement. This is why the International Crisis Group stated in 2004 that “[t]he NTGL along with the Transitional Legislative Assembly, is effectively run by members of former rebel movements” (2004f: 14). Battles over positions in the NTGL consumed much of its time and energy and corruption was endemic (Reno 2008: 389). As the International Crisis Group stated in 2004, “LURD and MODEL leaders have decided that Liberia and all top government positions are theirs by right of conquest” (2004f: 8).
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

The post-2005 Arrangement.  After Liberia had been governed by the NTGL for two years, national elections were held on 11 October 2005. In the first round of the presidential elections, no candidate won the necessary absolute majority of votes. Former football star George Weah, running for a party called CDC (‘Congress for Democratic Change’), was first, with 28 percent of the votes. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf – a former member of various Liberian governments and member of the UP (‘Unity Party’) – emerged second, gaining about 20 percent of the votes. However, in the November 8 runoff presidential elections, the picture turned once again, and Johnson-Sirleaf was elected with a total of 59.4 percent of the votes, while Weah came out second, collecting 40.6 percent. Interestingly, the results of the parliamentary elections did not mirror these figures very closely. In the Senate, COTOL (‘Coalition for the Transformation of Liberia’) won a majority of 23 percent of the votes, followed by the UP with roughly 13 percent. Weah’s CDC was on the fourth rank, with a total of about ten percent of the votes. In the House of Representatives the CDC ranked first with a total of 23 percent, while this time UP was on the fourth rank with about 12 percent of the votes (Harris 2005: 383–389). As a consequence of these election results, “[t]he party of the winning presidential candidate […] leads neither house, and is the main opposition party in just the Senate” (Harris 2005: 392). In the eyes of David Harris, the 2005 election was unusual when compared to other African post-conflict elections out of three reasons. He notes that the different rebel groups essentially ceased to exist as political forces in the post-conflict setting – unlike in Mozambique, Angola or Burundi – and he contends that there lacked an incumbent president or any other force which could potentially dominate the scene once Taylor was forced into exile. In addition, Harris underlines the fragile nature of the electorate’s loyalty for specific political parties, which led to “a patchwork of party victories in the Senate and House of Representatives across the 15 counties” (2005: 376–377).

b) The Role of External Parties

Neighboring States.  The first group of external parties engaged in Liberia were single neighboring or nearby countries with high personal or political stakes in the events in Liberia. A number of Francophone west African countries supported Taylor’s insurgency, including Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso. Houphouët-Boigny – Côte d’Ivoire’s former president – was possibly primarily interested in taking personal revenge because Liberian President Samuel Doe was responsible for the killing of his son-in-law Bennedict Tolbert (Jaye 2003: 646).

ECOWAS/ ECOMOG.  The ECOMOG deployment to Liberia had been a landmark development, as it “became the first subregional military force in the third world since the end of the Cold War, and the first subregional military force with whom the United Nations agreed to work as a secondary partner” (Howe 1996: 146). Just as in Sierra Leone, the deployment of ECOMOG goes back mainly to Nigeria’s initiative and insistence.
ECOMOG (‘ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group’) was created on 7 August 1990, after first attempts for seeking a political solution to the conflict had failed. Its mandate encompassed both peacekeeping and peace enforcement components. Despite committing to high aims – ‘restoring law and order’ and creating the ‘conditions for free and fair elections’, among other things – ECOMOG suffered from a number of problems. Among the first was ECOWAS’s divide between its Anglophone and its Francophone members. Some of the latter even supported Taylor’s insurgency, thereby actively working against ECOMOG. Another difficulty arose from the fact that the creation of ECOMOG had only been decided by the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) – an ad hoc committee created in April 1990 in order to support a political solution to the crisis in Liberia – and had not even been sanctioned by ECOWAS’s supreme body (see Howe 1996: 151–154). On the ground, ECOMOG’s engagement had oscillated between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. It collaborated with different factions in order to overthrow Taylor – with mixed results. On the one hand, it was thanks to the support from ULIMO and AFL (see below) that ECOMOG could defend Monrovia from the rebels. On the other hand, the factions proved unreliable and clearly acted as spoilers at various stages of the peacemaking process. The LPC (‘Liberian Peace Council’), for instance, threatened one of the numerous peace agreements (Cotonou, Benin, in July 1993) by starting a new offensive against the NPFL (Howe 1996: 159–161). Therefore, despite some marked collaboration, “ECOMOG did not control the factions” (Howe 1996: 160). By 1995, twelve peace agreements had failed, and at that point ECOWAS had changed its strategy by including all rebel groups in an executive council of state while simultaneously working towards their disarmament (Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 181).

**United Nations/ UNMIL.** The United Nations deployed three different missions in Liberia: UNOMIL (‘United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia’) aimed at supporting ECOMOG with the implementation of the 1993 peace agreement. UNOL (‘United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia’) was a small support mission established after the 1997 elections with the aim of assisting the government in its efforts to consolidate peace. Achieving this goal was undermined by the systematic exclusion of the opposition from state power and the quickly deteriorating security situation, among other things. UNMIL (‘United Nations Mission in Liberia’) was finally put into effect on 19 September 2003 with the adoption of Resolution 1509 by the UN Security Council. It consisted of a contingent of 15,000 UN peacekeepers and more than 1,000 police officers, was based on a robust Chapter-VII mandate, and aimed at the realization of a broad range of goals (see United Nations 2005b). In 2005, the UN Security Council – acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – adopted Resolution 1638, through which UNMIL’s mandate was specifically amended to “apprehend and detain former President Charles Taylor in the event of a return to Liberia and to transfer him or facilitate his transfer to Sierra Leone for prosecution before the Special Court for Sierra Leone” (United Nations 2005c).
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

ICGL (International Contact Group for Liberia). The ICGL comprised three main actors: the United States, the European Union and ECOWAS. The different parties fulfilled different roles:

“ECOWAS provided leadership in mediating the transitional political process, while the United States and the European Union, working largely through the United Nations, funded much of the security and other humanitarian operations. The International Crisis Group, an international think tank, contributed substantially to the intellectual and analytic perspectives of the ICGL” (Sawyer 2008: 180).

c) The Warring Factions

Throughout Liberia’s two civil wars, a number of different factions and splinter groups had emerged. The factions were mainly organized by affiliation to certain tribes and some of them heavily engaged in inter-factional battles that at least in part aimed at gaining control of valuable natural resources (Reno 1999: 105). In combination, the different factions had a strength of roughly 33,000 fighters, divided upon the different groups as follows:

“Of the 33,000, NPFL was the largest faction, accounting for 12,500 fighters. Doe’s old Armed Forces of Liberia counted 7,000 fighters, ULIMO-K had 6,800, ULIMO-J, 3,800, and LPC counted 7,000 fighters” (Reno 2004: 121).

Most of these factions have disappeared after Taylor was elected president in 1997, mostly out of fear for retaliation and revenge (International Crisis Group 2002a: 8). In the following, the different factions are characterized further:

NPFL. The NPFL, led by Charles Taylor, was the main contender throughout the first civil war and is clearly the party that is directly responsible for the outbreak of the war. The attractiveness of the NPFL stems mainly from its opposition to the Doe regime, which – due to its exclusive grip on power – has raised significant resistance from most of the non-Krahn population (Reno 1999: 92). But in the areas controlled by Taylor – variously called ‘Taylorland’ or ‘Greater Liberia’ – people had little choice than supporting the NPFL, as it used brute force in order to secure support from the population. The NPFL also heavily relied on urban and rural youth, and a significant portion of the rebel group was comprised of “abducted and orphaned children” behaving “notoriously brutal and rapacious” (Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 182).

INPFL. The INPFL (‘Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia’) was an early splinter group of the NPFL, led by Prince Yourmie Johnson. It was directed against both the NPFL and Doe’s Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). It initially collaborated with ECOMOG and enjoyed unlimited access to its headquarters, but exploited this confidence in order to abduct former president Doe from the ECOMOG compound on 9 September
1990, killing 70 of his bodyguards and assassinating Doe in a nearby site a few hours later (see Ellis 1999; Howe 1996: 154). The INPFL actively fought until late 1992 and was not part of the various peace agreements that were negotiated later (Howe 1996: 156). Prince Johnson participated in the 2003-2005 transitional government (NTGL), and he currently represents Nimba County in the Senate (see Sawyer 2008: 19).

ULIMO. ULIMO (‘United Liberation Movement of Liberians For Democracy’) has its roots in Krahn and Mandingo refugees who had escaped to Sierra Leone when Taylor’s insurgency began. Among them were many former soldiers from Doe’s AFL (‘Armed Forces of Liberia’) (Howe 1996: 156; Jaye 2003: 646). ULIMO consisted of several groups, most notably the LPC (‘Liberian Peace Council’), headed by George Boley, who was a former adviser to President Doe, the LUDF (‘Liberian United Defence Force’), led by a former office holder in the Doe government, General Albert Karpeh, the MRLM (‘Movement for the Redemption of Liberian Moslems’), founded by Doe’s former Minister for Information, Alhaji Kromah, and the aforementioned elements of Doe’s army which had fled to Sierra Leone. Its foundation goes back to the initiative of Alhaji Kromah (Reno 1999: 102–104). After Taylor had sparked the RUF insurgency in Sierra Leone in 1991, ULIMO took the offensive by crossing into Liberia in 1992. Initially united in their goal of overthrowing Taylor, ULIMO split into two factions along ethnic lines in 1994, with most Mandingos joining the ULIMO-K (led by Kromah) and most Krahn joining ULIMO-J (led by General Roosevelt Johnson) (Howe 1996: 156). ECOMOG relied on the ULIMO factions in its fight against the NPFL, which for them constituted a ‘low cost strategy’ for fighting the war. ULIMO and AFL support was also decisive for withstanding Taylor’s anti-Monrovia offensive ‘Operation Octopus’ of October 1992 (Reno 1999: 104).

LURD. LURD (‘Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy’) first appeared on the scene in July 2000 as a largely unknown actor. The International Crisis Group described it as being “essentially a loose coalition of anti-Taylor forces, drawing upon a variety of militia factions and refugee groups […]” (2002a: 4). It had close ties with Guinea, from where it launched its first invasion against Liberia. Guinean support for LURD drastically increased after LURD successfully retaliated Taylor’s counterattack on Guinean territory (International Crisis Group 2002a: 4–5). LURD was known for its close links with some of the earlier rebel groups, in particular ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K, but not with its former leaders Alhaji Kromah and Roosevelt Johnson. After the Accra Agreement, LURD suffered from leadership struggles, as the former leader Sekou Damate Conneh had “lost the respect of his fighters”, and his leadership role in the party was challenged by his own wife. Conneh also refused to participate in the NTGL – possibly out of his disappointment for not having been nominated as chairman, which further marginalized his role in the post-conflict environment (International Crisis Group 2004f: 9–10).
MODEL. MODEL (‘Movement for Democracy in Liberia’) was another anti-Taylor rebel group, and next to LURD the second main rebel group that took part in the offensive that removed Taylor from office. It was founded in March 2003 in Côte d’Ivoire and was chaired by Thomas Yaya Nimley. (International Crisis Group 2004f: 10–27). Just like LURD, MODEL appears to be mainly a coalition of convenience. For both groups, it “has been difficult knowing where they stand ideologically and many of their documents are vague along these lines” (Jaye 2003: 645). Jaye speculated that “[t]hey may have come together to achieve one fundamental goal – getting rid of Taylor but there are elements within these movements whose interests strongly coincides (sic!) with those of the previous regime: loot the economy and bastardise the system” (2003: 645).

A.13.3 Assessment

Taylor Presidency (1997-2003). Taylor’s presidency is a clear case of one party dominating the executive. His quasi-dictatorial style of governance effectively drove most other potential authorities out of the country. At the same time, the relations between the former belligerents (in this case the factions formed out of the former government troops and various other anti-Taylor factions) remained conflictual. While, initially, Taylor’s opponents virtually disappeared as many of them went into exile, they soon reformed and started another insurgency against the Taylor government. Thus, the relations can safely be considered obstructive. Finally, assessing whether the engagement of external actors was mediative or partisan is more difficult. Complexity arises from the highly partisan role that ECOMOG played during the war. On the one hand, it had effectively tried to beat Taylor’s NPFL militarily, often in coalition with some of the other warring factions. This clearly violated established principles of neutral peacekeeping. On the other hand, it had at several times made attempts for mediating between the warring parties, leading to 13 peace agreements and four transitional or interim government bodies. Although the ECOMOG intervention clearly was an anti-Taylor intervention, ECOWAS was split politically and needed to make concessions due to Taylor’s repeated successes on the battlefield. During the war, ECOMOG’s role was clearly more leaning to the partisan side of the scale, but there is reason to argue that ECOMOG switched to a mediative manner of engagement by 1995. After 1997, its role became more and more marginalized, as the mission was forced to withdraw from Liberia. Also the UN only played a neglectful role during Taylor’s reign. At the same time, the parties (including ECOWAS) contributed heavily to the adoption of the peace agreement. Thus, it appears most appropriate to classify external engagement as mediative. Therefore, the presidency of Charles Taylor is considered an instance of a ‘mediated, obstructive domination’ or ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity.

NTGL (2003-2005). The NTGL was a power-sharing arrangement, although it suffered from a number of shortcomings. The interim president lacked substantive power, and the former warring factions – GOL/ NPFL, LURD and MODEL – largely dominated
the scene. Although this arrangement was far from an ideal case of power-sharing, it fulfilled its main task successfully: preparing the country for the 2005 national elections. In the post-2003 polity, external parties have played a much stronger role. The United Nations now employed one of its largest peacekeeping missions (UNMIL), which has been continuously engaged in Liberia until today. It played a highly intrusive role during the NTGL period, to the extent that some observers even referred to the UN as the *de facto* authority in the territory. The intervention was clearly mediative, as the military role of the UN was much more confined to that of a traditional peacekeeping force. One would need to consider whether the high level of intrusiveness would even justify to code it as a supreme form of intervention. But this would appear misleading, because local actors have dominated the dynamics on the ground much stronger than in cases like Kosovo or East Timor. Out of these reasons, this situation is classified as an instance of the ‘mediated, obstructive power-sharing’ or ‘Doomed to Share’ type.

**Johnson-Sirleaf’s Presidency (since 2006).** Johnson-Sirleaf is the elected president of the country and not part of any official power-sharing government. However, she is not the undisputed Liberian leader. While the rebel groups have largely dissolved, many of the former faction leaders are still represented with high ranks in the government and effectively maintain strong claims to power. In addition, Johnson-Sirleaf’s party lacks a majority in both houses of the parliament, which makes her dependent on close cooperation with other parties. However, since there is no formal power-sharing arrangement in place and because Johnson-Sirleaf defeated her opponents in competitive elections, the case is considered a case of political domination here. The relations between the warring parties during this period have significantly improved when compared to earlier periods in Liberia’s post-conflict history. However, considering them constructive would go too far, because the United Nations continue to play a key role for contributing to security in the country. Many observers believe that a withdrawal of the UN force could trigger a relapse into factional violence (see also Reisinger 2009a). As a result, they should still be considered obstructive. The engagement of external actors has remained mediative, as they have continued to play a key role for providing stability and fostering societal reconciliation in Liberia. As a result, this situation is coded as an instance of the ‘mediated, obstructive domination’ or ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity type.
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

A.13.4 Map of Liberia

Figure A.13: Map: Liberia. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
A.14 Macedonia

### Table A.27: Basic Facts and Figures: Macedonia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>2,056,894 as of 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Area</td>
<td>25,333 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land</td>
<td>24,856 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastline</td>
<td>0 km (Landlocked)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Skopje</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish, remnants of Serbo-Croatian language typology also spoken in certain areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>Greece: 228 km; Serbia: 221 km; Albania: 151 km; Bulgaria: 148 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>67% Macedonian; 23% Albanian; 4% Turks; 2% Roma; 2% Serb; 2% other;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>67% Eastern Orthodox; 30% Muslim; 3% Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A.14.1 Country and Conflict Information

#### a) General Background

Upon the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation in 1991, Macedonia made its own moves towards independence, in particular after the nationalist parties won the first multi-party elections in 1990. The secession was peaceful, leading to the new state of the ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (FYROM). It became a parliamentary democracy, with the two most important groups being ethnic Macedonians (67% of the population) and ethnic Albanians (23% of the population), but in the new constitution only ethnic Macedonians were regarded as the constituent people of the republic (see UCDP 2010n).

The name Macedonia is ambivalent. It refers to the larger historical area called Macedonia, a Greek area, as well as the contemporary Macedonian nation-state, formally called the ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (FYROM). Until the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Macedonia was one of the six constituent republics of the Yugoslav Federation. When the grip of the Yugoslav Federation loosened at the beginning of the 1990s, Macedonia introduced multi-party elections, out of which a coalition government between two newly formed nationalist parties – the ARF (‘Alliance of Reform Forces’) and the
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

VMRO-DPMNE (‘Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity’) – and the Communist Party (LCM-PDR) emerged. In 1991, Macedonia declared its sovereignty through a plebiscite, but a name dispute with Greece prevented its recognition as a sovereign state by the European Community. Responding to Greek objections, Macedonia was recognized by the United Nations as a sovereign state under the name ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ in 1993 (Coleman 2008j: 7–11). The country is ethnically and religiously heterogeneous: 67 percent of the population are ethnic Macedonians of Roman Catholic belief, while some 23 percent are ethnic Albanians and hence Muslim. The remaining ten percent of the population consists of Turks, Serbs and Roma, among others (Coleman 2008j: 2). This makes FYROM today “one of the last truly multi-ethnic states in the Balkans” (Chivvis 2008: 142).

b) Conflict History

The one-sided pro-Macedonian provisions in the constitution triggered sentiments among the Albanians of being second class citizens. Over time, the tensions amounted to an armed conflict between the government and the UCK (‘Ushtria Clirimtare ë Kombëtare’, National Liberation Army) in 2001. The purpose of this conflict was to force a constitutional revision so as to eradicate the perceived discrimination against the Albanian people. The conflict lasted from January to August 2001, when a peace agreement containing constitutional revisions was signed, which called for numerous power-sharing provisions to be implemented. As a consequence of the agreement, a NATO-led peacekeeping force was deployed to the country. After constitutional amendments in 2005, the Macedonian government proclaimed that the peace agreement had been fully implemented (see UCDP 2010n).

In 2001, Macedonia experienced an armed conflict of much lower intensity than the ones experienced by some other former Yugoslavian states. The case is nonetheless of central importance, because the conflict could have easily turned into a large-scale civil war (see Chivvis 2008: 144). Though Macedonia’s ethnic groups have “co-existed uneasily” since the country had declared independence in 1991 (International Crisis Group 2001f: 1), they by and large maintained peaceful relations:

“The major grievance expressed by the ethnic Albanians was that their cultural distinctiveness was not publicly recognized. They demanded not only state protection of individual rights but protection of collective cultural rights” (Stanisevski and Miller 2009: 557).

