A European Army?
The European Defense Community
and the Politics of Transnational Influence
in Post-War Europe, 1950-1954

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Schreiben ist einfach.
Die Schwierigkeit besteht lediglich im Formulieren.

Paul Breitner
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### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAPD</td>
<td>Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACUE</td>
<td>American Committee on United Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aka</td>
<td>also known as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEL</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGH</td>
<td>Bundesgerichtshof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BL</td>
<td>Benelux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CED/EDC</td>
<td>Communauté Européenne de Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIME</td>
<td>Italian Council of the European Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Composite Index of National Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLN</td>
<td>Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMP</td>
<td>Comparative Manifesto Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMINTERN</td>
<td>Communist International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMISCO</td>
<td>Committee of the International Socialist Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBPO</td>
<td>Documents on British Policy Overseas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDF</td>
<td>Documents diplomatiques français</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDC/CED</td>
<td>European Defense Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELEC</td>
<td>European League for Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPU</td>
<td>European Parliamentary Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUF/UEF</td>
<td>European Union of Federalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA/FRN</td>
<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRUS</td>
<td>Foreign Relations of the United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>GER</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Highest density intervals</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFCTU</td>
<td>International Federation of Christian Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSI</td>
<td>Labour and Socialist International</td>
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<tr>
<td>LUX</td>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFE</td>
<td>Movimenta federalista europeo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLEUE</td>
<td>Mouvement Liberal pour l'Europe unie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSEUE</td>
<td>Mouvement Socialiste pour les États-Unis d'Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSI</td>
<td>Movimento Socialista Italiano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEI</td>
<td>Nouvelles Equipes Internationles</td>
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**Note:** for party abbreviations, please refer to Table A in the Appendix.
1. Introduction

In 1965, about two years after having resigned the German chancellorship, Konrad Adenauer agreed to an extensive interview with the journalist Günther Gaus for the television format “Zur Person”. In the black-and-white broadcast of December 29th, Adenauer stated emphatically that the greatest and most bitter disappointment of his years in office was the failure of the European Defense Community (EDC).\footnote{For the video footage see <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TV7weYGV6W8&t=5m51s> (Last accessed at 05-04 2015).} In his view, the rejection of the treaty in the French Assemblée Nationale was more than a mere temporary setback. The EDC, he argued, would have solved all ‘questions’ surrounding the best institutional organization of post-war Europe, questions that were still an object of struggle and conflict in the mid-1960’s. In his assessment, Adenauer was not alone. The French deputies that had supported the EDC – the so-called ‘cedistes’ – would henceforth refer to the day of their defeat as the ‘crime of August 30th’.\footnote{‘Cediste’ is a term referring to the French acronym of the EDC, namely CED (Communauté européenne de defense). After August 30th 1954, they referred to their defeat as ‘crime du 30 août’ (e.g. Clesse 1989).} Paul-Henri Spaak, in his diary, wrote in “enmity, spite, and fury” about the news of the vote in the French parliament, accusing the French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France of seeking to destroy the Atlantic Alliance.\footnote{“L’hostilité, la rancune et la fureur. […] Il [Mendès France, BF] a détruit la CED et s’apprête, j’en ai le sentiment, à détruire l’Alliance atlantique.” (quoted in Dumoulin 1999, 489).} Robert Schuman remarked that the European project faced the “ruins of a demolished edi-
Altiero Spinelli, contemplating the timing of the sudden death of former Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi on August 19th 1954, retroactively saw in his passing away an “ominous sign, the end of an epoch.” Henri Brugmans wrote later that the “fall of the European Defense Community constituted a turning point in the history of the European idea.”

In contemporary terminology, it is fair to say that the failure of the EDC constitutes a critical juncture in the history of European integration. A widely accepted consensus among scholars of post-war Europe has identified the ‘German problem’ as the key to the political and economic stability of post-war Europe. Within the emerging Cold War, every conception of a viable political post-war order centered on this issue. The failure of the EDC and its consequences paved the way for the path of European integration that is well-known. In terms of security cooperation, Germany and Italy entered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and were allowed to gradually build up its armed forces while being restricted, both in terms of the kinds of weapons as well as their operational autonomy, through NATO and the Western European Union (WEU). The institutions of the WEU are a ‘text-book’ case of the realist and transaction-costs based theory of institutional design, solving the issue of German rearmament through balancing and credible commitments through pooling (a permanent troop commitment by the UK to the continent controlled by a majority in the WEU Council) and a WEU ‘agency’ that, in theory, had the right of inspecting German arms at any time. The remaining participating member states pledged a number of troops to remain on the continent, their removal being subject to a vote in the WEU Council, which made a legal unilateral withdrawal impossible. This arrangement placated fears of a remilitarizing Germany on the continent through armament restrictions, third party oversight, and straightforward balancing and, thereby, permitted the peaceful economic and institutional integration of the continent. Henceforth, ‘supranational institutions’ would be limited to the regulation of the Common Market.

4 “[…] les décombres d’un édifice démolis […]” (quoted in Poidevin 1986, 380).
5 “[…] un signe néfaste, la fin d’une époque […]” (quoted in Vayssière 2007, 327).
6 “La chute de la Communauté européenne de défense constitué un tournant de l’idée européenne […]” (quoted in Vayssière 2007, 328).
The quotes mentioned above, however, make it clear that this solution was by no means undisputed or uncontested. A sizable portion of the political elite in post-war Europe had invested in the project of creating a European Army, that is, to address the ‘German problem’ by means of institutional ‘co-binding’ through pooling and delegating “core state powers” (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2013). Both the EDC and its associated plan to create a European Political Community (EPC), including provisions for a common market, went far beyond the degree of pooling, delegation, and representation that is in place today (Rittberger 2009).

This dissertation argues that taking the EDC seriously as a puzzle produces potentially more general insights into conditions and factors influencing intergovernmental cooperation, international institutions, and regional integration. Consider that the very proposal of creating a common army of troops in 1950 – only five years after the second world war – was, by all accounts, a quite extraordinary long shot as it called for a common army of troops with different languages and different organizational cultures only a few years after these very troops had been viciously fighting against each other. The plan thus raised serious doubts regarding its military effectiveness in an environment in which security and deterrence were truly scarce resources. Moving beyond a mere pre-emption of efforts to recreate a German army, the plan went at the very core of all participating nation-states as it implied the delegation of discretion over national troops that could no longer be deployed autonomously elsewhere (For an overview see Fursdon 1980). Why did the negotiating states pursue such a radical course of action? In addition, the course of the negotiations, at a first glance, seems highly paradoxical. Initially, all of the Allied states publicly assented to a proposal by the US that was, in terms of its outline, highly similar to the institutional solution of the WEU that was finally adopted in 1954. Nevertheless, the European states discarded that option in 1951 and negotiated and debated the ratification of the treaty for four years, only to recreate the almost ‘purely’ intergovernmental solution in the form of the WEU and German membership in NATO. Why was the bargain characterized by such seemingly apparent inefficiencies and paradoxes?
The present dissertation argues that understanding this early chapter of European integration requires revisiting conventional intergovernmental toolkits of explaining intergovernmental cooperation and bargaining. I will argue that a sufficient and exhaustive explanation of the ‘EDC bargain’ involves challenging the core assumption of this framework, i.e. treating the organizational apparatus of the state as a representative, rational agent.

In the post-war world, European decision-makers found themselves in a situation of high ‘violence interdependence’ of a globally unprecedented scale (See Deudney 2007, ch. 8). The political elite in Europe and the US had anticipated this problem at an early stage. As a result, calls for ‘European unity’ were ubiquitous in the post-war world as the emerging global geopolitical conflict made closer European cooperation imperative from a structural point of view. Hence, the questions of the required institutional designs were debated widely. Behind such calls, however, were widely different ‘causal stories’ that claimed to analyze the sources of the violent confrontations in Europe in the first half of the century and derived different institutional prescriptions for its resolution, in particular with regard to the principle of national sovereignty: radical federalist solutions advocated its complete abolishment, supranational solutions proposed its containment through limited pooling and delegation whereas ‘intergovernmental’ solutions maintained that institutionalized consultations between governments were sufficient. The resulting conflict of ideas did not map neatly unto the different states or party families. The political elite in post-war Europe still gravitated around old political forces of the late 19th and early 20th century (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). These forces did not have a united or cohesive attitude towards the nation. Political Catholicism had never developed a straightforward and unquestioning loyalty towards the nation-state (Kaiser 2007). International Socialism had a highly contested transnational conflict around that issue ever since the start of the First World War (Sassoon 1996). Liberal political forces in Europe always had to come to grips with the difficult relation between nationalism and cosmopolitan liberal ideology (Greenfeld 1992).

The conflict over institutional prescriptions was organized in a transnational network of political elites in post-war Europe around a number of well-known transnational organizations and manifested themselves in intra-party conflicts throughout continental Europe. Partly due to the institutional volatility of the French party system,
these divisions were the most extreme in France (Parsons 2002, 2003), but they were present throughout continental Western Europe. It is thus unwise to speak of an early ‘permissive’ consensus about the institutional organization of Europe (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 5): the constraining power of the post-war conflict showed itself straightforwardly when a large portion of the French deputies – Gaullists and Communists alike – in the Assemblée Nationale proceeded to proudly chant the Marseillaise after the EDC Treaty had been voted off the agenda in August 1954. Accordingly, Spaak attributed the failure of the EDC to pervasive and ‘powerful nationalist sentiments’. This conflict, it is argued, was present in the transnational and transgovernmental political ‘space’ in Europe from the very beginning. The formation of a number of transnational pressure groups and party organizations in post-war Europe - first studied by Walter Lipgens (Lipgens and Loth 1977; Lipgens 1984a; Lipgens and Loth 1988, 1990) - provided the organizational basis of an emerging – transnational – European conflict among the political elite in Europe whose structure cut across the separation of continental Europe into states and parties of the left and the right. As a result, domestic conflicts, government preferences and the bargaining behavior of the European states negotiating the European Defense Community exhibited patterns that cannot sufficiently be grasped by intergovernmental frameworks.

**The Analytical Contribution**

In order to better grasp the effect of that transnational conflict, this dissertation makes an effort to set up a distinct analytical framework that produces hypotheses explaining state-preferences and bargaining behavior that are distinct from the intergovernmental standard account. There are three reasons.

First, utilizing competing hypotheses is useful in order to exercise due care in challenging the intergovernmentalist framework. Evaluating competing explanations for the evidence and the bargaining processes at hand provides a source of discipline when dealing with ambiguous evidence and allows making more concrete statements as to how much explanatory value is added to the case at hand. Indeed, the claim is

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8 When the EDC was voted down, “Communists and Gaullists alike locked arms and serenaded the chamber with the Marseillaise.” (Creswell 2006, 158).

9 “[…] die Stärke der noch mächtigen nationalistischen Strömungen […]” (Spaak 1969, 297).
not that the main factors emphasized by intergovernmentalist accounts – such as geopolitical incentives, desire and competition for power and plenty – did not matter. Instead they are indeterminate to account for the specific ‘state behavior’ and thus do not provide a sufficient explanation of the case.

The second reason has to do with the question of the particularity or generality of the case. The ‘transnational framework’ that is developed draws extensively on a body of literature related to the analysis of contemporary issues of international cooperation. Hence, the applicability of the concepts used presumably relies on the technical and socio-economic context of a globalizing world in which states have been said to have acquired functions noticeably different from their role in post-war Europe (Genschel and Zangl 2008). Post-war Europe is, a priori, neither a typical nor a most likely case in which to expect a causally important role of transnational networks. At the same time, it cannot be said that it is a least likely case, since the issue touched on powerful symbols of national sentiments such as the national armies and since the American reconstruction efforts explicitly supported and incentivized transnational cooperation (Hogan 1987). Nevertheless, it is quite conceivable that the analytical lessons learned in this dissertation may prove useful for the analysis of other bargains in the history of European integration. After all, the transnational organizations analyzed in this dissertation, such as the European Movement and the Union of European Federalists, still exist today. The political and economic conditions of a globalized and economically and technologically increasingly interdependent world would equally suggest that the lessons learned in this dissertation might travel further than post-war Europe.

The third reason lies in the fact that the implications of dense transnational and transgovernmental networks for intergovernmental cooperation have not been sufficiently conceptualized in the literature. Although the concept of transnational and transgovernmental networks and their implications are by no means new (Nye and Keohane 1971; Keohane and Nye 1974), the literature is still characterized by an unfortunate methodological divide: quantitatively minded scholars utilize increasingly sophisticated methods to focus on identifiable network structures, but tend to ignore the content and the meaning of networks for the involved actors (McLean 2007). Qualitatively minded scholars do focus in the meaning of rhetorical and ideological commitments that are exchanged through networks; however, by overlooking the fundamental effects of network structures and their relation to ideological con-
Conflicts on outcomes, this line of research has produced largely ambiguous results (Kohler-Koch 2002). Combining insights from both perspectives reveals a more differentiated account of intergovernmental cooperation that, at least in the case of the EDC, outperforms the conventional intergovernmentalist framework. In particular, it is argued that the key ‘currency’ exchanged in transnational networks are rhetorical commitments (Schimmelfennig 2001, 2003). Similar norms and values provide the rhetorical means of committing to similar political goals across states and parties: hence, rhetorical commitments can generate trust (McLean 2007). Trust, in turn, contributes to transnational and transgovernmental coalition formation. As a result, transnational networks, under certain conditions, affect ‘state preferences’ for institutions – both in terms of their demand and supply – as well as the ‘bargaining behavior’ of states. As such, the mechanism relies on an expanded individual logic of consequences: provided that the behavioral consequences of rhetorical commitments are transparent, observable, and a long shadow of future interaction exists, trust is an optimal strategy for rational actors (Bowles 2004, 248). As a result, standard intergovernmentalist theories of the formation of institutional preferences and bargaining behavior need qualification.

Start with the demand conditions for common institutions (Mattli 1999b, 1999a). The argument adopts the conventional assumption that transnational networks play an important role in channeling the exchange of ideas and the building of trust between actors from competing countries (e.g. Risse 2002). Since the ‘efficiency’ of institutional designs depends on expected transaction costs, ideas and trust strongly influence institutional demands and preferences with regard to institutional designs. Political actors driven by ideological conflicts and mutual suspicions of defection have systematically different institutional preferences than those with similar ideological attachments, similar normative orientations, and mutual expectations of future cooperative behavior, and hence, mutual trust. Since ideas “do not float freely” (Risse-Kappen 1994), such conflicts are manifested in network structures and transnational political exchanges. Accordingly, transnational networks in post-war Europe provided the organizational basis for frequent contacts among like-minded actors across states that found themselves frequently at odds with domestic party colleagues on similar issues – notably ‘the nation’ – thereby reinforcing the transnational formation of actor coalitions across the “container-state” (Genschel and Leibfried 2008, 364), further exacerbating domestic conflicts, and thus, it is argued, contributed to the for-
mation of trust within certain transnational groups. As a result, transnational coalitions of actors had a distinct set of institutional preferences and, hence, influenced the formation of institutional preferences of the negotiating states.

Since divergent subjective assessments of similar material situations weakened the direct responsiveness of actor preferences to material and geostrategic factors, a sufficient explanation of specific governments’ preferences requires taking into account both structural or domestic circumstances as well as the shifting ties of domestic governmental actors to transgovernmental networks and transnational coalitions. Depending on their standing within and their influence on specific governmental cabinets, governmental preferences shift in response to changing patterns of “embeddedness” within specific transnational clusters or groups of actors (Granovetter 1985). As a consequence, it is not only domestic changes, such as new governing coalitions, that are responsible for shifts in government preferences. Hence, transgovernmental networks and coalitions can affect the ‘supply conditions’ for common institutions.

Finally, this dissertation argues that dense transgovernmental networks affect the dynamics of intergovernmental bargaining under uncertainty. Drawing on formal and experimental work on learning in networks (Jackson 2008; Golub and Jackson 2010; Lorenz, et al. 2011), it is argued that the structure of transgovernmental networks deeply affects the beliefs and the learning behavior of negotiators. Specifically, network structures that are based on mutual trust may put certain individuals and groups of actors in positions of disproportionate influence over the beliefs of other negotiating actors. This line of reasoning draws on the ‘wisdom of crowds’ effect (Galton 1907). The higher the influence of one particular group within transgovernmental networks, the higher the scope for biases to rule over entire bargains as errors and biases from a ‘single source’ are less likely to be contradicted by alternative evidence, arguments, and even errors (Lorenz, et al. 2011). As a consequence, individual influence over an adversary’s beliefs, specifically beliefs over possible outcomes may be a more important source of influence than the coercive capabilities of the state or its ‘outside options’, reflecting the old wisdom that “the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power” (Schattschneider 1960, 66). Thus, under specific conditions, intergovernmentalist views of the determinants of varying ‘state influence’ over bargaining outcomes become misleading. At the same time, there is no warrant for the optimistic hope of attaining increased efficiency in a ‘new
world order’ of ‘network governance’, as a prominent scholar has expressed it (Slaughter 2004). Depending on structures of trust and influence, networks may contribute to inefficiencies and the proliferation of highly biased information (Golub and Jackson 2010).

In sum, this dissertation argues that understanding and explaining the EDC requires a differentiated account of international cooperation, institution building, and regional integration that is, so far, only implicit in the contemporary literatures on institutional design and regional and European integration (Moravcsik 1998; Koremenos, et al. 2001; Rittberger 2005; Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2006; Cooley and Spruyt 2009), as well as the study of transnational networks and its effects, both contemporary and historical (Risse 2002; Kaiser, et al. 2008; Börzel and Heard-Lauréote 2009; Kaiser, et al. 2010). Figure 1.1 below contrasts the two theoretical frameworks.

Figure 1.1 Overview of the Argument

It is important to stress the complementarity of both the transnational dynamics and the ‘traditional’ factors emphasized by realist and liberal intergovernmentalism. Individual actors are not assumed to follow a logic of appropriateness: a ‘rationalist’ actor assumption – in its subjective variant - is retained throughout although based on more recent perspectives from institutional and behavioral economics (Bowles 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 2012). Actors in leading government positions still seek to define and act strategically on the basis of a perceived ‘national interest’. Ideological similarities across borders allow the transnational formation of trust, af-
fecting actors’ institutional reasoning about transaction costs, but not their predilec-
tions for political power. Hence, although preferences – the goals or ends of political
behavior – may be related to normative values and political ideologies, actors are
assumed to choose their political means in a strategic and ‘opportunistic’ manner.

**The Empirical Contribution**

The main empirical results of the dissertation as well as its analytical thrust map suit-
ably unto four “fault lines” in current scholarship on the Paris Treaties in post-war
Europe, i. e. the EDC as well as the Treaties on the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC) (Glockner and Rittberger 2012; Rittberger 2012, 80). Empirically,
the literature disagrees on four points: whether the most influential and key actors
were states or individuals and groups embedded in transnational networks; whether
the sources of actor interests were material or ideational; whether geopolitical or do-
monic constraints influenced changes in bargaining behavior and outcomes; and
whether preferences for institutional design followed efficiency concerns or norms of
democratically appropriate institutions. Using this differentiation, the theoretical and
empirical contribution of the present study can be mapped accordingly (see Table
1.1).

**Table 1.1 Context of the Argument**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intergovernmentalist framework</th>
<th>Transnationalist framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>State centric</td>
<td>Transnational actors in transnational and transgovernmental networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preferences</strong></td>
<td>Materialist and/ or ideational explanations: national interests and geopolitical ideologies</td>
<td>Ideational explanation: embeddedness of ‘value driven agents’ in transnational ‘communities’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bargaining and ratification</strong></td>
<td>Systemic and/ or domestic pressures exogenous or endogenous to the state: outside options and domestic uncertainty (two-level game) determine influence of states on bargaining outcomes</td>
<td>Network structure and learning: imbalanced transgovernmental networks lead to inefficient bargaining; network centrality of transnational actors affects their influence on bargaining outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional Design</strong></td>
<td>Rational design and democratic norms: reputation as conflict resource</td>
<td>Rational actors with ideological/norm related preferences (value driven transnational agents)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Table adapted from Rittberger (2012, 80)*

In a nutshell, the empirical results – both the quantitative collected here and the qual-
itative evidence collected by historians - suggest that the story of the EDC is partially
a story of a collective ‘misunderstanding’ that barely turned reality (Clesse 1989). Its sources appear to be systematically related to the rise and fall of a transnational coalition of ‘value driven agents’. The empirical chapters will combine methods of qualitative historical research and quantitative network analysis to identify an ideologically heterogeneous transnational coalition of supranationalist and federalist actors that was already in the making by the late 1940’s. This loose coalition is a heterogeneous collection of actors: it included, naturally, Jean Monnet whose access to US decision-makers proved crucial (Duchêne 1994); it included a number of high profile Christian Democrats such as Konrad Adenauer, Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Robert Schuman, Georges Bidault, and Alcide De Gasperi (Gehler 2001; Gehler and Kaiser 2001; Gehler, et al. 2001; Gehler and Kaiser 2004); additionally, it comprised radical federalists formerly associated with Resistance movements that were particularly strong in France and Italy and were exemplified by figures such as Altiero Spinelli or Henry Frenay (Vayssière 2002; Belot 2003; Vayssière 2005, 2007, 2011); it comprised Social Democrats such as Paul-Henri Spaak and Marinus van der Goes van Naters (Griffiths 1993b; Dumoulin 1999), and republican liberals such as Jean Monnet or Ugo La Malfa. By 1950 and early 1951 – during the negotiation of the Paris Treaties – it enjoyed considerable influence over the formulation of government preferences and bargaining strategies between 1950 and 1952. This coalition was in a privileged position since it consisted of major political figures from the continental governments and since its members had unique access to the US foreign policy establishment. Because its actors were ideologically committed to the same form of European unification – in the form of the least common denominator – these actors took a calculated risk when the Korean War broke out: utilizing all available political means, at times outright manipulation of governments, they managed to steer the negotiations in the direction of a European Army when the EDC Treaty was signed by mid-1952. The concomitant risks, however, were considerable. By the time the EDC Treaty was signed in May 1952, protests against the treaty started to gain ground, particularly in France and Germany. By early 1954, oddly enough, the two countries that had been at the forefront of pushing the negotiations in the direction they took – France and Italy – were the only countries left that had not ratified the treaty, as their governments were increasingly composed of more nationally inclined French Gaullists and Italian Monarchists. In the wake of increasing resistance, most proponents of the EDC Treaty – including the transnational coalition – cast their bets on efforts to envelop the controversial treaty in a more democratic institutional
framework in the form of the European Political Community. By 1954 these efforts faltered as public protests in France, coinciding with the disastrous defeat of the French colonial forces in Điện Biên Phủ, brought a new government under the French leader Pierre Mendès France into power. Until now, most of the governments involved in the negotiations of the EDC, including the US, had operated under the assumption that the EDC was the only viable form of German rearmament that would be accepted by the French. This dissertation argues that the EDC did not primarily fail because the French government allowed the treaty to be voted down. Rather, it failed because the leaders of the remaining Six and the US emphatically rejected Mendès France’s final offer of a revised EDC Treaty in early August of 1954. That offer was the result of arduous bargaining within the Mendès France government between the cedistes and the anti-cedistes, an internal least common denominator of the French governmental coalition that had significant chances of passing through the Assemblée Nationale. European and American leaders, however, suspected foul play: mistrusting the intentions of Mendès France and being convinced that the EDC alternative would ultimately muster sufficient votes, they roundly rebuffed Mendès France’s offer. The subsequent months amply demonstrated that the working assumption of the European and American EDC proponents – that there was no alternative to the EDC – was fatally flawed. In the final analysis, it appears that the influence of the transnational coalition was strong enough to suppress, for several years, the consideration of a possible and quite obvious bargaining solution that emerged within months after the EDC Treaty was rejected.

