
Dissertation
zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde
durch den
Promotionsausschuss Dr. rer. pol.
der Universität Bremen

vorgelegt von
Lara Sigwart

Tbilisi, Georgien
8. Oktober 2012

Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Klaus Schlichte, Institut für Interkulturelle und Internationale Studien, Universität Bremen
Zweitgutachter: Prof. Mark R. Beissinger, Department of Politics, Princeton University
Table of Contents – Overview

1. Introduction 11
2. Analytical framework 20
3. Empirical analysis 63
4. Discussion of findings 142
5. Conclusion 183
6. Bibliography 192
7. Annexes 216
8. Statement on authorship 287

Table of Contents – Detailed

1. Acknowledgments 5
2. List of abbreviations 8
3. List of graphic contents 9
4. Map of Georgia 10

1. Introduction 11

2. Analytical framework 24

2.1. Literature review 24

Existing literature on the South Ossetia conflict and politics in Georgia 25

1) Argument 1: Democratization and elections leading to violence – “Playing the ethnic card” 27

2) Argument 2: Illicit economies leading to violence – “Ethnic warfare is simply a cover story for criminal violence and predation” 30

Critique of Argument 1 and 2: Predatory policies of local state elites in Georgia 32

3) Argument 3: Emotions leading to violence – “Whether [the emotion] produces violence or not depends in large part on the intensity of the emotion” 35

Critique of Argument 3: Russia’s claim of regional dominance 37

4) Argument 4: Involvement of external actors leading to violence – “The West did not do enough” 39

Critique of Argument 4: Policies of Western negligence 41

Conclusion of the critique of existing arguments 42

2.2. The argument 44

2.3. Analytical framework 45

a) Key aspects of the argument and working hypotheses 46

Violence in the South Ossetia conflict 46

The Georgian state and its leaderships 48

External influence in the South Ossetia context 51

Acknowledgments 5

List of abbreviations 8

List of graphic contents 9

Map of Georgia 10

Introduction 11

Analytical framework 24

Literature review 24

Existing literature on the South Ossetia conflict and politics in Georgia 25

1) Argument 1: Democratization and elections leading to violence – “Playing the ethnic card” 27

2) Argument 2: Illicit economies leading to violence – “Ethnic warfare is simply a cover story for criminal violence and predation” 30

Critique of Argument 1 and 2: Predatory policies of local state elites in Georgia 32

3) Argument 3: Emotions leading to violence – “Whether [the emotion] produces violence or not depends in large part on the intensity of the emotion” 35

Critique of Argument 3: Russia’s claim of regional dominance 37

4) Argument 4: Involvement of external actors leading to violence – “The West did not do enough” 39

Critique of Argument 4: Policies of Western negligence 41

Conclusion of the critique of existing arguments 42

The argument 44

Analytical framework 45

Key aspects of the argument and working hypotheses 46

Violence in the South Ossetia conflict 46

The Georgian state and its leaderships 48

External influence in the South Ossetia context 51
b) Analytical framework and methods
   Change in local behavior: Tracing shifts
   Causality: Framing the causal link
   Narrative analysis: Locating and ascribing meaning to causal links
   Social mechanisms: Aggregating recurring causal links
   Model of analysis

3. Empirical analysis
   3.1. Analysis and use of the event data set
   3.2. Background of the study: Trajectory of politics and violence in the South Ossetia conflict 1989-2008
      Episode 1: 1989 to 1994 – Independence of Georgia, start of conflict in South Ossetia, and first Georgian-Ossetian war
      Episode 2: 1994-2002 – Shevardnadze-Chibirov agreement, Kokoity takes power, and re-escalation in 2002
      Episode 4: 2006-2008 – Kosovo recognition, NATO summit in Bucharest, August war and aftermath of the war
   3.3. Analysis of sequences of policies
      Interviews and sequences of policies
      Sequence 1 – 2002: Failure of the Baden process, Shevardnadze’s anti-corruption agenda and anti-crime operations
      Sequence 2 – 2004: Regime change, Ergneti closure and shelling of Tskhinvali
      Sequence 3 – 2008: Western support for roadmaps, Sanakoev administration and August war
      Western policies after 2008
   3.4. Empirical findings and model
   4. Discussion of findings
      4.1. Theoretical scope of the findings
         a) Before change of local behavior: The (re-)formation and implementation of the Western agenda
         b) After change of local behavior: Before turning points to escalation
         c) After escalations
      4.2. Empirical scope of the findings
         Sri Lanka
         Kashmir
         Mechanisms of violence in South Ossetia, Sri Lanka and Kashmir
         Divergences
   5. Conclusion
   6. Bibliography
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7.</th>
<th>Annexes</th>
<th>225</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANNEX 1: Chronology of political and violence events 1989-2007</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANNEX 2: Casualties in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone based on reports of the OSCE Mission to Georgia 1994 – 2006</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANNEX 3: Political events 1989 – 2008</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANNEX 4: List of interviews</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Statement on authorship</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
i. Acknowledgments

Over the course of the dissertation project I received various forms of support, advice and encouragement. I would like to first of all thank my two advisers, Klaus Schlichte and Mark Beissinger, who put great amounts of time and effort into bringing this dissertation into being. Their encouragement, valuable insights, trust in my abilities and consistent support over the years made this project happen.

I received generous funding over a period of three years from the Hans-Boeckler Foundation in Germany which was my first choice in my application for funding and which made extensive field research possible, including two months in Prague and eight months in Georgia as well as a seven-month visiting scholarship with Mark Beissinger at the Princeton University. At Hans-Bockler Foundation I would like to thank Iris Henkel and Insa Breyer. I also received financial support through the Marie-Curie scholarship program of the European Commission and the Ministry of Education and Science of Georgia. Without these funds, the dissertation would not have been realized in its empirical scope and could not have profited from input of different scholarly contexts. This was an invaluable gain for the project.

This research was greatly supported by Emma Pratt, Rachel Naylor, Jeremy Johnson, Rebecca Kraut and Camrin Christensen who proofread the final draft, the many people who were ready to read and discuss early versions in forms of conference papers such as Laura Daniels, Katharina Hoffmann, Arwa Abdelmoula, Augustas Balelis, Andrea Weiss, Eli Feiman, Megan Dean, Barbara Christophe, Ulla Pape, Lili Di Puppo, and of course my interview partners who gave critical insight and put time and effort into explaining and making me understand their points of view.

Most of all I would like to thank Lika Sanikidze, Lela Chakhaia, Elene Nodia and Gia Gotua who greatly enabled the field research through personal
support. These are also the four people who were my very first friends in Georgia when I came in 2003, who involved me in discussions, shared knowledge in an effort to make me as an outsider understand the complex situation in Georgia and who always put the trust in me that I would come to fair conclusions, even across the occasional political differences between us or even among themselves. I am certainly very grateful for this.

I would like to thank the various institutions and their co-workers who supported my research other than through financial means. At the Hans-Boeckler Foundation, Iris Henkel worked administrative miracles in the course of more than three years of my fellowship; at the University of Bremen, Carmen Ohlsen was of constant and immediate support to organize the dissertation between Tbilisi and Bremen; at the University of Groningen, Joost Herman supported my pre-doctoral research fellowship from January to July 2008; at the archive of the OSCE office in Prague, Alice Nemcova and the intern Ulrike Wiese supported my archival research in January and February 2009; at the Tbilisi State University, Nino Chikovani hosted my first research stay in 2009; at the Ilia State University, Ghia Nodia hosted my second research stay which took place also with great help of Maia Nikolaishvili in 2010. Institutions such as the ISET library of the Tbilisi State University, the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD) and the IDP Women Association ‘Consent’ were of invaluable structural support in conducting the research. I would like to thank Elene Khoshtaria, the former First Deputy State Minister of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, who, as my previous employer, showed great understanding for the load of finishing a dissertation next to a full-time job.

Last but not least I thank my father, Herbert Sigwart, who has always supported my education, in spirit and financially, in good and in bad times, who in my teenage years awakened my interest in politics, formed my
liberal stance and critical eye for issues of social justice, and was the one who suggested to me to study political science - “...because you always scream at the TV when they show the news.”

Lara Sigwart, Tbilisi, October 2012
ii. List of Abbreviations

AR – Activity Report (of the OSCE Mission to Georgia)
CSCE – Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
ERP – Economic Rehabilitation Program
EU – European Union
EUMM – European Union Monitoring Mission
IDP – Internally Displaced Person
JCC – Joint Control Commission of the Joint Peace Keeping Force in the
Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone
JPKF – Joint Peace Keeping Force
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Council
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PACE – Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe PKF – Peace
Keeping Force
SR – Spot Report (of the OSCE Mission to Georgia)
UN – United Nations
UNGA – United Nations General Assembly
US – United States of America
iii. List of graphic contents

| Graphic 1 | Model of analysis.                      | 61 |
| Table 1   | Phases of violence 1989 – 2008.         | 66 |
| Graphic 2 | Trajectory of violence based on the involvement of typologies of actors of violence. | 67 |
| Table 2   | Sequences leading to assertive policies: Initial condition, juncture and event with interview sources. | 94 |
| Table 3   | Characteristics of Western policies prior to escalations. | 132 |
| Graphic 3 | Model of re-escalation of violence in the South Ossetia conflict 1989-2008. | 138 |
| Table 4   | Mechanisms of violence during three phases prior to escalation | 145 |
| Table 5   | Differences and commonalities of mechanisms of violence in Sri Lanka, Kashmir and South Ossetia. | 174 |
iv. Map of Georgia
1. Introduction

On 8 August 2008, the conflict in South Ossetia turned into war for the second time since Georgia’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. When reports of international media confirmed heavy skirmishes between Georgian, Ossetian and Russian troops near South Ossetia, about an hour’s drive from Georgia’s capital Tbilisi (Syukaeva 2010, Karumidze and Wertsch 2009, BBC News Special reports), it took nearly everyone – from international and domestic observers to local residents – by surprise. However, escalation did not occur out of the blue. For months prior the war, residents of the conflict-affected areas had been queuing up in front of notaries in Tskhinvali to make their wills (Conciliation Resources 2009).

In fact, the region of South Ossetia, which is currently internationally recognized as part of Georgia’s territory, has undergone a continuous history of violence since the break-up of the Soviet Union. In 1989, the Ossetian and Georgian independence movements escalated the conflict between the two groups for the first time. Subsequently, the leaderships engaged in a war that was ended by a Georgian-Russian peace agreement in 1992 and that left South Ossetia de facto independent from Georgian central rule (HRW 1992, ICG 2004). Meanwhile, Georgia itself had gained independence from the Soviet Union and prepared to align itself with the West. Whereas the conflict in South Ossetia seemed under control, with the OSCE facilitating political talks and monitoring the ceasefire agreement, Georgia endured a civil war, a severe economic crisis, and a war in Abkhazia, which ended in 1994 (Coppeters and Legvold 2005).

When Georgia’s leadership changed for the third time in 2003 from Shevardnadze to the Western-oriented leader Saakashvili, the country finally seemed on track toward stability (i.a. Stewart et al. 2012). However, four months after the new government had taken power, in May 2004, the conflict in South Ossetia escalated again due to anti-smuggling raids. Subsequently and despite intense domestic and international efforts, the
situation in the deteriorated year after year through increasing violence and radicalizing rhetoric (Asmus 2010, Garthon 2010). The wide range of efforts to resolve the conflict included peace plans promoted at the United Nations (UN) and the Council of Europe and widely supported by the United States of America (US) and European leaders of the European Union (EU) and EU member states; enormous reform efforts curbing corruption on the Georgian side and progress within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) framework; ongoing political, negotiations facilitated through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with the Russian and Ossetian sides of the South Ossetia conflict; and a joint Georgian-Ossetian economic rehabilitation program.

Nevertheless, the conflict escalated into a short but devastating war for the second time in August 2008. This time, the end of the war cemented South Ossetia’s separation from Georgia even more, with the Russian Federation recognizing South Ossetian independence and the OSCE ending its mission as a facilitator in the conflict. As of 2012, the threat of escalation is unmitigated and the situation in the conflict area is as volatile as ever (RFE/RL 2012).

Considering the dynamic state of the South Ossetia conflict, this dissertation attempts to propose a plausible explanation as to why the conflict recurrently escalates. In face of the extensive settlement efforts undertaken by Georgian, Ossetian, Russian and Western actors, the conflict could have been expected to be resolved by one plan or another, be it annexation by the Russian Federation, re-establishment of Georgian central control, or international recognition of Ossetian independence. Instead, the conflict remains an impediment to Georgian statehood, a source of instability on Russia’s border, a constant worry for European leaders on the outskirts of Europe’s polity, and a burden on the livelihood of Georgians and Ossetians alike.
Importantly, the setting of the conflict exhibits persistent key characteristics over time: Russia and Georgia struggle over control of Georgia’s unaccomplished statehood, Western-Georgian ties increasingly intensify in the post-Soviet period, and control in the conflict remains a beacon of power to nationalist Georgian leaders. Simultaneously, ready-made arguments as to why the conflict persists dominate the general debate, among them Russia’s assumed political aim to regain influence over its neighbors, Georgian nationalist ambitions to reunify the territory of Georgia, and a Western-Russian struggle for dominance in the region (Fischer 2009). However, neither the persistent properties of the conflict nor any of these argumentative perspectives succeed in explaining why the conflict recurrently escalates.

This introduction approaches the research interest from two angles, first discussing the South Ossetia conflict in the post-Soviet context and then in the global context. Thereafter, the discussion introduces the central argument and presents the study with the road map of the dissertation.

South Ossetia in the post-Soviet context

The factors contributing to the continuous re-escalation of the South Ossetia conflict are not unique as to this particular case but pertain a variety of conflicts in the post-Soviet space, including Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, and Abkhazia, the second secessionist conflict with which Georgia grapples (for an overview of the context of secessionist conflicts in the post-Soviet context, see for example: De Waal 2010, King 2001, Lynch 2002, Zuercher 2007). Likewise, conflicts north of the Caucasus, such as in Chechnya and Circassia, or the Ingush-Ossetian conflict, reveal similar patterns such as Russia’s claim to regional power spots, post-Soviet strongmen’s and elites’ grip on power, the rise of nationalisms based on self-determination and territorial claims, or, depending on the legitimacy of these arguments, local populations’ search for independence by building new states, and Europe’s sometimes vague attempts to manage stability in
its bordering regions (King and Menon 2010, Tishkov 1999 and 2002, Schultz 2010). Many of the new actors in the post-Soviet space, above all in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, turn to either to Russia or to the Western axis of the EU and the US to secure independence (Fischer 2010, Markedonov 2008). The fact that these characteristics are pervasive throughout the post-Soviet space points to the decisive and sustained impact of the regional and international context on local development in individual countries. Policy patterns established over long periods of time can be expected to continuously exert similar effects on different settings.

The case of Georgia and the South Ossetian conflict varies in specific aspects from similar cases in the post-Soviet area. A brief discussion will show why outcomes are expected to be influenced considerably by a number of factors that set the South Ossetian case apart from the post-Soviet setting. First, Georgia’s relations with Russia during the Soviet Union were close in terms of economy and culture (De Waal 2010). The break of this link, and the shift to adversarial policies, exposed conflicting lines in Georgian society that had been suppressed for decades. Parts of Georgian society had benefitted from close ties with Moscow during the Soviet period, whereas other groups were persecuted or disregarded by the Soviet bureaucracy. A bitter sense of competition took hold in Georgia’s political environment. Therefore, issues of redistribution between formerly advantaged Soviet elites and newly emerging elites, as well as

---

1 Georgia marked the biggest share of exports in wine, vodka, and mineral water of all of the Soviet republics and was the most prestigious vacation destination (Derluguian 2007). Many Russian writers who are a source of Russian national pride resided in Georgia over the years and highly valued the place. Russian-Georgian marriages were commonplace. The Georgian communist elite received enormous endowments over the decades to ensure loyalty, and throughout the Soviet conquest of the Caucasus from the mid-19th century, Georgian elites played a crucial role in supporting Russia militarily.

2 This struggle became evident in its most devastating form during the civil war after 1993 when the Mkhedrioni forces backed president Shevardnadze against the Russian-ousted previous president Gamsakhurdia’s Zviadist groups. The struggle was carried forward in various forms, such as the Soviet intelligentsia’s aversion for the Saakashvili elite or the continuous allegations against political opponents of being paid by and acting on orders from Russia.
anti-Russian policies in the South Ossetia context, both mingled in the competing groups’ struggle for power.

Second, the first Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s very first step to bolster Georgian self-determination was an attempt to push Russia from South Ossetia and bring the region back under Georgian rule. When the conflict in South Ossetia turned into war in 1990, this contributed most strongly to the falling-out between Georgia and Russia. Crucially for Gamsakhurdia, losing South Ossetia meant losing power, and he was subsequently ousted and in 1992 replaced by the second president, Eduard Shevardnadze. Therefore, the conflict over South Ossetia holds a particular importance for Georgian domestic leaders, both with regard to anti-Russian politics and in terms of legitimizing their rule through attempts to integrate the state.

Third, Georgians’ relations with Ossetians during the Soviet period were culturally closer than with the Abkhaz minority. Ossetian communities in the oblast of South Ossetia and in villages in central Georgia were geographically closer to Georgians than Abkhazian communities, and infrastructural and social links through marriages and trade were particularly tight (HRW 1992). The history of close Georgian-Ossetian relations contributes to the strength of Georgia’s claim on the territory of South Ossetia.

Fourth, of all the former Soviet republics, Georgia has enjoyed (or suffered, depending on one’s point of view) the largest amount of international engagement, with the highest level of US financial support, two international missions – UN and OSCE – deployed on its territory, and the most institutionalized ties with European structures within EU and NATO frameworks (Fischer 2010, Cooley and Mitchell 2010b, Hanf and Nodia 2000). Georgia’s reform efforts were awarded with high levels of financial, economic, military and political support from the international community.
International engagement included the conflict in South Ossetia (Koenig 2005, Jawad 2008) but also and in particular focused on the liberal project of building the Georgian state and democracy (Lazarus 2010, Broers 2005). Fifth, South Ossetia is, in stark contrast to other post-Soviet secessionist territories, extremely secluded from the outside world, with little or no access to international organizations, and mostly dependent on Russian assistance and illicit trade (US Department of State Report 2011). Within this context, the dynamics of the conflict are significantly swayed by regional stakeholders’ policies and generally external influence in the dynamics of the conflict.

Sixth, among the former Soviet republics, Georgia experienced the most severe outbursts of violence after the split from the Soviet Union, with the two wars in South Ossetia in 1992 and 2008, one in Abkhazia, one civil war, and ongoing violence in the separatist areas. Therefore, the political context of Georgia and the dynamics of violence in South Ossetia provide a particularly significant setting for the study of re-escalation of violence.

Seventh, the conflict in South Ossetia is nourished considerably by South Ossetian links with its adjacent “brother nation” North Ossetia, located in the Russian Federation (see for North-South Ossetian history for example: King and Melvin 2000, Higgins and O’Reilly 2009). Cross-border cultural and political ties are strong, and appeals for unification of North and South Ossetia into ‘Greater Alania’ recur throughout both territories. None of the other ongoing post-Soviet conflicting parties, including Abkhazia, can call on as strong a cross-border diaspora as the Ossetians in South Ossetia. Claims of self-determination and territorial separation from Georgia stress Ossetian links across the Caucasus and reinforce the impetus for South Ossetian secessionism.

Eighth, both Georgia and South Ossetia border the Russian Federation, in contrast to Transnistria or Nagorno-Karabakh, which also receive extensive
amounts of political and financial resources from the Russian Federation to bolster political rule. This not only provides Russia the opportunity to influence South Ossetia and Georgia via North Ossetian politics and territory, but also puts Moscow in a state of alert as to international activities at the southern borders. This circumstance is particularly significant to Western external activity in Georgia.

In all of these respects, the case of the South Ossetian conflict differs from its siblings in the post-Soviet context. The issues discussed above highlight the key factors that reinforce conflict dynamics, such as territorial proximity, Western and Russian interests, and Georgia’s historically close Soviet ties. Moreover, these factors emphasize that 1) the South Ossetia conflict impacts local power politics in post-Soviet Georgia, and 2) Western external influence plays a key role in Georgia and the South Ossetia conflict. As will be shown, the discussion will establish these two factors as key components of the central argument, after discussing the South Ossetia case in the global context.

*South Ossetia in the global context*

The puzzle of recurring violence in South Ossetia, however, is not exclusively relevant to the post-Soviet context. Recurring violence is an issue of wider importance beyond this particular case, as even upon superficial examination we can find examples of re-escalating conflicts in similar settings, such as in Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Lebanon or East Timor (see i.a. Habibullah 2004, Shastri 2005, Cederman et al. 2010, Wimmer et al. 2010). All of these conflicts experienced recurring violence after stalemated periods of low-level or absent violence. They are also subject to ethnic strife over territory within the boundary of a state and experience varying levels of Western influence and domestic power struggle.

First, the subject of recurring violence in ongoing conflicts forms a key aspect of the study of the dynamics of the South Ossetia conflict and sets
this study apart from studies seeking to explain the onset of violence. Why violence recurs is a subset of the question of why violence occurs at all (see the seminal work of Kalyvas 2006). In this respect, the re-escalation of violence differs from violence that emerges out of previously non-violent contexts (Cederman et al. 2010, Eck 2009, Zartman 2002). In an ongoing conflict, a system of patterns and mechanisms has evolved and can be expected to have a determining and even intensifying effect on the occurrence of events (Cederman et al. 2010: 1). Therefore, in systems of recurring violence, these factors are held to explain re-escalation only if examined at different points throughout the process as they can be expected 1) to be part of the explanation why violence recurs and 2) change their retraining and incentivizing effects on actions, policies and choices over time.

Second, external and specifically Western engagement in domestic conflict contexts is a common phenomena. Western agendas inside volatile states largely overlap, as Western countries mostly dedicate their efforts to incentivizing democratic reform and state formation (Duffield 2002, Carothers 2000, Crawford 2002, Bader 2010, Levitsky and Way 2010). This is also the case in the context of the South Ossetia conflict and Georgia’s political process, as European states and the US have launched enormous efforts to Westernize the political system in Georgia after the end of the Soviet Union (Lazarus 2010, Fairbanks 2012). In this respect, Georgia is one of Western states’ post-Cold War ‘projects’ of liberal governance (see for example Anderson 2012). However, little is known about the specific effects of Western engagement in the context of local violence, and even less is known about its effects on re-escalation as Goodhand and Walton (2010) show this in the case study on Sri Lanka. Moreover, the specific policies Western actors utilize and their impact on particular events is a field largely unaddressed by social research. The following study will address some of these issues and discuss the findings in light of the conflict.
contexts in Sri Lanka and Kashmir to illustrate the general scope of the results.

Argument of the study

The above-listed characteristics of the dynamics of recurring violence in South Ossetia, both in the global and the regional context, highlight the importance of external Western engagement, the domestic power setting, and historical relations with Russia. However, none of these arguments provides an explanation as to why escalations occur at specific points in time and why they recur. Escalations do not necessarily coincide with agency of the Russian Federation or shifts in power. Those factors only explain that the context deteriorated in favor of escalation, but do not explain or provide credible links why and how escalations occurred at the points in time observed. Therefore, these studies refrain from addressing the specific conditions of the South Ossetia case and link secession to exogenous factors. This view represents the dominating perspective of scholars, politicians and the public in European states and the U.S., but clouds the view to the actual, powerful triggers of violence in the conflict. As a result, no systematic study on violence in South Ossetia has been done.

This dissertation will argue that the policies of Western external actors at specific points in time repeatedly encouraged or allowed local state leadership in Georgia to shift toward more assertive policies, with the result of escalation of violence in South Ossetia. The study argues further that Western policies significantly affect domestic power options. Because the South Ossetia conflict places territorial claims, competing group issues, international and domestic political support, and financial assets at stake, external policies incentivize Georgian state elites to utilize and comply with external influence in the context of the conflict. The argument holds that Western policies thereby trigger shifts in the behavior of Georgian state leadership and in this way create the context for repeated shifts toward
escalation. On this basis, the study further contends that recurring patterns of external influence can be seen prior to more than one instant of escalation. These patterns are chains of actions which work through local state policies and translate into mechanisms of external influence that enable the dynamics of re-escalation in the conflict.

In the first chapter, the discussion will deal in depth with the empirical and theoretical aspects of the argument, based on the review of existing arguments as to why violence in ethnic conflicts re-escalates and empirical considerations of the South Ossetia case.

Roadmap of the dissertation

The dissertation begins with the review of existing arguments as to why violence in ethnic conflicts re-escalates and critically discusses these in light of their applicability to re-escalation in South Ossetia. Subsequently, the chapter juxtaposes the causal argument against existing explanations and introduces the analytical framework of the study. The discussion first sustains the argument through theoretical considerations and establishes working hypotheses to guide the empirical analysis. Then the discussion addressed the methodological considerations of conducting the empirical analysis and concludes the introductory chapter with the model of analysis.

Thereafter, the second chapter covers the empirical analysis of the influence of Western policies on the power politics of local leadership in Georgia prior to escalations in 2002, 2004 and 2008. The chapter comprises two parts: First, the text gives an overview of the background of political development in Georgia and the events of violence in South Ossetia between 1989 and 2008. This part reflects the local context of events and agency related to the three points of escalation in 2002, 2004 and 2008. For this purpose, the text discusses, prior to the background
account, the data collection and casing of the three points of escalation in 2002, 2004 and 2008.

The second part of the chapter conducts the empirical analysis of Western policies prior to the three points of escalation by using the method of a narrative account. Here, the chapter proceeds by chronologically depicting the impact of Western policies on Georgian leadership’s power politics for each of the three re-escalation instances. The analysis takes into account reinforcing factors of conflict dynamics prior to escalations, such as Russian or Ossetian agency, as well as domestic constraints such as private interests, nationalist claims and demands of the population. However, the focus of the account is on depicting Western policies’ impact on Georgian leaderships’ power consolidation attempts in the context of the conflict, in order to sustain the argument claiming a causal link here that provides for re-escalation. The chapter concludes by proposing an explanatory model for violence re-escalation between 1989 and 2008 in the South Ossetia context.

The third and final chapter discusses the theoretical and empirical applicability of the findings of the South Ossetia case, first in light of existing theories of violence in ethnic conflicts, and second in light of violence in the Sri Lanka and Kashmir conflicts. The discussion specifically turns to the enhancement of existing mechanisms of violence, pointing out their specific functions under given circumstances, and concludes with a critical reflection on the theoretical aspects of Western engagement in internal contexts of violence. The conclusion summarizes the findings and points to suggestions for further research.

Altogether, the study finds that the future of the conflict in South Ossetia depends largely on Georgian-Western relations. The study, in a nutshell, finds that Western policies repeatedly trigger escalations in South Ossetia by providing strong incentives for Georgian leaderships to enact power-
consolidation policies in the context of the conflict. Therefore, Western policies repeatedly provide the impetus to shift toward assertive policies prior to escalations, especially by promoting a high level of inconsistency in terms of political agency and claims prior to escalations.

The Western agenda of both US and European actors generally appears to reinforce local dynamics. In a careful distinction between US and European policies, US policies appear to take effect particularly through their direct political impact on policies of the Georgian state leaderships in the context of the conflict. European agencies appear to rather take effect through institutional frameworks that then seem to shape Georgian leaderships choices, such as starting with the CSCE (Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe) framework at the very beginning of the conflict in 1992.

In this respect, the findings suggest that in order to help overcome the deep-set patterns of conflict and violence in the Georgian/South Ossetian context, the European Union should decentralize competencies and strengthen its locally based institutions, namely the EU Delegation to Georgia and the EU Special Representative to the South Caucasus. These institutions should be given more responsibility for decision-making and policy-formation vis-à-vis Georgian actors. Greater efficiency and consistency of EU policies through a clear separation of competences between EU agencies would greatly enhance the effect of such policies, as 1) the same actors would act at one level and be a consistent addressee for local concerns, and 2) agendas would not be shuffled between agencies and localities, thereby increasing the consistency of claims.

This first step of providing reliable grounds for EU-Georgia relations would greatly diminish the harm inflicted by European policies. In a second step, with strengthened consistency, the European Union would be able to introduce a legitimized system of sanctions in case of local encroachments.
The system would take effect on eye level with local actors and therefore not punish in hindsight, but rather capacitate a political contract including a priori fixed sanctions in transparent cases.
2. Analytical framework

The following chapter serves to build the causal argument of this study and develop an analytical framework. For this purpose, the chapter presents a review of literature on ethnic violence and a critique thereof, the causal argument of the study, and theoretical and methodological considerations regarding the key aspects of the argument in order to conduct the empirical analysis. The chapter concludes with a presentation of the model of analysis and an account of expected outcomes.

2.1. Literature review

The existing literature on ethnic violence differs mainly as to where explanations identify the “culprit” to which the occurrence of violence can be assigned. Many arguments follow the agency-oriented turn from the late 1990s (Beissinger 2000: 24), examining the political conditions of how actors’ interests and subsequent actions lead to violence. Other arguments focus rather on contextual factors as determining violent outcomes, such as regime change, resources, and external influence. However, most studies dealing with explaining ethnic violence include both structural and agency-based features and rather lean to one side or the other (see for this argument for example Brass 1996). Even if we identify who is pulling the trigger, the “culprit” of emerging violence is not easily located if we consider the dynamics and interactions prior to outbreaks of violence. Whereas the existing literature seems to widely acknowledge this, this is at the same time not reflected in the research agenda of most studies on ethnically based violence, as will be discussed below.

The following literature review discusses existing arguments aiming to explain violence in ethnic conflicts. The review identifies four core arguments: 1) Democratization and elections leading to violence, 2) Illicit economies leading to violence, 3) Grievances leading to violence, and 4) Involvement of external actors leading to violence. The discussion will review how those arguments may help to explain recurring violence in
ethnically framed contexts. With regard to forming the causal argument, the discussion will focus on the explanatory scope of existing research for recurring violence in the case of South Ossetia and in which respects these studies are or are not helpful.

Existing literature on the South Ossetia conflict and politics in Georgia

A narrow, but well-informed strand of studies accounts for events of the conflict in South Ossetia. An increasing number of studies accounts for the South Ossetia conflict, however, with most studies focusing on Georgia’s political context and including South Ossetia merely as a marker of Georgia’s transitional problems. By discussing the Georgian post-Soviet and in particular the post-Rose Revolution political system, studies largely focus on two juxtaposing topics relating to the conflict, first, state-building and democratization, as well as, second, ethnic groups and nationalism. The first field highlights the conflict as a result of local and international efforts in the realms of state-building and democratization. State-building policies thereafter fuel the conflict by pushing territorial integration (see Mitchell 2009 and Lazarus 2010). Democratization, on the other hand, might deteriorate the conflict if key reforms such as integration of minorities and institutional rights fail (see Huber 2004 and Broers 2005). The second field stressing ethnic groups and nationalism in relation to the conflict more specifically discusses causes of South Ossetian secession in light of post-Soviet nationalisms, as a by-product of Western-Russian

---


competition over influence in the region\textsuperscript{8}, or as caused and upheld through Russian influence in Georgia.\textsuperscript{9}

These studies do not provide an explanation as to why escalations occur at specific points in time and why they recur. Escalations do not necessarily coincide with agency of the Russian Federation or shifts in power. Those factors only explain that the context deteriorated in favor of escalation, but do not explain or provide credible links why and how escalations occurred at the points in time observed. Therefore, these studies refrain from addressing the specific conditions of the South Ossetia case and link secession to exogenous factors. This view represents the dominating perspective of scholars, politicians and the public in European states and the U.S., but clouds the view to the actual, powerful triggers of violence in the conflict. As a result, no systematic study on violence in South Ossetia has been done.

Studies on corruption and smuggling in the context of the South Ossetia conflict reflect stability and forms of political rule in post-Soviet Georgia\textsuperscript{10}, holding that corruption triggers escalation or protracts violence.\textsuperscript{11} These studies provide solid insight into domestic power functions that trigger or alleviate violence through corruption, however neglect to systematically encompass external influence on violence-triggering policies. Studies on Western influence in the South Ossetia conflict rarely move beyond specific sectors of engagement, performance of individual actors, or specific events such as the 2008 war\textsuperscript{12}, with the noteworthy exception of Lazarus’ paper (Lazarus 2010) that will help to frame the findings.


The dissertation will selectively draw on these studies to support the causal argument by sustaining the statements over the course of the discussion, particularly in the theoretical discussion of the argument and in the empirical chapter. Given that for the purposes of this study there is an insufficient scope of literature which focuses on the case, the following discussion will draw on main arguments in literature that seeks to explain ethnic violence and will critically reflect on their usefulness for studying re-escalation in South Ossetia. At the end of the discussion, the study will present a causal argument for re-escalating violence in the South Ossetia conflict.

1) Argument 1: Democratization and elections leading to violence – “Playing the ethnic card” (Mansfield and Snyder 2005: 70)

With the Soviet Union disintegrating and post-colonial processes taking effect, newly formed states emerged and endeavored to establish democratic systems. Considered a pillar of democracy, elections were held in these new entities to choose new leaders to these states. However, many of the electoral processes proved not only to lack democratic standards of being free and fair, but also coincided with outbreaks of violence. Moreover, violence often seemed to occur along ethnic lines. Subsequently, a large strand of studies took to explain the occurrence of violence in these newly emerging contexts examining the link between democratization and ethnic violence (see above all: Snyder and Mansfield 1995, Snyder 1993 and 2000, Brubaker 1996, Woodward 2003, Walter 1999): Is there any link, or are the factors leading to violence hidden to the eye, and not necessarily related to democratization itself? Who is involved with violence, and does this explain why violence breaks out and why violence coincides precisely with periods of elections? Does ethnicity actually play the key role it seemingly has?
Largely, the argument can be summarized as follows: Local groups struggle for power in the emerging order and make use of unstable structures such as media, resentments toward minorities, unequal distribution of resources and the like. Through these means, and often strategically, actors striving for power embark on mobilizing their constituencies in the processes of electoral competition, often by inciting violence. As a result, violence escalates, mostly in form of civil strife involving ethnic riots, and fosters and sustains inequalities and conflict along ethnic lines.

The link between the democratization processes and violence does not become clear immediately. In the beginning of the 1990s when new states started to establish democratic systems, democracy was widely held to foster peace (for studies discussing this argument see: Kaldor and Vejvoda 1997, Russett 1995). But the paradigm of “democratic peace” took interstate relations into focus, without taking into consideration internal conditions of democratizing states that had not yet been enshrined in theory. Social research throughout the 1990s came to acknowledge that transitional phases of political systems are predominantly characterized by instability, regularly involving outbreaks of violence (see for a seminal study on this argument: Snyder 1998). Hence, the context in which democratizations take place is highly volatile, as new groups emerge out of the fading order, often through forming new alliances which struggle for power in the emerging order (see for literature discussing this argument: Snyder and Ballantine 1996; Wucherpfennig, Cederman, Metternich and Gleditsch 2010: 3; Gagon 1995 and 2007).

Gaining power in democratizing orders largely hinges on securing resources which groups can make use of in political competition (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010: 106; also see: Brubaker and Laitin 1998). Here, a key resource is support of respective constituencies (see above all Wilkinson 2004: 21-22), as holding office gives authority over decisions about the distribution of resources. In new states, power-seekers tend to form identities by “playing the ethnic card” (Mansfield and Snyder
2005: 70). If a group striving for power can unify a constituency over an identity-forming claim under its banner a powerful resource is at the hands of the power elite. Thereby, ethnicity functions as a group-constituting force when promoted against an adversary, an ethnic “other” in competitive contexts (see above all: Anderson 1991, Ignatieff 1993).

Social sciences widely accept the perception of identities to be part of group membership processes (see the study of Berger and Luckmann 1987). Particularly David Laitin has specified that mechanisms of inter-group conflict promoted by elites tie groups internally together, or respectively, that intra-group policing by vilifying competing elites, ethnic groups or any oppositional forces and “enemies of the nation” (Laitin 1995 in Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 433) can play a crucial role for securing support of constituencies. Hence, if leaders succeed in forging strong group identification among the respective members and if they successfully link these categories to a power bid, constituencies tend to provide support (Walter 2009: 71, also see Mansfield and Snyder 2005, Goemans 2000). Further, if leaders make use of “elite manipulation” (Ballantine and Snyder 1996: 22) by staging a threat to the group through a second group under the claim to be able to protect their peer group from harm, constituencies tend to provide even stronger support (on this argument see for example: Toft 2003, Figueiredo and Weingast 1997, Brown 1996). Other manipulative mechanisms in the electoral process may be the misrepresentation of one’s own players and capacities in order to gain support (Snyder 2000: 67, also see Walter 2003, Fearon 1995), and the weak brokerage of political bargains (Mansfield and Snyder 2005: 67).

Therefore, the debate on democratization and elections sees ethnicity through the creation of identities as a strategic power resource for those competing at the core of power struggles. Ethnicity is viewed as but one power resource, though possibly the most powerful in democratizing contexts (for this argument see for example: Kendhammer 2010, Holliday
2008). If this is the case, how do ethnically framed electoral processes lead to violence? Studies explore which mechanisms work through political actors that then lead to mobilization and escalation. Characteristically, actors competing for power strategically work through ethnic entrepreneurs fomenting sentiments among constituencies (Brass 1997: 31, Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 440), for example introducing “ethnic wedges” into public debate to stress the salience of ethnic issues (Wilkinson 2006: 23, Gagnon 1998), or utilize media to direct public awareness in their favor (Snyder and Ballantine 1996: 14). Political elites make use of institutions established during democratization, such as the electoral or constitutional system or, political parties. A well-studied example of institutional manipulation of the electoral process is vote pooling through ethnic outbidding (on this mechanism see: Horowitz 1985: chapter 8, Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 434) or inbidding (Wilkinson 2004: 4) by overstating claims of liberalism, or logrolling with minority parties (Snyder 2000: 67). Furthermore, the debate identifies mechanisms not necessarily related to ethnic framing, such as elite manipulation of constituencies through waging war in a foreign crisis to consolidate power by fomenting fear among constituencies (for this argument see above all: Walter 2009, Mansfield and Snyder 2006, Brass 1997, Wilkinson 2006).

Escalations of violence in electoral competition of democratizing states are usually precipitated by a combination of several of these mechanisms (Mansfield and Snyder 2005: 67 and 169ff.). The debate does not systematically examine re-escalation of violence, but juxtaposes that the potential for violence to escalate recurs with each election cycle unless gains of the use of violence for power elites becomes obsolete.

2) Argument 2: Illicit economies leading to violence – “Ethnic warfare is simply a cover story for criminal violence and predation” (Brubaker 2004: 19)

The argument that illicit economies explain the recurrence of violence in ethnic conflicts emerged during the course of the 1990s as a response to
the assumption that ‘ancient hatreds’ between ethnic groups lie at the heart of inter-group warfare (Kalyvas 2001: 102ff., also see Schlichte 2006). Seminally for the debate, Fearon and Laitin made the case that economic interests significantly outdo ethnic factors in their impact on the likelihood of armed conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 75, also see Fearon and Laitin 1998 and the instrumentalist approaches of Brubaker 2004 and Keen 1998). A new strand of debate took to defending the so-called “new wars” of the 1990s not to be the result of ethnic and cultural differences, but to be the result of strife over newly accessible resources serving groups’ power claims (Kalyvas 2001: 103, also see Kalyvas 2008, Sinno 2008, Cunningham et al. 2009 and Sambanis 2000). Similar to the ethnicity argument, the violent potential of illicit economies is rooted in the existence of resources that can be exploited for political gains. Competing groups predate resources through diasporas, state capture, and smuggling as these supply lines bypass controlled markets (for this argument see the excellent study on Sarajevo of Andreas 2008, also see Wennmann 2004, Demmers 2007). Hence, the illicit economies argument contends that it is not perceptions of social inequality arising from ethnic diversity that trigger conflict (Wilkinson 2006: 32, Cederman et al. 2010: 92), but rather the goal of financing inter-group warfare of insurgent rebellion or self-enriching war lords (for this argument see: Collier and Hoeffler 2001, Weinstein 2007, Walter 2006).

The debate puts a clear emphasis on groups capturing the state in order to gain access to resources that serve as proxies for state power (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 76, Cederman et al.: 87, also see Woodward 2003). Schlichte points out that gaining legitimacy enables agents of violence to gain access to state resources through office, to access local constituencies, or to be entitled to use violence for these purposes (Schlichte 2009, first version 2007: 7).

This argument offers various explanations for recurring violence over extended periods of time. The core of the argument supports that actors
persistently engage in violence, because they 1) gain material assets from the use of force and 2) become a habitual part of an economy of violence (for this strand of debate see above all: Elwert 1997 and 1999; Jung, Schlichte and Siegelberg; Schlichte 2005; Zuercher and Koehler 2003). In markets of violence, violence becomes both a resource to extract more resources and a currency that can be used by actors to pursue their goals and simultaneously perpetuates the instable context necessary to maintain shadow economies. Weinstein points out that violence from rebel organizations tends to recur if resources become available (see Weinstein 2007).

The tipping moment of a system skipping from armed conflict into a market or an order of violence occurs when actors not only opt for violence as a low-cost means to achieve their goals, but when maintaining power requires actors to engage in armed action. The debate offers largely differing explanations for this: Rational choice-based explanations contend that state elites may opt for resurrection through warfare (Mansfield and Snyder 2005: 43, Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 434, also see Walter 2003). Process-centered perspectives argue that violence starts out as motivated by greed, but transgresses over time into a self-reinforcing mechanism of needs and thus perpetuate violence (Kalyvas and Balcet 2010: 416, also see Berdal and Malone 2000, Arnson and Zartman 2005). A few valuable studies on international engagement in conflicts with illicit economies show how external engagement tends to aggravate the level or likelihood of violence and often maintains predatory elites in specific cases (see for example: Andreas 2008, Cockayne and Lupell 2009).

Critique of Arguments 1 and 2: Predatory policies of local state elites in Georgia

In the course of 2004, criticism of new president Saakashvili’s policies took hold.¹³ The re-escalation of the conflict in South Ossetia was held to be a

¹³ For a detailed account of the background of Georgian politics in the context of the South Ossetia conflict, please see the first section of the empirical analysis, accounting for
result of more assertive, nationalist policies of the new Georgian leadership striving for territorial reintegration (see for example Wheatley 2005). The newly emerging elite announced a plan to establish Georgia as a viable member of the Western community, making the country fit for NATO and EU integration, and claiming to wrestle it from the paralyzing grip of the status quo imposed by Russia throughout the 1990s (Nodia 2000). Because settlement prospects were dim and there was time pressure to keep up with the population’s and international expectations, it was understood that the Georgian government took an impatient course that led to hawkish policies and engaged in a cycle of armed atrocities involving Russian and Ossetian forces (see for example: Jones 2009). After 2004, illicit practices deteriorated the balance of interests in the conflict, as Georgian and Ossetian groups aimed to gain control over smuggling through the South Ossetia region.

There is an appealing scope of explaining escalation through predatory power policies: Many observers hold that the Georgian government made the situation in the conflict worse by atrocious policies, with the aim to prove themselves in their new positions of power. In addition, it was widely held that high-ranking state actors and regional state actors attempted to gain control over illicit assets in the conflict area ( Fuller 2005, also see interviews in chapter 2).

The explanation is however flawed as it does not grasp why Georgian politics under the second president Shevardnadze were more peaceful than under the third president Saakashvili’s rule. Both presidencies ranked territorial re-integration and integration into Western structures high on their agendas and both administrations included members who personally gained from the conflict (see for this view for example Wheatly 2005, George 2009). When the power shift to Saakashvili took place in 2004, the

---

key events and trajectories between 1989 and 2009. The account given here serves solely to support the argument of the study and choses therefore a selective account on the basis of selective literature.
new elite enjoyed similar scopes of financial and political support from the international community and even far more from the population than Shevardnadze’s administration had at its peak. Why then did the stalemated conflict turn into repeated escalations over the successive years?

The argument could explain the re-escalation of violence out of predatory policies. The new Saakashvili elite, first under Saakashvili as the Minister of Justice then as president, attempted to overhaul the old order and to gain control over smuggling activities in the contested areas bordering South Ossetia.

In this instant, the argument cannot explain why the 2008 escalation occurred: Smuggling margins explicitly depended on uncontrolled borders provided by the status quo of the conflict and a low-level of violence. The escalation in 2008 created disorder, which undermined smuggling activities, harmed and business relations with partners on the other side of the bargain as access routes were closed down. If gains from illicit trade had been the motivation for policies of violence, attempts at reintegration of the area would not have been a viable policy. Hence, interest in gaining control over illicit assets can at most partially explain why the conflict re-escalates at different points in time.

Similarly, the argument that elections lead to violence does not hold in this case. The core aspect of this argument contends that violence emerges prior to or in the context of elections. Most of the studies concur that election cycles coinciding with mobilization cycles can result in violence.14 What if escalation occurs without elections in temporal proximity? The recurrence of violence in the South Ossetia case is not always or often not clearly linked to election periods: Violence in the conflict peaked after the new post-Soviet elite had taken power after 1989 (see the discussion in chapter 2). Also, violence re-intensified after elections were held in 2000

---

14 Beissinger identifies escalation toward the end of the mobilization cycle, though in terms of mobilization towards a political goal, not necessarily elections (Beissinger 2002).
and escalated only after the regime change was settled in 2004. Many mechanisms linked to election cycles may occur continuously throughout the process, but they might not 1) be specific for election contexts, or 2) lead to escalation, unless under additional circumstances.

3) **Argument 3: Emotions leading to violence – “Whether Resentment produces violence or not depends in large part on the intensity of the emotion” (Petersen 2002: 256)**

The debate on grievances emerging from political inequalities gained influence when at the start of the 1990s atrocities between ethnic groups broke out across the world, such as prominently in the former Yugoslavia (for this argument see for example: Kaufman 1996 and 2001; Gurr 1970 and 2000; Kaldor 1999; Westley 1966). Strong emotions based on group identity were held to trigger acts of violence by group members in case their peer group is – real or perceived – subject to an outside threat, mostly from a second ethnic group. Ethnicty is held to be a naturally inherited type of affection to the kin or cultural group into which an individual is born, and thus endows especially strong emotional bonds on its members (see for example: Huntington 1996, Ignatieff 1993, Westley 1966). To this end, notions of ethnicity are held to intensify emotions and thus the likelihood of the use of violence when group members act on their emotions to protect the group.

Also, after the debate turned to seeking explanations for ethnic violence not in identity-based approaches, but in political or private interests of actors or at least a nexus of private gains and political goals (for some of these critical views see: Kalyvas 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Korf 2005; Regan and Norton 2005), studies often have drawn on emotion-based explanations (Jeffrey 2007, Dion 1996). Proponents of this approach suggest that grievances take hold over time if volatile inter-group relationships are protracted through continuous – real or perceived –

---

15 Forms of violence such as domestic violence, gang violence, street criminality can all depend on group identification, but are not relevant for contexts of nationalist violence.
subjugation of one group, for instance through unequal distribution of power or goods or direct acts of physical violence (see for example: Petersen 2002, Wood 2003). The longer and the more gravely one group sees itself oppressed by another, the higher the likelihood of violence. ‘Ancient hatreds’ between groups, based on narratives often dating back centuries, motivate patterns of grievances that then lead to acts of violence.

Thereby, the argument focuses on social inequalities, often within the boundaries of a state that cause violence in the long run. In many cases those – perceived or real – inequalities are held to follow ethnic lines, and can be reinforced through strategic state policies. Wucherpfennig et al. point out that “Ethnicity can indeed prolong civil wars. This effect is entirely driven by conflicts with state-induced grievances, in cases of systematically excluding specific ethnic groups from access to state power” (Wucherpfennig et al. 2010: 3). Institutional approaches hold that institutions, often used by elites, may trigger or prevent violence depending on their scope of social equality promotion and prevention of grievances (Wilkinson 2006: 203).

Violence is held to break out when, both, emotions intensify to the tipping point and when context provides the opportunity (Petersen 2002: 18). Therefore, violence is more likely to occur when the social context changes, such as when social hierarchy is altered, new resources become available, or authority at the social center weakens (ibid.: 40). Proponents of the grievance argument particularly point to the end of the international system during the Cold War as having given rise to inter-group conflicts within new states through the absence of a sovereign. The Security Dilemma argument holds that fear triggers armed group conflict (for this argument see above all: Figueiredo and Weingast 1997). Strands of this approach points to the use of ethnicity by political elites, which lead to assumptions about the adversary group’s behavior which then has an

Similar to the illicit economy argument, once grievance-induced violence has started it introduces a deterministic self-reinforcing cycle of atrocities based on revenge. The longer the process drags on, the higher the likelihood of an order of violence to take hold: the more incidents of casualties, inequalities and sufferings amass and again turn into grievances, the more this enforces group identity, incentives for the use of violence and for re-escalation.

**Critique of Argument 3: Russia’s claim of regional dominance**

Russia’s role in the Caucasus has been contested latest since resistance against Russian-led rule started north and south of the Greater Caucasus in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{16} The common explanation for recurring violence in South Ossetia centers on Russian historical influence fuelling ethnic tensions in the Caucasus (Popescu 2007: 6, also see Markedonov 2008, Tishkov 2002, Blank 1995). Russia holds a tight political, economic and occasionally military grip on the former Soviet republics (see for example: Fischer 2010) as it sees its influence threatened by Westernizing efforts in its near abroad. To maintain influence over Georgia’s course, Russia supports the breakaway entities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a divide-and-rule strategy supporting titular nations over others. Russia’s meddling, according to this argument, destabilizes the context, or prevents it from stabilizing in the first place, to the extent that re-escalation of violence became imminent (Nichol 2008: 9 and 27).

\textsuperscript{16} The above critique of the election and illicit economy arguments has already raised the critique of the grievance argument, seminally in the debates between Collier and Hoeffler and Fearon and Laitin. It shall not be repeated here as this discussion aims at the use of the grievance argument in light of re-escalation in South Ossetia.
The historical legacies of grievances experienced an important shift after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Soviet institutions fuelled competition among titular nations in the Caucasus, and led to territorial claims based on self-determination after the patronage of Moscow had ended (see for example: De Waal 2010, Shatirishvili 2009). To this end, the Soviet period laid the foundations for inter-group relations that were deeply entrenched with real and perceived inequalities. The South Ossetia conflict entails a compelling history of grievances of Georgians and Ossetians, including narratives of the right to live in a certain place, unequal rights during the Soviet period and beyond, extend to ethnic cleansing and accounts of mutual atrocities (for seminal studies see: Birch 1996 and 1999).

The debate offers an explanation of how emotions that turn into grievances over extended periods of time can then cause violence. In this respect, Jeffrey brings up for debate the representative argument that “reescalation of conflict and failure of post-settlement democratization are more likely when there are incompatible national identities” (Jeffrey 2007: 679). However, the above discussed widespread argument of assertive Russia triggering domestic and external conditions of (re-)escalation does not provide an explanation as to why escalations occur at those specific points in time and why they recur. Russian, Georgian and Ossetian policies have been assertive ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The potential, the will and the attitude to use force in the context of the conflict existed at all points in time after 1989 among all the stakeholders. As argued above, escalations also do not necessarily coincide with shifts in power which might point to grievances as a cause: Georgian relations with Russia deteriorated after Russian president Putin came into power in 2000 and again after the regime change in Georgia in 2004. This does not explain why the conflict never escalated after changes in power among stakeholders between 1992 and 2002. In addition, this only explains that the context deteriorated in favor of escalation, but does not explain or
provide credible links why and how escalations occurred at the points in time observed.

Yet another weakness shows in the grievance argument when looking at South Ossetia in its regional context: Historical legacies of Russian regional dominance relate to all regional conflicts such as in Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria and Abkhazia. However as pointed out in the introduction, the South Ossetia conflict proves to be the most dynamic and intense among its siblings and the grievance argument does not help explain how this came about. Therefore, the discussion turns to the external influence of international actors as a possible explanation for re-escalation in South Ossetia.

4) Argument 4: Involvement of external actors leading to violence – “The West did not do enough” (Asmus 2010)

The impact of external influence on domestic events is a rarely studied subject. Theories of external influence in the post-Cold war period discuss rapid diversification of foreign relations of post-Soviet successor state after they lose Moscow as their external patron (for this approach see for example: Stein and Lobell 1997, Wallenstein and Axell 1993, Byman et al. 2001). With regard to external engagement in internal armed conflicts in the post-Soviet area and beyond, studies deal with forms of influence such as outside military intervention (see for example Zuercher 2007, Markedonov 2008), international assistance through financing or humanitarian aid (Crawford 1997 and 2000), peace-keeping missions (Koenig 2005, Jawad 2005), diaspora support (Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch 2009), and cross-border relations of ethnic communities (King and Menon 2010, Schultz 2010, Carment and James 1995, Saideman 1998).

Representative literature perceives the post-communist space as a sphere of interest for the West and Russia (for example see: Blank 1995, Markedonov 2008). The debates differ in which forms of influence they
assign to both the West and Russia in pursuing their political goals. Western agency is said to rely on conditionality policy that ties the implementation of stability-enhancing measures to political, economic and financial support for state elites (Sasse 2008, Levitsky and Way 2007, Schimmelfennig 2005, Crawford 2000, Milcher and Slay 2005). The US and EU’s focus their global efforts on a state-building agenda (Jung, Schlichte and Siegelberg 2003; Schlichte 2005) through which integration into Western structures such as NATO or EU depends on territorial integration. Although Western policies of the U.S., EU and individual EU member states differ at great length, Western conditional policy in the field of territorial integration largely focuses on enhancing stability through strengthening central state power.

Altogether, the scope of external impact on internal violence is not systematically explored beyond, either, specific forms of action or agendas of interests, or structural influence on domestic politics (Carment, James and Taydas 2009: 72). International Relations theory was the first strand of debate to theoretically grasp the role of external influence in changing domestic landscapes (see above all: Putnam 1990, Gourevitch 1978, Suhrke and Noble 1977). Studies focus on the proximity of military competition or democratic states that can result in diffusion of norms and values through ‘spill over’ or ‘contagion’ effects enhancing trends in transitional states (Jacoby 2006, Snyder 2000: 74 and 341 ff., also see: Checkel 1999, Gleditsch and Ward 2006, Whitehead 1996).

However, these studies focus on structural external influence on domestic political conditions and remain vague in terms of their function (Carment, James and Taydas 2009: 70; also see: Heraclides 1991; Zartman 1992; Saideman 1997; Keohane and Milner 1996) or provide weak explanations for the influence of external policies on internal conflicts as opposed to triggering inter-state strife (Carment, James and Taydas 2009: 72). In this respect, a large strand of single case studies exists that explore specific characteristics of violence through external and internal actors at the same
as acknowledging commonalities between conflict contexts across regions (Sorli, Gleditsch and Strand 2005; Korf 2005; Sanchez R. 2006; Bohara, Mitchell and Nepal 2006). However, they remain confined in their conclusions to individual contexts, or respectively explore how external Western influence affects failed democratization and authoritarian regimes, but do not systematically focus on the effects of external engagement on the processes of violence (for example see: Crawford 2005, Olsen 1998, Presnall 2009, Lewis 1996). Therefore, even when employing an explorative approach, studies refrain from generalizing their findings across cases (Sambanis 2004b, Lawson 2006: 409). Here, these studies mostly confine themselves to testing or confirming existing hypotheses (i.a. Senechal de la Roche 2001, Lawson 2006, Beissinger 2009).

**Critique of Argument 4: Policies of Western negligence**

As to the question of external influence in the South Ossetia conflict, there are usually two sets of opposing opinions. The first holds that external engagement does too little to end conflict, the second that it does too much, both held by local and international observers. The first perspective describes recurring violence in the conflict as a result of the lack of interest of the Western international community (above all see: Asmus 2010, Nodia 2004), holding that if Western actors had put more and different effort into resolving the conflict, the situation could have remained calm and the conflict could have been settled after the first war in 1992. Nonetheless, international and local actors engaged in the conflict on an intense level all through the period since 1992, through negotiations, monitoring the peace-keeping force, and initiating conflict-related institutions and roadmaps. The second perspective criticizes overly intense engagement aiming at realizing geopolitical interests by Russia and the U.S. with the result of fuelling the conflict in South Ossetia (for this view see: MacFarlane 1999, Cornell and Starr 2009). Thereby, the territory of South Ossetia serves as a proxy for underlying superpower interests of
hegemonic claims to the Caucasus region. In addition, the secessionist entities enjoyed external support through Russia and bordering entities, such as North Ossetia supporting South Ossetia (see the studies of Schultz 2010 as well as King and Menon 2010). However, similar to the grievance argument, these attitudes do not explain why dynamics in South Ossetia differ from Abkhazia or other post-Soviet conflicts which all are subject to these interests.