This state of peaceful coexistence changed in 2001, when an armed conflict erupted due to rising unrest of the Albanian minority with regard to Macedonian/ Slavic dominance. It commenced with an attack against a police station in the town of Tearce on 22 January
2001, in which one police man was killed. A group called NLA (‘National Liberation Army’) claimed responsibility for the attack. Further clashes occurred in the upcoming weeks, most notably in Tanusevci. In Tetovo, 30 kilometers west of Skopje and populated by a clear Albanian majority, violence escalated in March 2001 (Friedman 2009: 213; International Crisis Group 2001f: 3–8). Initially, the government was undecided in its attempts to contain the rebellion. The ethnic Macedonian parties were split between hardliners, who saw the conflict as an opportunity to “crush the Albanian minority once and for all”, and more moderate elements, who sought a settlement with them. The hardliners initially gained ground, which triggered a retaliation campaign against the rebels and which forced the Albanian party to leave the coalition government (Chivvis 2008: 144). As a consequence, the conflict escalated between March and May 2001. A turning point was reached with the secret ‘Prizren Agreement’, which was struck between two Albanian political parties (DPA and PDP) in May 2001. This “gave the NLA something that came very close to a legitimation and gave a mandate to the ethnic Albanian political parties to represent the interests of the rebels” (Balalovska et al. 2002: 31). As a consequence, “from that moment on, a military solution to the conflict was no longer a political option” (Balalovska et al. 2002: 31).

Nonetheless, fighting continued until August 2001 when the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ (see Government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2001) was signed. Among other things, it was agreed that “Macedonia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” as well as the “multi-ethnic character of Macedonia’s society must be preserved” and a range of constitutional amendments was adopted (Government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2001, par. 1.2 – 1.3 & Annex 1). This ultimately marked the end of the violence. Three origins of the crisis have generally been identified: The first views the crisis as a secession war aiming at the establishment of a ‘Greater Albania’ carved out from Albania, Kosovo and parts of the Albanian-populated parts of Macedonia. The second sees the conflict as imported from Kosovo, from where the NLA originates. The third explanation focuses on “the dysfunctional nature of the Macedonian state and its treatment of the Albanian minority throughout the 1990s” (Chivvis 2008: 141–144).

c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict parties</th>
<th>UCK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Conflict ID</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Episode ID</td>
<td>2231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>2001 – 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>minor armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix A Characterization and Classification of the Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victorious side</th>
<th>n/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>UNPREDEP (United Nations Preventive Deployment Force); March 1995 – February 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Mandate:</td>
<td>UNPREDEP: Established on 31 March 1995 to replace UNPROFOR in the former “Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The mandate of UNPREDEP remained essentially the same: to monitor and report any developments in the border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and threaten its territory” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2000e).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Table A.28: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Macedonia

A.14.2 Post-conflict situation

According to the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’, the armed conflict in Macedonia was of low intensity (‘minor armed conflict’) and lasted only throughout the year 2001. The ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ is generally seen as the end-point of the armed conflict, and it also significantly transformed the country’s political environment.

a) The Role of the Formal Government

Before the outbreak of the conflict, Macedonia’s government had essentially been dominated by the ethnic-Macedonian majority: “Although minority parties were frequently included in government coalitions, the political domination of the majority ethnic Macedonians was evident” (Stanisevski and Miller 2009: 557). During the uprising in 2001, the government was effectively split along several lines. After the Albanian parties left the government, Javier Solana attempted to convince the parties to form a government of national unity, which was never implemented due to the precarious relations inside the government:

“The right hand did not talk to the left: while ministries controlled by the Macedonian-nationalist party VMRO-DPMNE sought to escalate the war, the Social Democratic-controlled ministries sought to prosecute them for human-rights abuses. Meanwhile, the two Albanian political parties, eager to avoid angering the international community, remained officially in the government but, not wanting to cut themselves off from their political base, did little to cooperate with it. Needless to say, the government made no progress addressing Albanian grievances, while the rebellion continued to gain favour with the local Albanian population, spreading out across the north and west” (Chivvis 2008: 145).
A.14 Macedonia

The August 2001 ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ decisively modified the character towards a consociational model. It was “formulated as a broad policy framework for inclusion of minorities in decision-making processes as well as recognition of cultural specificities of cultural groups” (Stanisevski and Miller 2009: 558). However, the Agreement was difficult to implement, mainly because many ethnic Macedonian parties believed the agreement to be “imposed on them by ‘pro-Albanian’ Western powers” (Engström 2002: 2).

b) The Role of External Parties

Although Macedonia has not experienced the deployment of a large-scale peacekeeping mission in its post-conflict phase, external actors have played a key role in bringing an end to the conflict and pressuring the warring parties into negotiations. Leverage stemmed in part from the fact that Macedonia was highly dependent on Western aid (Balalovska et al. 2002: 34). At least three groups of actors were involved: the NATO, the United Nations, and the European Union.

NATO. NATO clearly was a key player during and after the conflict in Macedonia. NATO forces were engaged at the time of the 2001 incident in neighboring Kosovo through the KFOR mission. Like most other members of the international community, they were highly concerned that Macedonia would turn into the site of another large-scale armed conflict on the Balkans. Immediately after the events of Tanusevci, NATO increased its control of the Kosovo-Macedonian border, and deployed an emergency team in Macedonia (Balalovska et al. 2002: 21). After the adoption of the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ in August, NATO deployed a 4,500 strong mission (“Operation Essential Harvest”), which aimed at disarming the rebels. This task was completed already by September 2001, and NATO then remained engaged only through a small follow-up mission, by which the observers of the ceasefire were to be protected (Kim 2001: 1).

United Nations. Unlike in neighboring Kosovo, the United Nations played a minor role in Macedonia, as relations were relatively peaceful. Nonetheless, aware that events could suddenly change in the opposite direction, UNPREDEP (United Nations Preventive Deployment Force) was deployed between 1995 and 1999. It was the first preventive force ever deployed by the United Nations, and was generally lauded as a success before the outbreak of the conflict in 2001 – in particular when compared with the other cases on the Balkans (Bellamy 2002: 127). However, in retrospect is appears ironic that the UN withdrew its forces about one year before the conflict emerged.

EU and US. The European Union and the United States played a particularly important role in the adoption of the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’, as it was only “accepted under intense pressure from the international community (the European Union and the United States) and with the possibility of a bloody civil war looming in the background”
Appendix A Characterization and Classification of the Cases

(Stanishevski and Miller 2009: 561). In the post-conflict period, the EU has played a key role for inducing the Macedonian parties to continue to cooperate. It has also called upon the parties to swiftly implement the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’. It systematically used the perspective of a Macedonian EU membership as an instrument for exerting leverage on the former belligerents (see Ilievski and Taleski 2009: 360).

In sum, these different groups of external actors have played important roles for preventing an escalation of violence and finding a quick settlement to the conflict. In the post-conflict phase, they have at various times prevented attempts by spoilers and hardliners to derail the peace process and undermine the effectiveness of power-sharing in Macedonia. As Chivvis remarks, “[i]t is highly unlikely that Macedonia would have remained stable without the political and security support provided by NATO and the EU […]” (2008: 154).

c) The Warring Factions

In general, the relations between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians have been tense since Macedonia achieved independence in 1991. The struggle was mainly about official recognition of a distinct Albanian culture and identity:

“Albanians in Macedonia as a whole have demanded greater cultural and educational rights, such as recognizing Albanian as an official language and providing state support for their underground Albanian-language university in Tetovo. Albanians have sought greater representation in the government, armed forces and police. They have objected to the preamble of the constitution which refers to the Macedonian nation, which they contend relegates Albanians to the status of second-class citizens. They have claimed to represent as much as 40% of the country’s population, not the 22.9% recorded in the June 1994 census” (Kim 2001: 4–5).

Macedonians clearly were reluctant to give in to these demands – mainly out of fear that greater Albanian autonomy would divide the country and because many were convinced that the Albanian minority already enjoyed sufficient rights (Kim 2001: 5).

The main conflict parties were the National Liberation Army (NLA) and the ethnic-Macedonian government, led by the Macedonian-nationalist party VMRO-DPMNE. The NLA had links to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and received parts of its weapons and ammunition from Kosovo. However, the NLA was in a difficult position since its victory would have essentially implied a division of the country: “As for the NLA, they knew they could not win a war without dividing the country in two, since they had local support only in the northwest of Macedonia, and that territorial division was not something the international community would accept” (Balalovska et al. 2002: 35). After the settlement, the NLA was transformed into a political party and the relations between the former antagonists became moderately constructive. Despite occasional complaints and attempts by the parties to capitalize on underlying the incompatibility between the two
ethnic groups, the overall atmosphere was conducive, in particular after the more moderate opposition won a majority of votes in the 2002 parliamentary elections, which strongly accelerated the implementation of key provisions from the peace agreement (International Crisis Group 2003d: i).

A.14.3 Assessment

Macedonia’s post-conflict government entails important elements of power-sharing. In particular due to the strengthening of the principle of proportional representation of ethnic groups and the introduction of a minority veto to block decisions that threaten the Albanian cultural identity, the post-conflict polity closely resembles the consociational model. The post-conflict polity can hence be coded as a case of sharing of executive power. External parties have played an unusual rule in Macedonia, because they were to a large extent indirectly present. With NATO troops being deployed in neighboring Kosovo, a military intervention by the international community must have constituted a very real and credible threat to all those who would attempt to act as spoilers to the peace process. Due to their successful efforts to adopt the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’, external actors have shown that they by and large acted as a mediative force – despite ethnic-Macedonian allegations that they have acted in a partisan manner. The relations between the conflict parties were tense but peaceful before the outbreak of the armed conflict. Although – as all observers have noted – the conflict entailed a true potential for developing into a large-scale ethnic conflict, the parties nonetheless acted in a largely constructive manner, which is documented by the various attempts to resolve the conflict that took place between May and August 2001. In the post-conflict period, the relations can overall be considered constructive, because all major players have supported the implementation of the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’. Out of these reasons, Macedonia is classified here as an instance of the ‘mediated, constructive power-sharing’ or ‘Let’s Share’ polity type.
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

A.14.4 Map of Macedonia

Figure A.14: Map: Macedonia. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
A.15 Mozambique

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>19,881,392 as of 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Area</td>
<td>801,590 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land</td>
<td>784,090 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastline</td>
<td>2,470 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Maputo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Portuguese (official), Indigenous dialects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>Malawi: 1,569 km, Zimbabwe: 1,231 km, Tanzania: 756 km, South Africa: 491 km, Zambia: 419 km, Swaziland: 105 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>n/a Europeans; n/a Indians; n/a Euro-Africans; n/a indigenous tribal groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>50% Indigenous beliefs; 30% Christian; 20% Muslim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A.29: Basic Facts and Figures: Mozambique

A.15.1 Country and Conflict Information

a) General Background

Mozambique, once a Portugal colony, experienced a pro-independence war that began in September 1964, after a number of other colonial powers had been conceding independence to their colonies in Africa. The struggle was led by the Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO (‘Frente de Libertação de Moçambique’ – Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), which was founded in 1962 by Dr Eduardo Mondlande (killed in exile in 1969) and later led by Samora Machel. Mozambique became independent on 25 June 1975, after a bloodless coup in Portugal paved the way for a more liberal political leadership (see UCDP 2010o).

FRELIMO, formed in Dar es Salaam in 1962 by exiled Mozambicans, aimed at eradicating colonial structures and implementing a range of socialist policies in Mozambique, thereby appealing to the impoverished rural population (Reed 1996: 276). After more than a decade of anti-colonial struggle, FRELIMO was handed over power in 1975, when the right-wing dictatorship in Portugal was overthrown in what became known as the Carnation Revolution (Hatton et al. 2001: 19; Manning 2002: 38; Pitcher 2006: 92). However, FRELIMO’s Marxist-Leninist ambitions were perceived as a massive threat to other governments in the
region, most notably Rhodesia and South Africa, which were willing to support violent insurgencies on Mozambican territory in order to destabilize FRELIMO. This led to the founding of RENAMO in 1976 (see Morgan 1990: 610; Reed 1996: 278).

b) Conflict History

In 1977 a new armed struggle commenced – this time an intra-state conflict over the control of the government. The incumbent FRELIMO government was violently challenged by a group called RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, National Resistance Movement of Mozambique), which enjoyed the support from Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) and South Africa in retaliation for the FRELIMO-regime’s support of the anti-apartheid movements. Between 1985 and 1990, Zimbabwean troops were deployed in support of the FRELIMO government. The conflict lasted fifteen years (1977-1992) and ended with the 1992 Rome peace agreement. The conflict had devastating effects: millions had to flee (within and outside the country) and civilians were killed in high numbers as RENAMO made use of one-sided violence as one of its primary tactics (see UCDP 2010o).

Mozambique’s civil war is closely connected to the country’s colonial history and the specific dynamics of the Cold War. The FRELIMO government was challenged by a group called RENAMO (‘Resistência Nacional Moçambicana’), which had been sponsored by Rhodesia and South Africa as a counterweight to FRELIMO’s socialist influence in the region (see Manning 2002: 38; Pitcher 2006: 92). An armed conflict between the two parties commenced shortly after FRELIMO’s rise to power. Enjoying high levels of external support, RENAMO quickly transformed itself into a tightly organized military group that over time became an ever more destructive force, leading to an ongoing intensification of the conflict (see Costy 2004: 148–149; Morgan 1990: 610). In total, the conflict lasted for nearly sixteen years and had devastating results. More than one million people died as a result of the direct and indirect consequences attributed to the conflict and six million people became internally displaced (see Manning 2002: 38; Schnabel 2002: 10). This was accompanied by a large-scale destruction of the country’s economy and infrastructure (see Costy 2004: 150; Schnabel 2002: 10). The civil war formally came to a close in October 1992, when the government and the rebel movement signed the General Peace Agreement (GPA).

---

9This section is – with minor modifications – quoted from an earlier paper presented at the 50th Annual meeting of the International Studies Association (ISA) in New York (Reisinger 2009c).
c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict parties</th>
<th>RENAMO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Conflict ID</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Episode ID</td>
<td>1361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>1977 – 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victorious side</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>ONUMOZ (United Nations Operation in Mozambique); December 1992 – December 1994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mission Mandate:
“ONUMOZ was established to help implement the General Peace Agreement, signed by the President of the Republic of Mozambique and the President of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana. The mandate included facilitating the implementation of the Agreement; monitoring the ceasefire; monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces and providing security in the transport corridors; providing technical assistance and monitoring the entire electoral process” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2001d).

Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Table A.30: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Mozambique

A.15.2 Post-conflict situation

Mozambique is generally considered a typical Cold War conflict, in which both sides enjoyed significant material and ideological support from external parties. The sudden end of the conflict in 1992 can at least in part be contributed to the end of the superpower confrontation and the drying up of external funds.

a) The Role of the Formal Government

Unlike many other cases discussed in this dissertation, there was no transitional government established in Mozambique after the adoption of the peace agreement. Instead, the incumbent FRELIMO government stayed in power and the parties agreed to hold post-conflict elections within a time-frame of one year. Originally scheduled for fall 1993, the elections were again postponed by one year due to delays with the disarmament and demobilization process (see Alden 1995: 107). The elections finally took place in October...
1994 and were the first democratic elections in Mozambique’s history. The period before the elections was overshadowed by political disputes between the parties, with RENAMO declaring its withdrawal from the elections one day before they were scheduled to take place. Yet, these difficulties could be resolved, and elections took place in October 1994, generally declared “free and fair” by international observers (United Nations 2001b). With 65 percent, voter turnout was relatively high. FRELIMO’s Joaquim Alberto Chissano was confirmed as president, although with a surprisingly small margin, and his party won only 129 of 250 seats in the parliament (see Hatton et al. 2001: 20). Already in December, ONUMOZ began to dismantle its operation. Although many peacebuilding challenges remained, Costy notes that the country at that time was “an altogether different place than it had been just twenty-four months earlier” (2004: 157).

Besides facilitating elections, another key task of the peace process was to agree on the basic institutional design of the country. A particular challenge was to find the right balance between elements of centralization and decentralization (West and Kloeck-Jenson 1999: 461). Until the end of the civil war, Mozambique’s administrative structures had been dominated by strong authoritarianism from above – first imposed by the colonial power Portugal nearly 400 years ago and later continued by FRELIMO after independence in 1975 – and elements of traditional authority from below, exercised mainly by local chiefs and churches (Alexander 1997: 2–4). As a result, Mozambique’s political system is relatively centralized and contains little elements of power-sharing, devoting much power in the political process to the leading party (Manning 2002: 24–26). This practice has repeatedly been a source of contention.

Since the end of the civil war, FRELIMO has won all presidential and parliamentary elections, which clearly limited RENAMO’s influence on the political process. RENAMO has therefore frequently challenged the election results, often resulting in clashes between supporters of the two parties (African Elections Database 2007). A last serious dispute emerged after the presidential elections in 2004, in which FRELIMO’s Armando Guebuza could acquire an absolute majority of 63.7 percent of the votes. Accusing FRELIMO of severe fraud, RENAMO first rejected the election results and filed an official complaint with the country’s National Electoral Commission, but later withdrew its boycott, although some evidence for irregularities could be found. Nevertheless, the elections were declared “free and fair” by a number of international observers (Freedomhouse 2006). Despite these differences, Mozambique is today a relatively stable multi-party democracy, which greatly adds to its reputation as one of the most successful cases of post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa (see Costy 2004).

b) The Role of External Parties

A key component of the peace process in Mozambique was the UN peacebuilding mission (ONUMOZ). In total, more than 10,000 troops were deployed to Mozambique (see United Nations 2001b). In line with the General Peace Agreement, ONUMOZ’s mandate included
four main issue areas: political guidance of the peace process; military aspects, including monitoring the ceasefire as well as disarming and demobilizing former belligerents; monitoring the electoral process; and providing humanitarian assistance (see United Nations 2001b). Disarmament was difficult to achieve since both FRELIMO and RENAMO were more than reluctant to give up the control over their territories (Costy 2004: 153–155). A further problem was that ONUMOZ destroyed much less weapons than originally projected, partly due to its weak mandate in that regard. This led to an uncontrolled flow of weapons throughout the region (see Vines 1998a: 205). Demobilization was very successful. By August 1994, nearly 90 percent of the registered combatants had been demobilized. Among other things, this success could mainly be achieved since the conflict was generally ripe for resolution, and the reintegration program offered viable alternatives to fighting (see Costy 2004: 153-155).

c) The Warring Factions

During the entire duration of the civil war, the composition of the warring parties remained stable. FREMILO represented the ‘government-side’ and RENAMO was the only notable rebel group to challenge the government. FRELIMO labeled itself a Marxist-Leninist group, and soon after holding power began to establish an authoritarian one-party system. It adopted a large spectrum of socialist policies, ranging from large-scale nationalization of companies to an attempt to relocate a large part of the population to communal villages (see Costy 2004: 146; Pitcher 2006: 92). In this sense, the beginning of FRELIMO’s rule has “coincided with the end of formal political opposition of any kind” (Manning 2002: 48). Both from elements inside and outside Mozambique, these developments were regarded with skepticism, and by some states (most notably Rhodesia and South Africa) even perceived as a threat to their own existence (Costy 2004: 148–149). Support for FRELIMO in the government-controlled areas can mainly be explained by a general “sense of loyalty to the government”, which was often relatively distinct from the actual political orientations pushed forward by FRELIMO (Schafer 2001: 223). FRELIMO’s record in mobilizing and maintaining support is impressive. Despite all difficulties, it has been able to rule the country for more than thirty years and has, as Pitcher puts it, “managed to weather widespread discontent, oversee the rise and demise of socialism, conclude a devastating war and survive three democratic elections in Mozambique without being unseated from power, like many other ruling parties in Africa and Eastern and Central Europe” (2006: 94).