**Plan of the book**

The analytical and empirical argument of this dissertation unfolds over six chapters. The subsequent second chapter presents the two theoretical frameworks as dependent on a set of conditions. Intergovernmentalist assumptions, notably the treatment of the state as a corporate actor, are presented as predicated on a world of sovereign states divided by national-identities and mistrust. Several factors, it is argued, contribute to the unsuitability of such assumptions and, consequently, make the transnational framework necessary. These are: interdependence generating mutual benefits provided that collective action problems can be solved through common institutions; a dense set of transnational and transgovernmental networks connecting significant
portions of the political and cultural elite of interdependent states; the formation of transnational networks along similar ideological dispositions that imply some degree of detachment from the nation-state as a desirable model of political organization; and finally, that the latter similarities create political divisions that cut across states and parties and thus undermine that national demarcation of individual relationships of political trust. Reconstructing their main arguments, the chapter derives directly opposed hypotheses on the formation of institutional demands, factors influencing the supply of common institutions – i.e. the factors and constraints government preferences are responsive to – as well as the usage of information underlying the choice of bargaining strategies. These hypotheses are intended as tools to weigh the evidence presented in this dissertation. As a secondary purpose, they provide directions for further research.

The third chapter focuses on the design logic used as well as the methods employed to gather evidence. As mentioned above, the case study of the EDC does not constitute a systematic attempt at ‘falsifying’ or testing the hypotheses. On the basis of the plausibility of the presented transnational framework, it asks whether the latter provides a better explanation of the EDC period which, on the basis of the qualities of the case, would suggest that a wider applicability is plausible. In order to answer this question, the design follows a logic of ‘mixed methods’ (e.g. Greene 2007). One the one hand, it combines qualitative historical evidence to reconstruct patterns of rhetorical commitments to particular political and ideological institutional concepts of post-war Europe, the nature and content of beliefs circulating publicly and behind political stage, domestically as well as transnationally. Due to the emphasis on uncertainty and learning as bound together with issues of power and influence, the ‘process analysis’ of the bargain (Hall 2006), while drawing on game theoretic concepts, is more in line with what has been termed ‘negotiation analysis’, focusing on aspects of learning, the usage of beliefs in efforts to ‘change the game itself’ (see Sebenius 1992). In addition, qualitative ‘process tracing’ allows drawing on wide sources of information which becomes central in cases of ‘equifinality’, i.e. when the used hypotheses produces identical outcome expectations (George and Bennett 2005).

This qualitative information is combined with a quantitative analysis of transnational networks in post-war Europe in order to identify central actors and offer alternative evidence of transnational conflict structures. In particular, this chapter presents the way in which the network data was sampled. In order to reconstruct transnational
networks among the political elite in post-war Europe, this dissertation draws on the sociological analysis of interlocking electorates (Mizruchi 1996), combining several sampling strategies to yield networks based on individuals’ overlapping memberships in the eight transnational organization that existed in post-war Europe. These are: the European Movement, the European League for Economic Cooperation (ELEC), the European Union of Federalists (UEF), the European Parliamentary Union (EPU), the Mouvement Socialiste pour les États-Unis d'Europe (MSEUE), the Socialist International (COMISCO/ SI)\(^{10}\), the Christian Democratic Nouvelles Equipes Internationles (NEI), and the Christian Democratic Geneva Circle (e.g. Braunthal 1971; Lipgens and Loth 1988, 1990; Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993; Gehler and Kaiser 2004; Kaiser 2007; Vayssière 2007).

The toolkit of network analysis has significantly expanded over the last decades (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Newman 2010). Traditional analyses of centrality measures allow identifying prominent and hypothetically influential individuals and groups within transnational and transgovernmental networks. Second, methods of identifying structural clusters of more densely connected actors are particularly useful (Newman 2010, ch. 11). Such methods of identifying structural clusters of densely connected actors have been used widely recently in studies of legislative polarization among others and thus allow identifying transnational clusters of actors who, hypothetically, share similar dispositions and ideologies. In sum, while the affiliation used provides an imperfect but sufficient source to describe transnational conflict structures and gauge transgovernmental embeddedness, combining the analysis with qualitative information on the conflicts within and across these organizations yields the evidence needed for the transnational argument.

The fourth chapter serves two purposes. A first step establishes the broad contours of the *explanandum* of this dissertation. Interstate bargains may be described by a ‘negotiation dance’ (Raiffa 1982, 66, 68). It describes the ‘give and take’ of communicated positions, threats, and compromises as expressed by the leadership at the top of the organizational hierarchy of the state and its agents. Thus, ‘state behavior’ within interstate bargains can be reconstructed as a succession of ‘different positions’ that states or the representatives have rhetorically and publicly adopted as their ‘goal’ or

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\(^{10}\) The International was reconstituted after the war in London as the Committee of the International Socialist Conference (COMISCO), until 1951, when it was relabeled Socialist International at its inaugural congress in Frankfurt, Germany.
condition for mutual agreement. Focusing on positions over institutional design, this chapter reconstructs at least four different and persistent conflict constellations between the governments negotiating the EDC between 1950 and 1954. The task is thus to explain this ‘course of the bargain’ by reconstructing adopted bargaining positions as reflecting shifting preferences or strategic adaptations. Second, this chapter evaluates the analytical power of existing intergovernmentalist explanation with a specific view to the *explanandum* thus described. In addition, this chapter focuses on two main intergovernmentalist explanations. After demonstrating the insufficiency of realist explanations, it provides an intergovernmentalist first cut of explanations focusing on domestic politics by demonstrating that explanations focusing on party ideologies, differing national values between states, or interest group politics cannot account for the bargain either.

Having demonstrated the insufficiency of intergovernmentalist approaches, the three subsequent chapters evaluate the added value of the transnational framework.

Chapter 5 is concerned with the quantitative structural analysis of the transnational networks. First, it is shown that the rather dense transnational network exhibits a notable ‘elite’ of individuals who are disproportionately active across the transnational networks, and thus presumably influential in the transnational sphere. In addition, both the density of the network as well as its composition suggests that the transnational organizations constituted important ties among the political elite in post-war Europe across countries as well as across party families. Drawing on recent work in the identification of network clusters (Reichardt and Bornholdt 2006), the chapters identifies six distinct transnational groups of actors that share more similar cross-affiliations with each other than with the rest of the network. Of the six clusters identified, three are distinctly oriented towards party families: whereas the Christian Democrats form a single group, the transnational Social Democrats are split into two. The latter fact is taken as evidence of internal polarization that should span across Social Democratic parties on the continent. The remaining three clusters concern non-party family related transnational pressure groups, equally indicating an ideological polarization. Moreover, the composition of these clusters reveals that their composition is sufficiently similarly distributed across countries and party families to warrant the conclusion that their influence – if it exists – cuts across state borders and party organizations within the respective states. In addition, the identified clusters are used to reconstruct the embeddedness of governmental actors – the transgovernmen-
tal networks – between 1950 until 1954. The most important result established is somewhat unsurprising: the Christian Democratic cluster presents the transgovernmentally best connected group of actors between 1950 and 1952 by a rather wide margin, irrespective of the centrality indicator used to establish the result. Connecting most of the governments of the Six most of the time between 1950 and 1952, it is argued that transgovernmental networks reconstructed in this dissertation were ‘imbalanced’ between 1950 until 1952: the dominance of the Christian Democratic cluster was sufficiently high to expect their influence over the basic beliefs and arguments structuring the bargain in during this time to be predominant. Due to a number of domestic changes, this dominance declines rapidly by the end of 1952. Thus, in 1953 and 1954, no distinct group can be said to have had a similar sort of influence. In addition, more subtle differences exist: based on their governments’ embeddedness within these clusters, one would expect clear differences between France and Italy on the one hand, and Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK on the other hand. Whereas the former share a similar affiliation with the Federalist community and the European Movement between 1950 and 1953, the latter exhibit a primary attachment to the European Movement and the ELEC community. Thus, French and Italian governments were ardent supporters of a European supranational army in the early stages of the bargain whereas the fact that the ratification of the EDC stalled subsequently in both countries is reflected in a shifting transnational embeddedness of French and Italian governments after 1953.

The subsequent sixth chapter gives meaning to these structural analyses by arguing that the indications of internal differentiation and polarization found in the previous chapter are best understood as indications of transnational lines of conflict resembling post-war political cleavages in certain respects (save for their lack in distinctly organized political camps). The chapter focuses on formal as well as informal transnational exchanges. In addition to the transnational organizations in Europe, transatlantic exchanges between European and US elites are considered, as major sources of funding for the eight transnational organization were located in the US Foreign Policy establishment (Aldrich 1995, 1997). Analyzing rhetoric commitments and reasoned exchanges – public and private ones – that were passed along within these ‘networks’, certain ideological patterns emerge. By drawing on the existing literature on the main institutional ideas driving the European project in the 1950s (Lipgens 1968; Lipgens and Loth 1977; Lipgens 1984b; Jachtenfuchs, et al. 1998; Thiemeyer
1998; Jachtenfuchs 2002; Parsons 2002, 2003), this chapter identifies three different ‘typically’ expressed attitudes and lines of reasoning about European institutions: an intergovernmental model seeking to preserve the autonomy of the nation-state; a federalist model seeking to abolish the nation-state; and a supra-nationalist model that sought to contain the nation-state. Commitments to such models emerged on the basis of diverse analyses of the causes of the violent confrontations in the first half of the twentieth century. Yet, they yield typical institutional prescriptions. Intergovernmentalists praise the continuing relevance of national governments; on the other side, federalists denounce nationalism as the prime ‘evil’ that caused the war. Both extremes come with concrete institutional commitments: a ‘Council of States’ on the one hand, a completely new federated political community on the other hand. ‘Supranationalism’ is a more amorphous medium category that nonetheless contains distinct elements: partially sharing the federalist diagnosis, it seeks novel institutions to co-bind and thus to ‘preserve’ the nation-state. For this category, public commitments to curtailing the nation’s sovereignty – through pooling and delegation – are essential.

Analyzing the content of these commitments yields two results. First, in line with the structural analyses of the previous chapter, the ‘distribution’ of transnationally active actors committed to the different models of Europe cuts across party families and countries. The internal structural differentiation presented in the previous chapter is consistent with this observation: Social Democrats are characterized by intense internal conflicts between actors subscribing to all three models; Christian Democrats present a more uniform picture: a concern for the preservation of the ‘Abendland’ requiring the containment of European nationalism in the form of supranational institutions. Radical federalists, their members being recruited from all sides of the political spectrum, advocate a distinct institutional solution in the form of a European federation. Actors clustering around the ELEC limit their concerns to the effects of nationalist competition on European welfare and are thus drawn to ‘functional’ supranational solutions in the economic sphere. Finally, it is shown that transatlantic exchanges were dominated by the federalist and, to a certain extent, the supranational model. At the same time, the ideological divisions, in particular in the transnational European space are considerable. Thus, the European Movement, as the overarching organization assembling the most influential transnational pressure groups and individuals, was characterized by an extreme divide. As a result, although it may have
disposed of the most significant resources, no uniform political pressure in a single direction would emanate from this organization. Thus, the dominant conclusion is one of a complex overarching transnational conflict that cannot be reduced to party ideologies and provided ample room for conflict dynamics. Moreover, even the federalist community – largely seen as ideologically homogenous in the previous chapter – was based on a political compromise between rather diverse factions. Combined with the relative organizational weakness of these organizations, any transnational coalition formed on the basis of the transnational networks would be temporary, formed to achieve a specific political goal and dissolve afterwards rather quickly.

As rhetorical commitments are conceptualized as the building-blocks of transnational trust, the chapter continues by reconstructing the transnational dynamics of coalition formation between the late 1940’s and the early 1950’s. Up until 1950, a tenuous compromise organized in the European Movement had overshadowed foundational differences between intergovernmentalists and federalists in particular. Persisting ideological differences – within Social Democracy and between the continent and the UK in particular – caused frequent conflicts that reached a climax by 1951 within its main institutional forum, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (CoE). Spurred by the succeeding negotiations of the ECSC and the prospect of a continental parliament, mobilized by the prospect of a creation of a European Army, the strategies of the major federalists and supranationalists finally began to converge: Federalists put pressure on the Italian government to create a democratic federation; at the initiative of Paul-Henri Spaak, an alliance of Social Democratic federalists founded the ‘Action Committee for the European Constituent’ (Europäische Bewegung 1953); Christian Democrats put increasing pressure on Dutch and Belgian representatives to lobby for a European intergovernmental compromise on the EDC; finally, an identifiable elite of US officials positioned on the continent, in direct contact with Jean Monnet, successfully lobbied its government to endorse the EDC and use to leverage of aid conditionality to effect a compromise. Documenting evidence from common written exchanges, meetings and conference attendance shows sufficient evidence of strategic coordination: the transnational coalition dominated the transgovernmental scene, in particular between 1951 and 1953. After having realized a radical draft treaty for a European Political Community, the coalition began to disintegrate: conflicts within the Federalist community and the failure of the EPC Draft Treaty to find support among the governments of the Six exposed the non-existent
organizational basis of the coalition. Lacking a viable common political goal, it disintegrated quickly.

As a reflection of the transnational dimension of the political conflict over the EDC, however, there are traceable effects. Chapter 7 argues that these effects can be identified in two dimensions.

First, since actors engaged in the transnational coalition pursued similar if not identical political goals domestically, the degree of domestic conflict and differences over preferred institutional designs for post-war Europe and the ‘German question’, within and across parties, was sufficient to potentially affect governments and thus the formation of state preferences in its own right, albeit in a varied manner, depending on the quality of domestic institutions and mediated by the geopolitical context of every country. Consistent with the basic properties of the transnational conflict, all Socialist parties in the European countries were marked by relatively high degrees of internal conflict whereas Christian Democratic parties, in particular in the larger continental countries, were more inclined to demand the creation of supranational institutions with appropriate democratic institutions to create a European Army. The extent of the conflict varied and depended on national conditions. It divided the French SFIO heavily and reinforced divisions between the two existent Italian Social Democratic Parties. In Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the role of the Social Democratic party leadership seemed decisive: whereas the leadership in Germany and the Netherlands was relatively remote from the Europeanist transnational networks, the leadership in Belgium (Paul Henri Spaak) was part of its most active core. While not negating differences in institutional demands between, for example, larger and smaller continental, there is a sufficient disconnect: for example, the Christian Democratic leadership in Belgium pursued essentially similar objectives as the Dutch multiparty government but was challenged heavily by the Social Democratic leadership under Spaak. In sum, there is a disconnect between the distribution of capabilities and the geopolitical incentives on the one hand and the dominant demands on the other hand, which cannot be explained otherwise. Domestic elites that are active in the transnational communities pursuing supranational or federal models of post-war Europe tend to do so with regard to the problem of German rearmament within domestic political conflict. Domestic elites that are remote from these communities tend to fall within basic intergovernmental expectations: conservative Italian and German elites tend to view the EDC favorably from an instrumental point of view as
increasing the international influence of their countries, whereas others favor classic Alliance solutions to the German problem that preserve national sovereignty (i.e. the Gaullists in France), or deny the existential threat posed by the Soviet government and thus the necessity of balancing efforts and associated institutions (i.e. some British, French and German Social Democrats).

Thus, actors continue to pursue perceived ‘national interests’ and thus material circumstances and geopolitical incentives mattered. Without the outbreak of the Korean War, no Western government would have considered German rearmament at the time, certainly not via the creation of a European Army. In this sense, geopolitical incentives provide the necessary conditions. Without US pressure exerted on European governments to come to an agreement, the negotiations would likely have taken longer. Without French internal differences that allowed the credible signal of domestic constraints, the negotiations would likely have taken the course that was seemingly preferred by all governments except the French in 1950, namely German entry into NATO accompanied by suitable institutional safeguards as suggested by the ‘package deal’.

These considerations, however, equally demonstrate that geostrategic considerations require interpretable and causal analysis, which in turn left ample space for the transnational conflict to have its mark. Thus, the French divisions implied that a particular version of the French national interest – shared by Monnet, Schuman and others – vehemently pushed for a European army against mounting domestic scepticism and at considerable risk, in particular whether it would be possible to muster sufficient domestic support for their own project. The supranational option, initially considered and discarded by the US government, was taken in 1951 then largely on account of the activities of Monnet and Schuman in France, McCloy and Bruce in brokering a French-German agreement on institutional equality – the outlines of which had been exchanged freely for a while in the Geneva Circle as the previous chapter has demonstrated - and federalist pressure on the Italian government to reconsider its position. In every case, governments staffed with individuals that were ideologically close to the emerging transnational coalition deemed their choices to be in accordance with in the national interest; in every case, there were other compatriots – especially in the military establishment of each country – who saw it differently. Thus, in as much as French domestic constraints and US power mattered, ideas and assessment transmitted within and coordinated by transgovernmental and transnational
circles pushed the bargain along a supranational track. The positions of the bigger three governments in Paris thus shifted in 1951 partially as a result of maneuvering to convince the US government to reconsider its position on the European army; partially as a result of changing embeddedness as De Gasperi explicitly appointed a federalist leader of the Italian delegation and a principled opponent of German rearma-
ment – Jules Moch – left the French government. This created a new situation in which the EDC was supported by the leadership of the US and the three larger continental countries. In consequence, a new line of conflict over the institutions of the EDC between the governments of the smaller states and the larger state emerges.

However, the risk that was taken was as considerable as the proposed solution was radical. The final treaty violated two of three conditions for ratification that the Assemblée National had put forward in 1952. The Treaty, as indicated by Art. 38, did not submit the Army to a complete political authority yet, nor was British participation obtained. While the widely perceived lack of a proper subjection of the new military authority to democratically ‘appropriate’ institutions necessitated, as Article 38 put it, ‘confederal or federal’ structures, the British government suggested the ‘Eden Plan’ to provide for both conditions. This confederal alternative, however, was discarded, in favour of the path advocated by the new transnational coalition of federalists and European supranationalists around Spaak.

The irony is that although the intention behind the creation of the Ad Hoc Assembly was to increase the ratification chances of the EDC Treaty, it would arguably affect the opposite in France. By 1953, domestic changes in France and Italy affected these governments: underlying ideological convictions of both the French and the Italian governmental coalitions shifted by 1953, as indicated by the structural analysis performed in chapter 6. In Italy, the cabinets no longer subscribed to the federalist interpretation of the Italian ‘national interests’; seeking Allied support in Trieste and relying on increasingly nationalist deputies for support, the ratification procedure was delayed significantly. French Cabinets relied increasingly on Gaullist support and public agitation against the EDC Treaty. In both cases, thus, geopolitical incentives and a shifting proximity of governmental cabinets to the transnational coalition mattered. The latter ensured that ideological preferences for supranational solutions to the German problem became less salient as geopolitical developments such as Stalin’s death made it seem less and less imperative. Again, geopolitical incentives are
necessary, but insufficient: thus, Stalin’s death and the perspective of détente did not
alter the ratification prospects in Germany, the Netherlands, or Belgium. In France
and Italy, domestic instability shifted the control of parliamentary majorities and
governments away from the influence of individuals in proximity to the transnational
coalition.

These shifts, however, were not taken into account adequately by the remaining gov-
ernments. The US government in particular began to exhibit a peculiar ideological
bias: whereas the Truman administration had been highly skeptical of the supranational
army solution, Eisenhower and Dulles wholeheartedly followed the ideas that had,
earlier, been advocated by McCloy, Bruce and Monnet. In particular, the refusal
to consider, internally, possible alternative courses of action against the advice of
senior officials in the Policy Planning Staff is a case in point. This bias in strategic
planning preempted more serious consultations with the British government – which
had in fact begun to prepare for the failure of the EDC – and produced incentives to
delay ratification particularly in France and Italy. In as much as the influence of su-
pranational and federalist ideas advocated by core actors of the transnational coal-
tion led the bargain along the EDC track, they effected a peculiar bias in the ways in
which actors particularly in Germany and the US processed information. US decision
makers seemed to discard information regarding the dim ratification chances; the
German leadership seemed to trust its sources in the Geneva Circle more than the
increasingly bleak assessments from the embassy in Paris. Even Spaak, by 1954 Bel-
gian Foreign Minister, converged on similar strategic assessments as these actors,
providing evidence that these circles coordinated their strategic assessments.

As a result, the French government under Pierre Mendès France, who was voted into
power with the explicit commitment to seek a renegotiation of the treaty, was met
with extreme mistrust and accusations of having made secret deals with Soviet lead-
ers to demolish the EDC Treaty. The conditions that Mendès France put forward –
most importantly the abolishment of Art. 38 and a moratorium of eight years on ma-
jority decisions in the EDC Council of Ministers – were not even considered seri-
ously by the assembled foreign ministers in Brussels in early August 1954. By sticking
to a widely held view that there was a majority in the French Assemblée Nationale,
actors such as Adenauer and Spaak rejected an institutional compromise they would,
grosso modo, agree upon four years later in Messina and Rome. In as much as these
actors ideological proximity and mutual trust successfully provided for an astonish-
ing degree of mutual trust, in particular among former enemies of the war, it provided for inefficiencies as well. As the final months of 1954 showed, the insistence on the creation of a supranational army had done little but prolonged the negotiations for four years.

**Lessons learned and implications for further research**

The results of this dissertation add additional credibility to the argument that European integration can be analyzed in terms of an emerging transnational and supranational polity from the beginning (Kaiser and Starie 2005; Kaiser, et al. 2008). The present dissertation thus seeks to contribute to this debate by considering the EDC from a distinct analytical framework that allows for devising testable hypotheses that can be directly juxtaposed to the main theoretical rival of intergovernmentalism. Thus, a primary result of this dissertation is that the conflict of ideas that Craig Parsons has analyzed for the case of France was in actuality a transnational conflict among the political elite of Europe (Parsons 2002, 2003). That conflict did not manifest itself equally across the main party families of Christian Democracy and Social Democracy and was mediated by specific national contexts. In this sense, this dissertation contributes to an emerging view of post-war Europe that reemphasizes the role of ideas and transnational networks for the origins of European integration (Lipgens and Loth 1977; Kaiser and Starie 2005; Kaiser, et al. 2008; Kaiser, et al. 2010). Thus, future research on the role of ideas and transnational networks in the history of European integration may benefit from combining a distinct theoretically informed approach with a mixed-methods design that identifies both the structural aspects of networks as well as the content of rhetorical exchanges transmitted within them. A particularly interesting question consists in continuing to trace the possible impact that transnational contacts and efforts at building and maintaining trust had during the negotiations on the Treaties of Rome and throughout the remaining key stages in the history of European integration.

Second, this dissertation emphasizes that quantitative and qualitative empirical methods can be and should be combined. As it was beneficial for the specific historical problem to combine theoretically guided research drawing on theoretical arguments and methods across the theoretical and methodological divides of the discipline, a similar approach is recommended for work studying the role and impact of
transnational networks on other problems. Moreover, the explicit consideration of the
structural aspects of learning in networks yielded the consideration of a mechanism –
related to the ‘wisdom of crowds’ effect (Galton 1907; Surowiecki 2004) – that
showed that a naïve treatment of transnational or regulatory networks that discounts
questions of trust structures is deeply problematic. Thus, situations in which key de-
cision makers rely on ideologically homogenous sources of information may tend to
produce errors of judgment and suboptimal outcomes. In the present case, it pro-
duced an error of judgment that, essentially, prevented the creation of a specific con-
figuration of institutional elements, judged from a normative perspective, was far
more superior with regard to its envisioned degree of democratic representation, than
any solution proposed thereafter.
2. Theoretical Context, Review, and Hypotheses

The purpose of this chapter is to present the basic outlines of two alternative theoretical frameworks: first, the intergovernmentalist frameworks as the analytical ‘workhorse’ for understanding international dynamics; second, an alternative ‘transnational framework’ that aims to straighten out two weaknesses of intergovernmentalism. I argue that, under certain conditions, intergovernmentalism tends to produce misleading characterizations both of the preference formation as well as bargaining dynamics between states. In particular, intergovernmentalism relies, implicitly or explicitly, on the effectiveness of the institutions and values of the nation-state: nationalist values and identities as well as domestic institutions such as parties provide the glue for domestic conflict to remain ‘contained’ within the organizational apparatus of the state, discourage transnational formation of trust and, by extension, the formation of coalitions across states among actors with potentially similar interests. Whereas this state of affairs arguably describes major parts of international history adequately, the post-war world, I will argue, was different. Actors with similar interests and ideas found it advantageous to organize across borders. Loose but existent mutual engagement in transnational networks may lead to the formation of trust among like-minded actors through rhetorical commitments to common values. Domestic actors gain international political capital in exchange for domestic programmatic commitments and, as a result, political conflict acquires a partial transnational dimension through the formation of transnational coalitions.