Existing studies largely focus on the likelihood of outcomes through specific factors, as well across cases, and not on particular policies initiating processes in a recurring manner (see above all: Crawford 2000). As a result, the mechanisms these studies offer remain highly opaque in their functioning, offering diffuse causal links between external actors and violent outcomes (Bader 2010: 22). How specifically external influence plays out in different arenas to lay open causal links should be systematically embraced. Studies usually do not focus on external engagement as such, but on individual events such as one group rising to power or a decision to go to war, and also do not embrace why patterns recur persistently. The studies of Levitsky and Way (2010), Bader (2010) and Goodhand and Walton (2009) for the Sri Lanka case form welcome exceptions. Levitsky and Way focus on mechanisms of influence of external policies that are used by local state elites in transitional states in their favor. Levitsky and Way as well as Bader propose to specifically conduct analyses at the level of leadership agency and carve out repetitive patterns of policies at the local level. The discussion of findings will draw on these studies to frame the findings of the South Ossetia case.

Conclusion of the critique of existing arguments

The arguments in the existing literature give a fair picture of the predominant reasoning on escalations in ethnically framed, internal conflicts. However, they are not able to adequately address why the conflict in South Ossetia re-escalated at those points in time and
repeatedly escalates. Most importantly, the arguments confine themselves
to analyzing the political factors, and treat violence as an outcome of
conflict, but not as a subject of study. In the same vein, arguments loose
themselves at a merely situational or psychological level, holding that the
conflict escalated because individuals acted irrationally. Also, arguments
crumble at the macro level holding powers responsible with barely a
traceable connection to events on the ground, relating to decisions that
are made in far-away places.

The critique of these and other recent studies on ethnic violence begs for
inclusion of the study of dynamics of ethnic conflicts in the general study
of ethnic violence (for studies raising this critique see for example: Eck
Walter 2003 and 2009, Schlichte 2005) and also will enhance existing
theories with generalized hypotheses about the triggers of ethnic violence.
This assessment is supported by the critique of two recent and seminal
papers by Cederman et al. (2010) and Wucherpfenning et al. (2010): The
debates about ethnic violence neglect to account for historical patterns of
ethnic conflict leading to violence and protracting armed conflict (also see
Cederman et al. 2010: 97, Wimmer and Min 2006). Most studies focus on
singular events, isolated or exogenous factors or decisions taken, or very
specific forms of violence. Accordingly, Capoccia and Keleman stress the
importance of longitudinal comparison of two or more events within the
same unit of analysis (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 360).
As a result, the seemingly differently vectored explanations for Western
behavior in the South Ossetia context all rely on a hypothetically stable
relationship between the explanatory factors and their impact on
processes of violence. This means, 1) the course of events is expected to
change only when these factors change (and not if they interact differently
in the course of the process) and 2) the change in impact of these factors is
not assumed to happen outside the system, but not through their
interaction with each other or the process of violence.
The discussion reveals that recurring violence in stalemated conflicts is a very rarely studied subject and requires the input of an in-depth empirical inquiry into political agency. Also very little research has been done on how international influence affects dynamics of violence, considering the key role of external actors in internal conflicts over extended periods of time. The extent to which external policies frame local developments in the context of the South Ossetia conflict since at least 1991, suggests a continuous and significant impact.

Altogether, these arguments neglect or do not account for 1) the effects of international engagement, 2) the interaction of external Western policies with Georgian state agency, and 3) specific characteristics that apply to the conflict in South Ossetia, such as continuous re-escalation in a highly intense setting. The larger bulk of studies on violence in stalemated conflicts does not embrace these characteristics of the South Ossetia case. In this respect, the debate is not clear about when violence happens and how shifts in dynamics come about. Based on these considerations, the study will present a causal argument.

2.2. The argument

Altogether, the literature offers a rich debate on factors, causal chains, history, and context influencing violence in ethnic conflicts. Nonetheless, the previous discussion tried to show why those arguments do not adequately address the dynamics of the South Ossetia conflict. Therefore, the study presents its own argument pertaining to why violence in the South Ossetia conflict re-escalates.

The dissertation argues that policies of external actors at specific points in time provided for behavior of local state elites in Georgia to shift to assertive policies with the result of escalation. External policies significantly affect domestic power options as the South Ossetia conflict puts territorial claims, competing group issues, international and domestic
political support and financial assets at stake. Thereby, external policies incentivize Georgian state elites to utilize and to comply with external influence in the context of the conflict. The argument holds that this scheme repeatedly provides for escalation throughout the process. On this basis, the study further contends that patterns of external influence show prior to escalations. These patterns are chains of actions which work through local state policies and translate into mechanisms of external influence that enable dynamics of re-escalation in the conflict.

The purpose of the following study is to plausibly sustain the argument. Therefore, I would like to conclude the presentation of the argument based on an extensive literature review and its critique and introduce the methodological part that informs the analytical framework of the study. The analytical framework will present working hypotheses and methods to implement the subsequent empirical analysis.

2.3. Analytical framework

The following section presents the analytical framework of the study. First, I will discuss and present the working hypotheses that derive from the causal argument. Further, I will present a theoretical foundation for the causal link that ties agency recurrently to its violent outcome. This includes a discussion of identifying shifts in dynamics, defining the causal link, locating the causal link, presenting analytical tools and, finally, ascribing meaning to causal links through the concept of social mechanisms that will help conducting the empirical analysis. The section concludes with the presentation of the analytical framework.
a) Key aspects of the argument and working hypotheses

Violence in the South Ossetia conflict

The debate on armed conflict explores the issue from various analytical angles, such as why violence occurs in a particular location, but not in another (Wilkinson 2004: 20 and 58, also see: Kalyvas 2006), why violence occurs within the same conflict at a particular point in time and not at an earlier or later point in the process (Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 432, Beissinger 1998: 39, Wilkinson 2004: 26), why violence occurs in some cases, but not in others (Figueiredo and Weingast 1997: 1, also see: Weinstein 2007, Fearon and Laitin 1996), why some groups or individuals participate in violence while others do not (for this large strand of debate see for example: Wucherpfennig et al. 2010: 4, Kalyvas 2006, Humphreys and Weinstein 2008, Walter 2006, Brubaker and Laitin 1998), intensification of armed conflict in ethnic contexts (Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram 2003; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick 1997; Eberwein 1981; Fearon 1994; Morgan 1994; Reed 2000; Senese 1997), and why in particular conflicts particular forms of violence occur (Beissinger 1998: 8, also see: Fearon and Laitin 1996).

Fundamentally, this study examines violence, not war or conflict. The violence that is subject to the study is carried out by state actors and occurs in the context of armed inter-group conflict. The debate likes to distinguish between types of warfare, and the more recent discussions center on organized violence often within state boundaries including at least one non-state party (Kalyvas 2001: 102-103, also see: Sambanis 2000 and 2004, Kaldor 1999). Older definitions focus on conventional wars involving state actors engaging in armed action across international borders (see for example: Holsti 1996, Kaldor 1999). In addition, many studies assume violence to be a linear part of the processes of any kind of warfare: Once violence has started, dynamics progress via intensification to escalation until violence decreases. Moreover, most studies encompass only a single cycle of escalation (for this critique see: Eck 2009, Zartman 2007).
However, this definition excludes three important features worthy of study: First, it excludes violent incidents that can trigger (re)escalation prior to war or other forms of escalations of violence. These categories omit characteristics of violence such as intensity of violence, duration of wars, and effects of violence at particular points in time. Second, the more recent definition of wars within boundaries of the state as ‘internal’ limits the study of external dimensions of internal wars. Third, the ‘old’ definition of conventional war omits the politics of domestic power consolidation leading to violence.

That said, violence seems to be likely to occur under certain circumstances. As discussed above, recurring violence is a powerful characteristic of ethnonationalist conflicts and, conversely, ethnonationalist contexts make for protracted, highly dynamic and intense contexts for violence. The debate is most vivid in the attempts at making a legitimate distinction between ethnic and non-ethnic wars. If we assume ethnicity not as located within individuals, but within issues over which actors struggle (above all see: Brubaker 2004 and 2009), we can come to an empirical definition of ethnic conflict: “For a conflict to be classified as ethnic, armed organizations must both explicitly pursue ethnonationalist aims and recruit fighters and forge alliances on the basis of ethnic affiliations.” (Cederman et al. 2010: 101). As a result, this study sees ethnicity not as a characteristic that determines dynamics and motivations, but as a claim that is instrumentalized by actors to pursue their private and political goals and that, thus, alters the dynamics of a conflict toward escalation through agency with the aim of power consolidation. Therefore, this study chooses to employ the term ethically framed conflicts.

Therefore, ethically framed conflicts exhibit characteristics that other types of armed struggles do not exhibit: 1) Ethnic claims can prolong civil wars if the state induces grievances by systematically excluding ethnic groups from access to power (Wucherpfennig et al. 2010: 3, Cederman et al. 2010: 87), 2) Ethnonationalist claims play a pervasive role in change in
motivations of actors in the process of a conflict and can lead to shifts in dynamics (see the seminal study of Kalyvas 2008), 3) Violence in ethnically framed conflicts is more intense as various forms of violence can concur, including riots, looting, and genocide, and fighters are found to be more committed (see above all: Eck 2009), 4) The process of violence in ethnic conflicts is dynamic and not linear: As ethnic claims can be deliberately manipulated by political elites, historical path-dependencies sustain the spoilers of violence that act as sleeper agents continuously enabling breakouts of violence (Cederman et al. 2010: 97, also see: Snyder and Ballentine 1996, Wimmer and Min 2006).

To this end, the study conceives of the emergence of violence 1) as an indicator in the process leading to re-escalation, 2) as including triggers external and internal to state boundaries, and 3) as relevant to explaining re-escalation independent from whether violence takes place as an incident of war, civil uprising, insurgency etc. Further, this study centers on re-escalation of violence, and accordingly assumes violence to recur, because the causes of violence protract and prolong legacies that sustain the permanent possibility of re-escalation, taking effect over periods of low intensity or absence of violence (Wucherpfennig et al. 2010: 5). To conclude, the study centers on violence carried out by state actors in ethnically framed, re-escalating contexts of armed conflict within the boundaries of a state.

The Georgian state and its leaderships

Two recent and seminal papers by Cederman et al. (2010) and Wucherpfenning et al. (2010) complain that the debate on ethnic violence largely neglects the role of state actors in fuelling ethnic violence both strategically and indirectly (Cederman et al. 2010: 88, Wucherpfenning et al. 2010: 4; also see: Brass 1991, Wimmer 2002). This study closely links the notion of violence and the property of the state and its agents striving to consolidate power. Secessionist violence often occurs in the contexts of
ethnic conflict and for state actors, territory becomes a resource beyond its nominal economic or strategic value (Walter 2006: 313).

Particularly in the contexts of state formation as in the post-Soviet context of Georgia, territory is the central claim to power. In this respect, Schlichte proposes the concept of empirical statehood to analytically grasp processes in the newly forming states of the 1990s. Schlichte applies the concept of “empirical stateness” in order to analytically grasp and identify practices emerging from purposeful action in violence-prone state formation processes (Schlichte 1998: 107 ff., also see Migdal 1988). This study agrees with Schlichte’s definition of the state as “a field of power whose borders are fixed also by means violence, and whose dynamic (...) is informed by the practices of social actors” (Schlichte 2005: 106).

During the breakup of the Soviet Union, secessionist claims such as those over the territory of South Ossetia came to pose a direct threat to the authority of the central state in Georgia (e.g. Nodia 1989 and 2000). The claim to the Georgian state showed in several instances: First, it showed the importance of control over the territory. For the new Georgian state elite, control of the territory acted as a marker of Georgian independence from Russian domination; for South Ossetian leaders the territory enabled claims of political self-determination vis-a-vis Georgian rule; for Russian actors control over the territory’s status equaled influence over the independent Georgian state and a hold on Western influence in the region; and Western actors saw the territorial reintegration of Georgia as a priority on the way to statehood. In Georgia, each of the three post-independence presidents put the territorial re-integration of South Ossetia at the top of his agenda in an attempt to legitimize rule. The three post-independence governments all relied on an internal circle, a leadership or elite within the executive, of hand-picked personalities at the core of presidential power (Christophe 2005, draft version 2003: 74ff.). The key ministries occupied by the
leadership were in all three presidencies specifically tasked to attend to operations in the conflict area, negotiations with Russia or Western engagement (Sigwart 2006). Second, state actors had the most effective influence over the conflict’s dynamics and outcomes. Formal entitlement via state institutions gave military and police actors varying degrees of legitimacy. International actors endowed far more legitimacy to official actors than to the mercenaries, militias, political representatives or other forces of the separatist leaderships. In addition, material and symbolic resources of the state enabled the efficiency of state agency.  

Third, control over the territory of and around South Ossetia gave economic advantages to the state and its actors. In Georgia as in other post-communist countries the main source of state income, together with externally-driven financing were shadow economies (see Gordadze 2003). Until 2004, smuggling was the largest source of income of the South Ossetian leadership and a big asset of Shevardnadze’s state employees (Christophe 2005, draft version 2003: 85-87; also see: Kuhkianidze et al. 2004, George 2009). International funding relates in large scales to the conflict, such as rehabilitation payments, payments for displacements and financing through development assistance projects. These assets all went through the hands of state actors, often to their personal gain.

Fourth, the conflict gave the Georgian state international leverage. Post-Soviet Georgia came under pressure to reintegrate territorially in order to form a Western-style state. However, Georgia received enormous amounts of attention and financial incentives as a result of this flaw. Western engagement and support came to be fundamentally linked to the existence of secessionist conflict in Georgia.

---

17 The aftermath of the 2008 war provided a salient example of yhis inadvertent legitimization of state actions at an international level: Both Russian and Georgian actions were backed by claims of their statehood, as Russia asserted defending its citizens (though on de-jure foreign territory), and Georgia argued self-defense against an external threat to its sovereignty (Tagliavini report 2009).
As a result, the state, as a normative factor and pro-active organization, relates in an intense manner to the South Ossetia conflict. Territory and ethnic claims served as hinge categories of self-determination in Georgian recent history, new leaders put the conflict at the top of their domestic and international agendas, and state-related resources were most effective for gaining control in the conflict and for private gains through the conflict. Therefore, state leaderships as elites within the executive provide the analytical surface where multiple agencies tie together and spin off into the dynamics that are subject of the study.

External influence in the South Ossetia context

Prior to 1991, Georgia had been embedded into the Soviet order which entailed a rigid dependence of domestic policy on Moscow’s patronage (see Suny 1994, De Waal 2010). After independence, rapid diversification of foreign relations of post-Soviet successor states set in (on this process see: Stein and Lobell 1997, Wallensteen and Axell 1993). This radical shift to an internationalized agenda had important implications for Georgia’s domestic context. First, the external context of Georgia diversified on various levels. The highly bureaucratized Georgian Soviet Republic operating on family relations and other patrimonial structures turned into a privatizing state with developing foreign relations and international activity on the ground. Hence, the field in which Georgian politics unfolded heterogenized to an enormous extent, offering new partnerships and alliances for local elites.

Second, after the shift in Georgia’s external context, internal and to a lesser extent external patronage persisted. Whereas the external and the internal patrons had changed, the patrimonial structures that had provided for power resources continued to determine domestic politics (on these continuities see above all: Christophe 2001 and 2005, Stefes 2008, Zuercher and Koehler 2004). Western support of a single Western-leaning elite pushed Georgian political groups to unify into one ruling power
apparatus, which potentially kept intact limited patronage circles (see the commentary of Muskhelishvili 2012).¹⁸

Third, Western engagement focused on strengthening the state. Western organizations demanded measures to stabilize the rule of law through cracking down on corruption and smuggling. International funds were tied to providing incentives for domestic state actors to implement Western-style reforms. As a result, the state was massively boosted from the outside to become a firm authority over other societal groups within the designated boundaries of the state.¹⁹

Altogether, external policies appear to have to varying degrees sustained, directed and created incentives for power consolidation of local state agency. External actors enabled local elites to utilize resources provided by them such as funds, political support and outside leverage. As the empirical analysis will show, these intensifying ties created a complex field of interaction in the context of the South Ossetia conflict. In this respect, it is important to reiterate that the argument of the study holds Russian influence, first, not to be fully external to the context as the Russian Federation and Russian actors are immediate stakeholders in the conflict and, second, to be a key component of the escalation process in reinforcing conflict dynamics. Particularly, as will be shown, the interaction of Russian and Western state actors at the international level of conflict reinforces local escalation dynamics. However, as argued earlier, change in local behavior is held to be induced by Western policies. Therefore, the empirical analysis will account for the reinforcing effect of Russian policies

¹⁸ At least until 2004 Russia remained the largest trade partner and economic factor in Georgia after the break-down of the Soviet Union. After the Georgian-Russian fallout in 2004, the import volume shifted to Turkey, also as a result of the Russian blockade of Georgian import goods. Remittances of the Georgian diaspora in Russia remain a large economic factor in Georgia. However, although strongly influenced by state politics, trade relations between the two states build only a minor part of the economic activity after 2004, whereas private business relations, also in the banking sector, build the major part (EBRD Transition reports).

¹⁹ Western support also massively targeted democratizing projects of the non-governmental sector in Georgia (see for example: Angley 2010, Wheatley 2005).
at various levels in the context of determining Western-domestic interaction.

Against these considerations, the study reads external influence in two ways: On the one hand, external engagement relates to actors who are closely involved in the conflict’s affairs, but are not immediate stakeholders in the conflict with territorial properties, which are Western actors such as the EU, US, OSCE, UN, and NATO. On the other hand, external actors are those outside the jurisdiction of the Georgian state, but whose policies significantly influence on the local power context. The study therefore employs a unified definition of Western external actors. Bader assists this approach in his study of external party assistance in Georgia: "The distinction between U.S. and European [actors] masks striking similarities in approaches and conceptual underpinnings. (...) [P]rograms, whether by U.S. or by European actors, are shaped by a shared underlying norm about the type of organization that recipient[s] (...) transform into." (Bader 2010: 20). In this respect, the study encompasses boundaries of individual actors and addresses the agenda of “Western policies” as a common ground regarding state building and conflict management issues. Therefore, the study puts forward that external influence of Western actors seems to have played a decisive role in the re-escalation of violence. Whereas local stakeholders have, as argued above, persistently pursued assertive policies, this does not offer a satisfying explanation of re-escalation. The analysis, therefore, lends itself to examining the specific effects of Western policies in contexts of re-escalation in South Ossetia.

The dissertation argues that repeated escalation is brought about by specific mechanisms of external policies working through domestic agency to the effect of recurrently shifting the context towards escalation. This section will summarize the framing of the argument in four working hypotheses that inform the analytical framework: 1) Local state actors seek to consolidate domestic power, 2) External policies in the conflict context
affect power resources, 3) Change in local behavior is induced by Western policies, and 4) Recurring patterns of external policies prior to escalations.

**WHY1: Local state actors seek to consolidate domestic power.** In the post-Soviet context of Georgia, state power is permanently at stake. The volatile setting makes state resources attractive, vulnerable and significant for local elites to consolidate power. In this context, the success in territorial integration of South Ossetia is a big power resource for local state elites and is shaped through the influence of external policies of Western agency. Therefore, the study holds that external influence on local power consolidation in the context of the conflict has to be observed at the central state level, directing the analytical focus to external influence on capital politics in Georgia.

**WHY2: External policies in the conflict context affect power resources.** The analysis holds that the conflict is relevant to power consolidation at particular points in time that seem to strongly correlate with policies of Western agency, mainly at the national, but also the international and local level of the conflict. Hence, the study contends that the domestic power claim is decisively shaped and reinforced through state formation policies of external actors, particularly in the conflict context.

**WHY3: Change in local behavior induced by Western policies.** The study argues that prior to escalations, local behavior changes to assertive policies that directly or indirectly lead to escalation. Change in local behavior takes place when specific Western policies bring into effect incentives of local power consolidation. In this context, local state actors react to Western policies which provides for shifts to assertive policies that drive the context towards escalation.

**WHY4: Recurring patterns of external policies prior to escalations.** Dynamics in South Ossetia exhibit a consistent pattern of re-escalations ruptured by periods of low-intensity violence. Shifts in dynamics occur due to shifts in policies and behavior induced by Western policies. Hence, the analysis attempts to single out which external policies recur prior to
escalations by linking Western impact to domestic assertive shifts. Thus, the study further hypothesizes that if Western policies take effect prior to escalation and this policy is observable at least at one other point prior to escalation, the study may plausibly sustain the policy to be part of at least one of the violence-generating mechanisms of Western impact on the conflict dynamics.

b) Analytical framework and methods

In order to establish the analytical framework of this study, working hypotheses were developed with the following methodological considerations. The section starts out by defining the here employed understandings of agency in the form of policies, causality, and the tools of narrative analysis and social mechanisms that inform the empirical analysis of agency prior to escalations. Hereafter, the section sums up these reflections by presenting the model of analysis. The section concludes with remarks on the use of data. In the subsequent chapter, the discussion proceeds to the empirical analysis of agency in the context of the conflict.

Change in local behavior: Tracing shifts

By deploying the notion of policies, the study seeks to avoid interpretive or normative revaluations such as categories of identity or interests and aims at specifying the confluence of events through agency. Policies are defined as purposeful, framed and agenda-based actions of Western actors in the context of the conflict during periods prior to escalation. The analysis envisages policies that operate as part of an informed policy agenda of Western agency in the local, national and international arenas of the conflict. As is generally assumed, disaggregating policies will reveal that repetitive patterns of behavior appear throughout the process. Therefore, examining the influence Western policies bare on local power

---

20 The study refrains from employing the concept of practices (Bourdieu 1998, Reckwitz 2002), as the notion of policies highlights the effect of state agendas at specific points in time. The repetitive element of agency is captured by mechanisms and chains of similar actions that recur at different points in the process.
consolidation requires an analytical lens that reveals empirical reality. Observable action in the form of policies of Western agency is hence the first object of analysis with the aim of disaggregating repetitive patterns of agency on an empirical level.

Therefore, identifying policies is the first analytical step to unveil causal links that go beyond situational reasoning. In this respect, centering on re-escalation enables the study to make more valid statements. Individual motivations and decision-making processes that may have led to violence are always covert to the observer. In analyzing agency prior to a single event, social research can never plausibly sustain why an agent acted in the observed manner. In contrast, if the same mode of behavior recurs in similar situations, social research can postulate patterns of behavior in relation to the outcome that make agency plausible (above all see: Capoccia and Keleman 2007, Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). With this in mind, the next step of the study is to enable the identification of the points in time when local behavior changes and provides the context for a shift toward escalation.

Change in local behavior making for shifts to escalation takes place at specific points in time and signifies the temporal frame in which policies that bring about shifts take place. Hence, the study identifies those points in the process through, 1) identifying points in time when violence in the conflict spiked and, 2) seeking out shifts in assertive policies prior to escalations. For this purpose, the study employs two sets of data: analysis of the reports of the OSCE Mission to Georgia and interviews conducted in Georgia during 2009 and 2010 (see annex 4). This data enables the study to identify phases of violence that signify escalations and, in accounting for local perceptions through interviews, to plausibly signify prior shifts in local behavior in relation to Western agency. Before the study turns to the analysis of the data in chapter 2, it is necessary to define causality of external agency in local contexts, present
the method of narrative analysis that enables identifying plausible instants of causal agency and attribute interpretative meaning to them, and draw on the concept of social mechanisms to aggregate recurring violence in the context of the conflict.

Causality: Framing the causal link

The study employs Stathis Kalyvas’ useful concept of causality in multi-actor and multi-locality settings of processes of violence (2000, 2001, 2004, 2006, Kalyvas/ Balcell 2010). Kalyvas’ inquiry deals with generating a plausible causal link through explaining contentious outcomes through spatially and temporally complex sets of episodes: “The direction of causality (...) matters when deriving empirical, theoretical and normative implications about civil wars” (Kalyvas 2001: 104). This approach allows, firstly, to purport policies that take place simultaneously at different localities such as the international, national or local arena of the conflict, secondly, to locate the causal link at the level of domestic power politics, and thirdly, to bridge specifically the analytical gap between external and domestic policies and private and political interests. Kalyvas thus develops a convincing framework to grasp causalities of macro-political outcomes.

The first consideration envisages the problem of timing and locality if events leading to the same outcome are to happen simultaneously in different localities. Kalyvas’ concept contends that policies at different localities and possibly taking place simultaneously can be part of the same causal structure generating the same observed outcome (Kalyvas 2006: 364ff.). Importantly, Kalyvas’ approach sets itself apart from classical definitions of causality that assume a linear sequence of events constituting a causal chain that brings about the observed outcome (Mayntz 2005: 209, Mahoney 2000a: 536). In contrast, Kalyvas assumes events or, in this case, policies in different places at the same time can generate a unified causal structure under which the observed outcome comes about. In other words, events or policies with no obvious
connection can bare causal effects. This means, simultaneous instances might not show and in fact might not have an inherent causal connection between each other, but all of the instances together bring about the outcome. In this sense, this study assumes that the cause of escalation is power-consolidating behavior of local elites, whereas Western agency decisively triggers change in local behavior prior to escalation. This means, the study perceives Western agency in different arenas and possibly at the same time to exhibit the causal link, the chain of events leading to escalation.

The second consideration locates causality at the level of policies of domestic power consolidation of state leaderships. In Kalyvas’ terms, the explanatory elements generating violence tie together at the local and not the global level of the conflict (Kalyvas 2006: 383ff.). Kalyvas contends that to sustain a causal link happens if events at different levels invariably exhibit a repetitive effect on local events. Therefore, Kalyvas suggests that studying violence at the local level involves analysis of relationships among a wide range of actors in different arenas, while locating the analysis at the domestic level of power politics. At the heart of Kalyvas’ theory lies the proposition that escalations result from local attempts to bridge cleavages arising from interests at different levels of politics and through external policies. As a result, Kalyvas’ concept looks at factors driving multi-level conflicts at the domestic level by bridging the analytical cleavage between local and supranational conflicts of interests.

Kalyvas’ approach strengthens this study, first, through attributing causal significance to events happening at locations other than those where violence takes place. Second, the approach suggests locating causality where and when factors have an effect on the local power context. Hence, this approach links change in local behavior prior to escalations to external policies and supports that external policies do not cause, but determine the point in time and the manner in which change in local behavior prior to
escalation occurs. In this respect, this study centers on the national level of capital politics in Georgia at the same as investigating the international, national or local centers of agency. In the next step, it is necessary to discuss the method of narrative analysis in order to identify and interpret the causal link between Western agency and change in local behavior.

**Narrative analysis: Locating and ascribing meaning to causal links**

The study employs narrative analysis (for this approach see: Buethe 2002, Capoccia and Keleman 2007, Mahoney 2000a, Griffin 1992, also see Sewell 1996a) as a helpful approach to analyze complex sets of events. Narrative analysis is a “heuristic device that can make us more conscious of what we are already doing implicitly in rhetorical battles between rival historical narratives” (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 362). The study chooses narrative analysis to help to plausibly identify where the causal link between change in local behavior prior to escalation is located and how it is brought into being. The below discussion will clarify the analytical value of several features of narrative analysis such as critical juncture, path-dependent trajectory, and sequences.

Narrative analysis originates in historical sociology and embraces any kind of structured, theory-guided narrative that traces processes through reconstructing chains of social properties (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 354; King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 77-80) and “can offer a stylized but compelling reconstruction of the key decisions and choices” (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 358) as it aggregates complex settings and empirically demonstrates the hypothesized causal links at work (for this approach see the seminal studies of George and Bennett 2005, Elster 2000). As a result, Capoccia and Keleman introduce the term of the ‘critical juncture’ to grasp the very period of time when significant change is possible and alters the equilibrium of the process into a different state (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 346). Mahoney describes ‘critical junctures’ as “moments of relative structural indeterminism when willful actors
shape outcomes in a more voluntaristic fashion than normal circumstances permit” (Mahoney 2002: 7). Change takes place when the probability rises that choices exert a lasting and stable impact on the process. The scope of choices for key actors during those junctures narrows down, closes off alternative options, and subsequent agency generates self-reinforcing path-dependent processes (ibid.: 348).

Based on the notion of critical junctures, once the point in time of change in local behavior is identified, analyses can reconstruct the trajectory of a path through tracing events or policies back to the initial condition of the sequence. In this respect, several scholars propose to use narrative analysis through the ‘sequencing’ of series of relevant policies into episodes (Mahoney 2000a: 2, Buehne 2002: 482, Verba 1971: 308). Sequencing introduces a step-by-step approach which provides "a scene by scene description of the particular causal paths" (Reisch 1991: 17). Three properties are proposed to describe a path-dependent trajectory: First, tracing an outcome back to and along a particular set of historical events (Goldstone 1998: 834). Hence, the task is to show a plausible chain of a specific set of events leading to the observed outcome. Here, events in the early stages of a historical sequence matter more than events that happen closer in time to the outcome (Mahoney 2000a: 510, Pierson 2000: 263). This means, critical junctures are the moment from which local behavior changes, but not the moments when outcomes occur. Therefore, this study does not focus on the segment of the process after local behavior has changed, but focuses on the path leading up to change in local behavior triggered through Western policies.

Second, a path-dependent trajectory is characterized by what Mahoney calls “inherent sequentiality” (Mahoney 2000a: 529). A series or string of events leading from the shift to the outcome should exhibit deterministic characteristics: Once a path has set in, the outcome is likely to come about (Abbott 1992: 445, Mahoney 2000a: 511). This concept puts forward that conditions at the start of a path-dependent sequence do not cause the
outcome as the causal properties leading to the outcome do not exist then. Causality evolves only during the process, through the gradual, small steps constituted through agency (on the view of agency observable in steps of a process see for example: Goldstone 1998). Hence, these smaller steps are the central objects of analysis of this study.

Third, the last property of a path-dependent trajectory is assigned to identify a meaningful starting point in a sequence of events, as a contingent event marking the initial condition of a process. Initial conditions of a sequence pose a “surprising break” with theoretical or intuitive assumptions about the course of the process (Sewell 1996b: 843). Those expectations are in conflict with empirical reality when at least two separate trajectories temporally intersect (Mahoney 2000a: 527). More precisely, initial conditions are indeed held to trigger, shape and constitute the process, but they change during the process when they react with other factors that occur at later points in the process.

Specifically, Western agency by itself is not sufficient to set off a sequence of events. Western policies have to interact with local agency in a significant context in order to initiate a path, for example in a historical contingent instant of collision between competing agendas (Mahoney 2000b, Abbott 1983: 130). As a result, Western agency constitutes an initial condition when it interacts with local actors in a contingent moment resulting in 1) setting off an escalation cycle and 2) bringing about change in local behavior prior to the escalation.

Lastly, historical narrative analysis particularly supports specifying the causal link in an empirical context of agency. A theory-guided narrative “focuses on the aspects considered salient by the theory itself; (...) such aspects include the main actors, their goals, preferences, decisions, and the events that directly influenced them.” (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 357, also see Buete 2002: 483). In this respect, Capoccia and Keleman explicitly encourage narrative analysis to locate shifts in properties of agency to explain outcomes.
In this regard, historical narrative analysis allows for the interpretation of meaning of narrated events. To identify meaningful events, interviews were conducted according to the method of qualitative content analysis, allowing for narrative elements to be given priority while conducting the interviews and focusing on the specific issues of processes of escalation, Western policies, and local state politics (for this approach see: Meuser and Nagel 1991; Bogner, Littig and Menz 2005; Geddes 2004; Ragin 1987 and 1992; Oevermann et al. 1979). Specifically, each narrative accounted for within one interview identified the initial condition of an escalation cycle and the point of change in local behavior toward assertive policies. Therefore, the interviews provide plausible causal reasoning for the processes of escalation.

In addition, the interviews account for local perceptions through evaluations and assessments of locally based actors. Theoretical assumptions or a chronology of events cannot unearth the individual logic of local dynamics. Without social reasoning, change in local behavior toward assertive policies are not traceable. The interview process took into account local perceptions and local cultural contexts that influenced the reasoning behind the course and causes of agency and escalation (on the approach of raising local perception in social research see: Geertz 1991: chapter 1, Salmon 2006: 13, also see: MacPherson, Brooker and Ainsworth 2000). This enabled an analysis of sequences of action in order to identify plausible instances of causality and generate narratives of Western and Georgian policies prior to escalations.

Hence, the third and last step deals with how to aggregate recurring causal links between the narrated policies and escalations. Therefore, the last section frames how to identify specific social mechanisms of escalation and presents an operational concept of social mechanisms of specific instances of agency linked to repeated escalation. Hereafter, the chapter will present the model of analysis.
Social mechanisms: Aggregating recurring causal links

This study seeks not only to explain escalations, but also to explain the recurring instant of escalation. Hence, the study envisages the chronologically narrated accounts prior to several instances of escalations in order to detect possible patterns that might plausibly explain conditions for re-escalation. The aim of the study is to plausibly present mechanisms that generally lead to escalation in the South Ossetia context and in this context the study expects that Western policies prior to each of the escalations exhibit similarities that allow to deduct mechanisms. Therefore, the discussion conceptualizes social mechanisms to 1) explain occurrences at the meta level of agency prior to escalations, in order to 2) explain the repeated occurrence of those meta links at different points in time prior to escalations.

Hedstroem and Swedberg, the pioneers of consequent research on social mechanisms, along with Jon Elster, offer a compelling definition of social mechanisms at work (Hedstroem and Swedberg 1998, Elster 1989). Their concept distinguishes between social mechanisms that reveal the general logic of a process as opposed to specific social mechanisms that reveal the step-wise, practical functioning of a process. This study employs specific mechanisms of analysis, and aims at concluding with general mechanisms that plausibly explain the logic of re-escalation in South Ossetia.

Hedstroem and Swedberg state that a social mechanism ascribes an instant of agency within a causal chain of social events connecting an initial condition to an observed outcome (Hedstroem and Swedberg 1998: 6). Schelling's definition, therefore, captures the explanatory importance of mechanisms by stating that "[a] social mech is a plausible hypothesis, or set of plausible hypotheses, that could be the explanation of some social phenomena, the expalantion being in terms of interactions between individuals, or [between] individuals and some social aggregate." (Schelling
1978: chapter 2 in Hestroem and Swedberg 1998: 22-23). The definition puts forward three central ideas of the theory of social mechanisms:

First, the causal value of mechanisms links a starting point to an outcome. Social mechanisms not only are the ‘social glue’ that holds processes together, but they also explain how processes work specifically and step by step: Social mechanisms reveal the meaning of individual instances of events because they establish them as a part of the process and take account of them in practical relation to the outcome. Further, mechanisms go beyond signifying a mere link, but they also reveal how causality is expressed in empirical reality and therefore they exhibit practicality in analytical contexts. Therefore, plausibility of this link is a core feature of its actual validity: If the informed description of empirical reality through a mechanism is not reasonably convincing, the account is not plausible.

Second, the definition is based on generative properties of mechanisms. A mechanism, thus, actually brings about or produces the outcome step by step. These steps are traceable to the extent in which the narrative accounts for a consistent picture of the sequence. Schlichte agrees that mechanisms can be seen as sequences of practices leading to or impeding escalations of violence (Schlichte 2009, first version 2007: 91). In this respect, two aspects are noteworthy: On the one hand, mechanisms encompass the micro level of motivations, the meta level of agency and the macro level of a social outcome (Hedstroem and Swedberg 1998: 22). Especially ‘transformational’ mechanisms linking the meta and macro level, and explaining how agency translates into macro-social outcomes: “A number of individuals interact with one another, and the specific mechanism (which differs depending on the nature of the interaction) shows how these individual actions are transformed into some kind of outcome, be it intended or unintended” (ibid.: 23). This link is at the center of this study. On the other hand, mechanisms deal in a flexible way with the normative instant of the direction of causality. Social mechanisms allow for a complex understanding of present tense in empirical analysis: Prior events can in varying manners take effect on later events. This relates
to reproducing mechanisms that stress path-dependent features, reactive mechanisms that focus on present interaction, and reinforcing mechanisms that increase in intensity compared to earlier points in time (Mahoney 2000: 526 ff.). The study will make use of this operative, multi-facetted understanding and employ it in the discussion of findings.

In this respect, the first two properties of mechanisms comply with the causal understanding of historical analysis as presented earlier. In a third and for explanatory purposes most far-reaching property mechanisms enable generalizing behavior in given social contexts (Hedstroem and Swedberg 1998: 20). More precisely, a mechanism may recur across time and cases, but the functions of the same mechanism differ as they are specific for the empirical context. In this regard, Hedstroem and Swedberg support Merton’s early call for mechanisms to constitute a middle ground between laws and descriptions (Hedstroem and Swedberg 1998: 6). By accounting for social processes in a descriptive way, mechanisms lay open components of processes and enable their generalization. Therefore, the analysis of mechanisms is an intrinsic part of tracing path-dependent trajectories of social processes.

As mechanisms grasp common features of the logic of agency across time and cases, the general assumptions based on them can be applied to different settings of analysis. Therefore, Hedstroem and Swedberg chiefly conclude that “a mechanism is a function of a general behavior in different situations” (ibid.). In this vein, the study establishes policies of Western actors as specific functions of mechanisms leading to escalations and will discuss those in the model at the end of the empirical chapter as well as in the discussion of the findings.

Thus, the study will identify specific mechanisms of external influence at work prior to escalations and will draw conclusions and extensively discuss the scope of generalizability of these mechanisms in the theoretical discussion of the findings and the empirical cross-context discussion.
Model of analysis

The above methodological considerations are summarized in the following model of analysis:

Graphic 1: Model of analysis

The causal argument and the empirical analysis are supported by a model of analysis that seeks to plausibly frame when and how a sequence or a cycle of escalation is triggered by a historically contingent event, the initial condition that occurs through Western agency and enables local power consolidation at the international, national and local level, which informs the causal path to triggering the critical juncture of change in local behavior of Georgian state elites that, lastly, provides for the context to shift and bring about escalation.

To this end, the model frames how Western agency at the start of an escalation cycle intersects with specific circumstances on the international,
national or local level of the conflict and how this process affects local power consolidation options at the national level. The intersection causes a rupture in the process that opens a path for Western policies to trigger change in local behavior of power-seeking states elites. Western policies can exhibit restricting or enabling qualities in affecting local behavior as they effectively limit options of local power consolidation in the context of the conflict and enable power consolidating options as Western policies provide incentives for Georgian elites to consolidate power. The process starting from the initial instant of Western policies setting off a sequence of small steps leading to change in local behavior is the central focus of the empirical analysis. Those steps which tie together at the national level of state policies build a self-reinforcing, deterministic sequence of actions that triggers change in local behavior prior to escalation.

The study aims at identifying specific chains of actions prior to escalations and to translate those when-then links into a general, logical pattern of the dynamics of the conflict by establishing plausible if-then connections between agency and outcomes. For this purpose, the study will generate sequences of policies on the basis of phases of escalation and analyze the sequences in chapter 3. The study expects to find significant links between Western policies and escalations, particularly at the level of national state politics in Georgia. The study will present these links by generating at model of the dynamics of re-escalations in South Ossetia on the basis of mechanisms of external policies. These findings will be discussed reflecting their theoretical and empirical scope in chapter 4. Therefore, the study proceeds to the empirical analysis in the following chapter.
3. **Empirical analysis**

The empirical analysis starts out with a discussion of the event data set and identifies three phases of violence. Second, in its account of the identified phases of violence the chapter gives a background account of the trajectory of politics and violence in the South Ossetia context after 1989. The third part entails the empirical analysis of the sequences of policies determined through qualitative interviews and presents narratives of Western policies’ effect on Georgia state leaderships’ behavior prior to escalations. The chapter concludes with presenting the empirical findings of the study and proposes a model of re-escalation in South Ossetia.

3.1. **Analysis and use of the event data set**

The explorative outreach of the study and the utter lack of data on dynamics of violence in South Ossetia made extensive use of primary sources indispensable. For this purpose, the research undertook archival research at the OSCE archive in Prague in January and February 2009. Research at the OSCE archive provided a consistent body of data for identifying phases of violence in the South Ossetia context. The seven-week archival research achieved to establish an overview of increase and the decrease of violence in the conflict between 1989 and 2008 and of key political events in the political context of the conflict.

The material entails activity reports of the OSCE Mission to Georgia to the Vienna headquarter as the OSCE military monitoring mission reported on events of violence in the conflict area and gave assessments of their context since 1992. In addition, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Georgia reported on political activities. The reports account the OSCE’s facilitation of political talks between Georgian, Russian and Ossetian representatives, meetings with political leaders and general overviews of the political developments. Therefore, apart from accounts of violence the reports also give a valuable insight into the course of negotiations in the framework of the Russian-mandated Joint Control Commission (JCC), a political body that
functioned under the auspices of the OSCE from 1994 to 2008 and that was served to monitor and facilitate the political talks and the activities of the Georgian-Ossetian-Russian Joint Peace-Keeping Forces (JPKF). The reports account for talks in the fields of economic rehabilitation, political settlement of the de-jure status of South Ossetia, and the politically most contentious issue, the negotiations on return and compensations of the Georgian IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons).

As status talks permanently put this format at risk to be cancelled, a key task of the negotiations was to keep a platform of dialog alive and to organize every-day life in the conflict area under the absence of de jure state authorities. Therefore, many reports reveal how local issues were solved through the cooperation of the sides, such as gas, water and electricity supply issues, police cooperation in criminal incidents, and exchange of prisoners.

Moreover, the reports give an account of violence in the designated conflict zone from 1992 with bi-weekly reports from 1994. The OSCE reports therefore provide ample raw material on political decisions. For example, the assessment repeatedly shows that decisions taken in the framework of the JCC were as much informed by strong-hand interventions by the Russian representatives as by internal political developments in South Ossetia – a clear hint that events at the local level determined political dynamics at least as much as international decision-making at the level of Russia or the West. The task of the subsequent discussion will be to show how Western policies triggered these tendencies set off by events at the local level into escalation.

In assessing the data on violence in the conflict area, several issues have to be noted: The reports classify casualties as criminally motivated, ethnic strife, police or military action (see annex 2).²¹ The reports suggest that criminally motivated casualties had high potential to turn into ethnic tension, and also that the members of criminal groups were organized

along ethnic lines. The reports do not openly state, but give hints that violence between police or Peace-Keeping Forces often took place along ethnic lines in order to gain access to infrastructure and territory. The monitoring mission was not able to monitor or account for all instances of violence, casualties, movement and actions of agents of violence in the conflict area. Therefore, the figures are not quantifiable, for example the reports do not indicate any deaths in 1993 or 1994 and less than 5 dead in 2002, and only from 1997 do the reports systematically report on casualties, but only then give selective accounts (see annex 1). However, the accounts give a reliable assessment of the qualitative trajectory of violence relating to the decrease and increase of violence in the trajectory of the conflict.

The analysis of the data succeeded in showing an increase and decrease violence between 1989 and 2008. On this basis, an extensive chronology of political events and events of violence at the local, the national and international level of the conflict between 1989 and 2008 was generated (see annex 1). As a result, the material generated three phases of violence in the conflict by pointing out escalations throughout the period of analysis. Based on the accounts of casualties, the analysis identified escalations in 2002, 2004 and 2008. However, it is important to keep in mind that violence never ceased at any point in time between 1989 and 2008.
The graphic depicts violence starting with civil uprisings from 1989 and escalating into the first Georgian-Ossetian war between 1991 and 1992 that was followed by a stretch of low-level violence until 2000. During the first phase of violence after 2000, violence re-intensified for the first time after the war with increasing levels of casualties, also among military personnel, but especially the police in the conflict zone, and escalated in 2002 due to the start of large-scale anti-crime operations. During the second phase, the conflict remains at a tense level after 2002 and re-escalates again in 2004, first intensifying through the closure of the Georgian-Ossetian Ergneti market and in August 2004 with the shelling of Tskhinvali. During the third phase, violence kept increasing after 2004, with unprecedented levels of military actors involved, culminating in the second war in August 2008 with involvement of Russian and Georgian military.

To support the account of these phases of violence based on casualties, the study additionally linked the decrease and increase of violence to the additional variable of the involvement of typologies of actors of violence (see annexes 1 and 2). The analysis of the OSCE material showed the points in time when actors in the typologies of civilian, police and military were involved in violence. This served two purposes: First, the numbers of

---

Table 1: Phases of violence 1989 – 2008

|------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|

22 The reports of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) are restricted and cover only the Georgian-controlled territories.
deaths are highly flawed and cannot depict trajectories prior to escalations. In contrast, typologies of actors can reflect the level of intensity if we understand that the state-related status of actors signifies a higher intensity of violence than perpetrated by civilian actors. Second, typologies of actors support the explanatory aim of the study as they point out violence carried out by state actors.

The overall trajectory of violence based on the decrease and increase of violence are measured through involvement of typologies of actors and can be depicted as follows:

![Graphic 2: Trajectory of violence based on the involvement of typologies of actors of violence.](image_url)

The curve shows three major points of escalation in 1991, 2004 and 2008. The most pronounced increase of intensity shows that prior to the first war in 1991, state actors were significantly less involved in the onset of violence from 1989. After the intensity had decreased in 1994, the curve persistently remains at an intense level as a result of which the following escalations in 2004 and 2008 do show less radical increases. Even more significant, after each escalation the curve never falls back to the level prior to the escalation, but always decreases to a comparably higher level. Therefore, the curve gathers intensity with each escalation.
Therefore, the major differences between the three escalations can be summarized as a gradual shift from local to international conflict, from civilian actors of violence in 1989 to gradual involvement of state actors, and an overall increasing death toll from 1992. Together with the overall increasing involvement of state actors, this suggests that the conflict over time progresses into a conflict less between the communities or private agents than more between stakeholders at the state level. In other words, even though violence is carried out on the local level, the driving issues of the conflict seem to be increasingly located at the national or international level.

Altogether, the curve supports the conclusion that points of escalation in 2004 and 2008 identified through the analysis of the numbers of casualties. However, the curve does not show an escalation in 2002, although the graph accounts for an increased level of intensity from 2000. Apparently, the involvement of actors remains at fairly the same level between 1994 and 2004, with permanent involvement of police, militias and other non-state armed groups. Nevertheless, for 2002 the graph shows increased casualties and which points the study to account for an escalation in 2002. That being said, we should keep in mind that the study does not seek to explain varying levels of intensity, but looks at the periods prior to escalations of violence. To conclude, the graph altogether supports the argument for the division of three phases of violence identifying escalations in 2002, 2004 and 2008.

The following section will use these findings to frame the background discussion of the episodes of political events and violence with the three points of escalation in 2002, 2004 and 2008. In this respect, the account focuses on the local context of external and domestic policies. Thereafter, the study will continue with an empirical analysis of the interview material.

\[23\] The escalation of 1989 to 1991 that started the conflict does not count as an international conflict as Georgia was formally still part of the Soviet Union and Russian intervention counted as internal affair; only after Georgia had declared independence in 1991 involvement of Russian actors put the conflict on an international scale.
using the method of narrative analysis to examine the influence of Western policies on Georgian state leaderships’ behavior in the conflict.

The account is based on the analysis of the OSCE material (see annex 1) to add to the scarce reference material on the conflict. In addition, the account is based on the interviews held in Georgia in 2009 and 2010 (see the discussion in 3.3. and annexes 3 and 4) and on the primary and secondary sources on Georgia’s and the conflict’s political context which has been discussed in the literature review. Particularly the second sequence of events draws on the research done in the framework of the M.A. thesis (submitted to the board of the Otto-Suhr Institute at the Free University of Berlin in February 2006, referenced as Sigwart 2006), which centered on power policies of the Saakashvili leadership in the South Ossetia conflict between January and August 2004. The interviews were conducted in the framework of a DAAD-funded research project in Georgia from August to October 2005.

3.2. Background of the study: Trajectory of politics and violence in the South Ossetia conflict 1989-2008

Violence in South Ossetia took its start when national movements throughout the Soviet Union claimed self-determination at the end of the 1980s. After movements in Tskhinvali and Tbilisi started to foment public debate and violent clashes ensued, violence became a consistent pattern of the South Ossetia conflict that never came to cease.

The task of the background account is to provide contextual knowledge of the conflict highlighting major politic events and trajectories of violence. The purpose of the section is to point out the context of Western and local agency in light of the argument of the study. Therefore, the section will show how after 1989 Georgia state elites attempted to consolidate power in the context of the conflict and at how the Western agenda in the conflict reacted to local power claims. The background account of key political events covers four major episodes, comprising the periods of increasing
and decreasing violence before and after the escalations in 2002, 2004 and 2008.

The key events within the four episodes can be summarized as follows:

*Episode 1: 1989 to 1994* – Independence of Georgia, start of conflict in South Ossetia, and first Georgian-Ossetian war (Independence demonstrations, March to Tskhinvali, Gamsakhurdia becomes first president of Georgia, Gorbachev referendum, Ousting of Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze becomes second president of Georgia, Sochi agreement ending the first South Ossetia war, Start of war in Abkhazia, Start of JCC).

*Episode 2: 1994-2002* – Shevardnadze-Chibirov agreement, Kokoity takes power, and re-escalation in 2002 (Chibirov becomes de-facto president of South Ossetia, Shevardnadze-Chibirov agreement, Second war with Chechnya, Putin becomes (acting) president of the RF, Baden Document, Re-election of Shevardnadze, Kokoity replaces Chibirov as de-facto president of South Ossetia).


*Episode 4: 2006-2008* – Kosovo, NATO summit in Bucharest, August war and aftermath of the war (November demonstrations in Tbilisi, Okruashvili goes into exile, Recognition of Kosovo, NATO summit in Bucharest, Second war in South Ossetia, Russia recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia, End of OSCE Mission, mandate of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)).
Episode 1: 1989 to 1994 – Independence of Georgia, start of conflict in South Ossetia and first Georgian-Ossetian war

Summary. Between 1989 and 1994, claims of self-determination intensified the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. While Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union, Russian leaders supported South Ossetian attempts to cede from Georgia. The first Georgian president Gamsakhurdia started the conflict and the second president Shevardnadze ended the first war in 1992, both attempting to legitimize their rule through gaining control over South Ossetia. The peace agreement mandated Russia’s presence on the ground and upheld the political status quo of South Ossetia. When Western actors entered the conflict as facilitators, the Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian leaderships had already secured their interests of opportunities for illicit gains, shared control of territory and de-facto independence, particularly with Shevardnadze proving to be a strong leader and being able to provide payoffs to his civil servants through the profits from smuggling.

In early 1989, tensions rose in the Soviet Republic of Georgia when people in the capital of Tbilisi demonstrated for independence from the Soviet Union (see Suny 1994, Beissinger 2002, Nodia 1996). In March, the demonstrations in front of the Georgian parliament reached its peak.24 In the beginning, claims were brought against Abkhazian self-determination as fears grew that the region might drift away from Georgian central rule. However, Soviet troops cracked down on demonstrations causing civilian casualties on April 9, 1989. As a consequence, the public tide turned into demands of independence from Moscow rule (I 25). As the Georgian national movement gathered strength, claims of independence coincided with demands of Russian withdrawal from Georgia’s regions under the titular ethnoterritorial rule granted by the Soviet system.25 Effective

---

24 Three interview partners who were active in politics during and after the fall of the Soviet Union described the events at the time (I 25, I 29).
25 Under the Soviet system, administration of territorial entities was divided by ethnic groups. Adjara and Abkhazia held the status of autonomous republic, with more
central control over these territories was held to be necessary to achieve of Georgian independence.

The situation intensified when Zviad Gamsakhurdia became Georgia’s national figurehead on the way to the presidency of an independent Georgia. A popular writer, his ideas of independence of the Georgian nation attracted his followers and made him a powerful figure and activist well before he was elected president in October 1990. He fiercely pushed an anti-Soviet agenda with a nationalist rhetoric (see Nodia 1996, Jones 2005, Zhorzhkiani et al. 1992, Beissinger 2002, English 2008). After the spring demonstrations of 1989, Gamsakhurdia made South Ossetia the test case for his anti-Russian policy. After Gamsakhurdia, South Ossetia was the cradle of Georgian identity that was now in the grip of Russia’s ethnically divisive politics (see for example: Jones 1997, Aves 1992). On 10 November 1989, the South Ossetian leadership for the first time called on the Georgian Supreme Soviet to grant South Ossetia the status of autonomous republic (on this process above all see: ICG 2004). The Georgian Supreme Soviet refused the request.


Almost one year later on 20 September 1990, South Ossetia declared independence from Georgia and full sovereignty within the Soviet Union amid ongoing clashes. Yet, once more, both the Georgian and Russian leaderships formally rejected recognition. Ossetians were not part of the independence from the center in Tbilisi than South Ossetia which held the status of an autonomous region.
Georgian elections that on 30 October 1990 brought Gamsakhurdia into power, and later made him the first president of Georgia on 26 May 1991 (Report of the CSCE Rapporteur Mission to Georgia 17-22 May 1992, CSCE Communication No. 186). On 11 December 1990, six weeks after the parliamentary elections and in reaction to the South Ossetian declaration of independence, the Georgian parliament abolished the status of the autonomous region of South Ossetia, declaring the state of emergency for the region and putting it under central rule (Times 28.01.1991). Georgian central authorities dispatched police forces to Tskhinvali. In the course of December, the first casualties among Georgian police occurred, and just before January 1991 armed hostilities among Georgian guards, Ossetian militias and Russian troops broke out in Tskhinvali. When Georgian independence from the Soviet Union was finalized on 25 December 1991, Georgia was already engaged in its first internal war.

In what aggravated the general situation, Mikhail Gorbachev, head of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, offered a higher degree of self-rule to national entities. All autonomous republics could hold referendums over national independence. In March 1991, Gorbachev offered Abkhazia to receive the same sovereign status as Georgia within the Soviet Union (Lane and Ross 1994, I 13, I 24). When Gorbachev’s offer came, violence in South Ossetia had already been waging for months and the offer embittered Tbilisi even more as it undermined the claim of Georgia’s territorial unity (NYT 10.04.1991). Until March 1991, sources estimate 50 casualties; by the end of Gamsakhurdia’s rule in December 1991 some sources put the death toll at one thousand deaths.

---

26 The references abbreviate CSCE, later OSCE reports with AR for the bi-weekly Activity Reports of the Head of the OSCE Mission to Georgia to the Vienna headquarter, and SR for Spot Reports that were issued by the mission on occasion of incidents of violence that affected the situation in the conflict area.
27 Both, a former member of the Gamsakhurdia government and a co-worker of the EU Representative to the South Caucasus, emphasized Gorbachev’s offer as an event that alienated the Georgian national movement from Russian politics and the minorities. In addition, the offer alienated the South Ossetian independence movement.
28 Data on the South Ossetia conflict is not reliable. Here widely quoted data on the first Georgian-Ossetian war 1990 to 1992: Casualties of “at least 700” (International Herald
Western-Georgian relations did not experience a good start under this first presidency. Gamsakhurdia’s policies were met with stark Western contempt (on European and U.S. reaction see: HRW 1992, English 2008, Nodia 1995). Gamsakhurdia intended to establish order with a strong hand before introducing democracy. The West reacted by adamantly rejecting Gamsakhurdia’s crackdown on demonstrations, media and his nationalist rhetoric against ethnic minorities. As well, Gamsakhurdia’s refusal to introduce market oriented reforms and his intention to keep a planned economy system did not gain him support. When violence in South Ossetia escalated, the West mainly blamed it on Gamsakhurdia’s ethnically divisive rhetoric and welcomed the regime change to Shevardnadze with relief.

The end of Gamsakhurdia’s rule came at the hands of his internal opponent when political groups that were part of Gamsakhurdia’s umbrella coalition usurped his power (see Shatirishvili 2003, Nodia 1996). When Gamsakhurdia was ousted, violence in South Ossetia continued unmitigated. Shevardnadze arrived in Georgia to become the second president of Georgia in January 1992. He enjoyed the backing of the Mkhebrioni militias who had defied Gamsakhurdia. As the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Shevardnadze enjoyed an excellent standing with Russia as well (Suny 1994: 328-330). One of Shevardnadze’s first actions was to send the Georgian military to fight the war in South Ossetia. Until then, militias and the Georgian National Guard had engaged in skirmishes since the winter of 1990.