RENAMO quickly grew from a small guerrilla organization to a military group comprising almost 10,000 combatants and controlling about a quarter of national territory by the early 1990s. From the beginning on, it enjoyed heavy support from the apartheid regime in South Africa, which used RENAMO as a means to undermine FRELIMO’s regional appeal and credibility, ultimately in order to foster its own security after the dissolution of Rhodesia (see Costy, 2004: 148–149). RENAMO was mainly perceived as
“the party of the peripheral rural areas” where people felt a sense of exclusion from the FRELIMO state (Schafer 2001: 222). In the post-conflict period, RENAMO has played a very constructive role, which has become most clearly apparent by the acceptance of its electoral defeats. Observers agree that RENAMO’s transition from a rebel group to a political party was relatively unproblematic (see e.g. Weinstein 2002: 150). The party has generally remained refrained from the use of violence and has since 1989 “insisted that its goal was ‘constitutional reform’” rather than a defeat of the government (see Walter 1999: 147).

A.15.3 Assessment

In post-war Mozambique, the formal government is highly centralized and run exclusively by FRELIMO, whereas RENAMO has repeatedly lost presidential and parliamentary elections and has become reduced to the role of an eternal opposition party. This is an unusual level of domination of the post-conflict environment by only one of the former conflict parties. External parties played an important supportive role prior to the 1994 elections. Although, dismantling ONUMOZ already a few months after the elections certainly was a bold move, Mozambique indeed needed little external military presence through a traditional peacekeeping force. Consequently, the involvement of external actors has switched from traditional peacekeeping to a more open governance approach, in which various specialized UN agencies and NGOs are involved simultaneously and interdependently. Both ONUMOZ’s traditional peacekeeping presence and the involvement of other third parties in the post-conflict environment suggest that the involvement of external actors has been largely mediative. The relations between the former belligerents in post-war Mozambique are surprisingly constructive, despite the fact that RENAMO is virtually excluded from participation in the government. There have been minor tensions and complaints due to alleged electoral fraud, but these skirmishes were mostly spontaneous and locally restrained occurrences. The high level of cooperation between the parties is all the more surprising when compared to the case of Angola, where a very similar conflict took place. There, the main contender – UNITA – had extended its armed struggle until well into the 21st century. Out of the above reasons, the case of Mozambique is classified as an instance of the ‘mediated, constructive domination’ or ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polity type.
Figure A.15: Map: Mozambique. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
Appendix A Characterization and Classification of the Cases

A.16 Rwanda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>8,807,212 as of 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Area</td>
<td>26,340 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land</td>
<td>24,950 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastline</td>
<td>0 km (Landlocked)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Kigali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda; French; Kiswahili used in commercial centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>Burundi: 290 km; Tanzania: 217 km; Congo (DRC): 217 km; Uganda: 169 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>84% Hutu; 12% Tutsi; 3% Twa (pygmoid); 1% Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>65% Roman Catholic; 25% indigenous beliefs and other; 9% Protestant; 1% Muslim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A.31: Basic Facts and Figures: Rwanda

A.16.1 Country and Conflict Information

a) General Background

The people that populated the colonial area that was to become Rwanda and Burundi were linguistically and culturally homogeneous, but were still separated into three groups: the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa. However, the prevalent societal order was more one of social class than race (it was possible to become Tutsi through social advancement). After independence, Rwanda became dominated by the Hutu, which violently repressed the Tutsi (see UCDP 2010p).

Though very much linked to Burundi in terms of its ethnic and cultural composition, the developments in Rwanda and Burundi took completely different paths. Like in Burundi, the legacy of colonialism has “hardened distinction between the two ethnicities, not least through the ascription of stereotyped characteristics to each of them, and aroused the possibility of communal action, as Hutu or as Tutsi, which has barely been conceivable in the pre-colonial situation” (Clapham 1998: 197, emphasis original). Rwanda achieved independence from Belgian colonial rule in 1962, but already since 1958 the
A.16 Rwanda

Tutsi monarchy favored by the colonial powers had been overthrown by “a small group of Catholic-educated Hutu” – unlike in Burundi. This so called “social revolution” (Uvin 1999: 256) unfolded in three stages:

“In late 1959 there were localized anti-Tutsi violence and small pogroms in some provinces. Hundreds were killed, and many Tutsi fled the country. In 1960 and 1961 legislative elections resulted in the massive victory of Parmehutu, a radically anti-Tutsi party, and the subsequent overthrow of the monarchy. More Tutsi, including the previous powerholders, fled the country” (Uvin 1999: 256).

Between independence and the outbreak of the genocide, Rwanda had known only two regimes: the Kayibanda regime (1962-73), and General Habyarimana’s regime (1973-94) – both making use of violence and oppression against Tutsi and opposed Hutu members. Habyarimana gained power through a violent coup, which gave rise to the establishment of a single party regime led by the MRDN (‘National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development’). It effectively was a military dictatorship, which made use of systematic assassinations of opposition members, tight internal security and surveillance, and the upholding of farce elections in which Habyarimana regularly gained close to 100 percent of support (see Traniello 2008: 37; Uvin 1999: 257).

b) Conflict History

The Rwandan government had been attacked by small groups of exiled Tutsi since the 1960s. In the 1990s, the attacks became more organized after the formation of a Tutsi rebel group known as the RPF (‘Rwandan Patriotic Front’), which later invaded the country from Uganda. This triggered intra-state conflict lasting until the RPF overthrew the Hutu government in 1994. After 1997, remnants of the Hutu government and the Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR) organized an armed struggle from the eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – led by the FDLR (‘Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda’) since 1997, later renamed into PALIR (‘Peuple en Armes Pour la Libération du Rwanda’) – crossing the border into Rwanda. The conflicts in Rwanda have been characterized by substantial amounts of one-sided violence. Of special note is the Rwandan genocide of 1994, which was linked to the RPF’s struggle against the government. During a few months in 1994, the government of Rwanda, the Armed Forces of Rwanda and the so-called Interahamwe militia perpetrated mass-killings of ethnic Tutsi throughout Rwanda, murdering around 1,000,000 people or more. In the years before the genocide, the government of Rwanda had also killed many civilians of Tutsi origin, as did the RPF government after it seized power in 1994 (but then targeting Hutu). The government of Rwanda has been a secondary warring party to the conflict in the DRC during several years in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It supported rebel groups that
opposed the government of the DRC in an effort to wipe out Hutu rebel groups (see UCDP 2010p).

After the Tutsi-led RPF (‘Rwandan Patriotic Front’) had begun to attack the government in the early 1990s, a civil war started in Rwanda. Although the civil war has been described as “violent and bloody”, its overall intensity was lower than, for instance, in Burundi (Coleman 2008l: 9). As Christoper Clapham points out, the ruling Habyarimana regime reacted by attempting to “entrench itself”:

“Internally, it articulated an increasingly overt ideology of Hutu supremacy that has never been far beneath the surface, and which was readily mobilized to confront the largely (though not exclusively) Tutsi RPF [. . .]. Externally, Habyarimana sought aid from France which, under the presidencies first of Valery Giscard d’Estaing and then of Francois Mitterrand, had incorporated the former Belgian colonies in Africa [. . .] into the French sphere of influence” (1998: 198). France sent weapons and even a small contingent of troops in order to support the Habyarimana regime in its fight against the RPF (see Clapham 1998: 199). The conflict formally came to a close with the adoption of the Arusha Accords on 3 August 1993 (see Reyntjens 2004: 177). Among other things, it provided for the establishment of a ‘Broad Based Transitional Government’ in Art. 6, which has never been properly implemented, mainly because “the Rwandan government had been dragging its heels and failing to produce the transitional government” (Barnett 1997: 551). In order to monitor the peace agreement, UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) was deployed in October 1993. However, events suddenly escalated when Rwandan President Habyarimana’s airplane was shot down in the spring of 1994 – most likely by Hutu extremists within Habyarimana’s own administration. Immediately thereafter, a violent campaign against the Tutsi was initiated, carried out by the Hutu-dominated Interahamwe militias. The result was a genocide unprecedented since World War II, in which about one million people were killed within roughly 100 days between April and July 1994 (Coleman 2008l: 9). The genocide only came to an end after the RPF invaded Kigali on 4 July 1994. As a consequence, around two million Hutu fled from Rwanda, most notably to DRC, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania, out of fear for Tutsi retaliation (Traniello 2008: 38). While the genocide came as a surprise to many external observers, there is strong evidence that it had been well planned and prepared – logistically as well as ideologically – by the then-incumbent Hutu regime. As Hintjens notes, “[f]rom 1992 onwards, members of ‘Hutu power’ militias were being trained in techniques of hunt and destroy operations, rather than in open armed combat” (1999: 247).
c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict parties</th>
<th>FPR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Conflict ID</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Episode ID</td>
<td>1791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>1990 – 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>One-sided victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victorious side</td>
<td>Non-gov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda); October 1993 – March 1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mission Mandate:**

“UNAMIR was originally established to help implement the Arusha Peace Agreement signed by the Rwandese parties on 4 August 1993. UNAMIR’s mandate and strength were adjusted on a number of occasions in the face of the tragic events of the genocide and the changing situation in the country. UNAMIR’s mandate came to an end on 8 March 1996” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2001a).

*Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations*

Table A.32: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Rwanda

A.16.2 Post-conflict situation

According to the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’, the civil war in Rwanda lasted until 1994 and hence also includes the genocide. However, the short period between the conclusion of the Arusha Accords in August 1993 and the outbreak of the genocide in April 1994 should be considered a candidate for an independent post-conflict period, because it entailed the formation of a new government and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission. This situation clearly differed from the episode that began after the genocide. It is clearly not comparable to other post-conflict situations, for the simple reason that the genocide had such dramatic social and political effects that it by far overrides the dynamics and consequences of the preceding civil war. Rwanda is more adequately described as a “post-genocide society” (Uvin 2001). Nonetheless, for the sake of maintaining a coherent terminology the following section continues to refer to post-genocide Rwanda as a ‘post-conflict’ case.
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

a) The Role of the Formal Government

Between the conclusion of the Arusha Accords in 2003 and today, the composition of the formal government has changed three times in fundamental ways. The first constellation was the power-sharing arrangement adopted on the basis of the Arusha Accords in 1993, the second was the de facto rule of the RPF in the aftermath of the genocide (which was, officially, still based on the foundations of the Arusha Accords and also involved elements of power-sharing), and the third was the beginning of RPF leader Paul Kagame’s reign as the officially elected president in 2003 (and later confirmed in 2008):

Arusha Agreement (1993). During the Arusha Agreement of 1993, a transitional constitutional framework was devised that aimed at creating a ‘Broadly Based Transitional Government’ (BBTG) and provided for legislative and presidential elections to be held within a time frame of three years (s.o.). Yet, already after Habyarimana’s plane was shot down in 1994, the agreement collapsed. The Arusha Accords provided for the following distribution of governmental power:

“The power-sharing formula agreed upon at Arusha would have given the ruling pro-Hutu Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement et la Démocratie (MRNDD) and the Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) five cabinet positions each, the Mouvement démocratique républicain (MDR) four, the Parti social démocrate (PSD) and the Parti libéral (PL) three each, and the Parti démocrate chrétien (PDC) one. Excluded from the BBTG – and indeed from the negotiations – was the pro-Hutu extremist Convention pour la défense de la république (CDR)” (Lemarchand 2007: 4–5).

Lemarchand attributes the failure of the BBTG to four factors: The exclusion of the CDR; the fact that the assassination of Burundi’s President Ndadaye “pulled the rug from under the feet of the moderates”; the fact that the MRNDD and the RPF never trusted one another, and the “intense fears and anxieties felt by most Hutu in the face of the RPF invasion, the mutual hatreds born of atrocities committed by invaders and defenders, and the climate of all-pervasive suspicion surrounding the Arusha talks” (2007: 5). He views the negotiations as a continuation of civil war by other means, and points out that “the participants were constantly reassessing their relative strategic positions on the battlefield” and heavily rearmed themselves (2007: 6). A similarly negative assessment is given by Marisa Traniello:

“If South Africa is the ideal model possessing all the necessary conditions for power-sharing to thrive, then Rwanda represents the worst case scenario that played into almost every criticism of the concept. The power-sharing settlement, the Arusha Accords, failed to mitigate violence because it lacked such necessary factors as an able and committed leadership, a shared destiny and the will to accommodate. In addition, power-sharing led to the zero-sum scenario that South Africa managed to avoid” (2008: 38).
Post-Genocide ‘Power-Sharing’. After the genocide, it was again attempted to build a broadly-based government along the lines of the Arusha Agreement, with the RPF as senior-partner. Two parties were banned because of the leading role they had played during the genocide: The former ruling party MRND and the extremist Hutu party CDR. Faustin Twagiramungu, a Hutu from the MDR (‘Mouvement Démocratique Républicain’) became Prime Minister (see Reyntjens 2004: 178). However, the RPF highly influenced the provisions of the accords in its own favor:

“[A] number of amendments made unilaterally by the RPF to the Fundamental Law profoundly modified the political regime agreed in Arusha. They introduced a strong executive presidency, imposed the dominance of the RPF in the government, and redrew the composition of parliament. The amended Fundamental Law was, in effect, a subtle piece of constitutional engineering which attempted to mask the consolidation of the RPF’s hold on political power” (Reyntjens 2004: 178).

Soon thereafter, the RPF took other means to tighten its grip on power, when in 1995 “three leading Hutu members of the coalition were forced to resign: Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu, Interior Minister Seth Sendashonga, and Justice Minister Alphonse Nkubito” (Lemarchand 2007: 7). After some other resignations in 2000 and the banning of the MDR “on the eve of the legislative and presidential elections […] Rwanda had become for all intents and purposes a single-party state” (Lemarchand 2007: 7). The result of this shuffling around was that the “illusion of inclusiveness was soon shattered” (Reyntjens 2004: 180). However, this insight needed a long time to materialize. As Reyntjens argues, the RPF enjoyed a “genocide credit”, which accounted for the fact that “for a long time it was not considered politically correct to acknowledge that the RPF has not brought liberation, inclusiveness and democracy, but oppression, exclusion and dictatorship” (2006a: 1104).

The 2003 Elections. The time between the end of the genocide and the first post-genocide national elections was marked as a ‘transitional period’. Originally, it was to last until 1999, but the RPF unilaterally extended it to last for four more years until 2003. The National Electoral Commission (NEC) was largely controlled by the RPF, and the elections lacked a great deal of secrecy, as voters had to leave their fingerprint on the ballot sheet. The major opposition party, MDR, was banned in May 2003, as it was accused of ‘divisionism’. In the August 2003 presidential elections, Kagame was re-elected with an astonishing 95 percent of the votes in an election that was reportedly marked by irregularities, intimidation and fraud (see Reyntjens 2006a: 1106–1108). The next parliamentary elections took place in 2008, confirming the RPF majority with 78 percent of the votes. Again, a real alternative to the governing party lacked, as most relevant opposition parties continued to be banned (Stroh 2008).
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

b) The Role of External Parties

Before, during and after the genocide, external actors of various sorts have been engaged in Rwanda. The first group comprises international mediators, who have played a key role for the ‘successful’ completion of the Arusha Accords. Clapham attributes the settlement mainly to the demands of the international mediators to achieve an agreement – “a piece of paper to which all of the parties involved could be persuaded to put their signatures – entirely regardless of whether this agreement provided the basis for any workable political settlement” (Clapham 1998: 204). Next to that, a number of single states was involved in the country. France’s role in the early phase of the conflict – in particular its support for the Habyarimana government – can possibly be interpreted as a “general defence of francophonie” (Clapham 1998: 199). Uganda played an intermediate role for the outbreak of the conflict because the RPF launched its first attacks against the Habyarimana government from Ugandan territory. It is not clear whether this happened with or without prior knowledge of Uganda’s President Musevini, although there seems to be “not doubt at all as to Musevini’s general sympathy” (Clapham 1998: 199).

The United Nations played a particularly tragic role in Rwanda, not only because they could not prevent the genocide, but primarily because they would not even attempt to do so. Already before the genocide, UNAMIR was considered “under-funded and understaffed” (Traniello 2008: 38). When the genocide unfolded, UNAMIR was clearly unprepared to face the challenge, with only about 5,000 peacekeepers with light weaponry spread around the country. The focal event that ultimately led to the UN Security Council’s decision to withdraw nearly the entire force was the killing of ten Belgian peacekeepers (Suhrke 1998). The UN Security Council’s main motivation behind this decision was its conviction that the peacekeepers were unable to protect their own personnel (Barnett 1997). However, the question emerges which role the United Nations could have played in order to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. Clapham argues that in light of the parties’ determination to fight it out, the UN could have only significantly influenced the dynamics on the ground by decisively intervening on the side of one of the former conflict parties:

“Given the irreconcilable contradictions between the demands and expectations of the ‘Hutu power’ groups on the one hand and the RPF on the other, and the powerful forces which each controlled, any peace-keeping force could have affected the outcome only by intervening decisively on behalf of one side and against the other. […] To remain ‘neutral’, in the way that a UN force was bound to do, was to be condemned, as eventually happened, to impotence” (1998: 206).

In the post-genocide context, the UN and other external actors were increasingly marginalized by Kagame’s regime: “Kagame has effectively used the lack of United Nations and other international action during the genocide to paint a domestic picture of a do-nothing international force seeking control rather than assistance in reconstruction” (Coleman 2008: 11-11). At least after UNAMIR’s mandate ended by March 1996, the situation is essentially one in which no external actors have been present on the ground.
c) The Role of the Conflict Parties

In Rwanda, the distinction between the ‘government-side’ and ‘the rebels’ is more clear-cut than in other cases – Liberia, for instance. However, the two groups switched roles throughout the conflict. Deciding who is the government and who are the rebels therefore greatly depends on the moment of the analysis. The Habyarimana government was split into two blocks: the Hutu moderates, represented by the president himself, and the ‘Hutu Power’ extremists on whose account the shooting of Habyarimana’s plan most likely goes. The moderate sections of the government were formally in charge of the Arusha negotiations, which in part explains the large concessions made to the RPF. Despite being the official negotiators, Christopher Clapham contends that they lacked a real power basis within the government, mainly because they were “drawn disproportionately from members of former opposition parties […] together with some Habyarimana supporters from the more ‘liberal’ wing of the MRNDD” (1998: 203). This is key for understanding the dynamics of the Arusha agreements:

“They were, in effect, using the framework of internationally mediated negotiations, in order to bring about a shift in power within Rwanda, which they could not achieve through their control on the ground” (Clapham 1998: 203).

The extremists, in turn, refrained from the Arusha negotiations, mainly because they had little to gain from them. Before the accords, they had been the ones effectively constituting the state through an authoritarian and patrimonial system. These privileges were fundamentally threatened by the attempt to establish a broad-based and eventually liberal democratic system. Consequently, “[m]embers of the Hutu factions associated with the extremist wing of Habyarimana’s party created endless reasons, accompanied by assassinations and other murders, to delay the hand-over of power” (Clapham 1998: 204).