I argue that two consequences follow. First, by ‘embedding’ governments in transnational and transgovernmental networks, institutional preferences are less affected by power differences between states and more affected by the dominant ideologies that shape the institutional preferences of governments. A second implication concerns the relationship of ‘bargaining efficiency’ and transnational and transgovernmental networks respectively. Whereas the standard intergovernmentalist view of bargaining ignores the role of transgovernmental networks for the distribution of information among governments, much of the current literature on transnational networks does not adequately address the relationship between network structure and learning outcomes. Conceptualizing network structure adequately implies rejecting a naïve but widespread interpretation of transnational networks as efficient information transmitters. By reviewing the insights from the formal and experimental literature studying
the ‘wisdom of crowds’, I argue that transgovernmental networks of trust may yield not only influence but impede bargaining inefficiency if the beliefs of a few disproportionately well connected – ‘central’ – individuals and groups have a disproportionate impact on the beliefs of all participants of the bargain.

The main thrust of the argument is not to dispute the suitability of the broad intergovernmental framework in a variety of empirical settings. Transnational coalitions based on transnational networks are relatively fluid and weak associations. They do not overwhelm the incentives provided by national identities, domestic institutions, international material circumstances and geopolitical incentives, or domestic concerns of political actors for their own political survival. At the same time, their effect is far from unsystematic and, if ignored, leads to erroneous accounts of ‘state behavior’ that remain wedded to an overly idealized image of the “container-state” (Genschel and Leibfried 2008, 364).

This chapter begins by providing an overview of the explanandum, distinguishing preferences and strategies that make for the ‘negotiation dance’ of intergovernmental bargains in which actors seek to negotiate agreements through the exchange of offers and counteroffers, i.e. ‘bargaining positions (section 2.1). The subsequent section deals with the intergovernmentalist framework (section 2.2). It begins by outlining the basic conditions for intergovernmentalist assumptions to hold (2.2.1), provides a brief review of two kinds of sources of state preferences, i.e. Realist (2.2.2) and Liberal Intergovernmentalism (2.2.3), and proceeds to formulate basic hypotheses for the formation of state preferences (2.2.4) and bargaining behavior (2.2.5).

The subsequent section develops the transnational framework (section 2.3). It begins by reviewing the current literature on the role of transnational networks for explaining ‘state behavior’, arguing that there is untapped potential in the combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches – both analytically as well as empirically – as there are complementary shortcomings (2.3.1). The subsequent section (2.3.2) then specifies the concepts of transnational and transgovernmental networks uniting actors common purposes, values, and goals. Provided that actors in these networks are embedded in the governmental hierarchy, focusing on the state as a coherent and corporate actor may lead to erroneous conclusions. The subsequent sections build on these arguments, maintaining that under such circumstances, intergovernmentalist hypotheses do not explain state preferences sufficiently: governments whose actors are embedded in similar networks will tend to form similar preferences (2.3.3), and will
tend to deal with information differently as a defining feature of transnational networks is trust (2.3.4). A summary (2.4) contrasts both sets of hypotheses.

2.1 Definitions: Preferences and Strategies

I assume that all actors – be they individual or corporate actors – behave ‘rationally. Thus, I first need to briefly sketch and define the key components of rational behavior: desires, preferences and strategies (Elster 1989). Rational decisions depend on a range of possible alternatives and outcomes. Rational actors are assumed to evaluate outcomes in light of their desirability and their likelihood of becoming reality. These valuations are called preferences. Rationality implies actors that formulate preferences over outcomes so that they conform to certain formal requirements, such as transitivity and completeness (e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein 1994: xi). Being theoretical concepts, preferences are unobservable: they are “developed by first imposing rationality axioms on the decision-maker’s preferences and then analysing the consequences of these preferences for her choice behaviour (i.e. decisions-made)” (Mas-Colell, et al. 1995, 5). Given certain desires and beliefs, rational behaviour seeks to realize the actor’s most preferred outcome in the most efficient way.

Desires may be related to ‘objective’ material factors – i.e. desires for power and wealth – or subjective factors related to deep seated values or ideologies. The former approach has been described as ‘thick rationality’, while the latter has been described as ‘thinly rational’ (Green and Shapiro 1994, 17, 18). One reason is that ‘thick rationality’ provides an account of simple and constant desires. Thus, the analysis of behaviour is more straightforward as fewer motives of action are possible. In the context of ‘thin rationality’, subjective factors enter into the equation. The literature has a diverse terminology for such factors: ‘mental models’, ‘beliefs’, ‘ideas’,

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11 I do not consider a number of theories that are usually referred to as constructivist or ‘radical constructivists’ (Wendt 1999). Rather, all actors are assumed to be rational actors. The reason: while both moderate and radical constructivists emphasize the role of values and ideas shaping behavior, explanatory strategies are usually of two kinds. Either, the analysis is agnostic concerning “the constraint/conversion divide” (Parsons 2003, 16) and readily admits that actors behave strategically (e.g. Blyth 2002). In such cases, actors may be assumed to pursue ideological goals, but such behavior may be readily amenable to categories commonly described as ‘rational choice’. More radical approaches content that discourse and language shape behavior a deeper level. Such accounts do not offer ‘theories of behaviour’, i.e. they do not provide an account of how actors with similar ideas or in similar discursive formations act and react differently to differing incentives and are thus not useful for my purposes (Esser 1996, 1999).
‘frames’, etc. (Goffman 1974; Goldstein and Keohane 1993a; Denzau and North 1994). In the rationalist versions, ideas are ‘toolkits’ available to make sense of the environment (Swidler 1986; DiMaggio 1997). According to this argument, actors are predisposed to ‘interpret’ their situation (their chances for reelection, the prospects of success of a specific policy proposal etc.) according to dominant ideas or frames (Esser 1996, 1999). Thus, by linking action to certain outcomes rather than others, they influence rational behavior. The difficulty lies in the fact that, first, the range of possible motives is significantly larger and that subjective factors, (i.e. learning on account of new information or through deeper processes of socialization and mutual influence) may change and are less readily observable.

On way to classify the subjective factors further is to distinguish between different levels of generality of beliefs (Goldstein and Keohane 1993a, 8). Thus, world views (i.e. religions, sovereignty, and the nation) describe deep-seated ‘ontologies’ by which actors understand the political world. Principled beliefs or “conceptions of the desirable” (Van Deth and Scarbrough 1995, 28) similarly provide constraints over desirable and undesirable outcomes. Causal beliefs connect actions to outcomes and manifest themselves in ‘causal stories’ (Stone 1989). A final subjective element concerns strategic beliefs that encompass information and beliefs about the motives, preferences, and beliefs of other actors and thus inform strategic behaviour as well.

In sum, desires, and beliefs combine to produce actor behavior. In the context of this dissertation, the explanandum is more accurately called ‘state behavior’: in international strategic interaction and particular in interstate bargains, the ‘state’, as represented by the leadership at the top of the organizational hierarchy, reveals ‘its’ preferences through ‘bargaining behavior’, the empirical manifestation of which has prominently been called a ‘negotiation dance’ (Raiffa 1982, 66, 68). It describes the give and take of communicated positions, threats, and compromises- i.e. ‘positions’ that actors take on a certain issue. Thus, ‘state behavior’ within interstate bargains can be reconstructed as a succession of ‘different positions’ that states or the representatives have rhetorically and publicly adopted as their ‘goal’ or condition for mutual agreement. They can be either qualitatively reconstructed or measured quantitatively over time (Thurner 2006, 189). In both cases, explaining a bargain is to analytically reconstruct that ‘negotiation dance’ by reference to actor preferences and their strategic choices (c.f. Sebenius 1992).
Adopting the ‘negotiation dance’ of the EDC as my *explanandum*, will focus primarily on the issue of institutional design. In order to categorize different position and describe their change, I can rely on a wide literature on institutional design both in international relations and European integration. The differences in the categories capturing institutional variations used in the literature largely relate to different theoretical interests. Thus, following Lindberg and Scheingold (1970), Börzel distinguishes between the level and scope of authority to characterize institutional change overtime (Börzel 2005). Koremenos and colleagues distinguish between membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility (Koremenos, et al. 2001). Pollack emphasizes the issue of control in a more detailed manner through application of contract theory and the implied theorization of principal-agent relationships (Pollack 1997, 2003). A different approach distinguishes between centralization, functional scope, and territorial extension, all of which may vary in different according to respective policy related fields (Leuffen, et al. 2012, 8). A further important element is the degree to which parliamentary representation is included or not (Rittberger 2003, 2005, 2009). Finally, institutions may vary according to the degree of legalization (Keohane, et al. 2000).

I do not seek to address the complete bargain. Rather, I focus on a number of key issues that cut at the normative core of the nation-state and institutional issues related to the pooling and delegation of authority. Thus, for my purposes, it suffices to assess the positions taken over time by reference to three categories. I concentrate, first, on differences in the degree to which actors seek to pool decision-making; second, on differences in the degree to which decision-making is centralized or decentralized over multiple units; third, I consider differences in the degree to which actors call for parliamentary representation and control. Apart from simplifying the existing measures, I will leave out the issue of legalization for two reasons. First, I do not wish to systematically and exhaustively test competing hypotheses on institutional design, but rather seek to identify blind spots within the current theoretical literature on interstate bargains. Second, I seek to uncover the relationship between transnational networks and political conflict over European institutions in post-war Europe with regard to the EDC. A limited number of categories suffice to capture the main variation with regard to the EDC bargain as well as key differences between the two theoretical frameworks. They are summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Explanandum I: Institutional Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pooling/Control</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decision Rules</strong></td>
<td>All decisions by unanimity</td>
<td>Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) decision for limited number of low salience issues</td>
<td>QMV for several issues of medium/high salience (e.g. strong distributive consequences)</td>
<td>QMV is the rule; Unanimity only in cases of treaty changing decisions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delegation</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Executive Centralization</strong></td>
<td>Preparation of decisions is left to national delegations</td>
<td>Independent body, secretariat and gathering information to monitoring compliance</td>
<td>Monitoring, Agenda setting, partial implementation, limited sanctioning</td>
<td>Sanctioning non-compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parliamentary Representation/Legislative Control</strong></td>
<td>No parliament</td>
<td>National delegates, meetings sporadically, advisory role</td>
<td>Regular meetings, delegates or elected representatives, consulting/limited co-decision (need to be overruled)</td>
<td>Co-decision on high salience issues, appointment and control of Commission/Executive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first dimension comprises the pooling of decision-making that Koremenos and colleagues describe as control since unanimity implies that individual states, through their veto, can block decisions they do not find beneficial (Koremenos, et al. 2001). Degrees of difference are here reduced to voting rules and their scope. At the lowest level, no pooling implies unanimity, a case in which each state has a veto over essentially all common decisions. Majority decisions may then gradually be extended over a number of lower salience issues – i.e. issues that concern the implementation of decisions or such as regulatory decision with little distributive consequences. A new qualitative step occurs when majority decisions are introduced for high salience issues with significant distributive consequence. At the end of the spectrum, all decisions are made by the majority of votes, perhaps exempting more fundamental treaty changes.

Executive centralization refers to the degree to which an independent body is involved in the preparation and implementation of common decisions. Next to no involvement, the use of independent agencies for gathering information on the compliance of contracting states with their contractual obligations is the “least intrusive form of centralization” (Koremenos, et al. 2001, 771). The next qualitative step involves an independent body in the decision-making process within international or-
organizations through shared or exclusive agenda-setting rights and delegates the power of implementation over some issues to that body, while leaving the implementation of other issues to the contracting states. It may imply limited sanctioning capabilities. At the extreme end, complete centralization founds a new supranational executive that fully implements common decisions and monopolizes sanctioning over the issues involved.

For heuristic purposes, the degree of parliamentary representation can be divided roughly into four categories. Next to the absence of any parliamentary body, representative institutions may be present, but meet sporadically with their rights and involvement in common decision-making processes limited to an observing or merely consulting role. A further stage requires more frequent meetings of delegates or directly elected representatives and expands their rights. It minimally involves co-decision, that is, vetoes regarding certain issues have obligatory consequences unless overruled by other institutional players. At the extreme end of the spectrum, elected representatives are involved in deciding high salience issues, amounting to an effective veto and the appointment of the central ‘executive’ body. It implies effective parliamentary control including the rights to force it to resign.

These four dimensions roughly correspond to the spectrum between interstate cooperation on the one hand and the hierarchical governance and separation of powers in democratic states on the other hand – apart from the judiciary of course. It suffices to track changes in the ‘bargaining positions’ of those states involved in the EDC bargain over time and allows a better exposition of the two competing theoretical frameworks to which I turn in the next section.

2.2 Intergovernmentalism, a Review

Intergovernmentalist or state-centered frameworks share the assumption that international relations can adequately be described as competition between states for scarce resources (e.g. Pollack 2012). Thus, governments are treated as the ‘representative agent’ of the state as a corporate actor (e.g. Scharpf 1997, ch. 6). As an analytical ‘tradition’, it contains many ‘classic’ influences from ‘grand theories’ of international relations, mostly realism and liberalism. It comes in two variants: a realist perspective represented largely by classical realist and neorealist arguments (Morgenthau
Chapter 2 Theoretical Context, Review, and Hypotheses

1948; Hoffman 1966; Waltz 1979); and a liberal variant (Moravcsik 1997, 1998, 2008). Classical realist arguments are implicit in a number of diplomatic and economic histories of post-war Europe emphasizing the central role of the state as actor while identifying material as well as ideological ‘state interests’ as primary explanatory factors for the institutional landscape in post-war Europe (Hoffman 1966; Milward 1984, 2000). Liberal Intergovernmentalism is a classic and standard theory claiming to explain the outcomes of major intergovernmental conferences in the history of European Integration (Moravcsik 1997, 1998, 2000b, 2000a). In the field of international relations, the focus on state actors having specific and largely material interests plays a central part in the literature on international institutions, institutional design as well as associated regional integration theories (e.g. Keohane 1984; Mattli 1999a; Koremenos, et al. 2001; Cooley and Spruyt 2009). Intergovernmental assumptions regarding the centrality of the state as an actor are influential in institutionalist analyses of intergovernmental bargaining, institutionalist integration theories as well as in the scholarship on legislative decision-making in the EU insofar as material governmental preferences and rational ‘state bargaining behavior’ are important building blocks (Milner 1997; Tsebelis and Garrett 2001; Pollack 2003; Thomson, et al. 2006). In short, intergovernmentalism comprises the dominant assumptions through which the world of international relations is usually understood.

These assumptions can, by and large, be reduced to four (Rittberger 2012, 80). The first assumption holds that states are the primary actors in world politics. The second assumption may be more controversial when spelled out explicitly: states act at least somewhat rationally on the basis of their material or ideological interests. Third, intergovernmentalism assumes that states anticipate cooperation problems and design institutional solutions to them on the basis of efficiency, distributional, and norm based concerns. This assumption is the main tenet of so-called Liberal and Neoliberal theories of international regime formation and institutional change. Fourth, the Liberal paradigm equally stipulates that governments – as the ‘representative agents’ of ‘the state’ – need to adjust to the two-level’ game of international politics and domestic political conflicts. Section 2.2.1 will argue that these assumptions are suitable to a world in which nationalist values are widespread and seen as legitimate and the organization of the state is effective at enforcing hierarchical decision-making.
Although committed to a similar framework, Realists and Liberalist tend to disagree on the main incentives to which state-preferences respond: Realists emphasize the role of the material distribution of capabilities, power, and geopolitical threats (section 2.2.2) whereas Liberals emphasize the role of domestic conflicts, economic interests, and political ideologies (section 2.2.3). In order to inform preferences on institutional design, there are further differences concerning the central concerns that states care about: there are arguments emphasizing concerns for efficiency, relative power, as well as norms and core ideologies for appropriate institutions (section 2.2.4). Finally, there are substantial differences regarding the main determinants of bargaining behavior: realists, as an implication of their theory of preferences, maintain that power differences determine success at the bargaining table, discard domestic changes, and emphasize changes subjective threat assessments and geopolitical events as sources of strategic adjustment. Liberals emphasize the role of the ‘two-level game’, i.e. the domestic constellation of conflict as a potentially paradoxical source of bargaining power and argue that domestic shifts in the dominant coalition may lead to strategic adjustments as well (section 2.2.5).

A summary (section 2.2.6) briefly recaps the arguments of the intergovernmentalist framework.

2.2.1 When Are Intergovernmentalist Assumptions Plausible?

As already pointed out, intergovernmentalism as a theory of state preference formation and ‘rational state behavior’ hinges on the treatment of the state as a ‘representative agent’ – a coherent rational actor. This assumption analytically simplifies the task of the researcher and, as its pervasiveness demonstrates, explains a large number of issues related to international cooperation. Occam’s razor would dictate that, if an interstate bargain may be described and analyzed by reference to a dozen corporate actors, without loss of explanatory power, as compared to the interaction of several hundred or potentially thousands of individuals, the former should be preferred.

Assessing the empirical plausibility of the intergovernmentalist actor assumption has two sides: it involves both the treatment of the state as a site of processes of collective preference formation well as the ability of the state, as a corporate actor, to enact strategies. The former concerns the ways in which the international incentives com
bined with domestic institutionalized conflict provide the ‘input’ of the political system by a process of demand formulation that remains within the “container-state” (Genschel and Leibfried 2008, 364). The latter concerns the formal hierarchy of the organization of the state to enforce coherence in external appearance and to discipline its ‘agents’ – its individual actors within the hierarchy – to adhere to the agreed upon strategies (Scharpf 1997, 54, 55). How plausible is that ‘containment’ of conflict and will formation, that is, the confinement of conflict and its resolution to the territory of the state in a process of domestic conflict in which transnational relations play an analytically negligible role? How plausible is it to assume the ability of the organization of the state to act rationality, that is, to maximize a given end in complex environments – such as international negotiations – including the ability to acquire information as to the strategically best way to behave based on knowledge of others’ intentions (strategic uncertainty) as well as the ability to solve technical, legal, and socio-economic problems to select the causally effective policies or institutions (causal uncertainty)?

From a sociological perspective, the ‘confinement’ of domestic conflict during processes of preference formation seems entirely appropriate in the presence of strong national identities. Nationalism, simply put, is a notion of collective identity that coincided historically with the formation of the modern state (Gellner 1983; Bayly 2004, 206 ff.). Whether in its ethnic or civic variant (Kohn 1944), its defining feature is the “principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 1983, 1). Hence, nationalism is a “conception of the desirable” (Van Deth and Scarbrough 1995, 28). It confers legitimacy to the state and its territory as an expression of political self-determination of those belonging to the citizenry as an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991). It thereby gives an imagined unity, but only to those who ‘belong’. Nationalism has a ‘mythological content’ that narrates collective identities through “stories of trust and worth” (Smith 2003, 56). Hence, apart from its more or less ‘invented traditions’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), the cultural repertoire of nationalism comprises ‘ethically constitutive stories’ (Smith 2003 ch. 2), i.e. a collective identity that prescribes normatively relationships of trust and worth between the members of a nation. Accordingly, nationalism and exclusive nationalist identities have been empirically linked to patterns of trust formation and demarcation (Reeskens and Wright 2013). Hence, from a sociological perspective, nationalism is a normative principle that finds expression in formal institutions or-
ganizing and delineating membership and access to processes of collective preference-formation within ‘national’ borders. On the international level, it legitimizes norms of ‘national sovereignty’ and thus contributes to the ‘organized hypocrisy’ of that norm in international relations (Krasner 1999).

Going further one might say, it is also a world of ‘organized mistrust’, a demarcating line of authority and loyalty the crossing of which is considered ‘inappropriate’.\(^{12}\) The persistence of such values implies little meaningful transnational contact and thereby decreases expectations of repeated play among actors; different normative attachments or ‘conceptions of desirable’ forms of behavior – norms – decrease the subjective expectation of meeting ‘cooperating’ actors; different languages and cultures raise the transaction costs of verifying reputations, i.e. whether professed norms of behavior match observable behavior. Under such conditions, research in behavioral micro-economics suggests, mistrust is an ‘equilibrium outcome’, likely to remain absent in ‘anarchical fields’ such as markets or international interaction (Bowles 2004, 248). It is thus feasible to speculate that, even in the face of strong economic integration and partially converging economic interests among actors across states, mistrust due to nationalist divides may be resilient due to cultural and linguistic barriers. Nationalist divisions thus contain the formation of political coalitions within states: political conflict remains organized at the national level.

While the process of collective will formation provides the ends of state-behavior, the second side of the state-as-actor assumption implies the ability of the state to conform to requirements of rational action, justifying to posit ‘state-behavior’ as *explanandum*, the object of which is the organizational output of the state in the form of public declarations, etc. At a first approximation, the requirements that need to be fulfilled are threefold. First, the ‘input’ of collective will-formation must be translated into a set of preferences that are transitive and complete over possible outcomes. Second, as a corporate actor, the state must be capable of discipling members to comply with and carry out certain decisions, even if they disagree individually. Third, the state must be capable to deal with uncertainty and complexity in a rational manner, that is, its organizational capacities must approximate the ‘computational

\(^{12}\) Quote from an ‘experienced summiteer’ (G7), “If someone in Washington wanted to play one part of my government against another, I would tell him, ‘Get out immediately; it’s none of your business.’ So I wouldn’t like to interfere in any other friendly government’s internal controversies. As long as it doesn’t become known, okay, but once it became known, everyone would think that it was totally inappropriate.” (Putnam and Bayne 1987, 210).
demands’ that rational decision-making implies, as well as the ability of the state as a ‘principal’ to hold its agents in check.

The traditional challenge to the formal requirement of rationality is the psychology of decision-making that, through framing and other effects, violates formal rationality maxims (Kahneman and Tversky 2000). The state as an organization, however, is characterized by a set of qualities that, arguably, contribute towards organizational decision-making conforming to those requirements and working against individual psychological factors preventing the ‘rational’ formulation of goals and the specific ordered implementation of particular strategies (Geser 1990). As a distinct product of Western modernization, the state, in its organization, embodies the myths and prescriptions of formal rationalized decision-making as the repertoire of modern organizational forms (Meyer and Rowan 1977). As a modern organization, the capability to appear as international actor is incorporated through the bureaucratic division of labor to deal with work-load, standardized routines are part of an specific organizational culture of decision-making that conforms to the demands of being a state in the Westphalian system, capable of conducting ‘foreign policy’ (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 145, 146). These considerations lend plausibility to the assumptions of states conforming to formal requirements of rational action.

The supposed ability of any rational actor to deal with uncertainty and complexity in a rational manner is equally rooted in the ‘rational’ organizational form of the state. First, the organizational ability for the division of labor that is characteristic of modern organizations, equipped by ‘specialized’ personnel, should allow the gathering and utilization of considerable amounts of information (Geser 1990). This ability relates both to issues of causal as well as strategic uncertainty. Causal complexity is addressed through specialized and compartmentalized bureaucratic structures in which the respective specialized and ‘qualified’ personnel is tasked to find solutions to given problems. Strategic uncertainty is addressed through a traditional institutional structure of embassies and other organizational units that are tasked with information-gathering and thus to provide a picture of any strategic situation that is as complete as possible (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 145, 146).