Shevardnadze, as the second president of Georgia, seemed to follow a more moderate course than his predecessor. However, Shevardnadze attempted to prove being a capable leader by subduing separatist forces and regaining South Ossetia. As a result from January 1992, Georgian and

---

Tribune 1992), 1,000 (ICG 2004), or “up to 2000” (Le Monde 1992), 3,000 (Svetkovsky 1993); estimates of wounded quote 1500 (Le Monde 1992), missed persons 100 (ICG 2004). The UNHCR estimates Ossetian refugees in North Ossetia at 40,000, ICG and Birch at 100,000 (ICG 2004; Birch 1996); Georgian and ethnically mixed IDPs inside of Georgia at 10,000 and 5,000 (UNHCR 2004).
Russian military engaged in a six-month war in South Ossetia until a peace agreement was negotiated in June 1992 that left South Ossetia lost to central Georgian rule (see for example: ICG 2004, Cornell 2001 and 2002, Milcher and Slay 2005, Barbe and Johansson-Nogue 2008).

In June 1992, President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, and Shevardnadze built on their good personal relations and negotiated the Sochi Agreement which ended the war (Annex II of CSCE Communication No. 228, 05.08.1992, Report of the CSCE Fact-Finding Mission to the region of the Georgian- Ossetian Conflict, 25.-30.07.1992). The agreement set up a joint Peace-Keeping Force under the auspices of CSCE, from 1995 OSCE, and later included the EU as a participating member; however only Georgian, Russian and South Ossetian representatives held veto power (on the CSCE/OSCE process see: Koenig 2005, Mayorov 2002, Olcott Brill et al. 1999, Cummings 2001). South Ossetian, Russian (constituted mainly by North Ossetians) and Georgian troops were to control the buffer zone under Russian command. The Peace-Keeping Forces were the only security personnel the Sochi Agreement entitled to carry arms in the conflict zone. Joint checkpoints with members of each battalion were established throughout the area. Later from 2000, the peace-keeping forces were supplemented by joint operations of Georgian and Ossetian local police.

This arrangement marked the start of Western engagement in South Ossetia from the end of the first war in mid-1992. However, within six weeks after the Sochi agreement the war in Abkhazia started in August 1992 which proved to be an ongoing volatile situation also under Shevardnadze’s rule. By settling the war in South Ossetia, Shevardnadze cemented his claim to power by settling the conflict and maintaining close ties with Moscow and with the new South Ossetian leader, Ludvig Chibirov, being installed in 1993.

Episode 2: 1994-2002 – Shevardnadze-Chibirov agreement, Kokoity takes power, and re-escalation in 2002

80
**Summary.** Between 1994 and 2002, low-intensity violence persisted in South Ossetia, due to the good relations between the Georgian and South Ossetian leaderships and intense support of Western actors. From the very start of the 1990s, Western support of the Georgian elites centered on territorial integration, with a special focus on anti-corruption and anti-smuggling measures in the conflict area of South Ossetia. Simultaneously, Georgian and Ossetian leaders made enormous private gains from cooperatively organizing smuggling through South Ossetia and therefore kept the conflict from escalating. However from 2000 on, the situation was aggravated due to a hardening stance of Moscow, cancelling the settlement negotiations in Baden and replacing Chibirov with hardline leader Kokoity. As Georgian elites turned away from Russia, Russian politics in South Ossetia continued to reinforce the situation in the conflict. The conflict re-escalated in 2002 with Shevardnadze clinging to power by trying to re-organize smuggling to satisfy the clients of his regime as well as staging anti-corruption measures to the West and the harshly criticizing civil society.

From 1994, Western engagement increasingly stepped up its activity in Georgia and in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict amid the reality of the shaky power-sharing deal monitored through the Joint Control Commission (Koenig 2005, Jawad 2005, Mayorov 2002). While the deal was in place and Western actors sustained the process, the conflict remained in a volatile state. Frequent outbreaks of violence persisted, but were downplayed as local disputes. After Gamsakhurdia had been ousted, Georgia went through both, a civil war between non-state groups and a war with breakaway Abkhazia (on the first Abkhazia war see: Slider 1997, Hensell 2009, Coppieters 2004, Coppieters et al. 1998). Once those struggles of competing elites were overcome, Georgian capital politics settled into a routine from 1996 and Shevardnadze established uncontested rule with Western support.
After the peace agreement had been put in place in 1992, it took two years for a drop in violence. In 1993, at least 48 casualties in sixteen incidents were reported and in 1994, the death toll went down to thirteen. Casualties during this time mainly occurred because of shoot-outs between Ossetian or Georgian local gangs or between gangs and local authorities or PKFs, reported to be mostly related to smuggling activities. Casualties frequently occurred during controls at road posts and were then considered to be related to criminal activities. However, as mentioned earlier, the OSCE reports gave a detailed account on casualties only from 1997.29 Before this, the casualties rates and indications of causes were very vague. While casualties stayed at a low level throughout the 1990s, violence however simmered beneath the surface throughout the entire period. Altogether, at least 59 casualties were reported in the ‘calm’ period between 1994 and 1999.

In the 1990s, the balance in South Ossetia worked through active cooperation between Shevardnadze’s leadership and South Ossetia’s moderate leader Chibirov. Relations were supported by the JCC in settling organizational and security issues for the populations in the conflict area. Amid the ongoing war in early 1992, Torez Kumbegov became the de-facto president of South Ossetia. Already then Western actors’ intense interest in engaging in the conflict showed. JCC negotiations started and, on 23 January 1993, Kumbegov signed the memorandum on the cooperation between CSCE and the South Ossetian leadership (OSCE AR 12/92). The CSCE presented a “CSCE Plan for Georgia” envisaging gradual reintegration of South Ossetia into Georgia in July 1993.30

---

29 The major incidents during this period were an Ossetian being killed by a Georgian policeman during the first half of August 1997. In the first half of April 1998, a Russian PKF soldier killed a Georgian resident in the Georgian village of Tamarasheni. In the first half of December 1998, two Georgian residents were killed by other local residents. The suspects were subsequently arrested in a joint Georgian-South Ossetian operation of law enforcement bodies. Finally, on October 13, 1999, a North Ossetian was killed by local Ossetians at the Ergneti market.

30 The five-page document includes the “CSCE concept of a Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian Conflicts” and was viewed in the OSCE archive in Prague.
However, only two months later, Chibirov was elected the new head of the South Ossetian Supreme Soviet. Chibirov announced that Kolumbegov had been too much in favor of the CSCE plan (CSCE ARs 24.08., 28.11., 11.10.1993, CSCE Supplemental Report, 30.09.1993). After two years of half-hearted negotiations, from early 1996, Shevardnadze announced “perspectives for the relative quick settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict” and signed the “Initiative for a Peaceful Caucasus” (OSCE ARs 13.02. and 03.04.1996). On May 16, Shevardnadze and Chibirov signed a Memorandum on confidence-building and security measures in Moscow. This was considered as a major step toward the settlement of the conflict, but most of all it was an expression of close ties between the leaderships and was regarded favorably by Western partners.

Good relations between the South Ossetian and the Georgian leaderships also enabled significant incomes for both sides through organized smuggling through the region of South Ossetia to Georgia. The power basis of the Shevardnadze regime was rooted in a ‘pyramid system’ of re-distribution of revenues into the hands of regime-loyal clients (Christophe 2005: 78, also see: Easter 1996, George 2009, Holmes 1997). There were very few people at the top of the pyramid in the state apparatus that entertained a large network of corruption via police and regional state actors. At the bottom of this pyramid, most of the population had to bribe state employees for access to virtually anything, including roads, gas or jobs. This system ensured the power basis of the state elite and granted large incomes (on the role of corruption for governments see the studies of Banfield 1975, Charap and Harm 1991, Lapalombara 1994).

Smuggling played a significant role in allocating revenues in the hands of capital-loyal state actors in the regions, and granted gains for everybody involved. Therefore, Georgian, North and South Ossetian and Russian militia, police and civilian actors, and parts of the Peace-Keeping Forces engaged in smuggling, with smuggling activities peaking between 1995 and 2004 (ICG 2004: 9-10, also see: Vilanishvili 2005, Chkhartishvili et al. 2004).
Above all, Ergneti market flourished from the mid-1990s and became the most active trans-shipment center in Georgia, the hub of Georgian-Ossetian illegal and legal trade relations (on the role and functioning of Ergneti market see: George 2009, Kukhianidze et al. 2006, Kukhianidze 2003, 2004 and 2007). The market was the biggest source of income for the leadership in Tskhinvali, many of Shevardnadze’s civil servants and businessmen in North Ossetia (ibid., Wennmann 2004). Therefore, all sides across the conflict boundaries had a vested interested in keeping the illicit trade system alive. In order to organize smuggling activities along the routes between North Ossetia and Georgia, the main concern was to maintain order in the conflict area and keep violence at a low level (on this view see above all: George 2009).

At the same time, however, Chibirov signed a treaty of cooperation with North Ossetia. The Chibirov leadership openly stated the intention to unite with North Ossetia and become a member of the Russian Federation. From the end of the 1990s, the Russian political elite had undergone a transformation that, at least for Georgian politics, proved to be fatal (on this period see for example: Gower and Timmins 2009, Haukkala 2008, Sikorski 2009, Loewenhardt 2005, Cooley and Mitchell 2010a and 2010b, Allison 2008, Blank 1995). The change from Yeltsin to the Putin presidency radicalized Russian policy towards Georgia very quickly (see Cummings 2001, Allison 2008, Filippov 2009).

With almost immediate effect, the tightening Russian stance was revealed in the South Ossetia context: the so called Baden process of the JCC, a negotiation format envisaging the settlement of the region’s political status and at least to most international observers highly promising, was halted (on international view to the Baden process see: Koenig 2005; also see: I 8, I 14, I 1-16). In addition, Chibirov was replaced with his politically

---

31 The two local interview partners, though with diverse backgrounds of a current and a former government official, as well as a member of the EU Delegation had a more critical view stressing the disbalance in voting distribution leaving the Georgian side as a rule in a weaker position against the Russian, the South and the North Ossetian votes. This along with the hawkish turn in the Georgian governmental line, the interview partners
radical successor Eduard Kokoity who took power in December 2001 (on this turn in the process see: I 8, I 9, I 28, I 29). The failure of the Baden process was the first sign announcing the end of Chibirov’s era under whom the process toward a peace settlement had been striving. The replacement of Chibirov proved to be a major setback in the otherwise successful Georgian-Ossetian process that had taken place through the 1990s. By 1997, the institutions managing conflict affairs had been consolidated and internationalized; The OSCE branch office had taken up work in Tskhinvali, the three Peace-Keeping Forces had held the first joint training, the first meeting on the political status of South Ossetia had been held in Moscow, and Georgian and Ossetian intellectuals met for yet the second time.

After the South Ossetian elections in December 2001, in one of his very first public statements Kokoity announced Georgia’s acknowledgment of the ‘genocide’ against the South Ossetian people during the 1990-1992 war as conditional for dialog (OSCE AR 18.12.2001). The new South Ossetian course reiterated reunification with North Ossetia and would never again come as close to negotiating South Ossetia’s autonomous status within Georgia as under Chibirov. As relations deteriorate, Shevardnadze for the first time openly criticized Russia in June 2002, saying that Russia “secretly annexes” South Ossetia and thus made its mediating role less credible (ibid.).

Seconded by Georgia’s mutual interest of integration into the West, Western engagement gradually intensified over the 1990s. Formation of the Georgian state was a core priority, and here, intense activity showed in solving Georgia’s rule-of-law problems by enhancing capacities of the central state through fighting crime and corruption in South Ossetia where statehood was contested through territorial conflict. The Georgian state elite responded with a vivid interest in cooperation. During the 1990s, Shevardnadze had pursued a mild course toward Russia (see for example: suggested, led over time and regardless of change in personnel represented in the JCC to the Georgians’ refusal to carry on with the format.)
Mark 1996, Timmermann 1992, English 2000, Allison 2008), keeping a balance between Russian influence in Georgia, revenues for selected echelons of the elite and political stability in the territorial conflicts. However, when Russia’s political system transferred from Yeltsin to Putin in 2000, the ground of politically stable relations gradually eroded.

As the Georgian elites’ relations with Russia started to fall apart under Shevardnadze, Georgia’s turn to the West was accomplished through promoting an anti-Russian discourse and altogether opening a new, modernized perspective that was boosted through Western pledges of support for independence and progress (Christophe 2001, Jones 1993, Zuercher and Koehler 2004). Moscow’s politics, in contrast, weakened local independence politics as they supported competing groups in the secessionist regions as well as opposition groups in the capital, cutting links of Georgia with its North Caucasus neighbors and altogether attempting to diffuse social and infrastructural capital necessary to sustain independence (Proladze 2001, Sikharulidze 2001, Hanf and Nodia 2000). As local elites gradually experienced new power consolidating opportunities through relations with Western partners, their policies adopted a stern pro-Western course that, particularly from 2000, included meticulous fulfilment of Western conditionalities in the reform process that was to lead to Western integration into NATO and EU.

With the background of Western integration, from 2000, Georgia boosted anti-crime activities and therefore intensified efforts to control the situation in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict zone and its vicinity. The campaign was endorsed by then Georgian Minister of Justice and later president Mikheil Saakashvili and took place in the context of Western demands to restore rule of law in Georgia’s peripheral regions. Therefore, from 2002, the Georgian leadership announced a large-scale anti-corruption and anti-smuggling campaign as a senior member of a local research NGO pointed out (I 7), of which the operations in South Ossetia were one result.
As the result of tense Georgian, Ossetian and Russian relations and anti-crime operations after the end of Baden, re-intensification of the conflict occurred from 2000. As discussed earlier, the reports give only but a weak hint to the intensification through casualties: While OSCE reports indicate at least 59 casualties between 1994 and 1999, the death toll rises to a minimum of 29 casualties only between 2000 and 2003. Throughout 2000, very few casualties were reported, but on May 20 a highly symbolic killing took place in the Georgian village of Kheiti when five Georgian residents were killed in a car ambush. It was the commemoration day of the 1992 killings of 36 Ossetian residents. The killings were widely held to have happened in retaliation (OSCE AR 10/00, OSCE SR 21.05.2000). In 2001, the reported death toll in the conflict zone rose remarkably up to 13, more than doubling the 2000 rate.32

Particularly, the intensification showed an increase in the engagement of police and internal forces in the conflict area. In September 2002, OSCE observers located for the first time heavy armament in the conflict zone and Georgian troops of interior (troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) increased. South Ossetia leader Kokoity announced a “partial mobilization” of Ossetian forces, allegedly to secure the territory against fighters from the North Caucasus (OSCE AR 08.10.2002). In mid-October Georgian forces started to carry out large-scale anti-crime operations in the region of Shida Kartli. From that point, Ossetian and Georgian forces both engaged in anti-crime operations and struggled over access and infrastructure across the area. As a result, by March 10, 2003 the Georgian Ministry of Defense (MoD) unilaterally subordinated the Georgian battalion of the PKF under its authority (OSCE AR 06.03.2003), a breach of the JCC agreement that

---

32 On April 3, a gangland shoot-out in Tskhinvali left three Ossetians dead (OSCE AR 07/01). On May 13, a gunbattle between the South Ossetian police and Chechens caused four casualties (OSCE AR 09/01). It was the first time since 1997 that a law enforcement member was killed. In July, two were found dead in Tskhinvali and in the end of November two Ossetians and two Georgians were killed in two gunfights with the local police (OSCE AR 13/01 and 10/01).
initially envisaged the PKF troops under the bi-annually rotating Russian JPKF command.

The trend did not reverse and violence annually increased, significantly involving increasing death tolls among Georgian and Ossetian police forces, with Shevardnadze’s claim to power left in limbo amid Western demands for reform, harsh criticism of Georgian civil society organizations and an exacerbating situation in the conflict zone and with Russia. As the situation in South Ossetia became exacerbated, Shevardnadze gradually lost his grip on power. Failing to achieve territorial reintegration, Shevardnadze could not prove being a capable leader to the population and the international community. Ongoing corruption of his government and high crime levels related to smuggling around South Ossetia turned support of civil society organizations and Western organizations sour.

*Episode 3: 2002-2006 – Ousting of Shevardnadze, closure of Ergneti, Ljubljana Document, Sanakoev administration*

*Summary.* With Shevardnadze ousted in 2003, the new Saakashvili government tried to consolidate rule by fulfilling Western demands of a strengthened, democratic statehood. Introducing a sweeping change in the stance on South Ossetia, Saakashvili closed down the smuggling hub of Ergneti market in May 2004. Re-escalation ensued in August through the shelling of Tskhinvali. Subsequently, the government sought to draw Western support to further consolidate rule through promoting peace road maps to reintegrate South Ossetia. The government successfully played on a two-sided agenda, assuring Western partners of a democratic strategy while keeping open options for a military option on the ground. By 2006, all players in the conflict had radicalized, including the Georgian-led alternative South Ossetian Sanakoev administration, with new North Ossetian leader Mamsurov, and due to an erosion of the buffer institution of the JCC. The Georgian government enjoyed Western support in its stance.
In 2003, Shevardnadze’s power base finally broke away (Wheatley 2005: chapter 7, also see: Mitchell 2004, Coppieters and Legvold 2005). The 2000 presidential elections already had raised doubts of Western observer organizations and partners about Shevardnadze’s commitment to democratization and the November 2003 parliamentary elections were openly branded as falsified (OSCE/ODHIR reports, 10.04.2000 and 23.11.2003). After the elections, Mikheil Saakashvili, Shevardnadze’s former Minister of Justice, led the ensuing protests. Amid strong Western support of the protesters, the ‘Rose Revolution’ leaders ousted Shevardnadze and Saakashvili took office as the third president of Georgia in January 2004. Mitchell observed in 2004: “The Rose Revolution represented a victory not only for the Georgian people but for democracy globally. [It] ... demonstrated that, by aggressively contesting elections, exercising basic freedoms of speech and assembly, and applying smart strategic thinking, a democratic opposition can defeat a weak, semi-democratic kleptocracy” (Mitchell 2004: 342).

In Saakashvili’s generally ambitious reform agenda of rule of law and democratization, territorial integration ranked at the top (Wheatley 2005: 195ff., also see: Huber 2004, Jawad 2005). Saakashvili continued the course initiated under him as Shevardnadze’s Minister of Justice in establishing rule of law through addressing the conflicts and generally, just like Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze before him, banked on fortifying his rule through reintegrating the territories. The new impetus introduced a sweeping change in Georgian policy on the secessionist entities to a proactive course (I 9, I 1333). Western partners promised full support to the new government. Saakashvili’s first success is the peaceful reintegration of the secessionist region of Adjara in Georgia’s southwest and on the wave of triumph the Saakashvili leadership turned its attention to Tskhinvali in May 2004.

33 The critical views of two interview partners, both members of the opposition, framed this account.
The implications of the new policy showed for the first time when in May 2004 Georgian troops of interior closed down the market in Ergneti on the border of South Ossetia and Georgia (several interviews gave insight on this event: l 1, l 6, l 8, l 9). While the Georgian state servants who gained from the system had been replaced due to the regime change (for this view see: Papava 2006), the crackdown mainly cut off incomes of the South Ossetian side. South Ossetians already had eyed Saakashvili’s new agenda suspiciously from earlier that year (Peuch 2004, Fuller 2005). After Ergneti was closed, these fears seemed to be confirmed. In August 2004, six days after South Ossetian leader Kokoity and new Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania had signed a cease-fire agreement, Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs Irakli Okruashvili led an operation during which Georgian troops shelled Tskhinvali for hours (RFE/RL 20. and 27.08.2004, l 18). The next day on television, Saakashvili declares the incident a “brilliant operation” (RFE/RL Newswire, 20.08.2004). With this, the conflict in South Ossetia escalated for the first time since 1992 due to the involvement of the assertive armed action of state actors.34

Already at the end of 2003, the new Georgian government had sought Western support for their stance toward South Ossetia (Wheatley 2005: 218-219, also see: Milcher and Slay 2005, Barbe and Johansson-Nogue 2008, Popescu 2007, Zuercher 2007, Sigwart 2006). Saakashvili launched an all-encompassing international campaign to promote a peace road map for the settlement of the South Ossetia conflict as a Georgian representative at the OSCE meeting in Ljubljana observed (Socor 2005). The peace road map included the new government’s agenda in the conflict and envisaged confidence-building measures, negotiations, economic rehabilitation, legalized trade relations and broad autonomy. In the course

34 The more the conflict intensifie, the more OSCE reports refrained from accounting for casualties. For the period of 2004, the reports account for five casualties (two civilians and the deputy commander of the South Ossetian special forces are killed by Georgian police in separate incidents, two Ossetian peace-keepers are killed in an ambush). The shelling of Tskhinvali is accounted with unspecified numbers of both “military and civilian” casualties. However, intensification of the conflict shows in increased involvement of state actors in violence.
of 2004 and 2005, the road maps were widely presented to international audiences such as the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and the OSCE Permanent Council. The 2005 peace campaign managed to ensure Western support for the new government.

While Saakashvili’s peace campaign resounded in the international community, the signs of deterioration continued. Moscow took away influence from the Georgian official side in South Ossetia affairs step by step. Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and Kokoity signed a demilitarization agreement in November 2004 (OSCE AR 15/04, Civil.ge 06.11.2004). The agreement dictated that all military personnel apart from the Peace-Keeping deployments must leave the conflict zone. As a part of the deal, Georgian troops withdrew from the Sarabuki post in South Ossetia and left it to South Ossetian Peace-Keepers (I 9, I 18\(^\text{35}\)). The arrangement was lobbied by the Russian side and as a result supported by the Western side as a concession after the August 2004 escalation. While demilitarization was in fact never concluded on neither side, this gave a severe blow to Georgian military control in the area. Moreover, in August 2006 the Georgian military carried out a massive campaign in Abkhazia and gained back Upper Kodori Valley, a region inhabited by ethnic Georgians, but located in the Abkhazian-controlled area of the UN-monitored boundary line (I 14, I 1-13, I 23\(^\text{36}\); also see OSCE AR 26.04.1994). Furthermore, Moscow enhanced its influence in South Ossetia and the North Caucasus, through installing a new leader in North Ossetia, the most Moscow-loyal North Caucasus entity. After over seven years, the moderate Alexander Dzasokhov was replaced by hardliner Teimuraz Mamsurov May 31, 2005 (OSCE AR 11/05, Civil.Ge 11.06.2005, Komsansant 17.06.2005). Just as South Ossetia’s de-facto president Kokoity before him, Mamsurov

---

\(^{35}\) Two interview partners emphasized the importance of the Sarabuki post for the Georgian government’s policy toward South Ossetia.

\(^{36}\) Several interview partners, among them members of an international NGO and organization as well as a member of the opposition framed their account of events in South Ossetia with events in Kodori Valley.
insisted in one of his first public statements on the reunification of North and South Ossetia (RFE/RL 14.06.2005).

On the international level as well, relations between Russia and Georgia also very clearly deteriorated from 2006. In February 2006, Georgia underlined its determination in the conflict context and vetoed the Russian mandate of the Peace-Keeping Force in South Ossetia (OSCE AR 02/06). After the vote, the Georgian parliament instructed the government to revise the 1992 Sochi Agreement and replace the Russian-led Peace-Keeping Force (Civil.ge 07. and 15.02.2006).

In addition, the Georgian side started to question the JCC format from October 2006. In November 2006, the Georgian government held alternative elections in the Georgian-controlled parts of South Ossetia and established an alternative South Ossetia government under Dimitry Sanakoev (OSCE AR 19/06, 20/06, 22/06). The Georgian government, in a provocative move for the JCC counterparts, introduced Sanakoev as the Ossetian representative to the JCC. However, neither Russia nor the Western representatives of the JCC reacted to the decision. As a result, Russia did not pull out its peace-keepers until after the war in 2008.37

Altogether, after the escalation in 2004 the conflict remained at an intense level due to ongoing militarization and operations of security forces. The establishment of the Sanakoev administration, the eroding of the CC format and increased unilateralism of Russia through a tightening grip in the North Caucasus and Georgia’s Kodori campaign in Abkhazia also aggravated the situation after the 2004 escalation. Western support for Georgia’s strategy further progressed at the international level and remained reluctant, but supportive on the ground.

37 In September 2006, in an unparalleled move, Georgian intelligence arrested four Russian officers on spying charges, initiated a big media campaign and expelled them from Georgia to Russia (Civil.ge 27.09.2006, BBC News 02.10.2006). In April 2007, Georgia further irked Russia and vetoed Russia’s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) (RFE/RL 30.04.2007).
Episode 4: 2006-2008 – Kosovo recognition, NATO summit in Bucharest, August war and aftermath of the war

Summary. From 2006, the situation continued to become more and more tense at a fast pace. Harsh international criticism and domestic opposition challenged Saakashvili’s power base. The situation created the pressure for Saakashvili to act in his favor and he continued, just as his predecessors, to direct special efforts to territorial integration. At the same time, the recognition of Kosovo and the Bucharest NATO summit put Western policy under pressure vis-a-vis Russia’s stance of maintaining secessionism in the Caucasus. The aftermath of the August war left Western influence in the conflict diminished, however, Western-Georgian ties continued to exert considerable influence on Georgian elites’ power base.

Throughout 2007, tensions continued to steadily increase, with the Georgia parliament giving legal status to the Sanakoev administration in May 2007. Also, in July, a Russian missile hit close to the convoy of an EU delegation returning from a visit to Tskhinvali (I 14, I 20). At the same time tensions in Tbilisi rose as the Saakashvili regime grappled with its opposition (for this period see: Lazarus 2010, Mitchell 2009, Areshidze 2007, Tatum 2009, Welt 2009, Kalanadze and Orenstein 2009). In September, the launching of the new oppositional party of former Minister of Defense Okruashvili was stalled through charges of corruption, money laundering and abuse of office against him (Civil.ge 27.09.2007). In November, opposition-led street protests ensued and were subdued by military police with what international actors, including the US and EU fiercely condemned as disproportional use of force (see Bigg and Sindelar 2007). Therefore prior to the August war, the political situation put Saakavhili’s power base strongly at risk (Jones 2008: 3, also see: Lanskoy 2008). Just as the two leaderships before him, Saakashvili resorted to an

38 Especially members of international organizations, here the EU Delegation and OSCE, recalled this incident as a marker of increasing tensions in South Ossetia at the time, stressing the potential for violence from the South Ossetian side.
ever more hardening stance in South Ossetia, including fierce demands for the support of the international community.

In February 2008, the recognition of the international protectorate of Kosovo shook the context of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts (on the effect of Kosovo’s independence see: Averre 2009, Cerone 2009). Russia opposed Kosovo’s recognition, but then turned the situation by claiming the same rights for the South Caucasus separatist entities. As a result, Moscow took up official diplomatic relations with Tskhinvali and Sukhumi in April 2008. Two months on in April 2008, the NATO summit in Bucharest denied membership to Georgia in the near future (I 6, I 7\(^39\); also see: Asmus 2010, Nichol 2009, Bounds and Hendrickson 2009). Ahead of the summit, expectations in Georgia were high as NATO Secretary General Scheffer’s earlier remarks had boosted hopes for sooner membership, even without achieving territorial integrity (Civil.ge 12.02.2007). Ahead of the summit, Russia fiercely campaigned against a possible membership. Georgia saw this failure largely at the hands of Russia’s pressure on NATO member states, particularly Germany, with threatening to cut energy supplies. Although the summit stressed the member states’ will to admit Georgia at a later point, the rebuff to Georgia testified Russia’s strong ambitions and put a preliminary end to Georgia’s way into Western structures. The same month, Russia started legal relations with South Ossetia and Abkhazia (I 5\(^40\)).


\(^{39}\) A member of a local NGO and of the opposition accounted for the Bucharest summit as a chronological milestone in the cycle of escalation leading to the 2008 war.

\(^{40}\) A senior member of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia described Russia’s de facto recognition of the two entities as a consequence from the reality that, according to the interview, Russia created in Bucharest.
troops. Georgian military temporarily invaded Tskhinvali engaging in skirmishes with South Ossetian militias, but was pushed back by Russian military. Russian troops subsequently moved into central Georgian territory and occupied strategic locations beyond Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The war leaves several hundred dead (HRW 2009: 5). The war was ended with an initiative of the head of the EU presidency, French president Nicolas Sarkozy, when a ceasefire agreement was put in place between Georgia and Russia on 12 August and, after inconsistencies with a new version, on 8 September. Despite the condition for troops to withdraw to their pre-war positions, Russian forced only withdrew from central Georgia by mid-October, but remained present in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and formerly Georgian-controlled areas in South Ossetia.

As early as 26 August 2008, barely two weeks after the end of fighting, the Russian Federation recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In October, the EU and US initiated a new format of international talks on the future of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts to periodically take place in Geneva.

In May 2009, parliamentary elections in South Ossetia and the formerly Georgian-controlled region of Akhalgori fortified the new de-facto status (Barry 2009). The same month, the OSCE Mission to Georgia closed down as Russia vetoed the semi-annual prolongation the mandate had been living on since 1993. The UN Mission to Abkhazia was also vetoed by Russia and ended in June 2009. In October 2009, as a follow-up international monitoring tool to the OSCE Mission, the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) was implemented (Parmentier 2009, Simons 2012). However, the EUMM mandate is limited to monitoring Georgian-controlled territory, whereas the former OSCE mission had had access to parts of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian regions, and the EUMM does not carry a

---

41 Accounts of the war extensively diverge with respect to numbers of casualties and the three sequences of events, particularly contested on the point whether Georgian troops moved into South Ossetia before or after Russian troops moved into South Ossetia (see Jones 2008, IFFMCG 2009, Asmus 2010, Cornell and Starr 2009).
local negotiation mechanism as the JCC. After the 2008 war, control of these areas is left to the Russian military and local leaders with close ties with Moscow (Garthon 2010, Makarychev 2009).

To conclude, the second war in South Ossetia came about amid increasing external and internal pressure on Saakashvili’s power base. From 2006, the conflict intensified enormously due to Russia’s opposition to the Kosovo recognition and consolidation of the Sanakoev administration. Both in the Kosovo precedence and later at the NATO summit in Bucharest, the contentious politics between Russia and Western actors appeared and had a reinforcing effect on the local situation, with the result of the war in August 2008 that has left the situation in the conflict unsettled up to date.

3.3. Analysis of sequences of policies

As the background account has attempted to show, assertive agency frames the intensifying situation before each escalation. However, the sum, intensity, or sheer number of these actions does not explain why the conflict escalated at the points in time observed. Therefore, the empirical analysis explores sequences that circumscribe a chain or closed unit of events prior to escalations. For this purpose, the analysis identified three points of escalation in 2002, 2004 and 2008 prior to which a specific sequence of events takes effect. The analysis is aimed to identify specific policies of Western actors that repeatedly occur prior to escalations and can be plausibly linked to triggering change in local behavior. This section will start by introducing the interview method and analysis of the interview material with the result of identifying the three specific sequences. Thereafter, the section will present the reconstructed sequences based on narratives provided by interviews.

Interviews and sequences of policies

Apart from the analysis of the OSCE reports, a second body of data was generated through conducting interviews in 2009 and 2010 in Tbilisi, Gori
and in villages along the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict area. In total, 76 qualitative interviews were conducted, of which 39 were used for the study (see annex 4). The purpose of the interviews was to explore local perceptions of escalations and related policies in order to enable the analysis to establish plausible causal links to reveal chains of actions leading to escalations.

Interviewees were selected according to whether they were active in the context of the conflict prior to at least one of the escalations. The interviews were conducted with:

- residents of the area along the internal border with South Ossetia about their experiences of violence in the aftermath of the 2008 war,
- Georgian IDPs of the first and the second war about their accounts of violence,
- journalists present during escalations who have analytical insights into Georgian internal politics,
- opposition leaders about their assessments of state leaders’ power policies,
- current and former members of all three governments since independence about governmental policies, including representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
- current and former members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who had been representatives to the JCC,
- members of parliamentary commissions,
- representatives of the Ministry for Refugees on the conflict and Western relations,
- current and former representatives of the local district administration next to South Ossetia on cooperation with the South Ossetian side,
- local police in the conflict zone,
local and international non-governmental actors such as analysts at local think tanks on Western and Georgian policies or academics,
lawyers and human rights activists on ethnic cleansing cases during the second war,
members of international state organizations such as the OSCE, the EUMM (the EU Monitoring Mission which is the OSCE successor organization in the conflict) and the UN,
the EU Delegation to Georgia on Western and governmental policies,
soldiers who had been in action during the second war,
and former international and local advisors.

Based on the prior experience of research for the Master’s thesis, the respondents were expected to give more information if the conversations were not taped and held with prior agreement to being ‘off the record’, the agreement to use the materials without quotations and under strict anonymity. Therefore, this study refrained from recording the interviews electronically and instead recorded through handwritten notes and memory protocols. The electronic transcript of the handwritten notes and protocols comprises a document of 35 pages.

At the start of the interview, the main research interest was briefly introduced after which the respondents were asked to generally recount the events that in their opinion led to the respective points of escalation in 2002, 2004 or 2008. The rest of the interviews alternately drew on deepening issues the respondents brought up themselves, by pointing the conversation to specific issues of Western or local policies, and by encouragements to continue speaking. The study chose a question scheme establishing a chronological reconstruction of events to enable an account of events omitting political bias of the interviewees and centering on their local knowledge.
For example, if asked what are considered the *most important factors related to escalation*, the vast majority of respondents – international or local – stated the contention of US and Russia over influence in the post-Soviet space, with some pointing to either Putin’s or Saakashvili’s (from 2004) aggressive politics. However, if asked to depict the *major events prior to escalation*, interview partners would account almost exclusively for local events. This substantially supports the key feature of the causal argument: whereas Western activity in the conflict skyrocketed from 2004 and exerted considerable influence on Georgian actors’ power choices, Western agency showed little presence or activity at the local level and therefore was hardly visible to take effect. Therefore, the study reiterates once again, the following analysis focuses on the *triggering role of Western policies within events* at the local, national and international level of the conflict.

The analysis of the interview material focused on recurring narratives (for a discussion of this methodology see chapter 2). As each interview accounts for an individual narrative, the interviews do not necessarily narrate a detailed, stepwise or chronological sequence of events, but highlight specific events as crucial and present a reasoning why these events led to escalation. Specific key elements of narratives recur across interviews and hence enable the analysis to identify a plausible and unified reading of the policies which trigger the same cycle of escalation. Therefore, these narratives enable the below empirical account to reflect this process in light of the influence of specific Western policies on local behavior. In this respect, respondents provided similar assessments of those events that through the analysis of the material occurred to be key causal events prior to change in local behavior, based on accounts by local and international respondents across political boundaries alike. This means, respondents did not only account for the same events, but they also gave a similar reasoning of their impact. This is an important outcome as the value and interpretation attributed to individual events did not
strongly differ, but respondents largely overlapped on the importance and quality of those events that the analysis later identified as the initial conditions and points in change of local behavior of the escalation cycles.

The analysis of the OSCE material had identified intensifying and decreasing intensity around points of escalation of violence. In a further step, the interviews identified narratives of causal chains of events. In this manner, the interviews both pointed out the specific role of Western impact on local policies in key turning points of the process. The interviews provide and frame the following starting, shifting and end points of three sequences of events leading to escalation in 2002, 2004 and 2008:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time/Sequence</th>
<th>Initial condition/ Western policy, Start of escalation cycle</th>
<th>Juncture/ Change of local behavior</th>
<th>Event/ Escalation, End of escalation cycle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sequence 1</td>
<td>Failure of Baden process</td>
<td>Shevardnadze’s anti-corruption agenda</td>
<td>Anti-crime operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequence 2</td>
<td>Regime change</td>
<td>Closure of Ergneti market</td>
<td>Shelling of Tskhinvali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequence 3</td>
<td>Peace road maps of the Saakashvili leadership</td>
<td>Sanakoev administration</td>
<td>Armed action of Georgian, Ossetian and Russian forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Sequences leading to assertive policies: Initial condition, juncture and event with interview sources (I n).

On this basis, the empirical analysis explores these three sequences that circumscribe specific trajectories prior to the 2002, 2004 and 2008 escalations, with the interviews that account for these narratives being indicated in the table. The sequences span cycles of escalation that 1) are set off by an initial condition or contingent event when a Western policy interacts with its context, which 2) subsequently forms a path, a sequence events when Western policies significantly and gradually influence local power policies on the local, national and international level of the conflict context, which 3) subsequently triggers the critical juncture of change in local behavior that creates a shift to assertive policies that 4) lastly, with a
certain delay after the change in behavior brings about an escalation of violence.

Here, the study presents the trajectory of the sequences of escalation cycles in brief and then in depth in the below analysis. The first sequence took its start with the failure of the OSCE-facilitated Baden process that was to conclude in the reintegration agreement between South Ossetia and Georgia in 2000. The prospects seemed promising until Georgia denied Russia support for the war in Chechnya. As a result, Moscow initiated South Ossetia to pull out of the deal and the agreement was not signed. The core element of the Baden process had been the introduction of a tax system for shipments from Russia through South Ossetia to Georgia in order to diminish smuggling activities. After Baden failed, the OSCE and EU continued to negotiate an agreement if not on reintegration then at the very least on custom controls. This deal was not popular, neither within the South Ossetian nor the Georgian side as it would have cut illicit revenues. Negotiations, however, proceeded until 2002, when then Minister of Justice and later president Mikheil Saakashvili spearheaded the anti-corruption campaign of the Shevardnadze government, and as a part of this conducted large-scale anti-crime operations in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone. Subsequently, Georgian and Ossetian forces started to struggle over on-the-ground control on an intense level.

The second sequence set off with the regime change in Georgia from President Shevardnadze to Saakashvili after the Rose Revolution of November 2003. The new ruling elite under reformer Saakashvili came into power on a wave of massive Western support from the U.S. and Europe. Western demands settled on implementing rule of law by establishing central rule through territorial integration and a crackdown on corruption. Both these goals ranked at the top of Saakashvili’s inauguration agenda. In May 2004, three months into Saakashvili’s term, Georgian interior troops closed down the major smuggling hub the Ergneti market on the border with South Ossetia. Although this action established control to a significant
extent, the conflict however escalated with permanent skirmishes between the Ossetian militia and the Georgian police. When Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs Okruashvili shelled Tskhinvali in a brief and unanticipated operation, the conflict permanently reached a higher level of violence than since the first war ended in 1992. The third sequence started in the wake of intensifying relations with Western actors while the Saakashvili regime slowly settled into power. The Georgian government launched foreign policy efforts promoting peace road maps for settlement of the South Ossetia conflict, successfully gathering support in the international arena through frameworks such as NATO, EU, OSCE and UN. Additionally, in the course of 2005 Western engagement intensified in the conflict zone, through implementing joint Georgian-Ossetian economic rehabilitation projects. However, the Georgian government deemed Western support in territorial integration issues to be too hesitant. In the end of 2005, Tbilisi hardened its stance and installed the alternative Sanakoev administration with authority in the Georgian-controlled areas in the conflict zone, outraging Ossetian JCC representatives and shifting the situation toward assertive policies. Until the 2008 war, international activity in all arenas thrived whereas the situation in the conflict area deteriorated. The recognition of Kosovo and Russia’s commencement of legal relations with the secessionist Sokhumi and Tskhinvali leaderships provided contentious terrain for the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2007 that finally denied accession to Georgia in the mid-term. Four months after the summit, the South Ossetia conflict escalated into war in August 2008.

The previous section has given a background discussion of episodes of political events and violence framing on the basis of the three points of escalation in 2002, 2004 and 2008. It should be reiterated that the purpose of the subsequent account is not to explain actions or motivations of actors, but to plausibly frame why agency came to exhibit the observed effects. Therefore, the study proceeds with the empirical analysis of the
interview material by presenting the study with a narrative analysis of sequences of the Western and local policies in the conflict. It should also be reiterated that the interviews point out contingent events as well as their causal significance, but the interpretation follows on the basis of the previously discussed argument and related working hypothesis of the study. Therefore, in contrast to the background account that elaborated on the local context of events, the analysis of sequences emphasizes Western effects on those events. As discussed above, the account will depict the interaction of Western and local leadership policies at specific points in time and points out which Western policies at which levels of the conflict start and sustain cycles of escalation through triggering a change in behavior of local state leaderships.

The three sequences are based on the analysis of the interview materials (see annex 4). Each sequence is based on interviews and the materials from the OSCE archive (see annexes 1 and 3). The secondary literature is selectively quoted and draws on the sources used in the background chapter. It serves to frame the account of the interviews. The table of events which the interviews account for is included in the annex (see annex 1).

Sequence 1 – 2002

Initial condition: Failure of the Baden process → Change in local behavior: Shevardnadze’s anti-corruption agenda → Escalation: anti-crime operations

Summary. The first sequence began with the failure of the OSCE-facilitated Baden process that was to conclude in the reintegration agreement between South Ossetia and Georgia in 2000 through introducing extensive measures to curb smuggling. After Baden failed, the OSCE and EU continued to negotiate an agreement on custom controls. Negotiations proceeded until, in 2002, then-Minister of Justice and later president Mikheil Saakashvili spearheaded the anti-corruption campaign of the
Shevardnadze government, and as a part of this operation conducted large-scale anti-crime operations in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone. After the subsequent escalation, Georgian and Ossetian forces started to struggle over on-the-ground control on an intense level.

Western integration of Georgia took shape on a small scale at the start of the 1990s, as CSCE and later OSCE became active in Georgia as one of the first Western state organizations on the ground (I 8, I 14, I 1-16, I 5, I 20). The OSCE served as a gate-keeper for the Western actors to follow and as an introductory instrument to implement the conditionalities envisaged by the Western agenda, to promote democracy by establishing rule of law and assisting in solving territorial conflicts in Georgia (Jawad 2008, Koenig 2005). While expectations ran high from the very beginning of their cooperation and rhetoric from the Western and the Georgian sides adopted a grand style, the OSCE adopted a subdued manner and did not externalize funds but worked merely as a political tool of facilitation and observation. On the whole, OSCE’s ‘soft’ entry to Georgia’s political context at the beginning of Western integration tried to ease post-Soviet structures in conflicts, relations and politics into the Western framework, and eventually tried to make the country fit to adapt to Western structures in formal terms.

The most ambitious project in this plan was paving the way to Georgia’s territorial integrity. Functional state structures, it was agreed, required a predictable security setting for livelihood and prosperity, and would be provided if Georgia came to guard its internationally recognized borders with Russia, in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Functional statehood, the OSCE agenda held, was to be maintained through acquiring revenues at the hands of the state to sustain a functional economy (Socor 2005). In the

42 The UN was active in safe-guarding the post-conflict setup in Abkhazia, whereas the OSCE was mandated in South Ossetia, however, both operations were under Russian command. Interviews on the activities of European international organizations at the start of the 1990s in Georgia were held with current and former senior members of the Saakashvili government, the EU Delegation, and the OSCE Mission to Georgia.
case of Georgia this was a far-away reality at the start of the 2000s: Smuggling through Abkhazia, but mainly through South Ossetia occupied up to 70 per cent of incoming goods to Georgia that were cheaper than locally produced ones and that evaded taxation (Kukhianidze 2006).  

As a result, Western partners in the OSCE framework recognized settling illicit trade in South Ossetia as the most sensitive and urgent issue in terms of building the Georgian state. Therefore, the OSCE attempted to encompass the volatile aspects of the post-war situation in South Ossetia, including status, violence, illicit trade and territorial issues as a former member of the Shevardnadze government recalled in the interview (I 29). OSCE engagement, thus, was an integral part of Georgia’s post-Soviet politics since the CSCE had taken over facilitation of political negotiations and military issues in South Ossetia as early as 1992 and later in the JCC framework.

Former senior officials of the Shevardnadze government and a member of international organization confirmed that the OSCE’s focus on settling the South Ossetia conflict fed on close relations between Chibirov and the Georgian administration (I 8, I 14, I 1-8). In 1996, Shevardnadze and South Ossetian president Chibirov had fallen very short of reaching an agreement to reintegrate South Ossetia into Georgia within a broad-autonomy setting (I 943, Koenig 2005). The close cooperation between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali over smuggling revenues and financial perks for Chibirov from Tbilisi resulted in the mutual Georgian-Ossetian interest of low intensity of the conflict throughout the 1990s: The internal border was kept open and formal or informal organizational issues came to be settled between Georgians and Ossetian either directly or within the JCC framework (also see Episode 2). Additionally by 1999, the settlement talks had been enhanced into a broader international setting, with OSCE and EC member states attending the negotiations and backing them up with lobbying and facilitation activities.

43 Interview with a member of the opposition and political analyst in July 2009 in Tbilisi.
End of Baden process

Against this background, the end of the OSCE-led ‘Baden process’ in 2000 created a juncture in Western efforts in implementing territorial reintegration of South Ossetia and setting off a series of events that intensified the conflict until 2002. The process of the Baden talks envisaged framing the settlement of the South Ossetia conflict through gradual integration into Georgia (I 8, I 9, I 14, Koenig 2005). At the center of the agenda, the negotiations envisaged strengthening the capacities of the central state by ending illegal shipments from Russia to Georgia through introducing a free trade zone in South Ossetia (Socor 2005). This practical approach, that initially did not address South Ossetia’s political status, included introducing freight controls of shipments from the North Caucasus by Georgian personnel at the international border between Georgian and Russia. This scheme was to guarantee a minimal degree of Georgian involvement in border control at the Russian border and revenue from taxing the shipments. However, the Georgian and Ossetian sides maintained a cautious attitude toward finalization as the arrangement would have deprived the leaderships of their smuggling revenues. At the same time, particularly the Georgian side had the vested interest to comply with Western demands at least on the surface and show the commitment to fight smuggling (I 8, I 9, I 14, George 2009, Kukhianidze 2006). Therefore, negotiations dragged on. However, the OSCE pushed for implementation, and prepared for signing the result of three years of negotiations at the big meeting in Baden, South Germany in July 2000, with Russian, Georgian, South Ossetian, and North Ossetian representatives.

However, Russia’s second war in Chechnya in 1999 provided the context for Moscow to put an end to the Baden process and reinforce the strengthening Georgian-Ossetian relations. When Putin became acting president in December 1999, he offered but one chance to Shevardnadze by demanding from him to support Russia’s second war in Chechnya and grant overflight and deployment rights to Russian forces south of Pankisi valley on Georgian territory (Kuzio 1995, Proladze 2001, Sikharulidze
2001). Only one month before Putin’s rise to power in November 1999, Shevardnadze reiterated his commitment to Western structures at the 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul (OSCE AR 20/99, Van Santen 2000). Just as Gamsakhurdia before him, Shevardnadze refused to support Putin, with one eye on the Georgian population which would have condemned bonding with Russia over waging war with the Chechen ‘brother nation’ and with the other eye even more focused on the Western condemnation of Russia’s Chechnya atrocities as a current and a former senior member of the Georgian governments indicated in interviews (I 8, I 29). Thus, Shevardnadze refused and ultimately disgruntled Putin. In a direct reaction to Georgia’s refusal to cooperate with Russia on the Chechnya war, Russian representatives pulled out from the Baden deal and urged their South Ossetian counterparts to follow suit. The document that had been regarded as the greatest success in negotiations after the end of the 1992 war was not signed.

As a result, the Western side cancelled the format. However, the OSCE stuck to its approach of focusing on the issue of freight control in order to curb smuggling and strengthen central state authority. However, the following steps revealed a change in strategy as they detached from political issues such as the status of South Ossetia even more than the Baden approach had envisaged. Keeping close with practical more than political issues, the OSCE recovered from the Baden failure and soon organized a working meeting of the JCC Political Expert Group in Bucharest as in September 2001 and a second meeting in Castelo Branco in October 2002 a senior member of the EU Delegation to Georgia emphasized as an important milestone in the process (I 14). The meetings were attended by EU representatives giving credibility to the talks. Particularly the Castelo Branco meeting celebrated the results on establishing joint Georgian-Ossetian customs’ post.
Meanwhile, Moscow followed up on its blow to the negotiations. Though Russia had veto power in the JCC, the Castelo Branco and Bucharest
meetings envisaged the joint Georgian-Ossetian freight controls without participation of Russia on the territory of the South Ossetia region. The implementation of this border regime would have greatly diminished Russian influence on Georgian territory. To keep control, at the end of 2001, Moscow sacked the moderate Chibirov and replaced him with hard-line leader Eduard Kokoity as the de-facto president of South Ossetia, among others a former senior member of the Kokoity administration accounts in the interview (I 8, I 9, I 28, I 29).

Therefore, in the aftermath of the Baden process until 2002, Western policies aimed at building a functional state in Georgia were, on a political level, almost exclusively directed to recovering relationships among the conflicting parties and restoring border authority of the Georgian state. In this respect, the Western agenda put strengthening the central state in Georgia through fighting crime on top of its agenda, over multiple other measures of external state building such as enhancing military capacity, launching large-scale investment, or integrating the state into existing treaties. A local journalist suggests in the interview that before 2002, the brunt of Western engagement in state-building through territorial integrity took place at the local level in the conflict zone (I 2). Western actors continued to address stakeholders in the capital, but the very active, intense part of Western engagement concentrated on bringing together the conflict parties, mostly in Tskhinvali or Gori, but also in Tbilisi or Moscow. Therefore, the OSCE was locally involved in setting up talks, joint projects such as joint checkpoints of the Russian, Georgian and Ossetian peace-keeping forces, joint police patrols, talks on water and power supplies for villages or solving crime issues, the local journalist accounts for in detail, backed by the account of a senior member of the EU Delegation to Georgia who had been in charge of those international efforts (I 2, I 14). Engagement on the international level of Western agency or the level of the capital in Tbilisi was comparably low or non-existent.
After the European-initiated projects of the 1990s had failed in their initial scope, Western engagement gathered pace at the beginning of the 2000s. While the OSCE was still pushing forward border controls between South Ossetia and Georgia, the US, EU and large international state organizations such as the IMF, World Bank and NATO started to show presence in Georgia. This trend was genuinely supported by the Georgian state elite whose efforts to integrate into Western structures were unbridled. With this new and wide range of actors entering, the West’s focus on state-building measures in Georgia shifted from the local, issue-oriented focus of the 1990s to focusing on a capital-centered approach of strengthening the central state in Tbilisi.

Shevardnadze’s anti-corruption campaign

The shift to capital politics became most evident as Western actors more frequently and more stridently addressed the main state actors, uttering expectations, demands and conditionalities more fiercely than in the prior decade. Even before cooperation in defined frameworks took its start, this stance had an altering effect on central state politics. Envisaging a Western-style government in Georgia, the West took to vehemently criticizing corruption levels in Georgia from 2000 as several then active members of advocacy and international organizations recall (I 1-7, I 14, I 11). This stance was accompanied by large amounts of funding for Georgian civil society organizations engaging in democratization and opposing the Shevardnadze regime for embezzling the state budget and upholding a system of corruption that resulted in broad injustice (I 14). In 2002, IMF and Western governments mounted harsh criticism of the lack of rule of law, particularly in regards to corruption and crime levels. Georgian civil society groups at the same time raised pressure on the Georgian government. As a result, the IMF stalled loans to Georgia in 2001 and Western donors threatened to permanently withdraw financial support (also see footnote 14).
In order to secure Western support, Shevardnadze announced a large-scale anti-corruption campaign in 2002 (I 7, l 1-7). The campaign aimed at internally re-organizing smuggling with even better revenues for the state elite, mainly through dividing control of smuggling of gas and cigarettes between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Justice. However, toward Western partners the campaign aimed at staging an ambitious and successful rule-of-law reform to restore trust in the Shevardnadze government.

Anti-smuggling operations

The tide in the conflict turned toward escalation when then Minister of Justice and later president Mikheil Saakashvili implemented a large-scale anti-crime campaign in the area bordering South Ossetia (I 7, l 1-7). The campaign implemented part of the anti-corruption agenda of the Shevardnadze regime. In February 2002, the Georgian Ministry of Defense took command of the Georgian PKF battalions who were under the peace agreement subordinate to the JPKF command and from mid-October, Georgian forces carried out a large-scale anti-crime operation in the region of Shida Kartli with subsequent raids (OSCE AR 16/02, 17/02, 18/02, 21/02). At the same time in February 2002, representatives of Georgian and Ossetian Law Enforcement Bodies were named to jointly head a Special Coordination Center for anti-crime activities in the conflict zone (OSCE AR 03/02).

From then, Ossetian and Georgian forces engaged in anti-crime operations struggling over access and infrastructure across the area. The new Georgian policy overturned the local situation: A mutual spiral of assertive actions on the Ossetian and Georgian sides kicked-off as actions were reciprocated by Ossetian militias and non-regular actions by Peace keeping Forces. Ossetian as well as Georgian forces acted under the same banner of anti-smuggling or anti-crime campaigns. The situation amounted to increased numbers of security personnel, continuous road blocks, arbitrary raids and increased shoot-outs.
**Assessment of Western policies**

Georgian state elites were highly responsive to Western demands as they saw Western policies decisively influencing their domestic power base. The crucial influence of Western policies, therefore, concentrated in the concerted Baden process involving the Russian, Georgian and Ossetian sides to curb smuggling in South Ossetia and likewise introduced a rupture when the process failed. Thus, the state politics of Tbilisi’s elites underwent an alteration at the start of the 2000s. Analysts from local civil society organizations suggested in interviews that, adapting to the new Western conditionalities, state policies adopted an assertive stance and, as a result, brought about an intensification of violence in 2002 (I 31, I 32). Sustaining the argument of the study, Western policies did not *cause* escalation, however, dynamics changed at the very point in time when Western policies introduced a new stance to the situation.

In the aftermath of the Baden failure, the interaction of Western policies with Georgian state agency reinforced the escalation process, including mounting Western criticism of corruption levels in Georgia up to the point when the Georgian government introduced an anti-corruption campaign to comply with Western demands. The double-strategy of the Georgian side also shows in increasing escalative, unilateral activities of the PKF on the one hand, while on the other implementing a joint Coordination Center. Western partners proved satisfied with the Georgian government’s efforts, among them Minister Saakashvili’s high-profile initiative in the conflict zone. Funding to the Georgian state was, as a result, not stalled at any point in time (I 7, I 1-7). However, interviews make it seem this happened when multilateral efforts of Western policies proved not to be successful and Western policies went on to address responsibility for meeting the goals at the level of central state actors in Georgia – practically setting off a unilateral development (I 7, I 14). After the end of the Baden process, the

---

44 This was held to significantly weigh in on the process during interviews with both a local analyst and a former senior member of the Shevardnadze government (I 7, I 26).
Western agenda maintained the same focus of state-strengthening anti-corruption measures (Socor 2005, Jawad 2008), but at the same time mounted the pressure at the national level and hence reinforced local dynamics toward escalation. More specifically, Western policies after the Baden failure shifted from the local to the national level by changing the arena of Western agency from on-the-ground negotiations to cooperation with central state actors. Western-Russian relations at the international level of the South Ossetia conflict were not developed as an arena of agency of the conflict as yet. Following the shift to the national level, Western actors increasingly addressed demands of anti-smuggling and anti-corruption measures to Georgian state actors, in contrast to the prior multi-lateral approach of including the other parties.

In this context, the outline of an ambiguous influence of Western policies on domestic power consolidation showed for the first time within the post-Soviet political context. Prior to the 2002 escalation, Western policies on the one hand stressed democracy-building policies through seeking settlement through extensive negotiation schemes and through enhancing the rule of law by cutting down on crime and corruption. On the other hand, Western policies focused on state-strengthening policies through support of central rule by stressing territorial integrity as interviews with former members of the OSCE Mission to Georgia and the EU Delegation suggested (I 14, I 20, I 4).

Altogether, the analysis of the first sequence of actions finds three characteristics shaping dynamics in this period: 1) Western agency sets off and maintains the cycle of escalation by first, creating the salience of territorial integration policies, second, cancelling the policy in reaction with other stakeholders and third, reinforcing the cycle by interacting to a significant extent with local state elites, 2) Prior to escalation, Western agency changes the arena of agency to a higher level, from the local to the
national arena of the conflict, and 3) A focus on state-centered policies of Western actors prior to the escalation.

The discussion, hence, is set to further look into whether these three characteristics of Western policies might turn out to be generalizable mechanisms of the dynamics of the conflict. The study seeks to further sustain the argument of Western policies triggering dynamics, although domestic power policies or Russian influence hold a significant sway in the conflict. As for Russia’s impact, it is crucial for the dynamics that the Russian intervention ended the Baden process, but did not determine the policies that shaped the subsequent path to escalation. Instead, Georgian elites responded to and complied with the Western policies of state-centered anti-smuggling measures that had laid the foundation of the Baden process and continued to head the Western agenda in the aftermath. Therefore, Russian policies reinforced the trajectory, but are not seen as a cause in the cycle as defined above.