The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was in a dilemma situation at the beginning of the rebellion, because in light of the vast ethnic dominance of Hutu it “desperately tried to project itself as a truly national movement” – and not just a mere Tutsi campaign (Clapham 1998: 200). Initially the RPF faced some severe challenges, including the death of Fred Rwigyema, “the movement’s charismatic leader” (Clapham 1998: 200). However, due to its strength on the battlefield and its high overall level of organization, it was in a superior negotiating position. In the post-genocide context, the relationship between the RPF and those perceived as RPF opponents (mostly Hutu, but also former RPF hands) became increasingly obstructive:

“For early 1995 Hutu elites became the victims of harassment, imprisonment and even physical elimination. Provincial governors (prefets), local mayors, head teachers, clerics and judges were killed in increasing numbers. In many cases the responsibility of the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA), which had become the national army, was well documented” (Reyntjens 2006a: 1105).
Nonetheless, the RPF has continued to deny the role of ethnicity. As some cabinet members were formally of Hutu ethnic origin, the RPF continued to put forward the illusion of a ‘government of national unity’. In reality, about 70 percent of office holders on all levels of the administration were Tutsi by mid-2000 – a distribution that largely turns the demographic reality upside down (Reyntjens 2006a: 1110). The RPF was also accused of gross human right violations during its reign, which includes the reported killing of tens of thousands of civilians on its own territory and abroad – in particular in the DRC (Reyntjens 2006a: 1110).

A.16.3 Assessment

The RPF has essentially acted like a unitary government ever since it captured power in Kigali in 1994 and over time gave up its attempts to conceal its authoritarian claims. The August-2003 presidential elections only formalized what had already been the political reality long before, namely that Rwanda had effectively become a one-party state and that the RPF unilaterally controlled the political life entirely. For the entire post-genocide context, the role of the formal government is aptly captured by the term domination. The role of external parties is more difficult to assess. Before the genocide, they acted largely neutral and without much commitment. The number of peacekeepers sent to protect the provisions of the Arusha Agreement clearly was too small to fulfill this role effectively. During the genocide, the international community chose a strategy of non-intervention by withdrawing most of its troops. In the post-genocide context, the role of the UN and most of its specialized agencies was increasingly restricted by the regime. However, due to the ‘genocide credit’ (Reyntjens 2006b: 1114) the international community at large supported the RPF government and has for a long time tended to simply neglect its authoritarian tendencies. Classifying this form of engagement is not easy, but, all in all, there is reason to interpret this as a partisan form of intervention. Although the international community has not actively taken action against Hutu parties or has actively impeded their participation in the government, it has done nothing against Kagame’s attempts to centralize power and has (unlike in other cases) not even used its rhetoric powers to criticize the government’s actions. This is a much more moderate (in fact, passive) form of partisan involvement when compared, for instance, with the anti-Taliban war fought by external parties in Afghanistan, but it more aptly describes external actors’ behavior in the case of Rwanda than mediative engagement. The relations between the conflict parties have clearly been marked by a high level of obstruction and contention. Some remnants of the génocidaires continued an armed struggle against the RPF regime from DRC, while the RPF/RPA in turn committed systematic killings and human rights violations directed against political opponents of all kinds. Out of these reasons, post-genocide Rwanda is classified as an instance of the ‘partisan obstructive domination’ or ‘You Stay Out’ polity type.
Figure A.16: Map: Rwanda. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

A.17 Sierra Leone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>5,093,570 as of 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Area</td>
<td>71,740 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land</td>
<td>71,620 Sq. Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastline</td>
<td>402 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Freetown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>English (official, regular use limited to literate minority); Mende (principal vernacular in the south); Temne (principal vernacular in the north); Krio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>Guinea: 652 km; Liberia: 306 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>30% Temne; 30% Mende; 10% Krio; 10% Other African (approx.17); 10% Lebanese and Asian; 8% Yimba; 2% Maninka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>60% indigenous beliefs; 30% Muslim; 10% Christian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A.33: Basic Facts and Figures: Sierra Leone

A.17.1 Country and Conflict Information

a) General Background

Freetown was founded in 1787 as a place for freed slaves from the Americas. During the colonization, the British had applied a strategy of indirect rule through using indigenous power structures, leading to strong patterns of patrimonialism. After independence, one-party rule led to economic decline and has caused grievances among the population (see UCDP 2010q).

Despite its neopatrimonial tendencies (see above), Sierra Leone has had more experience with democratic governance than most other African countries in the early years of its existence. The first decade after independence even led to a peaceful shift of power when the APC (‘All People’s Congress’) successfully challenged the SLPP (‘Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party’) in the 1967 national elections. Unfortunately, after this short democratic episode “there followed a decade of turmoil as a torturous series of coups, countercoups, and rigged or boycotted elections led to the 1978 authorization of a single-party regime under President Siaka Stevens” from the APC (Wyrod 2008: 72; see also Hirsch 2001: 460)
147). It was only then that the state became increasingly neopatrimonial, and when Stevens retired in 1985 the country’s economy lay in ruins.

b) Conflict History

Intra-State conflict erupted in Sierra Leone in 1991, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) (later joined by the ‘Armed Forces Revolutionary Council’ – AFRC) invaded and attacked the government, trying to take power. The conflict lasted until 2000. The RUF carried out acts of one-sided violence against civilians (see UCDP 2010q).

In the early 1990s, President Momoh came under increasing pressure for his reluctant attempts towards reestablishing a multiparty system, and APC rule became more and more marked by the abuse of power. On 29 April 1992, a group of officers from the RSLMF (‘Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces’), including a military officer called Valentin Strasser, staged a coup against Momoh. Momoh was exiled in Guinea, and the putschists created an interim government called NPRC (‘National Provincial Ruling Council’) (Berman and Labonte 2006: 145). Strasser became the country’s de facto leader for the upcoming four years (Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 187; Coleman 2008m: 9). While the NPRC initially respected basic civil rights, included civilian officers in their ranks, and took attempts for a re-democratization of the country, it experienced increasing pressure due to the rise of the RUF (‘Revolutionary United Front’). In 1995, the RUF launched its first attack against the capital, Freetown, in order to take over the government, which, in turn, hired the private military company ‘Executive Outcomes’ to counter the attack (Coleman 2008m: 10).

Meanwhile, the NPRC promised to take measures for democratization, but severely lost legitimacy because it denied the eligibility of 57 people to take part in the elections. In early 1996, Strasser was overthrown by Capt. Julius Maada Bio in another coup, who paved the way for elections to take place in February 1996. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah became elected as the new president, and the 1991 constitution was reinstated. A peace agreement (Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone 1996) between Kabbah and RUF leader Foday Sankoh adopted at the end of the year never took effect, and the RUF continued their insurgency (Berman and Labonte 2006: 146, see also John 2007). The peace process was entirely derailed when Sankoh was arrested in March 1997. Becoming increasingly weak, President Kabbah was ousted and forced into exile by yet another military coup, this time led by army general Johnny Paul Koroma. Koroma invited Sankoh and the RUF to participate in a new de facto government named AFRC (‘Armed Forces Revolutionary Council’). International pressure against the new regime was mounting, ultimately leading to international sanctions and a UN authorized military intervention by ECOWAS forces (Berman and Labonte 2006: 148–149; Coleman 2008m: 11).
Kabbah’s administration was reinstalled after months of fighting between pro-Koroma and pro-Kabbah forces. In February 1998, ECOWAS and other pro-Kabbah forces were able to regain control of Freetown, and in March Kabbah was restored to power. Conflict between the AFRC/RUF and government-loyal forces continued, and by December 1998, the AFRC/RUF had managed to capture the diamond-rich Kono district. In January 1999, the rebels invaded Freetown again, dissipating the city in chaos and destruction. When they were ousted by ECOMOG forces three weeks later, more than 50,000 civilians had been killed and more than 5,000 homes destroyed (Coleman 2008m: 12). After this event, pressure on the RUF was rising and the government issued an arrest warrant against Sankoh. The AFRC decided to split with the RUF and support the government in its efforts to capture Sankoh, which succeeded in May 1999. Meanwhile, the RUF continued to control the diamond-rich areas of the country and set forth their rebellion against the government (Coleman 2008m: 12–13). This gave it a relatively strong negotiation position in the peace talks that were held in Lomé, Togo, in mid-1999 (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 94). Two of their demands were met and entered into a second peace agreement (Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone 1999) that was adopted in July 1999: the release of Sankoh, and the participation of the RUF in the government (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 94). The agreement came into effect, but it soon became clear that it constituted a “deeply flawed platform on which to base peace operations in Sierra Leone” (Berman and Labonte 2006: 200).

Roughly at the same time, the ECOMOG engagement faded out after domestic support for the mission in Nigeria – the largest contributor of troops to the mission – faltered, and the United Nations took over by setting up the 11,100 strong UNAMSIL (‘United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone’) force. The RUF rejected stronger international engagement, and was in particular opposed to the UN’s efforts to disarm its troops. The tensions culminated in a hostage crisis in May 2000, during which the RUF took some 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers hostage and shot protestors in front of Foday Sankoh’s home in Freetown. Immediately after this incident, the government issued a warrant to re-arrest Sankoh, which succeeded on 17 May 2000 (see e.g. Berman 2000: 12). Hopes that this would brake the RUF’s backbone, as President Kabbah asserted shortly after Sankoh’s arrest, were misplaced. The RUF continued with their rebellion, and – void of Sankoh’s leadership – split into two factions: the ‘old’ RUF led by General Issah, and a splinter group led by Dennis ‘Superman’ Mingo (Coleman 2008m: 13). This “fracturing of the RUF was a dangerous development as it changed the nature of the conflict, making it more decentralized and more volatile” (Coleman 2008m: 14).

Nonetheless, the conflict lost in intensity over the next months, and by the end of 2000 the terms for a peaceful settlement began to improve. In November 2000, a ceasefire agreement between the government and RUF was signed (Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone 2000). Accompanied with a severe stepping up of the United Nations’ involvement, this ultimately facilitated the end of the fighting. In January 2002, President
Kabbah declared ‘peace’ in his country, although the true challenges – including the integration of thousands of child soldiers – had only started to become visible. In the 2002 presidential elections, Kabbah was re-elected with 70 percent of the votes. His party – the SLLP – won 83 parliamentary seats, followed by 22 seats for the APC. The party formed out of the RUF – the RUFP (‘Revolutionary United Front Party’) – gained a mere 1.7 percent of the votes and was not represented in the parliament (Coleman 2008m: 14–16). In the elections following five years later, in 2007, the APC beat the SLLP in free and fair elections, marking the first instance of a peaceful transfer of power to an opposition party in a post-conflict country in Africa (Kandeh 2008: 607).

The civil war in Sierra Leone reached wide attention due to the notorious use of violence against the civilian population: “Infamous for recruitment of child soldiers, mutilation of civilians, and illicit diamond trafficking, Sierra Leone came to typify the worst elements of contemporary civil conflicts and, to some, all that was wrong with Africa” (Wyrod 2008: 70). Though many seem to favor ‘economic’ causes for explaining the outbreak of the civil war – including rebel leaders’ greed (see e.g. Richards 1996) – these accounts appear unable to explain the incredulous level of violence. As Cramer points out, it appears unconvincing that “[y]oung men could chop off poor farming women’s hands because this ensured that they would not be able to harvest crops when the RUF rebels had passed, so the women could not help government militias […]” (2006: 31). A key role in the conflict in Sierra Leone is attributed to the so called ‘youth’. However, as in other parts of Africa “the term ‘youth’ in Sierra Leone is a political label denoting political contestation and social position rather than biological age”, and it is used “as a label for marginalized young (and not so young) people, rather than for a whole population within a certain age bracket” (Christensen and Utas 2008: 516–517). Already in the 1967 parliamentary elections, the SLPP (and later also the APC) made use of urban youths (‘rarray boys’) in order to intimidate voters (Christensen and Utas 2008: 517).

c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict parties</th>
<th>RUF, AFRC, Kamajors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Conflict ID</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Episode ID</td>
<td>1871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>1991 – 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victorious side</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission mandate: UNOMSIL</td>
<td>“UNOMSIL was established in July 1998 to monitor the military and security situation in Sierra Leone, as well as the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants. It was also asked to assist in monitoring respect for international humanitarian law. UNOMSIL was terminated on 22 October 1999, when the Security Council authorized deployment of a new and significantly larger peacekeeping operation – the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2000d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission mandate: UNAMSIL</td>
<td>“On 22 October 1999, the Security Council established UNAMSIL to cooperate with the Government and the other parties in implementing the Lome Peace Agreement and to assist in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan. On 7 February 2000, the Council revised UNAMSIL’s mandate. It also expanded its size, as it did once again on 19 May 2000 and on 30 March 2001. UNAMSIL successfully completed its mandate in December 2005. It was succeeded by a new mission – the United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) – established by the Security Council to help consolidate peace in the country” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009f).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations;

Table A.34: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Sierra Leone

### A.17.2 Post-conflict situation

The conflict officially came to a close after the adoption of the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement in November 2000. However, when it comes to deciding about Sierra Leone’s post-conflict phase, it may make sense to start already one year earlier and also include the power-sharing arrangement struck between Kabbah and the RUF in 1999 into the picture, as this is a frequently discussed case that contains many important lessons for the dynamics of faulty power-sharing arrangements (see e.g. Mehler 2009; Spears 2002). As a result, at least two different ‘post-conflict’ periods can be distinguished: The short period of the power-sharing government lasting from July 1999 to Sankoh’s arrest in May 2000, and the episode that started with the conclusion of the Abuja Agreement in late 2000 (which can be differentiated further, as discussed below in more detail).
a) The Role of the Formal Government

Despite facing dull prospects for sustainable peace after the official end of the conflict in 2000 (see e.g. Radecke 2009: 22), Sierra Leone today has made considerable progress and has surprised many pessimistic observers. As the International Crisis Group observed in 2007, Sierra Leone today disposes of a “reasonable monopoly over the use of force” (quoted in Radecke 2009: 6). In the following, the role of the formal government in three distinct constellations is discussed: The post-Lomé constellation, the post-Abuja constellation and the subsequent elections held in 2002, and the new constellation emerging with the APC’s victory in the 2007 national elections.

The Post-Lomé Constellation. The first potential post-conflict polity can be seen in the post-1999 Lomé arrangement. Strictly speaking, it is not a post-conflict polity because the conflict officially continued for nearly three years after the conclusion of the agreement. It could therefore safely be dismissed on formal grounds. Yet, the agreement is particularly interesting, because it implemented a wide range of power-sharing measures, and although it did not directly lead to peace, it may have performed other vital functions that have, ultimately, contributed to peace. Binningsbø and Dupuy (2009), for instance, argue that the Lomé Agreement may have been deliberately used by the ruling SLPP in order to marginalize the RUF. The agreement introduced a wide range of power-sharing measures, and even included an amnesty for the (notoriously brutal) RUF leadership. Although the RUF leadership was, from that moment on, represented in the government in Freetown, fighting continued with the RUF still being the main contender (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 90–91). The agreement ultimately collapsed when the RUF took 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers hostage, and RUF rebels shot a number of protesters in front of Foday Sankoh’s home in Freetown shortly thereafter. This led to the removal and arrest of leading RUF personnel, including Sankoh, and paved the way for presidential and parliamentary elections in 2002 (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 90–92). The following quote aptly summarizes the rationale behind the power-sharing deal (for a more detailed overview, see Rashid 2000):

“Both during the Abidjan negotiations in 1996 and the Lomé negotiations in 1999, the RUF’s main demands were a power-sharing government, the vice-presidency for rebel leader Sankoh and the removal of foreign troops from Sierra Leone. The government initially rejected these demands. During the 1996 negotiations, the government had the upper hand militarily and was able to force Sankoh to sign the Abidjan accord even though it included neither power-sharing nor Sankoh’s vice-presidency. […] The RUF’s superior position by 1999 gave Kabbah little choice but to negotiate a peace agreement (Abraham 2004). Both parties realised that the conflict was not winnable. Kabbah was still viewed as the legitimate president of Sierra Leone. However, rejecting negotiations would have led to losing international and regional sympathy” (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 94).
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

One key provision of the power-sharing negotiations was to appoint a lucrative position to Foday Sankoh in order to facilitate an acceptance among the rebels. He was offered the chairmanship over the ‘Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development’ (CMRRD), which at the same time gave him the status of a vice president. In particular, this endowed him with significant control of Sierra Leone’s resource-rich areas. According to Binningsbø and Dupuy, this was “probably the single most important element in convincing the RUF to sign the peace agreement” (2009: 96).

The post-Abuja Constellation. The Abuja Ceasefire Agreement, signed by the government and the RUF in November 2000, put an end to the hostilities. Due to a decisive engagement of the United Nations as part of the UNAMSIL mission the parties stuck to the agreement this time (International Crisis Group 2001c: 1–2). It still took about one year until President Kabbah announced the end of fighting in January 2002, declaring “di war don don” (quoted in Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 91). The elections took place already in May 2002. Obviously, the voters identified the rebels – mostly RUF, but also the AFRC – as the forces most responsible for the civil war, which contributed to Kabbah’s clear victory (see Radecke 2009: 25). The party formed out of the RUF was crushed during the elections and not represented in the parliament (Coleman 2008m: 14–16). In this respect, “[t]he ballot had spoken loud and clear about the people’s rejection of the RUF” (John 2007: 46).

The RUF itself is largely marginalized in today’s post-conflict context. Its former leader Sankoh is dead, and many of the former belligerents today are imprisoned for their atrocities committed in the past. In the 2002 elections many voters considered the opposition parties – APC, RUFP and PLP – as the forces being most responsible for the civil war. This assessment clearly contributed to the SLPP’s and Kabbah clear victories in the parliamentary and presidential elections, respectively (see Radecke 2009: 25). Though support for Kabbah was clearly following ethnic and regional patterns – the SLPP’s power base is predominantly in the south-east, while the APC’s base is in the north-west – the elections essentially created a “one-party, dominant type of parliament” in which the opposition is largely marginalized. The APC’s subsequent abuse of power posed dangers to national unity, and the Kabbah government had been exposed to increasing criticism for its clientelist and corrupt mode of governance:

“Immediately after Kabbah’s election victory, the key ministries […] were delegated to south-easterners. The vice-presidency had been delegated to a southerner in the

10 Under the aegis of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations deployed two missions to Sierra Leone: the ‘United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone’ (UNOMSIL, July 1998 – October 1999) and the ‘United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone’ (UNAMSIL, October 1999 – December 2005). UNOMSIL was a small observer mission with a ‘maximum authorized strength’ of 210 military observers and 35 medical personnel. In contrast, UNAMSIL was of a significantly larger size and based on a more encompassing mandate. It had an initial troop ceiling of 13,000, which was raised twice to a maximum of 17,500 troops in 2003 (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2010).
person of Solomon Berewa. The pattern of such ‘juicy’ political appointments in favour of those from the south-east alienated political elites and people from other geopolitical regions, and gradually eroded support for the ruling SLPP government” (John 2007: 49).

These and other reasons accounted for an increasing alienation of voters with the SLPP. The choice of Solomon Berewa as Kabbah’s successor was unable to disperse peoples’ mistrust in the government. John was remarkably right in his speculation that “[i]n post-war Sierra Leone, having voted for peace in 1996 and 2002, the people will be voting for honest governance and their socio-economic welfare and prosperity” (2007: 51). Though it is too early to assess whether the APC will be able to contribute to these goals, voters were seemingly convinced that the SLPP could not.