Moreover, the ability of this organization to enforce rules hierarchically is apparent. Having emerged at least partially through interstate competition (Tilly 1975, 38), its key features are standing armies, an ‘adaptation’ to these conflicts; states, at first, are no more than a means to build and retain organizational structures that sustain armies
and employ them successfully in war (Tilly 1985, 1993). The material ‘monopoly of force’ domestically then provides an effective legal framework or other public goods that encourage wealth generation and the emergence of markets, especially property rights (Spruyt 2002, 139). This ability corresponds to the ability to exhibit highly strategic and rational ‘behavior’ internationally, be it diplomatically or in war. The hierarchical organizational structure equally allows a clear definition of preference orderings as well as their enforcement, even in the face of possible internal conflict. At the same time, bureaucratic politics can lead to distinct dynamics that decrease the control of the leadership over the bureaucratic apparatus. Liberal intergovernmentalism in principle deals with the Principal-Agent problem that may, under certain conditions, lead to a loss of control, for example of governments (principals) over delegations tasked with the negotiation of international treaties, for example (Milner 1997).

Nevertheless, institutional and identity related arguments lend a high plausibility to intergovernmentalist assumptions. If, however, the empirical conditions undermine either one of them, one would expect that the empirical usefulness of Intergovernmentalism declines. From the preceding considerations, it emerges that interactions between individuals across states that are based on similar political ideologies and create political trust among them would call these assumptions into question. The confinement of political conflict into nation-states would be undermined as actors with similar ideological preferences face incentives to form coalitions across states and the role of domestic institutions, in particular parties, to provide structure to political conflict would be diminished.

Having summarized preconditions for the usefulness of intergovernmentalist assumptions, I now turn to two substantive versions of the framework, beginning with the Realist variant.

2.2.2 Realist Intergovernmentalism: Material Capabilities and Geopolitics

Realist theory is at home when analyzing the foundational source of conflict in interstate relations: security. The foundation of the realist perspective consists in the ‘Hobbesian tradition’ in international relations theory (Vincent 1981; Doyle 1997, ch. 3). That tradition comes in two variants that characterize the basic ‘security interests’ that inform state security preferences. One tradition consists in the classical
realist school (Morgenthau 1948; Hoffman 1966; Carr 2001 [1945]). Focusing on
interstate competition for scarce resources in a hostile international world, this broad
framework in effect explains the choices made by political leaders by reference to
hypothesized geopolitical ‘state interests’ and figures prominently in the historiogra-
phy of post-war Europe. The second rationalist interpretation of the Hobbesian
view is Neorealist theory: international anarchy being the structural ordering prin-
iple, states are the only (rational) actors who, in the absence of functional differentia-
tion, must primarily be concerned for their own survival (Waltz 1979). As the distri-
bution of material capabilities is the only qualification distinguishing states – and as
power as the only safe source of security – the distribution of material capabilities
‘objectively’ induces state interests (Waltz 1979, 97). Competition for scarce re-
sources in this competitive environment induces dynamics of alliance formation,
declared as “formal associations of states for the use of […] military force” (Snyder
1990, 104), in which states make promises of support to other states, either to bal-
ance the distribution of capabilities by aligning with weaker states, or to ‘bandwag-
on’ by aligning with the strongest in the international ‘system’ (Walt 1987, 17;
Snyder 1997).

Neorealism, as the more recent version, has spawned considerable criticism as well
as an influential debate regarding its usefulness to explain individual state behavior.
Organizationally, states need to adapt the incentive structure of the international sys-
tem and develop appropriate organizational structures in order to survive, but there is
no inherent law dictating that they in fact do so. They may fail, but are likely to suf-
fer the consequences (Elman 1996). Arguments to the contrary point out that, pro-
vided that the assumption of the state as a rational actor is adequate, one would ex-
pect that Foreign Policy makers are sufficiently equipped to perceive their interests
accurately and thus they should inform foreign policy choices (Fearon 1998). Assum-
ing the latter thus implies assuming that states can formulate and act upon ‘ob-
jective’ interests - i.e. they possess an ability for ‘thick rationality’ (Green and
Shapiro 1994, 17, 18).

In the same vein, dedicated theories of state preferences with regard to alliances usu-
ally start with a simple consideration. Provided that a number of states find them-
theselves under a similar threat to each of them, as was certainly the case in post-war
Europe, cooperation through alliance formation has obvious benefits. Alliances,
however, are deeply problematic: promises of cooperation are ‘covenants without the
sword’, a mere window-dressing of the distribution of capabilities within the international system (Mearsheimer 1995). Additional drawbacks consist in the fact that alliances pose a considerable collective action problem that is highly salient since the security dilemma persists within alliances (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Snyder 1984). Hence, rational state-actors should anticipate such problems and design institutions that address such cooperation problems (Keohane 1984, 80 ff.). The sources of institutional preferences of states then replicate the Hobbesian logic: if the hierarchy of the state is, originally, an institutional solution to a security problem, there are conditions in which states would react according to a similar logic and construct limited hierarchies. This argument was first expounded in classical realist context with the advent of nuclear weapons (Herz 1957). More refined characterizations take into account the fact that collective action problems within alliances are structurally similar to cooperation problems in the economic sphere of human activity. Here, economic institutions allow them to handle information asymmetries, decrease transaction costs, and provide for solutions of collective action problems (e.g. Akerlof 1970; Williamson 1985).

Theorizing such questions has brought realist arguments about states’ geopolitical interests in connection with institutional economics, in particular with Williamson’s characterization of transaction costs to security issues leads to the consideration of to solve cooperation problems by providing credible commitments (Williamson 1979; Weber 1997; Weiss 2012). Centralized institutions – through pooling and delegation – provide credible commitments for alliance partners through ‘co-binding’ (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999, 182 ff.). The loss of autonomy that is entailed by committing to centralized institutions varies with context. Thus, ‘violence interdependence’, defined as the increasing “the capacity of actors to do violent harm to one another” (Deudney 2007, 35), directly influences the degree to which states are willing to submit to common institutions: if the ability of the state to survive is no longer given, ensuring that cooperation is mutually beneficial becomes the primary goal. In sum, two factors influence the demand for centralized alliance institutions: objectively, increasing levels of violence interdependence, i.e. increasing technological and material capabilities for destruction, imply incentives to move away from hierarchy towards more centralized common institutions (Deudney 1995; Weber 1997, 331; Deudney 2007). Subjectively, the sense of threat directly influences the immediate demand for such institutions. The main realist reference is thus the direct interaction
between preferences for institutions, geopolitical threats and the distribution of military and material capabilities.

The difficulty in delineating ‘objective’ from ‘subjective’ factors is reflected in the fact that a number of allegedly Realist argue that similar ideology may be a main factor in shaping the alliance choices of states (Walt 1987). However, incorporating subjective factors within a Realist framework is a matter of some controversy in the literature (Legro and Moravcsik 1999). Genuine Neorealism is a materialist theory: Realists do not deny ideological motives exist but rather contend “that they will invariably align well with the power-politics motives of the state. Either the two do not diverge or, when they do, ideology will not drive policy because the resulting policy would not be in the interest of the state.” (Braumoeller 2013, 48). However, there are numerous examples of alleged ‘Realist’ scholars drawing on ideological arguments. Hoffman’s influential piece on post-war Europe is a case in point as is Walt’s study of Alliance formation (Hoffman 1966; Walt 1987). Moreover, there is a considerable formal literature focusing on security issues and alliance formation which, by introducing factors situated at the domestic levels such as ‘audience costs’, sits uneasily between Realism and Liberalism (Fearon 1994). Having identified material capabilities and geopolitical threats as the main realist factors, I will return to these issues briefly in the next section that focuses on the Liberal variant of intergovernmentalism.

2.2.3 Liberal Intergovernmentalism: Interests, Ideas, and Domestic Conflict

The distinctiveness of Liberal Intergovernmentalism results from the focus on domestic political conflict: key factors are economic interests and interest group politics, domestic institutions, party competition, and ideologies (Milner 1997; Moravcsik 1998, 2008). It thus incorporates multiple and highly different assumptions concerning the sources of actor preferences and the institutional variation impacting upon generate domestic political conflict (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2012). As summarized by Moravcsik, domestic actors can be motivated by considerations of economic benefits, of domestic power related goals (i.e. political office), as well as ideational and identity related goals that pit domestic actors against each other (Moravcsik 2008). The ‘national interest’ as pursued by governments is an outcome of domestic conflict: it can change whenever a new domestic coalitions takes
power and reassesses the national interest in light of a different geopolitical ideology or responsiveness to different set of interest groups. Thus, “more intense, certain, and institutionally represented and organized interests” render liberal Intergovernmentalism more determinate and vice versa (Moravcsik 1998, 36).

The first source of state preferences - economic interests – resonates with traditionally liberal works by Schumpeter, Bentham and Kant (Doyle 1997). In the modern formulation, the impact of competing domestic economic interests follows the differential interests for market access or protection from external competition that different economic sectors have, depending on their international competitiveness (e.g. Grossman and Helpman 1995). Such conflicts between different sectorial lobbies affect domestic political conflicts, in particular coalitional alignments (e.g. Rogowski 1989). Accordingly, lobbying competition between representatives of different economic sectors results in ‘state-interests’ that are fragmented along economic sectors, with varying interests for international liberalization of trade according to variables of economic interdependence and comparative advantage (Moravcsik 1997, 1998). However, whereas this logic is straightforward on economic issues, it is less clear in the area of security issues, since markets logics work out differently. First, security is more salient than welfare: in an insecure world, reaping economic benefits may become impossible rather quickly. Second, although the economics of military defense certainly imply economies of scale, the scope for benefits from the functional differentiation of markets for security is context dependent since governments will seek to retain their capabilities as much as possible in order to provide for autonomous defensive capabilities (e.g. Caverley 2007; DeVore 2013). In addition, the negotiation of alliances implies the negotiation of security commitments and defensive expenditures: once an Alliance agreement has been reached, every alliance partner will need to decide how much resources to contribute to the alliance and spending decision need to be coordinated within the alliance (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966, 268). In so far as the production of goods intended as contribution to the alliance is involved in the alliance negotiations, the logic of competitive domestic lobbying and different sectoral interests thus should apply: states should be at least somewhat responsive to domestic industrial lobbies seeking either protection from external competition or lobbying for contracts to produce military goods.

The second source of state preferences ties state preferences to domestic institutions and actors’ desire for power and influence, in short ‘office’. Democratic institutions
in particular shape state preferences in several ways. The most direct institutional link concerns the Kantian democratic peace (Doyle 1997, 252 ff.). Due to democratic leaders’ dependence on electoral fortunes – and leaders’ interest in office – democratic leaders tend not to engage war with each other and are expected to be more selective in choices for engaging conflict since their electoral survival directly hinges on success (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 1999). Moreover, political leaders’ ‘domestic audiences’ – i.e. voters – are often assumed to monitor negotiating performances and reward reputations for resolve and success (Guisinger and Smith 2002). Leaders’ inability to pursue announced public commitments are assumed to incur ‘audience costs’ (Fearon 1994). Competition for voter attention similarly induces an institutionalized conflicts between the branches of governments (Milner 1997, 33 ff.). Political actors in the opposition are expected to seek to formulate alternative Foreign Policies and criticize the priorities of their government. In other words, the fact that political conflict is organized publicly in democracies implies that mere the interest in political office induces leaders and actors of the political opposition to engage in competition for foreign policy goals. Such conflict can be traced back to actors material interests in office, in particular given the fact that party constituencies are tied to distinct economic sectors or factors of production (Rogowski 1989; Hiscox 2002).

Competing for domestic attention introduces incentives for differing domestic accounts of what the ‘national interest’ may be. These considerations lead to the final domestic source of state preferences, namely differing geopolitical ‘ideologies’ and identities (Moravcsik 2008, 241). Ideal-typically, there are three sources for ideological differences: “national identity, political ideology, and socioeconomic order.” (Moravcsik 2008, 241). Competing national identities may exacerbate domestic conflict over the appropriate scope of competing states sovereign jurisdictions (e.g. Van Evera 1994). Political ideologies – normative or causal views of the world – can influence leaders’ strategic and causal thinking and thus affect the formation of state preferences and the preferred shape of international institutions (Snyder 1991; Goldstein and Keohane 1993b; Rittberger 2003). Finally, foundational conceptions of what constitutes the building-blocks of the world heavily influence state preferences (Wendt 1999). Most pertinently, specific ideas or ideologies of socio-economic order influence domestic and international conflicts over economic institutions (Blyth 2002, 2013).
Depending on the nature of ideas, ideologies can be organized at the state level as well as the domestic level. In other words, national identities themselves may allude to similar values, thus making certain governments more likely to enter into binding alliance agreement with each other (Adler and Barnett 1998). Other conflicts, such as those pertaining to legitimate political and socio-economic orders may pit domestic actors against each other: in such cases, conflicts are organized in domestic conflicts by intermediary organizations, primarily parties, interest groups, and civil society (Moravcsik 1997, 1998, 2008). Finally, ideologies may cut across parties as well as states, as emphasized in Craig Parsons’ recent work (Parsons 2002, 2003; Parsons and Weber 2011). Although compatible in principle with the ideological variant, it is difficult how a systematic pattern of ideological differences may exist without a distinct organizational basis.

2.2.4 Three Perspectives on Institutional Design: Power, Credible Commitments, and Norms

What are the implications of the Realist and Liberal arguments for the institutional preferences of states? Given that states are assumed to be primary actors, their preferences are accounted for by reference to institutionalist theories in Political Science. Institutional preferences are commonly based on two sources of motivations for actors’ behavior and thus their institutional preferences: the ‘logic of consequences’ on the one hand; a ‘logic of appropriateness’ on the other hand (March and Olsen 1989, 160).

The logic of appropriateness implies an unequivocal proposition stating that actors react and think according to shared norms of behavior and collective decision-making that shape their conceptions of appropriate institutions (cf. Wendt 1999). Hence, democratic leaders – as the representative agents – are expected to design institutions that respect minimal standards of democratic representation even if competing goals – such as the efficiency of decision-making – suffer (Rittberger 2003, 2005).

The utilitarian assumption – i.e. the logic of consequences – leads to two perspectives on institutional designs that are not entirely compatible. As Douglass North puts it with respect to Political Economy, there is a “persistent tension between the ownership structure which maximized the rents to the ruler (and his group) and an effi-

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cient system that reduced transaction costs and encouraged economic growth” (North 1981, 25). The former implies the competitive pursuit of power and plenty within asymmetric power relationships: more powerful actors are expected to exploit their position and design institutions for their own benefit, ruling out ‘efficient’ institutional designs (Knight 1992; Acemoglu 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). The latter perspective is based on the Coase theorem stipulating that, in the absence of transaction costs, actors are always able, through negotiations, to find some allocation of property rights or other forms redistribution that internalize ‘externalities’ and thus find the most efficient solution to any cooperation problem. Since transaction costs are considerable in the real world, actors are expected create a variety of institutional and organizational forms that improve the efficiency of decision-making (Coase 1960; Demsetz 1967; Williamson 1979, 1985).

The difference is crucial. In the efficiency based view, institutions are ‘technical’ or ‘neutral’ instruments, formed to ‘solve’ social and political problems. However, as Acemoglu argues, there can be no equivalent to the Coase theorem in politics because the commitment problem looms large (Acemoglu 2003). Those who are more powerful have the capability and thus the incentives to adjust existing institutions – such as property rights or formalized venues for political access – to their own benefit. Hence, the formation of ‘inclusive’ political and economic institutions – allowing for the emergence of competitive markets, guaranteed property rights, and stable democratic institutions – presupposes a certain balance of power between the political and economic rulers and the ruled.

A similar reasoning applies to inter-state politics. Accordingly, some accounts emphasize the need for credible commitments and efficient designs for decision-making (for an explicit application to the EDC see Weber 1997; Pollack 2003). Others emphasize the role of the distribution of power for institutional preferences in which more powerful states seek to institutionalize their own advantages whereas less powerful states seek institutional more credible commitments, control mechanisms, and equality of rights (Cooley and Spruyt 2009; for an application to alliance design see Mattes 2012).
Demand and Supply Conditions

Walter Mattli’s distinction between the demand and supply conditions for regional integration incorporates these different incentives (Mattli 1999b, 1999a). For economic issues, the demand side conditions capture the effects of interdependence on the processes of domestic preference formation: interdependence implies that economic processes in one country have strong externalities which, if unaddressed, lead to mutually detrimental outcomes affecting the welfare of both countries. Actors directly affected by such outcomes will lobby the state to push for international institutions effectively reducing these externalities. Common institutions then allow reaping welfare gains from trade liberalization through specialization, increased division of labor, and economies of scale. An analogous reasoning applies to security. A high degree of ‘violence interdependence’ can be understood as a situation in which states have strong potential to destroy each other quickly, creating incentives to institutionalize interaction (Deudney 2007). In such an environment, behavior within alliances produces strong ‘externalities’: in the face of a high external threat, any failure to cooperate creates high security risks for all potential partners. Hence, a high level of external threats should lead to domestic demands for common alliance institutions that formalize alliance investments and allow for credible commitments through hierarchical control (Weber 1997). The security dilemma within alliances implies that commitments to cooperation need to be credible and reliable. Hierarchic alliance institutions are a means to ensure cooperation as they allow more efficient control of defection. Hierarchy entails costs in autonomy. Demands for centralized institutions should thus increase and decrease with the external threat (Lake 2009, 275 ff.). This problem increases in salience with the degree of outside threats: the more a country requires alliance partners to contribute deterrence capabilities, the higher the need for secure commitments.

In sum, the key factors that induce specific levels of demands for international institutions are violence interdependence and security externalities, such as geopolitical threats. As a general precondition, geopolitical threats lead to balancing demands. Threats imply a structural aspect – the distribution of relevant military and economic capabilities – and a contextual aspect relating to explicit declarations of intent from adversaries as well as strategic assessments of external threats from other countries. In the realist reasoning, demands for balancing via the mobilization of capabilities and alliance cooperation directly vary with both factors.
Violence interdependence, i.e. “the capacity of actors to do violent harm to one another” (Deudney 2007, 35), then implies geographic proximity and technological and material capabilities for destruction: the more imminent a threat is objectively, the less feasible unilateral deterrence becomes. As a result, the higher the demand for alliance institutions that secure adequate contributions to common survival, (Deudney 1995; Weber 1997, 331; Deudney 2007). States under a similar material threat should thus exhibit similar patterns of demands for common institutions to govern alliance behavior, to regulate negative externalities, and to solve collective action problems through monitoring and credible commitments (Weber 1997; Weiss 2012). Security threats relate both to external issues as well as to the security dilemma within alliances: the higher a sense of threat within an alliance, the higher the transaction costs stemming from uncertainty of cooperation commitments. ‘Co-binding’, from a transaction cost perspective, is a means to address the security dilemma within alliances and ensure cooperation. It is a function of two factors: uncertainty regarding the behavior of other actors, and asset specificity of the investments alliance partners contribute (Williamson 1979; Weber 1997; Weiss 2012). The higher the perceived potential for defection, the higher the demand for more centralized institutions since states will seek assurances against potential defectors, resulting, in extreme cases, for preferences for institutional ‘co-binding’ (Weber 1997).

Uncertainty is addressed through centralized institutions (Williamson and Masten 1999; Williamson 2000). At the lowest level, delegating powers of information gathering provides a credible form of monitoring of alliance investments and compliance with joint agreements. Independent agencies can be involved to gather information on the compliance of contracting states with their contractual obligations as information collection is “least intrusive form of centralization” (Koremenos, et al. 2001, 771). Delegating more extensive agenda-setting rights may provide a form of credible commitment that contributes to the efficiency of decision-making by reducing the possibility of ‘cycling’ as available agreements are reached more efficiently (Pollack 1997). Finally delegating and pooling substantial sovereign prerogatives - such as policy decisions to majority voting or submitting to more powerful centralized institutions, including a power to issue sanctions for violating joint agreements, provide institutionally credible commitments (Moravcsik 1998). Hence, from these considerations, it follows that the higher the security externalities between any two states under a common threat, the higher the demand for credible commitments and central-
ized institutions regulating security cooperation. Moreover, perceived intentions and reputation may matter (Mattes 2012). States can be expected to take the past behavior of other states into account when judging their status: the more a state has, in past, complied with its alliance obligations, the less other states are concerned with its prospective behavior in the future, and vice versa (Mattes 2012).

The term ‘asset specificity’ equally relates to problems of credible commitment: it may be used to conceptually grasp the problem of functional differentiation within Alliances (Weber 1997; Weiss 2012). Asset-specificity describes “political-military structures that can or cannot be redeployed for alternative purposes”, for example, in alternative Alliance arrangements (Weiss 2012, 667). Conversely, if command structures and technological arrangements are easily adaptable to an alternative, ‘deterrence equivalent’ alliance, asset-specificity is low and the need to submit to fully spelled out centralized institutions is less salient. Hence, demands for functional differentiation in capabilities within alliances may be used to signal the credibility of investments to assay the security dilemma within alliances.

In sum, the demand side from an intergovernmental perspective can be summarized thus:

**H1** The higher the security threats to a particular country, the higher the demand for balancing through mobilization of capabilities and alliance cooperation. The higher the ‘violence interdependence’ between any two Alliance partners and the higher the perceived potential for defection of Alliance partners, the higher the demand for credible commitments and centralized institutions.

Turning to the supply side, one turns to the “incentives to be more concerned with the distributional consequences of coordination.” (Mattli 1999b, 15). In other words, because conflict over resources persists between alliance partners, asymmetries in the distribution of capabilities within the alliance are expected to structure the conflict over specific institutional forms between the negotiating states, in particular because power asymmetries make the enforcement problem and the commitment problem more severe (Koremenos, et al. 2001; Mattes 2012). Thus, stronger states will seek to realize institutions in which their influence and control over future outcomes reflect their relative standing (Koremenos, et al. 2001, 791). As weaker states will seek to address resulting enforcement problems, differences in the *ex ante* distribution of
power should be reflected in the constellation of conflict between the negotiating states.

Pursuing their individual advantage, more powerful countries will seek to institutionalize power asymmetries through rules and decision-making procedures stacked in their favor (Cooley and Spruyt 2009). Thus stronger states will seek to secure their influence by structuring decision-making rules – i.e. the distribution of votes – to their advantage. Moreover, stronger states can be expected to benefit from incomplete contracts and thus to reject neutral third party enforcement (Ibid.). Smaller and less powerful states, in turn, should opt for more complete contracts and elaborate control of independent agencies: if hierarchical, centralized intuitions do not come with proper controls, smaller states will reject them (Koremenos, et al. 2001, 789, 790). Smaller powers, fearing a *de facto* loss of influence once a bargain has been formally fixed in contracts, thus seek commitments primarily through third party adjudication and demand less centralization. Moreover, smaller powers should seek *ex ante* controls through detailed contracts as well as *ex post* control through retaining unanimity – and thus veto rights as much as possible (Pollack 2003; Cooley and Spruyt 2009). In sum, the distribution of power between negotiating states should be reflected in the conflict structure between states in the following manner:

**H2 More powerful states are less worried about the control of centralized institutions and care more about efficiency and their influence. The more relative power a state has within an alliance bargain, the more it will prefer beneficial pooling of decision-making. Less powerful states are more worried about the control of centralized institutions and care more about their autonomy. The less relative power a state has within an alliance bargain, the more it will prefer unanimity and veto rights.**

In addition, the role of norms in the design of supranational institutions is best situated on the supply side since its core argument conflicts with the design goal of institutional efficiency but may work complementary with the power related logic. Eschewing a purely constructivist as well as a purely materialist logic, the argument relies on the concept of strategic action in a community environment in which norms are assumed to be resources in conflict. To be successful in political conflicts, actors need to use “ethos-based arguments to strengthen the legitimacy of their own goals against the claims and arguments of their opponents.” (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2006, 1158, 1159). Insofar as these claims are made within a community of democratic
states, failing to comply with rhetoric standards affects leaders’ reputation, both within an international community as well as, potentially, within the domestic democratic political conflict. Hence, this particular line of reasoning is compatible in principle with a liberal account of state preferences that allows for norms to play a role in political conflict, both domestically as well as within an international community, provided that the negotiating states are organized democratically.