Further, Georgian state elites coped with the demands of Western actors to their own advantage of power consolidation as former senior members of Georgian governments suggest (I 12, I 25, I 26): Shevardnadze reshuffled portfolios within his cabinet so that smuggling revenues appeared to be retracted even more effectively; Shevardnadze’s successful protégé, Saakashvili, gained internal and international recognition through his anti-crime agenda; the Georgian leadership implemented a unilateral stance in the conflict zone at the same time as, in the formal framework, upholding joint Georgian- Ossetian activities in the JCC framework; with the result that the government – though not supported by the international community into a next term – temporarily succeeded in muting Western criticism and gained support.

However, while Western policies offered opportunities for power consolidation, they at the same time put restraints on options for agency in the conflict. Georgian power politics depended to such a significant
extent on Western support that the dynamics after the 2002 Baden failure suggest that Western policies triggered the escalation cycle by decisively curbing local power consolidation opportunities. In this manner, Western policies worked through the power consolidation policies of local state actors whose change in behavior, then, led to escalation.

**Sequence 2 – 2004**

*Initial condition: Regime change → Change of behavior: Ergneti closure → Escalation: Shelling of Tskhinvali*

**Summary.** The second sequence was set off by the 2003 regime change in Georgia from President Shevardnadze to Saakashvili, which occurred with a wave of Western support from the U.S. and Europe. Western demands settled on implementing rule of law by establishing central rule through territorial integration and crackdown on corruption. In May 2004, Georgian troops of the Ministry of Interior closed down the major smuggling hub Ergneti market on the border with South Ossetia. When Georgian troops shelled Tskhinvali in an overnight operation in August 2004, the conflict permanently escalated for the first time since the war ended in 1992.

From the early 2000s, Georgia’s Western partners started to bolster the Georgian state as part of a more developed agenda and thus cast relations in terms of more formalized integration processes. Those efforts granted Georgia enhanced relations with Europe and made an active foreign policy regarding Georgia a more important element of European and American foreign policy.

**Regime change**

Intensified and more focused Western engagement took a key role in the sea change in Georgia’s domestic politics with the turn from the
Shevardnadze to the Saakashvili presidency (I 1, I 6, I 8, I 9, I 13, I 14\textsuperscript{15}, Wheatley 2005, Milcher and Slay 2005, Barbe and Johansson-Nogue 2008, Mitchell 2012). Whereas the new government came into power on a promise of stability, the South Ossetia conflict escalated within months after the change in power presidency (I 1, I 6, I 8, I 9, ICG 2004, Peuch 2004, Fuller 2005, Mayorov 2002, Kolst and Blakkisrud 2008). Western policies engaging in the regime change seem to have crucially set off the cycle that, starting from the Rose Revolution protests in November 2003, triggered the change in local policies that resulted in the closure of Ergneti market which marked the change of local policies to an assertive stance in the conflict.

Whereas the Shevardnadze era had introduced close relations with the West, the regime turned out to be superseded by the very consequences of the intensified relations it had initiated in the first place. In the parliamentary elections of 2003, Western actors, particularly European states but also the US, did not support the Shevardnadze model into another term (I 1, I 6, I 29, Mitchell 2004, Coppieters and Legvold 2005, Wheatley 2005). Instead, Georgia’s Western allies turned to newcomer and ardent democrat Saakashvili who already under Shevardnadze had proven capable of implementing the Western agenda.

From 2000, Western organizations such as IMF, Transparency International and governments to Soros’ Open Society Foundation or the National Democratic Institute had harshly criticized the Shevardnadze regime for lack of democratic rule and had supported civil society organizations working for a change in Georgia. After the post-election protests had taken off in November 2003, Western support played a key role in supporting

\textsuperscript{15} The following section draws on interviews taken mainly with persons with oppositional views to the increasingly unpopular Saakashvili government after the 2008 South Ossetia war. Among those were members of the opposition, but also co-workers of international organizations and two members of former governments now in the opposition. All of these persons had been fierce supporters of the movement that Saakashvili headed to oust Shevardnadze and, in the aftermath, got disappointed by what they felt as undemocratic politics of the Saakashvili government. Therefore the interviews gave vivid testimony of the rise of Saakashvili’s rule.
Saakashvili’s ousting of Shevardnadze (I 1, I 29, Karumidze and Wertsch 2005, Mitchell 2004 and 2012). As Western criticism gathered pace in the years before the 2003 parliamentary elections, Western players consistently addressed the lack of rule of law and high levels of embezzlement and corruption, with a very small proportion of funds spent on the actual target projects (Timm 2012, also see Stewart et al. 2012).

As after 2002, Western allies had lost trust in the Shevardnadze government to be a reliable partner in strengthening state structures in Georgia, Western actors wished for a new elite to spearhead the country’s reform process. Funding, loans and political support for Georgia soared after Saakashvili took power in January 2004. Western agendas of integration into NATO and European structures carved out specific conditionalities linked to this support, specifically aimed at strengthening state structures. These structural changes included: military reform through professional training, reliable chain of command and equipment; economic reform generating sustainable revenues for the state through privatization, regulated import and export flows, and raising the budget through tax collection; investments into infrastructure and construction through transparent procurement and the like (European Neighbourhood Policy - Reference documents 2003 and 2004, NATO Press Releases 2005 and 2006).

In response to Western incentives, when taking power Saakashvili introduced not only a new elite, but also a new code of conduct for

---

46 In January 2004 during his visit in Tbilisi, Powell reconfirmed a payment of 164 m USD to Georgia during the 2004 fiscal year, and allocating 64 m in training and equipment of Georgian troops (Civil.ge 26.01.2004). In August 2005, the US State Department announced the allocation of the ‘Millenium Aid Fund’ of 130 m USD economic rehabilitation, in addition to the regular annual fund (US State Dep 16.08.2005). EU funds to Georgia started in 1991. The EU assistance programme TACIS allocated 131 million Euro to Georgia until the start of the European Neighborhood Policy Initiative in 2006 which includes annual payments of 30-40 m Euro. Implementing the Ljubljana document of November 2005, in June 2006 a donor conference in Brussels pledged 10 m Euro for the OSCE-led joint Georgian-South Ossetian economic rehabilitation programme. On average throughout the post-independence period, the payments amount to 70 per cent of the gross annual state budget.
political life in Georgia. These new ways of power fed considerably on previously existent resources: Fierce anti-Russian rhetoric and a stern pro-Western stance, even more radical than under Shevardnadze, set the agenda of the new elite (Lazarus 2010, Wheatley 2005). The new government proved keen to implement Western conditionalities to their full extent. Centralized presidential power directed the implementation of policies in the capital and in the regions and reshuffled personnel and posts in a managerial manner as a senior member of an oppositional party who had been close to Saakashvili’s allies at the start of his rule recounts (I 6). The Saakashvili elite, from December 2003, almost built a state from scraps. As state structures were weak or non-existent, Saakashvili and a small group of people concentrated power in their hands and managed state-forming tasks almost on their own accord. Reform – democratic or functional – thus turned into a matter of strong state structures first.

On these propositions, Saakashvili both floated into power as well as brought those expectations into office. However, the implementation of a strong, centralized state was crucially realized through the support of Western actors. The new-style politics concentrated power in the hands of even fewer actors as opposed to Shevardnadze’s ‘pyramid model’ (Stefes 2008, Timm 2012, also see Stewart et al. 2012, Sigwart 2006). This left a smaller number of people in de-facto decision-making positions and resulted in a nominal decrease of embezzlement and abuse of public office which was noted and well-received by Western partners. In the same manner, more money was spent on state-related issues such as infrastructure, military expenditures and institutional capacities such as police than under Shevardnadze (Liklikadze 2007, Fuller and Giragosian 2007). The Saakashvili leadership justified expenses with institution building measures and the national right to self-defense. Likewise, policies, and also Western-oriented reform, came to be implemented more quickly and somewhat more effectively which sustained Western support for the new government in spite of democratic caveats.
Whereas the Western agenda prior to the 2003 regime change had focused on state-strengthening measures, Western support of the regime transition from Shevardnadze to Saakashvili strongly emphasized democratic reform: Protests were internationally supported because they abstained from violence and because they followed what were recognized as falsified elections. The new leader Saakashvili was held to put an end to corruption and respect the choice of the people. In this scheme, state-building still was top of the list of Western demands, but this desire was bolstered by strong pro-democracy rhetoric.

In this respect, as much as Western actors’ support of the Rose Revolution was based on the call for democracy, just as in the years prior to the revolution the West’s support aimed at integration into Western organizational structures. The Western agenda was set not only to democratize, but essentially to gradually adapt to Western structures by first establishing functional and capable state structures at the hands of a committed elite. Therefore, Western support first of all centered on the central tasks of the state, such as collecting revenues, guarding international borders, enhancing predictability through preventing war, unfair elections or other instability-raising instances.

Closure of Ergneti market

Against this background, the Western support of the regime change introduced a shift in the behavior of the local elites. Whereas Saakashvili had already started anti-corruption policies under Shevardnadze, the strong Western demands of rule of law which had carried him to power reinforced the necessity to act appropriately and quickly in order to maintain the support of Western partners. Accordingly, when Saakashvili introduced his agenda upon taking office in January 2004, territorial integration of the secessionist regions of Georgia ranked on top of the leadership’s list of reforms (Peuch 2004, Fuller 2005). The day after his inauguration in a joint press conference with U.S. Secretary of State Powell
in Tbilisi, Saakashvili announced a plan to integrate Georgia into Western structures as well as to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity as part of the same process (Civil.ge 26.01.2004, Mitchell 2012). The leadership targeted not only Western, but also domestic support based on nationalist claims of territorial reintegration, just as the previous two post-Soviet leaderships, with Western support reinforcing the claim.

With respect to Western engagement in Georgia, the smuggling hub of Ergneti market interfered with efforts to establish central authority in the region (I 1, I 2, I 6, I 8, I 9, I 10, I 18, I 2947, Kukhianidze et al. 2006, Kukhianidze 2004, Christophe 2005, Wennmann 2004, also see Episode 2). Ergneti market continued to flourish also after anti-crime campaigns started in 2002. The Georgian and Ossetian sides had an interest in gaining control over the flow of goods, or, respectively, to stage commitment to rule of law to Western partners, but the mutual interest of keeping smuggling through Ergneti alive persisted also after 2002 (George 2009, Kukhianidze et al. 2006). It had become a trans-shipment center of goods from the North Caucasus, including smuggling of gas, cigarettes, flour and sunflower seed oil. At the same time, Ergneti provided the basis for small trade between Georgians and Ossetians.

Thus, Ergneti adopted a dual meaning: On the one hand, it ensured contact and relations between the ethnic communities on the ground and maintained movement of people across the border. On the other hand, Ergneti supplied Georgia’s economy with large flows of untaxed goods, and thus supported corruption, incentives for state leaders to uphold the

47 Many of the interview partners mentioned the role of Ergneti market as crucial in the development of conflict. They ranked from senior police officers, regarded as among the most rigid allies of the government, to opposition members fiercely pitched against the government, to political analysts who have conducted research on the ground before the market was closed down. Everybody unanimously agreed that closing down the market escalated the conflict after a decade of relative calm, that alternative measures had not been fully taken into account and that the conflict had taken a point of no return after which it could not have been expected to de-escalate back to the previous level.
status quo and averted state revenues and integration into international trade (I 7, Kukhianidze 2002 and 2004).

Both during Shevardnadze’s and Saakashvili’s rule, central actors in Tbilisi did not meddle in local affairs, ensuring the loyalty of the district administration in Gori by providing opportunities for them to gain from smuggling, and in turn enjoying money transfers and the assurance of general order (Christophe 2005, George 2009, Stewart et al. 2012, Vilanishvili 2004). It was held that unregulated trade via the market was one of the major instruments Russia used to wield influence in Georgia’s affairs. The Ergneti system was the one practical obstacle that prevented building a functioning economy in Georgia.

Therefore, the Ergneti scheme came down to linking smuggling to lower levels of violence in the conflict area, but simultaneously keeping violence confined. As a result, when the Saakashvili elite took power and closed the market, the trajectory toward escalation leapt forward. Envisaging an ambitious process of reform particularly in integrating South Ossetia, in May 2004 the new elite decided to circumvent the dragging JCC format and adopt a swifter strategy. The internal debate was led by Okruashvili’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and the National Security Council under Secretary Bezhuashvili (I 6, I 7).

Okruashvili, an ethnic Georgian originating from Tskhinvali and close ally of president Saakashvili, was said to privately gain from smuggling networks together with new Gori governor Mikheil Kareli and, officially as a part of anti-corruption reforms (Vilanishvili 2005, Papava 2006), Tbilisi installed the so called Financial Police in the Gori region to target smuggling activities (for an account of these activities see Sigwart 2006). Four months after Saakashvili had taken office, Georgian troops of the Ministry of Interior, supported by Gori police, moved into Ergneti in a large-scale operation on May 31, 2004 (OSCE AR 10/04). Troops raided the market in a matter of hours. No casualties or major shoot-outs occurred and Ergneti market closed down for good.
With the Ergneti action, the Saakashvili regime for the first time showed a shift to assertive policies in the conflict. The previous discussion suggests that the operation was the attempt to consolidate power in satisfying domestic, nationalist claims and self-enrichment prospects by way of complying with very specific Western demands with respect to central rule. More specifically, the concrete focus of Western actors on central authority through anti-corruption policies in South Ossetia and subsequent Georgian compliance suggests a key role of Western policies in triggering this shift.

*Shelling of Tskhinvali*

In the immediate aftermath of the Ergneti closure, the imminent intensification of the South Ossetia conflict turned into escalation when Minister of Internal Affairs Okruashvili launched an operation on Tskhinvali in August 2004 (OSCE AR 15/04, OSCE SRs 4, 5, 12, 16). In an unparalleled move since the end of the 1991/1992 war, Georgian troops of the Ministry of Interior shelled Tskhinvali from the surrounding heights. The Russian command of the JPKF threatened to call in battalions of the Russian army deployed 130 km north near Vladikavkaz should Georgian troops advance any further. Okruashvili ended the campaign, but the following day Saakashvili praised Okruashvili’s stealth campaign on TV (RFE/RL 20. and 27.08.2004).

*Assessment of Western policies*

With the regime change from the Shevardnadze to the Saakashvili government after November 2003, Georgian policies in reintegrating South Ossetia changed to a fiercer stance. This change was set off through Western support of the regime change that linked political backing of Saakashvili’s power to the implementation of large-scale state-strengthening reforms. Western demands, therefore, decisively framed the change in local behavior that showed itself in the closure of Ergneti market, an anti-smuggling campaign with the aim of restoring central
authority in the region of South Ossetia. The conflict intensified and in the aftermath escalated when Georgian troops shelled Tskhinvali in August 2004.

In light of the discussion that concluded the previous first sequence, the analysis of the second sequence finds once more a significant reactive instant of Western policy with local dynamics in the context of the 2003 regime change which set off a reinforcing, interactive cycle of Western policies promoting strong leadership and assertive Georgian state policies of territorial reintegration.

Secondly, also similar to the 2002 escalation, the focus of Western agency in the conflict prior to the escalation shifts from the national to the international level. The Georgian government and Western partners already had taken to prepare for settlement plans of the conflict, so called peace road maps that were to be presented in important international frameworks in 2004 and 2005 (in detail see Sequence 3). The focus of Western actors, therefore, was already shifting from the national to the international level of the conflict, with the West granting confidence to the Saakashvili leadership in resolving the conflict without use of force (see the interview references above, among these I 1, I 8, I 14, I 24, I 32, I 33). Hence, after concentration of support at the national level during the protest and Saakashvili’s inauguration, the US and OSCE support Georgian conflict politics at the international level. Therefore, this Western policy performs stronger in 2004 than in 2002 as it changes from the national to the international level as opposed to from the local to the national level, displaying the increasing internationalization of Georgian politics with Saakashvili and showing a more clear-cut shift in spanning localities.

Third, in 2004 it for the first time showed how the paradox of Western policies oscillating between state and democracy-centered policies created an instable context for local agency in the conflict. The link was also evident prior to the 2002 escalation through the fostering of negotiations at the same time as putting unilateral pressure on state actors in Tbilisi.
However back then, the link had been weaker as it envisaged multilateral versus unilateral policy formats. In the context of 2004, the paradox of this Western policy intensifies as it emphasizes on the one hand formats promoting democracy-centered non-use of force and on the other hand directly targets bolstering the state elite (see interview references above: I 6, I 9, I 12, I 14).

Therefore, the analysis of the second sequence suggests that two instances of Western policies trigger instability in the conflict: First, through a paradoxical focus on hard and soft measures at the same time and second, through a superseding, persistent focus on strengthening the state elite. Significantly from 2005, influential Western funding organizations such as the Open Society Foundation cut back their fundings to civil society organizations, which had been a major pillar in strengthening agents of change. This left outside support concentrated on the state level to a much larger extent than before.

However, the discussion pointed out that the Ergneti raid was motivated by the re-structuring of smuggling revenues into the hands of certain members of the new elite. Therefore, a possible explanation could contend that the new leadership used the time window of strong support right after the regime change to as tacitly as possible re-organize flows of assets with assertive measures, with the convenient by-product of establishing central authority.48 The shift to assertive policies, thus, would have been generated through local factors and not through external Western impact.

Nonetheless, the re-organization of smuggling for private gains does not sufficiently explain the shift in local behavior. First, the closure of the Ergneti market would have fulfilled this purpose without the ensuing escalation of violence. The subsequent engagement of the Georgian state is a strong indicator that the leadership aimed at restoring territorial

---

48 Several interviews partners who gave their account of the early phase of Saakashvili’s government suggest this, see I 1, I 6, I 26.
integrity, not only acquiring financial assets. However, another locally-based explanation could attribute the escalation to nationalist, emotionally triggered motives of Minister Okruashvili who was born in Tskhinvali as a close ally of the early phase of the Saakashvili government suggests (I 6). Strong hints that this is not a sufficient basis to exclude the triggering role of Western impact is provided by two further arguments.

Therefore, second, the preparation of the Western-Georgian jointly prepared peace road maps over the summer of 2004 hinted to the necessity to secure Western support in the conflict and that reintegration of South Ossetia, therefore, was at least in part a reaction to Western demands (I 4, I 14). Western policies in the conflict, this suggests, were as a strong a factor for local policies to move in the conflict as locally based demands.

Third, in targeting smuggling activities, the leadership's choice of policies specifically complied with the Western agenda already enumerated in the Baden document. Therefore, the concrete choice of policies, as opposed to, for example, closing the border or striking an informal deal, also might allow the study to deduct the triggering role of Western policies prior to the escalation in 2004 (I 14, I 26, I 31). Western expectations at the point of the regime change, therefore, played a decisive role in augmenting the pressure on the regime to act.

Altogether, the discussion seems to maintain that Western policies not only significantly frame the point in time when the conflict escalated, but also shape local state policies that shift the context toward escalation. In this respect, the three characteristics of Western policies of the 2002 escalation performed in an even more clearly-shaped manner, namely of interaction, shift to a broader locality of agency at the international level, and the paradox of at the same time democracy and state-centered policies of Western agency in the conflict. The conflict, therefore, escalated when these characteristics took effect.
Sequence 3 – 2008

Initial condition: Western support for peace road maps → Change of local behavior: Sanakoev administration → Escalation: August war

Between 2004 and 2006, Georgia implemented an ambitious reform agenda, taking on strengthening and restructuring institutions to eliminate corruption and build efficient state capacities, strengthening the police and military capacities, launching a second privatization reform, reconstructing infrastructure on a large scale, attracting tourism and bolstering Western relations.

While the Saakashvili government consolidated power over the course of 2004, Western engagement stepped up activity. Both negotiations at the international level on NATO and European integration as well as cooperation with the new government on internal Georgian affairs acquired a foothold. With regard to territorial integration, Western support continued to be the focal point in the Georgian agenda it had been since the 2004 regime change. In addition, Western and Russian relations intensified in the 2000s, including in the context of the South Ossetia conflict. Georgia’s NATO process came to be one particular arena of Western-Russian contention taking effect on Georgia’s South Ossetia policies.

Western support for the peace road map

One month after the shelling of Tskhinvali, Saakashvili presented a road map for conflict settlement at the UN General Assembly in New York, envisaging confidence-building, demilitarization and intensified OSCE monitoring, and the autonomous status of South Ossetia in the Georgian constitution (UNGA 21.09.2004, Sigwart 2006). The so-called Peace Plan was part of an encompassing campaign launched by the Georgian government to promote its new course in South Ossetia.

In January 2005, Saakashvili presented the ‘Peace Initiative South Ossetia’ at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe with deepened
aspects of institutional cooperation with South Ossetia on economic rehabilitation and restitution (PACE 24.01.2005). In July, Saakashvili launched an international conference in Batumi, receiving international support for the plan, amongst others from OSCE Chairman Rupel. In October 2005, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli presented the Peace Plan at the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna (OSCE Permanent Council 2005a and 2005b).

The 2005 efforts in gathering international political support in the conflict peaked at the OSCE-launched Ministerial meeting in Ljubljana in November as a member of the Georgian delegation remembered in the interview (I 9, also see: Socor 2005,). The Ljubljana document envisaged an ambitious role of the EU, US and OSCE in establishing a free trade zone in South Ossetia and thereby helping to reintegrate the region gradually.

The peace road maps were a key instrument in the Georgian leadership’s attempt to attract Western support by presenting an agenda devoted to democratic standards of multilateral cooperation and non-use of force in territorial integration. Meanwhile, assertive actions continued on the ground, as an attempt of Georgian forces to hold their current positions as well as to keep open the option of a military solution to territorial integration. The Western partners continued to support the Georgian strategy unanimously, as reaffirmed at a high-level international conference on South Ossetia in Batumi in July 2005 (Civil.ge 10.07.2005, Fuller 2005, Sigwart 2006). In response to the peace plan, the US Mission to the OSCE criticized Russia’s destabilizing role, praised Georgian democratic reforms and commitments and gave its “full and sincere support” (OSCE PC 31.10.2005). In November 2005 the Ljubljana document formalized support of the US, EU, and OSCE for Saakashvili’s government in the framework of territorial integration.

As part of the agenda set in the Ljubljana document, Western policies increased measures to settle the situation locally at the same time as
launching efforts at the international level. Specifically, the document envisaged establishing confidence-building measures between the Georgian and South Ossetian leaderships through launching an “Economic Rehabilitation Program” (ERP) in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict zone (I 1, I 3, I 4, I 8, I 14, I 17, I 20\(^{49}\)). As early as 2004, OSCE officials started to carve out the plan to introduce economic rehabilitation in order to foster cooperation and economic prosperity in the region of South Ossetia and the bordering Georgian-controlled territories and provide for gradual integration of the region into Georgia (I 4, ERP Final Assessment 2009). The plan had significance as it made Georgian and South Ossetian political actors share responsibility for the first time since the end of the Soviet Union. Economic rehabilitation payments had been planned all the while since the war in 1992, but were recurrently held back in a dragging process by either the Russian or the Georgian side – due to opaque procurement processes, distribution policies and general lack of supervision which members of international organizations in charge with closely monitoring the process reported during the interviews (I 1, I 14, CSCE Communication No. REF.SEC/183/95, OSCE AR 05/98).

The Ljubljana document of 2005 finally agreed on the implementation of the ERP facilitated by the OSCE with funding not from the local stakeholders, but from outside donors to go through an elected board with representatives from all sides. The main condition of the ERP was cooperation between Georgia and South Ossetia on the implementation of these rehabilitation projects in the framework of the JCC. In November 2005, the Needs Assessment Study for the ERP projects was conducted, in May 2006 the Ossetian, Georgian and Russian JCC representatives

---

49 The following section is based on interviews mainly with former members of the OSCE Mission to Georgia, but also other international organizations. These OSCE co-workers had been based both in Tbilisi and Tskhinvali and had been part of the intensive process of negotiations between the Georgian, Ossetian, Russian, European and U.S. counterparts before and during the set-up of the ERP. They had also been part of ongoing talks during the implementation of the ERP which namely took place in Tskhinvali and dealt with ad-hoc issues concerning specific projects in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone and, therefore, could give insight into the political aspects of the conflict at the micro-level of decision-making processes.
approved of the portfolio and one month later the European donor countries were informed of the JCC decision at a conference in Brussels (OSCE AR 10/06, ERP Final Assessment 2009). In December 2006, the program started. The projects embraced a wide range of sectors, including agriculture, infrastructure (such as hospitals and roads), micro-economy projects targeted at improving the livelihood of individual citizens, and restoring water, gas and power supply lines.

However, these efforts took place alongside a deteriorating local situation after 2006. Relations soured over spying accusations, overflight and drone incidents on the territory of South Ossetia, shoot-outs in the volatile border regions, import blockades for small trade and sharp rhetoric (OSCE AR 10/06, SR 257/06, SR 297/06). The Ossetian leadership participated in the ERP because they could siphon off funds, while they simultaneously received trainings from the Russian military to prepare for escalation (BBC 10.08.2012). Disruption of gas, water and power supplies along the lines of ethnically divided villages created a continuous bone of contention and displayed the arbitrary attitude of all sides to the process, most of all leaving farmers without irrigation as several co-workers of international donors and organizations observed at the time (I 14, I 3, I 4).

Simultaneously illustrating the tendency of Georgian policies to use assertive measures in territorial integration and Western willingness to comply with it, Georgian police forces restored control in the Georgian-inhabited Kodori Valley in Abkhazia in July 2006 (I 5, I 7, I 9, I 14, I 1-13, I 23, I 25); also OSCE AR 26.04.1994). The operation brought the situation to the verge of war as Georgian forces moved, in breach of the UNOMIG agreement, into Abkhaz-controlled territory on the other side of the

---

50 Interview partners with a very different background raised the events of the territorial conflict over Kodori Valley as an indicator for the state of conflict policies in Georgia. Particularly the July 2006 incident was accounted for by a Georgian opposition member, a co-worker of international NGO and one of the EU Delegation (I 9, I 14, I 23).
Administrative Border Line. Georgian police permanently remained deployed in the area.

The Georgian government declared the defeat of local warlord Kitsovani as the main reason for the campaign and on these grounds received full U.S. support. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew Bryza announced: “So there is a lack of a capability to create the conditions, the secure conditions, free from crime, that allow IDPs to return [to Gali region, Abkhazia]. And what I’m saying now is there was a similar situation in Kodori, where there was lawlessness. In this case, the Georgian government is eliminating the lawlessness and restoring the rule of law.” (Civil.ge 02.08.2006)

Whereas Western actors showed a reluctant stance at the local level, these dynamics were significantly superseded by events on the international and national level. Western actors relied on brittle on-the-ground arrangements while hailing steps undertaken by Saakashvili in the international framework, for instance of UNGA, two months earlier. Instead, Western actors pursued multi-level engagement with their attention and efforts mainly to the international level as the local situation intensified. Western engagement after 2004 in the first place continued to buffer deteriorating effects in the conflict zone by on-the-ground facilitation and stressing non-force measures.

Sanakoev administration

After the launch of the new Georgian agenda from 2004, the reluctance of Western policies translated into passive support of the unilateral stance of the Georgian government and gradually led to a significant change in local behavior in the conflict in the second half of 2006. Amid the volatile situation on the ground, Georgian policies had also been assertive prior to 2006, but had remained restrained after the August shelling in 2004. This however changed when, subsequently, the Georgian government
intensified its initiative to gain control in the conflict both in the conflict area as well as within the JCC.

In October 2006, the newly established ‘Salvation Union of Ossetians’, organized by ethnic Ossetians living in Georgia, announced alternative polls in South Ossetia (I 1, I 2, I 3, I 4, I 8, I 14, I 28, OSCE AR 19/06, 20/06, 22/06). On 12 November, in a parallel move to the elections of the Tskhinvali leadership, the Union held presidential polls in the Georgian-controlled regions of South Ossetia (Civil.ge 12.11.2004). In December, Dmitri Sanakoev was announced alternative president of South Ossetia, whereas Kokoity was re-elected in South Ossetia. Dmitri Sanakoev, former South Ossetian defense minister and a military commander in the first Georgian-Ossetian war, had defected to the Georgian side. The Tbilisi government declared its willingness to formalize the self-declared alternative government (Civil.ge 01.12.2006). Sanakoev’s administration was inaugurated in December 2006, the same month when the ERP projects started. On May 8, 2007, the Georgian parliament passed a resolution formally setting up the administration (I 28). The ‘Sanakoev administration’ took office in the ethnic Georgian village of Kurta, located in South Ossetia, seen as a provocative move by the South Ossetian side.

The Georgian side presented Sanakoev as the official representative of the South Ossetian side to the EU and OSCE representatives of the JCC. Sanakoev announced the non-violent resolution of the conflict and a peaceful unity of Ossetians and Georgians inside of Georgia as his top priority. The Georgian government announced to leave the format if he was not accepted (I 4, I 5, I 8, I 9, I 14, I 34). Not only did Russian and South Ossetian counterparts boycott the new administration (Civil.ge 01.12.2006), but the introduction of Sanakoev into the JCC format

51 The alternative elections on the administration in Tskhinvali was held to be a major turning point in the conflict by several interview partners, both with a local and an international background. They all suggested that this step by the Georgian leadership was strategic, but also willfully provocative.
outraged the Ossetian counterparts. Western representatives feared that the format would lose Tbilisi if they did not comply. Ultimately, Western partners accepted the institution of the Sanakoev administration, on the grounds of not denying the Georgians to establish a body of control of their own on their territory.

In the course of 2007, the situation in the JCC further deteriorated to the point of the JCC format being de-facto cancelled. In January 2008, the Georgian leadership fortified its assertive stance and replaced dovish State Minister for Reintegration Giorgi Khaindrava, the Georgian JCC representative, with the more rigorous Temur Yakobashvili (I 8, I 1-8, also see Sigwart 2006). Georgian representatives under the new State Minister insisted that Western partners, particularly the Delegation of the European Commission and the OSCE Mission to Georgia, did not sufficiently support Georgian demands. Thus, Georgia bailed out of political talks and only the administrative meetings on practical issues continued, including the ERP programme.

As a result, by installing the Sanakoev administration, Tbilisi attempted to swerve a stagnating situation into one with a perspective toward both Western and territorial integration: First, in introducing an alternative administration in South Ossetia, central control in the area was to ensue as a post-factum reality, gradually to be transferred into formalized terms as an oppositional political analyst observed (I 9). Second, several international and local decision-makers suggested that the formal JCC recognition of Georgian-backed Sanakoev as the South Ossetian representative practically coerced Western partners into support of the leadership’s policy (I 4, I 5, I 8, I 14).52

As much as the Georgian side portrayed Western engagement as falling short in supporting Georgian interests, Western policies however

---

52 Also, a background talk with a senior analyst of an EC-funded think tank was held on the topic.
supported the shift to the increasingly assertive policies of the Georgian leadership. At the same time, Western actors maintained the general, all-encompassing conditional policy of territorial integration and central authority. In this manner, Western demands were the constant addressees of Georgian territorial integration efforts. As a result, Western policies, starting from the support of the road maps in 2004, gradually triggered the change in local behavior that installed Sanakoev and undermined permissive options through multilateral formats.

August war

From 2006 until the 2008 August war, the international level of the conflict created a reinforcing spiral with strong Western and Russian involvement in the framework of Georgia’s NATO integration. Simultaneously, assertive policies at the national level were supported by the shaky internal power base of the Saakashvili regime and harsh Western criticism of national politics. In this regard, during 2007 the internal power basis of the Saakashvili regime suffered from strong internal opposition when anti-government protests by political groups and the population that lasted for months. The situation escalated on 7 November 2007, with Georgian military police cracking down on demonstrators (Mitchell 2009, Areshidze 2007, Tatum 2009).

The incident sparked outrage in Georgian society, and solicited sharp critique from Western partners for disproportionate use of force (HRW 2007). This temporarily strained relations with Western partners and, as a senior member of the EU Delegation suggested, put pressure on the Georgian government to restore trust in its democratic capacities (I 14).

However, after 2006, the Western focus on Georgia’s integration into Western structures concentrated at the international level with strong Russian opposition to further Western-Georgian integration. At the local level where OSCE and Russia interacted directly, the relations of Western and Russian actors had deteriorated over the South Ossetia conflict from
as early as 2004. In November 2004, the Kokoity-Zhvania agreement had handed over the strategically important Georgian-held Sarabuki checkpoint in the conflict zone to Ossetian forces (I 9, OSCE AR 21/04). This agreement was a result of Russia’s initiative vis-a-vis Western representatives that raised the Georgian assertive action of closing Ergneti market as worrisome evidence of Georgian aggressive tendencies. Therefore, Russia demanded from OSCE and EU representatives to provide security for the Ossetian population and demanded that they hand over the crucial checkpoint to the Ossetian PKF. The repeated shifts of Georgian policies to assertive measures provided grounds for Russia to push its claims and whereas Western bilateral support of Georgia remained stable, the argument weakened the West’s pro-Georgian stance in opposition to Russia.

By 2008, Western and Russian struggles over a stance on Georgia’s internal politics were taken to the international level. The intensified Western course of Georgia led to Western interference with Russian interests, and therefore not only Georgia increasingly collided with Russia on an international level, but also the EU and US who entered the Russian sphere of interest over the Georgia row (I 29, I 1453, Fischer 2009, Nicol 2008, Allison 2008, Loewenhardt 2005, Asmus 2010). In February 2008, the declaration of independence of the Serbian international protectorate, Kosovo, created a precedent for secessionist entities. Russia disagreed with EU member states supportive of Kosovo’s independence. Disgruntled Russia threatened with consequences for the situation in the South Caucasus conflicts (I 5, I 14, I 16, I 24, I 2954, Aaron 2008, Averre 2009, Cerone 2009, Aaron 2008). Russian officials particularly hinted to the possibility of Kosovo being a blueprint for the South Ossetia

53 In particular international analysts and decision-makers depicted in interviews the arising conflict of European states and the US with Russia by way of a close Western-Georgian alliance.
54 Numerous interview partners emphasized the immediate effect of Kosovo’s independence on the conflict in South Ossetia, especially vivid by a senior member of the European Union Special Representative to the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia (I 24).
case. In the wake of the Western-Russian row over Kosovo, Moscow used the situation to its advantage and established official diplomatic relations with Tskhinvali and Sokhumi in April 2008.

That same month, the NATO summit in Bucharest was to decide over further steps of Georgia’s accession to the transatlantic treaty. Expectations prior to Bucharest ran high, not only in Georgia: Georgia was the most active NATO partner in Europe’s neighborhood, had fulfilled all requirements superbly and had received adequate approval through assessments and NATO officials over the years (I 1, I 5, I 6, I 7, I 9, I 29\textsuperscript{55}). Military reforms had been successful. Political impediments such as territorial integrity were factually disregarded by NATO Secretary General De Scheffer ahead of the Bucharest summit. In a surprising statement, De Scheffer announced that lack of territorial integrity was not a hindrance for Georgia to receive the formal admission to the NATO membership track, opposing critical voices that hinted to the persisting problems with Cyprus’ unresolved territorial status. Whereas the Bush administration vehemently lobbied for Membership Action Plan (MAP) status for Georgia and Ukraine, Germany’s Chancellor Merkel strictly opposed this (I 1, I 29, I 6\textsuperscript{56}, Asmus 2010) as she put forward that Georgia was not ready to join the West in the near future due to poor performance in democratic reform (see the insightful study of Asmus 2010). However, at the time of Bucharest summit Merkel already held the opinion that Georgia was not ready to join the West in the near future due to poor performance in democratic reform (ibid.). However, the Western leaders established that Georgian would eventually become a NATO member and left the question of timing open. Although Germany and France had openly opposed MAP prior to the

\textsuperscript{55} The following account on the impact of Georgia’s ambitions to become a NATO member on the South Ossetia conflict is based on numerous interviews that traced Georgia’s NATO process from the beginning of the 2000s or accounted for an inside view of certain parts of the political process.

\textsuperscript{56} Three interview partners, two senior analysts of Georgia-based think tanks and an opposition member, reported on the perspective of the Georgian leadership on the events on the international level. These accounts frame the following paragraph.
summit, the drop-out was nevertheless reinforced by dynamics on the ground.

The result of the Bucharest summit had closed the door not only for Western integration, but also posed a rebuff to Georgia’s overall political choice to an overwhelming extent: NATO membership had been the one fixed, palpable goal of Georgia’s post-Soviet politics and a cornerstone of security perceptions in the country. Bucharest wiped out all this at once, so the Georgian perception. In addition, the Saakashvili regime was subject to ongoing internal protests and ensuing Western criticism. The inability to reintegrate the territories as initially promised to the population additionally weakened Saakashvili’s power base. The reluctance of Western partners provided grounds for Russia to be reassured in its unilateral, arbitrary stance in fostering secessionism. Therefore, the decision of the NATO summit in Bucharest put a reinforcing impetus to the situation, with the result of escalation (see footnote 14: I 1, I 6, I 9, I 29). As a result, amid the deteriorating dynamics and Russia’s advances to bolster separatism on the ground, Western policies swayed the situation decisively and within four months of the summit the conflict escalated into war in August 2008.

During the first week of August, the situation escalated into war when Georgian and Russian military clashed on the territory of South Ossetia. The war lasted five days and took a toll of several hundred dead, including a high number of civilians (HRW 2009, Asmus 2010, Garthon 2010, King 2008). Russian forces moved into Georgian central territory as close as 40 km from Tbilisi. After a diplomatic intervention by head of the French EU presidency Nicolas Sarkozy, Russian troops retreated, but permanently remained deployed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Assessment of Western policies

Prior to the August war the escalation cycle had been kicked off by Western support for a divisive stance of the Georgian leadership, rooted in
increasingly assertive measures on the ground with the simultaneous promotion of a peaceful settlement in international frameworks. This cycle led to Western policies triggering change in local behavior to assertive policies in 2006 when the Georgian state elite introduced the Sanakoev administration in the Georgian-controlled areas of South Ossetia. After the installation of Sanakoev, Western policies reinforced local dynamics with agency at the international level, especially at the NATO summit in Bucharest. Withdrawal of Western support in the Bucharest summit, for the Georgian elite, meant loss of the power-sustaining prospect of territorial reintegration and helped push the clash between Russian and Georgian military in the escalation of the August 2008 war.

Altogether, Western policies prior to the 2008 escalation confirm the pattern of the previous two escalations in 2002 and 2004 on an even more intense scale. In reaction to the Georgian foreign policy agenda of promoting the peace road maps from 2004 with strong Western support, a wide array of interviews gave the impression that Western policies interacted with policies of local and international actors to the extent of setting off a cycle of escalation (for interview references on this argument see in the analysis above: I 1, I 3, I 4, I 8, I 9, I 14, I 17, I 20). Thereafter, the interaction of Western policies with Georgian, Ossetian and Russian stakeholders gradually reinforced local dynamics toward assertive measures.

Repeatedly after 2002 and 2004, Western policies at the start of the escalation cycle concentrated on the local and national level of the conflict and after the change in behavior shift from there to the international level. In the international context of the conflict, namely through the Kosovo and Bucharest instances as several interviews supported (for interview references on this argument see in the analysis above: I 5, I 6, I 7, I 9, I 14, I 16, I 24, I 29), Western efforts at the integration of Georgia in NATO structures and Russia’s opposing stance reinforced the deteriorating local dynamics that led to the escalation in 2008.
Similar to the previous escalations, Western policies continuously oscillated between stressing democracy- and state-centered policies in the period between 2006 and 2008. The paradox of democracy- vs. state-centered demands addressed simultaneously to the Georgian leadership by Western policies pertained to these dynamics. On the one hand, Western policies promoted the non-violent settlement of the secessionist conflicts, thereby vigorously supporting Saakashvili’s proposals for peace road maps and enhancing the ERP format. On the other hand, Western claims take the form of strengthening central state power in the hands of the government. Here, Western policies, as before, continued to voice demands of crackdown on crime and corruption and economic growth, targeting regaining central control over the breakaway territory of South Ossetia.57

The discussion suggests that local dynamics were crucial in bringing about escalations, but also that the timing of the escalation cannot be explained solely through the local spiral of militarization between Georgian, Ossetian and Russian forces. Rather, Western policies played a key role in creating the necessary conditions for enabling these local dynamics at specific points in time, crucially through supporting the Sanakoev administration and the Bucharest decision. In this fashion, Western policies at these points in time created a vacuum for domestic policy choices in the conflict and put the domestic power base in peril. Hence, Western policies prior to escalations increased the pressure for the local state elite to act and fostered assertive policies as a viable option.

The discussion gives a brief overview of Western policies after 2008 and then turns to the discussion of the empirical findings to conclude the empirical analysis.

57 Several local experts with an accurate scrutiny of events stressed this ambiguity of European and US policies in Georgia (I 1, I 6, I 29). Interestingly, this analysis was rarely shared by members of international organizations. These would more often tend to blame policy failure on inefficient state structures, corrupt decision-makers or an opaque spiral of events (I 20, Sigwart 2006).
Western policies after 2008

In the four years after the 2008 war, incidents of violence in the conflict area considerably decreased. Nonetheless, the risk of escalation has remained high. The situation in and around South Ossetia operates largely on informal arrangements as it is recognized as an independent state only by Russia (Kolst and Blakksrud 2008). Shortly after the 2008 war, Moscow formally recognized the two entities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states and established close ties with their administrations. Also, Russia vetoed the prolongation of both the OSCE mandate in the South Ossetia conflict and the UN mandate in Abkhazia. With this, the presence of the international community in these areas ended, except for access of few humanitarian organizations. The follow-up institution, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), from 2009 has in fact enhanced EU ties with Georgia, but operates only on Georgian-controlled territory and includes the international framework of the Geneva talks to enhance security measures in the conflict zone (Gower and Timmins 2009, Haukkala 2008, Fischer 2009).

When the EU-mediated the cease-fire agreement in 2008 installed the EUMM, Western actors again assumed the role of a facilitator, but without fixed guarantees (NYT 07.11.2008, IIECGS 2009). The West stays involved on the ground and on the central level, but international-level activity concerning Georgia is reduced to the Geneva talks and economic issues of European integration. Thus, just as after the 2002 and 2004 escalations, Western engagement retreated from the international to the national level of the conflict. Thus, Western integration seems to continue, territorial integration left aside. Therefore, in an overall perspective compared to the steady increase of Western engagement on the international level of the conflict from 2000, a sharp decrease in international activity shows after the 2008 escalation. Direct Western conditionalities of territorial integrity have grown more succinct, whereas Western policy unchangingly exhibits
the paradox of those oscillating policies that gave opportunity for escalation in the past.

Therefore, the reality of possible escalation in Georgia remains against the backdrop of Western support in Georgia. In March 2010, the Georgian government reiterated its will to return the secessionist entities peacefully and to start a dialog with both leaderships (Office of the State Minister for Reintegration 2010). Western actors continue to support Georgia, with Secretary of State Clinton speaking on July 5, 2010 of the “occupation” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russian troops (U.S. Senate 11.12.2010) and a resolution of the European Parliament in November 2011 condemned that “Russia continues to occupy the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/ South Ossetia” (European Parliament resolution 17.11.2011). Prior to the Georgian parliamentary elections in October 2012, the EUMM uttered warnings of increased militarization in the conflict zone (RFE/RL 2012).

In light of the previous analysis, therefore, the current situation shows characteristics of a new escalation cycle, particularly with respect to Western characteristic policies. This is even more the case as the characteristics of Western policies prior to the 2002, 2004 and 2008 escalations are not only repetitive, but also intensify with each escalation. The specific findings will be discussed in the subsequent section, including an interpretive summary of the events in the South Ossetia conflict.

3.4. **Empirical findings and model**

The previous sequential depiction and discussion of events leading up to escalations of violence in 2002, 2004 and 2008 in South Ossetia highlighted the particular role of specific Western policies influencing the re-escalation of violence through the effects on local power consolidation of Georgian state elites.
The table below summarizes the results of the specific analytical focus on, first, instances of policies taking place in different arenas regarding levels of agency (local, national or international) and possibly simultaneously and, second, Western democracy- and state-centered policies. Both features have been analyzed regarding their effect on local power consolidation. Therefore, the findings are summarized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sequence</th>
<th>Western Policy</th>
<th>Characteristics at start/ end of cycle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>End of Baden process -&gt; Shevardnadze’s anti-corruption agenda -&gt; Anti-crime operations in conflict zone</td>
<td>-W calls election fraud -W pushes taxing system between SO and Geo -W calls for anti-corr reforms or funding will be cut -W starts NATO integr</td>
<td>Start: loc+dem-state → End: nat+dem-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Regime change -&gt; Ergnet closure -&gt; Shelling of Tskhinvali</td>
<td>-W supports Saaka into power -W supports Saakas democratic agenda -W demands terr integr and central power -W intensifies EU and NATO cooperation</td>
<td>Start: nat+dem-state → End: int+nat+state-dem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Support of peace road map -&gt; Sanakoev administration -&gt; August war</td>
<td>-W starts ERP -W supports Geo peace road maps, wider reforms -W specifies conditionalities -W raises dem reform doubts in Bucharest</td>
<td>Start: loc+nat+dem (ERP), int+dem-state (road map) → End: int+state-dem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Characteristics of Western policies prior to escalations: W (West), dem-state (democracy and state-centered policies, first mentioned performs stronger), loc-nat-int (local, national, international level).

The analysis finds that for all escalation cycles a pattern of reactive interaction of Western policies with other units of agency at the start of the cycle and a subsequent pattern of enforcing effects of Western policies triggering change in local behavior to assertive policies. The table depicts the dynamics of two more characteristics the analysis detected: First, the shift between levels of agency of Western policies from the local or national level at the start of the cycle to the national or international level at the end of the cycle. Second, the paradox of Western policies oscillating between democracy- and state-centered policies, with a clear priority of state-centered policies (territorial integration, anti-corruption, anti-smuggling, central rule, leadership capacity), but the tendency to employ democracy-centered claims and formats (non-use of force rhetoric and
conditionality, negotiations, confidence-building measures, multilateral cooperation) when attempting to raise the pressure on the national level of state elite agency. In addition, the analysis detects that after each escalation, Western agency shifts back to the national level with reinforced state-centered demands.

Prior to the 2002 escalation, the analysis accounts for the failure of the Baden process as the starting point of the escalation cycle when Western policies interacted with local stakeholders at the local level by facilitating this negotiation-based format. Subsequently, Western policies shifted to the national level of governmental politics in Georgia and to addressing state-centered demands of anti-smuggling policies of the Baden format to be implemented by the state elite. The framework of the Georgian government’s larger anti-corruption campaign was identified as the reaction of the Georgian leadership to this and introduced the change in local behavior that gave way to an assertive stance in the conflict through then Minister of Justice Saakashvili’s run of anti-crime operations in 2002. The analysis identified distinctive Western policies addressed to the Georgian state elites that took effect after the failure of the Baden talks: Western actors called significant irregularities in the 2000 parliamentary elections in Georgia; Western actors pushed the introduction of freight controls and a taxing system between Georgia and South Ossetia through the Georgian side within the OSCE; Western institutions demanded anti-corruption reforms and threatened with cancellation of external financing; Western partners intensified the NATO integration process of Georgia. These policies illustrate the increasing demands that Western agency put on the state elite at the national level in the context of the South Ossetia conflict.

Altogether for the 2002 escalation, the table therefore depicts 1) a shift of Western policies from the local level of agency within the Baden format to the national level of Georgian national politics, and 2) a shift from state-
centered policies of territorial integration through anti-smuggling measures within the democracy-centered format of the multilateral Baden negotiations to democracy-centered anti-corruption claims at the national level. Overall, prior to 2002 Western policies shift to a more disaggregated level of agency from the local to the national level and also exhibit features of oscillating between democracy- and state-centered claims with the effect of creating the pressure for Georgian state elites to comply.

Prior to the 2004 escalation, the analysis identified the 2003 regime change to the Saakashvili leadership as the point when Western agency interacted with Georgian actors at the national level to the extent of providing support in the framework of democracy-centered demands of anti-corruption policies at the national level. Subsequently, the closure of Ergneti market posed as the point from which local behavior of the Georgian state elite changed with the result of the shelling of Tskhinvali in August 2004. The empirical account identified the following specific Western policies triggering this change in local behavior: Western actors unanimously supported Saakashvili into power on democracy-based demands; Western actors supported Saakashvili’s democratic agenda of non-violence in conflict settlement and anti-corruption reforms; Western partners demanded establishing territorial integrity and centralized power; Western actors intensified EU and NATO cooperation with Georgia.

Altogether in the context of the 2004 escalation, after the regime change Western policies 1) shifted the field of action from the national to the international level of the conflict, pursuing territorial integration in international frameworks. 2) Western policies exhibited a mix of democracy and state-building policies focused on the national level, particularly stressing enhancing the state capacity of the leadership in order to fulfil democratic standards of eliminating corruption. Therefore, the stress of democracy-related issues during the regime change period shifts to state-formation issues in the consolidation phase such as
establishing central power. As a result, both characteristics perform even stronger than in 2002, as Western policies shift from the national to the international level and as the ‘democracy versus state’ paradox is more visible through the simultaneous demands of non-use of force and territorial integration demands.

Prior to the escalation in 2008, the analysis identified Western support of the South Ossetia peace road map at the international level and the implementation of the ERP at the local level as the democracy-based formats targeting state-centered aims. Subsequently, the analysis identified the start of the Sanakoev administration as the point from which local behavior of the Georgian state elite changed with the result of the August 2008 war. The analysis identified the following Western policies taking effect on local behavior: Western actors supported Georgian conflict settlement proposals und the general reform agenda; Western initiative started the Economic Rehabilitation Programme in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone; Western actors supported the Sanakoev administration; Western actors increased conditionalities for integrating into Western structures; Western actors refused progress on NATO integration at the Bucharest summit.

Altogether, prior to the 2008 escalation, Western policies 1) shifted from a simultaneous track of, both, policies at the international and local level to after the change in local behavior most activity at the international level of the conflict. 2) Western policies shifted from democracy-based formats to foster territorial integrity to omitting territorial integrity and took to stress democracy-centered claims at the international level of the NATO summit. Hence, the two characteristics again performed more strongly compared to the previous escalation, with a more intense reinforcing effect of Western policies on local behavior prior to the escalation, the shift from the local and national to the international level and an extensive paradox of democracy vs. state-centered policies.
To conclude, the analysis suggests that the three characteristics of 1) interaction and reinforcing policies, 2) shifts from the local or national to the national or international level, and 3) the democracy-state paradox of Western policies oscillating between these two properties are instances of the conflict dynamics that lead to violence by triggering change in local behavior to assertive policies at specific points in the process. Therefore, the conclusion of the empirical analysis proposes a causal link between these properties of Western policies and change in local behavior with the result of repeated escalation. The discussion on this basis proposes case-specific generalizations in form of mechanisms of Western policies in the context of re-escalation in South Ossetia. In this regard, the study takes the step to move from specific empirical statements (“The empirical analysis showed that when x happened, then y resulted”) to establishing causal claims (“The empirical study renders the claim plausible that if x happens, then y results”) of violence-generating mechanisms in the South Ossetia conflict:

1) If strong interaction of Western policies takes place in a reactive manner with other stakeholders in the conflict, this contingency starts an escalation cycle, creates a reinforcing dynamic of Western agency in interaction with other stakeholders and leads to escalation.

2) If Western policies a) shift between arenas of activity and b) shift within a cycle to the international level of agency, they provide for the context to shift in favor of escalation, because a) local state elites profit from/are impeded by inconsistent demands of policies to be implemented at the local and national level, b) the interest-based agenda of Western actors generates inconsistent support for either stakeholder in the conflict including the respective Georgian government, c) when a Western policy strategy fails, Western agency changes the arena and puts more pressure on the national level and d) they shift to the more disaggregated, ‘higher’ level of agency at the international level.
3) If Western policies favor state-building strategies over democracy-building strategies, but use of democracy-centered claims to push their interests, they provide for the context to shift in favor of escalation, because a) local state elites make use of enhanced power resources, b) they create the necessity to territorially integrate in order to accomplish foreign policy goals, and c) they create a tension between integrity and non-violence demands that makes assertive local decision-making a viable option.

The previous discussion suggests general causal links that enable re-escalation of violence in South Ossetia. Based on these statements on the role of agency, the discussion seeks to present an inherently coherent, plausible model of re-escalation on the basis of the South Ossetia case. The key characteristic of recurring escalation is the inconsistency of external policies that expresses itself in seemingly contradictory object claims and simultaneous agency at different levels. These properties of inconsistency interact with local agency in the process in a manner that triggers paths to escalation. Therefore, the model of re-escalation in South Ossetia specifies social mechanisms, the most immediate empirical expressions of actors’ attempts to maintain power as they link agency to violent outcomes, and can be presented as follows:
Western policy

M1 Interaction

M2 Level Shift

M3 Object Shift

Change of Local Behavior

a) reactive

national level

state-centered

b) reinforcing

international level

democracy-centered

RE-ESCALATION


The model describes how policies of Western actors translate into mechanisms of Western influence that, according to the study, repeatedly trigger change of behavior of Georgian local state elites prior to escalations. In this respect, the model specifies the link between Western agency and local state policies through three mechanisms, Interaction, Level shift and Object shift. The mechanisms take effect in a stepwise and path-dependent manner from the start to the end of an escalation cycle. In addition to triggering change in local behavior, the mechanisms exhibit a reinforcing effect on local behavior over time prior to escalation.\footnote{\textsuperscript{58} It should be noted that the properties of mechanisms at the end of the escalation cycle are observed to take place after the change in local behavior. This confirms, as earlier discussed, that Western policies take effect only in reaction with and to local dynamics. The graphic highlights the path of the respective mechanisms.}
These mechanisms describe a recurring process prior to escalations enabling the pivotal angle between local agency and violent outcome: 1) The **Interaction mechanism** embraces reactive Western policies progressing to reinforcing policies during the cycle. The mechanism shows how external policies induce a shift in the context of the conflict that starts an escalation cycle. Agency that starts the escalation cycle is of reactive character as it brings about the shift through interacting with the other involved agents. In contrast, as the escalation proceeds, external policies are much more resilient to interaction with other agents to the extent of still being affected by their actions, but not amounting to the contingency of creating another shift. Rather, events following the initial condition at the start of the cycle are of reinforcing character intensifying the course toward escalation, 2) the **Level shift mechanism** embraces a shift of Western policies from the national to the international level during the cycle. The mechanism shows how external policies at the start of the escalation cycle take strong effect at the national level of policies and shift to the international level of the conflict at the end of the escalation cycle, often after the change in local behavior took place. However, external policies engage permanently at all levels of the conflict, but with a regularity of these varying intensities, and 3) the **Claim shift mechanism** does not proceed in a linear way and exhibits democracy- and state-centered policies simultaneously, however, with a tendency toward democracy-centered policies when exhibiting increasingly reinforcing effects. The mechanism shows how external policies generally emphasize a state-centered agenda at the start of an escalation cycle and induce democracy-centered policies to push claims at certain points in the process. Hence, both agendas are put forth simultaneously, but with varying intensity at the start and end of the escalation cycle. Therefore, the analysis suggests a paradox of agency. However, what seems to be an ambiguous property of Western agency appears to be a compensating mechanism of Western agency aiming at preventing risks posed to power consolidation of local actors at various levels. In other terms, whereas the
paradox pressures local actors and creates instability, the policies are carried out with the intention of stabilization. Therefore, the paradox of Western policies shows that practice they prohibit assertive action on the one hand, while on the other hand demanding a quick settlement of the conflict in view of Western integration and, second, of supporting leadership capacities in order to fortify central power on the one hand, but on the other hand strengthening a regime with a volatile power basis and potential for assertive policies.

Interestingly, the specific policies of both Western and local agents do not exhibit significant variation throughout the period. Western agency repeatedly shows the same inconsistencies, whereas local actors pursue a unilateral agenda and utilize the makeshift paradox. This suggests that whereas structural conditions throughout the period of analysis change (such as the locality of agency, the shift to a state-centered character, and increasingly framed agendas), however, agency follows the same mechanisms. In other words, the amplitude or intensity of the mechanisms increases, but their character remains consistent.