The 2007 elections. The national elections that took place on 11 August and 8 September 2007 were surprising in various regards. They were “the first post-conflict elections in Africa in which an incumbent party was defeated” (Kandeh 2008: 607), and are considered “the freest and most participatory in [Sierra Leone’s] history” (Wyrod 2008: 70). In the presidential elections, the incumbent Kabbah was challenged by Koroma, Berewa and Charles Margai (Wyrod 2008: 71). Margai is a former member of the SLPP who had lost the leadership struggle with Kabbah in 1996. As a consequence, he separated and formed his own party, the PMDC (‘People’s Movement for Democratic Change’), which “was to prove a significant challenge to the governing party” (Ohman 2008: 765). The results of the election were clear: “The SLPP was the main loser of the election, losing almost half of its parliamentary seats […] and being forced to fight the presidential run-off elections as the runner-up” (Ohman 2008: 766–767). Though the SLPP’s defeat may have been the result of many factors – including the rising dissatisfaction with the APC – another contributing factor lies in changes of the electoral system since the 2002 election from a proportional representation (PR) to a majoritarian first-past-the-post system. In effect, “[t]his led to strong SLPP districts such as Bonthe losing many of their seats, whereas the Western Area Urban (around the capital of Freetown, with strong support for the All People’s Congress (APC)) increased its allocation from 8 to 17 seats” (Ohman 2008: 765). This changed the post-2007 situation significantly from the post-2002 situation. Unlike the SLPP, “[t]he APC does need the support of other parties in parliament […]” (Ohman 2008: 767). But support comes exclusively from the PMDC, which occupies four minister posts in the government, and not from the SLPP. The latter is effectively excluded from government power now, and with regard to the former belligerents there is a clear situation of dominance present (Ohman 2008: 767).

b) The Role of External Parties

By funding some 80 percent of Sierra Leone’s national budget, the international community greatly contributed to the stabilization of governance in post-war Sierra Leone (Kandeh
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

2008: 605). In total, three groups of external actors became engaged in Sierra Leone during and after the civil war:

ECOWAS.  ECOWAS played a major role in the Sierra Leonean civil war, in particular before the deployment of UNAMSIL. It “took a lead role in restoring the Kabbah government to office” (Hirsch 2001: 151). Nigeria played the main part in the realization of this goal, both in material and political terms. It is estimated that by June 1999, some 12,000 ECOMOG troops were present, with Nigeria possibly contributing as much as 10,000 troops (Berman and Labonte 2006: 151–153). Nigerian commitment drastically declined after the February 1999 elections in Nigeria, which subsequently led to the deployment of UNAMSIL about one year later.

United Nations.  Initially, the United Nations only engaged reluctantly in Sierra Leone. The first mission, UNOMSIL, (deployed in April 1998) was a meager support mission for the ECOWAS operation, consisting “mainly of the deployment of ten military liaison officers” (Berman and Labonte 2006: 150). Only in May 2000, when the conflict was already coming to an end, the United Nations took serious efforts to secure peace through the deployment of UNAMSIL. Its troop ceiling was raised to 13,000 and later to 17,500 – the largest UN peacekeeping mission at that time – and in August the mission was given a robust mandate to “deter and, where necessary, decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by responding robustly to any hostile action or threat of imminent and direct use of force” (U.N. Security Council 2000d; see also Berman and Labonte 2006: 164–165).

United Kingdom.  As the former colonial power, the United Kingdom also played a central role in supporting the efforts for peace in Sierra Leone, offering wide-ranging support, which included “paying almost all the costs of the 1996 election” and “deploying 700 combat forces to Freetown in the wake of the RUF’s kidnapping of UNAMSIL peacekeepers” (Hirsch 2001: 153; see also Berman and Labonte 2006: 180).

c) The Warring Factions

The RUF constituted the main rebel group in Sierra Leone. They had their origins in the 1980s, when Libyan leader al-Qadhafi funded a range of African revolutionary movements in order to support their struggle against governments backed by the US. This included Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaore, Liberia’s Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh from the RUF. It is striking that the RUF lacked any independent political identity that went beyond its externals sponsors: “[T]he RUF lacks any independent political legitimacy. It is effectively controlled by Liberia’s President Taylor, who uses it to advance his regional ambitions” (International Crisis Group 2001d: 13). The rise of the RUF rebels can only be understood in the context of a quickly progressing context of state dissolution starting in the early 1990s (Coleman 2008m: 10). Links between Taylor and the RUF were strong, in particular
as the latter supported the initial campaign of Taylor’s NPFL against Samuel Doe in Liberia in 1989. “In return, Taylor provided a base in Liberia for the RUF to launch its ‘revolution’ with the help of 200 Burkinabè regular soldiers and NPFL veterans on 23 March 1991” (Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 185).

What is striking about the RUF is that it enjoyed little public support – unlike the NPFL in Liberia. Its main constituency was a marginalized ‘lumpen proletariat’, in particular “young illicit miners in the diamond-producing areas”, which gave rise to an “unholy alliance of marginals, criminals, and social misfits” (Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 186). Another difference to the NPFL is that the RUF “had no concrete program or systematic explanation of its objectives except the vague and generalized pronouncements of its leader, Foday Sankoh, to terrified residents in Kailahun” (Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 185). The rise of the RUF therefore has probably less to do with the political prospects it offered than with a combination of generally favorable conditions. By and large, the RUF was able to “capitalize on the absence of international resolve, an incoherent strategy, a poorly designed peacekeeping mission command and control structure, and discordant agendas” (Berman and Labonte 2006: 159). The general disagreement about the root causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone is also reflected in interpretations of the RUF’s character. Some see the RUF simply as a relatively unorganized bunch of youths, while others see it as a tightly organized military organization:

“Some see the rebels as angry, uncoordinated youths who have taken up arms to fight corruption and hopelessness in their country. Others see them as a highly organised armed group, bent solely on its own enrichment and power, that has skilfully walked the line between war and peace, and kept the international community guessing, for ten years” (International Crisis Group 2001c: 9).

Due to its marginalization in the 2002 elections, the RUFP essentially ceased to be a contender on its own. After its leader Sankoh was arrested, the RUF split up into two factions – the ‘old’ RUF led by General Issah, and a splinter group led by Dennis ‘Superman’ Mingo (Coleman 2008m: 13). This made its transfer to a political party in 2002 extremely difficult. Nonetheless, the RUF still constituted a potential threat to security, in particular since there was the constant possibility RUF hard-liners would collaborate with those RUF fighters who had gone into exile to Liberia (see International Crisis Group 2002d: 9). RUF’s former ally, the AFRC, did fare little better in the elections. Its former leader Johnny Paul Koroma received three percent in the presidential polls, and his party, the ‘People’s Liberation Party’ (PLP) received two parliamentary seats only (International Crisis Group 2002d: 9). The International Crisis Group considered this outcome both “surprising and alarming”, since a high percentage of people in the security sector – including the army and the police – voted for Johnny Paul Koroma. In their eyes, this “demonstrated the potential for sharp division between the SLPP leadership and the security forces” (2002d: 9). Before the 2007 elections, it has merged with the APC, and therefore some parts of what formerly constituted the RUF is part of the government today.
A.17.3 Assessment

**Post-Lomé Constellation.** The short post-Lomé period can, for the reasons outlined above, be treated as its own post-conflict polity case. This period is marked by an extremely faulty and obstructive attempt for power-sharing, in which the belligerents were formally part of the same government, but at the same time continued to challenge themselves on the battlefield. Considering this situation as a case of *obstructive power-sharing* should be relatively obvious. What is more difficult to assess is how to deal with the engagement of external actors. At the time of the Lomé Agreement, ECOWAS maintained a strong peace force in the country and had previously played a crucial role for re-installing Kabbah in office. However, there is reason to argue that their engagement became more mediative in the post-Lomé phase. After the Nigerian elections in February 1999, support for the mission dropped drastically, and UNAMSIL took over already in October, taking a decisive yet mediative stance. Out of these reasons, the post-Lomé constellation is classified as an instance of the mediated, obstructive power-sharing or *‘Doomed to Share’* type.

**Post-Abuja Constellation.** The post-Abuja constellation is more unequivocally a post-conflict case. It led to the complete marginalization of the RUF and the renewed democratic legitimation of the incumbent President Kabbah and his party, the SLPP (‘Sierra Leone People’s Party’) (Coleman 2008m: 14–16). The election created a situation of *domination* by one of the former warring parties (the government side) amidst continuing obstructive relations. The rebel group was severely marginalized by Sankoh’s final arrest and their poor showing in the elections, but nonetheless remained a potentially dangerous force. President Kabbah himself did little to foster more constructive relations with his former enemies. Once in power, he was soon criticized for the exclusionary system of rule he established. Hence, the relations between the former belligerents can also be considered *obstructive* in the post-Abuja period. However, the engagement of external actors in the post-conflict phase has not changed significantly. As already before, UNAMSIL mainly aimed at helping to implement the provisions of the ceasefire agreement and contribute to the overall stability of the situation in Sierra Leone. Therefore, it can be considered *mediative*. Out of these reasons, this situation is classified as an instance of the ‘mediated, obstructive domination’ or *‘The Winner Took it All’* type.

**Post-2007 Constellation.** The situation that emerged after the APC’s victory in the elections is the third distinct post-conflict episode that can be observed in Sierra Leone. Since it led to a change in government, it can be treated as a polity type of its own. In many aspects, this polity type differed from its direct predecessor: First, UNAMSIL troops had withdrawn in 2005, which greatly reduced the influence of external actors on the ground. Yet, the international community was still involved, for instance through supervising the elections and continuing to provide humanitarian and development aid. Second, the relations between the domestic parties have changed significantly. Although Kabbah had
used all means in order to create a one-party state, he was not reelected. Unlike in many other cases discussed in this dissertation (for instance Imomali Rakhmonov in Tajikistan discussed below), Kabbah was unable to gain a second term of office through wide-spread electoral fraud, and he has accepted his defeat in the elections. Thus, there is reason to argue that the relations between the domestic parties in Sierra Leone have slowly begun to become constructive. Out of these reasons, this situation is classified as an instance of the mediated, constructive domination or ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ type.
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

A.17.4 Map of Sierra Leone

Figure A.17: Map: Sierra Leone. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
A.18 Tajikistan

A.18.1 Country and Conflict Information

a) General Background

Tajikistan reached its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The old ruling elite remained in power and a former Communist was elected president. This triggered resistance from various anti-communist groups – democrats, nationalists and Islamic parties. Together, they formed the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), a rebel group whose aim was to overthrow the government (see UCDP 2010r).

Tajikistan is an artificial creation of the Soviet Union in Central Asia. It was created as an autonomous republic within Uzbekistan, which was itself created as a Soviet Socialist Republic in 1924. Tajikistan is a mountainous region with most of its territory lying above 3,000 meters. For geographical reasons, the different parts of the country have historically experienced little interaction with one another, which accounts for the emergence of distinct regional cultures (International Crisis Group 2001e: 1–2). As Tetsuro Iji puts it, “[n]o strong sense of national identity existed among the Tajikistanis, whose identity was based rather on affiliation to a particular region” – a crucial factor in the civil war that broke out after independence (2001: 359). Two provinces – the region of Kulyob and the northern region of Leninabad – constituted “the pillars of Soviet Tajikistan” (International Crisis Group 2009b: 2). Tajikistan gained independence in 1991, and soon thereafter the civil war broke out (International Crisis Group 2001e: 1–2).

b) Conflict History

The United Tajik Opposition began its fight against the government in 1992, and after conclusion of several peace agreements the conflict was terminated by 1996 and the UTO was represented in a power-sharing government. However, this triggered opposition from another rebel group – the Movement for Peace in Tajikistan – which renewed the fight against the government in 1998. They were quickly defeated, and the conflict has remained inactive since 1999 (see UCDP 2010r).

The civil war in Tajikistan started after the former Communist leader Rakhmon Nabiev from the Leninabad Province was elected president in 1991. The opposition gained about 30 percent of the votes, but the election was considered flawed and the opposition parties challenged their results. After the protests had been ongoing for nearly one year, President Nabiev created a presidential guard with the aim of crushing the opposition. Fighting broke out, but Russian troops intervened and the regime was forced to form
Appendix A  Characterization and Classification of the Cases

a coalition government in which the opposition would hold eight out of 24 ministerial posts (International Crisis Group 2001e: 2). Yet, after elites from both the Leninabad and Kulyob Provinces rejected the arrangement, fighting became widespread, and Nabiev was forced to resign. Subsequently, the little known Imomali Rakhmonov from Kulyob, member of the Popular Front, seized the capital Dushanbe in December 1992 (see Iji 2001: 360; International Crisis Group 2001e: 2). Rakhmonov mobilized public support through selling his coup as an active resistance against the attempt to establish an Islamic state in Tajikistan, which secured him military support from both Russia and Uzbekistan (International Crisis Group 2009b: 3). The new de facto regime triggered great resistance from a group called UTO (United Tajik Opposition), which initiated an armed struggle against the government in 1992. Most fighting had already ended by February 1993, although the civil war officially continued until 1997 (International Crisis Group 2001e: 2). Despite its relatively short duration, the war was of high intensity. An estimated 60,000 to 100,000 persons died in the fighting, and more than 600,000 were internally displaced. UN-administered negotiations between President Rakhmonov and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), Said Abdullo Nuri, culminated in the June 1997 ‘General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan’ signed in Moscow (International Crisis Group 2001e: 2).

c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict parties</th>
<th>UTO, Movement for Peace in Tajikistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Conflict ID</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Episode ID</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>1992 – 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victorious side</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>UNMOT (United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan); December 1994 – May 2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mission Mandate: “UNMOT was established in 1994 to monitor the ceasefire agreement between the Government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition. Following the signing by the parties of the 1997 general peace agreement, UNMOT’s mandate was expanded to help monitor its implementation. The mission successfully accomplished the assigned tasks and on 15 May 2000 its mandate was terminated” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2000c).

Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Table A.35: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Tajikistan

A.18.2 Post-conflict situation

According to the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’, the civil war in Tajikistan lasted from 1992 to 1996 (see above). Thus, the settlement of the conflict in 1997 can be taken as the starting point for Tajikistan’s post-conflict period. Although another insurgency started shortly thereafter, it was defeated relatively quickly and did not leave lasting marks in Tajikistan’s political environment. In the following, the post-conflict situation starting with the settlement in 1997 is characterized in more detail.

a) The Role of the Formal Government

After the successful putsch in 1992, the de facto government under Rakhmonov initially enjoyed no democratic legitimacy of any sort. However, in the November 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections, Rakhmonov was elected, winning “an unlikely 97 per cent on an even more implausible 98 per cent turnout” (International Crisis Group 2001e: 4). He has managed to retain the presidency until today. In order to appear more ‘western’, he changed his name to Rakhmon in the meantime by removing the Slavic suffix (International Crisis Group 2009b: 2). Ever since he took power, he has embodied an extremely centralized and personalized system of rule, in which “his presidential administration is the source of all power in the country, while most ministers are little more than channels of communication to the president, or implementers of his will” (International Crisis Group 2009b: 2). This is unlikely to change in the near future:

Rakhmon seems now to be aiming to remain president for life. A change to the constitution in 2003 extended the presidential term from five to seven years, with the provision that the president could serve two consecutive terms. Rakhmon stood for election under the new rules in November 2006. Both government officials and opposition activists believe he plans to run again in 2013, and will find a way to extend his rule after that date if his health permits” (International Crisis Group 2009b: 4).

The Tajik state has variously been described as a ‘virtual state’ that is struck by corruption, rent-seeking and patronage. As in many other poor countries – be it in Central Asia or in Africa – control of the state sector is one of the very few opportunities for elites to enrich themselves. The International Crisis Group recently contended: “It is no coincidence that the wealthiest people are almost all in the government: access to state funds, including
through the misappropriation of budgetary allocations, is a key source of enrichment” (2009b: 15). Not surprisingly, Rakhmon’s exclusive hold on power has also set back the effectiveness of the power-sharing arrangement adopted in 1997. The General Agreement provided for members of the UTO to be co-opted “into the structures of the executive branch, including the ministries, agencies, local government, judiciary and law enforcement bodies in accordance with a quota” (Government of the Republic of Tajikistan 1997, Art. 3). However, observers generally agree that the government’s commitment to these provisions has never been genuine and has hardly limited the power of the Rakhmon administration in any meaningful sense: “The government and its strongmen feel they won the civil war and see little need to make more than cosmetic concessions on the power-sharing issue” (Smith 1999: 247). For instance, soon after being implemented, Rakhmon’s cronies effectively occupied all key positions in the government, and “opposition commanders have gradually been removed from their positions” (Heathershaw 2009b: 1315; see also Heathershaw 2007: 220; Lynch 2001: 63).

b) The Role of External Parties

Throughout the conflict, a number of individual states was engaged in seeking a settlement for the conflict in Tajikistan, most notably Russia and Iran: “Russia was the guarantor of the survival of the Rakhmonov regime in both economic and military terms, whereas Iran has cultural and linguistic affinities with Tajikistan and was the major foreign supporter of the Islamic opposition” (Iji 2005: 192). The United Nations were engaged between 1994 and 2000 with an observer mission in order to monitor the ceasefire between the government and the opposition. In this role, they cooperated closely with regional parties, including the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Iji 2005: 195–197).

In the post-conflict phase, external actors have been key for securing the survival of the regime. Though the regime itself is weak and “could, theoretically speaking, collapse at any moment”, Rakhmon has used every opportunity to present himself as the only political alternative in the country, and signaled to the international community to continue their financial efforts in order to prevent the regime from collapsing (International Crisis Group 2009b: 19). In this sense, the regime has successfully used “its helplessness as a lever” (International Crisis Group 2009b: 19). However, it must also be noted that “Tajikistan is a very low priority in most world capitals”, and that western donors have limited stakes in the country’s future development (International Crisis Group 2009b: 20).

c) The Warring Parties

Popular Front of Tajikistan. The PTF (‘Popular Front of Tajikistan’) emerged in the Kulyob region out of opposition against Nabiev’s Communist government, and is seen as the “incubator of the civil war” (International Crisis Group 2009b: 2). The region
then represented the “centre of resistance to the new non-communist government”. It had effectively seceded from the central government in 1992 and built up parallel state structures, which included a central government and its own militia group, led by Sangak Safarov. It received heavy backing from some other former Soviet republics, most notably Russia and Uzbekistan. The militia later renamed itself into Popular Front, and was a “heavily armed though poorly disciplined military force […] famous as much for their looting and atrocities as their combat skills” (International Crisis Group 2009b: 2). Although it initially challenged the central government, it came to represent the government side itself after its successful 1992 coup.

United Tajik Opposition (UTO). The UTO was a coalition of ethnic groups from the Garm and Gorno-Badakhshan regions, comprised of both liberal, democratic elements and Islamists. They were opposed to the political domination of the country by Kulyob and Leninabad groups, which Nabiev’s presidency embodied, and hence united in their goal of overthrowing the government (International Crisis Group 2003f: 13). The relationship between the UTO and the government in the post-conflict context is clearly obstructive: “The president has gradually limited their powers and enforced the state’s writ, but in some areas success has been only partial” (International Crisis Group 2004g: 1).