The argument presupposes given “divergent or adverse constitutional member state preferences” for the pooling of delegation of decision-making authority (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2006, 1161). On the basis of the preceding considerations, the question of salience should be more relevant for larger powers insofar as they are systematically expected to display a higher tendency for implementing institutions that pool and delegate decision-making authority. In addition, larger powers stand to gain in influence from including representational institution: as much as they gain from weighted majorities, they gain through parliamentary representation. In so far as larger states are more populous, representative institutions benefit by them potentially helping to generate policies in their favor, provided that delegates follow ‘national interests’.

When and to What Do State Preferences Adapt?

Having specified the content of ‘state-preferences’, a final set question concerns the issue of change. As already described in the introduction, the EDC bargain was characterized by a number of position shifts and changes in the basic conflict constellation between the negotiating states. As argued in section 2.1, ‘bargaining positions’, as strategic choices themselves, can change easily. Preferences, however, do not change without shifts in desires. Preferences may be said to ‘adapt’ if beliefs change on account of new information or if the range of feasible outcomes changes on account of novel or unforeseen events. Given the preceding remarks about the realist and liberal intergovernmentalist accounts of state preferences, it is clear that they provide differing but nonetheless genuine intergovernmental accounts of the ways in which states adapt their preferences to changing environments.

In the Realist perspective, states are coherent actors with coherent desires, i.e. they possess ‘thick rationality’. Thus, the two sources of adaptation are changing geopolitical threat levels and shifts in the distribution of material capabilities. Thus, geopoliti-
ical crises – much similar to economic crisis – may trigger a higher demand for centralized institutions and a higher willingness of governments to sacrifice individual gains for the assurance of common safety (Mattli 1999b).

In the Liberal version, governments may be expected to react rationally and thus in a similar vein provided that the main desire is security. The key difference, however, is that desires may ‘change’ provided that the dominant domestic coalition changes and introduces different ideological goals and thus a different definition of the national interest. Moreover, any domestic political change that affects the ratification constraint, available agreements and outside options, are likely to affect a government’s bargaining position. (Putnam 1988; Milner 1997). Thus, in the liberal version, domestic actors pursuing ideological goals matter.

The key is the ability of domestic institutions to structure conflict. Thus, the timing of shifts should reflect differences in the composition of governments and any developments in the composition of domestic legislative institutions that affect the chances of the ratification of agreements. Moreover, since assessments of threat levels are partially subjective, they are– in the liberal view – affected by domestic political ideologies as well. Party ideologies – as causal belief systems – may be associated with different assessments of threat levels, the effectiveness of institutional arrangements or the interpretations of intents of other states. Hence, domestic changes may affect ‘state preferences’.

Both the Realist and the Liberal account of position shifts can thus be summarized.

**H3** Governments’ bargaining positions change in response to changing geopolitical threat level (‘security crises’), changes in the distribution of material capabilities or domestic shifts in the party composition of the governing coalition.

Having characterized the sources, directions, and dynamic of state-preference formation from a Realist and a Liberal point of view, I turn to strategy formulation and bargaining behavior in the next section.
2.2.5 Intergovernmental Bargaining Behavior: Outside Options, Domestic Constraints, and Uncertainty

The present section considers the Realist and Liberal determinants of bargaining behavior and bargaining success. The former largely boils down to the question of the uses of information, the latter to the main sources of leverage that actors can successfully bring to bear at the bargaining table. Bargaining success in the Realist account is a question of material capabilities. The Liberal version is more in line with the expansive formal work on bargaining theory, the causes of war, and other issues of interstate cooperation that has dominated scholarly work since the early 1990’s (Powell 2002; Reiter 2003). Two key claims include the emphasis on the role of domestic institutions and domestic political conflict. Most prominently, bargaining power may, in addition to available outside options, result from the exploitation of the ‘paradox of weakness’ that can arise under certain conditions (Schelling 1960). Finally, obtaining accurate information is a key precondition of bargaining success as the choice of means to achieve desired ends depends on available information. Governments need to make assessments of the intentions of their counterparts at the negotiation table: what are they willing to accept? What is their ratification constraint? These strategic beliefs are part and parcel of bargaining behavior and acquiring accurate information a key condition for success. Whereas Realists are largely silent on this matter, Liberals point to principal-agent problems and the role of domestic institutions that can contribute to or undermine the efficient attainment and usage of available strategic information.

The realist version of bargaining theory follows straightforward materialist reasoning and applies conventional bargaining theories. The basic elements of any situational logic of bargaining power are their basic interests for ‘power and plenty’ and the existing distribution of material capabilities. Both determine the outside options, i.e. “what the bargainers obtain if they fail to reach an agreement because they terminate the bargaining” (Powell 2002, 4). In the Realist account, the less material capabilities and viable geopolitical alternatives a state possesses, the more dependent it will be on cooperative agreements with other states, i.e. alliances. The higher that dependence is, the more the state will need to acquiesce to less beneficial agreements. In turn, the lower that dependency is, the more a state can credibly threaten to leave negotiations and, consequently, the higher will be its ability to shape the bargaining outcome. Thus, apart from this structural logic of power, geopolitical considerations
such as geography—may come into play as well by affecting the relative potential exposure to attacks and thus the valuation of outside options. In sum, the same factors that influence preferences, affect states’ influence on bargaining outcomes.

Recent work on interstate bargaining has demonstrated, however, that “source of power drives only one of the causal mechanisms that bargaining theory suggests” and that simple realist reasoning is “overly simplistic” (Schneider 2005, 677). Bargaining outcomes have been analyzed to depend on a host of factors, some of which are difficult to verify empirically. First, formal work has amply demonstrated that small details of the bargaining protocol can have large effects on outcomes (Muthoo 1999). Moreover, uncertainty is associated with inefficiency: bargains may fail to reach the Pareto Frontier if actors base their strategies on false information in the same way as uncertainty is a major factor that impedes the efficient functioning of markets (Akerlof 1970). Applying this insight, Fearon has shown in an influential article that a uncertainty may be a primary source of bargaining inefficiency causing wars even if actors do not seek it (Fearon 1995; Fey and Ramsay 2011).

How do (state) actors deal with uncertainty in the intergovernmentalist framework? In the simplest case, actors that are uncertain about each other’s’ disagreement value (outside options) will ‘test’ each other’s’ resolve in an interplay of threats, offers and counteroffers. Thus, under uncertainty, “bargaining is a form of communication.” (Morrow 1989, 941). Since every negotiator has an incentive to misrepresent her valuation of available outside options, negotiators seeking their advantage run the risk of a breakdown of negotiations. In other words, states as representative agents face the “negotiators dilemma” between “creating value” and “claiming value”, the former requiring “openness” and revealing one’s preferences, the latter calling for “manipulating alternatives and aspirations” (Lax and Sebenius 1986, 154). In this sense, the impact of uncertainty on negotiations has observable implications for the process of intergovernmental negotiations. Seeking their advantage, actors should refuse to compromise while threatening to call the bargain off, thus signalling strong resolve but, at the same time, risking failure. This testing of resolve – or ‘bargaining deadlock’ – is thus a learning process that may produce ‘avoidable’ inefficiencies, bargaining failure, and even wars as a more or less probable outcome of negotiations.

In addition, the valuation of outside options – and thus bargaining power – may be affected by domestic conflict and institutional constraints. Thus, within the ‘two-level game’ of international negotiations (Putnam 1988; Milner 1997), domestic con-
straints and formal rules can be utilized as a ‘commitment device’ in order to rig “the incentives so that the other party must choose in one’s favor.” (Schelling 1960, 37). Formal constitutional constraints or unavailable domestic majorities – as ratification constraints – may allow leaders to credibly commit to an agreement that is more favorable to them by pointing out that remaining alternatives are non-attainable. Hence, by allowing states to confront their negotiation partners with such a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ offer, constitutional constraints or a powerful domestic opposition may be sources of bargaining power. In this sense, a small domestic zone of agreement that passes ratification hurdle may be highly beneficial (Putnam 1988, 441).

Both the Realist and the Liberal account thus summarize the intergovernmental view of bargaining power.

**H4** *The higher the military capabilities of a state and the more attractive its outside options to the alliance bargain, the higher the influence of its preferences on the course and outcome of the bargain. The higher and the more influential the domestic opposition to cooperation within the alliance, the higher the influence of that government’s preferences on the course and outcome of the bargain.*

However, both the simple Realist view of bargaining power as well as the ‘Schelling conjecture’ equally depend on a large number of modeling assumptions regarding actors’ ideal points and institutional settings (a brief overview in Bailer and Schneider 2006, 155 ff.). More importantly, uncertainty plays a critical role as well since no commitment can be credible if it is not believed in by other negotiating partners (Iida 1993; Mo 1994; Milner 1997; Tarar 2001). Since every government will have substantially more knowledge concerning the preferences of its domestic coalition than any external observer, negotiators face an incentive to portray the chances of ratification as more tenuous than they actually are if it allows pushing the international compromise more closely to their most preferred outcome. Being aware of this problem, all negotiators will mistrust extreme signals of domestic constraint.

From a liberal point of view, both supranational as well as domestic institutions may reduce the impact of uncertainty on negotiations. International institutions, through third party monitoring, serve to alleviate distrust among states by providing third party information on the domestic compliance with international agreements (Keohane 1984). In addition, domestic democratic institutions organize political con-
conflict in a more public and transparent manner than autocratic institutions as the observation of the public behavior of organized political opposition in other states reveals information about the governments’ resolve, possible ratification constraints, and thus the governments’ valuation of gains (Eyerman and Hart 1996; Schultz 1998; Prins 2003; Ramsay 2004). Moreover, public declarations of intent and commitment by democratic leaders are – ceteris paribus – more credible than those of autocratic ones since reputations for resolve and foreign policy consistency are an electoral asset and backing down from publicly announced commitments incurs ‘audience costs’ (Fearon 1994; Guisinger and Smith 2002). Moreover, the formal accountability of ministers and governments to the legislature, as well as public formal rules that structure political conflict ease the identification of ratification constraints of the negotiating parties (Martin 2000, 168 ff.). Nevertheless, “[even] among governments as well known to one another as the Western Allies are, officials are often surprisingly misinformed about domestic alignments abroad, and they are skeptical of their own ability to maneuver effectively in a foreign game whose rules they do not fully understand” (Putnam and Bayne 1987, 210).

In addition, governments appoint delegates for negotiations to make contact with foreign governments and conduct negotiations through privileged institutionalized and formalized venues, mostly diplomatic exchanges. Delegation invites classic principal-agent problems that may result in a loss of real authority for the principal if agents have adverse preference and shirk the given mandate (e.g. Aghion and Tirole 1997). Lenient rules or mandates, urgency of the decisions to be made, invasive and badly incentivized performance measurement, and the presence of multiple principals with diverging preferences contribute to agency loss and decrease the real authority and influence over decisions by principals and thus governments (Aghion and Tirole 1997; Miller 2005, 213, 214). As a result, bargaining inefficiencies and ratification failures can occur if the negotiating agents of the state agree to compromises that government principals or domestic actors do not find beneficial. For governments, agency loss in such situations is an information problem. Hence, in order to prevent these problems from affecting their ability to effectively deal with uncertainty, principals need high quality information, “any additional information about the agent’s action, however imperfect, can be used to improve the welfare of both the principal and the agent.” (Hölmstrom 1979, 75). Apart from formalized *ex ante* and *ex post* oversight mechanisms, using multiple sources of information – or distributing
information gathering tasks among multiple agents – is an important and ‘rational’ possibility to address the issue of asymmetric information (Salanié 2005, 140, 141).

To deal with such issues, the intergovernmental framework prescribes that actors rely on internal multiple sources, not sources emanating from states that, within an intergovernmental – national – paradigm, are expected to have adverse preference mechanisms. Government actors rely on privileged diplomatic channels – embassies, members of delegations, organizational resources of the governments ministries, and in the case of security cooperation in particular the military – as well as domestic interest groups to provide credible, i.e. trusted information that may be used to validate alternative, sources of information (cf. Milner 1997, ch. 3). The possibility of agency loss implies nevertheless, that a treaty negotiated as a result of agency loss due to asymmetric information and/ or adverse preferences may be, so to speak, ‘new domestic information’ once presented to the government. A similar reasoning applies to domestic institutions, such as parliaments, tasked with mandating governments and ratifying international treaties (Ibid.).

**H5** Bargaining strategies change on account of novel information that is obtained through institutionalized and trusted sources comprising domestic actors, interest groups, and institutionalized formal diplomatic and ministerial channels. Multiple domestic principals, lenient mandates and adverse preferences between governments and their delegates increase the likelihood of ratification failure.

### 2.2.6 Summary

This section has presented the intergovernmental framework. It has argued that it rests, analytically and empirically, on three conditions: an effective organizational hierarchy, effective domestic institutions structuring conflict, and national values that contain conflict within state borders. Common identities and ideologies ensure that organized political conflict remains within the confines of the nation-state. Effective institutions comprise two aspects. An effective hierarchy ensures that individuals or agents act in the interest of the principal – i.e. the government leadership independent – and the division of labor ensures that information is processed efficiently by state institutions. Under such circumstances, states form preferences for alliance institutions in accordance with their relative power and in response to outside threat levels.
Shifts in the party composition of domestic governing coalitions may affect these preferences, whereas the ability to insert these preferences into final agreements depends on state power and credible domestic constraints.

If ideological commitments cross borders and domestic conflict inhibits the effectiveness of domestic institutions, a different picture may emerge.

2.3 Transnational Networks: An Alternative to Intergovernmentalism?

The observation that political mobilization occurs across frontiers is nothing new and has, with the advent of internet and technology, acquired new impetus. Recently, students of global movements have increasingly looked at the impact of transnational organizations and networks on a range of outcomes in international relations. This section critically reviews this scholarship, focusing on two aspects: taking up the literature on transnational relations, it argues that the concept of embedded action, as developed by Granovetter (1985), provides a more realistic view of the impact of value-oriented transnational networks on state-behavior. Second, it argues that a widespread view sees transnational and transgovernmental networks as ‘efficient’ transmitters of information. As shown below, that is not the case. Combining both arguments, I argue that the impact transnational networks depends on the nature of individuals within them, in particular their domestic influence, i.e. their position to influence, within the hierarchy of the state and the dynamics of domestic conflict, the preference formation and the choice of bargaining strategies. In sum, it is the embeddedness of actors within transnational networks that matters. Second, high influence may be associated with a propensity to influence the transmission of information within a bargaining setting and to contribute to bargaining inefficiency.

Again, this is not to say that ideas ‘travelling’ through networks trump structural factors, or basic desires for power, in terms of actors’ motivations. The argument is rather that under such conditions intergovernmentalist theories “whether realist or liberal-are underdetermining and cannot account for […] the specific content of the change” in governmental preferences (Risse-Kappen 1994, 185).

I begin by reviewing the literature on transnational relations and transnational networks and its main insights (section 2.3.1). Second, I specify the concepts of ‘transnational networks’ and ‘transgovernmental networks’ (section 2.3.2). Third, relating
the conditions for impact of transnational networks on the formation of state preferences to intergovernmentalist assumptions, I develop competing hypotheses regarding state-preference formation (section 2.3.3). Fourth, I develop competing hypotheses regarding the use of information and choice of bargaining strategies of states (section 2.3.4).

2.3.1 Transnational Networks in International Relations: A Review

Quantitative social network analysis has a long tradition in both sociology and economics (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Easley and Kleinberg 2010). Advances in analytical methods of network analysis have led to numerous quantitative applications in Political Sciences and the subfield of International Relations in recent years (for an overview see Hafner-Burton, et al. 2009; Kahler 2009). Scholars have reexamined the structure international system, international trade patterns, alliance formation, and the diffusion of regulative standards (e.g. Maoz 2006; Hafner-Burton, et al. 2009; Maoz 2012b).

Part of the problem with this literature, however, is that the concept of networks suffers from an underspecified use (Hafner-Burton, et al. 2009). Thus, the types of actors that are considered in the literature on transnational networks vary considerably from states, to international organizations, to multi-national cooperations, social movements, governmental agencies and individuals. As a consequence, it is difficult to pinpoint current knowledge regarding the precise roles and the mechanisms that different types of transnational networks may facilitate, the impact – if any – they can have and, in particular, the structural prerequisites of such claims (Risse 2012). The ambiguity, to a certain extent, is a result of a foundational difficulty: what explains network formation? Why do actors engage some types of actors, and not others? Do actors choose their environment and thus their social and political relations? Or are actors rather a product of their environment, and thus their social and political relations? When and how do networks enable or constrain actors’ capabilities to act? These are difficult questions that are not definitively solved (Risse 2012). Thus, scholarship using the concept of networks in Political Science and International Relations is highly disparate: some treat networks as a resource and tool of efficient governance (Slaughter 2004), some describe transnational networks as instruments of powerful states to reproduce hegemony (Cox 1987); some analyze transnational net-
work structures as outcomes or expressions of social and interstate conflict (Keck and Sikkink 1998); some argue that transgovernmental networks affect political and social outcomes and thus state preferences and seek to identify the conditions for such an impact (for an overview see Risse 2012).

Consider the governance literature: here, transnational networks have been argued to provide an important mechanism of in international ‘governance’ in the post-Cold War world (Rosenau 1992). Thus, some see the ‘networked polity’ as a form or regional political organization suitable to modern, industrialized, fragmented, Western Europe (Ansell 2000). In particular, it is often maintained that globalization led to a change in the relationship between public and private actors: networks are thus considered an apt organizational form of decision-making in the absence of hierarchy and where knowledge is fragmented and support hard to mobilize, both in Europe (Kohler-Koch 1996; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999), as well as globally (Hall and Biersteker 2002; Cutler 2003). In this sense, transnational and transgovernmental networks are seen as a novel means by which a more fragmented, multipolar, modern world characterized by unprecedented mobility and technological connectedness can be governed. More flexible than hierarchy, more ordered than anarchy or markets, networks have thus been described as resources of “information, expertise, financial means, or political support” (Börzel and Heard-Lauréote 2009, 141).

Others focus on the role that social and political relationships – i.e. networks – have in socializing actors, thus transmitting norms and ideas, and, as a result, effecting change. Early work by Karl W. Deutsch’s already analyzed the emergence and persistence organized political power of the state as “dependent on the highly uneven distribution of social communication facilities and of economic, cultural, and geographic interdependence.” (Deutsch 1953, 187). In this sense, the nation-state – the basis for the suitability of the intergovernmental framework – is a historically contingent result of specific patterns of interaction transcending the political boundaries that preceded it. A recent trend in historiography, for example, has analyzed the transmission of ideas and norms in the 19th century through transnational networks that contributed to an early rise of ‘internationalism’: These scholars share the commitment to write ‘transnational histories (Geyer and Paulmann 2001; Bayly, et al. 2006; Osterhammel 2011). Conceptually, they oppose the tradition of ‘diplomatic history’ that corresponds directly with the realist framework as described above (Iriye 2007).
Additionally, there are influential arguments holding that the European Union is a site of ‘transnational socialization’ (Schimmelfennig 2005). Others maintain that transgovernmental networks can be important carriers of democratic norms, thus contributing to democratization (Freyburg 2014). These arguments are kin to those in the governance literature, maintaining that networks provide superior access points for private actors early in decision-making processes, allow information, socialization, and thus the ‘upgrading of the common interest’ (Börzel and Heard-Lauréote 2009, 143). Finally, recent arguments have similarly emphasized the role of transnational networks in the formation of post-war European institutions (Kaiser and Starie 2005; Kaiser, et al. 2008; Kaiser, et al. 2010).

Apart from transmitting ideas, a special emphasis concerns the role that networks may play in the transmission of information. Thus, they are said to effectively disseminate information, provide for the diffusion of best regulatory standards, improve compliance by socializing actors into ‘network norms’ that provide for a propensity of self-regulation through enhancing reputation based mechanisms for cooperation (Slaughter 2004, ch. 5). The role of transnational communities and networks of private actors in shaping global economic regulation has been equally emphasized (Djelic and Quack 2010; Büthe and Mattli 2011). Structural distances between governments in transgovernmental networks established through global regulators have been argued to explain patterns of policy convergence (Bach and Newman 2010). Others find that proximity in transgovernmental contacts encourages policy learning and adoption of best practices (Cao 2012).

A different argument relates the rise of transnational networks – and thus the formation of a transnational elite – as structures of power. Scholars from different traditions such as Robert Gilpin and Robert Cox have argued that the mechanisms of transnational governance are mechanisms of US hegemony (Gilpin 1975; Cox 1987). In this view, the global political system expressed in transnational relations stems from the global hegemony of the US state. Far from being a ‘neutral’ response to new problems of governance, this view holds that the built up of a tight web of international institutions after the Second World War, staffed with individuals with a similar mindset, were a strategic choice: ‘transnational relationships’ are thus a deliberate design (Krasner 1995).

An additional interesting approach is to utilize network analysis as a means to describe political conflict. Reflecting the sociological insight that individual prefer-
ences and network embeddedness are highly correlated, studies of the US congress have shown that shifting ideological polarization is reflected in changing cooperative networks in congress (Zhang, et al. 2008), and the UK parliament (Maoz and Somer-Topcu 2010; Heaney, et al. 2012). Moreover, quantitative measures of network distance – based on bill co-sponsorship – seem to provide better correlates of voting behavior in Congress than ideal-point estimates (Fowler 2006). Analogously, networks reconstructed from state memberships in IGO’s show clustering patterns of states into disparate communities that reflect global conflicts (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006; Maoz 2006, 2012a, 2012b). In the same vein, clustering in trade networks is equally well suited to provide indicators of interstate conflicts (Lupu and Traag 2013). In the context of the EU and its intergovernmental conferences, trans-governmental networks – at least in the case of the Treaty of Amsterdam – have been found to follow patterns of economic interdependence (Thurner and Binder 2009; Thurner and Pappi 2009; Thurner and Binder 2011).

Finally, there is ample scholarship that has studied the ways in which transnational networks and organizations may impact state policies and preferences. The scope for such impact is considerable: for example, transnational networks have been ascribed an important role in ending the Cold War (Risse-Kappen 1994). Other studies trace the impact of transnational actors committed to common values in diverse issue areas such as human rights (Risse, et al. 1999), environmental politics (Schreurs, et al. 2009), and norms of warfare (Price 1998). Building upon Deutsch, Adler and Barnett argued that ‘security communities’ develop between states under conditions of shared identities, intense transnational contact, and emerging norms of reciprocity, making cooperation stable over time and excluding violence as means for pursuing conflicting interests among such states (Adler and Barnett 1998, 31).

The most important contribution in this line of research concerns the conditions for such impacts that can be differentiated according to international and domestic factors (Risse 2012). Effective political action requires capabilities and resources to deal with collective action problems (Olson 1971). Transnational networks are resources for actors engaged in diverse transnational and international organizations that provide the organizational and social resources for coordinating action effectively (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Smith 1998; Boli and Thomas 1999). On the ideational plane, the argument of ‘frame resonance’ has been advanced: the higher the internal coherence and ‘the fit’ between the values and norms behind the political advocacy
of a transnational coalition with those of domestic discourses, the higher the scope for impact (Checkel 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Second, it has been argued that the higher the international institutionalization of a specific issue, the higher the scope for transnational coalitions to impact state behavior (Risse-Kappen 1995a).