In this respect, Western policies seem to repeat a consistent pattern in an increasingly intensifying manner. They stabilize the logic of sudden local shifts and marginalize potentially consistency-generating factors. Part of this is that Western actors do not and cannot alter stakeholders’ claims: The general escalative tendency of the conflict is given at any point in time after the situation turned violent in 1989 through persistently assertive policies of Russian, Georgian and Ossetian actors. The worsening reality of external influence of Western agency for the case of the South Ossetia conflict lies in providing the incentive for the situation to shift. In other words, incentives for an assertive stance of Russia, Georgia and Ossetia remain equally high or become higher under Western influence. Western policies do not provide assurance, but feed the local legacy of insecurity – of agency and contextual outcomes.
To conclude, the causal link established at the start of the study is supported: Throughout the period of analysis, Western policies repeatedly affect local power politics to the extent of shifting the conflict’s context toward escalation. The following and last chapter discusses the findings in light of existing theories and embeds them in the state of research. Then the chapter will discuss the findings empirically on the basis of the conflict contexts in Sri Lanka and Kashmir.
4. Discussion of findings

The following chapter presents the discussion of the findings of the study, in both a theoretical and empirical context. First, the discussion reflects existing research on mechanisms of violence, uses selected research to frame the findings and shows the generalizing outreach of the mechanisms proposed for the South Ossetia study. Second, the discussion reflects the empirical outreach of the findings in light of the contexts of the Sri Lanka and Kashmir conflicts.

4.1. Theoretical scope of the findings

The literature review at the beginning of the study already stated two important shortcomings of research in the study of violence: On the one hand, existing research grapples with the phenomena of violence at a theoretical level and often fails to define a cogent explanandum in the face of empirical reality. Existing studies attempt to address forms of violence, types of agents of violence or levels of intensity. However, studies frequently fail to provide a rigorous definition of the process of violence at the center of scrutiny. Explanations differ greatly depending on whether violence is at its onset or part of a protracted, ongoing conflict process (see the discussion in chapter 2: Beissinger 2000, Cederman et al. 2010), a shortcoming which requires research to get stronger on relating rigorous scrutiny of the dynamics of violence to their underlying triggers.

On the other hand, existing research struggles on a methodological level to identify the underlying triggers of the dynamics of violence and the respective mechanisms of processes of violence. Research rarely encompasses the process of disaggregating factors before presenting them in aggregated theoretical models (Balcells/ Kalyvas 2010: 416). Particularly, research disregards the specific properties and processes of agency in the context of struggles for social power that catalyze violence (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 347, Mahoney 2000a: 514). In this, scholars suggest to look at the functioning of state agency to span the gap between meta and
macro processes of violence (Cederman et al. 2010: 3-4, Wimmer et al. 2010: 89, also see: Hedstroem and Swedberg 1998).

Specifically, studies of mechanisms of violence often center on instances of non-state violence such as mass civilian uprisings and riots (see above all: White 2006, Horowitz 1985), insurgency violence (Weinstein 2007, Wood 2003) or genocide, terrorist attacks or other forms of collective violence (Lemarchand 2009, Martin et al. 2009, Collier and Sambanis 2003). These studies do not establish an outreach from micro level findings to macro level outcomes as they center on change of behavior at the micro level of motivations with the result to engage in violence at the meta level of forms of agency (Tarrow 2007: 593, also see: Weinstein 2007, Covington 2002, McCauley et al. 2008, Branch and Wood 2010). Therefore, mechanisms as aggregated, repetitive forms of agency leading to violence are either not the subject of study or are treated as black boxes, as explanatory instances whose functioning remains opaque (Mayntz 2005: 207, also see: Fearon 2000). Tarrow concludes it to be "ambitious enough" to seek to identify mechanisms of violence at the onset of civil war and continues: "But identifying the operative mechanisms is even more daunting when we turn to the process of escalation, for example, how and when nonviolent protest and low levels of violence escalate into civil war. Sambanis [Collier and Sambanis 2003] observes that such transitions are poorly understood” (Tarrow 2007: 595).

This discussion highlights the seminal work of Tilly, McAdam and Tarrow (2001) on social mechanisms of violence to frame the findings of the study on South Ossetia. In drawing on Tilly et al.‘s mechanisms and a few other helpful studies (see above all: Kalyvas 2006, Tarrow and McAdam 2003, Levitsky and Way 2010, and Mansfield and Snyder 2007) that specify mechanisms of external agency’s effect on local power consolidation in fragile states, the discussion highlights the possibilities of enhancement and gains for the study of violence. Other studies rarely address the
findings of Tilly et al. in a comprehensive manner. Rather, research treats the work as one example of research of violence (see for example: Sambanis 2004, Levy and Thompson 2010).

The 2001 study of Tilly et al. is a rare instance of rigorous scrutiny of a variety of mechanisms of violence using the methodology of case study. As such, the research highlights specific mechanisms of social agency of political elites for different phases of the escalation process. The study grounds mechanisms in the aggregating property of power-seeking agency and local actors’ attempts to utilize the conflict context to their ends. Therefore, considering existing studies of mechanisms of violence, the study of Tilly et al. poses in two key aspects an exception to the general shortcomings of the debate that, moreover, connect their study to the explanatory outreach of the South Ossetia findings: First, the level at which Tilly et al. look at violence moves beyond micro-meta level research and creates a link between agency and outcomes. Agency, in their study, takes the role of a pivotal, if unintentional determinant link between actors’ agendas and the outcome of escalation. In addition, the study links relational factors of interaction between actors to the macro level to explain violence and encompass agencies as environmental factors of violence. Hence, mechanisms can identify categories of actions and specific sequences of actions that frame the path to escalations. Those studies that use the theoretical gains of Tilly et al.’s research systematically mainly draw on the micro-meta connection of mechanisms of beliefs, values and identities bringing about motivations of agency in the context of violence (for this see: Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Lamont and Molnar 2002). This fails the theoretical challenge to address the meta-macro level link that Tilly et al.’s mechanisms propose. Moreover, Tilly et al. acknowledge that violent outcomes are closely linked to leaderships’ attempts to consolidate their power resources. In this respect, Tilly et al.’s study can support the South Ossetia findings in that Western agency performs as a dynamic, interest-based albeit structural property that triggers local behavior in
relation to the violent outcome. Second, the study of Tilly et al. distinguishes itself in how it aggregates patterns of violence as part of a given process. The study envisages forms of agency in relation to their function in the process, e.g. whether they puncture, reinforce or show reactive patterns in the trajectory toward escalation. This favorably connects to the findings of the South Ossetia case as generalizing mechanisms across cases solidify reliability, but generalizing mechanisms within the same case facilitates understanding if and how mechanisms change over time. Lastly, we have to take note that the South Ossetia study focuses on mechanisms of external policies that initiate change of local behavior, but the Tilly et al. study centers on local mechanisms of violence.

The study of Tilly, McAdam and Tarrow includes mechanisms that are utilized by local elites during different phases of the escalation processes. Out of these, particularly the brokerage and the object shift mechanism take effect during all phases of escalation and aggregate multiple, more fine-tuned mechanisms. Therefore, brokerage and object shift turn out to be key mechanisms in processes prior to escalations of violence and are seen as complementing the findings of the South Ossetia case. The following table lists Tilly et al.’s mechanisms in relation to other relevant research findings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilization</th>
<th>Brokerage</th>
<th>Object shift</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social appropriation</td>
<td>Attribution of threat and opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Re-) Formation of agenda</td>
<td>Category formation</td>
<td>Certification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scale shift (Tarrow/ McAdam 2003)</td>
<td>Category formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leverage (Levitsky/ Way 2010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linkage (Levitsky/ Way 2010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bridging the local-global gap (Kalyvas 2006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interaction (Sigwart)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turning point to escalation</td>
<td>Radicalization</td>
<td>Identity shift (also Kalyvas 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level shift mechanism (Sigwart)</td>
<td>Convergence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Claim shift mechanism (Sigwart)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Mechanisms of violence during three phases prior to escalation

153
Tilly et al. include social appropriation among mechanisms during the phase of mobilization, which accounts for the mobilizing role of social localities and actors where social capital and potential agents concentrate (e.g. in churches or mosques, at public events etc.) and which can be seen as brokering resources through locality. Further, attribution of threat and opportunity describes the process of the invention or importation and subsequent diffusion of a shared definition of concerning alterations in the likely consequences of possible actions which, through arbitrary alteration of claims, performs similarly to the mechanism of object shift (92 ff., in detail discussed below). Falling last, in the mobilization phase is brokerage, the linking of two sites, units or actors through a broker (142), a mechanism through which political organizers draw disconnected factions and localities into a common front (155). Functions of brokerage are also reported when local political actors seek to consolidate power by bridging the gaps in the locality of agency between national and international level (Kalyvas 2006: chapter 2), when the process of scale shift “through which contention at one level is transposed to a higher (or a lower) one” takes effect (Tarrow and McAdam 2003: 2), or through leverage and linkage that describe how close ties between local regimes and Western actors might generate (non-)democratic outcomes (Levitsky and Way 2010: 15ff.). For mechanisms during the formation of actors’ claims and resources (155), Tilly et al. likewise account for brokerage and, moreover, category formation which performs through an aggregating function similar to brokerage and creates identities through unifying separated populations. Importantly, Tilly et al. list object shift, the alteration in relations between claimants and objects of claims during which actors alternate their claim making among international actors, national authorities, and local targets, with corresponding shifts among repertoires, rhetoric, and categories (ibid.). certification in this phase of escalation which catalyzes the legitimization of actors taking shape centrally, both in international response to national regimes and domestic (re)validation of national actors. Lastly, Tilly et al. list for mechanisms during turning points of
conflicts (161) as well brokerage, and furthermore, identity shift, when actors adopt changed group perceptions in reaction to the process or interaction with other actors, leading to altered motivations and actions. This mechanism supports the process of object shift when identities change throughout processes as they are re-negotiated and, ultimately, result in reshaped actions and policies and, consequently, have an impact at policies at different levels of the conflict (Balcells/ Kalyvas 2010: 427). Radicalization, according to Tilly et al., is the during the escalation process increasing contradiction between prevailing claims across the boundaries between two actors, and convergence, the ‘radical flank effect’ of radicalization through increasing contradictions to drive less extreme actors into closer alliances.

According to Tilly et al.’s study brokerage and object shift appear to be the most effectual mechanisms of escalation. Altogether, mechanisms of external influence linked to escalation seem to chiefly evolve around a) locality of agency and actors’ claims and b) points in time when taking effect. As a consequence, specific functions of the brokerage and object shift mechanisms appear in the South Ossetia case. Therefore, the empirical findings enhance these mechanisms as theoretical concepts that explain different phases of escalation processes.

The South Ossetia findings point to mechanisms taking effect in two different phases that successively occur and shape the trajectory toward escalation: First, the (re-)formation and implementation of the Western agenda in the period from the start of the escalation cycle before change in local behavior occurs, and second, what Tilly et al. describe as the turning point to escalation, the period between change in local behavior and escalation when Western agency exhibits reinforcing effects in the aftermath of change in behavior.
a) Before change of local behavior: The (re-)formation and implementation of the Western agenda:

The study of Tilly et al. regards brokerage as the least obvious, but most influential mechanism in several cases studied (Tilly et al. 2001: 254). The overarching function of brokerage is demonstrated by aggregating different forms of action through which political actors aim at unifying resources to gain the means to consolidate power. Brokerage can be observed during all phases of escalation, but in the phase of (re-)formation and implementation of the Western agenda, the efforts of brokering advantageous settings perform strongly and thus give particular impetus to the process. As such, brokerage connects carriers of claims such as agents or localities of agency (Tarrow and McAdam 2003: 12, also see: Kalyvas 2006, Tilly et al. 2001). At this point, external policies in the South Ossetia case exhibit specific functions of how brokerage enables drawing together resources for action.

In the South Ossetia case, the interaction mechanism specifies how specific functions of Brokerage take effect from the start to the end of the escalation cycle. Particularly prior to change in behavior of Georgian state elites, Western policies exhibit a pattern of influence on local behavior over an extended period of time spanning months or years. Linkage, meaning close ties with Western actors, turns out to draw stakeholders of the conflict at the start of escalation cycles into cooperation formats of negotiations in 2002 and of intense political and financial support in 2004 and 2008 through Western actors. After change in behavior to assertive policies, linkage persists through close ties in the course of the escalation cycle, but subsequent policies affect local behavior in a reinforcing manner as opposed to changing the trajectory. In addition, level shift of Western agency combines resources of influence on local politics at different levels between which Western actors shift. This means that Brokerage during the formation phase of Western agency prior to escalations can take the specific function of the Interaction and Level shift mechanisms through spanning extended periods of time, drawing local actors into close ties
through cooperation formats and intense political and financial support, determining a reinforcing trajectory through, in a further function, drawing together efforts at different localities of agency simultaneously, with a tendency toward the international level.

In addition, during the run up to the escalations in South Ossetia in 2002, 2004 and 2008, leverage of Western influence also appears to take a specific function of the brokerage mechanism. The leverage mechanism holds that the stronger the local regimes’ bargaining power, the lower Western leverage or, respectively, effect of Western influence on local behavior (Levitsky and Way 2010: 28). After 2004, Western actors intensified conditionalities which contributed to the unilateral, anti-Western stance of Georgian state actors. This culminated in the installment of the Sanakoev administration in 2006, which the analysis identified as the turning point to assertive policies. Indeed, the policies of Georgian state elites in the conflict repeatedly show low Western leverage: Local policies reflect a stance independent from Western demands, as well as Western agency shows reticence toward local assertive tendencies. Levitsky and Way maintain that leverage rarely translates into effective democratizing pressure (2010: 29) as Western powers usually allow regimes to escape sanction: “Even in sub-Saharan Africa, where Western leverage is greatest, scholars have found no positive relationship between conditionality and democratization” (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997 in Levitsky and Way 2010: 30; also see Crawford 1997, Lawson 1999, Ethier 2003).

However, Levitsky and Way study democratizing, not state-strengthening policies of Western actors. In this respect, the South Ossetia study reflects high Western leverage vis-à-vis state-centered policies. Whereas the unilateral, strong bargaining stance of the Georgians in the case of Sanakoev demonstrates low Western leverage regarding democracy-centered policies, it simultaneously proves high Western leverage
regarding state-centered policies, as the Sanakoev administration is the larger response to Western policies in the JCC framework to establish effective state control over Georgian territory. This also relates to the other heavy-handed state policies of the Georgian side in conflict matters in 2002 or 2004, since the underlying claim of Western agency invariably proved to be state-centered.

Therefore, leverage in the South Ossetia case proves to be a function of brokerage, since Western actors will employ democratization rhetoric and promote related policies even when state-centered aims are at the center of the agenda. Western agency, thus, brokers resources by bridging the seeming gap between democracy and state-centered policies, particularly prior to changes in local behavior, to the end of pushing their claims and with the result of reinforcing escalation.

Also prior to change in local behavior, object shift exhibits specific functions in the South Ossetia case. Categories in forms of claims that had been introduced as main stakes in the process at the point of initial condition generally do not appear to change until after the change in local behavior shortly before escalation. Western actors will employ both democracy- and state-centered policies throughout the cycle. However, in their implementation they will focus on strengthening state capacity and utilize democracy-centered claims, particularly non-use of force, when exerting political pressure on local actors to fulfill demands of state capacity. After change in local behavior, democracy-centered demands additionally reinforce the escalation trajectory. Therefore, both categories, anti-corruption as state-centered and non-violence as democracy-centered, are employed from the start of the cycle. In this respect, categories such as anti-corruption measures for the purpose of state strengthening will be stressed throughout the cycle, but even more they will be backed up by implementation of respective formats and institutions. In contrast, the non-use of force demand banks more on
situational (though repetitive) use of rhetoric than on agency informing rules of behavior.

b) After change of local behavior: Before turning points to escalation

The functions of brokerage serve a different role after the change in local behavior has occurred. During (re-)formation of the Western agenda, brokerage specifically serves bolstering power resources to take effect on the local level. When dynamics turn to escalation, brokerage exhausts its aggregating effect of unifying resources to implement policies. Instead, brokerage is still in effect, but Western policies prove inconsistent and diffusive by switching both levels and claims. The phase of unifying resources seems to have concluded. Instead, the brokerage mechanism takes a negative, disaggregating function: Western policies shift the locality of agency to a different arena of the conflict, moving to the international level instead of concentrating activity on one level.

Prominently within the South Ossetia study, before the 2008 escalation, Western policies addressed the conflict context at the level of the NATO summit in Bucharest, reinforcing the escalating trajectory. In 2004 after the closure of the Ergneti market and amid the escalating trajectory, the West concentrated on supporting President Saakashvili’s peace road maps at the international level. In 2002, the OSCE scheduled work meetings on combating smuggling in Castelo Branco and Bucharest while the Shevardnadze government launched anti-smuggling operations in the conflict zone. In all these instances, Western policies disaggregated resources they had focused at the national or local level prior to change in local behavior and henceforth addressed actors at different levels simultaneously, albeit mostly at the international level. In this, brokerage is still intact before escalation as Western agency spans sites, units and actors, but in a disaggregating, negative function. As a result, ‘negative brokerage’ seems to be an attempt to preserve power in reaction to the changing context of escalation, a pro-active policy of raising Western
actors’ stakes in dislocating from an assertive context and reinforces escalation by triggering instability through inconsistence.

According to Tilly et al., object shift occurs during the phase prior to change in local behavior when actors gather resources prior to escalations. However this study found that object shift also plays a prominent role in shaping the process after change of local behavior to assertive policies. Particularly, claim shift as a specific function of object shift shows that the closer the shift of local behavior in time, the more Western policies shift their stress to democracy-centered policies (while keeping their focus on state-centered policies), arguably to solidify their position from which to influence local policies in the conflict context. Western agency alters claims and rhetoric through shifts between addressees at international or national levels, for instance addressing the NATO summit in Bucharest while enhancing local cooperation in the ERP. Even more significantly, Western agency performs through shifts in claims or forms of claims in how political actors change claims, how claims are asserted or how different actors are addressed by the same claim at different points in the process. This includes conditionalities, re-negotiated stakes, shifts in categories or change in rhetoric. Within the same conflict process, Western actors appear to accommodate this switch in rhetoric of claims with a reinforcing effect whenever escalation approaches.

c) After escalations

As mentioned earlier, both level shift and claim shift are active also after escalations when a) Western policies switch their focus back to the national level, b) tone down on forcing demands through democracy-centered claims (though they permanently play a crucial role) and c) turn to state-centered policies. However, studies of dynamics of violence look at the onset of violence, at escalations as singular phenomena or at the duration of violence instead of systematically studying re-escalation processes.
Therefore, the mechanisms of this study 1) need to be regarded as properties that at least take a crucial part in triggering re-escalation of violence, not only repeated escalation under similar conditions, and 2) introduce the post-escalation period as an additional phase of violence to the study of dynamics of violence. This period deserves special scrutiny as it exhibits specific functions of mechanisms not existent in other phases, such as the return to the national level and alteration in claims, and as it opens the path to a renewed escalation cycle. Research has to systematically consider that, in re-escalative systems of violence, after the escalation is before the escalation. Therefore, mechanisms that take effect after escalation are likely to be part of and eventually lead to re-escalation.

Lastly, this discussion does only links the functioning of mechanisms to specific phases of escalation, but also allows establishing a more specified concept of external agency. First, the discussion suggests that the seeming paradox of simultaneous democracy and state-centered policies works as a compensating mechanism of Western power claims in response to perceived risks to power resources. Prior to change in local behavior, Western actors try to achieve implementation of their agendas by employing both tiers of democratic and state policies. Western policies never lose focus of either democracy and state-centered claims and policies, but take the identified form as they employ both claims. Oscillation between both strands (which creates the paradox) serves to consolidate the Western stance and destabilize the local context during the extended process prior to escalations. Therefore, the clear switch to a stress of democracy-centered claims before escalation and the clear switch to a stress of state-centered policies after escalation reasonably explains the significant role the ‘democracy vs state-claims paradox’ plays for consolidating Western policies.

Second, the South Ossetia study focused on mechanisms of external policies that initiate change of local behavior. This makes an important
distinction to the works of Tilly et al., Levitsky and Way, Kalyvas, and Mansfield and Snyder as these studies center on local mechanisms of power consolidation in and through violent contexts. However, mechanisms of external actors overlap significantly with local power mechanisms. Western actors to a large extent utilize the same mechanisms to influence the local context as local power actors utilize to consolidate their power basis. The difference in conditions of external agency can be presumed to derive from lower commitment through lower levels of legitimization pressure (Schlichte 2009, first version 2007: 199ff., also see: Toft 2003), access to different resources and different use of resources such as IMF or EU conditionality policies (above all see: Crawford 2000), and different cultures and practices of politics forming agendas (Goodhand and Walton 2009: 313).

However, the similarities of external Western mechanisms of influence with local power mechanisms, such as aggregating resources, utilizing different strategies of deterrence or coalition-building, identity formation mechanisms or employing rhetoric and specific formats of action, are striking and should be taken into account. Like local actors, external actors pursue interests through (however differently tuned) power policies. Domestic and external state actors follow and are subjected to a state-centered agenda of state formation in their states of origin and outside in different arenas. Additionally, Western actors equally underlie re-negotiation of identities, interests and alliances as they are part of the same conflict process as local actors.

The findings of the South Ossetia study have been generated through tracing of plausible causal links prior to escalations. In generalizing the findings to contexts of violence of other countries, the discussion therefore looks at key decision points in these conflict processes. The following discussion, though refraining from an in-depth study, examines the contexts of the Sri Lanka and Kashmir conflicts and discusses the role of
Western policies prior to turning points to escalation in those conflicts in light of the South Ossetia findings.

4.2. Empirical scope of the findings

To reflect the mechanisms identified in the South Ossetia case and deepen the theoretical gain for further research, the discussion chooses the conflict contexts in Sri Lanka and Kashmir to provide a basis for discussion of the South Ossetia process. Sri Lanka grapples with a violent secessionist conflict in the north, characterized by periods of low-intensity violence and escalation since the 1970s, with strong incentives for domestic elites to engage in violence (Goodhand and Walton 2009: 304, also see: Korf 2005, Selby 2008; for an overview of the Sri Lanka context see: Rösel 1997, Kreuzer and Weiberg 2005, Uyangoda 2008, Nieto 2008). Kashmir has been experiencing uprisings for self-determination since the 1940s and is a continuous hotspot of violence since the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, with US policies exerting a strong influence on the Indian agenda in Kashmir (above all see: Mohan 1999, Habibullah 2004, for an overview of the Kashmir conflict see: Mohan 1992, ICG 2010a, Wirsing 1994, Schofield 2003). Both conflicts are subject to strong outside interests, including India and the Indian state of Tamil Nadu in Sri Lanka and India and neighboring Pakistan in Kashmir. Western actors also pursue their stability agendas in these territorial conflicts, the US in cooperating with India, but also with Pakistan on Kashmir whereas in Sri Lanka the US and a wide range of European actors are present.

The contexts of the South Ossetia, Sri Lanka and Kashmir conflicts are similar in features such as dynamics of re-escalation, territorial disintegration of the central state through and ethnically framed conflict and significant levels of Western engagement.\textsuperscript{59} It is to be expected that

\textsuperscript{59} The selection of these two conflicts is a result of the author’s review of secondary literature available on these cases. However, other conflict contexts would meet similar criteria, for instance Lebanon or East Timor (Zahar 2005, Murden 2000, Sahin 2007, Glassman 2003, Wade 2002).
similar features of domestic power consolidating behavior regulate dynamics in the conflicts and that external policies affect on power consolidation opportunities in this context. The characteristics of the Sri Lanka and Kashmir conflicts, therefore, offer opportunities to identify patterns similar to the South Ossetia case. Power mechanisms of local state behavior can be expected to be similar across conflicts which provides a basis for generalizing the findings of the South Ossetia case (Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 431). Similarly, George and Bennett (2005: 81-82) and Imig and Tarrow (2001) point to the importance of establishing comparisons of similar cases with different contexts or environmental conditions, but similar outcomes. Voronkova argues, "This perspective is likely to produce more convincing arguments when they are shown to be associated with similar and/or divergent outcomes emerging under diverse conditions across different geographic regions" (Voronkova 2011: 14).

This discussion, however, refrains from systematic comparison, aiming instead at identifying plausible linkages across cases. On this basis, the reflection of findings in an empirical context might enable an insight into how mechanisms of Western influence play out in processes of violence beyond the single case study. As such, the added value of this discussion lies in accounting of the Sri Lanka and Kashmir contexts with regard to links of external and domestic policies that seem likely to have significant effects on local power behavior in the contexts of the conflicts. If it is possible to show plausible common external-domestic effects similar to the South Ossetia findings by way of illustration in these empirical contexts, the general scope of the mechanisms can be sustained. Further, the discussion expects the mechanisms to be presented in these cases, but anticipates that they will show variations in their impact. Similarly, if it is possible to offer plausible reasons for why the functions of these mechanisms might differ between cases, it will enhance the range of interpretation the findings offer and widen the scope for further research. The conclusions of this however brief empirical discussion will point out
links for further and in-depth research, also on the basis of the above theoretical discussion.

The section is set to loosely discuss the relevance of the three mechanisms identified in the context of the South Ossetia conflict for the Sri Lanka and Kashmir contexts: First, the Interaction mechanism of early reactive patterns of Western actors with their counterparts and later reinforcing interaction patterns; second, the Level shift mechanism with Western policies shifting between arenas of activity, after which providing for the context to shift in favor of escalation; and third, the Claim shift mechanism when Western policies during the run up to escalation gradually increase stress on democracy-centered claims to push their state-centered agendas and thereby providing for the context to shift in favor of escalation. In the South Ossetia context, these mechanisms can be plausibly traced to when Western policies impact on local power consolidating opportunities in specific ways. The following discussion accounts for possible similarities of local power consolidating behavior of the Colombo and Delhi elites in reaction to Western policies in the contexts of the Sri Lanka and Kashmir escalations.

The following discussion will consecutively take account of the Sri Lanka and Kashmir conflicts and the links between external policies and repeated escalations. For each conflict the text discusses the chronologies of violence by accounting for similarities of their dynamics, local power setting and external Western influence with the South Ossetia case, locates if possible the respective mechanisms, and lastly provides for plausible explanations for similarities and divergences.

**Sri Lanka**

The following account, first, gives a reading of the process of violence, depicting how power consolidation of Sri Lankan local elites played out in the conflict context and how external engagement, particularly of Western actors, evolved over time. Then, the Sri Lanka account will conclude with a
reflection on the special role of Western external influence for the
dynamics of violence, taking specific examples of Western policies and by
identifying possible links with the mechanisms.

After gaining full independence from the British Empire in 1948, Ceylon,
renamed to Sri Lanka in 1972, started to develop a local elite (for this
period in the modern history of Sri Lanka see: Roesel 1997, Uyangoda
2008, Shastri 2005). During colonial rule, competences and participation
among ethnic groups, particularly between the majority Sinhalese and the
Tamils being the second largest ethnic group of Sri Lanka, was divided
along and cemented through administrative structures, legislative
regulations and territorial divisions. When colonial institutions broke open,
the new Sinhalese ruling elite sought to consolidate power by establishing
ethnic majority rule, based on Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism (Weiberg
2005: 9).

As a result, access to resources such as property and land became
gradually regulated through the patronage rule of the two Sinhalese
majority parties Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and United National Party
(UNP)\(^6\). The Sinhalese agenda called for massive settlement policies in the
Tamil-populated north (from 6 per cent Sinhalese in the 1940s up to 25 per
cent in 2001), made Sinhalese the official language and Buddhism the
official religion and, established a centralized structure in 1972, the latter
consolidated in the 1978 introduction of the presidential constitution. In
addition to marginalizing the Tamil and Muslim minorities, these shifts
spurred an inner-Sinhalese struggle (on the factors of inner-Sinhalese
conflicts see: Smith 1999). Both political parties, alternatingly in power
since independence, pursued a centralized, elite-oriented power structure
without distributing power to local Sinhalese party representatives. In
1990, the central state de facto lost control over insurgencies by the

---

\(^6\) The following backdrop of modern Sri Lankan history is mainly based on the insightful
radical Sinhalese movement of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna – People’s Liberation Front (JVP) in the south (ibid.: 24).

Altogether, the process of violence in Sri Lanka from the late 1970s underwent four main cycles of escalation, punctured by extensive negotiations and by power oscillating between the major Sinhalese parties (above all see: Kreuzer and Weiberg 2005, ICG 2010c, Shastri 2005). Externally, India’s influence served as a destabilizing force and Western engagement established increasing influence at the same time as violence escalated into war.

In the first phase of violence from 1983, the separatist Tamil military group Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) launched a war against the central government of Sri Lanka, aiming at establishing an independent Tamil state in the north of the country. Previously in 1976, intensifying violence and political tension had culminated in the formation of the LTTE. In 1987, with violence showing no sign of abating, the Sri Lankan government signed an agreement with India to deploy a peace-keeping force. This resulted in a further three-year engagement with the LTTE until Indian troops retreated, leaving the country in a worse state than before. The second phase of violence started in 1990, when fighting between the government and LTTE escalated again. Fighting acquired a new quality: In 1991, the LTTE was implicated in the assassination of Indian Premier Ghandi and in 1993, Sri Lankan President Premadasa was killed in an LTTE bombing. This surge of violence considerably deepened the rift in Tamil-Sinhalese relations. Meanwhile, the LTTE continuously gained military and political strength through diaspora and Tamil Nadu support (on the diaspora support for Tamil Nadu see: Zunzer 2004, ICG 2010b). The third phase of violence as of

---

61 India’s short performance underlined its ambiguous role, supporting alternately the central government and the LTTE. Delhi’s access to Sri Lanka leads through the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu and often through the preferences of the local administration there. India’s engagement should be seen as an inconsistent set of strategies of a regional stakeholder that, while different from the role of Russia in the South Ossetia case, nevertheless reinforces local tensions (Iyer 1988, Ganguly 1995, Smith 1999: 18-20).
1994 continued with the Sri Lankan army suffering considerable losses. Later that year, President Kumaratunga rose to power on the promise of bringing peace, vowed to end war and opened peace talks with the LTTE. In 1995, peace talks failed with the LTTE sinking two naval crafts. Amid intensifying violence in the end of the 1990s, in 2001, Kumaratunga was re-elected into a coalition with UNP, then with opponent Wickremasinghe as Prime Minister (on the domestic power struggle within and via the formal institutions see the study of Shastri 2002). Until 2002, the war continued at an intense level, taking place in the north and east of the country, reaching the capital through suicide and other bombings, including an attempt on the life of Kumaratunga and the destruction of half the Sri Lankan air force at a bombing at Colombo airport (ICG 2010c). In February 2002, the second attempt at peace talks opened with the government and LTTE signing a Norwegian-mediated ceasefire agreement. Peace talks wound down when the LTTE withdrew from the negotiations in 2003, with the first suicide bombing since 2001 in Colombo in 2004. In the fourth and to date last phase, violence gradually escalated into war from January 2008, ending with the full military defeat of the LTTE, dismemberment of its leadership and control of the north by the central government in May 2009.

Throughout these points of escalation, local power trajectories reinforced the dynamics and laid the ground for Western policies’ influence at those decisive points. The devolution of power, a core part of the constitutional reform tabled in 1995, aimed at calming the north and east of the country. However, the government utilized the judicial procedure to re-allocate power to Sinhalese bodies and Sinhalese-controlled territories (see Smith 1999). In 1996, the constitutional reform was voted down in parliament. The plan failed because the Sri Lankan elite nonetheless gave priority to the military solution, the LTTE was not given equal leverage in negotiations (Weiberg 2005: 33-34) and the autonomy arrangement offered through the devolution plan was too limited to be accepted by the broader section of Tamil groups (ICG 2006a: 1).
The plan played a key role during and immediately after the election period in 1994 as a part of the peace package that brought Kumaratunga into office. However, nationalist Sinhalese groups did not support devolution (ICG 2006a: 6, Smith 1999: 26-28). The subsequent refusal of the devolution scheme by radical Sinhalese constituencies are credited with bringing about the loss of the incumbent government in the 2004 elections much more than the government’s unsuccessful performance in the peace process. The plan came to be refused once more in 2006. (Glasius and Kostovicova 2008: 94, Goodhand and Walton 2009: 321, also see: Bastian 2006, Kelegama 2006). Ropers et al., therefore, maintain that the core issue of violence in Sri Lanka is the inner-Sinhalese struggle over power distribution, and the conflict with the Tamils in the north is the side stage of this conflict where those tensions are escalating (Ferdinands et al. 2004: 14). Yet, throughout 1994 and 1995 violence continued simultaneously with the constitutional efforts and even intensified, giving reason to assume that the political solution was never considered a serious alternative to the military option (ICG 2006a: 4). Therefore, the inner-Sinhalese political landscape impeded non-assertive policies.

This discussion supports the central argument brought out for the South Ossetia case as the domestic landscape proves to be the key factor of state elite’s ability to maintain power and leaderships’ policies in the conflict build a major part of their power basis. The following discussion shows how the triggering effect of Western policies can be seen to affect on conflict dynamics through their impact on local power policies.

This trajectory of local power struggle perpetuated through Western involvement when the devolution plan was rejected in parliament in August 2000, again amid intensifying violence in the north. Until 2000, external engagement of Western actors had remained at a low level. The new round of talks took its start on massive initiative of Western actors (on the international process see: Weiberg 2005). Moreover after 2002, Western actors, most of all the US, EU, the UK, Germany, Japan and World
Bank, for the first time became directly engaged in the negotiations (Goodhand et al. 2011: 14). Starting from 2000, Western engagement aimed at taking influence on the process of violence through conditionalities linked to negotiations and funding and herein, intensely aiming at taking influence on the central government’s policies in the conflict. From the initial discussions of a constitutional reform to decentralize power in the mid-1990s, Sri Lankan elites started campaigning in elections to settle the conflict through talks. A pattern of local policies evolved that established ongoing military action against the LTTE with negotiations simultaneously taking place. Western actors, particularly in the context of Norway's mediation initiative in 2002, linked continuing funding to continuing negotiations (Uyangoda 2009).

At the point of intensifying Western engagement, Kumaratunga faced yet another election round, first presidential elections in December 1999 and then parliamentary elections in October 2000. Amid a weak record, Kumaratunga feared losing the vote (on the analysis of this period in Sri Lankan domestic politics see: Shastri 2005). At this stage of the process, the continuation of violence had become profitable for both sides. Particularly, the government sought to divert attention from the poor economic situation and allegations of fraud against Kumaratunga, which could come up into focus in case of an end of the war (see Weiberg 2005). Instead, the government renewed the offer of peace talks in the end of 1998, just prior to elections while prolonging the military campaign. Kumaratunga suffered a setback in the 2001 parliamentary election and had to go into coalition with her UNPF political opponent Wickremasinghe who headed the new government as Prime Minister.

However, talks only started from 2000 when Western engagement was solicited by the Sri Lankan government (Weiberg 2005: 40, ICG 2006a: 5). The peace initiative was led by Norway and co-chaired by Japan, the US
and India. The EU had a lesser coordinating role, but was a main financing party together with the UK and Germany. The funding parties brought out conditionalities of payments by linking continuing payments to ongoing peace talks, most bluntly expressed in the emblematic World Bank statement of February 2003, ‘No talks, no money’(Weiberg 2005: 49).

Nonetheless, Western support was focused on the government and international engagement largely marginalized the LTTE, pushing it to give up terror tactics, whereas the government enjoyed leverage despite open use of force and severe human rights violations (HRW 2012). At the same time in 2002, the US opened negotiations with the government on a defense agreement to allow US military access to Indian and Sri Lankan territories, simultaneously stepping up pressure on the LTTE. Analysts continued to assess the government to pursue the double strategy of upholding talks to attract international funding and political support for regaining the north and remaining in power, whereas the military campaign continued (Goodhand and Walton 2009: 311). Western policies, thus, had created close ties with the government, which enabled the western agenda to table conditionalities.

The pattern of Western policies further reinforced local dynamics. From 2001, the Wickremasinghe government pursued the economization of the conflict by introducing economic development and making fighting irrelevant by transforming the north in a flourishing region through and for the means of the business entities that had supported the government during the elections (Goodhand and Walton 2009: 308). The LTTE withdrew from the talks in April 2004, citing exclusion from meetings with international donors (ICG 2006a). The LTTE leadership broke from peace talks as their possible gains seemed minor in an internationally-driven process that favored state actors over non-state actors (Uyangoda 2009). Also in 2004, the government decided that intense international

---

62 EU engagement surged in the context of the Tsunami disaster in 2004 when joint EU efforts became more visible, more institutionalized and funding volumes and readiness outdo other parties (Glasius and Kostovicova 2008).
engagement was not in their interests as it was not believed that there could be a political solution without a military victory (Uyangoda 2008). The Wickremasinghe government lost the elections of 2004 when they lost the support of Southern radical constituencies, whereas the newly elected Rajapakse government moved away from seeking legitimacy through Western support and focused on domestic support through nationalist goals and the financial support of non-Western actors. However, the government sought to avoid Western criticism by launching yet another round of peace talks in 2006 whilst continuing the military campaign. By 2007, Germany, the UK and the US reacted by suspending particular development-related funds, but overall support continued. From then, violence spiraled into the war of 2008 that resulted in military victory of the government.

Goodhand and Walton (2009: 310) list major points of criticism of Western engagement during this period as, first of all, being too closely engaged with the government leading to de-facto support of assertive policies (also see: Lunstaed 2007) and, along with this, an overemphasis on structural management of the peace process whilst turning a blind eye on real-life events of simultaneously mounting violence. In this respect, Goodhand and Walton indicate instances that embed Western agency in Sri Lanka with its characteristics in the South Ossetia context.

Western influence in Sri Lanka’s conflict context displays the pattern of triggering shifts in local dynamics at decisive points in the process, particularly in cooperation with the government in 2001 and 2004. This impact seems to be possible to take effect, as in the south Ossetia context, through Western agency’s intense sway over local leadership’s power interests. This particularly showed when the Rajapakse government in 2004 took a distance from Western support to secure their domestic power basis. Goodhand and Walton hold that Western engagement triggered ambiguous effects when the same policy was received in
different ways: When military support or funding is provided, the Western actors might intend to push attached conditionalities of non-violence, but various local actors only see de-facto support for the governmental military line and the central state (Goodhand and Walton 2009: 314), a pattern similar to the South Ossetia case when local dynamics are reinforced through Western support held to curb Russian interests.

Against this backdrop, Western engagement in Sri Lanka, very similar to South Ossetia, proved “incoherent” when actors linked aid to violence (Goodhand and Walton 2009: 312-314). Western donors, for lack of a consistent strategy, started to work “around” conflict, meaning partially and temporarily withdrawing funds, but not suspending other budget lines or political support (Goodhand 2011), creating inconsistencies similar to the shifting policies of Western agency in the South Ossetia context.

As a result, the Sri Lanka characteristics translate into similarities with mechanisms identified for the South Ossetia case. First, Western policies proved inconsistent through switching claims during periods of risk of violence. In a striking similarity with the South Ossetia context, the major impact on local behavior seemed to occur through inconsistency between democracy and state-centered agendas of Western actors addressing the Sri Lankan government. Furthermore, Western actors opted for pushing the central state through substantiating democracy-related issues such as non-use of force. Further, the imperative of non-use of force, however pursued inconsistently by Western actors, caused a backlash at the local level through mobilizing radial constituencies and the military against the government. Second, Goodhand and Walton list that Norway’s double role in the peace process as both facilitator in the talks and as monitoring party on the ground impeded a clear-cut Western policy in the political process. Similarly in the South Ossetia process, the same Western actors that implemented conditionalities for the post-Soviet Georgian leaderships at the national level, implemented policies outdoing those conditionalities
during negotiations at the international level. Third, the account gives indications that Level shift might have played a role in creating inconsistencies: Apparently, donor and political decisions are taken outside the country in Western capitals, such as at the UN or World Bank headquarters.

Here, an in-depth analysis would have to show which Western policies specifically played out prior to escalations in Sri Lanka, and how Western policies progressed prior and after change in local behavior. With regard to Level shift, it should be detected which policies took effect at which level prior to escalations. However, the account suggests that Interaction in its reinforcing function, Level shift and Object shift play decisive roles in the context of escalations of violence in Sri Lanka.

**Kashmir**

After the end of British rule in 1947, the region of Kashmir\(^{63}\) accessed to India and the first war between India and Pakistan broke out over control of the region. The Muslim-majority Kashmir, from 1957 by its own constitution a part of India, became the most contentious issue between Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan with two of the three Indo-Pakistan wars (the first in 1947, the second war in 1965) being fought over Kashmir (see for example: Ganguly 2006, Lamb 1991). In 1962, India fought another war over Kashmir with China (see Schofield 2003). In 1965, the special status of the region of Jammu and Kashmir was established in the Indian constitution under article 370, erasing large parts of its autonomy allowing India to ban laws or call emergency rule (Schofield 2003: 121-126).

\(^{63}\) Kashmir denotes a larger area that includes the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir (the Kashmir Valley, Jammu and Ladakh), the Pakistani-administered Gilgit-Baltistan and the Azad Kashmir provinces (Azad Jammu and Kashmir, AJK), and the Chinese-administered regions of Aksai Chin and Trans-Karakoram Tract. The subject of this account, however, is the Indian-ruled state of Jammu and Kashmir.
The dynamics in the Kashmir conflict follow the continuous struggle between India and Pakistan for control over the region, with India maintaining its nominal status. Violence also includes internal Kashmir struggles of Muslim groups opposing Indian rule or the Kashmir administration with the aim of accession to Pakistan or independence. However, much of the conflict’s dynamics is shaped by the ongoing regime consolidation of India’s and Pakistan’s state elites which overcasts and influences local power struggles (ICG 2003a: 4). The unresolved conflict over Kashmir is often assessed to be the one main obstacle for India to consolidate as a state (Mohan 2006: 20).

Indian state elites maintained a Hindu-oriented nationalism to legitimize the strong-hand approach of maintaining rule in Muslim-majority Kashmir. Therefore, India’s non-recognition of post-colonial Pakistan and Pakistan’s support for Muslim groups in Kashmir, fueled Indian nationalist claims over Kashmir (see for example: Ganguly 1995 and 1996). The Western agenda is largely represented by US influence on Indian state politics, also on Delhi’s Kashmir agenda, and to a lesser extent on Pakistan. External influence in the Kashmir conflict takes place mainly through the U.S. and to a lesser extent through Europe. Some ties of India with France and the UK exist, but have marginal influence in the context of Kashmir politics (Mohan 2006: 25).

Internal politics in Kashmir largely hinge on the application of article 370 in India’s constitution (ICG 2002: 6, on Kashmir’s domestic politics also see: Lamb 1991, Ganguly 1997). The article is the most important means for Delhi to maintain control in Kashmiri affairs. The special constitutional status as a measure of autonomy rule guarantees local elections in Kashmir. Violence regularly breaks out during the pre-election period due to the fueling of sentiments through Pakistan and insurgent movements seeking to break from Indian rule, both playing on ethnic lines. Indian authorities are quick in calling a state of emergency on the basis of article 370 when the situation during the election period destabilizes. This situation grants Delhi full military and legal powers in Kashmir. Therefore,
Kashmir’s special status is less a provision of autonomy, but more an instrument of territorial control through the Indian central state, utilizing lines of ethnic conflict for the purpose of central control. Therefore, the special status increases Kashmiri nationalist sentiments and furthers Pakistan’s irredentist claims in Kashmir.

After the second Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, Kashmir’s status was de-jure fixed as a part of India. In the aftermath, there have been five major phases of escalation, including: first, the 1984 conquering of Sichen Glacier region by the Indian army; second, the 1990 killing of protesters by Indian troops, marking the start of the Kashmir insurgency uniting large strands of the otherwise ethnically divided population; third, the 1999 Kargil war between India and Pakistan in the Kargil district of Kashmir when Indian troops between May and July aimed at pushing back Pakistani troops that had infiltrated the Indian-administered part of Jammu and Kashmir; fourth, the 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in New Delhi, bringing Pakistan and India to the brink of an all-out war; and, fifth, the May 2008 escalation over the transfer by Indian authorities of forest land in the Kashmir Valley to the Hindu Shri Amarnath Shrine Trust.

In 1984, the conflict in Kashmir reached its first escalation point after India’s victory in the third war with Pakistan in 1971 (ICG 2003b: 5-6). Following the war, India had observed an all-control line as opposed to reconciliation. This claim extended to internal politics in Kashmir with heavy rigging of the 1972 elections and subsequent Srinagar governments following a loyal pro-Delhi course. The situation reached a tipping point when in 1984 the Delhi-critical Minister Farooq Abdullah was dismissed. Abdullah’s dismissal was widely held to have sparked the beginning of the Kashmir insurgency (ICG 2002: 6). Also in 1984, Indian troops took the disputed Siachen Glacier in a military action that defeated Pakistani troops in the area (ICG 2006: 4). The taking of Siachen Glacier – including the following dispute over the glacier that continued as of 2012 – and the
heavy-handed approach in Srinagar politics were a display of India’s all-out attempts to consolidate power in its disputed north.

The situation had been strained with Pakistan supporting militant groups and with civil uprisings against the government, when in 1990, Kashmir governor Jagmohan’s orders caused the shootings of demonstrators (Schofield 2003: 143-154). From 1995, the situation between Kashmir resistance and Indian central rule was exacerbated by India systematically using militant groups for counter-insurgency strategies (ibid. 158-163).

Throughout this tense trajectory in the 1990s, the United States took up the pattern of distinctly supporting the Indian line of consolidation through force in Kashmir under the Bill Clinton administration (Mohan 2006: 20). Generally it must be noted, that external influence in the Kashmir conflict continuously took place at the national level of Delhi politics, in contrast to the South Ossetia context where Western actors were present at the local and international levels prior to escalations. US support for India, thus, focused on state politics at the Indian national level and on non-proliferation and confidence-building measures in the military framework with Pakistan. In 1998, Washington refused an active mediation role in Kashmir and also refrained from supporting a referendum on Kashmir’s status (Ganguly, R. 2001: 312 and 318; Thakur 1992: 165-82).

Against this backdrop, in 1998, the year prior to the Kargil escalation, the United States’ external engagement was continuously focused on supporting the national level of India’s state policies and on sending dismissive messages to Islamabad, as opposed to taking action on the local level of the conflict. The 1999 Kargil war started when Indian troops pushed back Pakistani troops and Pakistan-backed militants infiltrating the Indian-controlled side of the Line of Control (LoC). Strong US backing and international support for India continued and condemned Pakistan’s actions during the war. The border clash ended only after intense US mediation over fears of a nuclear conflict (ICG 2002: 10) and Pakistan
withdrew its troops following the personal intervention of President Clinton (Ganguly 2006: 47-48).

During the Kargil dispute, all major parties in India, including the opposition, agreed to point to Pakistan’s backing of terrorism in order to attract US support for India (ICG 2003b: 13). Similar to the South Ossetia or Sri Lanka contexts, Western external influence concentrated policies at the national level instead of the local level. Therefore, and similar to South Ossetia and Sri Lanka, the Indian state elites seemed to follow the stance of external policies in implementing their line in the conflict. In attempting to direct US pressure toward Pakistan, Indian state politics look to the US approach in centering on the international level instead of the local level of the conflict. In other words, the side of India or the US did not initiate or support direct cooperation with domestic actors in Kashmir, but, rather, the international-level politics of the Kashmir conflict provided for use of violence of the Indian local state elites.

The Kargil war ended after a two-month campaign in July 1999. Even though the Kashmir insurgency had already been abating from 1996, overall violence in Kashmir further increased, mainly due to the reorganization of militant groups in Pakistan (ICG 2003b: 6). In the wake of Clinton’s South Asia visit in 2000, Delhi attempted to solidify relations with the United States by taking action in Kashmir. India stepped up counter-insurgency actions in Kashmir in order to convey a message of counter-terrorism strategy and at the same time released leaders of the Kashmir independence movement (Ganguly, R. 2001: 324). Whereas engaging in local politics through this moderate stance can be seen as an inclusive, pro-democratic move, India at the same time intensified the counter-insurgency and thus directly contributed to increased violence in Kashmir. Hence, it seems as though India’s Kashmir policy was more focused on keeping US support for Delhi’s actions than on ending violence in Kashmir.
Therefore, India’s policies, similar to the South Ossetia and Sri Lanka contexts, turn out to simultaneously implement a pro-democratic, liberal peace agenda and to impose central rule through force. Whereas in Kashmir, in contrast to South Ossetia and Sri Lanka, external engagement through Western agency and in particularly the US was non-existent on the local level, the Western agenda pervasive in the other cases did have an impact in Kashmir. The Western stance, nevertheless, appeared to be implemented indirectly through the local policies of India, just as in the cases of South Ossetia and Sri Lanka, even though Western actors were not involved on the ground in Kashmir.

The 2001 escalation of the terrorist attacks on India’s parliament were considered to be a result of the prior, misled Kashmir policies of both Pakistan and India (ICG 2002: 5-6). International condemnation of the attacks put pressure on Pakistan to end its support for terrorist groups. In the years after the attacks of September 2001 and the change from the Clinton to the Bush administration, the United States continued to tighten their relations with India promoting anti-terrorism alliances. To stress this, in 2005, Bush and Indian Premier Singh signed a nuclear pact that allowed India, with the backing of nuclear power, to pursue an even more self-assured line in Kashmir (Mohan 2006: 24-25).

After the nuclearization politics of the mid-2000s, the overall trajectory of the Kashmir conflict persisted, with Indian local rule holding strong in Kashmir and escalations of violence both on the local and the national level. In the escalation of May 2008, the Indian government transferred Kashmir territory to the Shri Amarnath Shrine Trust, a Hindu religious site. This provoked anger among Kashmiri Muslims, led to violent street protests extending over months, and to a breakup of the ruling coalition in Kashmir. As a result, once more so-called ‘Governor’s rule’ was imposed with police killing several protesters (ICG 2010a: 4). The contention over

179
the land row led to the break between the Valley on the one hand and Jammu and Ladakh on the other, adding to the internal divide of Kashmir.

Altogether, the account suggests that one major difference in triggers of violence in Kashmir lies in the structure of external influence, largely diverging in crucial aspects from the Sri Lanka or South Ossetia contexts. This, together with strong indications of the same mechanisms at work as in South Ossetia, gives further insight into their functioning. On the one hand, dynamics in Kashmir are pinched between the two great powers of Pakistan and India, but without a greater power pressuring the smaller central state via its territorial divide. Interestingly, dynamics of violence still seem to be decided on the national level of the conflict with cooperation of the Delhi elites with US foreign policy. For instance, the massive Mumbai terrorist attacks of November 2008 could be seen as one of the arenas of the Kashmir conflict that continuously mars relations between India and Pakistan.

However, the ‘great power’ stand-off in Kashmir seems to coincide with very little direct involvement of Western policies in the conflict, at the local level, and in Western restraint in initiating negotiation formats or providing funding. Western policies, nevertheless, seem to play a decisive role in the dynamics when influencing on local power politics of Indian state elites. Importantly, the Western state formation agenda including its focus on central state support still plays out on the ground. Even to a greater extent than in South Ossetia or Sri Lanka, the Western agenda seems to be adopted and translated by the central state elites in the conflict context and to the effect of triggering violence on the ground. Western influence in this respect seems to work through the formalized legislative setting of the special status and the dispute with Pakistan over territorial integrity in which the Western anti-terrorist agenda interferes. Furthermore, on the national level Western policies play on both a democracy and a state-centered agenda, which aggravates the conflict. This particularly showed in
2000 when, as a result of the Clinton policy, Delhi simultaneously stepped up assertive and permissive measures at the local level, striving to generate legitimacy from their Western partners.

However similar to the Sri Lanka context, an in-depth analysis would assess which specific external policies induced escalations on the ground in Kashmir. Analyses should look not only to US policies toward India, but also to the dynamics of India-Pakistan relations. In addition, in-depth analysis should reveal how Indian interference in Kashmir affairs leads to local escalations, not only focus on post-escalation Indian intervention once violence has flared up in Kashmir. From specific Indian policies and their points in time analyses can deduce how Western policies, most of all with regard to Claim shift, affect escalations.

*Mechanisms of violence in South Ossetia, Sri Lanka and Kashmir*

Both the Sri Lanka and the Kashmir conflicts show striking similarities with mechanisms of external Western policies in the context of dynamics of violence in South Ossetia. The three conflicts are similarly set in their re-escalation dynamics of intra-state territorial disputes linked to ethnic groups claiming self-determination after independence. Moreover, re-escalation can be seen to be caused by local state elites’ power consolidation politics, being triggered by external and domestic resources of legitimization, nationalist mobilization of ethnic groups, states agents’ use of force for territorial control, and attracting political and financial resources from external supporters of state formation. The broadened perspective of the Sri Lanka and Kashmir contexts suggests that Western policies of liberal peace-building initiate local state elites to comply with demands of state formation, which seem to be globally present. These demands are facilitated through external agendas and instruments of state formation and locally driven through those domestic elites’ private and political power interests.
The findings of the South Ossetia study suggested three mechanisms of re-escalation through external influence, first, Interaction of reactive interaction between Western and other stakeholders kicking off the escalation cycle and subsequent reinforcing interaction until change in local behavior, second, Level shift of external agency switching localities of agency prior to escalations and, third, Claim shift with external agency switching between democracy and state-enforcing policies. The South Ossetia findings revealed specific functions framing plausible causal explanations of the mechanisms’ effects. However, it has to be reiterated that only an in-depth study of the Sri Lanka and Kashmir contexts could reveal functions of the mechanisms. Nevertheless, the three mechanisms, even in their micro functions, are largely represented both in Sri Lanka and Kashmir. The below table accounts for the intensity of the three mechanisms in Sri Lanka and Kashmir and for differences in available power resources of local state elites that might enable explanation of differences in intensity of the mechanisms and thereby enhance their hypothetical functioning:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Interaction</th>
<th>Level shift</th>
<th>Claim shift</th>
<th>Divergences in power resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S. Oss</td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>strong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Sri Lanka | strong  | strong      | strong      | - professionalized Western engagement: unchanged reinforcing effect of Western policies, even to a more intense degree  
- non-Western partners: unchanged assertive tendency on local level (relatively new phenomenon, possible change over time has to be studied)  
- Western anti-terror agenda: functions as but one reinforcing instance at the national level |
| Kashmir | weak        | weak        | strong      | - more consistent Western support for India (than for Georgia): unchanged pressure on the national level  
- lack of territorial proxy of Pakistan (such as North Ossetia or Tamil Nadu): unchanged escalation cycle  
- Western anti-terror agenda: functions as but one reinforcing instant at the national level |

Table 5: Differences and commonalities of mechanisms of violence in Sri Lanka, Kashmir and South Ossetia.
The interaction mechanism is most difficult to locate as the discussion does not have the scope to trace the sequence of the processes in depth, which makes it difficult to ascertain the extent to which stakeholder interaction led to the start of the escalation cycle, or merely reinforced their interactions in the subsequent course of the process. In order to sustain the mechanisms, it would be crucial to identify the respective reinforcing instances. However, it seems that in the Sri Lanka and South Ossetia cases the reactive pattern is more existent than in Kashmir. In Kashmir, it seems as though a shift at the national or local level is sufficient to kick off an escalation cycle, making the context very vulnerable to the escalating effect of a relatively isolated event with relatively little reinforcing impact, or a high level of inertia, in the subsequent trajectory, specifically by external actors at the national level.

The level shift mechanism would require more scrutiny of the locality of specific West policies prior to escalations to make a sustained statement, particularly in Sri Lanka. Western policies at the international level are used by both Sri Lanka and India elites to maintain their claims in the conflicts. Local state elites intensely respond to the Western paradigm, by which the Western agenda works through the national to the local level of the conflicts in both cases. The switch of levels of Western agency is more pervasive in Sri Lanka than in Kashmir as Western agency is directly involved at all levels, whereas in Kashmir, Western actors are represented exclusively on the international level. This might, first, hint that the more an external regional power pushes its agenda, the more level shift occurs. This strongly relates to the South Ossetia case where Russia is a stakeholder via the West and to Sri Lanka where India is a negotiating partner of Western actors. As level shift is less significant in Kashmir, one could, second, further hypothesize that the existence of a territorial neighboring proxy – such as the Indian state Tamil Nadu or the Russian Federation republic North Ossetia – diversifies activities to the local level. In case of no such proxy, the national state elites do not address these
local stakeholders and Western activity might be rather confined to the national and even more the international level. Considering both hypotheses, the Kashmir context shows equal tendencies of escalation as the two other contexts, but Level shift occurs not involving the local level. Therefore, the discussion suggests that particularly shifts between the national and international level of the conflicts reinforce escalation trajectories.