A.18.3 Assessment

Ever since Rakhmon took power in Tajikistan, the government has boiled down to the presidency, who has been the only political authority in the country. Political opposition has been harassed and elections have constantly been manipulated so as to secure the victory for the president. Despite the presence of formal power-sharing, the role of the formal government in Tajikistan must therefore be considered a case of de facto domination in which the opposition’s scope of action is severely curtailed. The relations between the former warring parties must overall be considered obstructive, although Tajikistan is certainly not as high up the scale as other obstructive post-conflict cases in this regard. Leaders of the UTO – the main rebel faction in the civil war – were co-opted into the government at the end of the war, which indicates a certain willingness to accept the status quo. However, this form of elite accommodation frustrated those who stood outside of the deal and who have since then repeatedly resisted central authority. In addition, Rakhmon has more and more attempted to hollow out the power-sharing provisions over time, which has given rise to further frustration among the excluded opposition. The rise of another armed insurgency in 1998 can be seen as a strong indicator for the general dissatisfaction with the incumbent regime. Therefore, despite the fact that some key elites from the initial rebel group UTO accepted Rakhmon’s policy of accommodation, it appears most plausible to regard the relations between the former warring parties as being obstructive. The manner of external engagement, finally, has changed significantly during Tajikistan’s post-conflict period. The outbreak of the war in Afghanistan can be seen as the crucial turning point
in this regard. Before, the situation had been marked by a pronounced indifference of the west, which appeared willing to leave the country within Russia’s sphere of influence. This has changed significantly after the international engagement in Afghanistan, in the course of which Tajikistan gained significantly in strategic importance for the west. Therefore, these two phases are considered as distinct post-conflict polity cases here:

**The Situation before the ‘War on Terrorism’ (1996-2001).** Although some external actors (most notably) Russia supported the incumbent regime in a partisan manner during the war, their engagement in the post-conflict phase (before 2001) must overall be regarded as mediative. Although one can certainly assume that Russia had a tacit preference for the incumbent regime, there is little evidence that it supported the ruling party in a systematic and intentional manner after the end of the war. In combination with the two factors identified above (political domination and obstructive relations), Tajikistan between 1996 and 2001 is thus classified as a ‘mediated, obstructive domination’ or ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity case.

**The Situation after 2001.** After the ‘war against terrorism’ which was proclaimed by the United States after 11 September 2001, Tajikistan suddenly gained in strategic important. There is strong indication that external actors have since then maintained a vested interest in the stability and survival of the Rakhmon regime. Two reasons played a role here: **First,** although Rakhmon enjoys, at best, a dubious democratic legitimacy and only represents the interests of a small fraction of the population from the Kulyob region, he is arguably the only force which can guarantee stability in present-day Tajikistan. **Second,** he has successfully portrayed himself as the only power being able to repel Islamic influence in the country, which secures him Western attention and support (see International Crisis Group 2009b: 3). This accounted for external engagement to become partisan since late 2001. In combination with the two characteristics identified above (political domination and obstructive relations), Tajikistan since 2001 is considered as an instance of the ‘partisan obstructive domination’ or ‘You Stay Out’ polity type.

A.18.4 Map of Tajikistan
Figure A.18: Map: Tajikistan. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
Appendix B

Detailed Overview of the Typification Process

The following section gives a more detailed account of the typification process than the one contained in section 1.2.3. As already noted, the process was roughly based on a four-stage model for constructing so-called ‘empirically grounded’ typologies\(^1\) formulated by Susann Kluge. It contains the following steps: (1) establishing relevant analytical dimensions, (2) classifying cases and analyzing empirical regularities, (3) analyzing the context/coherence of the classes and reducing them into materially relevant types, (4) characterizing the types in an empirically rich manner (1999: 260–288; see also Kelle and Kluge 2010: 91–107; Kluge 2000). These four steps are now described in more detail.

**Deriving an Inductive, Exploratory Typology (Taxonomy).** The first step involved in formulating a typology of post-conflict polities was mainly inductive. Based on the question *by which clusters of attributes is the phenomenon structured?*, the purpose was to identify obvious structural differences between different post-conflict countries based on a subset of cases. It included the following cases (in alphabetical order): Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Côte d’Ivoire, East Timor, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone. They were mainly analyzed on the basis of information from the UCDP Database (UCDP 2010a), the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2010), and the ‘UCDP/Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ (version 4-2008). The cases were analyzed on the basis of the analytical framework (see 2.1.2) – i.e. with respect to the role of formal government, the role of external actors and the role of the former warring parties in the post-conflict phase. The aim of this analysis was to identify structural (and not merely gradual) differences with regard to the interactions unfolding between the different post-conflict actors. This led to a rough ‘taxonomy’ of post-conflict polities, which consisted of four different types. They were called ‘polarized coexistence’, ‘partisan intervention’, ‘constructive power-sharing’, and ‘opportunistic power-sharing’. They are described below in more detail:

\(^1\)In German: “Stufenmodell empirisch begründeter Typenbildung” (Kluge 1999).
1. **Polarized coexistence**: In a ‘polarized coexistence’ polity, the former warring parties are strictly isolated from one another, sometimes to the extreme that each of them control a fraction of the country’s territory. External actors are typically trying to make sure that each of the conflict parties respects the other’s sphere of influence – for instance through maintaining a demilitarized zone established between the two territories – while at the same time encouraging a peaceful dialogue between the parties. As only one party is represented in the formal government, there is no power-sharing taking place. The clearest example for this type is Côte d’Ivoire, where an armed conflict between two rebel groups (MPCI, ‘Coalition of Northern Soldiers’ and FN, ‘Forces Nouvelles’) against the government effectively split the country into two parts, with the north being held by the rebels and the south held by the government. After a peace-agreement in 2004 and the deployment of a UN mission (UNOCI), efforts concentrated mainly on establishing and maintaining a buffer zone between the two antagonistic groups. Although there were attempts for power-sharing between the groups – and a formal power-sharing arrangement was put in place – true cooperation between the former belligerents has been minimal.

2. **Partisan Intervention**: In a ‘partisan intervention’ polity, the relationship between the warring parties is highly antagonistic – just like in the case of polarized coexistence. However, the main difference is the role played by external actors. They are no neutral arbitrators, but engage in a highly partisan manner by openly supporting one of the parties they consider legitimate. Often – though not necessarily always – the party enjoying the support of external actors also holds formal authority, while the other party questions the legitimacy of the government and formulates competing claims to power. The clearest example for this situation is Afghanistan, with external actors supporting a fragile formal government considered illegitimate by large portions of the population, while simultaneously actively fighting against the Taliban and other insurgent groups considered illegitimate by the international community. With reservations, this type also applies to East Timor, Kosovo, Iraq and Cambodia.

3. **Constructive power-sharing**: A ‘constructive power-sharing’ polity is characterized by a real (i.e. not merely formal) sharing of governmental authority between the former belligerents. In addition, the parties by and large maintain a constructive relationship, with both of them being interested in maintaining peaceful relations. The role of external actors is largely mediative and supportive. At a first glance, Angola is a typical example for constructive power-sharing that was supported by external actors in a mediative manner. Surprisingly, however, the number of cases clearly fulfilling this category is small. More often than not, formal power-sharing arrangements do not lead to an effective sharing of governmental authority between the former warring parties, and often the parties remain in an obstructive relationship.
4. **Opportunistic power-sharing**: Finally, in an ‘opportunistic power-sharing’ polity, all relevant conflict parties are officially represented in the government, which is supported by external actors. Yet, unlike in a truly constructive power-sharing polity, not all of the parties are truly interested in maintaining peace. There is some indication that at least some of them only refrain from resort to violence because taking part in the power-sharing arrangement promises personal benefits for them. A good example for this type is Liberia (after the second civil war). Though a formal power-sharing arrangement had been established after the conflict’s end in 2004, the former warlords continued to use the country’s political institutions for advancing their private benefits.

**Extracting Essential Analytical Dimensions (Property Space).** The goal of the second step was to transform the descriptive types identified in the first step to a higher level of abstractness and generalizability. This was achieved by developing a heuristic typology based on abstract analytical dimensions, which was directly based on the taxonomy developed in step one. Assuming that the latter depicts relevant differences between cases, it was asked: *by which combinations of attributes could these differences be systematically expressed?* In other words, the goal was to explicate those analytical dimensions on which the first typology was already implicitly based, and combine them to a heuristic typology portraying all logically possible combinations between the different attributes of the variables. Through this procedure, classifying cases could be expected to become easier and more systematic. This led to the identification of the three analytical dimensions similar to those contained in section 2.2 above (‘effectiveness of power-sharing’, ‘external actors’ degree of partiality’, ‘relations between the former belligerents’). Combining these three dimensions leads to a heuristic typology containing eight logically possible types of post-conflict polities.

**Forming Semantically Meaningful Types.** The added value of the heuristic typology is that it enables an easier and more systematic typification of cases. This is of great help when attempting to classify a large number of cases, as it was the case with the 18 post-conflict countries that were classified in the context of this dissertation. However, relying exclusively on a heuristic is in some regards dangerous. Most importantly, it can be expected that the different dimensions of the heuristic are simply imposed onto cases in an overly positivist manner, thereby turning a blind eye to the true dynamics that can be encountered in a specific case. Although the different types contained in the heuristic are empirically grounded, this is not yet the same as deriving semantically meaningful types of post-conflict polities. For this purpose, it was necessary to condense the property space such that it contains (a) only those types that are internally coherent, and (b) those types that actually appear in the real world. Achieving this required to engage in a process of what Elman (2005) called *compression* and *expansion*. The former concept implies
to erase all cells that appear logically inconclusive, whereas logical expansion implies adding classes based on an abstract combination of the different analytical dimensions. By the same token, empirical compression means erasing cells that do not occur in the real world,\(^2\) while empirical expansion is about adding meaningful classes for those cases that are not adequately represented by an existing property space (see Elman 2005).

The empirical basis for this exercise were the 18 post-conflict countries contained in appendix A. They contributed significantly to an adaptation and refinement of earlier versions of the typology. During this analysis, it became apparent that some cases fit better into the existing types than others. Through the qualitative analysis of a broad range of cases, a number of misfits and potential pitfalls could be identified and resolved. In particular, classifying those cases in which external actors not only intervened in a mediative or partisan manner, but where they effectively became the supreme authority of the post-conflict polity – for instance as part of a transitional administration mission – turned out to be particularly problematic. The typology therefore needed to be adapted such that cases of transitional authority could be subsumed. The simplest way to achieve a good fit between the dimensions of the typology and empirical reality was to rename the dimension *External Actors’ Degree of Partiality* to the more general *Influence of External Parties*, and to add the category *Executive Supremacy* to this variable. As this new category does not make sense when combined with power-sharing – which by definition implies that the former conflict parties jointly constitute the formal government – the new category *Surpremacy* is treated as a special case of *domination*. The typology and its different polity types are discussed in further detail in the next section. This adds two new possible polity types to the typology. At the end of this process stood the typology consisting of six types of post-conflict polities, which is depicted in table 2.1 on page 44.

**Characterizing the Types.** The final step in the establishment of the typology aimed at a rich empirical characterization of the types by choosing two typical cases for each of them. The results of this process are presented in chapters three to seven above.

\(^2\)However, although these cases do not form part of the actual empirically grounded typology, the classes erased because they do not occur in the real world should still be retained in the property space since they could potentially occur at some point in the future.
Appendix C

Overview of Conflict Theories

This chapter aims at giving an overview of relevant literature about the broader complex of civil wars and post-war interventions. This necessarily requires selectivity; consequently not all aspects of potential relevance are covered or discussed in sufficient detail. ‘Civil war is not a stupid thing’, one recent book claims in its title (Cramer 2006). This is indeed a provocative claim, but it underlines that civil wars often make sense for those who wage it, and that they may generally perform important functions as catalysts of social change. The aim of this section is to shed some light on the complex phenomenon of internal warfare. Though this dissertation is mainly on the effects of intervention in post-war situations and not on civil wars, these two phenomena are obviously intimately related: Without internal armed conflict there is no need for post-conflict intervention in the first place. A profound understanding of conflict dynamics is therefore critical for everything else that follows. More importantly even, much of the literature on post-conflict intervention is disturbingly atheoretical, with the greater part consisting of “How-to-do-it books” aiming at finding the ‘right’ recipe or determining the appropriate sequencing of interventionist policies (Gilady and Russett 2002: 394; Seibel 2008: 501).\footnote{Examples are the works by Paris (1997, 2004), who starts off with a theoretical critique of liberal statebuilding but in the end provides a universalist and somewhat simplistic peacebuilding recipe himself, which he calls institutionalization before liberalization. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) are a notable exception as they at least differentiate between two different conflict structures (coordination vs. cooperation conflicts), for which they suggest different peacebuilding strategies.} Classical IR theory, too, is of limited use when it comes to civil wars (see Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 41). What these exclusively policy-oriented accounts often ignore is that ‘post-conflict’ is not synonymic for the absence of conflict; it can at best be about a continuation of conflict by other means – to reverse the famous phrase by Clausewitz.\footnote{The 19th century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz made the famous statement that ‘war is the continuation of policy by other means’ (see e.g. van Creveld 2002: 12).} Conflict theories are therefore of central importance to the subject matter, as they provide the theoretical backing for questions that are key to successful post-conflict intervention: why does conflict break out, how does it end, and why does it recur? Section C.1 covers theories about the causes and explanations of civil wars, and section C.2 deals with theories about conflict termination and recurrence.
C.1 The Causes of Armed Conflict

Shedding light on the origins of armed conflict belongs to the core of the discipline of International Relations. Although scholars have for centuries been looking for answers to the question why people begin to fight, a satisfactory answer has not yet been found. Unlike in some other sub disciplines of International Relations, there are “few law-like propositions, limited predictive capacities and no consensus as to what the causes of war are”, and it is highly contested “whether it is possible to generalize about anything as complex and context-dependent as war” (Levy 2002: 350). Despite these difficulties, there is no lack of theories attempting exactly that. All major disciplines forming part of the larger area of social sciences and humanities have developed conflict theories. In fact, the abundance is so overwhelming that becomes difficult to put them in some meaningful order.

There are at least three ways to classify conflict theories: with respect to (a) the level of analysis on which the theory focuses; (b) a theory’s metatheoretical basis; or (c) the nature of its substantive arguments. Of those, the last category is least useful for devising a systematic inventory of conflict theories, as the number of different categories can be endless. Regarding the levels of analysis, a distinction between individual, intrastate, and international or systemic levels (Bonacker and Imbusch 2006: 115–120) appears relatively uncontroversial. Finally, when it comes to a theory’s metatheoretical claims, a distinction between four different categories appears useful in the context of conflict studies: rational choice, constructivism, essentialism, and structuralism (see Kaufmann 2005). Since each metatheoretical perspective can (and does) make arguments on different levels of analysis, it appears helpful to combine the two perspectives into a common framework of analysis. This promises a systematic way for distinguishing between different sub-groups of theories that depart from the same metatheoretical basis. In the following sections, the four metatheoretical perspectives are discussed with respect to the three levels of analysis.

C.1.1 Rationalism

In the past two decades, the field of conflict studies has increasingly been dominated by rational-choice explanations (see also Cramer 2002: 1846; Walt 1999: 5). Theories

---

3 Note that ‘system’ can have two largely incompatible meanings. The first is descriptive and views a system simply as a constellation consisting of various sub-entities, the other is functionalist and views a system as an entity whose existence and stability is the unintentional reference point of all actions within the system (see Zürn 1992: 41). Unless otherwise stated, systemic here refers to the international system understood in a descriptive sense.

4 But see for instance Christopher Daase’s critique (Daase 1999). The systemic and the national level have been prominently discussed already in Singer (1961).

5 Other distinctions would be those proposed for instance by Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (1997), who distinguish between interest-based, power-based and knowledge-based approaches. Doyle and Sambanis draw a distinction between rational choice, constructivist, economic, psychological and political theories (2006: 31–32).
rooted in the rational tradition are based on methodological individualism as the underlying ontological perspective, which attempts to explain structures and processes by reference to actors’ behavior (Zürn 1992: 36). Actors need not be individuals, but can well be corporate actors – social entities acting as if they were single entities. Furthermore, actions are held to be intentional – they are explained through their intended consequences, no matter whether they are ultimately realized or not (Zürn 1992: 40).

At least three broad understandings of rationalism are present, depending on the rigidity of the underlying assumptions. In the narrowest understanding, rational choice covers only those theories that deal with strategic interaction between individuals, mostly analyzed through game-theoretic models. Stephen M. Walt is a proponent of this view, arguing that models in which individual utility maximization occurs against an “exogenous, noncalculating environment” do not form part of rational choice at all (1999: 10). In a second viewpoint occupying the center position, rational choice can simply be viewed as a methodological approach that explains outcomes in terms of “individual goal-seeking under constraints”, which can be “technological, institutional, or arise from interdependencies among actors’ choices” (Snidal 2002: 10). In this broader understanding, rational choice is simply based on the assumption that agents “maximize their preferences in a microrational way” (Kaufmann 2005: 181), which can well happen against a “non-calculating environment”. It is furthermore assumed that actors’ preferences are complete and transitory and that they always seek to maximize their utility given certain external constraints. Since both groups of theories are based on economic principles like cost-benefit calculations, they can be subsumed under the heading economic rational choice theories (e.g. Doyle and Sambanis 2006). The third group is constituted by political rational theories (Sambanis 2002), which explain rebellion “as a way to redress grievance” stemming from “political oppression, collapsing institutions, system transition, or informational problems” (Sambanis 2002: 223). Political rational choice theories clearly differ from economic theories in that the assumption of self-seeking behavior is collapsed, pointing to a different conception of rationality. Using Max Weber’s distinction, it can be argued that economic theories capture actions in terms of instrumental rationality (“Zweckrationalität”), whereas political theories imply a particular form of value rationality (“Wertrationalität”) (Weber [1922] 2006: §2). Nonetheless, the assumption of intentional behavior holds in both versions: actions can be explained by their intended consequences, which can be judged either in

---

6Note that the goals are not necessarily restricted to “self-regarding or material interests”, but could potentially include “other-regarding and normative or ideational ‘goals’” (Snidal 2002: 75).

7Microeconomic theory assumes further that ‘more is always better’, i.e. that consuming more of a certain good produces a higher absolute utility, although the marginal utility gained from consuming an additional unit is decreasing as the consumption of that good increases (see e.g. Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2001).

8Weber distinguishes four types of social action: Instrumentally-rational action is “determined by expectations as to the behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings; these expectations are used as ‘conditions’ or ‘means’ for the attainment of the actor’s own rationally pursued and calculated ends”; value-rational action is “determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects of success; affectual
Appendix C  Overview of Conflict Theories

normative (‘which consequence is good?’) or in instrumental terms (‘which consequence is good for me?’). However, these differences between economic and political approaches lead to decisively different substantive claims about the causes of armed conflict. This has been captured most bluntly in David Collier’s and Anke Hoeffler’s work, in which they reduce the explanatory focus of economic theories to ‘greed’ and that of political theories to ‘grievance’ (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; 2004). Although this is overstated, it underlines the necessity for a differential treatment of the two branches. For all three levels of analysis, economic and political theories are therefore discussed separately.

On the individual level, rational choice theories on armed conflict generally try to explain why it is rational for individuals to take part in an insurgency. Economic theories focus on the general constraints and opportunities individuals are facing for explaining their decision to join or not to join an insurgency. In this reading, civil wars are likely to occur whenever for a particular agent the expected utility of fighting exceeds the expected utility of maintaining peace. Armed conflict at large can be explained by the private gains it produces, which may render it rational for some groups to wage war although it is collectively suboptimal (see Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 43). In short – as Cramer somewhat ironically notes – conflict can be expected when “homo oeconomicus goes to war” (Cramer 2006: 124 /yaonely; see also Cramer 2002). Scholars typically refer to Grossman (1991) and Hirshleifer (1995) as the pioneers, other important contributions include Fearon (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (1996 and 2003). Political theories instead focus on the motives or ‘grievances’ compelling people to fight, irrespective of their expected gains and opportunity costs. From this perspective, it would be rational to join an insurgency if the perceived grievances are tense enough to motivate individual action for changing matters towards the better. Scholars rejecting economic concepts of rationality have used this as a pattern for explaining the dynamics involved in particular conflicts, for instance that in West Africa. As Abdullah and Rashid argue, “[i]n both Liberia and Sierra Leone, youths, students, and other subaltern forces learned that a change of government was impossible through the ballot box” (2004: 176).