Analyzing the domestic conditions, the literature pays particular attention to Liberal theory by considering the “domestic balance of political power forces” (Kaufmann and Pape 1999, 632). If transnational coalitions seek to influence state behavior, they need to influence decision-makers. Since these actors face diverse incentives and pressures in domestic political conflict, domestic institutional factors and the ‘opportunity structures’ that open or close in the dynamics of conflict matter. One argument has established a link between the potential for impact and the ‘openness’ of domestic structures (Risse-Kappen 1995b; Evangelista 1997). Openness implies that domestic conflict consists of multiple and competing voices and a lower ability of the decision-making centers in parties or domestic governments to discipline and enforce decisions. Thus Evangelista argued that authoritative structures provide little access for transnational influence but a high potential impact if individuals at the top of the organizational hierarchy are affected. Conversely, pluralist systems and systems with a high number of veto points are more ‘open’ to influence but provide less scope for impact (Evangelista 1995).

Thus, while there is ample research on conditions for successful influence on state preferences, the literature tends to suffer from two weaknesses. First, being heavily geared towards case study research, there is still a lack of studies of instances of failed impact. Moreover, the overall picture is ambiguous: for example, early common claims regarding the fact that networks contribute to efficient information dissemination in international and European governance were qualified by largely ambiguous findings (Héritier 2003).

A clear advance in recent years has been increasing attention to structural methods of social network analysis. The analysis of influence is enriched by revealing structural positions within transnational networks as well as through structural description of potential access of transnational actors to governments (Moore, et al. 2003; Lake and Wong 2009; Murdie and Davis 2012). However, on a conceptual level, there is very little recognition of the insights provided by formal literature on network formation, information transmission that goes beyond using centrality as an indicator for power and influence.
The quantitative literature, however, has its own problems. It’s strength is to provide unique means to describe the structure of international and transnational cooperative networks among states and individuals, showing that there are strong structural correlates to a number of important outcomes. Unfortunately, most quantitative designs give little information as to what is ‘happening’ in networks. Counting contacts between individuals does not provide information on the content of exchanges, on the meaning of particular networks for participants, what types of information are exchanged, which contacts ‘mean’ more to actors and whom they trust or distrust, etc. (McLean 2007). Thus, quantitative analyses could benefit immensely from qualitative insights – such mixed designs are, however, hard to come by in the literature.

The next section will focus on concept specification, while the subsequent sections will draw together the existing literature on transnational networks, and formal methods to provide hypotheses in impact of preferences and bargaining behavior.

2.3.2 Transnational Networks: Definitions

This section specifies the concept of ‘transnational networks’. Starting from the basic definition of networks in general, I introduce the conceptual definition of social networks, opposing them to two alternative forms of social organization: markets and hierarchies. I derive their capacity as a social resource allowing for the formation of trust. I continue by reviewing an explicit definition of transnational and transgovernmental networks as consisting of ties between actors across states and governments who share similar values and ideologies and who seek to influence ‘state behavior’. I then characterize their analytical and descriptive potential: placing actor behavior within specific networks that share similar values and ideologies allows an empirically sound social characterization of their preferences. Utilizing this advantage requires a concrete analysis of ‘practices of networking’, i.e. the rhetorical and discursive strategies by which social and political ties are gained and maintained. I conclude by arguing that a formulation of the conditions for a traceable impact on preferences and bargaining strategies has to take into account both the structure as well as the political dynamics within transnational networks.

In order to understand the network concept, distinguish a descriptive meaning of the term ‘network’ from its conceptual meaning. At a descriptive level, a network is a set of objects and a set of relations among these objects, or, more prosaically “[…] a
collection of points joined together in pairs by lines.” (Newman 2010, 1). This definition covers the exact mathematical meaning of a network as well as empirical manifestations, from technological networks between computers (such as the Internet), biological networks (biochemical, neural, ecological), as well as relationships between social or political actors. Thus, in a descriptive sense a social network merely describes feasible kinds of relationships among a set of actors and can thus refer to formal relationships of authority – i.e. an organizational chart of a government or an international organization constitutes a network – as well as informal relationships like kinship and patronage, common membership in various executive boards, friendship, trust, or mere frequency of interaction (Ibid.).

At a conceptual level, networks may be described as ideal-typical forms of interaction between actors that need to be distinguished from markets and anarchic fields on the one hand and organizational hierarchies on the other hand. In this sense, networks constitute relationships among actors that are more stable or intense than one-shot quasi-anonymous interactions (for example in anonymous markets), yet informal, more infrequent and not rule governed as institutionalized relationships in hierarchical organizations: they are “neither fish nor fowl, nor some mongrel hybrid, but a distinctly different form” (Powell 1990, 299). Such forms of informal relationships are beneficial to political and economic actors because they allow for higher flexibility than hierarchies and higher commitment and reliability than anonymous one shot interactions in markets because actors meet each other more frequently and can establish more personal relationships. Powell argues that such structures are more conducive to emergent norms of reciprocity and trust (Ibid.). In this sense, dependable trust networks have a number of advantages for political actors in particular. For example, in any archetypical situation resembling prisoner dilemma type situations, trust allows reaping gains from cooperation that cannot be reached in anarchic situations or only enforced in hierarchies by costly threats and sanctions. Granovetter amply summarized that view by taking the extreme case: “In the family, there is no Prisoner's Dilemma because each is confident that the others can be counted on.” (Granovetter 1985, 490).

Trust in the political world is risky, or rather, trusting implies taking a risk by definition. Thus, trust may be defined as “[...] ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of others.”
It constitutes a political form of social capital, that is, a resource based on mutual obligations, norms, and information (Coleman 1988, 103, 104).

When is trusting others a good strategy? Theoretical and empirical research on the development of informal trust in market-like transactions – where formal institutions guaranteeing and enforcing property rights are absent – suggests that three factors contribute to trust relationships among rational actors (Bowles 2004, 248). These are: the presence of the possibility of retaliation (1), that is, an expectation of repeated play that is associated with the possibility of sanctioning of defectors in the next round (tit for tat); (2) segmentation between cooperators and defectors, i.e. the expectation that one is likely to encounter ‘like-minded’ cooperating types of actors (ethnic or linguistic segmentation for example or strong presence of in-group norms based on a common identity), and (3) a possibility to establish a reputation that is easily (cost-free) verified. It is easy to see that the conceptual definition of networks covers such relationships. Networks that contribute to trust relationships need to be based on frequent interaction between actors that are like-minded or share values and ideas and in which interaction is transparent. Insofar as transnational networks form between actors sharing similar ideological or normative goals, they conform to a pattern of ‘homophily’, that is, individuals with similar characteristics as identities being more likely to have more intense contacts (McPherson, et al. 2001).

On a descriptive level, the fact that such sociological forms of ‘capital’ are reflected network structures is an old insight from social network analysis. Early sociological classics using methods of graph theory developed into social network analysis to situate individual action in social structure and study how the specific properties of social structures reflect social outcomes such as group conflicts, influence or social mobility (e.g. Granovetter 1973; Zachary 1977). In addition, the main thrust of these arguments was that patterns of relationships between actors, that is, their ‘embeddedness’ in different groups with differing norms, differing allegiances and so forth allow to avoid, conceptually, both the over-socialized ‘homo sociologicus’ as well as under-socialized ‘homo oeconomicus’ (Granovetter 1985). Moreover, describing cohesive groups of individuals on account of their contacts allows identifying those norms, frames, or ideas that are more dominant in some groups than in others and thus giving a ‘social’ account of their preferences and goals since basic preferences, including those relevant for political behavior, do not develop ‘within individuals’ themselves in isolation from their social and political environment (Kenny 1992).
Thus, networks, in a descriptive and analytical sense, allow identifying the collective causal and normative ideas that affect actors’ formulation of their goals as well as the ‘definition of the situation’, that is, their understanding of the strategic situation in which they find themselves (Esser 1996, 1999).

Based on these considerations, it appears that ‘transnational networks’ may provide an analytical and empirical challenge to the suitability of intergovernmentalist assumptions. While the use of the term may refer to a broad range of sociological and economic phenomena, the most prominent definition of transnational networks describes them as “[…] contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of government.” (Nye and Keohane 1971, 331). This definition thus includes actors such as “[…] multinational business enterprises and revolutionary movements; trade unions and scientific networks; international air transport […].” (Nye and Keohane 1971, 331). At a more specific level, it is instructive to consider the more special case of transgovernmental networks:

“We define transgovernmental relations as sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments. Thus we take the policies of top leaders as our benchmarks of ‘official government policy’”. (Keohane and Nye 1974, 43).

In a sense, then, transnational and transgovernmental relations establish the potential for actors within the administrative hierarchy of the state to influence or even change ‘official government’ policy. Hence, in the same way as transnational networks undermine the ‘containment’ of distinct patterns of political conflicts within states, transgovernmental coalition-building undermines the state:

“[…] transgovernmental coalition building takes place when sub-units build coalitions with like-minded agencies from other governments against elements of their own administrative structures. At that point, the unity of the state as a foreign policy actor breaks down” (Keohane and Nye 1974, 44)

Note that this definition leaves open the ways in which contacts are constituted. The relationships between actors may be formed in various ways: membership in similar organizations, acquaintance, attendance of similar events, etc., as long as actors can be expected to interact repeatedly in the future. The second, more important aspect consists in the presence of a similar and distinct set of “[…] shared values, a common discourse, and a dense exchange of information and services” as a
core characteristic (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 2) Thus, the concept of a transnational network in this sense has a more limited meaning, than the usage of the term in the broader sociological and economic debate: a key characteristic is the goal to change policy outcomes as well as terms and frames of political debate or discourse (Ibid.). According to this definition, then, transnational networks are likely to be associated with trust because they are based on the three conditions presented above. Insofar as networks represent frequent and intense contacts between individuals, they increase the likelihood of repeated interactions. Second, frequent interaction implies that actors expect to meet others who profess to a similar identity, joined values, and a common discourse. Finally, for it to be possible to establish whether actors adhere to their professed identities, common commitments need to be associated with “strong behavioral consequences” (McLean 2007, 225).

Thus, transnational and transgovernmental actors are defined as communities of actors sharing similar political goals, beliefs and values among whom, as a result, relationships of trust evolve that allow transnational political coordination and coalition-building across states and to influence, if necessary and possible, the hierarchical organization of the state to adopt and enforce those preferences in line with the goals of the transnational coalition. While these considerations apply to the presence or absence of transnational networks, a similarly important question concerns the dynamics by which network ties are upheld. After all, transnational networks are social relationships: as such, they are not “merely given, nor do they have a simple fixed meaning.” (McLean 2007, xi). In this sense, maintaining political networks as resources requires ‘investments’, that is, networks are

“[…] the product of investment strategies, individual or collective […] aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships that are directly usable in the short or long term, […] that are at once necessary and elective, implying durable obligations subjectively felt (feelings of gratitude, respect, friendship, etc.) or institutionally guaranteed (rights)” (Bourdieu 1986, 249).

In Bourdieu’s account, these strategies consist of ‘exchanges’ – material or rhetorical – that provide economic, political, or social benefits for the members of a group and carry ‘symbolic’ meaning, acknowledging mutual obligations and memberships (Ibid.). ‘Networking’ consists of discursive and rhetorical strategies that seek to establish a reputation for trustworthiness within a particular social or political group. In sum, actors “[…] negotiate their way into relationships by means of words.” (McLean 2007, 33).
One particular strategy consist in rhetorically expressing adherence to a common ‘logos’ – political reasoning – and ‘ethos’ or set of values of the community (Schimmelfennig 2001, 2003). Provided that the sincerity of such commitments can be credibly observed – for example by putting electoral fortunes at risk in domestic conflict – such commitments may be more or less credible. A second prominent set of strategies of mobilization and establishing interpersonal relationships has been analyzed as ‘frame alignment processes’ in the social movement literature, that is, the “linkage or conjunction of individual and [collective] interpretive frameworks.” (Snow, et al. 1986, 467). Such practices are aimed at establishing and maintain valuable networks ties and contacts thus involve the manipulation of meaning and other resources from the available cultural ‘toolkit’ (Swidler 1986).

As a result, it is important to take into account a more elaborate definition of structures of influence in particular the notion of embeddedness. As the previous section has argued, the conceptual notion is eminently suitable for both the quantitative and the qualitative tradition.

### 2.3.3 Transnational Embeddedness and Governmental Preferences

In the transnational perspective, I take as actors the individuals that make up transnational and transgovernmental communities. In terms of their basic motives, I reject the usual dichotomy between strategic actors following the logic of consequences and value driven actors following a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989). An emphasis on rationality and thus strategic behavior does not exclude the possibility of preferences informed by ‘values’: “Self-interest is not presumed by rationality (one could have transitive and complete altruistic or masochistic preferences), but it is commonly treated as axiomatic in economics (and sometimes confused with rationality).” (Bowles 2004, 96). Thus, I remain within a ‘utility maximization’ paradigm, whereas utility is heavily dependent on ideology. Actors are rational but base their choices on subjective and, *inter alia*, normative reasons (Shafir, et al. 1993). These include, apart from considerations for power and plenty, conceptions of what is causally feasible as well as valued “conceptions of the desirable” (Van Deth and Scarbrough 1995, 28). Since resources are always scarce, political power need not be the paramount end of political action. Any actor committed to normative political change will require power to achieve given ends. Thus, while
material and power related interests are objective sources of preferences and incentives, they ‘compete’, so to speak, with given subjective motives: ideas, norms, values, and so on. Most importantly, I do not expect ideas and values to make geopolitical incentives and interests – such as security – or domestic considerations – such as power and plenty – irrelevant. I do expect them to be important but indeterminate factors unable to explain state behavior sufficiently.

Political actors tend to influence each other through exchange of ideas and arguments. Such influence can be expected to be proportional to the amount of interaction. At the same time, actors choose their relationships to a certain degree, they “influence each other through their interactions, [they] seek out others of like-mindedness to interact with.” (Krackhardt 1998, 246). Choices of networking may be due to multiple motives: information, exchanges of favors, mutual commitment to common norms and thus the creation of social and political capital (Coleman 1988, 103, 104; McPherson, et al. 2001).

Norms and obligations, however, are multiple and usually conflicting. In terms of the scope of the argument, a corollary of maintaining the ‘rationality assumption and assuming multiple motivations, is that transnational commitments, if existent, are one of multiple commitments and obligations that elite political actors make. Moreover, I assume they are made not out of sheer convictions but with a definite goal in mind. The precondition is not identity but similarity of values, ideas, and strategies. By definition, their goal is to influence state behavior according to shared goals and strategies. It suffices that actors from a set of countries agree on the desirability of a certain set of policies or institutions and are willing to take political risks in their domestic arenas. Given the different incentives actors from diverse countries face, such coalitions must “traverse [large] gaps in power, wealth, ideology, culture, strategic interests, and organizational forms.” (Bandy and Smith 2005, 231).

The literature on transnational movements, reviewed above, already contained a number of conditions that specify when and under what circumstances transnational movements and networks may have an impact on state preferences. The higher the resources, the higher the ability to organize, and the higher the capability for action.

Given the collective action problem, cohesive ideologies that bind actors together are important carriers of influence. Rhetoric allows the negotiation of commitments, sticking to commitments in the face of potential political costs builds mutual trust. Thus, the basis for the successful construction of transnational communities and coalitions is ideological similarity and available resources.

**H6 The higher the ideological cohesiveness of a transnational coalition and the material resources at its disposal, the higher will be the potential impact its activities can have on the preferences and bargaining strategies of state governments.**

While these conditions capture the general conditions for impact, a closer look at the domestic institutions and concrete entry points is needed. Regarding the domestic conditions, the literature has emphasized the role of domestic institutions that structure political conflict. Employing the logic used by Evangelista (1995, 1997), it follows that the less the party leadership of domestic parties is able to enforce party discipline, the easier it is for any transnational coalition to gain access and make its voices heard in the processes of demand formation, that is, to be a particular voice among many, seeking to gain attention and to influence the demand side of the processes of preference formation.

Vice versa, the higher the capability of the party leadership to enforce party discipline, the harder it is for a transitional coalition to attain that status; at the same time, if core members of the party hierarchy are central actors within an ideologically cohesive transnational coalition, the scope for impact widens dramatically. Moreover, if the party leadership attains governmental power, the potential impact on the supply conditions is equally increased. Finally, if the leadership of several state governments is embedded in similar transgovernmental coalitions of actors with similar political goals, their preferences should be similar, depending on the degree to which government leaders are able to enforce their views.

At the same time, the implication for shifting conflict constellations, i.e. shifting bargaining positions is different from the intergovernmentalist proposition. The less domestic institutions and parties structure political conflict, the less government preferences will be affected by domestic changes in the party composition of governments and, conversely, the higher the potential impact of a changing embeddedness of governments in transnational coalitions.
H7 The higher the embeddedness of domestic party members in transnational coalitions and the lower their capability to structure conflict and enforce collective decisions domestically, the higher the potential impact of transnational coalition on the formation of political demands. The higher the embeddedness of the transnational coalition in domestic governments, the higher the potential impact on supply conditions as similar causal beliefs and normative beliefs lead to similar preferences across countries.

H8 Governments’ bargaining positions change in response to any domestic changes affecting the embeddedness of governments in transnational coalitions.

Since the ideological cohesiveness of transnational coalitions is presumed to mediate impact and since that impact is dependent on the embeddedness of governments within those coalitions, the supply of centralized institutions is dependent on government embeddedness. As a corollary, individuals’ normative considerations come into play in the same manner as presented in the intergovernmental section. Under the condition of widespread acceptance of democratic norms, actors seek to design institutions meeting requirements of democratic representation (Rittberger 2001, 2005, 2006). This tendency may be partly attributed to concerns for democratic norms and partly to concerns for political support. A major role may be due to salience: within democratic societies, political actors pushing for international institutions that seem to violate core principles of democracy are likely to be punished electorally and reputationally (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2006). Thus, groups should exhibit a consistency in their institutional demands: the higher the centralization of demanded institutions, the higher the degree of representation.

Having treated state preference formation, I now turn to bargaining strategies and strategic beliefs.

2.3.4 The Wisdom of Crowds and the Paradox of Influence: Network Structure and Uncertainty

Whereas the previous section has dealt with preferences, this section deals with beliefs and bargaining strategies. As mentioned above, transgovernmental networks are often associated with the efficient distribution of information among governments.
The prevalence of such views may be due, partially, to a naïve transfer of ‘the wisdom of crowds’ argument to concepts of network governance. In principle, the argument is powerful (Galton 1907; Surowiecki 2004). Decision-making under conditions in which many actors can have their perspectives be heard and their beliefs and information can influence decision-making may indeed be characterized of higher quality. Provided that the sources of errors and biases are distributed normally, the larger the crowd, the more accurate the outcome; hierarchies, in which a small number of individuals take final decisions, are bound to be more error prone. With the rise of information technology and the internet, the effect has received increased attention (Surowiecki 2004).

On the other hand, numerous studies on the effects of group think, for example, have demonstrated that group decision-making may be prone to errors (Esser 1998). Indeed, the ‘wisdom of crowds’ effect depends on disagreement and non-systematic sources of errors. If many members of a group share similar world views, goals, or causal and strategic beliefs, this effect should not occur. Moreover, with regard to the literature studying learning in networks, there is a long tradition of formal work linking network structures to specific outcomes, for example by showing how the successful diffusion of economically beneficial technical innovations is facilitated or hindered by specific network structures, just as much as the spread of diseases is facilitated or hindered by certain network structures (see Jackson 2008, ch. 7; Easley and Kleinberg 2010, ch. 19).

To consider the effect of network structures on learning under uncertainty, the formal literature draws on a family of models that analyze the structural effects of trust relationships among actors trying to reach a consensus on a matter of personal and subjective beliefs about some uncertain issue and thus give a more substantial interpretation to notions of network centrality and the conditions for the effect to occur (DeGroot 1974; Jackson 2008, 228 ff.). The most important result: networks can both make learning robust to extreme opinions or wholly prevent the learning ‘wisdom’ of a group: ‘network effects’ are thus effects of varying network structure. For individuals and groups alike, it is their position, the quality of their ties – their centrality – that matters.
One considers a group of $n$ actors, who have initial subjective beliefs regarding a
certain issue, e.g. the likelihood for a certain event to occur (for the following see esp. Jackson 2008, chapters 7, 8). The relationship among the actors is modeled by assuming that the members of the group have varying trust towards each other, which can be represented as a network in the form of an $n \times n$ matrix $T$ so that the entry $T_{ij}$ is the trust that agent $i$ has in the belief of agent $j$. This matrix $T$ needs to be ‘row-stochastic’, meaning that all row entries sum to 1, which merely implies that each actor divides his total trust among others as well as himself (i.e. possesses ‘self-confidence’). Figure 2.1 below displays such a possible completely connected trust network among six actors.

![Figure 2.1 Completely Connected Trust Network](image)

*Note: Each actor places an equal amount of trust $\delta/(n-1)$ on all other actors and has (positive) self-confidence of $1 - \delta$ with $\delta \in [0,1].$

In order to capture the learning process, the model simplifies the process by assumption, namely assuming a ‘naïve’ learning process in which actors copy the (weighted) beliefs of other actors as observed in the current round in order to form their belief in

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14 The initial beliefs at $t_0$ are represented by a vector of probabilities $p(0) = (p_1(0), \ldots, p_n(0))$ where each individual value lies within the unit interval $p_i(0) \in [0,1]$. 
the next round.\textsuperscript{15} On such assumptions, actors will reach a consensus in finite time under the condition of aperiodicity (Jackson 2008, 233, 234).\textsuperscript{16}

Since this process amounts to actors taking a weighted average of the opinions of others, the structure illustrated in Figure 2.1 above will lead to the popularly known ‘wisdom of crowds’ effect, described above. Assume that actors’ initial subjective beliefs are the result of each actor receiving a noisy signal about the ‘true state’ of affairs \(\mu\) of some unknown variable accompanied by a random error, drawn from a normal distribution with mean value \(\mu = 0\). Allowing such a group of actors to become arbitrarily large \((n \rightarrow \infty)\), the Central Limit Theorem ensures that the final beliefs of the actors will converge to the true value since actors take simple and equal averages of the opinion of others (Jackson 2008, 250).\textsuperscript{17} The process of learning in such a network thus illustrates the “wisdom of crowd effect […] a statistical phenomenon […] based on a mathematical aggregation of individual estimates” (Lorenz, et al. 2011). Thus, the graph above is an example of an ‘efficient network’ in which accurate information processing is easily achieved as the network grows (Jackson 2008, 157 ff.). However, such structures are unlikely.

In order to investigate the effect of alternative network structures on such learning outcomes, recent work by Golub and Jackson use a definition of social influence that is derived from the trust networks introduced and has a direct meaning in terms of the standard centrality measure of Eigenvector Centrality (Jackson 2008, 238; Golub and Jackson 2010, 121; see also next chapter). In order to illustrate the argument, Figure 2.2 below displays a substantially different network structure. In this case, the most ‘central’ actor still trusts every other actor equally with a weight of \(\delta/(n - 1)\), whereas the remaining actors do not trust each other and place an arbitrary but similar weight \(1 - \varepsilon\) on the central actor.

\textsuperscript{15} This updating process over time can be represented as \(p(t) = Tp(t - 1) = T^t p(0)\) (Jackson 2008, 228).

\textsuperscript{16} A network is aperiodic if the greatest common divisor of all directed cycles is 1. If this technical condition is not present, beliefs ‘cycle’: actors keep updating according to weighted copies of their neighbors’ beliefs without ever reaching a steady state in which every actor has the same belief and disagreement persists (Jackson 2008, 232, 233).

\textsuperscript{17} \(\lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr \{|p^n(\infty) - \mu| \geq \varepsilon\} = 0\)
As can be seen, in this network there is a strong imbalance. There is a single actor that is disproportionately more trusted than any other actor in the network. In order to analytically capture the influence such network structures have on learning outcomes, Golub and Jackson show that for every trust network that fulfills the conditions for convergence, there is an influence vector $s$ that assigns an ‘influence value’ to each actor. This vector $s$ captures the relative influence each actor has on the final learning outcome since it gives the weights with which the resulting vector of beliefs can be computed directly.  