The *Claim shift mechanism* is prominent in all three contexts and seems to be the most important mechanism taking effect prior to escalations. The oscillation of Western policies between peace talks and negotiations on the one hand and support of militarizing, central state elites on the other hand seems a general pattern of Western destabilization of volatile trajectories of violence. As Goodhand and Walton point out for the Sri Lanka case, Western agency takes on a double role, often even on the same level of agency. This circumstance becomes visible in the case of negotiations over conflict settlement in an international context when Western actors often assume a leading role, as initiators or facilitators, but at the very least pointedly address their expectations of the outcome of negotiations to the central state elites involved in them. In this vein, Western actors often link success in negotiations to funding or political support. However, Western actors also heavily emphasize the process and style of negotiations: Western partners establish issues on the agenda (local elections, territorial access of groups of population, economic rehabilitation etc.), direct small decisions along the way of negotiations (deployment of a military check point in a specific area, ethnic composition of peace-keeping forces, tasks of police forces, etc.), or establish directives of validation or legitimacy of the negotiations or of local state agency within the negotiations (monitoring reports of observers in conflict areas, assumed signs of commitment by local actors, election monitoring reports, etc.). All these measures have considerable impact even without a formalized mandate of the involved Western agents, but more
importantly, none of these policies is addressed or implemented to a consistent extent. Instead, international negotiations more often create a platform for the dual role of Western actors in simultaneously stressing democracy and state-centered demands, which fosters the ambiguous strategy of local state elites in prolonging negotiations while seeking a military solution.

Possibly the most convincing suggestion of the importance of claim shift in triggering escalation can be attributed to the Kashmir context. Out of three mechanisms, only claim shift shows as a significant indicator of escalation in Kashmir. Interaction and level shift perform weakly. However, escalations occur with high effects of assertive policies of local elites in response to Western policies playing at both democracy and state-centered policies throughout the trajectory. In this respect, claim shift seems to be a prevalent trigger of the escalation trajectory.

Divergences

These cross-context similarities seem plausible even given the context-specific divergences, and seem even more plausible in light of those differences. Therefore, table 5 also accounts for divergences between the contexts. Specific divergences between contexts might make for different readings of similar results, but more importantly, these differences in functions of mechanisms bring to the surface the explanatory outreach of the causal links they propose to embrace. The following brief list of structural differences in available power resources for local state shows that even though these differences exist, the underlying mechanisms of Western policies nonetheless trigger local policies in similar ways. The following discussion does not claim completeness, but will confine itself to those differences that arise from the above discussion.

Resources to which local elites in Sri Lanka and Kashmir can resort in order to consolidate power differ greatly. In one example, Sri Lanka’s two-party
system creates a major difference to Kashmir or Georgia in how the two Sri Lankan family clans at the head of state swap office almost every other election as an integral part of the established democratic procedure. Even though this provides a solid power resource elites can utilize in Sri Lanka, but which does not occur in Georgia or Kashmir, this does not make for a difference in power consolidating behavior of local elites in the contexts of the conflicts. First, elites’ power depends on strengthening the state and state policies even if they are not in office. This might plausibly explain why in all three cases opposition parties support the government line when it comes to strong-handed policies in the conflicts, also with respect to corresponding with Western engagement, such as in India during the Kargil war. Second, more than on Western support, elite’s power consolidation depends on other local, more radical domestic actors such as the military, the JVP or radical Buddhist groups (above all see: Rösel 2004, Piechotta 2003, Weiberg 2009) in Sri Lanka or the Orthodox church in Georgia. A case in point was when the Rajapakse government in Sri Lanka turned to an anti-Western stance after the successor government had lost domestic support over too close cooperation with Western agencies. In Georgia, leaderships regularly come under pressure from conservative or radical Orthodox groups, which accuse them of selling out Georgia to Western interests, with the Georgian Orthodox church ranking by far the most trusted institution in Georgia (CRRC 2012). When the church outlet ‘Episkopali’ after the 2008 war promoted the idea that God had sent the Russian troops to punish Georgia for its ties with the West, this found wide approval among the population, despite the fact that the conflict was already considered to be a product of the West and Russia clashing over Georgia.

The nationalist stance Georgian state elites employ in the conflict to keep domestic support significantly impacts on options in those critical moments of shifts that are triggered by Western policies. This appears to support the central argument as it might be a hint that the conditionalities of the Western liberal peace project create exactly the pressure point on
local elites that gives way to assertive measures as it alienates the government from the population.

In a first divergence, the pattern of Western policies toward conflicting states differs across contexts. In Sri Lanka, the Western peace project is much better implemented, structured and professionalized than in Georgia or Kashmir. As the discussion shows, it does not make for differences in effects. Rather, in the Sri Lanka case it is plausible to assume, also on the basis of the Goodhand and Walton study, that the higher level of organization concentrates Western impact, makes it more effective and to an even higher extent reinforces escalation trajectories. Furthermore, even though Western actors do not engage on the ground in Kashmir, Western conditionalities reinforce trajectories in how the Indian national elites translate Western policies via their democracy-centered policies of local elections, human and civil rights of local party leaders and the like. A second difference in Western policies is found in the Kashmir case where the West has a clear and far more consistent line in supporting India against Pakistan than supporting Georgia against Russia. Mohan even claims this led to a more compromising stance of India in negotiations with Pakistan (Mohan 2006: 20), but effects remain unchanged as the toll of violence has not abated. In a general view, support with a more or a less clear-cut bias on one side of conflict does not seem to correlate with less influence of Western policies on the national/central state level. Therefore, bias does neither seem to lead to consistency in Western policies with regard to levels and claims, nor does it release the incentives for local elites to shift to escalation. A third difference is posed by the Western anti-terrorism agenda that is a crucial stake in Delhi-Islamabad relations over Kashmir and in Colombo’s stance toward LTTE. The terrorism agenda has led to a tougher approach of the West toward LTTE and Pakistan, and much so to the use of the central state elites in Colombo and Delhi who secure Western support by joining the anti-terrorism alliance. International terrorism, on the other hand, is not an issue in the South
Ossetia context where no Islamist militants or political Muslim groups are involved (on the North Caucasus context of the South Ossetia conflict see: Dzutsev 2012). Nonetheless, reading the effects of the terrorism agenda on the elites in Sri Lanka or India suggests the conclusion that Western anti-terrorism policies are reinforcing the Western globally pursued state formation project. In other words, the anti-terrorism agenda makes Western actors concentrate their policies specifically at the level of the central state as this organization shares the common interest of subduing elements that undermine traditional features of stateness. This leads to the strengthening of state elites that generally tend to opt for assertive measures in circumstances of territorial disintegration. A fourth difference is the trend of the Sri Lankan government to seek out external support of non-Western actors such as China to keep domestic support and private gains, whereas Georgia maintains an invariably strong pro-Western course. However, the difference does not withstand closer scrutiny: Sri Lanka still adheres to the Western agenda with the Rajapakse government initiating new rounds of talks after 2006. Also, Georgia entertains trade relations of comparably considerable volume with China and Iran (Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 12.07.2012, Xinhua 05.04.2010; Kachia 2011). Rather, the trend of small states with territorial problems turning to non-Western support reveals how little commitment and opportunity to pursue non-assertive measures in territorial disputes exists at the level of local state elites. Therefore, attracting resources from actors that do not link their support to democracy-centered conditionalities, do not attempt to influence domestic affairs, and do not trigger criticism by local constituencies seems a favorable option.

Altogether, divergences in patterns of external policies to a substantial extent account for the same mechanisms of Western agency with respect to inconsistency of claims and arenas. As had been mentioned earlier as part of the theoretical discussion, even though conditions such as availability to resources or agendas might differ between contexts or
within the same process, this exhibits surprisingly little effect with the same mechanisms functioning prior to re-escalation. Therefore, the findings of the South Ossetia research at times come about under diverging functions of external agency by weighing differently on specific policies, categories of actors, or level of agency, or operating under differing local mechanisms of power when elites are composed or respond differently to Western actors. Generally, the causal link of Western policies and local elite behavior that was detected in the South Ossetia case is commonly repeated to the same effect of re-escalation. Therefore, it seems plausible to assume that when Western policies proceed in the general way described, local elites react in the observed way to the effect of providing for the context to shift toward escalation. In other words, similar cross-case patterns are not only rooted in similar case structures, but also in similar effects on similar local behavior of repetitive patterns of external policies.

The Sri Lanka and the Kashmir contexts provide excellent examples of how Western influence in contexts of violence follows a defined agenda of, both, state formation and liberal peace-building. Goodhand and Walton have already stated in their Sri Lanka study that this agenda envisages implementing vested interests through a liberal vision of importing conflict resolution, liberal democracy and market economy and their effect on local elites’ policies (Goodhand and Walton 2009: 304).

The study of Lazarus (2010) examines neo-liberal state building and democracy promotion specifically in the case of Georgia. Regarding illiberal effects of Western policies on domestic forms of rule in Georgia, Lazarus comes to similar conclusions as this study (Lazarus 2010: 2). Importantly, Lazarus emphasizes that, first, the self-interest of the agendas of all states results in support of autocratic regimes and, second, technocratic needs of external actors “produce[s] a centralising rather than a democratic or participatory bias in their modus operandi” (ibid.). Lazarus, therefore,
criticizes an increasing gap of legitimacy of Western engagement in the field of democracy promotion (ibid.: 3).

This study agrees with these findings and found that these illiberal outcomes take significant effect specifically in the context of escalations of violence in the South Ossetia case. Moreover, the empirical discussion illustrated important considerations for studies of the Western project. In the contexts of South Ossetia, Sri Lanka and Kashmir, the Western state formation/liberal agenda is a practical expression of the Western pursuit of power outside its domestic sphere, generating mechanisms of external influence that significantly contribute to triggering local violence. The discussion of the Kashmir context illustrated that even if Western engagement on the local or national level of the conflict is limited, the structural norm pressure of the Western agenda works through national policies and influences contexts of violence. The Sri Lanka case provides a clear example of how ongoing violence provides the basis for Western actors to push conditionalities connected to their agendas. Once violence ceases, Western actors lose their stakes. Therefore, Western policies not only trigger violence, but they also only function in contexts of violence.

The generalizing empirical outreach of the findings suggests that it is less specific forms of external policies that rule the game and lead to escalations (such as specific forms of military, political or financial support), but the state formation and liberal peace agendas that local state actors themselves locally interpret make for re-escalating dynamics of violence. It is surprising to what an enormous extent and simultaneous precision local state elites, in their attempts to consolidate power, are capable of transforming the state-formation agenda through the lens of local politics on the ground of their respective violent conflicts. This can be observed in all instances mentioned above, such as a more professionalized Western peace agenda at the central state level, consistent Western support for the central state in the conflict, and the
focus on democracy features of non-violence. In all cases, the Western
two-pronged role on various levels fosters the central state elite’s
assertion-leaning stance in the conflicts and provides for re-escalation.
5. Conclusion

This dissertation proposes an explanation to the question of why violence in South Ossetia has escalated recurrently since its start in 1989. After careful discussion of the existing arguments in light of the empirical context, the study examines the influence of Western policies in re-escalations in the conflict. Western policies, the argument maintains, influence the power politics of Georgian state elites to the extent of providing incentives for assertive policies toward South Ossetia. This interaction, intersecting with the policies of Russian and Ossetian stakeholders and domestic political and private incentives, repeatedly leads to the escalation of violence in the conflict.

The research argued that studies on the South Ossetia conflict largely juxtapose state-building and democratization and also, ethnic groups and nationalism as key factors of the conflict. Neither strand of debate provides an explanation as to why escalations occur at specific points in time and why they recur. Those factors merely explain that the context deteriorated in favor of escalation, but do not explain or provide credible links why and how escalations occurred at the points in time observed. Therefore, these studies refrain from addressing the specific conditions of the South Ossetia case and link secession to exogenous factors. The research undertaken here is an attempt to contribute to the debate a systematic study on triggers of violence in South Ossetia as a representative case of a protracted armed conflict.

The study traces the process of Western policies’ influence on Georgian leaderships’ options for power consolidation prior to escalations. The study further suggests that the patterns of Western agency that repeatedly occurred prior to three instances of escalation – in 2002, 2004 and 2008 – are mechanisms of re-escalation in South Ossetia. More precisely, the study maintains that the three mechanisms of Interaction, Level shift and
Object shift each take effect from the start to the end of the escalation cycle and hence gradually lead to escalation.

In its most crucial finding, the study claims to have plausibly sustained this causal link by showing that, first, shifts in Western policies determined the points in time of escalation (as opposed to the impetus of Georgian, Ossetian or Russian agency) and, second, shifts in Western policies set off escalation cycles (in continuous interaction with other stakeholders). Therefore, the study concludes that the influence of Western actors such as the OSCE, the EU, the US, NATO and EU member states had and continues to have a direct and decisive impact on the dynamics of the conflict through enabling and restricting the options of power consolidation for local leaderships.

These closing remarks would like to point out three issues of relevance for further consideration, relating to conclusions about the case, the general properties of the case and resources for further research. First, the revelation of the Bucharest fallacy emphasizes the importance of unseating the false perception of the influence of Russian-Georgian or Russian-Western contentious politics in the context of the conflict. The 2008 August war altered the structure of European-Russian relations since the Second World War in a lasting manner, as it gave way to the end of the European Security Charta. Because of this, it is widely held that Russian pressure at the NATO summit in Bucharest pushed the dynamics of the South Ossetia conflict over the brink to war, and that Western actors were the guilty but weak by-standers. In light of this study, however, it appears that the Bucharest summit in April 2008 was not the triggering factor but merely a reinforcing instance of Western actors’ passive support of local assertive politics one and a half years earlier. The study points out how Western policies, once the escalation cycle had started, reinforced dynamics through the Bucharest refusal, but that in fact Western policies’ triggering effect took place at the very local level in interaction with (and
support of) the local leadership. At least in this important instance, the much-employed argument of a Western-Russian struggle, occurring over the heads of local stakeholders and detached from local affairs, does not hold. A remarkable finding of this study is that, apparently, Georgian state elites are more easily led into assertive policies through Western influence than through domestic or Russian incentives.

The prevalence of Western influence on the conflict’s dynamics is also apparent through the enormous impact of the paradigm of stateness translated into policy. Western influence not only crucially determines the choice of policies (anti-smuggling, anti-crime, anti-corruption, territorial integration, taxation and customs, etc.), but also of agendas. Stateness ranks before private gains, nationalist ambitions, democratic goals, or even Western integration. The norm of statehood, facilitated through Western policies, creates the necessity for local state leaderships to comply with it, regardless of Western actors’ motives or local leaderships’ aims. As actors work through the norm of the state, not only does the specific role of Western policies prior to escalations become apparent in facilitating in local contexts. It is also clear that the state paradigm weakens the immediate effect of local Russian or Georgian interests in the conflict and renders the Western impact on re-escalation dynamics more forceful.

Therefore, the general prevalence of the paradigm of stateness, working through Western policies into local choices and affecting the dynamics of violence, is the most important finding with general applicability for other contexts of violence. In this respect, the study sustains the paradox of liberal external state building leading to illiberal outcomes such as assertive measures of state leaderships in contexts of violence. As Goodhand and Walton’s discussions of Sri Lanka and Lazarus’ discussions of Georgia impressively show, the focus of Western politics on local state elites largely triggers illiberal outcomes in volatile states. This study would like to add that Western policies themselves are founded on the paradigm
of statehood and therefore not only convey a norm to local contexts, but also underlie very similar power restrictions and interests as the local elites who then guide Western policies toward illiberal domestic choices. More precisely, even in their foreign policy agendas, Western policies in local contexts of violence exhibit mechanisms largely overlapping with local mechanisms of power consolidation in the same contexts. In general, it can be held that Western actors seek influence, or power, in conflict contexts while being subject to, and subjecting others to, the norm of stateness. In a crucial difference from local elites, Western actors enjoy a higher degree of free range between levels of agency and claims, which, under specific conditions, has a particularly intense reinforcing effect on local dynamics. It is possible that Western agents might enjoy a greater freedom of range than local elites in part because they are less accountable to their constituencies, who are more removed from their leaders’ actions abroad (there are of course exceptions such as high expenses in warfare or casualties of soldiers). In this light, a key finding of the study tells us that not only the power interest of local elites triggers escalation, but also the power interest of external Western actors.

The study specifically established a link between Western policies and re-escalations of violence. The findings show that only similar circumstances of agency (interaction of stakeholders, agendas, policies, etc.) under which the conflict escalates recur at different points in time. Western agency, as well, exhibits a pattern that specifically upholds the dynamics of re-escalation over extended periods of time and encompassing individual points of escalation. This was revealed by the overall trajectory of intensification of the conflict, which was discussed at the start of the empirical analysis, showing that over the re-escalation process, increasing Western engagement coincides with an increasing focus on issues of the state and the involvement of state actors. Similarly, the study shows that with each escalation the paradox of democracy versus state-centered policies increases whereby Western agency not only aggravates the
dynamics prior to each escalation, but also seems to maintain the general
tendency toward re-escalation.

This link between Western policies and re-escalations of violence might be
explained by considering the Sri Lanka context, for which Goodhand and
Walton (2010) argue that the formation and implementation of the
Western agenda necessitates the existence of violence. It is worth looking
at the preliminary end of the cycle of violence in Sri Lanka after the 2009
war. During the military campaign, international state actors reluctantly
condemned the government for human rights violations. Punitive steps of
Western agencies against the Sri Lankan government were implemented
with years of delay, among them the cancellation of preferential trade
relations with the EU or the refusal of the conditions linked to an IMF loan
(see ICG 2010). Similarly, when the UNHCR announced that it would
investigate human rights violations in March 2012, the Colombo
government refused the request citing concerns of infringement of
sovereignty. It seems to raise legitimate questions about Western agency
that when the Sri Lankan government ceased seeing the necessity of
military violence as a means of securing internal control after the military
victory of 2009, the implementation of the Western agenda in Sri Lanka
lost its foothold.

This situation, in contrast to the South Ossetia case, can be seen to have
arisen because the Sri Lankan government expected the military conflict to
have ended. In contexts of ongoing violence such as South Ossetia, the
‘non-use of force’ demand by international actors continues to direct
Western-local relations, such as in the framework of the Geneva talks in
which the Georgian government signaled goodwill to Western actors by
unilaterally declaring non-use of force after the war of 2008. If the link
between the efficiency of the Western liberal peace agenda and ongoing
violence proves to be as strong as the discussion suggests, it is critical that
the agenda be revised.
As discussed in the examples of Goodhand and Walton and Lazarus, a very small but insightful body of research looks at the effect of the Western liberal peace agenda on local regimes. Western actors do not seem able to navigate between their desire for a strong state as a reliant partner, and their poor understanding of local necessities which, one way or another, seem to regularly lead to authoritarian features of rule, particularly in light of Western support. However, with respect to local contexts of violence facilitated by these regimes, it should be noted that local violence is one of the outcomes of the Western agenda. Vice versa, violence seems to be among the most powerful catalyzing forces, providing a determining context of agency. As this study shows, once violence has started, the initial interests and conditions persist, intensify, and seemingly inevitably lead to escalation. This is particularly valid for the paradigm of statehood and the power claims of local and external actors linked to it – especially, as the research suggests, for the impact of external policies on local power mechanisms.

The study calls for further research to be done in the field of re-escalation in internal contexts of violence. First, the link between external and local policies needs to be further explored. Further research should focus on a disaggregation of the processes in the chain of agency leading to violence. In this respect, there is a need to identify the precise external mechanisms that elicit change in local behavior prior to escalation. Research should answer whether there are specific mechanisms that are more likely than others to trigger change in behavior, whether this effect of mechanisms of external agency varies according to points in time (earlier or later in the escalation cycle), and whether further research can derive more generalized statements on the characteristics of the mechanisms identified, analyzing the effect of 1) claim or action-based properties of state and democracy-centered policies (e.g. rhetoric, formats, facilitation projects, implementation of frameworks, etc.) or 2) the effect of and connection between levels of agency, in further exploring how external
agency switches arenas of agency and how agency at different levels, such as the international, national and local level of the conflict, exhibits different effects on the dynamics of re-escalation. In this respect, it might be important to look at the different effects of state-centered policies in contrast to democracy-centered policies in terms of the level at which they are carried out. For instance, democracy-centered policies could exhibit different effects at the international as opposed to the national level of the conflict. This study gave some attention to that topic, but further research should explore the issue in depth.

The second suggestion for further research also points to study at the level of agency, but with the aim of aggregating social mechanisms of violence. In order to expand the scope of the findings, it would be necessary to compare key decision points prior to escalations by working across cases (also see Capoccia and Keleman 2007). In the context of the previous analysis, this would include identifying shifts in local behavior toward more assertive policies, as well as possibly related Western policies prior to the turning points. As a result, social research could make statements about when in the escalation cycle behavior is generally more likely to shift and under which circumstances, including not only external Western policies but also their interaction with local and regional factors in the conflict.

Lastly, this study brings up the question of why South Ossetia seems to be the major place of contention and not Abkhazia, the locus of the second secessionist conflict on Georgia’s territory. Escalations of violence in Abkhazia took place regularly from the end of the war in 1994 until 2008, involving the UN-mandated Georgian and Abkhaz police forces, regular Georgian troops on interior as well as local Georgian and Abkhaz militias, and, since 2008, Russian troops deployed in Abkhazia. Nonetheless, escalations in Abkhazia seem to exhibit much weaker effects on the power basis of Georgian elites and draw less vociferous Western reactions than violence in the South Ossetia context (see on the conflict in Abkhazia:

Two aspects are central: First, a possible answer to differing links between dynamics and agency might be that the conflict with Abkhazia plays a very different role from that in South Ossetia in terms of power consolidation for Georgian leadership. The Georgian nationalist narrative usually establishes Abkhazia as a separate nation within the Georgian state, whereas this attitude does not extend to South Ossetia (Khinchagashvili 2004, Shatirishvili 2003). Second, separation after the end of the Abkhaz-Georgian war in 1994 took the form of a far more formalized and institutionalized framework of de-facto autonomy than in South Ossetia, with the emergence of a local political culture, the formation of foreign relations between the Abkhaz elite and Western agencies, and a de-facto visa regime with Georgia through the UN Mission. In post-Soviet South Ossetia, all these features were closely linked to and controlled by the Russian Federation. A third indicator might be that organized armed conflict in Abkhazia at the start of the 1990s was an arena for local Georgian strongmen struggling for power in the capital (I 1, also see: Coppieters and Legvold 2005). This suggests that whereas secessionism might have been based on and implemented through ethnic nationalism, the dynamics of the conflict in Abkhazia generated power resources linked to ethnic nationalism and external involvement through Western actors to a far lesser extent than in South Ossetia. This might have led to different dynamics in the Abkhazia context and a different link between Georgian power consolidation and Western impact in the Abkhazia context than in South Ossetia.
However, some interview partners suggested that the conflict in Abkhazia could be seen as a smokescreen for the South Ossetia context (I 1, I 2, I 3). This view holds that Russia has a stronger interest in control over Abkhazia because of access to Black Sea waters than in land-locked South Ossetia (also see Derlugian 2007). Proponents argue that, therefore, Abkhazia is in fact the center of Russian-Georgian contention and that when dynamics in Abkhazia shift, the ramifications resonate in multiplied form in the less stable South Ossetia. This view could be sustained, as just two months prior to the installment of the Sanakoev administration in 2006, Georgian troops recaptured Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia. In this context, a shift in Abkhazia could be seen as having preceded and possibly being part of the same Georgian agenda of territorial integration as the shift to assertive behavior of Georgian elites in South Ossetia. Similarly, the view holds that the 2008 war started not in South Ossetia, but with Russian troops quietly moving into Abkhazia days prior to the start of armed action in South Ossetia.

These arguments plausibly sustain that there is a link between the Abkhazia and the South Ossetia dynamics that is not only forged by the common context, but also shown in palpable trajectories of events on the ground. However, the diminished scope of politicized Western engagement with Abkhazia when addressing state elites in Tbilisi suggests a greater impact of Western policies on local power consolidation in the South Ossetia context. It seems as though the differences between the Abkhazia and South Ossetia contexts actually fortify the findings of the South Ossetia study: They explicitly reiterate that shifts in local behavior bring about escalations in South Ossetia, but that, simultaneously, Western engagement is the key trigger to escalation and re-escalation in South Ossetia and possibly in other cases as well.
6. Bibliography


Allison, Roy 2008: Russia resurgent? Moscow’s campaign to ‘coerce Georgia to peace’, in International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 6, pp. 1145–1171.


De Waal, Thomas 2010b. The lightness of history in the Caucasus, Open Democracy, 4 November 2010.


International Crisis Group (ICG) 2010b. The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE, Asia Report No. 186, 23 February 2010


Jawad, Pamela 2005. Democratic Consolidation in Georgia after the “Rose Revolution”?, PRIF Reports No. 73, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), Frankfurt on Main.


Kaldor, Mary and Ivan Vejvoda 1997. Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, in International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1, pp. 59-82.


Korf, Kreuzer, King, King, Kohan, Kelegama, Kukhianidze, Khashig, Benedikt Charles Marietta Caucasian 87, Perspectives, War Affairs, Georgia. in the Politics, for Research Eurasia, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 48-71.


Khinchagashvili, Shota: M.A. thesis accepted at Central European University Budapest (unpublished paper)


Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 2012, Fifth Session of China-Georgia Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade was Held in Tbilisi, Mr. Chong Quan, Deputy China International Trade Representative, 12 July 2012.


Sikorski, R. 2009. The EU’s “Eastern Partnership” is the Key to Relations with Russia, in Europe’s World 12 (Summer 2009).


U.S. Senate 2010. A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to the territorial integrity of Georgia and the situation within Georgia’s internationally recognized borders. S.RES.698


221

Voronkova, Anastasia 2011. Understanding the Dynamics of Ethnonationalist Contention: Political Mobilization, Resistance and Violence in Nagorno-Karabakh and Northern Ireland, A thesis submitted to the School of Politics and International Relations Queen Mary, University of London for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.


Unnoted News sources:
BBC News online, Special reports on the 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict.
Civil.ge: Civil Georgia – Daily News Online
### 7. Annexes

#### ANNEX 1: Chronology of political and violence events 1989-2007

Based on research at the archive of the OSCE office in Prague, Czech Republic, January and February 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 Jan</td>
<td>Khashoggi Agreement signed by Yeltzin and Gams</td>
<td>Dok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Communication No. 186 Prague, 29 May 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>jurisdiction of the Russian Soviet Republic</td>
<td>Communication No. 186 Prague, 29 May 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unification with NO</td>
<td>Communication No. 186 Prague, 29 May 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12(3)</td>
<td>-- Gams leaves country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Communication No. 186 Prague, 29 May 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Dusting of Gams</td>
<td>Report of the CSCE Rapporteur Mission to the Republic of Georgia 17-22 May 1992, CSCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Communication No. 186 Prague, 29 May 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Communication No. 186 Prague, 29 May 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Mar</td>
<td>OSGE admitted to OSCE</td>
<td>Decision by the CSCE Council of Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>Decision to disband the paramilitary Mkhedroni</td>
<td>Report of the CSCE Rapporteur Mission to the Republic of Georgia 17-22 May 1992, CSCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Communication No. 186 Prague, 29 May 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>2 killed</td>
<td>Activity Report (issued 20 Apr 1993, no indication on which time period) When exactly, who,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and background</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
May 11


= preparation process of Sochi Agreement
- Geo side ready for soft form of autonomy (“functional autonomy”)
- SO side (refers to Decil of ind) calls for third force to neutralize the fighting and provision of legal guarantees for people living in that area
- “The Republic of Georgia has a population of nearly 5,5 mln. of which 64 % are Georgian, 10 % Russian and Ukrainian, 9 Armenian, 5 % Azerbaijanis, 3 % Ossetian, 3 % Adzhars and 2 % Akhchis. In addition there are also Jewish, Greek and some other ethnic groups.”

May 15


= “Massacre” in SO (By Geo troops or villagers)
- Os civilians
- Geo gov immediately condemns act
- Geo gov assures to take heavy armament away from Geo villagers in SO to prevent violence

May 25

Geo student killed in SO

CSCE Communication No. 135, CSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report, May 21-28, 1993

One year later memorial held in Tamarakerti, calls for reconciliation

May 30

First call-up for new Geo national army

Mkhedrioni to be part of the Geo army

June 20

36 civilians killed on road north of Tskhinvali


= preparation process of Sochi Agreement
- Geo side ready for soft form of autonomy (“functional autonomy”)
- SO side (refers to Decil of ind) calls for third force to neutralize the fighting and provision of legal guarantees for people living in that area
- “The Republic of Georgia has a population of nearly 5,5 mln. of which 64 % are Georgian, 10 % Russian and Ukrainian, 9 Armenian, 5 % Azerbaijanis, 3 % Ossetian, 3 % Adzhars and 2 % Akhchis. In addition there are also Jewish, Greek and some other ethnic groups.”

July 25

Geo student killed in SO

CSCE Communication No. 135, CSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report, May 21-28, 1993

One year later memorial held in Tamarakerti, calls for reconciliation

June 24

Sochi Agreement signed


Signed by Yeltsin, Leva and co-signed by SO and NO representatives
- Full cease-fire from 28 Jun, security corridor along the lines of contact, withdrawal of armed formations, disarmament/ disbandment of militias. JCC has been set up. Os-Geo-RU PKF created and deployed. Military observers subordinate to the JCC supervises implementation of cease-fire
- JCC has been set up through “Dagomys Agreement” WHERE IS IT? WHEN?

July 25

Estimate of RU and SO on reconstruction needs

CSCE Communication No. 135 Prague, 14 June 1993, CSCE Mission to Georgia – Activity Report June 5 – 13, 1993

- 14 billion rubles from both RU and GEO over 5 years
- never paid out for SO gov refusing transfers through Geo banking system and three-monthly accounts for it

July 29-30

1st CSCE fact-finding Mission


= implementation of the Monitoring Mission
- SO most cautious, insists on full autonomy with perspective to possible unification with NO
- RU rejects change of Geo borders
- all support unanimously tripartite PKF

July 29- August

Deployment of JPKF

Joint Peace Keeping and Law Enforcement Forces

Aug

IJC meetings come to a complete halt

- after two or three meetings

October 10

Parliamentary Elections in Geo

Information by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights/OSCE on the elections in Georgia, CSCE Communication No. 302 Prague, 16 October 1992

Elections held in consistence with international standards and democratic procedures
- except: complex election system, refugee situation, lack of explanation for voters
- election postponed in nine districts

2000-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reports—Activity Report of HoM: Lengthy discussions on Status and reporting mandate of the PKFs [which information is to be gathered]—Interim Report of PR: First sentence: “On our way to Tbilisi we translated Moscow, where we had a first round of negotiations with the aim to finalize the Protocol on assistance offered by the Russian Federation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td></td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 41, Activity Report, Jan 22-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>Start of CSCE’s mandated activity in Geo</td>
<td>Incident in the end of the week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>Meeting SO-CSCE in Tskh</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 41, Activity Report 13 April 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Re-establishment of working groups of JCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Start of efforts to revive the JCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>Geo-RU talks in Sochi</td>
<td>Activity Report 1-9 April 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Negotiations stalled # No JCC meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– after this sharp increase of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>3 Os farmers killed</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 107 Prague, 25 May 1993, CSCE Mission to Georgia – Activity Report May 12-20, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Killings by unidentified uniformed men, 6 km West of Tskh while farmers were working in the fields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– queries between PKFs, Os deny Geo access to roads, Geo unidentified take Os PKF hostage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Tensions in SO have increased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Growing social and economic ties between NO and SO; NO downplays political significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Tensions remain after killings of 14 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-25</td>
<td>Jostaniar, head of Mikhailistran', visits Nikos, where Geo PKF is located</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 128, CSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report, May 21-28, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>2 bodies of Geo PKF military personnel found, 1 Os soldier killed</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 145 Prague 10 June 1993, Activity Report of the Georgia Mission, 31 May – 4 June 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– went missing on 25 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– according to JPKF officials retaliation for killed Os soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– PM Tskh signs “On the restoration of the economy and the social safety of the population of the Tskhinvali region.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– $50 million rubles for reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– retroactive benefits for ethnic Geo in SO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-23 Jun</td>
<td>RU refuses to sign state treaty over acceptance of GEO’s boundaries until Geo has granted autonomy to Abkh and SO</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 150 Prague, 14 June 1993, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report, June 14-23, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shakhray (in charge of RU nationalities’ policy) responsible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SO points at increasing nationalistic statements in Tbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chochev (Deputy Chairman of SO Supreme Soviet) hardlining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Some leaders threaten to launch a campaign to destabilize the North Caucasus if events do not go their way.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Idea of a conference on the settlement of the conflict along with international involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Status quo &amp; Geo accepts SO’s pre-war administrative set-up and SO tacitly drops seek of independence (report says there is wide acceptance in SO leadership)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JPKF # for SO important part of status quo is being part of PKF and guarding their borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Guarantees # SO demands guarantees on int monitoring of Geo troop movement and possible use of force against SO and presence of PKF, Russian or int.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Report urges to press Embassies of CSCE member states to raise the topic of SO with Geo (not only the CSCE mission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UPKFR obviously gets armament from RU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Jun-6 Jul</td>
<td>CSCE Mission’s ongoing efforts to set up an int conference</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 150 Prague, 14 June 1993, CSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report, June 24-Jul 6, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Two sides: either independence with ongoing economic blockade from Geo or a federal subject within Geo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SO press: death of police chief is a result of the struggle of the two sides. Peace of independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Irina Sarishvili of the National Democratic Party, considered to be the number two of the Geo parliament; from Sept vice-prime minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sandra Kavazze, Personal Representative of the HeAD of State for Abkh and SO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jul</td>
<td>CSCE concept of a settlement of the SO and Abkh conflicts</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 150 Prague, 14 June 1993, CSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ A CSCE Plan for Georgia, July 18, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Aug</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. Prague, August 5, 1993, Activity Report, July 27 – August 5, 1993</td>
<td>– 4 shooting incidents at JPKF posts, 2 at villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– CSCE mission focuses on moderate elements on SO side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– SO and Geo say informal contacts the only way possible to restore contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– SO and Geo both reluctant as for int conference immediately</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-14 Aug</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. Prague, August 14, 1993, Activity Report, August 6-14, 1993</td>
<td>– no support for CSCE concept for the settlement of the SO conflict (Jul 18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– CSCE mission pushes SO leadership to make progress on time with progress in Abkh (Abkh is used as a comparison)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Aug</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. Prague, 24 August 1993, Activity Report: 25-24 August 1993</td>
<td>– Kubum: Geo takes more territory for GEO settlements; Geo does not allow Os to return to Geo villages in SO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– has addressed RU for reestablishing JCC, but no response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Bagoyeva (Information Secretary to SO Supreme Soviet): Int Comm does take Geo perspective in the conflict and sees SO as an internal Geo problem/ Kubum: Ru Yeltsin does see SO as an internal GEO matter, too</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Sept</td>
<td>Geo Parliament approved new government</td>
<td>– Intermittent tensions remain too strong to start the return of refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Sept</td>
<td>Geo Ru Agreement on Econ Rehab of the conflict areas signed</td>
<td>gains momentum as a basis for SO Geo political settlement negotiations in May 1998 (see No.5/98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Sevion of the SO Supreme Soviet: Kubum leaves SO, Chochiyev (Deputy Head) ousted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– civilians cutting wood are armed; no other sources for heating available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- &quot;In conclusion, it appears that the introduction of peacekeeping foros without a subsequent political regulation of the conflict, normalisation of economic activity, and establishment of the rule of law has led to the strengthening of lawless elements in the larger part of the zone of conflict. […] A tendency toward hidden, anarchic or mafia-style methods of governing has arisen, the alternative to which can only be dictatorship. &quot;(No. 303)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Sept</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 301 Prague, 29 September 1993, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Situation in Georgia (28 September 1993)</td>
<td>– Sulhum/Il falls to Abkh forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 307 Prague, 29 September 1993, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Situation in Georgia (28 September 1993)</td>
<td>– Euclid returns to Abkh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. Prague, 30 September 1993, Supplemental Report, September 27-30, 1993</td>
<td>– strong efforts of CSCE mission to accomplish agreement, several meetings in Tskh conducted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-29 Sept</td>
<td>13 bodies of Os civilians found</td>
<td>CSCE Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-11 Oct</td>
<td>Geo forces lost control of all of Alkh during first days of Oct</td>
<td>CSCE Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No. 352 Prague, 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>October 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gams lost momentum in Western Geo</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>352 Prague, 11 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>October 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CSCE Mission to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Georgia/Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Report, October 1-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-27 Oct</td>
<td>Shev decides CIS membership</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>352 Prague, 28 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>October 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Oct</td>
<td>Visit of CIO to SO</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>352 Prague, 28 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>October 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Nov</td>
<td>SO parliament adopts “First Constitution of SO”</td>
<td>CSCE Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vienna Vienna 5 April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2001, CSCE Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to Georgia/Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Report, October 12-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Nov</td>
<td>Opening of gas pipeline from NO to SO</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>399 Prague, 14 December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>November 13 December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Dec</td>
<td>4 Oss killed</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>399 Prague, 14 December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>November 13 December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Dec</td>
<td>First Geo parliamentary session after two months</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>399 Prague, 14 December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>November 13 December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Dec</td>
<td>2 or 4 Oss die in mine attack on vehicle.</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>399 Prague, 14 December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>November 13 December</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3 Geo bodies in Os village found

Dec 22 before Jan 22
9 killed on JPFL base by explosion CSCE Communication No. 439 Prague, 4 January 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report, December 14-29, 1993

– Deputy Head of SO Supreme Soviet wounded, rest of SO gov left neighboring room only moments before blast
– connection with escape of suspect in the killing of Alan Otbashv. Dzhioev was leading the radical group within the OPKF. ([Cross-check?])

22 Dec
Moderate members of SO gov meet with CSCE mission CSCE Communication No. 439 Prague, 4 January 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report, December 14-29, 1993

– "In a candid discussion they (the moderates) told us that they wanted to move towards negotiations with the Georgian side as soon as possible, but were prevented from doing so by the more extremist elements in the leadership, who apparently have links to Mafia groups that profit from the situation of unresolved conflict."
– accused of treason by hardliners
– 15 or 16 people within the OPKF contingents support hardliners in SO gov, threaten to use force against anyone holding a pro-peace line. They profit from situation. # probably responsible for blast
– Moderates hope NO authorities can take JPFL hardliners into custody (NO only counterweight / executive power in SO)
– moderates’ strategy: promote round table discussions without mandate. Hardliners support this.

29 Dec-8 Jan
Sums died. Shev calls commission to investigate the circumstances of his death.

CSCE Communication No. 422 Prague, 10 January 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report, 29 December 1993 to 8 January 1994

1994

9-21 Jan

– SO leadership condemns unannounced Geo PM (Patatian) visit to Geo villages in SO in anticipation of hardline moderate decision after elections on 27 Mar

– No contacts between SO police and Geo villages, meeting of JPFL officers, representatives of local comm., law enforcement bodies in SO and representative of Geo villages lack of cooperation reason for failure to cope with criminality. JPFL does not feel responsible for police work, but police sees JPFL as entitled to use force. Criminal activities tie into NO, across border via Reky pass

all sides continuously affirm willingness to re-establish ICC. Geo says the ICC can first be meeting without SO, only Geo, RO, NO and SO joins in later (?)

22 Jan-4 Feb
CSCE Communication No. 435 Prague, 4 February 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report, January 12 - February 4, 1994

New SO party: Republican Party of People’s Unity. Moderate, but declared goal is unity with NO
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-Feb</td>
<td>Yeltsin visits Geo to negotiate</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 457 Prague, 4 February 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report, January 22 - February 4, 1994</td>
<td>Demonstrations in SO against Yeltsin visit and against good relation between RU and Geo, because good relations between Geo and Ru are considered to have negative effects on SO's interests. Yeltsin stresses the integrity of Geo, RU participation in PPS and negotiations, agreements signed on free trade, military support (development of armed forces, granting credits [this role obviously incrementally taken over by US!])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geo deputy minister of defense killed in bomb blast, minister slightly injured</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 457 Prague, 4 February 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report, January 22 - February 4, 1994</td>
<td>On the morning of Yeltsin visit, Defense Minister had tendered his resignation probably forces who are in opposition to the good RU/Geo relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-Feb</td>
<td>CSCE visits Shev</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 469 Prague, 16 February 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report, 5-15 February 1994</td>
<td>Shev's proposal: “The settlement of the conflict should take place in four stages: restoration of the ICC, direct political dialogue with the South Ossetians, a program for the return of refugees, and, finally, agreement on the political status of the territory.” CSCE promotes its participation in ICC, all sides agree, first SO, then Geo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-Feb</td>
<td>PR and military visits Tskh/ JPKF</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 469 Prague, 16 February 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report, 5-15 February 1994</td>
<td>Separate reports by General Schaadli and General Bergh on their visit of JPKF. WHERE?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Feb</td>
<td>Pre-SO elections Chbi: 12 registered pol parties in SO, new leader expected to be from the radical spectre ethnically based division of forces in Tskh deepens. Geo population of SO organized as “Union of Geo Citizens” sent letter to Geo parliament to prevent the SO elections. JCC: SO underlines they want to be an equal part of it. SO complains Geo did not want political aspects into work of the former JCC. SO wants authority in law and order and clearly separated mandate of JCC and JPKF. SO for the first time did not demand a return of SO territories lost during the war as a preliminary step to negotiations. JPKF meeting supports CSCE participation on JCC, Geo says 40 observers too much, 15 sufficient. Geo National Independence Party: Radical opposition, leader Irakli Tsereteli, anti-RU.</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 512 Prague, 2 March 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report, 16-28 February 1994</td>
<td>Turned in Geo parliament because of C5 decision, parties change to opposition PC requirements on mandate of JPKF WHERE?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

233
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>CSCE Communication No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 Mar</td>
<td>CSCE visit to Tbilisi</td>
<td>512 Prague, 16 March 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report, 1-15 March 1994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-28 Mar</td>
<td>Hostage Incident in SO Oss</td>
<td>541 Prague, 30 March 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia: 1) Report on Hostage Incident in South Ossetia, 2) Report on Trip to Tskhinvali, Elections, March 22-28, 1994</td>
<td>Znauri region: first two Geo seized, then 8 Oss by Geo villagers kept hostage until 28 Mar, the day after the election incident expected to have serious consequences on elections release of all captives on 28 Mar, mediated by JPKF. See hostage crisis report No. 560: details on negotiations, no ethnic background.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar</td>
<td>Geo police surge Geo parliament</td>
<td>546 Prague, 5 April 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report, 16-31 March 1994</td>
<td>From 31 Mar Parliamentary struggles, debate on constitution of cabinet police upsurges in protest of confirming MIA Shota Kviraya into office, attack on Shev Shov withstands and pushes through his candidate for Deputy PM, Margiani. In this period: First congress of the CUG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Apr</td>
<td>RU Geo sing Abkh Agreement on return of refugees and IDPs</td>
<td>587 Prague, 26 April 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia: Activity Report, April 1 - April 15, 1994</td>
<td>Heated reactions in Geo and Abkh, violence in Kodrivi valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-Apr</td>
<td>2nd round of SO parliamentary elections</td>
<td>587 Prague, 26 April 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia: Activity Report, April 1 - April 15, 1994</td>
<td>CbN won 75% of the seats Geo discreet press statement denouncing SO elections, not to enhance a more radical vote; but high-level attitudes more tense Vasha Khatchapuriidze, PR of Head of Ste of Geo for SO affairs named stressing that any Abkh agreements are no precedents for SO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-30 Apr</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 606 Prague, 3 May 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report, April 16 - April 30, 1994, strengthening of border control at Roki tunnel meets SO criticism, because it could hinder SO contacts with NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Apr</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 606 Prague, 3 May 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report, April 16 - April 30, 1994, Deputy MIA shot in car with driver and bodyguard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 May</td>
<td>First meeting of SO Geo representatives, in Vladikavkaz, CSCE Communication No. 637 Vienna, 13 May 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Georgian-South Ossetian Agreement in Vladikavkaz, informal, decision to set up expert group. In public meeting was declared as discussing the refugee problem; NO minister for nationality affairs situation in SO after parl elections tense: shooting incident in the streets of Tskh, turmoil in parliament and internal struggle in gov struggles between RU and SO PKF, SO tried to disarm RU soldiers SO wants to dissolve de facto MIA with hardline minister Dzhioyev into a parliamentary department head by moderate Gassiev meeting of Gassiev and Galazov, NO president, NO hardline pro unity of &quot;one Ossetia&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 May</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 638 Vienna, 25 May 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report, 16-21 May 1994, follow-up meeting for Vladikavkaz did not take place; confirmation of both sides of willingness of talks, but reluctance as for difference esp in status questions opening of CSCE office in Tskh delayed, because of non-secure location</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 June</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 639 Vienna, 3 June 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Trips to Tkhinvali on 30-31 May 1994, CSCE Communication No. 677 Vienna, 3 June 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Trip to Tkhinvali on 2 June 1994, RU PKF blocks all roads into Tskh, Ergenti closed immediately hostage taking on both sides in conflict zone, threats of further killings; CSCE mediated release on 2 Jun stalls preparation of second Geo SO meeting in Vlad; after solution SO parl decides participation on second Vlad meeting killings likely to be connected to stalling the Vlad talks, mainly from SO side</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-10 Jun</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 700 Vienna, 20 June 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report (1 June - 16 June, 1994), forsook special status for Ajara and Abkh, but not for SO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Jun</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 700 Vienna, 20 June 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report (1 June - 16 June, 1994), Second meeting SO-Geo in Vlad, strengthens role of monitoring mission; confirms will of political settlement, in this respect revival of ICC envisaged [ICC as a tool for pol settlement]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jun</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 727 Vienna, 4 July 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report for 16-30 June, 1994, Shev for the first time admits Geo mistakes, in his weekly radio address; Vlad results in Geo positively met new market north of Tskh where Geo farmers sell their products, protected by RU PKF; greater bus travel from and to Tskh RU PKF redeployed to posts formerly held by SO and Geo, because of lacking impartiality, f.e. SO troops were using checkpoints as custom control monitors meet villagers regularly and for the first time took part in the weekly security committee meeting of the JPKF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No.</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-Jun</td>
<td>SO Geo agree on joint repair of the water system</td>
<td>727 Vienna, 4 July</td>
<td>since two years sabotage of water pipeline; agreement on restoring supply from Geo lines to Os villages; core demand of moderate SO leadership to get backhold over coop with Geo in population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-8-Jul</td>
<td>Geo RU meeting in Moscow</td>
<td>749 Vienna, 21 July</td>
<td>Geo + RU deputy PMs; agreement over reconstitution of PKF; SO did not participate, was informed major tasks of the JCC shall be directing the JPKLF [1] and its law enforcing and crime-fightin mechanisms [ before SO insisted on the division of both. See later, in 2004 when Gori police and financial police interfere with regional authority on the ground] CSCE shall play major role in defining the future status of SO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-Jul</td>
<td>British Amb to Ru visits Tskh</td>
<td>749 Vienna, 21 July</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-31-Jul</td>
<td>3 killed in Nikosi, shot</td>
<td>759 Vienna, 2 August</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-21-Jul</td>
<td>N0 Minister for Nationalities visits Geo with khachapurize</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-Jul</td>
<td>JCC Agreement signed in Tskh</td>
<td>759 Vienna, 2 August</td>
<td>Geo Vice PM, Menagarashili and RU Deputy MFA, Pastukhov JCC permanent secretariat to be in Tskh; working language RU; no official translation; meetings at least every two months question of JCC chairmanship CSCE to be part of JCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16-31 July</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>769 Vienna, 10 August</td>
<td>CSCE handed over the 26 Jul Agreement to SO leadership; now SO leadership in turmoil to defend it against internal forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Aug</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. 775 Vienna, 16 August 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ 2) The Political Situation in South Ossetia, 2) Activity Report for the Period 1-15 August</td>
<td>Increasing radicalization of political scene in SO; radical opposition starts to wield power, starts to militarize, has power in the SO security forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gasimov resigned after pressure because of singing the Viadi Agreement of 14 Jun, plus SO parliament annulled SO consent with the document; SO parl is reviewing the Doc now — Ru and Geo express hope to hold JCC meeting 15 Aug main SO radicals Bagayev, Minister of National Security and Kabisov, a parl deputy chairman; brother of 8 heads one of two major SO criminal groups, the other by the sons of a high-ranking police officer; B's loyals as well in PKF &quot;Anything enhancing stability is (therefore) perceived as a threat&quot; radicals are equally anti-Ru as anti-Geo, even in favor of an anti-Ru Caucasus coalition if Ru lets SO down against Geo. Duslayev in Chechnia is major ally tensions between Ru and SO PKF's rise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CSCE distributes concept of SO constitutional status [WHY NOW, WHEN EVEN THE JCC MEETING IS STALLED?] 1) Geo villager killed 2) CSCE officials meeting with Mr Atsamaz Kabisov, deputy chairman of the State National Security Council, and Mr. Dmitriy Medvedev, foreign minister in Tbilisi on 15 September 1994, Tskh: 17 September 1994 3) Kabisov says status paper unacceptable even for part review, because it considers SO as a part of Geo, reluctance for talks with Geo; SO del currently in Moscow because of JCC decision</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-15 Oct</td>
<td>1 Geo villager killed</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. Vienna, 20 October 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report 1-15 October 1994 (When exactly not indicated) 1) Geo villager killed 40 SO Oss which were released over the day. Spilled over to Artaxsi, Geo hostages taken. PKF mediation Russian-led 2) SO Ru negotiations on JCC no results. Ru support of PKF continues to be frozen. But 1.5 of the 5 mio for reconstruction paid through NO. 3) 1 Geo villager killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-14 Oct</td>
<td>Delegates from secessionist regions in Tskh, 220th anniversary of &quot;RU Oss union&quot;</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. Vienna, 20 October 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report 1-15 October 1994 1) Geo villager killed 2) CSCE officials meeting with Mr Atsamaz Kabisov, deputy chairman of the State National Security Council, and Mr. Dmitriy Medvedev, foreign minister in Tbilisi on 15 September 1994, Tskh: 17 September 1994 3) Kabisov says status paper unacceptable even for part review, because it considers SO as a part of Geo, reluctance for talks with Geo; SO del currently in Moscow because of JCC decision 4) 1 Geo villager killed 5) 1 Geo villager killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Oct</td>
<td>3 Oss. 3 Geo killed (Oss PKF and Geo MKhe)</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. Vienna, 3 November 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report for 16 - 31 October 1994 one MKhe leader taken hostage by Oss criminals, financial claims. MKhe - Oss shoot out at Oss PKF checkpoint. One SO PKF killed in retaliation, civilians on both sides took hostages, too. Whereabouts of key hostages unclear. CSCE in direct contact with MKhe officials agree that PKFs of all sides too much part of the local environment to be impartial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