Theories on the intrastate level focus on the domestic context of states for explaining their likelihood of experiencing a civil war. Economic theories tend to focus on opportunity structures in which individual interest maximization occurs. One branch concentrates on resource abundance as the critical variable by which civil wars can be explained. Two versions can be identified: ‘Honey pot’ theories generally stipulate that natural resources provide an incentive for non-state actors like warlords or rebel groups to seize control and capture the resources for the private gains they promise (Kahl 2006: 14, see also Le Billon

---

9Collier expresses a clear theoretical preference for greed-based over grievance-based theories, which he justifies by arguing that "the provision of justice […] is a public good and so faces acute collective action problems". He furthermore underlines that when the rebels nonetheless "fight for a cause rather than for their own self-interest", predation may be the only mechanism by which to sustain the rebellion (Collier 2000: 839).
C.1 The Causes of Armed Conflict

2001b; de Soysa 2002). ‘Resource-curse’ theories, in contrast, presume that the rents associated with the exploitation of natural resources make ruling elites unresponsive to the demands of their citizens. This leads to the emergence of typical rentier-states, exhibiting at best rudimentary forms of statehood and always standing at the brink of collapse (see Kahl 2006: 14). Typical examples include the regimes in Nigeria and Algeria, which can sustain themselves exclusively through oil revenues (Karl 1999; Sandbakken 2006), or the role of diamonds in Sierra Leone (Olsson 2007). Resources alone, however, are hardly sufficient for triggering rebellions – otherwise Norway would run a similar risk as states like Nigeria or Sudan. An important enabling condition is the lack of effective control of these resources by the state, for instance because domestic institutions have collapsed or are highly dysfunctional (e.g. Reno 1999). Political theories instead often focus on grievances stemming from domestic conditions – be that political or economical – that are believed to motivate people to rebel. Like in economic theories, natural resources are considered an important motive. While economic theories focus on the abundance of resources, political theories focus on their scarcity. These resource scarcity theories are written in a so called neo-Malthusian tradition, which stipulates that “global ecological constraints (related to resource use and emissions) […] have significant influence on global developments in the twenty-first century” (Meadows et al. 2004: x). It is generally argued that an overuse or degradation of natural resources has the potential to put severe pressure on people whose livelihoods crucially depend on these resources, causing severe poverty and destitution. This can – either directly or in conjunction with weak state structures – trigger rebellions (see Kahl 2006: 8–10). The most comprehensive account of scarcity-induced violence is given by Thomas Homer-Dixon and other researchers from the so called ‘Toronto group’ (e.g. Ember and Ember 1992; Goldstone 2001; Homer-Dixon 1991; Percival and Homer-Dixon 2001).

Rational theories on the systemic level portrait the effects of systemic factors on the decision of domestic actors to engage in rebellion. The explainas here lies in the international environment. Economic-systemic theories focus on the global political economy and its effects on the cost-benefit decisions of self-seeking rebels. The ‘new war’ literature (e.g. Kaldor 1999; Münkler 2002) – discussed in more detail below – argues that the alleged transformation of warfare in the post-Cold War era is a result of fundamental changes in the international environment. In this reading, it is not primarily the presence of favorable domestic opportunities through which rebellions are triggered and sustained, but their embeddedness in a global political economy. William Reno for instance highlights the crucial role of commodity sales on the international market for financing the rebellions by self-seeking warlords, arguing that warlord politics “is a rational response to globalization in weak states” (1999: 28). Just as with theories focusing on the intrastate level, weak domestic institutions are an enabling factor for rebellions to occur, but they are often not sufficient. Political-systemic theories locate the sources for violent uprising in grievances
Appendix C Overview of Conflict Theories

whose roots are systemic but whose effects are local. Conflict is particularly likely if these grievances affect only some groups within a country while others benefit from them.

Despite its high proliferation, some scholars remain highly skeptical towards rational-choice explanations of armed conflict, especially in their economic variant. Cramer argues that despite their “apparent appeal and formal elegance”, these models are “extremely reductionist, highly speculative, and profoundly misleading” as they are often based on “an absurdly simplistic, overly direct rationalization of the role of material resources in conflict” (2002: 1849). By the same token, Hutchful and Aning specifically criticize Collier and Hoeffler’s binary choice between greed and grievance as highly simplistic and reductionist, pointing to the large range of other potential factors that could play a role and that is ignored by this research (2004: 200). Nonetheless, due to their high proliferation and partly because of a degree of parsimony that other theories lack, rational explanations present an important contribution to the literature on the sources of armed conflict that is hard to ignore.

C.1.2 Structuralism

Structuralism, in its most general form, can be described as a theoretical position that gives ontological preference to social structures over social actors (see e.g. Hollis 2007; Zangl 1999: 30–34). Structural theories constitute the opposite of individual accounts as represented by the rational tradition:

“Social theories that reduce system structures to the properties of individuals usually construe the explanatory role of structures as one of constraining the choices of preexisting agents, while those that conceptualize system structures as irreducible entities underlying agents typically understand structures as generating or explaining agents themselves” (Wendt 1987: 340).

Thus, although structural theories differ greatly with regard to their domain-specific and substantive (‘first order’) claims, they share certain fundamental ontological and epistemological (‘second order’) assumptions (Wendt 1999: 4–6). In the following the core claims of different structural theories about armed conflict are portrayed, organized according to the level of analysis on which the respective structure is located by the different theories. As, by definition, a social structure cannot be located on the individual level (only physical or mental structures, which are subsumed under essentialism in this framework), the classification starts with theories on the substate/ intrastate level.

On the intrastate level, structuralist theories highlight the role of certain domestic structures in bringing about armed conflict. In analogy to the neorealist school in International Relations, one group of theories locates the causes of armed conflict in the so called intrastate or ethnic security dilemma (e.g. Kaufman 1996; Posen 1993; Roe 1999; Rose 2000). The arguments are directly adopted from the realist tradition in International Relations, such that “the failed state becomes a pocket international system and behaves like
C.1 The Causes of Armed Conflict

one” (Kaufmann 2005: 199). The central structural condition of the international system is anarchy, that is, a situation in which there is no higher authority than national states, and in which they consequently need to rely on self-help for guaranteeing their own security (e.g. Waltz 1979). The result is a security dilemma\(^\text{10}\) in the sense that “states must always fear each other and war between them is always possible” (Sørensen 2007: 354). Turning to the domestic level, a security dilemma is likely to arise whenever a central sanctioning authority is either absent in a specific state or too weak to provide security, and when the different social groups – be they politically, ethnically or religiously defined – are uncertain about each others’ intentions such that they resort to self-help (Roe 1999). A totally different perspective is occupied by Johan Galtung’s ‘Structural Theory of Aggression’. Instead of focusing on the domestic security dilemma, Galtung explains aggression – and hence armed conflict – by reference to a structural condition called ‘rank disequilibrium’. By this, Galtung understands an inconsistent ranking across various social dimensions that individuals, groups, or nations are exposed to (Galtung 1972: 85). Rank disequilibria emerge when either of these subjects scale high in some dimensions of a social rank, but low in others. Social rank dimensions, as Galtung understands them, cover “the most crucial things of life, the matters for which people live and die”, and can principally be located on the individual level (education, income or ethnicity), national level (population pyramid, per capita income) or global level (alliances or central vs. peripheral nation) (Galtung 1972: 89).\(^\text{11}\) However, a rank disequilibrium in itself is no sufficient condition for aggression to actually occur. Therefore, the theory is only partly structural, as it does not attempt to explain aggression exclusively by reference to social structures.

On the systemic level, theories on armed conflict focus on the structure of the international systems and its implications for the domestic level. While some of the grand theories in International Relations – in particular structural realism – traditionally focus on interstate war as their *explanandum* and tend to ignore the domestic level both as causes and effects of the international system, others explicitly highlight links between the systemic and the domestic level. An important contribution in this regard are world-system theories (e.g. Wallerstein 1974; 1979; 2004).\(^\text{12}\) Wallerstein defines a world-system as “a multicultural territorial division of labor in which the production and exchange of basic goods and raw materials is necessary for the everyday life of its inhabitants” (Wallerstein in Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995: 389). The core feature of all world systems is that they exhibit an intersocietal hierarchy consisting of a core, a periphery and a semi-periphery (Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995: 390). The relations between these groups are characterized

\(^{10}\) In John Mearsheimer’s phrase, “[t]he essence of the security dilemma is that the measures a state takes to increase its own security usually decrease the security of other states” (2001: 36).

\(^{11}\) In Galtung’s terminology, those who are ranked high in a given dimension are called ‘topdogs’ (T), while those who rank low are called ‘underdogs’ (U). He believes that those who are T in one dimension and U in another are likely to take T as their point of reference for both dimensions and strive for achieving it, and that being ranked T in any dimension may imply a certain command over important resources that can be used in the struggle to achieve T in other dimensions (1972: 88).

\(^{12}\) For review essays, see Chirot and Hall (1982) and Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995).
Appendix C Overview of Conflict Theories

by a clear tendency for states in the center to exploit those in the periphery (Galtung [1971] 2000). World-system theories are not per se conflict theories, but clearly underline the conflictual potential of core-periphery relations. There have been attempts for explaining ethnic mobilization by a country’s status in the world system, arguing that peripheral states are more likely to face ethnic violence than non-peripheral states (Olzak and Tsutsui 1998). A second set of theories attributes the weakness of many third-world states – and hence their proneness for civil wars – to a structural organizing principle of the international system: sovereignty (Jackson 1990; Jackson and Rosberg 1982). It departs from the generous manner by which the international community has granted sovereignty to newly formed Third-World – and especially post-colonial – states irrespective of their domestic conditions. Jackson has called this custom the ‘negative sovereignty regime’, and showed that many entities considered ‘states’ by the international community in reality lack central requirements of empirical statehood:

“The study discloses an image of Third World states as consisting not of self-standing structures with domestic foundations […] but of territorial jurisdictions supported from above by international law and material aid – a kind of international safety net. In short, they often appear to be juridical more than empirical entities: hence quasi-states” (Jackson 1990: 5).”

While Jackson’s theory is not in itself a conflict theory, his concept of quasi-states and the implications he postulates have readily been taken by conflict theorists.

C.1.3 Constructivism

In their extreme forms (rational) individualist accounts and structuralist accounts often appear irreconcilable. While the former stipulate that structures are reducible to individual agents and their interests, the latter postulates that individuals’ preferences and actions are entirely determined by exogenous (super-)structures. The theoretical position that claims the middle ground between the two extreme positions is social constructivism – at least in the ‘thin’ version as it is proposed by Wendt (1999) and others. The core difference between rational and constructivist accounts of social action is generally expressed in terms of two different ‘logics’ of action. Rational accounts adhere to a logic of consequence, whereas constructivist accounts follow a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989; 1998). Constructivist explanations of armed conflict focus the social construction of beliefs, preferences and the routes by which they can lead to armed conflict (Sambanis 2002: 227).

Constructivist explanations have become particularly prominent with regard to ethnic conflict (Horowitz 1999; [1985] 2000). Using a broad brush, one can distinguish two theoretical perspectives on ethnic cleavages: the primordial or ‘hard’ perspective, which

13By the same token, it can be argued that structuralist accounts follow ‘logic of inevitability’, as individual action so often is determined by the overarching social structure.
C.1 The Causes of Armed Conflict

believes that ethnic groups are “ascriptive, firmly bounded entities based on a strong sense of communality [...] and engendering a great willingness on the part of the group to sacrifice for collective welfare” (Horowitz 1999: 346), and a constructivist or ‘soft’ perspective, which claims that “collective identities are constantly made and remade in social discourse and do not reflect essential differences” (Kaufmann 2005: 197). These two perspectives are clearly incompatible: “Constructivism differs from primordialism mainly by considering identity as not inherently conflictual and focusing on the molding of identity by leaders, social systems, or circumstance” (Sambanis 2002: 227). As an essentialist perspective, primordialism is discussed in the respective section below.

On the individual level, constructivism deals with the question of how individual identities and loyalties form and develop. Russel Hardin, for instance, draws a distinction between identities and identifications, arguing that while the former may simply be determined external factors like nationality, historical or cultural circumstances, the latter is in part the result of an individual’s rational decision to identify with a certain group whenever it is “potentially beneficial to be a member of the prevailing group” (Hardin 1997: 7, for a critique see Kaufmann 2005: 183–184).14

On the intrastate level, constructivist theories play a key role in explaining nationalism and ethnic warfare (e.g. Anderson 2006; Brubaker 1995). As Stuart Kaufman notes, “[t]he constructivist position begins from the insight that the meaning of an ethnic identity [...] is a set of ideas” (2001: 23). Two generations or ‘waves’ of constructivist thought on ethnic conflict can be distinguished: a strong form based on the premise that collective identities are moldable to the extent that historical or cultural features become meaningless, and a weak form underlining that once formed, ethnic identities can be ‘sticky’, inhibiting attempts for easy manipulation (Kaufmann 2005: 197). Stuart Kaufman (2001) has studied the phenomenon of nationalism and ethnic hatred based on a range of ethnic conflicts, including Georgia, former Yugoslavia and Moldova. By attempting a synthesis between constructivist and primordialist thinking, he arrives at a soft constructivist position by which the “core of the ethnic identity is the ‘myth-symbol complex’ – the combination of myths, memories, values, and symbols that defines not only who is a member of the group but what it means to be a member” (Kaufman 2001: 25). He derives a theoretical position called ‘symbolic choice’ – whose core assumption is that “people choose by responding to the most emotionally potent symbol evoked” – mainly in delineation to rational-choice positions (Kaufman 2001: 28). For him, the outbreak of ethnic war is contingent upon three necessary conditions: (1) the presence of myths justifying ethnic hostility – in particular in form of myths about past atrocities committed by antagonistic ethnic groups, and in form of myths by which the political domination of a certain territory can be justified –, (2) ethnic fear, and (3) the presence of opportunities to mobilize and fight (Kaufman 2001: 30–32).

14Note that Hardin acknowledges that identifications may also be purely irrational, for example those that are “primordial, atavistic [and] inconsistent”, or that they can aim at satisfying the interest of certain groups to which the individual belongs. He calls the latter extrarational motivation (1997: 14).
Appendix C  Overview of Conflict Theories

Constructivist positions on the systemic level are most prominently represented for students of International Relations through Wendt’s ‘Social Theory of International Politics’ (Wendt 1999) and the vast variety of other works that have emerged since then. Yet, as with other branches of IR theory, these works are of little use when it comes to explaining civil wars.

C.1.4 Essentialism

Essentialism subsumes those theoretical perspectives that focus on the ‘given’ characteristics of subjects in order to explain certain outcomes. Clearly, this gives rise to a great variety of possible theories. Subjects can be anything ranging from individuals to large macro-sociological groups, and their characteristics can be formed by historic, ethnic, religious or otherwise identity-forming factors. When it comes to explaining armed conflict, essentialist theories tend to focus either on certain psychological features of mankind ‘as such’ on the level of the individual, or the inherently incompatible nature of characteristics attributed to different identity-groups on the intrastate or systemic level – typically in form of ethnicity, ideology, class, religion, cultural traditions, and the like. Unlike constructivist theories, it is believed by proponents of essentialism that these are perennial and primordial features that are not primarily the result of deliberate attempts for identity manipulation (Geertz 1963; Shils 1957).

On the individual level, essentialist thinking with relevance to the causes of civil war mainly originates from (social) psychology. Explanations focus on the psychological reactions of human beings towards their outside world. A famous example is the “frustration-aggression theory” formulated by Ted Gurr, in which he stipulates that “theory about civil violence is most fruitfully based on systematic knowledge about those properties of men that determine how they react to certain characteristics of their society” (1972: 36–37). Interestingly, the theory shares certain assumptions with the rational-choice tradition in that it defines frustration as “interference with goal-directed behavior” (1972: 36–37). Yet, the provoked reactions are not merely instrumental – as rational-choice approaches would stipulate – but typically contain a strong “appetitive” element that aims at injuring or eliminating those against whom it is directed (Gurr 1972: 34–35, see also Kriesberg 2002: 33–34).

On the intrastate level, essentialist thinking treats concepts such as identity and ethnicity as primordial characteristics ascribed to a particular group by a common culture and history: “Essentialism’s core insight is that mass loyalties to communal identities reflect deep psychological needs” (Kaufmann 2005: 195). Unlike constructivists who think that ethnic identity is at least in part the result of social construction and hence susceptible to manipulation by ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’, primordialists “view ethnicity as an exceptionally strong affiliation that charges inter-ethnic interactions with the potential for violence” (Sambanis 2002: 227). Among primordialists, different shades can be identified, with hard primordialists/ essentialists believing that violence is the result of ancient hatred between
C.2 Termination and Recurrence of Armed Conflicts

groups, “rooted in old sources of enmity and memories of past atrocities” (Sambanis 2002: 227), and soft primordialists/essentialists following constructivists by accepting that identities can within limits be the result of manipulations, while at the same time insisting on “essentialism’s original focus on psychological and emotional modes of explanation” (Kaufmann 2005: 195).

On the systemic level, essentialist theories focus on deep-rooted cleavages and incompatibilities between large identity blocks present on the systemic level. The most prominent (and controversial) reference is Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ argument (1992; 1998):

“The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future” (Huntington 1992).

Civilizations are viewed as quasi homogenous cultural blocks with an inherent tendency for incompatibility. Not surprisingly, this work has been heavily criticized by authors attempting to unveil Huntington’s imprecision when it comes to delineating different “civilizations” (e.g. Riesebrodt 2001; Senghaas 1998).

C.2 Termination and Recurrence of Armed Conflicts

Aside from the question why civil wars occur in the first place, scholars on armed conflict are interested in two further questions: how do civil wars end, and why do they recur? Again, the debate about termination and recurrence of civil wars is split along the lines of different theoretical schools, although here the dividing lines and controversies are probably less virulent as those about the causes of civil war. Here it is more appropriate to distinguish theories according to the substantial claims they make rather than with regard to their meta-theoretical affiliations.

C.2.1 Termination

In comparison to accounts about the causes of armed conflict, knowledge about the mechanisms through which civil wars come to an end is sparse (Licklider 1995: 681). The difficulty starts with delineating when a civil war can be considered terminated. Clearly the end of a civil war must not be conflated with the end of the underlying conflict, which often continues well beyond the actual fighting. Duffield (2001) even generally questions whether a clear distinction between a state of war and a state of peace can be drawn (see also Ferdowsi and Matthies 2003b: 28–30). For analytical purposes, it can only be said that a civil war ends if at least one necessary condition of the underlying civil war definition
Appendix C  Overview of Conflict Theories

ceases to be fulfilled (Licklider 1995: 682), and this depends, of course, on the underlying conflict definition. The literature on conflict termination can be roughly divided into one group emphasizing the role of structural factors, and a second group giving greater weight to the importance of agency:

With regard to structural theories, a distinction suggested by Hartzell et al. in their work about the determinants of post-conflict peace is helpful. They distinguish between two sets of variables: the settlement environment, which includes the “characteristics of the country in which the civil war takes place, the larger international environment, and the civil war itself”, and the settlement arrangement, where they examine “institutions and types of protections often associated with negotiated settlements” (Hartzell et al. 2001: 187).