In the case of the completely connected network, displayed in Figure 2.1, that value is identical for every actor. In the case of the imbalanced network shown in Figure 2.2, the vector is (Golub and Jackson 2010, 128):

---

18 The influence of each actor is captured by a vector $s \in [0,1]^n$ and $\sum_i s_i = 1$ so that the final stationary vector of beliefs after the updating has converged is composed of the initial vector of beliefs $p_n(0)$ weighted by $s$ so that $p_\infty = s \cdot p(0) = \sum_i s_i p_i(0)$ (Jackson 2008, 238). The vector $s$ then assigns an influence value to each actor. Golub and Jackson prove that $s$ corresponds to this vector is the unique (row) Eigenvector $v$ of $T$ with a corresponding Eigenvalue of $\lambda = 1$ (Golub and Jackson 2010, 137 ff.).
Chapter 2 Theoretical Context, Review, and Hypotheses

\[ s_i(n) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{1 - \varepsilon}{1 - \varepsilon + \delta}, & \text{for } i = 1 \\
\frac{\delta}{(n - 1)(1 - \varepsilon + \delta)}, & \text{for } i > 1 
\end{cases} \]

In the latter case, the group of actors is bound to arrive at a false conclusion. As the network grows \((n \to \infty)\), the influence value of the central actor \(s_{i=1}\) remains unaffected whereas the values of the remaining actors \(s_{i>1}\) become vanishingly small as the denominator in this case grows with larger \(n\). The relatively stark result that Golub and Jackson thus demonstrate is that learning in such a network will never converge to true values, irrespective of the initial belief vector \(p(0)\) since the (relative) difference of influence between the central actor (and the associated error with his signal) and the remaining network grows larger with larger \(n\) (Golub and Jackson 2010, 128). Growing the network thus only adds to the imbalance in the network and makes the relative influence of the central actor more extreme. This structural property extends not just to individuals but to the overall group structure of networks in general (Ibid). In general terms, Golub and Jackson identify structural conditions that prevent such biased learning outcomes: the condition of balance implies that no group in a network is trusted by another group infinitely more than it trusts back as the network grows; minimal dispersion implies that groups retain sufficient trust connections to other groups containing all agents as the network grows (Jackson 2008, 252; Golub and Jackson 2010, 130, 131). To put it in simple terms: The higher the relative influence of a particular individual or group, the higher the likelihood of the whole group being wrong.

Despite the simple assumption of learning within this setup, the influence of network centrality on information processing in groups has been demonstrated experimentally (Lorenz, et al. 2011). Moreover, as mentioned above, although the projected outcome of such a biased learning process resembles phenomena commonly labeled group-think in the context of foreign policy analysis (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 283), the updating is “boundedly rational […]” as the assumption implies actors “ failing to adjust correctly for repetitions and dependencies in information that they hear multiple times.” (Golub and Jackson 2010, 113). Accordingly, similar efforts in studying learning in networks with fully Bayesian actors do not study trust network structures “in a substantial way”, as ‘sociological’ notions such as trust are somewhat remote from their assumptions (Jackson 2008).
In sum, network structures matter. In particular, structures of transgovernmental networks should have a direct impact on learning processes within intergovernmental negotiations. If they are ‘balanced’, approximating the first structure, learning should occur ‘efficiently’ and no specific transnational actors should have a disproportionate influence on the beliefs of the negotiating actors. If, on the other hand, the structure of transgovernmental networks approximates an imbalanced state, as the latter graph indicated, the position within transgovernmental networks should matter. Provided that actors trust individuals with similar ideological predispositions more than others, privileged groups – or transgovernmental coalitions - within such networks can dispose of substantial influence over the kind of information governments base their strategic decisions on. Whereas these considerations assume that every government is equal, such influence may vary in accordance with the power and influence of specific governments the coalition has access to.

These considerations thus draw a decidedly different picture of the ways in which governments deal with information. Transnational and transgovernmental coalitions may have influence on beliefs of governments if they are in a privileged position within the transgovernmental networks. At the same time, common ideology may lead to error through common bias. High influence may thus be paradoxical as governments are, as a result, likely to base their decisions on false information. Ideological bias in information processing, moreover, need not be irrational under asymmetric information (Calvert 1985; Kydd 2003). Depending on actors’ embeddedness within transnational and transgovernmental networks, bargaining inefficiencies might no longer be due to situational contingencies, but rather of a systematic kind, if highly connected transnational actors base their views on erroneous and biased judgments.

**H9 The higher the ideological cohesiveness of a group in transnational networks, the higher it’s potential to provide for trustful relationships among its actors. The higher the centrality of a group in transgovernmental networks, the larger its influence on the beliefs of governments and thus on the course and outcome of the bargain.**

A precondition for these considerations to apply is thus that actors within governments deal with information differently, depending on whether the source is ideologically close or distant.
**H10** Bargaining strategies may change on account of novel information. Information from individuals with similar ideological commitments is treated as more credible than information from individuals with different ideological commitments.

### 2.4 Summary

This section has synthesized two theoretical frameworks from the available literature on state preference formation and bargaining behavior. It has argued that transnational networks may undermine the conditions upon which the empirical precision of intergovernmentalist theories is predicated. This argument is based on the claim that, first, transnational networks connect groups with similar ideologies across states and thus contribute to the organization of similar patterns of demands for common institutions across states; second, that the ‘embeddedness’ of governments in transnational and transgovernmental networks affects the supply conditions for common institutions by affecting the dominant ideologies that shape the institutional preferences of governments; third, that transnational and transgovernmental networks that are based on similar ideologies contribute to the formation of relationships of trust among state officials and thus affect both the ways in which governments deal with uncertainty as well as the ‘efficiency’ of the bargain. In particular, it is the structure of networks that matters: the beliefs of few disproportionately well connected – ‘central’ – individuals and groups can potentially have a disproportionate impact on the beliefs of all, independent of the accuracy of these beliefs.

In order to contrast the implications of these claims with an intergovernmental views, Table 2.2 below contrasts the hypotheses developed in this chapter.
Table 2.2 Summary of Competing Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intergovernmental Framework</th>
<th>Transnational Framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H1</strong> The higher the security threats to a particular country, the higher the demand for balancing through mobilization of capabilities and alliance cooperation. The higher the ‘violence interdependence’ between any two Alliance partners and the higher the perceived potential for defection of Alliance partners, the higher the demand for credible commitments and centralized institutions.</td>
<td><strong>H6</strong> The higher the ideological cohesiveness of a transnational coalition and the material resources at its disposal, the higher will be the potential impact its activities can have on the preferences and bargaining strategies of state governments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H2</strong> More powerful states are less worried about the control of centralized institutions and care more about efficiency and their influence. The more relative power a state has within an alliance bargain, the more it will prefer beneficial pooling of decision-making. Less powerful states are more worried about the control of centralized institutions and care more about their autonomy. The less relative power a state has within an alliance bargain, the more it will prefer unanimity and veto rights.</td>
<td><strong>H7</strong> The higher the embeddedness of domestic party members in transnational coalitions and the lower their capability to structure conflict and enforce collective decisions domestically, the higher the potential impact of transnational coalition on the formation of political demands. The higher the embeddedness of the transnational coalition in domestic governments, the higher the potential impact on supply conditions as similar causal beliefs and normative beliefs lead to similar preferences across countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H3</strong> Governments’ bargaining positions change in response to changing geopolitical threat level (‘security crises’), changes in the distribution of material capabilities or domestic shifts in the party composition of the governing coalition.</td>
<td><strong>H8</strong> Governments’ bargaining positions change in response to any domestic changes affecting the embeddedness of governments in transnational coalitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H4</strong> The higher the military capabilities of a state and the more attractive its outside options to the alliance bargain, the higher the influence of its preferences on the course and outcome of the bargain. The higher and the more influential the domestic opposition to cooperation within the alliance, the higher the influence of that government’s preferences on the course and outcome of the bargain.</td>
<td><strong>H9</strong> The higher the ideological cohesiveness of a group in transnational networks, the higher it’s potential to provide for trustful relationships among its actors. The higher the centrality of a group in transgovernmental networks, the larger its influence on the beliefs of governments and thus on the course and outcome of the bargain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H5</strong> Bargaining strategies change on account of novel information that is obtained through institutionalized and trusted sources comprising domestic actors, interest groups, and institutionalized formal diplomatic and ministerial channels. Multiple domestic principals, lenient mandates and adverse preferences between governments and their delegates increase the likelihood of ratification failure.</td>
<td><strong>H10</strong> Bargaining strategies may change on account of novel information. Information from individuals with similar ideological commitments is treated as more credible than information from individuals with different ideological commitments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These hypotheses will inform the analysis of the EDC bargain. The next chapter will lay out the logic of the research design utilized to inform these hypotheses.
3. The EDC as a Case and the Rationale of the Research Design

The present chapter has two tasks. First, it presents the current state of research on post-war Europe in general and the European Defense Community in particular and discusses the status of the EDC as a case by asking what the EDC bargain is a case of (section 3.1). I argue that there is a peculiar consensus early scholarship of post-war Europe that has identified an unexplained convergence of attitudes among the European political elite across states and parties, an insight that is no longer treated as significant by later scholarship that falls more neatly into the categories of the intergovernmentalist and the transnational framework presented in the previous chapter. Taking this observation as a point of departure, the second section (3.2) focuses on the research design of the dissertation following the logic of a ‘mixed design’ (e.g. Greene 2007). I delineate the ways in which the network data was sampled from available public records (3.2.1) as well as the analytical and descriptive tools I rely upon to analyze the data (3.2.2). Finally, I characterize the qualitative and quantitative sources of information that are utilized for studying the bargaining process (section 3.3).

3.1 The EDC and its Status as a Case-Study

This section reviews the scholarship on the EDC mainly in light of the theoretical frameworks presented in the previous chapter (section 3.1.1) and situates the EDC as a case by asking: what is the EDC a case of (section 3.1.2)?

3.1.1 Two Stories about Post-War Europe and the EDC

Why did the European states first negotiate unsuccessfully a supranational army for four years only to discard it and to agree on a NATO solution for the ‘German problem’ within mere months? The present section reviews the available answers in the scholarship on the EDC and post-war Europe in a condensed way. It identifies, in line with the two frameworks presented in the previous chapter, two basic types narratives, intergovernmental and transnational. Reviewing the literature, I argue that
there is a lack of systematic analysis of the impact of prominent transnational organizations and networks on the post-war European bargains.

**Intergovernmental Narratives: Geopolitical Threats or Domestic Ideas?**

The intergovernmental framework encapsulates a number of arguments that focus on geopolitical constraints, the national interests, and different types of motivations for ‘national leaders’, ideas and domestic conflict, and finally democratic values for the formation of preferences for institutional design. The heterogeneity stems from the fact that the vast historical literature, difficult to categorize, largely follows the intergovernmental framework only implicitly, in particular scholars operating in the framework of ‘diplomatic history’ stipulate that governmental leaders in post-war Europe made the institutional choices they did as a response to the internal geopolitical situation and economic situation after the war. Loth has distilled four distinct challenges which posed themselves to virtually all decision-makers at the time: the challenge to secure peace in Europe, the challenge to incorporate Germany within such an architecture, the challenge to ensure economic reconstruction and thus to rebuild European trade flows, and the challenge of preserving autonomy within the emerging confrontation of the two superpowers (Loth 2014).

Thus, the most prominent geopolitical line of reasoning sees the EDC bargain as a series of adaptations to a shifting geopolitical context, and in particular the emerging confrontation between the two blocks. European states were motivated by a desire to preempt German resurgence while seeking to address an impending Soviet continental hegemony (Hitchcock 1998; Creswell 2006). Thus, those countries most directly threatened by German reconstruction – i.e. the Six, but most notably France – had to find a way out of the dilemma by integrating Germany in the alliance to balance against the Soviet threat (e.g. Gillingham 1991; Herbst 1996; Hitchcock 1998; Trachtenberg 1999; Creswell 2006). One argument holds that the course of the bargain over German rearmament is captured by a shifting geopolitical context in line with intergovernmentalist reasoning: whereas the sense of threat was highest when the Korean War broke out, the sense of threat declined by 1953 with Stalin’s death and the end of the Korean War. Hence, the Pleven Plan was a sincere effort to integrate Germany into the Alliance through co-binding in the aftermath of the outbreak of the Korean War; after Stalin’s death, autonomy became more salient, in particular...
for the French government (McAllister 2002; Dinan 2004). Germany assented because it could thereby gain recognition and groped one step closer to sovereignty and full integration in the West (Herbst 1996). The US administration preferred the EDC because it opened the possibility of reducing the US burden of defending the continent, but was content with the WEU as long as German resources were tapped and thus utilized its considerable leverage to push European elites along the integration path (Leffler 1992; Schwabe 1993, 1995; Trachtenberg 1999). European elites assented and even welcomed US influence in light of the Soviet threat (Lundestad 1986, 2003). In terms of specific country preferences, one argument adds that, hoping for US support and seeing the war in Indochina escalate, the French government simply delayed any decision on German rearmament until the war in Indochina was resolved (Wall 1991; Aimaq 1996, 2000). Italy sought to gain influence within the Alliance by following the integration path (Magagnoli 1998, 1999). The Benelux countries, fearing continental hegemony by France and Germany, were sceptical about the plans but assented for lack of alternatives and US pressure; as a result, the rejection of the EDC and its replacement by the WEU was welcomed (Van der Harst 1990; Coolsaet 2002). British interests were equally focused on increasing US engagement on the continent. Although there were considerable doubts as to the efficiency of the EDC, the British government supported it from the outside and, once it failed, quickly acted to safeguard it by a British troop commitment to the WEU, thus minimizing the potential damage to the alliance (Ruane 2000, 55).

Hence, from a geopolitical view, the EDC is seen is the response to a high threat in reaction to the Korean War, necessitating a quick build-up of allied forces, which involved high transaction costs, especially regarding the viability and reputation of the German partner. High transaction costs and reputation concerns thus lead to proposals for the hierarchic and centralized institutional design of the EDC (Weber 1997; Mattes 2012). As all countries doubted the reliability of the Germans, credible commitments were required (Mattes 2012); the creation of a supranational army provided such commitments in an extreme form, but created considerable transaction costs, the response to which is the creation of centralized hierarchies (Weber 1997). Thus, whereas under a high external threat, the need for external balancing was the supreme concern, once the threat situation lessened and autonomy became more salient, different design solutions were preferred and the WEU seemed preferable (recently Rosato 2011). These arguments straightforwardly correspond to the realist
intergovernmental hypotheses that emphasize material and ‘objective’ geopolitical constraints, the intergovernmentalist hypotheses developed in the previous chapter, and, at a first approximation, offer reasonable explanation of the EDC bargain, its failure, and the outcome in form of the WEU treaty.

However, much of the historical scholarship, including the literature reviewed above, explicitly recognizes the fact that there was ample conflict both internationally as well as domestically over the question of post-war international European institutions. This fact does not easily square with the notion of a ‘national interest’. The general problem with arguments based on notions of ‘national interest’ is that their demonstration, ideally, would require the demonstration of “patterns in which many people within a state—ideally, even people who disagree on other things—arrive at similar views of geopolitical challenges and responses.” (Parsons 2013, 794, 795). Significant and prolonged domestic conflicts over foreign policy issues cast a doubt on the very existence of a clearly identifiable ‘national interest’.

An early influential analysis by Stanley Hoffman argued that responses to the geopolitical situation depended on subjective attitudes and nationalist values, which, in turn, were deeply affected by the war experience. The populations of the ‘winners of the war’ (especially France) were more inclined to value national sovereignty as a means of defense in the emerging global conflict whereas for the ‘losers of the war’ (Germany and Italy), nationalism was totally discredited (Hoffman 1966, 871, 872). In addition, he argued that there were different types of attitudes towards European integration, recognizable among the governmental elite in every continental country: there were those who sought European unity as a means to gain independence from the US and the Soviet Union, those who sought it as a means to ensure continued US support and strengthen the transatlantic alliance, and those who thought that both would be possible without sacrificing essential parts of national sovereignty (Hoffman 1966, 874). Depending on whether individuals in government would belong to any one category, governments would accordingly pursue different strategies. Hoffman does not explain the existence of these different attitudes, nor does he mention the transnational organizations or their possible impact.

Two recent analyses of the French case equally take issue with the notion of the national interest. These can, explicitly or implicitly, be grouped as ‘liberal intergovernmental’ arguments as they emphasize domestic conflict. Craig Parsons documented domestic conflicts that cut across and divided French parties and centered around
different preferred institutional models for Europe, namely a traditional, a confederal, and a federal model (Parsons 2003, 43 ff.). As a result, there was ample domestic disagreement and no coherent and widely shared formulation of the French ‘national interest’ existed. Thus, the conditions in France call into question that basic assumptions of the intergovernmentalist paradigm since the French state constituted “[…] the limiting case of the most fragmented state imaginable making a series of contested decisions to which no one rallied at all.” (Parsons 2013, 797). The fate of the EDC in France was inextricably tied to the ‘third force coalition’ between the Christian Democratic MRP, the Socialist SFIO, and the Radical party. Noting that after the French elections in 1951, as the Socialists left the governing coalition for good French governments increasingly preferred traditional (Gaullist deputies) or confederal models and the ratification of the EDC Treaty became ever more unlikely (Parsons 2003, 74). Overall, Parsons submits that there were three different typical attitudes that were highly influential for French politics but he does not explain them.19 The reader is left wondering whether they were a French peculiarity or part of a larger picture that is not addressed.

A similar argument focusing on domestic conflict is offered by Helen Milner. “Changes in domestic politics thus shifted the governing majority against the EDC” (Milner 1997, 195). According to this argument, shifting coalitional alignments changed the parameters of the ‘two-level game’ played as the 1951 elections for the French Assemblée Nationale changed the position of the median voter away from the EDC (Ibid., 200). Additionally, domestic groups – for example the military – were, in Milner's account, much more opposed to the EDC than to the ECSC. Thus, Milner claims that more positive attitudes of interest groups towards the ECSC provided affirmative ‘information’ concerning the contractual details and eased ratification, whereas the harsh opposition by interest groups and the military towards the EDC provided ‘negative information’, thus contributing to the rejection (Ibid., 199). Moreover, not only did the overall ideological outlook of French governments shift over time against a supranational army, but the delegation that negotiated the treaty deliberately overstepped its mandate as a function of conflicting preferences within

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19 The argument is that after “the French consensus on European policies dissolved” in 1948, French elites developed these three models without explaining – or even speculating on the origins of – these models (Parsons 2003, 43).
the French government and the Quai d’Orsay (Massigli 1978, 287; Milner 1997, 195; Parsons 2003, 73; Creswell 2006, 63).

A final argument concerns specific preferences for institutional design and the different levels of parliamentary representation associated with the EDC, the EPC, and the WEU. Rittberger argues that democratically elected governments operating within a community of states with shared democratic norms formed preferences for institutional designs on the basis of an antecedent preference to delegate or pool sovereignty (Rittberger 2001, 2003, 2006). The higher this antecedent preference, the higher the potential ‘democratic deficit’ that would emerge without ‘appropriate’ concomitant representative institutions. Hence, the levels of representation and parliamentary influence envisioned in the EDC Treaty were, compared to any institutional initiative in the history of European integration, very high because the EDC envisioned unprecedented amounts of delegation and pooling. At the same time, governments reacted negatively to the EPC Draft Treaty proposed in 1953 because they felt that the implied level of parliamentary control and influence exceeded the requirements (Rittberger 2006). This mechanism can be linked with a diverse range of antecedent motives: the latter may result from different levels of preferred institutional centralization associated with shifting geopolitical threats and institutional demands or it can be based on specific ideological preferences, such as actors from the German delegation utilizing a ‘federal state’ analogy as a yardstick for appropriate ‘institutional design’ (Rittberger 2012, 89).

By way of a summary, it is notable that the intergovernmental arguments, particularly those advanced by Hoffman and Parson, raise open questions that may conceivably be addressed by considering the transnational dimension. Hoffman notes the existence of at least three different typical attitudes towards the European project across countries, but does not explain why they existed. Parsons noted three types of attitudes towards European institutions in France, but does not explain them either. In both instances the authors argue that the types of attitudes that prevailed in European governments at any given time account for specific government preferences and thus ‘government behavior’. The next section will turn to transnational arguments to see whether there are any clues to answer this question.
Transnational Narratives

Transnational approaches contend that the ‘four incentives’ influenced not only governments, but that they heavily affected European political elites on a transnational scale. However, while the scholarship examined so far has virtually ignored the potential impact of transnational networks and organizations on major initiatives of European integration in general and the EDC in particular, Walter Lipgens’ classic work may have overstated it (e.g. Lipgens and Loth 1977; Lipgens 1984a; Lipgens and Loth 1988, 1990). Lipgens emphasized the role of the emerging transnational organizations and in particular federalist actors for the early origins of the European project (e.g. Lipgens and Loth 1977; Lipgens 1984b). Thus, Lipgens and Loth provided invaluable documentation of the different ‘ideas of Europe’ that circulated in the resistance movements during and after the Second World War (Lipgens 1984a), in the various transnational organizations immediately after the war (Lipgens and Loth 1990), as well as in the domestic parties and interest groups in the European countries (Lipgens and Loth 1988). Offering a comprehensive picture of the transnational conflicts over post-war Europe in the immediate years after the war, Lipgens’ work, unfortunately, did not surpass the point of documenting the ideas circulating within the transnational organizations and did not demonstrate a systematic influence of these organizations beyond 1950. Thus, Alan Milward maintained that Lipgens only provided the “the chronicle of fringe political groups” (Milward 2000, 17). One exception is the publication of key documents relating to the negotiations of the Six in December 1951, in which the conflict about the question of complete parliamentary control of the budget and the political authority came to a climax between the larger and the smaller states negotiating the EDC, documenting at least a temporary influence of Italian federalists over the Italian government (Lipgens 1984b, 655, 662; Pistone 2008). Beyond that invaluable documentation, however, it remains unclear how to relate this documentation to the overall impact of the transnational organizations on European bargains, both analytically as well as empirically.

A second particularly influential work is the argument developed by Ernst B. Haas in order to account for the early origins of European integration (Haas 2004 [1958]). Analysing the ratification debates within the national parliaments over the ECSC and the EDC Treaties, Haas came to the conclusion that no “[...] common dedication to European principles [can] be isolated as a unifying element.” (Haas 2004 [1958], 153). Comparing the party families across the negotiating states, Haas noted that
while there was no unifying element in Socialist and Liberal parties, Christian Democratic parties were notable for their “commitment to a united and peaceful Europe, commonly shared by all six parties and cemented with Church teaching.” (Ibid.). Overall, he stated that there was initially an “elusive majority, based on convergent rather than homogenous motives and ideologies” that provided for the ratification of the ECSC Treaty (Ibid., 155). Haas generalized this convergence of motives and ideologies to a basic condition for the emergence of supranational institutions. Accordingly, states need to be conform to democratic principles and have reached relatively high state of industrial development. The last condition consists in a sufficient similarity of political cleavages, since the process of conflict mediation and ‘spill-over “fares best in situations controlled by social groupings […] divided among ideologically homogenous lines” (Haas 1961, 378). Hence, the expansive study of transnational parties and, in particular, trade unions and party groups conducted in the original monograph on the political dynamics set in motion by the ECSC (Haas 2004 [1958]). Haas argument is thus that there was a convergent majority of different political forces which produced the major European initiatives that formed the early European institutions. These supranational institutions set in motion dynamics of transnational organization that work against the containment of political conflict within the nation state by supplying a distinct organizational form that allows the ‘upgrading of common interest’. This account implies that institutional change is more than mere ‘competence creep’ due to the informational advantages of a supranational agent slipping or shirking her original mandate from member-state principals (Pollack 2003). ‘Supranationality’ in this sense a set of transnational and transgovernmental relationships among actors that, due to the formation of mutual trust, allows for bargaining modes that ‘upgrade the common interest’ although actors stick to a logic of consequences and pursue ‘egoistic interests’ throughout. In a sense, the transnational framework presented in the previous chapter is a lopsided version of Haas’ neo-functionalism: his theory is predicated on supranational institutions – for parties and governments alike – working to produce a convergence of views over time whereas a transnational argument emphasizes that networks provide for loose ways to organize an embryonic political conflict that provides for convergent motives, ideologies and trust.