237
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>CSCE Communication No.</th>
<th>CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report for 1-15 November 1994</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct</td>
<td>Agreement of reconvening of the JCC signed in Moscow</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No.</td>
<td>18 November 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report for 1-15 November 1994</td>
<td>Oss threaten to killgeo hostage. Hostages not held by authorities of either side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-Nov</td>
<td>First JCC meeting in Moscow</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No.</td>
<td>18 November 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report for 1-15 November 1994</td>
<td>SO delegation to Moscow exerted pressure on RU. CSCE no member of JCC, no political working group established during first meeting (exon, refugee, PKF working groups). Geo threaten to killOss hostage is Geo is not released. Geo authorities no access to Oss hostage. Oss (illegal PKF checkpoint at Ubita), 0.5 km toGeo village Nul, 9 km west toTikh, in reaction to hostage-taking, denies Geo access to fields. Geo PKF has withdrawn from joint Oss-Geo checkpoint at Mungut, backlash because CSCE favors as many joint checkpoints as possible. No regular JPKF command meetings during the period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second JCC meeting took place in Vladikavkaz</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No.</td>
<td>6 December 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report 16-30 November 1994</td>
<td>SO took part despite prior threats to boycott. Major issues improved discipline of PKFs (which means impartiality, increase of criminality, weapon smuggling) and RU for unified command and control mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Dec</td>
<td>Colloquium SO CSCE on constitutional status of SO (follow up 11 Nob)</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No.</td>
<td>21 December 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Weekly Activity Report 11-15 December 1994</td>
<td>RU given full command of all three PKFs for first period of three months, then RU names commander each six months. Meant to create acceptance of local forces. — background more control over discipline of PKFs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Dec</td>
<td>Third JCC meeting in Moscow</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No.</td>
<td>21 December 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Weekly Activity Report 11-15 December 1994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Dec</td>
<td>Geo-Oss meet without outside initiative on local criminality</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No.</td>
<td>4 January 1994, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report for the period December 16-31, 1994</td>
<td>Tackle crime issues where the two jurisdictions interact. SO very reluctant to bilateral contacts with Geo on high-level major issue anti-crime, increasing crime among PKF member,s increasing of armed robberies in general. Constitutional process in Geo proceed. Constitutional Commission in charge. Federalism, self-rule est. major issues of concern. Check other sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Mar</td>
<td>Geo Osi Round table in Vladikavkaz on future bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 March</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. Vienna, 10 March 1995,</td>
<td>Geo participants admitted serious mistakes in 1990/91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-23 Mar</td>
<td>RU MFDO in Tbs signs 25-year treaty for Russ military bases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 April</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. Vienna, 15 April 1995,</td>
<td>13,000 RU troops based in Geo, unclear whether Geo receives payment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-25 April</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. Vienna, 20-25 April 1995,</td>
<td>RU's enhanced policy towards conflict with focus on terr integrity and settlement seem to have</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 May</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. Vienna, 11 May 1995,</td>
<td>Thur meeting discussed land tenures, anti-crime, disarmament of civilian population,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>exchange of lists of refugees, stolen cars; Geo issued 1.5 for reconstruction, to be followed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>by 1.2 credits from RU first mentioning of firm US statement supporting Geo terr integrity, US Amb to Geo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JCC meeting again delayed from early May to late May report sees</td>
<td>Geo and SO PKFs fail to rotate their personnel, draw personnel from the local population problem</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>growing acceptance by the South Ossetians that the regions future</td>
<td>of contradicting chains of command -- Geo PKF adheres to Geo MFDO, not to JPKF command.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Joint Osi Geo meeting on constitutional issues delayed, probably until after Geo parl decided over constitutional draft. Osi (like Abkh) refused to take part in Geo constitutional process after Geo offered this very belatedly. Start of dismantling of illegal checkpoints, delay of disarmament of civicen population Osi and Geo police at JPKF regularly Geo hostage reportedly killed, SO PKF held captive by the Geo hostage's brother -- grown into private vendetta including criminal activities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 May 1995</td>
<td>OSCE mission to Georgia/ Activity Report 1-15 May 1995</td>
<td>REF.SEC/95/95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 May 1995</td>
<td>Triangular PKF patrol start / Bichovsk, SO/PKF soldier held hostage released</td>
<td>REF.SEC/95/95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 June 1995</td>
<td>Fourth Session of JCC in Moscow (there was a fifth already, but whatever)</td>
<td>REF.SEC/95/95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 July 1995</td>
<td>OSCE mission to Georgia/ Activity Report 16-30 June 1995</td>
<td>REF.SEC/95/95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 July 1995</td>
<td>OSCE mission to Georgia/ Activity Report for the Period of July 1-15, 1995</td>
<td>REF.SEC/95/95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SO insists that JCC was always moot as a means for political talks, not as a frame for substantive discussions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO in a financial squeeze, Moscow covers 80% of their budget. When NO in financial crisis, it is reflected in financial crisis in SO. Majority of SO leadership acknowledges that long-term solution is integration into Geo, but actions are obverse.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SO refers to Abkh wanting RU pressure to join Geo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-20 Jul</td>
<td>Fifth JCC session in Tskh and Tbil // First visit of official SO delegation to Geo-controlled territory since 1989</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. REF.SEC/183/95 8 August 1995 OSCE RESTRICTED ENGLISH only Vienna, 7 August 1995, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity report 16-31 July, 1995</td>
<td>Geo ready to pay 1 mio USD reconstruction funds, promises 5 mio more if RU gives credits CSCE missions starts first independent initiative in JCC, issuing proposal for economic rehab programme initiated E214 · S0N77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-Jul</td>
<td>SO withdraws signature of 15th JCC session declaration</td>
<td>CSCE Communication No. REF.SEC/197/95 22 August 1995 OSCE RESTRICTED ENGLISH only Vienna, 22 August 1995, CSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity report for the period August 1-15, 1995</td>
<td>inside SO pressure by parl indicated by report. Now all sides withdraw from signing SO plans on delaying decision (often the case, reports indicate) no clear vision on SO site, no pro or cons, so foot-dragging the process. Kachiev leading figure, Minister of Information, leader of communist party who holds 20% of the seats, pro integration into RU; SO mafia either wants to reintegrate with Geo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weekly Thursday meetings (PROTOCOLS) under chairmanship of RU JPKF commander, bring together operational officials from SO and Geo neighboring regions: subject matters: irrigation water, formland division, city water supplies, telephone connections, repair of highway and railway links, industrial enterprise cooperation, exchange of natural gas versus electricity supplies. F.ex. permission of passage through Geo territory for isolated SO village, on deputy minister level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Interestingly enough, top level Georgian reaction in private has been that the question of the restoration of Georgia’s sovereignty over Abkhazia and South Ossetia is basically in Russian hands.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Association of Caucasian Republics to which Abkh and SO have been admitted full members Decision over Geo constitution not this year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-Aug</td>
<td>Attempt to Shev’s life // Geo parl passes constitution</td>
<td>OSCE Communication No. REF.SEC/202/95 1 September 1995 OSCE RESTRICTED English only, Vienna 1 September 1995, OSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity report 16-30 August 1995</td>
<td>Shev managed to pass Geo’s constitution, extremists reacted in exasperation no paragraph on Geo’s territorial structure as initially planned, like referring to self-rule in Abkh, SO, Aja. New election law forthcoming. RU tries to nail down SO to its own former demand to have bilateral negotiationswith Geo, but now they refuse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-20 Sep</td>
<td>RU MFA visits Geo</td>
<td>OSCE Communication No. REF.SEC/246/95 25 September 1995 OSCE RESTRICTED English only, Vienna 25 September 1995, OSCE Mission to Georgia/ Biweekly Activity Report (01 August - 15 September 1995) Chernomyrdin, only Abkh discussed, SO hardly a topic, &quot;strategic&quot; relations, BTC first time mentioned no direct talks in sight, time of next JCC meeting still unclear</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-25 Sep</td>
<td>Fifth anniversary of SO independence</td>
<td>OSCE Communication No. REF.SEC/246/95 25 September 1995 OSCE RESTRICTED English only, Vienna 25 September 1995, OSCE Mission to Georgia/ Biweekly Activity Report (01 August - 15 September 1995) RU, JPKF and OSCE boycott the celebration SO backed out from own proposal of 3 Mar to implement Geo So commision on origins of the conflict. Tskh demanded the comm to start out with examining SO settlement from the 1st century BC. Some SN PM soldiers marched, NO pres did not participate, but NO PM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Oct</td>
<td>Second Econ Rehab Prog Meeting</td>
<td>OSCE Communication No. REF.SEC/306/95 27 October 1995 OSCE RESTRICTED English only, Vienna 27 October 1995, OSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report (1-24 October, 1995) OSCE launched, first meeting was held in September in Tbil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-31 Oct</td>
<td>Geo SO meeting in Vlad</td>
<td>OSCE Communication No. REF.SEC/363/95 21 November 1995 OSCE RESTRICTED English only, Vienna 20 November 1995, OSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report 25 October - 18 November 1995 RU, NO, OSCE as intermediaries. Decision to start negotiating process on political status seen as Ahke start of the political negotiation process three years after then end of the hostilities&quot; (421)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Nov</td>
<td>SO refuses to open OSCE branch office in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication No. REF.SEC/363/95 21 November 1995 OSCE RESTRICTED English only, Vienna 20 November 1995, OSCE Mission to Georgia/ Activity Report 25 October - 18 November 1995 Letter of MFA Medoeyev. Only acceptable if office in run directly by Vienna, otherwise &quot;indirect confirmation of the extension of the sovereignty of the state where it is accredited to South Ossetia.&quot; (transl OSCE)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>OSCE Communication No.</td>
<td>OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report for the period of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Dec</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Ref. Sec. 421/95</td>
<td>11 - 27 December 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>No. 27</td>
<td>1 January - 31 December 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-Jan</td>
<td>Speech on SO</td>
<td>No. 28</td>
<td>26 January - 28 January 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Mar</td>
<td>OV's Initiative for a peaceful Caucasus</td>
<td>No. 30</td>
<td>8 March - 10 March 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Mar</td>
<td>Visit by NO president Galazov</td>
<td>No. 32</td>
<td>12 March - 14 March 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Apr</td>
<td>FCA agreement with EU</td>
<td>No. 34</td>
<td>22 April - 24 April 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 May</td>
<td>MoU signed</td>
<td>No. 36</td>
<td>16 May - 18 May 1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Moscow, Shev-Chib, security and confidence, later econ. SO very satisfied with MoU, in turn offered new talks about OSCE branch office on Tskh [it seems like OSCE wants to push it to an OSCE branch office, although the talks initially were about a JCC office, OSCE really sneaked in]. Geo refuses official SO statement on the MoU implementation, because de facto recognition 13/14 Jun RU CIS minister visits Tbs and Tskh. Ombudsman law adopted on 16 May, but introduction only in 2004, parl did not approve of Shev's candidate Kvesadze.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>OSCE Communication No.</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-Jun</td>
<td>RU presid elections for RU citizens in SO</td>
<td>Vienna July 9, 1996, OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report</td>
<td>at JPKF headquarters in Tbil out of 800 ballots 600 were RU PKF soldiers replacement of JPKF commander, still one, erkavy transferred to Vlad as chief-of-staff of 3rd army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-24 Jul</td>
<td>JCC meeting in Vlad</td>
<td>Vienna-August 2, 1996, OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report</td>
<td>report of mid-monitoring as first step of demilitarization the withdrawal of heavy armament is envisaged first JCC meet after one year’s interval, focus on military issues. No agreement on second JCC meet after one year’s interval, focus on military issues. No agreement on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Murders in first half of 1996 reaches 15*</td>
<td></td>
<td>RU institute publishes poll in Jul, that 1.5 want to return to Geo, 38.6 unite with RU, 30 keep up independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-Aug</td>
<td>Shev-Chib meeting in Vlad</td>
<td>Vienna-September 6, 1996, OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report</td>
<td>meeting: reestablishment of high level negotiation of status, econ and parl + pmv meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE Communication No. Vienna September 6, 1996, OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report for the period of September 1996</td>
<td></td>
<td>SO announces delay of status negotiations because of announcement of SO elections on 10 Nov. Shev says he understands that Chib wants to secure his presidency before starting neg. Gabarayev, chairman of SO council of ministers, is Chib’s fiercest internal opponent and key in the elections. Second SO Geo journalists roundtable on 18 Sept in Tbs econ rehab: Norway and GTZ involved from the very first monitoring patrols reduced from four to three. Oss posts often undermanned, still irregular pay for Os PKF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Sep</td>
<td>Agera elections</td>
<td>Vienna-September 26, 1996, OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report for the period of September 1996</td>
<td>Agera leadership denies OSCE to monitor elections and accuses FNM of plot to break the elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE Communication No. Vienna-September 26, 1996, OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report for the period of September 1996</td>
<td></td>
<td>SO elections: Chib and Gagloyt moderate, Gabarayev and three others hardline. Telephone poll sees 65% in favor of Chib [constant impression that SO leadership covers negotiations up from SO public]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-Oct</td>
<td>OSCE Agreement to open OSCE branch office in Tbil</td>
<td>Vienna-October 15, 1996 - OSCE Restricted English Only Annexes: Russian only, Vienna, 21 October 1996, OSCE Mission to Georgia, Branch Office in Tbil</td>
<td>negotiations since Apr 1995 staffed by Tbs office, run under OSCE office, seen as reconciliatory step of SO leadership because of elections on 10 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/12</td>
<td>OSCE Mission to Georgia/elnosis in Tskh</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>OSCE Communication No. Vienna December 9, 1996, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ACTIVITY REPORT for the period of 15 - 30 November 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/12</td>
<td>First meeting of SO and Geo &quot;law protection authorities&quot; in Gori</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>Delegations headed by Deputy Ministers of Justice and General Prosecutors. Plus JPKF head and head of Gori administration (viceroy?) law protection in the conflict zone. SO demanded legal protection of citizens of both sides in the conflict zone, impose coordination within law protection authorities, mutual handover of SO residents to respective authorities plus files.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/12</td>
<td>Chib reshuffled SO leadership, all key positions with moderates now, all approved by parl. Kochiev dismissed, Gagloity increases influence due to winter shortfalls energy supply from Ru cut, Rocky tunnel blocked.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/12</td>
<td>First visit of high ranking SO official to Geo territory, preparitions of JCC meeting. 18 Jan assassination attempt on SO Head of org working on domestic crimes.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/12</td>
<td>Second visit, met with chib and Dzugayev. Meeting of Geo intellectuals in Tskh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: There is a JCC all-party working group regularly convening, and there are in the other hand the official JCC meetings.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>OSCE Communication Vienna</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13-25 Feb</td>
<td>Seventh JCC meeting in Vlad</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna February 25, 1997, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 3/97 for the period of 1 - 21 February 1997</td>
<td>JCC decided to reduce JPKF, gradual transfer into civilian bodies, reduction from 25 to 16 checkpoints, only Oss and Geo checkpoints reduced — Oss and Geo voluntarily offered to reduce the forces, formal agreement prevented by Oss drawback. Note: Number of checkpoints and posts that are indicated are highly unreliable. Compilations of SO JPKF: old fighters gradually replaced through conscripts, no other armed formations in the conflict zone (no remilitarization), RU asked to finance Oss PKF econ working group halted, current budget for 1997 RU 9 billion rubles, Geo 3 mio GEL work on branch office started.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5 Mar</td>
<td>First status meeting in Moscow</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna March 19, 1997, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 4/97 for the period of 22 February - 15 March 1997</td>
<td>procedural matters, tense and shaky, only through mediators Chb-HoM meeting 24 Feb: Chb complains about financial means to SO from RU and Geo, HoM says finances conditional on settlement, then more int money, SO must open up to int ing and that they are working only through JPKF: five Oss posts that were to be closed down still opened. exchange of prisoners Geo-SO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Apr</td>
<td>First So Geo meeting within UNDP Steering Committee on econ rehab</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna April 14, 1997, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 5/97 for the period of 16-31 March 1997</td>
<td>Article ”Cis the beginning or the end of history”, 26 Mar, Ncakrisimya tseetsa — neo-imperial line of RU, destabilizing Geo, making use of secessionist conflicts only chance to act upon anti-Russian movement JPKF: Geo army units seen in conflict zone, Geo MFO reminded that no troops an weapons shall be introduced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Apr</td>
<td>First So Geo meeting within UNDP Steering Committee on econ rehab</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna April 18, 1997, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 6/97 for the period of 1-15 April 1997</td>
<td>for 1997 6 mio USD rehab for all conflict area delay in closure of posts/ checkpoints, because Oss soldiers have no accommodation working group drafted guidelines for joint 1EB law enforcement bodies — Golk only in RU, bad quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 May</td>
<td>1 Oss refugee killed in Geo village</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna June 4, 1997, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 7/97 for the period of 1-31 May, 1997</td>
<td>this and several other criminal incidents want of Tskh, JPKF head has set up a joint mobile task group, observers and PKF, to react fast; troops has a post between Artviri and Plavciani — obvious desertion of local law enforcement agencies JPKF comm tried to solve the incident by bringing together law enforcement bodies at the RU post in Artviri on 4 Jun, but Oss delegation did not come and Oss villagers threatened to take Geo delegation and JPKF comm and OSCE rep hostage, JPKF comm resolved tensions Osipots at Tsmelis and Durabili remain open Chb lifts curfew for tskh from 9 Jun [first time in at least one year..]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Jun</td>
<td>First joint training of military observers from all three parties</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna June 18, 1997, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 9/97 for the period of 1-15 June, 1997</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>OSCE Communication</td>
<td>Note</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-Jul</td>
<td>OSCE opens its branch office in Tskhino</td>
<td>Vienna July 18, 1997, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 13/97 for the period of 1 - 15 July, 1997</td>
<td>mainly refugee/IDP matters meetings of UNDP Steering Comm to be held there</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-Jul</td>
<td>Parliamentary SO partial elections</td>
<td>Vienna August 6, 1997, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 12/97 for the period of 17-31 July, 1997</td>
<td>Six exclusively Geo seats remain vacant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-Jul</td>
<td>OSCE opens its branch office in Tskhino</td>
<td>Vienna August 6, 1997, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 12/97 for the period of 17-31 July, 1997</td>
<td>Blast at Geo museum in Tamarasheni directed against joint work of Geo and Osset LEths, criminal 50 MIA forces too little to ensure security, ask JPKF for personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-Aug</td>
<td>1st OSCE policeman killed by Geo soldier</td>
<td>Vienna August 23, 1997, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 13/97 for the period of 1-22 August 1997</td>
<td>50 curfew reintroduced due to crime increase Another bomb blast in Tamarasheni unforeseen is provision of security for returning refugees by JPKF, possibly relocation of posts and expanding of tasks meeting of Geo and Osset representatives of the Commission for the Dead and Unaccounted on 14 Aug, during next meeting a list will be presented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-Sep</td>
<td>OSCE opens its branch office in Tskhino</td>
<td>Vienna September 23, 1997, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 14/97 for the period of 23 August-22 September, 1997</td>
<td>Visit of Ardzinba, visit to Ts to make it easier for Chib to have similar meeting with Shev econ rehab: energy project at risk, because in sufficient number of bid for project tender (why?) Assessment for future TACIS project about to start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-Sep</td>
<td>OSCE opens its branch office in Tskhino</td>
<td>Vienna October 6, 1997, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 15/97 for the period of 13 - 30 September, 1997</td>
<td>Transfer of law and order main topic: Protocol signed. Meant to facilitate the final demilitarisation action Surprisingly, Geo and Osset decided to close down three posts along the main route through SO. Monitoring of the transport of arms, narcotics, explosives transferred to police authorities of both sides. (because they have a deal among themselves?) SO independence day ignored by Geo pres. in SO delegations from Pridnestrovie, Karabakh and NO. IU duma sent five people headed by chairman of the Committee on CIS issues Tihonov who said he is in favor of the creation of a new Soviet Union Several Osset PKF soldiers participated in the celebration Find Dokis that initiated the Law dimension of the JPKF and any formal agreements on it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/10/97</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna October 31, 1997, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 17/97 for the period of 16 - 31 October, 1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/11/97</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna November 25, 1997, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 18/97 for the period of 1-20 November, 1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/11/97</td>
<td>Public Prosecutor of Gori region kidnapped 7 km north of Tskh. No solution to it yet.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/12/97</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna November 25, 1997, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 18/97 for the period of 1-20 November, 1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/12/97</td>
<td>Joint declaration, operative parts held 50 concern about econ assistance, above all further joint work on refugees stressed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-9 Dec</td>
<td>RU Deputy PM Serov to Tibs, talks about border dispute</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-9 Dec</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna December 21, 1997, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 19/97 for the period of 21 November - 10 December, 1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-9 Dec</td>
<td>RU post extended into neutral zone on Georgian military highway between Khuchbaq and Vlad, Geo post moved hundred meters north, too, demonstrations in front of RU embassy. -- Shev-Serov agree on moving back both troops to their former positions, patrol neutral stretch jointly, settle delimitation of border soon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-9 Dec</td>
<td>NO: 48 families returned to SO, 4 to Geo. for the first time this year no serious criminal incidents reported during the two weeks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan 1998</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna January 6, 1998, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 19/97 for the period of 1 - 31 December, 1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan 1998</td>
<td>neo still stalled because of RU’s intermediary doc, Chib faces internal opposition to his course. SO’s course now uncompromising, meeting with Dzugayev now hardlines. Taking advantage of econ crisis, nationalist youth organization anti Chib. SO further privatizes land, Geo anti</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan 1998</td>
<td>First consecutive period where no serious violations were registered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan 1998</td>
<td>OSx wait for Geo to draft an intermediary doc (as response to RU’s); all sides infavor of expert meeting prior to formal second round of nego</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jan 1998</td>
<td>Geo proclaims will to settle Geo-SO conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jan 1998</td>
<td>Dzugayev (speaker) stresses infrent of pael “rasusubjektnot”, equal subject relationship to Geo, a line taken from nego in Mar 1997 in Mosc. JPKF: Geo unilaterally removed two posts, Diexvi, Dvani</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JPJF: Criminal tensions in Tamarasheni
Shve sees SO conflict easier to resolve than Abkh; SO conflict might be caught in "Abkhazia trap" with the Ossetia waiting for what the Abkh get and delaying the nego process with inescapable reconstruction aid demands, Shve says.

RJ, Amb Mayrov, visits Tbs 5-12 Feb, confirms rehab programme through tenders, RJ's efforts for energy supply to SO, confirms SO integration to Geo

Jan 30 Drasikov says SO rehab through GEO-RU implementation plan, NO supports settlement of conflict, Chibstresses NO-SO integration process

9-Feb Ass attempt on Shve
6 Zviadists arrested
Chib condemns attempt

Econ rehab: reconstr of individual houses due to start on 15 Mar, problems with NO energy firm with signed contract and disappeared, handover to local Geo or Osx company.
Taking of int hostages in Vladi and Zugd
IRC pulled out of SO because calm and stable

because Ankh hot, SO-Geo keep low profile, ICC postponed land disputes in zones with mix populaci., detention of Osx by Geo police without coop of LEBs
question whether Osx-PKF will be under SO-MIA or NO-M for Emergencies

SO-Geo talks go on exclusively about financial issues on reconstr
JPJF: SO asked JPJF to reestablish four checkpoints, due to unilateral Geo police movements

20 Mar SO in North Caucasus meeting in Rostov-on-Don
18 SO joined the "Association of Social and Economic Development of Northern Caucasus"

in early 1998 serious escalations between Zviadists and Geo police, between demonstrators in Tbs and in Gali region. Hostages, leading figures of Zviadists killed by Geo police, internal Zviadist struggle between moderate and extremist wing (acts of revenge against moderates)

1-22 Apr 3 killed, 1 Geo by RJ/PKF soldier
in Tamarasheni

21 Apr Mayorov visits Geo
Georg failed to present their intermediary doc, supposedly still discussed within Geo gov. Rehab discussed
Mayorov is Ambassador for what??
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27-Apr</td>
<td>Geo MDF resigns because he fails to ensure Shev’s security escort</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna May 4, 1998, OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report No. 7/98 for the period of 16 – 30 April 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-May</td>
<td>Declaration by SO MFA on lack of Geo finances for rehab</td>
<td>new MDF Tursadze Abish and SO veteran UNHCR head after 90 days in custody at Vladi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-May</td>
<td>SO Deputy chairman of Gov shot in Vladi</td>
<td>in charge of econ dev of the region, hardliner as to status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-Jun</td>
<td>Shev-Chib meeting in Borjomi</td>
<td>fourth meeting in three years, joint declaration focused on econ matters and appealed to int doners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Aug</td>
<td>First Col visit to Tash</td>
<td>Russia delays appointment new head to JOC. -- What caused the Russian anti-consensus turn?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

250
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5-Sep</td>
<td>1 Ossetian villager killed</td>
<td>OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report No. 15/98 for the period of 1 September – 20 September 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-Sep</td>
<td>Econ rehab-Prog and MoU signed</td>
<td>OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report No. 15/98 for the period of 1 September – 20 September 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-Sep</td>
<td>Some locals hand in weapons to SO authorities (why?)</td>
<td>4th session of the JCC Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and IDPs at the end of Sept Machavariani: Special Representative of the President on Political, Security and Conflict Settlement Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-Sep</td>
<td>Election observers are not going to be kidnapped</td>
<td>PKF commander promises that election observers are not going to be kidnapped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Sep</td>
<td>Geo elections on local self-government bodies</td>
<td>OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report No. 15/98 for the period of 14 – 30 November 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Sep</td>
<td>Machavariani visits Tkhr and hands over intermediate doc</td>
<td>OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report No. 15/98 for the period of 14 – 30 November 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-Sep</td>
<td>Geo election observers are not going to be kidnapped</td>
<td>PKF commander promises that election observers are not going to be kidnapped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Sep</td>
<td>Preparations for SO parl elections, out of 53 seats (before 41)</td>
<td>Preparations for SO parl elections, out of 53 seats (before 41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Sep</td>
<td>2 Geo killed</td>
<td>OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report No. 15/98 for the period of 14 – 30 November 1998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Econ rehab financing: Geo wants share of funds earmarked for SO although SO suffered 80% of the damage

Machavariani PB of pros on the Geo-SO conflict settlement [already for a long time]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9-Jan</td>
<td>First meeting Chib and Lordkipanidze in SO</td>
<td>Geo natives enters expert meeting Samachablo CoE groups of Chibs of settlement SO</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9-Jan</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 17 February, 1999, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA Activity Report No. 1/99 for the period of 1 – 15 February 1999</td>
<td>in the Ossetian villages of Znauri and Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-17 Feb</td>
<td>First meeting of SO and Geo expert groups on the comprehensive settlement</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 11 March, 1999, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA Activity Report No. 4/99 for the period of 16 – 28 February 1999</td>
<td>Geo wants parallel pol settlement and econ rehab, SO wants rehab prior to stilement JPKF: so called &quot;free market area&quot; at the entrance of TIAH (argnet market?) has problem of violence — (first mentioning of Ermets) JPKF: commander proposes to establish a joint checkpoint with three Os and three Geo PKF soldiers to control the area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16-17 Feb</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 11 March, 1999, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA Activity Report No. 6/99 for the period of 16 – 31 March 1999</td>
<td>preparation of SO elections: out 33 districts, 4 to Georgians 6 political movements competing: Communist Party; All Ossetian Movement &quot;Styr Nekhsh&quot;; Youth Union of South Osetia; Union of the Defenders of the Fatherland (leader – Mr. V. Gbabaray, former &quot;Prime-Minister of South Osetia&quot;); Socialist movement &quot;Fatherland&quot; (leader – Mr. V. Gobasans, &quot;Vice-Minister of External Affairs&quot;, Personal Representative of the South Ossetian leader Mr. Chibirov to political negotiation(s); National-Democratic Party (leader – Mr. H. Gagolits); employee of the &quot;Ministry of External Relations&quot; and son of the former &quot;Minister of External Relations&quot;). JPKF: number of checkpoints now down to 10, ongoing closures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**OSCE Communication Vienna 29 April, 1999; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 7/99 for the Period of 1–15 April 1999**

- second expert meeting (of the plenipotentiary delegations of Geo and SO sides) will be postponed due to SO elections.

- A sociological poll among 200 respondents in Tskhinvali, carried out by the Tskhinvali Information Center, has shown that 48.8% of them consider that over the last year the Georgian-Ossetian relations have improved, while 41.6% saw no significant changes. 10.6% believe that this year the situation will improve crucially, 10.4% are pessimistic, 52.8% do not foresee major changes. 9.9% are for an independent state, 3.2% accept South Ossetia under control of both Russia and Georgia, 3.2% - preserving the status quo, 4.8% - as a territory under international control and protection, 4.8% - as a subject of a confederation of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Ajaria and Georgia with equal rights, 21.6% prefer South Ossetia within the Russian Federation, 49.6% - South Ossetia as a part of Republic of North Ossetia- Alania.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar</td>
<td>ICC meeting in Moscow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Apr</td>
<td>Machav illegally nego because of SO elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Apr</td>
<td>Death of ICC commander Major General Anatoly Krassovsky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Apr</td>
<td>Khashbegi company owner Topadze opens restaurant in Tskh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May</td>
<td>Prime Minister killed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OSCE Communication Vienna 4 May, 1999; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 8/99 for the period of 16 – 30 April 1999**

- agreement of signing RU-Geo Agreement on rehab soon
- Tbilov underlines econ rehab by Geo to SO as an obligation, Machav says signing RU-Geo agreement on rehab will be postponed
- no further information, he was replaced
- SR says, that he was killed by a company commander of the same battalion in Tskh. Drunk, overreacted to criticism.
- employs Ocs

**OSCE Communication Vienna 4 May, 1999; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 8/99 for the period of 16 – 30 April 1999**

- running for “Deputy” during parl elections (maybe deputy head of parl)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>One candidate killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May</td>
<td>Arasle Mayor killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 May</td>
<td>SO parl elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>SO parl elections, second round // NO high-level del in Tskh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-Jun</td>
<td>RU affirms EU as an observer to the JCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Jun</td>
<td>Shevt at EU summit in Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4-Aug</td>
<td>Geo closes down Gori-Tbilisi highway for shipping traffic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-Aug</td>
<td>Geo State Customs Department, prevent smuggling entering Geo proper, Department and Sp continue to discuss the Roki tunnel as a tax collection point; Geo proposes that Tbilisi &amp; British company to control tax collection at Roki, it’s already does controls throughout Geo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-11-Sep</td>
<td>Second Geo-So expert’s meeting in Java</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
- Aug 18 = August 18
- Jul 25 = July 25
- Jul 18 = July 18
- Aug 25 = August 25
- Jul 20 = July 20
- Aug 19 = August 19
- Jul 22 = July 22
- Jul 21 = July 21
- Aug 20 = August 20
- Jul 28 = July 28
- Aug 16 = August 16
- Jul 17 = July 17
- Aug 17 = August 17
- Jul 30 = July 30
- Jul 29 = July 29
- Aug 15 = August 15
- Jul 31 = July 31
- Aug 14 = August 14
- Jul 26 = July 26
- Aug 13 = August 13
- Jul 24 = July 24
- Aug 12 = August 12
- Jul 23 = July 23
- Aug 11 = August 11
- Jul 22 = July 22
- Aug 10 = August 10
- Jul 21 = July 21
- Aug 9 = August 9
- Jul 20 = July 20
- Aug 8 = August 8
- Jul 19 = July 19
- Aug 7 = August 7
- Jul 18 = July 18
- Aug 6 = August 6
- Jul 17 = July 17
- Aug 5 = August 5
- Jul 16 = July 16
- Aug 4 = August 4
- Jul 15 = July 15
- Aug 3 = August 3
- Jul 14 = July 14
- Aug 2 = August 2
- Jul 13 = July 13
- Aug 1 = August 1
- Jul 12 = July 12
- Jul 11 = July 11
- Jul 10 = July 10
- Jul 9 = July 9
- Jul 8 = July 8
- Jul 7 = July 7
- Jul 6 = July 6
- Jul 5 = July 5
- Jul 4 = July 4
- Jul 3 = July 3
- Jul 2 = July 2
- Jul 1 = July 1
- Jun 30 = June 30
- Jun 29 = June 29
- Jun 28 = June 28
- Jun 27 = June 27
- Jun 26 = June 26
- Jun 25 = June 25
- Jun 24 = June 24
- Jun 23 = June 23
- Jun 22 = June 22
- Jun 21 = June 21
- Jun 20 = June 20
- Jun 19 = June 19
- Jun 18 = June 18
- Jun 17 = June 17
- Jun 16 = June 16
- Jun 15 = June 15
- Jun 14 = June 14
- Jun 13 = June 13
- Jun 12 = June 12
- Jun 11 = June 11
- Jun 10 = June 10
- Jun 9 = June 9
- Jun 8 = June 8
- Jun 7 = June 7
- Jun 6 = June 6
- Jun 5 = June 5
- Jun 4 = June 4
- Jun 3 = June 3
- Jun 2 = June 2
- Jun 1 = June 1
- May 31 = May 31
- May 30 = May 30
- May 29 = May 29
- May 28 = May 28
- May 27 = May 27
- May 26 = May 26
- May 25 = May 25
- May 24 = May 24
- May 23 = May 23
- May 22 = May 22
- May 21 = May 21
- May 20 = May 20
- May 19 = May 19
- May 18 = May 18
- May 17 = May 17
- May 16 = May 16
- May 15 = May 15
- May 14 = May 14
- May 13 = May 13
- May 12 = May 12
- May 11 = May 11
- May 10 = May 10
- May 9 = May 9
- May 8 = May 8
- May 7 = May 7
- May 6 = May 6
- May 5 = May 5
- May 4 = May 4
- May 3 = May 3
- May 2 = May 2
- May 1 = May 1
Geo-Oss talks


early Oct: Geo SO meet in Tbil, discuss electricity and customs control, SO about to harden line; mid Oct: informal Geo-Oss talks in Varna, Bulgaria launched by American NGO Conflict Management Group, Macha and Dustayev (now Chairman of the State Committee on Information and Press). Amb of Austria and France visit SO.

13 Oct
1 NO killed at Fakly market

robbery at Faliky market outside Tskh, SG police says suspects are local Oss.

30 Oct
SO demands de facto visa application of foreign citizens
OSCE Communication Vienna 5 November, 1999, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 18/99 for the period of 26-31 October 1999

in conformity with the “Decree of the President of South Ossetia” of 1 August 1997

24 Nov
OSCE Communication Vienna 18 November, 1999, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 19/99 for the period of 1 – 17 November 1999

bomb found under fuel truck in market area

since the beginning of Sept electricity supply from Geo to conflict zone unpredictable, absent for days in row; Chib because of this under open public pressure to resign, leaflets circulate in Tskh

Geo currently in regress with electricity payments to RU

RU-Geo across rehab agreement delayed again

24Nov
Geo electricity supply to SO resumes // OSCE
summit in Istanbul
OSCE Communication Vienna 7 December, 1999, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 20/99 for the period of 17-30 November 1999

17 Nov: 250 demonstrant in center of Tskh against CHN, when on 22 Nov electricity supply resumes, it is five days before another demonstration is announced. Since Nov 22 no demonstrations anymore.


— Check OSCE summit in Istanbul, which decisions, Shv says on Nov 18 summit was most important event in the world since the end of the cold war”

Nov 26, Hom meets Menapkariishvili: “The Hom again underlined that lack of electricity is providing an excellent opportunity to Chibirov’s opponents to openly challenge the moderate South Ossetian leader.” [Also, entweder bringt er ihn auf eine Idee oder er wamnt ihm]

JPF > 3 of 4 temporary posts closed, meant during the harvest season

17-19 Dec
SOSLA presents draft restitution law
OSCE Communication Vienna 24 December, 1999, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 21/99 for the period of 01 - 23 December 1999

JPF: Geo families from Erede have began to hand over weapons to JPF and local police; temporary post at Ioncha remains

[ RU mediates bilateral meeting of Geo-S, Geo accepts RU as mediator] 14 Dec: Macha Chib Koch meet in Tskh with mediation of Mayrowov
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 Feb</td>
<td>SO Geo meet in Tskh on customs</td>
<td>1st high-level meeting on cooperation in the field of customs, Lordi proposes coop because smuggling is Geo most important security problem, Chib says joint customs policy possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Feb</td>
<td>NO pres visits Tbil on SO</td>
<td>customs and transport discussed, and TRACECA project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Feb</td>
<td>Joint Coordination Center with JPKF in force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Mar</td>
<td>RU visa restrictions for Geo</td>
<td>So hopes to be exception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Mar</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 17 January, 2000, OSCE Mission TO Georgia/ Activity Report No. 01/00 for the period of 24 December 1999 - 15 January 2000</td>
<td>energy supply from Geo still sporadic, from RU, too Voluntary handover programme continues at the OSCE Mission to Georgia/OSCE in Tbilisi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Feb</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 7 February, 2000, OSCE Mission TO Georgia/ Activity Report No. 2/00 16 - 31 January 2000</td>
<td>SO MFA publishes statement in which it strongly condemns Geo accusations that weapons are smuggled through SO from RU military base near Tbi to the North Caucasus Weapon collection: since start 50 pieces of arms and some kilos of explosives 22 Jan: OSCE office in Tskh burglarized, second time in three months bomb detonation near restaurant in Tskh, tensions between Geo and Oss at Fallow 28 Dec: Geo-Ru rehab draft initialized in Moscow, but not signed yet Shev presses to clarify status of Ajara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Feb</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 18 February, 2000, OSCE Mission TO Georgia/ Activity Report No. 03/00 for the period of 01-15 February 2000</td>
<td>9 Feb: Shev says that his and Polt's views to SO and Abkh the same 7 Feb: Shev announces that Geo-Ru rehab agreement will be signed after Geo and RU elections JPKF: Geo-OSO jointly control road between Tskh and Kekh to prevent vehicle robberies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Mar</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 3 March, 2000, OSCE Mission TO Georgia/ Activity Report No. 2/00 16 - 31 January 2000</td>
<td>1 Mar: OSCE Communication Vienna 3 March, 2000, OSCE Mission TO Georgia/ Activity Report No. 2/00 16 - 31 January 2000 So refuses joint Geo SO customs control at Roki tunnel Press Service of SO Press and Gov condemns article in RU newspaper Ivestiya of 4 Mar, which says that recent meeting between Geo and SO press officials is secret meeting to discuss status of SO JPKF: &quot;Since the beginning of this year, more than 90 pieces of firearms, over 40 kilograms of explosives, mines, grenades have been handled over by local Ossetian and Georgian population without any compensation!&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Mar</td>
<td>Shev announces early solution of Ajara status</td>
<td>Shev announces early solution of Ajara status JPKF began patrolling their road between Tskh and Arsaani on 11 Mar due to increased crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

257
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>OSCE Communication Vienna 17 May, 2000, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 9/00 for the period of 5-16 May 2000</th>
<th>OSCE Communication Vienna 6 June, 2000, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 10/00 15 May - 5 June 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 May</td>
<td>Geo spies on Falloy</td>
<td>Geo Special Services representative disguised as journalists took pictures etc. of Falloy market area, discovered, beaten, detained by SO LEB; released with apologies; official on both sides admit they spy on the area as for terrorist attacks in Nikolai armed persons checked docs of Geo passing by demanding RU language docs</td>
<td>car ambush in Geo village Pshst, joint Geo SO Investigative group established on 1 Jun upon insistence of IPKF commander. commemoration day of 1992 killing of 36 Os by Geo --- “one of the most painful memories of the conflict,” report says. As a consequence, voluntary weapon handover has virtually stopped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 May</td>
<td>5 Geo killed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 6 June, 2000, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 10/00 15 May - 5 June 2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>group of SO militia tried to occupy a building rented by the company Kuravodshipi Fremt at the falloy market. An armed unit of RU PFR's convinced them to leave. What or who is “South Ossetian militia”? The police --- “The reports start here to call them militia, maybe a downgrading for they are not to considered legitimate police forces?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May</td>
<td>Third Geo SO experts' meeting on pol nego in Java</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 6 June, 2000, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 10/00 15 May - 5 June 2000</td>
<td>intermediary doc for refugee return with RU, NO, OSCE in Java (when the term intermedi doc was introduced, 1. the informal meetings started and 2. it became an institution in playin goal) SO authorities let Geo journalists visit Tskh prisons to prove that conditions for Geo good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-Jun</td>
<td>Geo SO protocol on joint LEB activities signed</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 19 June, 2000, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 11/00 5 – 15 June 2000</td>
<td>it states that crimes committed in the area are not ethnically motivated weapon collection started again</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-Jun</td>
<td>Zhaihev article in Neza Gazeta</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 5 July, 2000, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 12/00 for the period of 16 - 30 June 2000</td>
<td>JPRF comm officially complains about SO police harassing JPRF forces, warns that they will be disarmed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- JPRF: Geo plated car at Sunisi carried 15 kg of explosives; Falby still tense, some explosives found
- 12 May CoE meeting in Tskh, Chib very critical of Geo
- “one of the most painful memories of the conflict,” report says.
- Group of SO militia tried to occupy a building rented by the company Kuravodshipi Fremt at the falloy market. An armed unit of RU PFR's convinced them to leave.
- “South Ossetian militia” - “The reports start here to call them militia, maybe a downgrading for they are not considered legitimate police forces?”
- Intermediary doc for refugee return with RU, NO, OSCE in Java (when the term intermediary doc was introduced, 1. the informal meetings started and 2. it became an institution in playin goal) SO authorities let Geo journalists visit Tskh prisons to prove that conditions for Geo good
- JPRF officially complaints about SO police harassing JPRF forces, warns that they will be disarmed
- “in Tskh, Chib very critical of Geo”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Reporting Period</th>
<th>Report/Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 11-13 Jul | 4th expert meeting in Baden                                                       | OSCE Communication Vienna 29 July, 2000, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 15/00 for the period of 1 – 15 July 2000 | Reports satisfied with expert meetings’ progressions.  
Three issues emerged, which the experts found expedient to be dealt with as part of one package, such as:  
1. Recognition of the territorial integrity of Georgia. Building of state-legal relationships within its internationally recognised borders and, concurrently, acceptance of the vital links between South Ossetia and North Ossetia - Alania of the Russian Federation;  
2. Attributes of a future South Ossetian state: Creation of own constitution, institutions, emblems and contractual powers within trade, economy, science and technology and culture. In this context, a particular bone of contention is the name of the future entity.  
3. International guarantees: To be introduced to support the above arrangement.  
   - SO, GEO, EC Del, OSCE: EU Platform on economic rehabilitation projects signed: 1) electricity Geo to SO, 2) rehab Gori-Tskh railway and Tskh train station, 3) rehab Tskh gas supply grid |
| 13 Jul | OSCE Communication Vienna 2-August, 2000, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 14/00 for the period of 15-31 July 2000 | OSCE Communication Vienna 1 August, 2000, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 14/00 for the period of 15-31 July 2000 | 18-17 Jul Transcaucasian motor highway (Roki tunnel) between SO and RU was closed due to mudslide, only connection via Geo military highway (Khazbegi).  
30 Jul Liakhvi ponds opened in response to the drought, Terefoni irrigation canal will be filled  
SO wants OSCE as mediator, Geo wants interventional involvement, both want RU; Macha: SO must nullify declaration of independence and Geo in turn will grant extensive autonomy rights.  
Kakabado-Moh, Geo Minister for Special Affairs says, Geo electricity supply starts from 25 July, to Tskh and neighboring villages, also water, passports discussed (JPKF): Kalhos region: anti-tank mine found and destroyed, planted as a warning against illegal wood-cutting.  
25 Jul: Os OsMOSI stop Geo driver in Geo part of Ergneti, harass him, Geo crowd gathers, JPKF rapid response force resolves it. [It seems like local population adapted to the unsettled situation and created their mechanism of Selbstjustiz, demonstrating, hostage-taking.].  
29 Jul: RU stops JPKF fuel transport at Roki tunnel and SO authorities replaced some SO JPKF tankers with unauthorised tankers [not really clear to me what was going on here actually].  
Weapon cell goes on, more than 200 collected an 106 kg explosives |
<p>| 18 Aug | Shav-Putin discuss SO at CIS meeting in Yalta                                      | OSCE Communication Vienna 4 September, 2000, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 16/00 for the period of 15 - 31 August 2000 | Shav says, stance of RU and Geo less fierce and RU pres Ozzakhov very willing to help     |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 Aug</td>
<td>Geo meet in Tbilisi</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 4 September, 2000, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 16/00 for the period of 15 - 31 August 2000 \n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-20 Sept</td>
<td>10th celebration of independence</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 4 October, 2000, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 18/00 for the period of 15-30 September 2000 \n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Sept</td>
<td>Geo police detains five Ossetian in SO</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 4 October, 2000, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 18/00 for the period of 15-30 September 2000 \n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Oct</td>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 15 October, 2000, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 19/00 for the period of 1 - 15 October 2000 \n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-10 Nov</td>
<td>Geo RI mega on visa regime fail</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 7 November, 2000, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 20/00 for the period of 16 - 31 October 2000 \n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 12 November, 2000, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 21/00 for the period of 1 - 15 November 2000 \n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 30 December, 2000, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 23/00 for the period of 1 - 15 December 2000 \n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>RU visa regime for Geo citizens in effect</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 17 January, 2001, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 01/01 for the period of 15 December 2000 - 15 January 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 23 Dec | 2nd Geo RU rehab agreement in Tbilisi signed | Bilateral "Agreement on Mutual Assistance in the Restoration of the Economy in the Zone of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict and on Return of Refugees". SO positive.  
- Fidelity market hot area, shooting incidents |
| 18 Feb | MEETINGS | OSCE Communication Vienna 18 February, 2001, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 03/01 for the period of 1 - 15 February 2001 |
| | | SO started in the end of last year (has not been mentioned before) taxing goods destined to Geo, upon request of the JPKF commander the taxation is postponed until 20 Feb only supply to Tskhinvali now through mainline from RU, which runs through Geo enclave consisting of several villages north of Tskhinvali. SO has announced at the administrative meeting that it intend to build another line circumventing the Geo villages  
- Now it seems there are following categories of meetings:  
  - weekly administrative meeting (bilateral) - "weekly administrative and security meeting between the Georgian and South Ossetian sides under the chairmanship of the JPKF commander"  
  - weekly joint LEB meeting (JPKF attached)  
  - weekly JPKF meeting with monitors  
  - occasionally JCC meetings, as for now none in 18 months  
  - bilateral Geo GEo meetings on econ rehab  
  - bilateral SO Geo working group on status issues, "pol expert group" (JCC attached)  
  - preparatory working groups to the JCC meetings (exon, refugees, LEB/ security)  
  - bilateral working group on refugees/ IDP return (on the initiative of Geo, it was discussed and I think it has already at least wo times convened)  
  - three meetings between Shev and Chib 1996-Jun 1998 |
| 26 Feb | JCC’s joint LEB meeting in Tskhinvali | OSCE Communication Vienna 9 March, 2001, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 04/01 for the period of 16 - 28 February 2001 |
| | | The report says, the last meeting took place in Jul 99, but they have met in the meantime. I  
- Geo wants less military presence in the SO Geo conflict zone and advocates more int support for joint Geo-Osset police force  
- The Joint Control Commission’s ‘ Working Group on the Activities of the Joint Peace Keeping Forces and Cooperation between the Law Enforcing Bodies in the Georgian- Ossetian Zone of Conflict |
| | | OSCE Communication Vienna 23 March, 2001, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 05/01 for the period of 1 March 2001 - 15 March 2001 |
| | | JPKF: crime increases, esp. robberies on main roads, Tskhinvali LEBs involved in crime, one arrested.  
- Electricity temporarily restored for few hours per day, 669 arms, 136 kilos of explosives handed over |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 Mar</td>
<td>Energy supply line from RU to SO restored</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 3 April, 2001; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 06/01 for the period of 16 March 2001 – 31 March 2001 was destroyed in parts by avalanche in Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-22 Mar</td>
<td>JCC prep-working groups met in Moscow</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 3 April, 2001; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 06/01 for the period of 16 March 2001 – 31 March 2001 RU on LEb and econ Econ: Did not agree to establish joint agency to implement econ rehab program in conflict zone. Geo wants bilateral composition, RU wants multilateral one like JCC. (One of the first times that it seems to me that RU takes clear stance on foot-in-mouth policy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Apr</td>
<td>3 Ossetian killed in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 19 April, 2001; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 07/01 for the period of 1 April – 16 April 2001 “apparent” gangland fight, shootout 11 Apr: SO shows trial against burglars on TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-Apr</td>
<td>SO referendum on constitution held</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 3 April, 2001; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 06/01 for the period of 16 March 2001 – 31 March 2001; OSCE Communication Vienna 19 April, 2001; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 07/01 for the period of 1 April – 16 April 2001 SO referendum held on amendment to 1996 constitution. SO authorities set up five constituencies to hold referendum (see 2 Nov 1993 and Spot report) SO officials: 69.1% turnout (23,660 people), 66.7% approved the constitution. Geo villages (approx. 9,000 people) boycotted Changes: presidential candidates must have lived ten years in SO (barring Russian compatriots), Os and RU official languages, though in mainly Geo populated areas Geo has official status RU MFA and OSCE issue concern about referendum hampering resolution process JPKF: situation tense, telephone threats to hospitals and schools on mining and bombing, IDP/refugee return to places of origin which is re taken over by others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-25 Apr</td>
<td>11th JCC session in Vladik</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 30 April, 2001; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 06/01 for the period of 17 - 30 April 2001 11 Apr: First time joined JCC meeting Results: Special Coordination center to be established joint police body. Bilateral econ: to be established: Ru-Geo agency to finance rehab programs from their state budget and int resources, and Geo-SO agency to attract int donors and investors -- on IDP/ref no decisions All sides agree that “the JPKF is the main stabilizing factor in the zone of conflict”. Mission stresses that criminal incidents can “trigger off widespread violence” Geo and RU wants to establish three additional posts along main route, but SO refuses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-23 Apr</td>
<td>Fifth meeting of experts on pol issues in Vladik</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 30 April, 2001; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 06/01 for the period of 17 - 30 April 2001 TAK: “Experts Group of the Authorized Delegations of the Sides within the Framework of the Negotiation Process on a Full-scale Resolution of the Georgian-Osetian Conflict” decides to continue pursuing the talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May</td>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 17 May, 2001; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 09/01 for the period of 1 - 15 May 2001 Gobozova (chpb advisor) sees nego with Geo in deadlock. Says, situation has changed as for RU has a new leadership and int orgs have become more involved. geo stresses that neither side has a legal document and this is why Geo can interpret the existing agreements whosha re based on gos will and are merely political deliberately.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 May</td>
<td>Geo police arrests Geo PKF commander</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 17 May, 2001, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 09/01 for the period of 1 - 15 May 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 May</td>
<td>1 SO police, 2 (supposedly) Chechen, 1 hostage killed in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 27 May, 2001, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 09/01 for the period of 1 - 15 May 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 May</td>
<td>1 SO police, 2 (supposedly) Chechen, 1 hostage killed in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 27 May, 2001, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 10/01 for the period of 16 - 31 May 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 June</td>
<td>NO police arrested Geo PKF commander</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 16 June, 2001, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 11/01 for the period of 1 - 15 June 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 June</td>
<td>1 SO police, 2 (supposedly) Chechen, 1 hostage killed in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 16 June, 2001, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 11/01 for the period of 1 - 15 June 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 June</td>
<td>1 SO police, 2 (supposedly) Chechen, 1 hostage killed in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 18 June, 2001, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 12/01 for the period of 16 June - 3 July 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 June</td>
<td>1 SO police, 2 (supposedly) Chechen, 1 hostage killed in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 18 June, 2001, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 12/01 for the period of 16 June - 3 July 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 June</td>
<td>1 SO police, 2 (supposedly) Chechen, 1 hostage killed in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 18 June, 2001, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 12/01 for the period of 16 June - 3 July 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 June</td>
<td>l.chib dismissal. gov</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 18 June, 2001, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 11/01 for the period of 1 - 15 June 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 June</td>
<td>1 SO police, 2 (supposedly) Chechen, 1 hostage killed in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 18 June, 2001, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 12/01 for the period of 16 June - 3 July 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 June</td>
<td>1 SO police, 2 (supposedly) Chechen, 1 hostage killed in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 18 June, 2001, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 12/01 for the period of 16 June - 3 July 2001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

263
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>OSCE Communication</th>
<th>OSCE Communication</th>
<th>Acknowledge: role of int and RU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-3 Jul</td>
<td>Second secessionist MFA meeting in Stepanakert</td>
<td>18 July, 2001; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 13/01 for the period of 4-15 July 2001</td>
<td>13/01</td>
<td>role of int and RU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-Jul</td>
<td>2 found dead in Tash</td>
<td>18 July, 2001; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 13/01 for the period of 4-15 July 2001</td>
<td>15/01</td>
<td>no further information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-19 Sept</td>
<td>OSCE Expert meeting on police issues in Bucharest</td>
<td>3 September, 2001; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 15/01 for the period of 16 - 31 August 2001</td>
<td>15/01</td>
<td>UNHCR closes office in Tash by the end of Oct. Number of returnees too little.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14-19 Sept</td>
<td>2nd expert meeting on police issues in Bucharest</td>
<td>18 September, 2001; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 16/01 for the period of 1- 15 September 2001</td>
<td>16/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 Oct</td>
<td>OSCE Expert meeting on police issues in Bucharest</td>
<td>2 October, 2001; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 17/01 for the period of 16-30 September 2001</td>
<td>17/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 Nov</td>
<td>First round of SO pres elections</td>
<td>19 November, 2001; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 19/01 for the period of 27 October - 18 November 2001</td>
<td>19/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Dec</td>
<td>OSCE Expert meeting on police issues in Bucharest</td>
<td>2 December, 2001; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 20/01 for the period of 18 - 30 November 2001</td>
<td>20/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Dec</td>
<td>Second round of SO pres elections</td>
<td>18 December, 2001; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 21/01 for the period of 1 – 15 December 2001</td>
<td>21/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 9 January, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 22/02 for the period of 16 – 31 December 2001</td>
<td>210,000 Euro, to strengthen the activities of Geo-SO conflict settlement mechanisms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Dec</td>
<td>EC/OSCE grant concluded in Brussels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 18 January, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 01/02 for the period of 16 - 31 January 2002</td>
<td>JPKF: SO continuously complains about helicopter flights. Over Tskh. Since 13 Oct nine unidentified helicopter flights over &quot;the zone of conflict&quot; [Did the flights start in the end of 2001 or have they been always happening, but none complained?] Roki is closed due to avalanches, as a result, Faloys is almost empty and prices esp on fuel have increased</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Jan</td>
<td>Bidziskhov reelected pres of NO</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 6 February, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 02/02 for the period of 16 - 31 January 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Feb</td>
<td>LEB representatives to Special Coordination Center named</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 18 February, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 03/02 for the period of 1 - 15 February 2002</td>
<td>at weekly administrative meeting. Presentation of the names to the Council of Permanent Representatives [First time i am aware of this; &quot;supervisory body to the Special Coordination Center] Rokitsy returns to SO after three weeks in RU [without really giving word]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Mar</td>
<td>Goxi-Gama visits Geo</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 18 March, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 05/02 for the period of 01 - 15 March, 2002</td>
<td>in Focus weapon hand-over program, community-based projects for weapons</td>
<td>10 Mar: [First?] Meeting of Kok and Dzahik in Viad, decide to intensify relations, regularity, information exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Mar</td>
<td>SCC officially inaugurated</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 18 March, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 05/02 for the period of 01 - 15 March, 2002</td>
<td>EU hands over equipment monthly running costs 25,000 Euro. EU funded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

265
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 Apr</td>
<td>Irrigation project for Geo and Osi villages signed by MoJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Apr</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 18 April, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 07/02 for the period of 1–15 April, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-15 May</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 1-15 May, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 08/02 for the period of 16-30 April, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 June</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 3 June, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 11/02 for the period of 1-15 June, 2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16 Mar: YO publishes appeal to RU Duma, that uner the pretext of fighting terrorism in Pankisi NATO troops shall be deployed in Geo, this is "a real threat of military aggression against SO".

Was there a NATO meeting or visit recently? What initiated this article?]

JPKF: car thefts frequent
28 Mar: 14th observation of unidentified helicopter, near Osi village Mugali (since mid/end of 2001 the reports indicate the ethnicity of the respective village, ethnicizing)
15 Mar: hidden weapons found near Tranci highway, in case of explosion the main electricity line from RU to SO destroyed

6 Apr: Kub interview with Sevene Maya Ossetiya: No working contacts with Geo established so far; explosives on highway bear "no Chechen or Geo implication"

JPKF: few incidents of criminal nature
The Mission-facilitated "Programme of Voluntary Hand-Over of Small Arms and Light Weapons"

JPKF: calm and stable
[The Mission considers the Geo-SO conflict settlement process to be "supported by two mechanisms": JCC and Experts' Group on Comp. Settlement]

"end of May": JC at Interex, Massow, Kok and Jergenia (ABM-PM). Kok: Geo upgrades military, prepares for clash against SO, trained by "foreign instructors". He says, only close cooperation with RU military attack of Geo.
JPKF: calm and stable

Co-Chairman's meeting's prepare JCC-WSG and organize econ rehab "since 28 February, three JCC Co-chairman sessions have been held, two ad hoc committee meetings on refugees and IDPs and one meeting of the working group on military and security issues [ prep, not administrative]
JPKF: calm and stable. JCC decides to include two MI-24 attack helicopters into inventory because of unidentified flights
| Date | Event | OSCE Communication Vienna 1 July, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 12/02 for the period of 16-30 June, 2002
In recent weeks there are increasing numbers of Abkh and SO that have obtained RU citizenship; Choch and RU say, more than 50% of them already hold RU passports. From 1 Jul there will be new RU citizenship law introduced that makes it easier to obtain citizenship. 

[Quote from the AR that presumably quotes from the legal text:] ”simplified procedure to obtain Russian citizenship for applicants “who were citizens of the Soviet Union, resided and continue to reside in the states formerly constituting the USSR, but did not receive citizenship of these states and remain” as a result of this – persons with no citizenship”. * 28 Jun, NG: SO conflict of all post-Soviet conflict the one “closest to a settlement” JCC co-Chair Boris Chochiyev

| Date | Event | OSCE Communication Vienna 15 July, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 13/02 for the period of 1 – 15 July 2002
From now, meetings of JCC Co-Chairs will be considered as “JCC meetings” because they are on equal footing with the “JCC sessions”.

Choch, Macha, for NG Temuraz Kaxov
SO and Geo reluctant to agree on modalities on 2.5 mio Euro EU grant
SO and Geo jointly stood against EU/OSCE proposal to establish a freight and control center Gori-Tskh-Vladi. Until now it is a tax-free zone, center could retrieve revenues. Vested interests on the road seem to remain strong.

OSCE/EU say rehab should be earmarked to nego process. [OSCE/EU first time openly state that they are willing to do rehab-first-then-nego. Before, it was SO who always said this.]

JPRF: calm and stable
18th celebration of JPRF: Geo MoD orders Geo PKF not to participate. Macha says, decision “confrontational” [Who heads the MoD? Which political group?] --- MoD and PR for Conflict settlement are pitching against each other

| Date | Event | OSCE Communication Vienna 16 August, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 14/02 for the period of 16 July – 15 August 2002
with former OSMN commander. Fourth appointment to this position since Rok resumed office.