Theories focusing on the settlement environment presume that the factors affecting successful conflict termination can be found in the structure of the country or the underlying conflict (see Hartzell et al. 2001: 188–190). One argument focuses on the qualities of a country’s political system, arguing that authoritarian regimes are less likely to accommodate competing interests than democratic regimes. Consequently, civil war settlements are more difficult to achieve, and conflicts are likely to last longer (see Hartzell et al. 2001: 189). A second argument focuses on the nature of the issues underlying the conflict. It is postulated that identity-based conflicts are more difficult to resolve than political or ideological ones (see Licklider 1993: 15). However, the possibly single most important contribution goes back to I. William Zartman’s notion of ‘conflict ripeness’, introduced in the early eighties (1989). Simply put, Zartman argued that the initiation of peace negotiations (and ultimately the settlement of conflicts) is most likely to occur when conflicts are ripe for resolution, which in turn depends on the emergence of a ‘Mutually Hurting Stalemate’ (MHS) between the warring factions (2000b: 227–228). The basic premise behind the concept is that “when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them […] they seek a way out” (2000b: 282). In the absence of such a stalemate negotiations are very unlikely to take place. As long as one of the parties believes being still capable of defeating the other(s) on the battlefield, they almost always will try to do so (see Ferdowsi and Matthies 2003b: 30). Thus, the principle underlying the parties’ decisions whether to continue fighting or initiating negotiations is essentially a cost-benefit calculation. This may be conceptualized in game-theoretic terms as the transformation of a negative-sum game (the stalemate) into a positive-sum game (negotiations) (Zartman 2001a: 8–9).

Arguments focusing on the settlement arrangements are mainly concerned with issues like the effectiveness of specific mechanisms within peace arrangements, for example power-sharing provisions, third-party enforcement, or territorial autonomy.16 In Nurturing

---

15 Note that Zartman argues elsewhere that not all conflicts may be determined by “cost-benefit cultures”.
Specifically, he points out the existence of “true believer” cultures in which Mutually Hurting Stalemates do not facilitate peace negotiations (2000b: 240).

16 An excellent study on the long-term effects of different settlement arrangements (in German) is provided by Ulrich Schneckener (2002), who studies the implementation of different conflict termination mechanisms.
C.2 Termination and Recurrence of Armed Conflicts

Peace Fen Osler Hampson (1996a) explores why some peace settlements fail and others do not, focusing on the characteristics and the implementation of the peace agreements. His main insight is that peace agreements are not self-executing, but depend greatly on those who implement them. Ongoing commitment and political will by third parties is therefore central to a successful termination of a conflict after peace agreements (Hampson 1996a: 205–234). Nilsson (2008) concentrates likewise on settlement arrangements through focusing on the inclusion or exclusion of certain conflict parties in peace process in order to determine which representation promises a successful termination of the conflict.

Theories that give greater weight to agency focus on the characteristics and preferences of the conflict parties. The possible best-known reference is the concept of civil war spoilers introduced by Stedman (1997). Spoilers are “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (1997: 5). Spoilers, therefore, only emerge “when there is a peace process to undermine” (1997: 7). Stedman distinguishes between limited, greedy and total spoilers, depending on their goals and commitments. Limited spoilers follow certain limited goals, for instance motivated by certain grievances, but may nonetheless be highly committed to their realization. Total spoilers, in contrast, are driven by radical ideologies and are determined to realize their goals by all means. A medium position is occupied by greedy spoilers, whose goals are contingent upon cost-benefit calculations (Stedman 1997: 9–11). Agency of international actors is granted through the strategies applied by international actors, which can decide about the success or failure of spoilers. They have three strategies at their disposal: inducement, socialization and coercion. He suggests that total spoilers can only be effectively managed by recourse to coercion (either through the use of force or through what he calls the ‘departing train strategy’); limited spoilers are best managed through an inducement strategy in which its demands are accommodated into the peace process if possible (Stedman 1997: 9–11).

C.2.2 Recurrence

Scholarship about the recurrence of civil war is comparatively sparse, and what has been written focuses mainly on the ‘conflict trap’ hypothesis (e.g. Collier 2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; 2006). This hypothesis concentrates “on the characteristics or attributes of the previous war to explain why a second or third war might occur” (Walter 2004: 372). The ‘trap’ in this case lies in the presumed causal mechanism: poverty leads to armed conflict, and armed conflict in turn leads to poverty. While low-income countries generally face the highest risk of experiencing armed conflict, a prior conflict increases this risk significantly, while at the same time undermining the prospects for economic development: “Once a rebellion has started, a society risks being caught in a conflict trap. Ending the conflict is difficult, and even if it ends, the risk that it will start again is high” (Collier

---

(minority protection mechanisms within states, bilateral minority protection mechanisms, consociational democracy and territorial solutions) in the context of historical civil wars in Europe.
Appendix C Overview of Conflict Theories

2003: 91). However, in a large number of writings the recurrence rate of armed conflict is simply overstated. It is mostly written that the rate of civil war recurrence in the first five years after a civil war ended lies at around 50 percent, mostly by referring to the influential work by Collier and Hoeffler (2002). Yet, as Suhrke and Samset point out, the figure has some obscure origins and is hard to be arrived at by simple arithmetic. Analyzing the 49 countries listed in Collier and Hoeffler’s work, Suhrke and Samset find that “[i]n only 13 cases did a second civil war recur within the first five-year period, which gives an average recurrence rate of around 26 per cent” (2007: 197). Thus, there is reason to believe that the rate of conflict recurrence is actually only half of what most scholars and policy-makers believe it is.

Obviously linked to the question of conflict recurrence is the duration of post-conflict peace. Scholars have tried to determine under which conditions post-conflict peace lasts longest, mostly by recourse to event-history analysis. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) propose the concept of a “peacebuilding triangle” to study the effect of three interrelated variables on the determinants of peacebuilding success. As “the first statistical analysis on the correlates of successful peacebuilding and the contribution of UN peace operations to peacebuilding outcomes” (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 782), their study still uses cross-sectional analysis instead of event-history techniques. Overall, they find that “multilateral, United Nations peace operations make a positive difference” (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 779).

Using event history models, Virginia P. Fortna has studied whether external intervention in post-conflict environments has a positive effect on the duration of post-conflict peace. Based on her findings, she can confirm such an effect on both the likelihood and the duration of peace, concluding that “[t]he efforts of the international community to help war-torn states avoid a slide back to civil war are well worth it” (Fortna 2004: 288). Hartzell et al. investigate the effect of a range of key variables on the duration of post-conflict peace. Their results suggest that peace is most likely to fail after civil wars of high intensity in countries having little experience with democratic rule that end with a negotiated settlement. Likewise, it is most likely to last in countries that were democracies before the outbreak of the civil war, in which the intensity of the civil war was low, in which the peace agreement includes provisions for territorial autonomy, and in which third parties offer security assurances to the former belligerents (Hartzell et al. 2001: 202). Hartzell and Hoddie have studied the effect of power-sharing arrangements on

---

17 Event history analysis (also called: survival analysis or failure time analysis) aims at describing, explaining or predicting the occurrence of certain events of interest based on a set of covariates (see Allison 2004: 369). Event-history analysis is suitable for capturing questions of timing and political change (see Box-Steefensmeier et al. 2003: 50), whereas cross-sectional analysis merely provides a snapshot based on the assumption that the “state probabilities are fairly trendless or stable” (Blossfeld et al. 2007: 5–7). A variety of both parametric and non-parametric models can be applied, but the most widely used model in the social sciences is the so-called ‘Cox proportional hazard model’.

18 The triangle consists of the three dimensions: the level of hostilities, local capacities, and international capacities.

19 An extended analysis employing also event-history models is provided in Doyle and Sambanis (2006: 69–143).
the duration of post-conflict peace. Power-sharing goes back to Arend Lijphart’s concept of consociational democracy and is based on the premise that divided societies are most fruitfully governed when the different fractions share government power (Lijphart 1975; 1980). In their statistical analysis, they confirm this effect for power-sharing arrangements after civil wars, finding that “[t]he more extensive the network of power-sharing institutions contending parties agree to create, the less likely they are to return to the use of armed violence to settle disputes” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003: 330).
Abbreviations

ADFIL  Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre/ Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo

AFL  Armed Forces of Liberia

AFRC  Armed Forces Revolutionary Council [Sierra Leone]

AMIB  African Mission in Burundi

APC  All People’s Congress [Sierra Leone]

APO  Ouagadougou Peace Agreement [Côte d’Ivoire]

ARENA  Republican Nationalist Alliance [El Salvador]

ARF  Alliance of Reform Forces [FYROM]

AU  African Union

BBTG  Broadly Based Transitional Government [Rwanda]

BINUB  United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi

CAFTA-DR  Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement

CDC  Congress for Democratic Change [Liberia]

CDR  Convention pour la défense de la république [Rwanda]

CEO  Chief Executive Officer

CG  Convention de gouvernement [Burundi]

CIA  Central Intelligence Agency [USA]

CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States

CMRRD  Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development [Sierra Leone]

CNDD  Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie [Burundi]
Abbreviations

**CNL** Comité National de Libération/ National Liberation Committee [Democratic Republic of the Congo]

**CNRM** Conselho Nacional de Resistência Maubere [East Timor]

**CNRT** Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense [East Timor]

**CONADER** Commission Nationale de la Demobilization et Reinsertion [Democratic Republic of the Congo]

**COTOL** Coalition for the Transformation of Liberia

**COW** Correlates of War

**CPE** Complex Political Emergency

**CPP** Cambodia’s People’s Party, Commission for the Consolidation of Peace [Sierra Leone]

**DDR** Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

**DPA** Department of Political Affairs [United Nations]

**DPKO** Department of Peacekeeping Operations [United Nations]

**DR-CAFTA** see: CAFTA-DR

**DRC** Democratic Republic of the Congo

**DUI** Democratic Union for Integration

**ECOMOG** ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group

**ECOWAS** Economic Community of West African States

**EGP** Guerrilla Army of the Poor [Guatemala]

**ERP** Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo [El Salvador]

**EU** European Union

**EUFOR** European Union Force [Democratic Republic of the Congo]

**EULEX** European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

**EUPOL** European Union Police Mission

**EUSEC** European Union Security Reform Mission
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAL</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación [El Salvador]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Rebel Armed Forces [Guatemala]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARN</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional - Armed Forces of National Resistance [El Salvador]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>Forces for the Defense of Democracy [Burundi]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda/ Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda [Democratic Republic of the Congo]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDN</td>
<td>National Defence Forces [Burundi]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDNG</td>
<td>Frente Democratico Nueva Guatemala [Spanish: New Guatemala Democratic Front]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FESCI</td>
<td>Federation of Scholars and Students of Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLNC</td>
<td>Front de la Libération Nationale Congolaise/ Front for the National Liberation of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLRN</td>
<td>Front pour la Libération et la Reconstruction Nationales [Haiti]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMLN</td>
<td>Farrabundo Morti National Liberation Front [El Salvador]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Forces Nouvelles [Côte d’Ivoire]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>Front National de Libération [Burundi]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPI</td>
<td>Front Populaire Ivorienne [Côte d’Ivoire]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPL</td>
<td>Fuerzas Populares de Liberación [El Salvador]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Guatemalan Republican Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROLINA</td>
<td>Front pour la Libération Nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>Front Uni National Pour Un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif [Cambodia]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abbreviations

FYROM  Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GAM  Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement [Indonesia]
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GEMAP  Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme [Liberia]
GPA  General Peace Agreement
GURN  Governo de Unidade Nacional [Angola]
HNP  Haitian National Police
IBL  Institutionalization Before Liberalization
ICD  Inter-Congolese Dialogue
ICG  International Crisis Group
ICGL  International Contact Group for Liberia
ICISS  International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IEMF  Interim Emergency Multinational Force [Democratic Republic of the Congo]
IFOR  Implementation Force
IGNU  Interim Government of National Unity [Liberia]
IMF  International Monetary Fund
INPFL  Independent National Patriotic Front for Liberia
INTERFET  International Force for East Timor
IR  International Relations
ISA  International Studies Association
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force [Afghanistan]
JMPLA  Joven Movimento Popular de Libertaçao de Angola
KFOR  Kosovo Force
KLA  Kosovo Liberation Army [also UCK]
KPNLF  Khmer People’s National Liberation Front [Cambodia]
KR  Khmer Rouge [Cambodia]
KVM  Kosovo Verification Mission
LDK  Democratic League of Kosovo
LNC  Liberian National Conference
LNTG  Liberia National Transitional Government
LPC  Liberian Peace Council
LUDF  Liberian United Defence Force
LURD  Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MAS  Movement of Solidary Actions [Guatemala]
MDR  Mouvement Démocratique Républicain [Rwanda]
MHS  Mutually Hurting Stalemate
MIF  Multinational Interim Force [Haiti]
MINUCI  United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire
MINUGUA  United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINURCAT  United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINUSTAH  United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MIPONUH  UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MJP  Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix [Côte d’Ivoire]
MLC  Mouvement de Libération Congolais/ Movement for the Liberation of Congo [Democratic Republic of the Congo]
MNF  Multinational Force [Haiti]
MODEL  Movement for Democracy in Liberia
Abbreviations

**MPCI**  Coalition of Northern Soldiers [Côte d'Ivoire]

**MPIGO**  Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest

**MPLA**  Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola

**MRDN**  National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development [Rwanda]

**MRLM**  Movement for the Redemption of Liberian Moslems

**MRND**  Mouvement Républicain National Pour La Démocratie Et Le Développement [Rwanda]

**MRNDD**  Mouvement Révolutionnaire National Pour Le Développement Et La Démocratie [Rwanda]

**NAFTA**  North American Free Trade Organization

**NATO**  North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**NEC**  National Electoral Commission [Rwanda]

**NLA**  National Liberation Army [Macedonia]

**NPFL**  National Patriotic Front for Liberia

**NPRC**  National Provincial Ruling Council [Sierra Leone]

**NTGL**  National Transitional Government of Liberia

**OAS**  Organization of American States

**OAU**  Organization of African Unity

**OECD**  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

**OHR**  Office of the High Representative [Bosnia and Herzegovina]

**ONUB**  United Nations Operation in Burundi

**ONUC**  United Nations Operation in the Congo [DRC]

**ONUMOZ**  United Nations Operation in Mozambique

**ONUSAL**  United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador

**ORPA**  Revolutionary Organization of Armed People [Guatemala]

**OSCE**  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
**PACMT** Political Agreement on Consensual Management of the Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

**PALIPEHUTU** Parti Pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu

**PALIR** Peuple en Armes Pour la Libération du Rwanda

**PAN** National Action Party [Guatemala]

**PD** Partido Democratico [East Timor]

**PDC** Christian Democratic Party [El Salvador]

**PDCI-RDA** Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire – African Democratic Rally

**PDCI** Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire

**PDK** Party of Democratic Kampuchea [Cambodia]

**PDP** Party for Democratic Prosperity [Macedonia]

**PDPA** People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan

**PGT** Guatemalan Party of Labour

**PISG** Provisional Institutions of Self Government [Kosovo]

**PL** Liberal Party [Rwanda]

**PLP** People’s Liberation Party [Sierra Leone]

**PMC** Private Military Company

**PMDC** People’s Movement for Democratic Change [Sierra Leone]

**PPRD** People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy [Democratic Republic of the Congo]

**PR** Proportional Representation

**PRIIO** International Peace Research Institute, Olso

**PRK** People’s Republic of Kampuchea [Cambodia]

**PRTC** Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos – Revolutionary Party of the Central American Workers [El Salvador]

**PSD** Parti Social Démocrate [Rwanda]
Abbreviations

PTF  Popular Front of Tajikistan
RCD-G  RCD-Goma [Democratic Republic of the Congo]
RCD-K/ML  RCD-Kisangani/ Movement of Liberation
RCD-K  RCD-Kisangani [Democratic Republic of the Congo]
RCD-ML  RCD-Movement for Liberation [Democratic Republic of the Congo]
RCD  Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie/ Congolese Rally for Democracy [Democratic Republic of the Congo]
RDR  Rally of the Republicans [Côte d’Ivoire]
RENAMO  Mozambican National Resistance
RPA  Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF  Rwandan Patriotic Front
RSLMF  Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces
RUF  Revolutionary United Front [Sierra Leone]
RUFP  Revolutionary United Front Party [Sierra Leone]
SC  Security Council
SDSM  Social Democratic Union of Macedonia
SFB  Sonderforschungsbereich [Collaborative Research Center]
SFRY  Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SLPP  Sierra Leone Peoples Party
SMC  Standing Mediation Committee [Liberia]
SOC  State of Cambodia
SRSG  Special Representative of the Secretary General
UCDP  Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UCK  Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (see KLA)
UFCO  United Fruit Company [Guatemala]
ULIMO  United Liberation Movement of Liberians For Democracy
UN  United Nations
UNAMA  United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMET  United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMIC  United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAMIR  United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL  United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM  United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme
UNGOMAP  United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA  União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola / National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNMIBH  United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIH  United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIK  United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL  United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISET  United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMIT  United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNMOT  United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOCI  United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
UNOL  United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia
UNOMIL  United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL  United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNPREDEP  United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR  United Nations Protection Force
Abbreviations

UNSMIH  UN Support Mission in Haiti
UNTAC  United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES  United Nations transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
UNTAET  UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTMIH  UN Transition Mission in Haiti
UP  Unity Party [Liberia]
URNG  Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca
US  United States
USA  United States of America
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
UTO  United Tajik Opposition
VMRO-DPMNE  Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity
Bibliography

Books, Book Chapters and Articles


Bibliography


Anstey, Mark (2007). “Can a fledgling democracy take flight in the Democratic Republic

Republic of Congo: the inter-Congolese dialogue process.” *African Journal on Conflict

conflict rehabilitation. Lessons from South East Europe and strategic consequences for
the Euro-Atlantic community*, eds. Jean-Jacques de Dardel, Gustav E. Gustenau, and

r50/paper50.pdf [Accessed: June 21, 2010].


to Conceptualization, Measurement and Scaling.” *American Sociological Review* 38
(1):18–33.

—— (1994). *Typologies and taxonomies. An Introduction to Classification Techniques*. A


Balalovska, Kristina, Alessandro Silj, and Mario Zucconi (2002). *Minority Politics in
Southeast Europe. Crisis in Macedonia*. Rome: Ethnobarometer. Available from:

Balli, Volker. “Power and Gestalt of Political Concepts. A Study of the Emergence,
Bibliography


Bibliography


Books, Book Chapters and Articles


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Books, Book Chapters and Articles


Bibliography


Books, Book Chapters and Articles


Bibliography


Bibliography


Skocpol, Theda (1979). States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Tawiah, Colonel Theophilus, and Festus B. Aboagye (2005). “Synergies of Regional and UN Interventions. The ECOWAS Mission in Liberia and the Protection of Civilians.” In: *A tortuous road to peace. The dynamics of regional, UN and international hu-
Bibliography


Bibliography


(1994b). Resolution 955 [‘on the establishment of an International Tribunal and adoption of the Statute of the Tribunal’], adopted by the Security Council at its 3453rd


Bibliography


Policy Reports and Official Documents


Bibliography


Bibliography


News Sources