Water: SO says, water pipe through Geo village was damaged so water supply to Tskh was stopped for four days. On weekly admin meeting on 1 Aug, SO threatened to close water pipe to Gori. On next meeting on 8 Aug Geo authorities informed that they repaired the pipe and prosecute the saboteurs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>OSCE Communication</th>
<th>Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 Jul</td>
<td>Extraordinary JCC session in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 16 August, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 14/02 for the period of 16 July – 15 August 2002</td>
<td>serious problems in JPKF: Geo PKF stays away from JPKF celebration, JCC says, breach of Sochi and breach of orders. As well, understaffed and ill-equipped Geo PKF has no combat ability, and the same for Osb battalion; in mid-Jul eight RU PKF soldiers abandoned their post because they were unsatisfied. 29 Jul: Chuch informs JCC that SO defence authorities have order to open fire against helicopters which are conducting unauthorized flights over SO territory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Aug</td>
<td>Shev says SO can be called SO</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 5 September, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 15/02 for the period of 15-31 August 2002</td>
<td>JPKF: several cases of crime rising tensions. 15 Aug abduction of 1 Geo PKF, Geo criticizes that JPKF search nits extend over Eastern border. 20 Aug Geo villagers in protest close road to Amesi/ mainly Gfs. 22 Aug at weekly admin meeting, JPKF commander justifies the extension with urgency, Geo says it did not receive prior notice. Occasional movements of armed persons in and around C2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-9 Sept</td>
<td>3-killed</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 8 October, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 16/02 for the period of 1-30 September 2002</td>
<td>3-day weekly administrative meeting: TEBIs of both sides discuss measures to increase anti-crime; JPKF comm announces that joint patrols shall be implemented [now for the first time since the start of the reports, the length of the SO section exceeds the Abkh section and it exceeds it by far. More violence/ tensions in SO]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13- Sep</td>
<td>Kolk announces partial mobilization</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 8 October, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 16/02 for the period of 1-30 September 2002</td>
<td>against international terrorism: Securing the Northern border 27 Sept: JPKF commander announces search operation including JPKF checkpoints at the Georgian main East-West road between Tbs and Gori. JCC refused, SO and GEi's, too. 20 Sep: SO shows heavy armament at military parade, Geo says breach of agreement [report creates direct link between Shev speech (30 Sep) on anti-terror fight in Pankisi and Kolk statement at the same day [Interfa] that SO mobilization proves that SO can &quot;restore order if need be&quot; [the report indirectly quoting] irrigation canal project finished on 12 Sept, supervised by OSCE, financed by UK, 30km canal both for SO and Geo villagers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Sep</td>
<td>Burja visits Geo villages in C2</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 8 October, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 16/02 for the period of 1-30 September 2002</td>
<td>Burja, Chairperson of Geo part, OSCE accompanied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4 Oct</td>
<td>JCC meets in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 15 October, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 17/02 for the period of 1-15 October 2002</td>
<td>as well, pol expert group meets in Tskh JPKF: MIA has increased police presence in Gori region and Security zone, three &quot;block points&quot; [means: road blocks] to be established, JPKF and SO informed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18- Oct</td>
<td>JCC meets in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 4 November, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 18/02 for the period of 16 – 31 October 2002</td>
<td>Weekly Sec and Admin meeting canceled because the JCC commander who is the chair was released from this occupation by his superior. JPKF: tension has remained Mid-Oct: Geo MIA carries out large-scale sec operation in Shida Kartli region, anti-crime action. Police and MIA troops establish additional road blocks, i.e. at Tkhavi. In effect, entire North-South axis under control, from Gori to Vadi. JPKF comm says this is increasing tensions. 24 Oct SCC meeting in Tskh, serious intentions apprehended</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 Oct JCC AD Hoc Committee on Refugees and IDPs met for the fourth time this year
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26-29 Oct</td>
<td>Expert group meeting in Castelo Branco, Portugal</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 4 November, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 18/02 for the period of 16 – 31 October 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 22 November, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 19/02 for the period of 01 - 15 November 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 2 December, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 20/02 for the period of 16-30 November 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Dec</td>
<td>Rchiadzhardi, Vakhtang, named PR of the pres for Geo-Qis conflict</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 17 December, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 21/02 for the period of 1 – 15 December 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Jan</td>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 18 January, 2003, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 01/03 for the period of 16 December 2002 to 15 January 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 26 January, 2003, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 01/03 for the period of 16 December 2002 to 15 January 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

JPKF: calm. Heavy armament under OAs authority found in Gubela, "not in accordance with the agreement covering size and type of weapons in the zone of conflict." 22 Jan: Group of traders blocks Falloy in protest against rising prices for entering the market. [what means entering? trading there?] |
<p>| 5 Feb | Rihow and Viza meet in Tbilisi | OSCE Communication Vienna 17 February, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 03/03 for the period of 01-15 February 2003. Agenda: econ rehab. JPKF: SO has admitted presence of heavy armament, says it is going to destroy it in the near future. Vehicle hijacking is starting to cause ethnic tensions in the Tamarasheni-K'ekhvi area, 27 Jan and 13 Feb demonstrations on road at Tamar against car theft. Chibisov released from jail, but not allowed to leave region and waiting for trial. |
| 9 Feb | SCC meeting in Tbilisi | OSCE Communication Vienna 17 February, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 03/03 for the period of 01-15 February 2003. Enhancing the SCC, fighting organized crime. W/E on mil sec issues will review the expediency of the bilateral LEB post K'ekhvi Geo LEB to consider black posts at T'kave and Arzanoi. |
| 21 Feb | SCC meeting | OSCE Communication Vienna 28 February, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 04/03 for the period of 16-28 February 2003. Rihow and Viza say (both on 13 Feb) that they are willing to have Gero and SO MPs meeting. Rihow wants RU Deputy MIA Lobzhanidze in the meeting too. 15 Feb Mayerov in SG: RU side is &quot;strongly in favor of the continuation of revo, process&quot;, this is important because situation in the C2 has deteriorated lately. M says RU side has facilitated all three high-level meetings between Chibidshev, but now the conditions of such meetings &quot;do not allow for it&quot;. JPKF: stable. [since the recent deterioration of reports state not anymore: calm and stable], but &quot;stable and nothing unusual was reported&quot;, and then lobbing the criminal incident(s) increase in crime, Tamar-K'ekhvi remains tense. |
| 6 Mar | SCC meeting | OSCE Communication Vienna 25 March, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 05/03 for the period of 01-15 March 2003. Review of work during the past 12 months. So far, no permit for LEB members to carry weapons in the C2. 10 Mar: Rehab meeting for restoration of Gori-Tskhinvali highway. 11 Mar: Shev says after meeting with Putin at OS meeting in Sochi (6-7 Mar) [no further information given, no SR found]. &quot;That parallel to the Abkhaz problem, we shall be working for the solution to other complex issues, such as, for example, the ultimate settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict and the restoration of relations with this region.&quot; JPKF: stable. |
| 10 Mar | Geo-JPKF subordinated to Head of Geo Military | OSCE Communication Vienna 31 March, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 06/03 for the period of 16-31 March 2003. Mission will investigate whether chain of command is affected. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 Mar</td>
<td>JCC Co chair meeting at RU Embassy in Tbilisi</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 31 March, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 06/03 for the period of 16–31 March 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Apr</td>
<td>SO police launches “security” operation started for one month</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 15 April, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 07/03 for the period of 01-15 April 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Apr</td>
<td>JCC WG on MI and Sec meets in Tbilisi</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 30 April, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 08/03 for the period of 16-30 April 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>3 Geo shot dead at Tamar</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 15 May, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 09/03 for the period of 1-15 May 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 May</td>
<td>JCC meeting in Gori</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 31 May, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 10/03 for the period of 16-31 May 2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
- **April:** Delay of Geo-Ru interchangeable program and third phase of EC rehabilitation program
- **What were the first and the second phase? Check reports**
- **JPKF:** stable, several heavy cases of armed robbery
- **Triangular checkpoint at Megavrikosi is withdrawn and instead a mobile checkpoint is deployed which cover the area Ergneti-erankel-Tkakvi Geo-Osce dispute over land ownership in Nuli prevented to turn violent**

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>3 Geo shot dead at Tamar</td>
<td>Implementation of RU-Geo intergov Agreement from 23 Dec 2000 by setting up an agency, canceled to use EC rehab funds for setting up the tax vignet system on the Transc highway, because SO refused to subordinate its tax authorities to a joint Geo-SO body even though under JCC supervision.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23-25 Jun  | 28th JCC meeting in Moscow
---|---
OSCE Communication Vienna 15 June, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 11/03 for the period of 1-15 June 2003

5 Jun Koch says, Kok ready to meet Shev. Since taking office, Kok has stressed that Geo acknowledgement of its guilt is precondition of meeting between him and Shev

50-Jun  | KKR dismisses heads of security structures
---|---
OSCE Communication Vienna 16 July, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 15/03 for the period of 1-15 July 2003

[When did they do all the other??? Probably, because they renamed the JCC Co-Chair meetings into JCC meetings] (see SR 30 Jun 2003)

decree issued that dismisses "the heads of "State" Security, Defense, Justice and Customs administrations. The decree ordered the personnel of the "Reconnaissance Department" of the "Ministry of Defense" and of the "Escort Unit" of the "State Security Committee" to disband."

Kok declares he wants to cut the link between officials and crime Geo MIA and other Geo officials praise Kok

PKF: tension increased as assaults in the vicinity of Tskh. Forces loyal to Kok protected TV station, post office and state buildings

All PKFs participated in the PKF anniversary

Geo has increased its PKF personnel, newly trained and deployed troops

4-Jul  | 80-informs public about appeal to Putin to join RF
---|---

no official response from RU, internal source to media that it will not be considered

14-15 Jul  | 28th JCC meeting // 9th Pol experts meeting in Tskh
---|---
OSCE Communication Vienna 16 July, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 15/03 for the period of 1-15 July 2003

18-Jul, Caucasus Press, SO NPA Speer says that "the Ossetian side is concerned with the presence of Georgian commandos, trained by American instructors, in the region of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.**, referring to newly deployed Geo PKF troops [Check on NATO activities in Geo, when did they start, when and how was it decided?]

13-Aug  | 80-informs part about dismissal of gov
---|---
OSCE Communication Vienna 15 August, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 15/03 for the period of 1-15 August 2003

in line with anti-corruption fight rehab of So section of Trans Cam goes on with NO and Ru money

PKF: calm, Oss PKF relocated post at lomcha to a new location near by with more defensive features which the Oss PKF has not done before

18-Aug  | 80-informs part about dismissal of gov
---|---
OSCE Communication Vienna 1 September, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 16/03 for the period of 15 - 31 August 2003

Khugayev, SO PM, moves to Vlad after being dismissed

Tensions on Trans Cam because of unilateral actions: SO does road repairs, Geo anti-smuggling operations

PKF: calm. Nabidonov, Acting PKF Commander, says he will raise fight issue with JCC and Geo Mod, he protests against additional deployment of Geo forces to Geo PKF, not in accordance with the start of EC funding from approx. 2000 that int money started to flow into Geo]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 Sep</td>
<td>Igor Sanakoyev appointed PM of SO</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 30 September, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 18/03 for the period of 15 - 30 September 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Sep</td>
<td>SO Indep Day held in very low key manner</td>
<td>RU citizen, appointed by parti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Sep</td>
<td>JPKF Command announces to deploy all unauth posts</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 30 September, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 18/03 for the period of 15 - 30 September 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Oct</td>
<td>Trilateral meeting on pol status of SO in TBi</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 25 October, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 19/03 for the period of 1 - 15 October 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Oct</td>
<td>SGC meeting</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 31 October, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 20/03 for the period of 15 - 30 October 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Sep: Kox reconfirms peaceful settlement JPKF: calm. JPKF comm. complains about unauth Geo police checkpoint at Adzvi. eastern part of CZ. JPKF post at Kekhvi withdrawn. Weekly Admin Meeting skipped. SO deputy MoDef tells Geo news agency that the planned 6000 troops army is almost completed, reports takes no sign of it.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Oct</td>
<td>1 Geo police killed</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 11 October, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 22/03 for the period of 15 - 30 October 2003. HM says to Kik that donor perspectives lessen considerably the poor profile of Geo in The Hague and at the SCC meeting, SO must be more active in nego process. Kik reassures will for peaceful settlement. JPKF: calm, flights. SO says troops in state of emergency as for Geo elections SO ICC Chair tells Geo media that SO wants to send officers to training to Kosovo as invited. Directly contracting with previous SO demand that in exchange there should be a change in the structure of SFC with NGO official participating.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Nov</td>
<td>Kik meets RU MFA in Moscow</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 1 December, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 22/03 for the period of 15 - 30 November 2003. Kik: SO worried about situation in Geo, will await for whom the Geo population will elect, restating will for peaceful settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Dec</td>
<td>Mission discusses rehab funds with SO JPKF: calm</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 15 December, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 23/03 for the period of 1 – 15 December 2003. Mission discusses rehab funds with SO JPKF: calm 31 Dec: Geo security forces carry out anti-smuggling campaign at Megreli, 3 km south-east of Tskhinvali on Geo controlled terr. JPKF: Command notified before. SO MoD says SO armed forces in alert before Geo elections, Mission did not observe increased activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Dec</td>
<td>Putin says RU respects terr int of Geo</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 31 December, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 24/03 for the period of 15–31 December 2003. at the same says, &quot;The highland people form a kind of community and Russia cannot ignore this&quot; [Itar-Tass] Geo names Malkhaz Kakabadze Minister for Special Affairs to be in charge of the EC funds from Geo side JPKF: anti-smuggling operation by special unit of the Ministry of State Security at Tirdznisi (10 km south–east of Tskhinvali in the CZ). Unlike the first one this month, this one is coordinated with the JPKF command. Temporary JPKF posts at Kakhitsi and Megreli to monitor Geo Special forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan</td>
<td>1 killed</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 31 December, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 24/03 for the period of 15–31 December 2003. at Archavi in firefight, three injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Jan</td>
<td>Saaka visits CZ</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 15 January, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 01/04 for the period of 1 – 15 January 2004. for the first time disclosed that the visits, Tamanhwhely, with MIA Barakadze. SO Minister for Internal Affairs asks him to leave the territory. 4 Jan: Kik: &quot;provocative move&quot; Note: This visit happened one day before the Geo pres elections JPKF: calm, flights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-Jan</td>
<td>SO MFA statement: increase in belligerent statements by Geo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 31 January, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 02/04 for the period of 15 - 31 January 2004 against SO since the resignation of Shvey, in particular Ika Ti who said that under the new Geo flag &quot;we will enter both Sukhumti and Tskhinvali&quot;. JPKF: calm. 19 Jan JPKF redeployed checkpoint at Kekhvi. Geo police had never withdrawn. Now, again, it is a joint JPKF/Geo police/SD police checkpoint. Redeployment caused strains in the region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-Jan</td>
<td>MoJ on Rehab signed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|        | OSCE Communication Vienna 31 January, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 02/04 for the period of 15 - 31 January 2004 JDC, EC, OSCE, UNHCR, UNDP. 2.5 mio Euro MoJ on the Implementation of the third EC funded rehabilitation program in the zone of Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Procedures: "UNDP will implement the projects through a local Project Implementing Unit (PIU), assisted by an international expert. The PIU will work under the supervision of a Steering Committee, chaired by the Mission. The Georgian and South-Ossetian sides, the EC, and UNDP will also participate in the Steering Committee."
<p>| 8-Feb  | Dep Comm of the SO Special Forces killed by Geo police              |
|        | OSCE Communication Vienna 15 February, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 03/04 for the period of 1-15 February 2004 Geo police controlled the car at a checkpoint at Erakhi, shootout. Geo police claims car was stolen. JPKF: sometimes mix-up of authorities between SO immigration service and JPKF |
| 14-Feb | Khain named State Minister                                          |
|        | OSCE Communication Vienna 15 February, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 03/04 for the period of 1-15 February 2004 for Conflict Resolution, entire Geo gov appointed |
| 25-Feb | 2 Geo die                                                            |
|        | OSCE Communication Vienna 29 February, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 04/04 for the period of 16-29 February 2004 - in Tamarasheni, in street fight, Geo villagers block the road, SO police blocks all roads surrounding Tskhinvali by order of SO MIA Geo changes its JPKF policy: Geo JPKF representative says, Geo PKF has been disbanded, only one is still there and two battalions will be reinstated elsewhere in the GZ. The Geo PKF will in future not comprise conscripts, but recruited locals. Press reports say, the Geo PKF has not been disbanded. 24-26 OSCE RU MFA meeting in Moscow, RU reiterates appreciation for work of OSCE |
| 3-Mar  | Geo police carry out operation at Falloy                            |
|        | OSCE Communication Vienna 23 March, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 05/04 for the period of 1 - 15 March 2004 anti-smuggling. On the spot, SO police and JPKF rapid reaction arrived |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 31 March, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 06/04 for the period of 15 – 31 March 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Mar</td>
<td>29 Mar Black Sea Press Saaka: “as soon as power is consolidated in the rest of Georgia, we shall reach an agreement with the Ossetians, our friends. We have nothing to argue about”, as well smuggling a problem, NO involvement welcome, improvement of Geo-RU relations JPKF: c/s, several flights (observations of heavy armament becomes more frequent, observers usually across denied by Os military, See Sr 16 Mar) land dispute in Null, OsIs beaten up by Geo [Note: There are OSCE Monitoring Officers and JPKF Military Observers]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Apr</td>
<td>SO calls for conscription</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Apr</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 15 April, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 07/04 for the period of 1 - 15 April 2004 [JPKF: c/s, flights, JPKF comm informs Mission that monitoring will be carried out from now only together with a representative of the SO MoD. Details of the route to be announced in advance [up until now HoM has held at least three meeting with Chair]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-Apr</td>
<td>Tskhici killed by Geo police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-Apr</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 31 April, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 07/04 for the period of 1 - 15 April 2004 when police tried to stop the car Piza for it was reportedly stolen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-Apr</td>
<td>JCC meeting in Tbilis again, Kik and Khain meet for the first time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-Apr</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 30 April, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 06/04 for the period of 16 - 30 April 2004 after six months break endorses appointment of NO representative to SCC. Until very recently, Geo was opposed to this proposal from SO which was blocking progress in the SCC. JPKF: c/s, Geo MoD dies, “death believed to be from natural causes”, Alimbegovich new MoD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>JCC Co-Chairs meet at RU Embassy in Tbilis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 May</td>
<td>SO parl elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 May</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 31 May, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 10/04 for the period of 16-31 May 2004 26 May: Saaka addresses SO “brothers” to start immediate talks on the restoration of a single state” pledged, status of OsI language will be guaranteed, speaks OsI. SO MoF Djoriey says SO is interested only in good neighborhood relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May</td>
<td>Geo MoD deploys in Imereti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 31 May, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 10/04 for the period of 16-31 May 2004 [See all SRs and ARs from here] deployed to protect geo police checkpoints. MIA special forces by helicopter to Tkvarcheli, protect police carrying out anti-smuggling operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Jun</td>
<td>Reolets tries to visit CZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Jun</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 31 May, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 11/04 for the period of 16-31 May 2004 Geo children in village, is held back by SO authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-Jun</td>
<td>Geo PM to cross-task SO activities among Geo bodies; Vano Merabishvili, former Secretary of the NCS, now Sec. Minister Anti-smuggling ongoing; SO against Geo checkpoint at Tkvarcheli, reduces links with Geo authorities, does not allow them to enter SO, postpones meetings with int frameworks 12 Jun Saaka announces on Ruhani that Geo “has stopped contraband” from SO. JPKF: tense but stable. Flights, Geo PFK now provided by MIA troops. 11 Jun: Chech complains about bias of the OSCE against SO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-Jun</td>
<td>JCC Co Chair informal meeting in Tblisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Jun-1 Jul</td>
<td>JCC meeting in Moscow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-Jul</td>
<td>Informal JCC Co Chair meeting in Tblisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-Jul</td>
<td>Montage-taking of 42 Geo options in C2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-15 Jul</td>
<td>JCC high-level meeting in Moscow</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


JPKF tension further escalated. Geo police detains trucks such as JPKF fuel trucks, increases personnel and armament at checkpoints. »»”None of these armaments exceed the limitations of the respective agreements between the conflicting sides.”“

Constantly movement of unidentified armed troops in the CE (reports indicate that illegal checkpoints are due to – from Geo: police/ MIA troops, and – from SO: unidentified armed persons). SO deploys checkpoints, and officially says so, as for protection of population. SO and GEo deploy checkpoints right next to each other, within hours and withdrawing again.

Saaka introduces Vice PM to cross-task SO activities among Geo bodies; Vano Merabishvili, former Secretary of the NCS, now Sec Minister

Anti-smuggling ongoing; SO against Geo checkpoint at Tiviari, reduces links with Geo authorities, does not allow them to enter SO, postpones meetings with int frameworks

12 Jun Saaka announces on R/(t)avini-2 that Geo “has stopped conductance” from SO.

JPKF: “tense but stable”. Flights. Geo PKF now provided by MIA troops. Geo anti-smuggling ongoing. SO condemns the “blockade” on SO, continues banning journalists and foreigners, enforces checkpoints at borders, restricts movements of Geo living in SO

11 Jun: Choch complaints about bias of the OSCE against SO.

25 Jun Loshokin R/U Dep MIA visits Tblisi and Zurabishvili, Zurab says, Geo made concrete proposal for joint control of Rk/s (press conference at media TV)

30-Jun-1 Jul | JCC meeting in Moscow |


Khan (Geo JCC Co-chair) in opening statement demands the release of three members of Geo Sec Ministry detained in Tblisi: SO refuses, the meeting was canceled.

3-Jul-1 Tskiteli (EUROPEAN UNION Special Representative) in SO, main issue finishing of Geo-Tbisi railway

6-Jul | Informal JCC Co Chair meeting in Tblisi |


8-Jul | Montage-taking of 42 Geo options in C2 |


JPKF Extremely tense. “Close to develop into violent.”

7 Jul, increase of tensions: two RJ lorries taken by Geo MIA, SO deploys in Pria, Geo Senior Military Representative in JPKF [not the Geo KF commander?] detained by SO for 1.5 hours, and released.

8-Jul: 39 released OSCE mediated on 9 Jul

10-Jul: Extraordinary JPKF meeting in Tblisi. RJ commander of RU Ground forces urges easing of tensions. MNO (Mission Monitoring Office) apprehended by SO
25–28 Jul
Zhelev, President of Bulgaria, Special Envoy of OSCE visits Tbs

OSCE Communication Vienna 31 July, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 14/04 for the period of 16 – 31 July 2004 SIR 20, 21, 30 Jul urges parties to stick to new commitments, meets Saaka, Bunia, Zurabi, Kahi. OSCE issues statement calling for all sides to control their armed personnel in the CZ.

JPKF: Extremely tense, situation worsened.
JPKF: Ruk PKF helps SO authorities to remove Oss road block between Talib and Tamara on Trans Cam, Geo post remains.
JPKF: Geo police and MVD troops found at Erebi. Deputy head of the Erebi Administration threatens senior Russian Military Observer that he will be shot if he shows up again.

31/32 1d overnight fire on Tamarasheni, Achaveli and Karta (All Geo, north of Tbil)

+++masses of illegal heavy armament found by MOs. Troops movements without giving prior notice to JPKF command frequent.

13–14 Aug
Ruk and Zhv sign ceasefire agreement Casualties

OSCE Communication Vienna 15 August, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 15/04 for the period of 01-15 August 2004 SIR 4, 5, 12, 16 (2 reports for 16-Aug) AUG

JPKF: situation gradually deteriorated. Exchanges of fire increased, civilian villages under fire, both military and civilian casualties. [First time casualties mentioned in the AR since 31 May]
JPKF: 2 more staff for mil observer mission

13–14 Aug
Geo parl sets up Committee on Restoration of Territorial Integrity

OSCE Communication Vienna 15 August, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 15/04 for the period of 01-15 August 2004

First session on 16-Aug on SO. Issues for both for Abkh and SO. 23 members.

17–18 Aug
Extraordinary JCC meeting with Ruk and Zhv in Tbil and Tbs

OSCE Communication Vienna 15 August, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 16/04 for the period of 16-31 August 2004

decision to continue high-level meetings
decision to clear heights overlooking the Georgian by-pass road in a joint Geo/ Oss operation. Planned for 19 Aug, but abandoned on 18 Aug, after renewed Geo shelling of the heights. JCC then agreed on locating JPKF observers at the same site.

19–21 Aug
Saaka issues statement to withdraw all armed troops from CZ

OSCE Communication Vienna 31 August, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 16/04 for the period of 16-31 August 2004 SIR

JPKF: situation gradually calmed down.
JPKF: 15-18 nightly firefights with use of heavy artillery.
No exchange of fire being reported since evening of 19 Aug.
However, the sides use the ceasefire to improve previous and new defensive positions throughout the CZ. As well, deliberate non-cooperation by both sides with JPKF and OSCE on the ground (during monitoring.)
No full withdrawal be either side. Geo PKF ratatates replacing MIA troops with MMD troops
So MFA does not allow Geo villagers’ religious procession from Nkozi to Tamar through Tbil, Khain to clarify it. Provision used by pass road.
Geo media call the provision og humanitarian aid by the Geo gov to Geo and Oss villages in the CZ the “humanitarian attack”

2–11 Sep
23 OSCE Ambassadors visit Geo

OSCE Communication Vienna 16 September, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 17/04 for the period of 1-15 September 2004

JPKF: stable. Despite occasional light arms fire, ceasefire hold.
"The Mission believes that the bulk of the Georgian Interior Ministry troops have been withdrawn from the zone of conflict."
JPKF: meet with entire Geo leadership, with SO leadership and raise issues of escalation and settlement
B-Sep
Rualkhemetov replaces Nabidov as PKF commanders
OSCE Communication Vienna 16 September, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA Activity Report No. 17/04 for the period of 1-15 September 2004 Weekly Mission Military Reports from 7 Sep

[1] recall an incident linked to Nabidov, related to SO status — he said smith that he is no sure to which country SO belongs and was dismissed shortly after that.

21-Sep
Saaka addresses UNSC
OSCE Communication Vienna 3 October, 2004, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA Activity Report No. 18/04 for the period of 16-30 September 2004

1-20,22/04. OSCE for the period of 16-30 September 2004

30-Sep
JCC meeting in Moscow
OSCE Communication Vienna 3 October, 2004, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA Activity Report No. 18/04 for the period of 16-30 September 2004

preparation of 2hr-Rok meeting.
PKF: tense but stable. Improved explosives (IED) found on Trans cam near RU post at Kekhi. The report says possibilities are: a)the condition and age of the explosive, the lack of camouflage of the IED and the timing of the find, point to the likelihood that this was an IED meant to be found rather than to be used; b) this was an attempt to set an IED by non-professional persons intended to disrupt traffic on the Transcam or to ambush a PKF convoy; c) this was an attempt to provoke some sort of reaction, either from local inhabitants in both communities or from the PKF; d) this was an attempt to maintain a high level of tension in the zone of conflict amongst the population (from both communities). It also might be a mixture of any or all of the above."

12 Oct
2 Oss PKF soldiers killed
OSCE Communication Vienna 28 October, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA Activity Report No. 19/04 for the period of 01-15 October 2004

Ambush on four Oss PKP’s belonging to NO PKF battalion. 4km SE of Ord. Gromi, close to Kirikak. Geo police detained the wounded at Geo hospital and released them later. >>> SR

12 Oct
due to this, Steering Committee for rehab did not take place Geo police detained buses traveling through Roki to Armenia. Karélik says, passengers only allowed to travel through Lars checkpoint. [First time, Karélik is mentioned as an authority] PKF situation has worsened. Daytime shooting resumed, nighttime shooting increased. No flights.

15 Nov
Rok-2hr meeting in Sochi
OSCE Communication Vienna 25 November, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA Activity Report No. 21/04 for the period of 01-15 November 2004

agree to withdraw all armed units from the GC. EC, Loishzerm, JCC Co chairs. >>>SR 8 Oct PKF: stable but tense. Overnight shooting with light arms. Flights. RU and Geo PKF stated joint demining.

19-20 Nov
JCC meeting, Vlad
OSCE Communication Vienna 30 November, 2002, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA Activity Report No. 22/04 for the period of 15-30 November 2004

Demilitarisation
PKF: first week very tense. Second week “calmed down considerably ... down to one or two incidents [of nightly exchanges of fire] per night” renewed Geo police activity in the southern C2, 19 Nov ambush on Geo PKF with two
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 Jan</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 29 February, 2005, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 02/05 for the period of 15-31 January 2005</td>
<td>SO resident detained by Geo police being suspected of two murders in Tamarasheni last year. Same night, Geo chief of police of Eredvi taken hostage while being on duty in Ergneti. 27 Jan last hostage released. JPKF: Smal arms shooting. Refusal of MoD to grant OSce access to Dzevera. New illegal SO positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Jan</td>
<td>Emergency Session of the JCC in Tskh</td>
<td>Yield to be the waxing point of hostage crisis 24 Jan SO pari appeals to CoE to send its representatives to study the situation on the ground.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Jan</td>
<td>Saaka delivers speech at PACE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Feb</td>
<td>US diplomats meet Echch in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 15 February, 2005, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 03/05 for the period of 1-15 February 2005 5-Feb 3rd meeting of Steering committee JPKF: relatively calm, shooting incidents diminished. Open appearance of SO MoD units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-28 Feb</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 2 March, 2005, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 04/05 for the period of 16-28 February 2005</td>
<td>24 Feb SPKFs met with Khan &gt;&gt;&gt; SFC process on joint policing reinstalled JPKF: calm but tense. Mainty small arms, but some grande explosions. Restriction of OSce personnel by SO MoD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 March</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 16 March, 2005, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 05/05 for the period of 1-15 March 2005</td>
<td>Weekly Administrative Meetings (Thursday meetings) under the chairmanship of the JPKF commander have resumed after a break of one year. 1 Mar: Fourth meeting of the Steering Committee JPKF: calm but tense. Low level, but shooting increased in some areas from the Dzini-Satikhani-Eredvi triangle along the Lesser Ialchvi River to the north-east of Tskhinvali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-17 Mar</td>
<td>JCC Co Chairs meeting in Moscow</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 4 April, 2005, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 06/05 for the period of 16-31 March 2005 agree on: drafting action plan for “completing” demil, as well special focus to joint LEB and rehab. 17 Mar: Geo gov issues decree on controlling humanitarian aid into CZ, coordinating Geo bodies, certifying goods etc., Khiam tasked with coordination and liaison with JPJK. JPJK: calm but tense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 15 April, 2005, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 07/05 for the period of 1-15 April 2005 JPK: calm (this generally means, small arms fire remain at a low level with several grenade explosions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 3 May, 2005, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 08/05 for the period of 16-30 April 2005 Informal meeting of the Steering Committee JPK calm. Sides agree for the first time on small steps for demil. 20 Apr: McI says it has closed the reservist training base in TV interview, too.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>Geo and SO security forces clash</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 3 May, 2005, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 09/05 for the period of 1-15 May 2005 5 May - Sixth meeting of the Steering Committee JPJK: calm. Dzevra fully dismantled. Demil stalled again. 7 May: Geo students hold demonstration at JPJK post in Megrelkbi against RU bases in Geo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-31 May</td>
<td>JCC Co Chairs meet in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 3 June, 2005, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 10/05 for the period of 16-31 May 2005 Initially in Vlad, but due to shooting on 29 May relocated to Tskh, prep of meeting between Geo and SO MIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 19th</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 17 August, 2005, OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report No. 15/05 for the period of 1 - 15 August 2005</td>
<td>7 Aug Saaka assures of Geo not repairing military operation, due to earlier statements of Kofi, JPKF c/f. Limited traffic on TransCam under JPKF escort through Geo villages. 2 Aug 9th meeting of the Steering Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 9th</td>
<td>Saaka on strategy</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 21 September, 2005, OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report No. 17/05 for the period of 1 - 15 September 2005 See AR First speech after summer break. Three stages, 1. State apparatus reform 2. Infrastructure and energy, 3. jobs and economy. All three stages of the plan serve the &quot;ultimate goal of unifying Georgia&quot; RU fosters the militarization of CJs. Wants Americans in to SO settlement: &quot;For the first time in many years, the Americans have expressed their readiness to get directly involved in the settlement of conflicts in Georgia.&quot; JPKF tense 15 Sept 10th Steering Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 20-22</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 5 October, 2005, OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report No. 18/05 for the period of 16 - 30 September 2005</td>
<td>M&amp;O (Eknos) dorses Transcam at Achagbeli after ml parade in Tskh, did vehicle searches without prior JPKF consultation; early evening mortars strike civilian buildings in Tskh 21 Sept: Seven explosions near Geo villages north of Tskh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 11th</td>
<td>Geo parl resolution on JPKF</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 20 October, 2005, OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report No. 19/05 for the period of 1 - 15 October 2005 Resolution &quot;Regarding the Current Situation in the Conflict Regions on the Territory of Georgia and Ongoing Peace Operations&quot; Geo govt to hold talks with all sides to improve performance of JPKF Report back to par 10 Feb. If negative assessment of nego, par &quot;shall demand the cessation of the peace-keeping operation and [... ] abolition of the existing structures from 15 Feb 2006&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 24-25</td>
<td>45th JCC meeting in Moscow</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 3 November, 2005, OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report No. 20/05 for the period of 15 – 31 October 2005 Three stage approach for settlement: 1. demil, 2. rehab, 3. pol settlement by status, on the basis of Saaka’s LUNGA proposal from Sep 2004 and Kofi’s statement from 24 Dec 2004. JPKF: first time since 20 Sep more stable, but still tense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 26th</td>
<td>First ILB meeting hosted by OSCE in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 3 November, 2005, OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report No. 20/05 for the period of 15 – 31 October 2005 50 MIA Mindayyan, representatives of the neighboring police departments of Shota Kartli, Racha-Lachkhumi, Mtskheta-Tsmaeti, Chief Shota Kartli regional police. Jugheli. Consent of Geo MIA, one representative Signing of joint action plan 27 Oct Geo PM Nakhadze requests JCC CO chair of visiting Geo villages, who says he should contact SO MFA. Visit was postponed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 15-17</td>
<td>ICC Co Chairs meet in Ljubljana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Dec</td>
<td>Ralik proposes joint settlement steps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Dec</td>
<td>Ralik agrees with Geo on settlement road map</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OSCE Communication Vienna 16 November, 2005, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 21/05 for the period of 01 – 15 November 2005**


... OSCE initiated Needs Assessment Study.

10 Nov 11th Steering Committee, Geo-Os gas experts have jointly begun to assess the Java-Tsik pipeline in view of the connection of Geo villages through the Khkho-Tsik segment of the pipe

OSCE still expects to receive a final Geo investigation report on explosions of 20 Sep

**OSCE Communication Vienna 5 December, 2005, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 22/05 for the period of 15 – 30 November 2005**

only joint positions in NAS and rehab, in other issues the protocol only outlines the differences.

JPKF: C/O Geo boy from 19-Aug released after joint SO and Geo police operation (SRs)

15 Nov rear escalation when Geo car with non-valid JPKF plates was stopped by RU/PKF,

one occupant was Geo Dep Chief of Special Forces of the MIA, 20 masked and armed men arrived and the OP commander ordered his men into combat alert. Geo MOs discussed with Geo MIA personnel and eased tensions.

**OSCE Communication Vienna 16 December, 2005, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 23/05 for the period of 1 – 15 December 2005**

JPKF: situation deteriorated significantly, then to 7/t/s.

9 Dec again all cars irrespective of their plates and origine let through Geo checkpoints

7 Dec all detainees released.

6 Dec SO detainees four Geo police and 20 Geo civilians. Later that day Geo police detains four SO officials. SO MIA orders to open fire on unauthorized armed formations.

5 Dec one SO police arrested by Geo Military police for counterfeiting.

4 Dec Geo police earlier that day closed road along the Lesser Liakhvi River for cars with RU and Geo plates.

4 Dec Relatives of the four missing Geo block Transcam. Blockade of relatives until 13 Dec.

15 Dec SO police recovers bodies of the men, Geo and Osx detained.

2 Dec SO MIA post attacked by Geo Sepcial forces, MOs cannot find sings of attack.

**OSCE Communication Vienna 4 January, 2005, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 24/04 for the period of 16-31 December 2004**

22-23 Dec: ICC Co chairs meet in Tbi on Soxs 5 Nov and Vladi 20 Nov. Choch criticizes OSCE policy of dubious standards, ignores Geo violations and is light on SO.

24 Dec: ICC Co chairs meet in Tbi. Agreement that Geo and Osx ICC Co chairs inspect all key positions in the CE including hills surrounding Liakhvi Gorge.

29 Dec: Djizyev: MMbOs not needed at Rohi, their numbers sufficient enough to be unbiased

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>no agreement on action plan although acknowledgment that there are new initiatives. Most divergent issue dem. Mistrust of SO because of Resolution of Geo parli from 11 Oct concerning possible withdrawal of PKF. Geo calls for prompt demil. independent from a joint peace plan. Other sides considered this as a refusal to work on a joint peace plan. 19 Dec OSCE receives a copy of the Final Investigation Report of the Geo MIA on the shelling of Tskh on 20 Sept WHERE IS THE DOCT?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Jan</td>
<td>1 Oz found dead</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 6 February, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 01/06 for the period of 9 - 31 January 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>close to Geo villages to the north of Tskh 5 Jan: SO JCC CG Chair refuses meeting in Tbs due to his security. Geo Co Chair reiterates invitation and assures that sec will be guaranteed. 18 Jan ND NO Chair invites to Vladj, but Geo Co Chair refuses due to snow. SO Co Chair offers to travel through Transcam, but Geo Co Chair says this would mean crossing an international border illegally. JPKF: US flight. SD complains about frequent rotations of Geo PKF, allegedly in prep of future mil operations. 16 Jan JPKF comm address strong letter to Geo because deployment of Geo police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15- Feb</td>
<td>Geo parli calls for abolition of JPKF (revision of Soch)</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 22 February, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 02/06 for the period of 1 - 15 February 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>See this AR on Security Situation for a typical compilation of incidents as an example to what the situation settled into gradually since 2004. calls for intensified coop of the govt with iso and partner states to &quot;replace the peacekeeping troops of the Russian Federation by an &quot;effective international peacekeeping operation&quot;, and to develop a new negotiation format which can help implementing the &quot;peace plan approved by the Foreign Ministers of the OSCE member states.&quot; JPKF: more tense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 6 March, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 03/06 for the period of 16 - 28 February 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17 Feb RU Co Chair proposes to relocate JCC meeting from Vienna to Moscow. Geo immediately refuses. Scheduled Vienna meeting 20-21 Feb canceled and took place in Moscow only with NO, SO and RU, without Geo, OSCE and EC. [Exclusions of JCC meetings start to become a tense issue, last one Tbs or Vladj] JPKF: increased SO military activity observed. Second rotation of Geo PKF in six weeks, temporary SO road blocks to reprevent, Geo block sin response N and S of Tskh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 17 March, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 04/06 for the period of 1-15 March 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JPKF: UT: tight. Geo MI Pol Chief says, RU PKF's must hold valid Geo visa. JPKF Comm announces that non-Geo personnel can leave posts only on official duty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-29 Mar</td>
<td>48th JCC meeting in Vladi</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 4 April, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 05/06 for the period of 16 – 31 March 2006 Geo criticizes fulfillment of JPKF mandate, SO in turn criticizes MMOs and patrolling activities only in presence of JPKF. Agreed on forwarding recommendations to their resp. leaderships JPKF TF, then c/s Especially NO PKFs are mistrustful against MMOs. Because of Geo police anti-smuggling in South of C2 lack of coop between SO and Geo LEBs and due to this the resulting damage between the local populations on both sides. (de facto means, lack of coop rises ethnic tensions) 17 Mar: 13th Steering Committee, agrees that most projects are completed, remaining is gasification of Kekhvi and hydro-power station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-31 Mar</td>
<td>Geo-Oss dialogue meeting in Vladi</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 20 April, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 06/06 for the period of 1 - 15 April 2006 “Georgian-Ossetian dialogue meeting” on “Compensation, Restitution and Restoration of rights for the victims of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict”, organized by International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). — SO authorities refused to take part 14-15 Apr Third NAS meeting JPKF: c/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 May</td>
<td>SATC Parli Assembly sits in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 2 May, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 07/06 for the period of 16 – 30 April 2006 JPKF: c/s 21 Apr: NAS Comm decides to reduce projects from 12.5 to 10 mio Euro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-22 May</td>
<td>49th JCC session in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 23 May, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 08/06 for the period of 1 - 15 May 2006 JPKF: c/s 11 May Kok says, MMOs conduct monitoring with Geo Intelligence Service and must quit or MMOs will be expelled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-28 May</td>
<td>SO detains Geo citizens</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 2 June, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 09/06 for the period of 15-31 May 2006; OSCE Communication Vienna 3 June, 2006, SEC.FE/257/06 RESTRICTED; OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Spot Report; SUddlen increase in tension and associated incidents around Tskhinvali 27 - 28 May 2006. SO LEIBs detain Geo citizens for 30 min for document check. Four hours later, Geo police detains 2-Os at Khchkhia, then further eight detained and taken to gori. More people detained in other places. SO police and the RU PKF OP at Tamashvili close the Transcam. At Kurtka Fushor 8 SO detained. Dep Gov of Shida Kartli arrives at Kurtka. Order for detentions from Gori Chief of Regional Police. Operation however diffuse, not clear who is in charge. Geo PM and MIA express concern to Mission. Other Geo sources say, Osi are checked as for entering through Roki. Geo Special Forces surround Penk OP and hold PKF personnel at gunpoint, take detainees to Eredvi. In the course of 28 May, all detainees are released and TransCam reopened. — SR ascribes Geo actions as extremely irreversible and over-handled, as a reaction to the detention of a small number of Geo by SOs. SR 257: details on responsibilities, chain of actors, behavior — 17 May: 14 th meeting of Steering Comm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Jun</td>
<td>OSCE Donor’s Conference on SO in Brussels</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 23 June, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 10/06 for the period of 1 -15 June 2006. NAS process preparation for Donor’s Conf/ ongoing rehab Geo PM Noghi and CIO open conf. Four JCC Co chairs. More than 10 mio Euros. SO continuously accuses OSCE of spying for Geo, passing on biased information to CIO. PKF: c/v. Increased activity by Geo Special Forces, so that on 14 Jun a group of Osi residents came up to OP and asked MMOs for help. MMOs accompanied them back to their villages until armed SO volunteers arrived. (That’s that about the OSCE weapon hand-over program.) [out-of-hand situation, vigilanism tolerated, OSCE concept failed]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-Jun</td>
<td>50th JCC session in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 3 July, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 11/06 for the period of 16 -30 June 2006. attended by Geo and SO LEIB heads and respective representatives of the RU and NO bodies. Most immediate security decision: Removal of two recently moved and reinforced checkpoints at Anemuri (by SO police) and Zemo Prisi (by Geo police) SR 297/06 JPKF: t and unpredictable. Continued improvements of SO positions, increased number of Geo LEIBs at posts in C. 22-23 Jun Tskhinvali radio calls for demonstration infront of OSCE office against the “pro-Georgian activities of the OSCE”, demo against post in Prisi only disperses when confirmed that the post had been removed. (Before the escalation in May 2004, SO leadership praised the OSCE’s activities even in public statements) See SR 298 on internal SO atmosphere against int.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-Jul</td>
<td>First meeting of Sierra Comm with SO and Geo represent</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 24 July, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 12/06 for the period of 1 -15 July 2006. only on-the-ground project issues. 13 Jul: MsMo discusses 11 Jun detention of MMOs with Choch and PKF comm. JPKF: t and unpredictable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9//14 Jul</td>
<td>head of SO NGO killed in bomb blast/ 2 in explosion in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 24 July, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 12/06 for the period of 1 -15 July 2006. until 25 Jul major Geo military exercises at Ospreo media warnings that situation could be destabilized by either side in the context of St Petersburg G8 meeting.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

286
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-Aug</td>
<td>41st Steering Comm. meeting in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 31 August, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 14/06 for the period of 1 - 15 August 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-Aug</td>
<td>51st JCC in Moscow</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 31 August, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 14/06 for the period of 1 - 15 August 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-Aug</td>
<td>Shooting at Saaka helicopter at C2 overflight</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 31 August, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 14/06 for the period of 1 - 15 August 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-Sep</td>
<td>3 SO police, 1 Geo police die in shooting incident</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 22 September, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 16/06 for the period of 1 - 15 September 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Sep</td>
<td>Informal JCC Co Chair meeting in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 22 September, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 16/06 for the period of 1 - 15 September 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Geo</td>
<td>2 Geo die close to C2 of gunshot</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 5 October, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 17/06 for the period of 16 - 30 September 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-Sep</td>
<td>17th Steering Comm with Geo and SO</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 5 October, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/Activity Report No. 17/06 for the period of 16 - 30 September 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- JPKF: t/u. many overflights.
- 14 Jul: expiry of “Georgian period of “grace” for people already traveling to and from RU
- 23 Jul: SO volunteers at Dilmahone (Dsh) open fire at Geo police officer driving by, seriously injured, manages to reach Annex (Geo)
- 28 Jul: discovery of 250 m of new trenches SE of Tskh built by SO MIA

[Where does actually derive the word “immigration post”? From Russian use? Used for SO police checkpoints, introduced only several years ago]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12-13 Oct</td>
<td>Third round of talks of the 51st IJC session</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 20 October, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 18/06 for the period of 1-15 October 2006</td>
<td>reaffirmation of antagonistic positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Oct</td>
<td>NO announces to create Liaison Office in Tskh</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 6 November, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 19/06 for the period of 16-31 October 2006</td>
<td>Geravim Khugayev to be heard, was SO FM 1993-95, NO FM Nitolav Khitiditsov: “enhance coop between the two republics” “Salvation Union of Ossetians” sets up alternative elections in opposition to Kok. Election Committee sits in Eredet. SO claims Tbs tries to establish puppet government in Tskh. Candidates: Masa Chigoeva-Tsaboshvili, Georgiy Ghanoiev, Teymuraz Osheragov, Tamara Charayeva and Dmitriy Sanaoyev. 28 Oct NO parl call Duma to condemn 1920 acts of “Geo national extremist forces” as genocide. 30 Oct 13th Steer Comm JFK: f/u. “Ossetian Road of Life” bypasses Geo villages along Transcam n of Tskh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Oct</td>
<td>1 Geo dies</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 6 November, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 19/06 for the period of 16-31 October 2006</td>
<td>in hospital after incident on 9 Oct between Geo and SO locals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Oct</td>
<td>1 Geo dies</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 6 November, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 19/06 for the period of 16-31 October 2006</td>
<td>as a result of mine explosion between Kurta and Kekhvi. [most common reaction of both sides after casualties occur: closing down of their respectively controlled roads, mostly the TransCam. If members of the services die, controls of goods and documents tighten, are arbitrarily performed, with subsequent arrests, abuse in detention — it is mainly the free movement in the CZ that is affected first]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Oct</td>
<td>Start of B exceedingly long pipeline</td>
<td>OSCE Communication Vienna 6 November, 2006, OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA/ Activity Report No. 19/06 for the period of 16-31 October 2006</td>
<td>Mamsurov and Kok attended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SO "presidential election" result in landslide victory of Kok together with the approval of independence in the "referendum of independence"  
"Alternative election" declares Dimitry Sanakoev the winner (Os and former PM and MoD of SO) and "alternative referendum" asks for start of nego with Geo on federal grounds.  
--- two rival Ossetian camps in SO might seriously deteriorate tensions in CZ. (Are the pro-Sana guys really Ossetian?!)  
OSCE strengthens rehab team  
JPKF: 1/16, During election 11-13 Nov SO police strengthened positions and armed personnel. |
| 3 Dec | RU Duma calls on int comm to recognize ind | OSCE Communication Vienna 3 December, 2006, OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report No. 21/06 for the period of 16-30 November 2006.  
JPKF: Working Meeting (WM) of Steer Comm (which is the executive body to the econ Rehab Programme/ NAO) in Tash.  
All sides agree that project contributes to building trust between the sides (only setting where this is said in a long time).  
JPKF: 1/16, During meeting 11-13 Nov SO police strengthened positions and armed personnel. |
| 29 Nov | Sana appoints gov | OSCE Communication Vienna 29 December, 2006, OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report No. 22/06 for the period of 1-15 December 2006.  
Karta-based |
| 12 Dec | SO hands in draft to redefine role of OSCE in SO | OSCE Communication Vienna 29 December, 2006, OSCE Mission to Georgia/Activity Report No. 22/06 for the period of 1-15 December 2006.  
Draft MoU on the basis of 1993 MoU. So repeatedly tried to change the 1993 MoU. |
### ANNEX 2: Casualties

Account of casualties in the Georgian- Ossetian conflict zone based on reports of the OSCE Mission to Georgia 1994 – 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>JPKF</th>
<th>other LEBs</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
<th>Unspecified</th>
<th>Oss</th>
<th>Geo</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>16 Oct</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 Mihe</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>none</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>first half</td>
<td>&gt;15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>30 May</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>east of Tskh</td>
<td>refugee in Geo village</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>first half of Jul</td>
<td>head of village by predecessor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>first half of Aug</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>by Geo policeman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>first half of Apr</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tamarasheni</td>
<td>by &quot;drunk&quot; RU PKF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>maybe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5-Sep</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>by RU training missile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>first half of Dec</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Artsevi</td>
<td>locals arrested in joint LEB activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>first half of Feb</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>maybe</td>
<td>Znauri and Java (Oss)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td>former IDP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13-Jul</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Falloy market</td>
<td>robbery, suspects are local Oss</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>13 Oct</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Falloy market</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 May</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tskh</td>
<td>criminal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 May</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Kheiti (Geo)</td>
<td>car ambush, commemoration day of 1992 killings of Oss by geo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Apr</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tskh</td>
<td>gangs' shootout</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 May</td>
<td>1 police (SO)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tskh</td>
<td>Chechen, 1 hostage; supposedly Chechen, shootout at control by SO police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-Jul</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tskh</td>
<td>found dead</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>end Nov</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>gang shoots at Geo/SO police control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>early Sep</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tamarasheni</td>
<td>sons and father</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Oct</td>
<td>1 police (geo)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Khviti</td>
<td>during operation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>end Dec</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Archevi</td>
<td>shootout</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-Feb</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Eredvi</td>
<td>Deputy Commander of the SO Special Forces shot by Geo police during control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-Apr</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ptsa</td>
<td>by Geo police during control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-Aug</td>
<td>2 (Oss)</td>
<td>both military and civilian</td>
<td>first time, casualties are mentioned since May 31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Oct</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kirbali</td>
<td>NO PKF, ambush</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>5 (4 Oss uniformed, 1 Geo police)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Geo vill n of Tskh</td>
<td>body found, mine accident</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>end Jun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Geo Vill of</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-Jan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Geo vill n of Tskh found dead</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-Jul</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tskh head of SO NSC in bomb blast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Jul</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tskh</td>
<td>explosion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-Sep</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tbeti</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>end Sep</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>close to CZ, gunshot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Oct</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>in hospital after shooting on Oct 9 between Geo and Oss locals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Oct</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>mine accident between Kurtta/ Kekhvi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CZ = Conflict zone  
LEB = Law Enforcement Body/ Bodies  
NO = North Ossetian
### ANNEX 3: Political events 1989 – 2008

Data from OSCE reports and interviews of the field research in Georgia in 2009 and 2010 (I n)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sept</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>InterFront founded in Latvia (I 24)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Start of anti-Abkh demos (I 25, 29) (SPE)</td>
<td>Demos turn into pro-Geo indep (I 25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SO declares indep; RU low key when SO declares indep</td>
<td>Elections/ Gamsa into power (I 25)</td>
<td>March to Tskh (I 13, 25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gorb referendum (I 13, 24) ; Khuzbegi Agreement</td>
<td>Gorb offers Gamsa deal (I 19) [Apr/ May]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Parl abolishes SO aut (I 25) ; Violence started formally with Geo police killed, Tbs declared state of emerg (I 13)</td>
<td>Parish elected SO (I 19) ; Chech support (I 29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yeltsin elected president</td>
<td>Sochi agreement, JCC started (I 29)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Start of war in Abkh (I 29)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chib into power (I 8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>1995 - 1998: no events accounted in interviews</td>
<td>Change in CZ perimeters (I 17) ; West starts to demand changes (I 7)</td>
<td>Anti-corr council of Nodia, Usupa (I 7) ; Intense NATO policy (I 29)</td>
<td>Snipers killed 26 police in Gori Jan-Sept (I 7) ; Restart of SO-Geo contacts/ start of mil build-up (I 23)</td>
<td>From 2004 in general more Geo police actions (I 14)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>Baden Document (I 8, 14, 01-16)</td>
<td>Second Chechen war (I 8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>OSCE summit Istanbul</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>Putin becomes (acting) president</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1999

Jan

Feb

Constitutional reform (I 6)

Mar

Apr

May

Ergneti closure (I 1, 6, 8, 9)

Jun

Jul

Baden Document (I 8, 14, 01-16)

Aug

Second Chechen war (I 8)

Sep

Bucharest Pol exp group meeting (I 14)

Oct

Castelo Branco Pol Exp Group meeting (I 14)

Nov

OSCE summit Istanbul

Dec

Putin becomes (acting) president

Kok into power (I 8, 9, 28, 29) ; Start of RU visa regime (I 29)

Rose Rev policy on separatists (I 9, 13)

"Verge of war" through Okrua (I 18)

Saaka bei UNGA

Kok-Zhv sign disarmament agreement/ "Sarabuki" (I 9, 18)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sept</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Saaka bei PACE</td>
<td>Semneby appointed EUSRSC (I 14)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shamba visits Tbs/Saaka at mil base (I 6, 23)</td>
<td>Mamusrov into power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NATO Summit Bucharest (I 6, 7) ; Ru-SO start legal relations (I 5) ; Drone incident in Abkh (I 5, 14, 20)</td>
<td>Geo part formally sets up Sana admin (I 28)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ru missile hit close to EU Del on way back from Tskh (I 14, 20)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Okrua launches party/ is arrested 2 days later</td>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE reports published (I 12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Yakobashvili appointed SMR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>August war (I 7, 8, 13, 27)</td>
<td>Sarkozy initiative (I 14)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- West cuts funds for democracy (I 6); Start of negos with Abkh (I 12)
- Start of negos with Abkh (I 12)
- NATO Summit Bucharest (I 6, 7) ; Ru-SO start legal relations (I 5) ; Drone incident in Abkh (I 5, 14, 20)
- Geo part formally sets up Sana admin (I 28)
**ANNEX 4: List of interviews**

Total number of interviews: 76, out of these listed as references: 39

Interviews that were conducted as part of the research, but that do not appear as references go without codes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference code</th>
<th>Occupation at time of interview</th>
<th>Date and place of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I 1</td>
<td>Senior analyst with international human rights organization</td>
<td>May 2009, Tbilisi (two meetings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 2</td>
<td>Journalist, Tbilisi</td>
<td>May 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 3</td>
<td>Senior co-worker of UNDP, former OSCE project manager on ERP</td>
<td>June 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 4</td>
<td>Former senior co-worker of OSCE Mission to Georgia</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 5</td>
<td>Senior member of the Ministry of Internal Affairs</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 6</td>
<td>Senior member of the Republican Party (opposition), former MP</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 7</td>
<td>Senior member of local NGO</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 1-7</td>
<td>Senior member of local NGO</td>
<td>June 2010, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 8, I 11-8</td>
<td>Senior member of the Office of the State Minister for Reintegration</td>
<td>July and September 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 9</td>
<td>Political analyst and member of Republican Party (opposition)</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi Georgian-English translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 10</td>
<td>Senior member of the Regional Police of Shida Kartli, Gori</td>
<td>July 2009, Gori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 11</td>
<td>Member of the opposition in Gori, Senior member of the city council in Gori</td>
<td>July 2009, Gori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 12</td>
<td>Senior member of Our Georgia – Free Democrats Party (opposition)</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 13, I 11-13</td>
<td>Senior member of United Georgian Traditionalists Party; Former senior member of Gamsakhurdia government</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi (two meetings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 14</td>
<td>Senior member of the EU Delegation to Georgia</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 15</td>
<td>Lawyer, former co-worker at local human rights NGO</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 16, I 11-16</td>
<td>Expert with opposition party, former senior member of the Saakashvili government</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi (two meetings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 17</td>
<td>Expert on security issues with international organization, Gori; former co-worker with OSCE on South Ossetia</td>
<td>July 2009, Gori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 18</td>
<td>Journalist with international NGO</td>
<td>July 2009, Gori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 20</td>
<td>Former senior member of OSCE Mission to Georgia</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 21</td>
<td>Journalist with local human rights NGO, Gori</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 22</td>
<td>Senior member of the Ministry of Refugees</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 23</td>
<td>Project manager with international NGO</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 24</td>
<td>Co-worker with European Special Representative to the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia</td>
<td>August 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Two leading members of the Social Democrats’ Party of Georgia</td>
<td>August 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Former senior advisor to the Shevardnadze government</td>
<td>August 2009, Tbilisi (two meetings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Senior member of local NGO, former senior advisor to the Shevardnadze government</td>
<td>August 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Senior member of the alternative Administration of South Ossetia</td>
<td>August 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Senior member of local think tank, former senior advisor to the Shevardnadze government</td>
<td>August 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Senior member of local think tank; former senior member of the Shevardnadze government</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Project manager with local NGO</td>
<td>July 2010, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Former senior member of OSCE Mission to Georgia</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Journalist with public TV station, Tbilisi</td>
<td>July 2010, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Co-worker with EU Delegation to Georgia</td>
<td>July 2010, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior member of international research NGO, Tbilisi</td>
<td>June 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professor of history, formerly advisor to the Gamsakhurdia government</td>
<td>June 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Free-lance journalist, Vladikavkaz</td>
<td>June 2009, Yerevan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Programme Coordinator with international NGO</td>
<td>June 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Co-worker with EUMM, Gori</td>
<td>July 2009, Gori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Co-worker with EUMM, Gori</td>
<td>July 2009, Gori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior co-worker with EUMM, Gori</td>
<td>July 2009, Gori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Editor of local newspaper, Gori</td>
<td>July 2009, Gori – Georgian-English translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident of Ditsi</td>
<td>July 2009, Ditsi – Georgian-English translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident of Ditsi</td>
<td>July 2009, Ditsi – Georgian-English translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Former senior member of district administration in Gori, former OSCE co-worker on South Ossetia</td>
<td>July 2009, Ditsi – Georgian-English translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member of alternative administration to South Ossetia under authority of the Government of Georgia</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi Georgian-English translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project manager at local IDP advocacy NGO</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Co-worker at local IDP advocacy NGO</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior member of regional NGO, Tbilisi</td>
<td>July 2009, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior journalist with local newspaper, Tbilisi</td>
<td>August 2009, Tabakhmela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior member of international research NGO, Tbilisi</td>
<td>July 2010, Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 interviews with IDPs at the Gori IDP camp</td>
<td>July 2009, Gori – Georgian-English translation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Statement on authorship

Schriftliche Erklärung zur Autorenschaft der Dissertation

Ich, Lara Sigwart, erkläre hiermit, dass ich die Dissertation ohne unerlaubte Hilfe angefertigt habe, dass ich keine anderen als die von mir angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel benutzt habe und dass ich die den benutzten Werken wörtlich oder inhaltlich entnommenen Stellen als solche kenntlich gemacht habe.

Lara Sigwart Tbilisi, den 8. Oktober 2012

Statement on the authorship of the dissertation

I, Lara Sigwart, hereby testify that I wrote the dissertation without unpermitted assistance, that I did not use sources or instruments other than indicated and that I referenced the works quoted or used otherwise.

Lara Sigwart Tbilisi, October 8, 2012