Recent contributions have taken up the arguments of Lipgens and Haas in different ways and thus added to the plausibility of the applicability of a ‘transnational ap-
approach’ to the origins of the first European treaties. A number of recent publications have documented historical evidence about the influence of the post-war Christian Democratic network as well as informal transatlantic contacts on early Treaty negotiations (Kaiser and Starie 2005; Kaiser 2007; Kaiser and Leucht 2008; Kaiser, et al. 2008; Kaiser, et al. 2010; Leucht 2010). This line of research has a common denominator: basing their work on the ‘policy network’ perspective relying on

“[…] a shift from centralized ‘government’ by cohesive state institutions exercising their clearly defined powers in hierarchical forms of decision-making towards decentralized and informal forms of political communication and decision-making by sets of state and non-state actors in less hierarchically structured or even non-hierarchical relationships” (Kaiser and Leucht 2008, 37).

Taking up Haas’ emphasis on the unity and pro-integration stance of Christian Democrats, the argument here is that Christian Democratic networks had five functions: the creation of trust and political capital, the monopolization of party contacts and muting of internal dissent, the development of common policy objectives, and the identification of suitable allies. Thus, Christian Democrats used their networks for “constructing a transnational coalition for their supranational core Europe without Britain” (Ibid. 39 ff.). As important as these insights and the reported evidence are, open questions remain. As Haas wrote already in 1958, “[…] the Christian Democratic votes, after all, did not suffice […]” (Haas 2004 [1958], 154). Thus, when discussing the failure of the EDC Treaty, Kaiser concurs with arguments that see the EDC failure in the “increasingly difficult circumstances” that characterized the geopolitical landscape – due to Stalin’s death – as well as French domestic realignments (Kaiser 2007, 256, 258). The EDC hence failed despite the Christian Democrats. No concrete analysis of an impact on the negotiations is given because as “ […] forums of collective self-reassurance, the NEI congresses and the Geneva meetings obviously did not have a direct and immediate influence on inter-state negotiations.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2001, 795). Moreover, the focus on Christian Democracy exclusively begs the question what was different about Christian Democracy as opposed to the other transnational organizations, and why the alleged impact of ideological reassurance was strong in the case of Christian Democracy but not in the remaining transnational organizations.

In addition, Kaiser and his colleagues have considered transatlantic transgovernmental networks between the US embassy group at in Paris and the delegations negotiating the ECSC Treaty. These transgovernmental contacts are said to have fulfilled key
functions during the negotiations (Kaiser and Leucht 2008, 45). Thus, they “facilitated links to a wider circle of academics” and provided information and political capital to construct “transnational alliances to prevent national administrations and interest groups from impeding the interstate negotiations” (Ibid.).

In sum, there is significant scholarship emphasizing the role of European transnational, Christian Democratic, and transgovernmental networks as constituting a source of political capital for the construction of transnational coalitions that become a source for ‘political entrepreneurship’ and thus afford influence. A systematic analyses of the impact of the remaining transnational organizations and networks, however, is lacking and thus does not provide a suitable answer to the question where the different attitudes emphasized by Hoffman and Parsons come from.

**Summary**

This section has presented two basic lines of reasoning in the existent scholarship on the EDC and post-war Europe that provide answers as to why the European states first negotiated unsuccessfully a supranational army for four years only to discard it and to agree on a NATO solution for the ‘German problem’ within a couple of months. Among the intergovernmentalist narratives, I have presented two basic lines of reasoning. Geopolitical accounts argue that the intense threat in 1950 led particularly the French government to value security from Germany more than the autonomy of disposing of a French army. Thus, whereas under a high external threat, the need for external balancing was the supreme concern, once the threat situation lessened with Stalin’s death and the opening of a possible détente with the Soviets, autonomy became more salient, and different design solutions, i.e. the WEU, were preferred. Other accounts complement this view by stressing the significance of domestic conflicts, differing nationalist values between the winners and losers of war, differing ideological preferences among the government leadership of European states, France in particular, and, finally, the possibility that the French government may have been unable to ensure that the French delegation negotiated in accordance with its mandate. Intergovernmentalist views, however, are at a loss to explain apparently widespread conflict in Europe over preferred European institutions.

Other views, more in line with the transnational perspective, stress the significance of federalist ideas exchanged in the transnational European organizations. There is
significant scholarship emphasizing the role of European transnational, Christian Democratic, and transatlantic transgovernmental networks as constituting a source of political capital for the construction of transnational coalitions that become a source for ‘political entrepreneurship’ and thus afford influence. A systematic analysis of the impact of the remaining transnational organizations and networks, however, is lacking. Moreover, there is a peculiar complementarity. Classic analyses stress the convergence of attitudes among European elites, whereas Parsons notes that in France, ideological differences cut across parties and produced a distinct ideological conflict that is reminiscent of the different ideas circulating in the transnational organizations as analyzed by Walter Lipgens. Addressing this lack is a key purpose of this dissertation, which may add to our understanding of a particular source of domestic conflict among the political elite in post-war Europe and its significance for the early bargains.

3.1.2 Implications: the Status of the Case of the EDC

In order to delineate the significance of the results, it is necessary to know what EDC is a case of? How ‘typical’, ‘extreme’, or ‘deviant’ was the EDC bargain? (Gerring 2007, 89, 90)? There are three relevant references: a debate about the primary political forces in post-war Europe, a debate about the primary explanatory factors for intergovernmental bargains in European integration, and a debate about the major forces explaining intergovernmental bargains between democracies in general (Figure 3.1).

First, there is the debate over the most influential political forces in post-war Europe and their impact on the outcome, reviewed in the previous section (3.1.1). As described in the previous section, there is a curious lack of a systematic study of the influence and significance of the transnational organization studied extensively by Walter Lipgens for the post-war European bargains. From the point of view of the dependent variable, selecting the EDC for such a study is unusual. Contrary to the major bargains in post-war Europe, (such as the ECSC Treaty and the Treaties of Rome) the question of German rearmament dominated domestic conflicts.
Economic issues were secondary, largely contained in the EPC Treaty, or in other initiatives at the time such as the Green Pool proposal (Thiemeyer 1999). This differentiates the EDC and the Pleven Plan from every single post-war European initiative, failed or successful. Although security questions were at the heart of the ECSC Treaty as well, it did not concern the terms under which German soldiers would be allowed to bear arms. In this sense, the EDC is not a ‘deviant’ case as the German question was certainly implicit in any potential or actual negotiation among the Western powers after the Second World War. Since the EDC, however, directly addressed the issue by calling for delegation and pooling in the sphere of security and the military - i.e. the ‘core state powers’ that are provide the foundation of the modern state – it was surely of an ‘extreme’ character. Consequently, the EDC bargain was bound to be more controversial than the ECSC Treaty or the subsequent Treaties of Rome and conclusions drawn here do not automatically travel to other European grand bargains.

Seen from a different perspective, the EDC bargain is arguably a ‘most likely’ case for both the ideational and the realist intergovernmental narratives. It is a primary candidate for realist explanations of state-preferences and bargaining strategies since it was a clear cut case of alliance bargaining on security matters. It is equally a most likely case for explanations focusing on the impact of nationalist and federalist ideologies on the formation of state preferences since the delegation and pooling of ‘core
state powers’ touched the most basic symbols of national sovereignty. As a result, ideological differences should acquire higher salience. For the same reasons, the EDC Treaty is a least likely case for the neo-functionalist and liberal intergovernmentalist narratives that focus on economic interest or touch primarily economic issues respectively. First, security matters under conditions of a high subjective sense of threat are more salient than economic matters since wealth is meaningless when acquired in a fundamentally insecure environment. Thus, the influence of economic interest groups may be expected to be considerably lower than in the case of a negotiation of a trade agreement. Hence, any finding of a considerable impact on preference formation cannot be generalized to post-war Europe without further examination.

On the other hand, the EDC constitutes a case of particular interest since it is fair to say that the failure of the EDC constitutes a critical juncture in the history of European integration. Had the Treaty been ratified, the path of European Integration, in terms of its institutional arrangements, would have looked somewhat different. The EDC Treaty itself contained remarkably different degrees of pooling and delegation – including prerogatives of the European parliament – than much of the subsequent European Treaties across the most conflictual political issues (Rittberger 2006). It was only after the EDC failure that the dualism between ‘high level’ security issues being relegated to NATO and economic ‘low level’ issues relegated for EU institutions became obvious. Thus, failure of the EDC and its consequences paved the way for the path of European integration as it is known. Henceforth, ‘supranational institutions’ would be limited to the regulation of the Common Market.

It is difficult to characterizing the significance of the case beyond this historical time frame. Both in reference to intergovernmental bargains throughout European integration as well as more general questions of cooperation between democracies, this is a single outcome study. To consider generalizability is to have an idea whether the insights regarding the role of transnational conflict, transnational embeddedness and state preferences as well as the relationship between structure of transgovernmental networks of trust, bargaining influence and bargaining efficiency gained for the EDC

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20 As Maurice Faure later put it, “Les traités de Rome se réfèrent évidemment à un tout autre domaine, puisqu’ au lieu de se référer au domaine politique suprême, qui est celui de la sécurité, l’armée, le drapeau, la patrie, avec tout l’honneur, tout que c’a ancré au cours des âges dans le cœur des nations” (see Faure 1987, 4).
are worth considering for other times and places. Given the fact that the European post-war environment was a peculiar place, it is thus difficult to establish wider generality. As subsequent chapters will show, the resources underlying the transnational networks, particularly the European Movement were heavily indebted to American funds organized through transatlantic networks.

Finally, however, the argument related to transgovernmental networks potentially being sources of bargaining inefficiency is not predicated on a particular time and place. Moreover, it is largely an argument related to the existence of the mechanism and thus its significance is not affected by the fact that it is established in a single case study. If confirmed, this insight would merit further attention.

3.1.3 Summary

This section has given a brief overview of the current literature on post-war Europe and given an account of the EDC as a case. It was shown that even the vast historical literature that operates within an intergovernmental perspective emphasizes very different aspects of post-war Europe and the international landscape. First, there is the argument stressing the geopolitical context and national interest: the heightened threat induced by the Korean War produced radical conceptions for a European Army whereas a lessening of the threat after the end of the war and Stalin’s death made sovereignty concerns more salient and thus led to the WEU. Second, there is the argument regarding changing domestic coalitions: it holds that in the early 1950’s, governmental coalitions were positively disposed towards European solutions advocating substantial pooling and delegation, whereas changes in domestic coalitions – particularly in France – in the mid 1950’s were less positively disposed and thus renegotiated the WEU solution. Third, there is an argument in the literature adding that the internal conflicts in France may have led to the French delegation overstepping its mandate and thus negotiating a Treaty that did not muster domestic support. However, both classic and contemporary analyses point out that, first, there is evidence of significant ideological conflict in France across multiple parties and that, second, the mid 1950’s saw a peculiar convergence of attitudes among the governmental elite in Europe.

The analyses operating within a transnational perspective stress the significance of ideas exchanged in the transnational European organizations, There is significant
scholarship emphasizing the role of European transnational, Christian Democratic, and transatlantic transgovernmental networks as constituting a source of political capital for the construction of transnational coalitions that become a source for ‘political entrepreneurship’ and thus afford influence. A systematic analysis of the impact of the remaining transnational organizations and networks, however, is lacking. This fact is peculiar since the existing arguments by Haas and Hoffman, emphasizing a ‘convergence’ of attitude that is unexplained otherwise unexplained, as well as the observation of cross-cutting conflicts in France points to the possibility that transnational factors may have been influential across the European states.

In addition, this section has characterized different frames of reference for the analysis of the EDC. As a critical juncture in European integration history, a ‘sufficient’ and exhaustive understanding of its failure constitutes worthwhile knowledge. I argued further that the EDC bargain is a ‘most likely’ case for both the ideational and the realist intergovernmental narratives since its topic was security cooperation. In addition, it is a most likely case for explanations focusing on the impact of nationalist and federalist ideologies on the formation of state preferences since the delegation and pooling of ‘core state powers’ touched the most basic symbols of national sovereignty. For similar reasons, one should not expect explanation focusing on clearly identifiable economic interests and significant interest group activity to fare well. In terms of the generality of the framework developed, the insights produced may or may not travel beyond the EDC. At the same time, the argument related to transgovernmental networks potentially being sources of bargaining inefficiency is not predicated on a particular time and place. Moreover, it is largely an argument related to the existence of the mechanism and thus its significance is not affected by the fact that it is established in a single case study. If confirmed, this insight would merit further attention.

3.2 Research Design

This section discusses the research design of the dissertation and the methodological trade-offs that it implies. Addressing the puzzle of the EDC by investigating the relationship between the European transnational networks and the behavior of the states or governments negotiating the EDC requires, first, an idea of the composition and the structure of the most important transnational networks; second, information on
their relationship towards the states and governments involved in the Treaty negotiations; third, information on degree to which actors subscribed to similar or conflicting ideologies; fourth, an understanding of the transnational dynamics of coordination, trust, information sharing, and coalition-formation over time; fifth, sufficient information on the domestic conflict over the EDC in the key states negotiating the treaty; and, finally, information on the preference formation within the negotiating conflicts as well as an understanding of the ways in which governments made strategic choices during the EDC bargain.

I draw on both quantitative and qualitative means to address these issues. In order to assess the structural dimension of the transnational networks, I conducted a network analysis utilizing the membership patterns of actors in the European transnational organizations as a structural indicator of contact. Qualitatively, I use available primary documents, memoirs, and information gained from secondary historical literature to reconstruct both transnational and transgovernmental exchanges as well as domestic conflicts and the preferences and strategic choices of governments.

3.2.1 Transnational Co-Affiliation Networks: Measurement and Analysis

Recall that the term network has two meanings in this dissertation. On the conceptual level, I refer to transnational and transgovernmental networks in the sense delineated in the previous chapter: they are defined as communities of actors sharing similar political goals, beliefs and values among whom, as a result, relationships of trust evolve that allow transnational political coordination and coalition-building across states and to influence, if necessary and possible, the hierarchical organization of the state to adopt and enforce those preferences in line with the goals of the transnational coalition. The operationalization of this concept has multiple dimensions. It implies the identification of actors, a characterization of the structural relationships among them, a description and assessment of their ideological commonalities, and an evaluation of the degrees to which they coordinate and trust each other. Thus, I propose operationalizing the concept using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The first quantitative step involves identifying the transnational co-affiliation network constituted by membership in the main European transnational organizations that existed in post-war Europe. This step allows identifying, first, the main actor population, their party affiliation and nationality; second, the identification of potential clus-
ters among these actors across the transnational organizations; and, finally, the embeddedness of European governments within these communities over time. I focus on the European organizations because organizational membership provide a simple criterion for the identification of European transnational networks and, second, it is here where structural information is most relevant, especially with regard to the composition of the transnational network in terms of actor nationalities and party affiliation. A structural description of the transatlantic network is more difficult as no clear-cut criterion for the identification of a relationship exists. Since the number of relevant actors is smaller in this case, relying on qualitative information suffices.

I begin by discussing the sampling method employed, continue by describing the measures and methods used to analyze the emerging network, and conclude by discussing the advantages and limitations of the method employed.

**Sampling the Network**

The goal of the quantitative network analysis is threefold: first, to identify the key transnationally active European elite actors that are relevant and have been hypothetically politically influential in the post-war years; second, to identify structural relationships among them; third, to evaluate the embeddedness of the negotiating governments within these networks over time. The relationship between actors can be based on different concepts and thus measured differently. In Political Science, applications have been based on different indicators such as the intensity of contacts as established through surveys (Thurner and Binder 2009), the co-sponsorship of bills in Congress (Fowler 2006), and many more.

For present purposes, I study the co-affiliation network constituted by individuals’ activities and membership in the main transnational organizations as studied, for example, by Walter Lippens (Lipgens 1984a; Lipgens and Loth 1988, 1990). To put it simply, an “affiliation network is a network in which actors are connected via co-membership of groups of some kind.” (Newman 2010, 53). The study of co-affiliation networks is widely established in sociology, going back to Wight Mills’ analysis of the US power elite by identifying the ‘interlocking directorates’ of large US corporations to Galaskiewicz’s analysis of the “urban grant economy” of the city of Chicago constituted by the CEO’s of companies in Chicago and their attendance
of similar clubs (Mills 1956, 8; Galaskiewicz 1985; Burris 2005). Table 3.1 provides an example of a matrix constituting an affiliation network.

**Table 3.1 Affiliation Matrix Example**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The criterion of membership provides a reasonably clear form of addressing the ‘boundary problem’ arising in reconstructing social networks from different archival records since the criterion for the existence of a relationship is straightforward in this case (Burt 1983). The information is thus easily collectable and allows drawing inferences about relationships between individuals as well as between institutions and organizations. However, the method is based on a relatively strong assumption: membership in a similar organization equals contact, similar affiliations patterns in different organizations imply more intense contact. It is thus a relatively crude measure: common membership may very well coexist with a lack of significant interaction and even considerable conflict. A related issue is that the procedure largely ignores different positions of authority or hierarchy within common institutions and organizations: an individual is either ‘in’ or ‘out’. However, reweighting ties according to external information is not an option. It would be extremely dependent on the assumptions made, there is a lack of information that could inform a choice among a large set of possible assumptions, it is not clear what a general and guiding principle could be that would perform equally for the different organizations and, most importantly, this would increase the problem of equivalence since governments do not function similarly across dissimilar countries. In combination with qualitative information as to the quality of the identified relationships and the ideological disposi-
tions of individuals, it is nevertheless a reasonably suitable approach for the task at hand.

The organizations that were considered constitute the ‘universe’ of transnational European organizations existed in 1950 as displayed in Table 3.2 with one exception. Given the scarcity of available documentation, the ‘Liberal World Union’ is not considered. Its publications suggest only highly sporadic and unevenly attended meetings that did not concern themselves to a significant degree with questions of European integration (Jacobson 1962, 585 ff.).

Table 3.2 Organizations of the European Transnational Network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational Group</th>
<th>Party Affiliation</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nouvelles Équipes Internationales</td>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
<td>NEI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geneva Circle</td>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
<td>Geneva Circle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mouvement Socialiste pour les États-Unis d'Europe</td>
<td>Largely Socialist but membership is open</td>
<td>MSEUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist International</td>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>COMISCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliamentary Union</td>
<td>Not affiliated</td>
<td>EPU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of European Federalists</td>
<td>Not affiliated</td>
<td>UEF/EUF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European League for Economic Cooperation</td>
<td>Not affiliated</td>
<td>ELEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Europe Movement</td>
<td>Not affiliated</td>
<td>European Movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A second issue is that membership varies over time, as does activity. Collecting and analyzing information on the dynamics of the network would have complicated the data collection significantly as yearly data is not readily available in published sources. Moreover, the primary research interest for the quantitative analysis focuses on the structural underpinnings of transnational conflict and its potential impact, via the actors, on domestic conflict and government preferences and strategies. The dynamics of trust, coordination, coalition formation, and information exchanges are addressed by qualitative means. For this reason, the decision was made to use 1950 as the cut year and collect data for the transnational organizations from the foundation until 1950. Thus, the structural information largely concerns the transnational European network during the heyday of genuine transnational conflict after the war before supranational institutions (Council of Europe and ECSC) complicate the pic-
ture significantly and allows drawing extensively on the available published documenta-

In terms of the individual actors, I did not sample the complete network as exhaus-
tive membership lists were not available but instead rely on an adapted version of
snowball sampling that likely creates an elite bias within the sample network. That
bias, however, is an acceptable shortcoming since the primary purpose of the analy-
sis is to identify exactly that elite.

The data was collected in a two-step process. The first step seeks to identify a com-
plete set of institutions/ groups and actors.

1. Identify all individual Cabinet members of all governments (coalitions) of the
   Six and the UK between 1949-1958 at the ministerial level.

2. Identify members in official functions of all of the international organizations
   of the Western Alliance of which these countries were part of.

3. Identify the leading members (i.e. organizational executives/ secretariats) of
   all transnational organizations (i.e. Europeanist and the federalists and trans-
national party organizations).

The result was a preliminary affiliation matrix containing 1,209 individuals with
their respective function or membership as summarized in Table 3.3.

These steps give a preliminary affiliation matrix with the complete set of institutions/
groups and actors. The second step was to use available primary sources, biogra-
phical sources and the secondary literature to cross-check and code memberships of the
individuals identified with the organizations in the dataset (i.e. lower level membe-
ship) and include information on individuals’ party membership.21

21 The most useful sources, apart from the secondary literature, have been the online editions of the
Foreign Relations of the United States (http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS) which contain
exhaustive person indices as well as the online editions of the Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregier-
ung which provide useful biographical information (http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/
0000/TextSucheKapPr.html). The main biographical sources used for are the Munzing Archiv
(http://www.munzinger.de/search/start.jsp), for France the archival sources of the Assemblée Nationale
(http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/), for Belgium the online presence of the Académie Royale
(http://www.academieroyle.be/cgi?usr=Kqua99wegx&lg=fr&pag=903&rec=0&frm=363&id=3418&flux=34356366),
for the Netherlands the homepage of the national parliament (http://www.parlement.com/9291000/bio/01867),
for Europe the European navigator (http://www.cvce.eu/), the minutes of the meetings of the Council of Europe can be found here
Chapter 3 The EDC as a Case and the Rationale of the Research Design

Table 3.3 List of Institutions and Organizations Used for Sampling the Network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Committee of Ministers (Council of Europe)</td>
<td>Foreign ministers of Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe</td>
<td>Delegates from National Parliaments of the Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) Council</td>
<td>Foreign ministers of Member States. Some Countries (i.e. Germany) appointed a special representative or delegated special ministers. Includes OEEC Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEEC Ministerial Council</td>
<td>Yearly meetings of ministers of the economy or delegated special ministers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Security Council</td>
<td>Foreign ministers of Member States and Heads of Governments (participation varies). Includes NATO Secretary General.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Authority (ECSC)</td>
<td>Appointed Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Ministers (ECSC)</td>
<td>Varying participation by Heads of State, Foreign ministers, or delegated special ministers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Assembly (ECSC)</td>
<td>Delegates from National Parliaments of the Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad Hoc Assembly (EPC)</td>
<td>Delegated Members from the Common Assembly and National Parliaments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Membership in transnational groups comes with a problem of equivalence as well. The Geneva Circle was a largely informal ‘gathering’ per invitation from the secretariat in Switzerland, inaugurated by informal contacts between French, German, and Swiss Democrats. Here I drew on the published documents and included the individuals participating in meetings during the period used for the other organizations as well (from foundation to 1950). The NEI meetings were attended partially by formally delegates actors from those Christian Democratic parties that had become formal members; others attended on an individual basis because some Christian Democratic parties – notably the French MRP – did not become formal members until later. In this case, I coded attendance of meetings as indicated by the secondary literature and the published collections of meetings, conference protocols (primarily Lipgens and Loth 1990; Papini 1996; Gehler and Kaiser 2004). For the other organizations, a combination of utilizing secondary sources and available primary records of the meetings and conferences was necessary as well; the main sources include for the Socialists (Steininger 1979a; Lipgens and Loth 1990; Dreyfus 1991; Griffiths 1993b; Castagnez 2004), for the federalist groups (Lipgens and Loth 1990; Vayssière 2007;
Pistone 2008), for the ELEC (ELEC 1957; Lipgens and Loth 1990; Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993), and for the European Movement (Zurcher 1958; Lipgens and Loth 1990; Tordeurs 2000). Finally, when checking for membership of individuals that entered the data-set in the first step (mostly the members of the supranational parliaments), the biographical sources usually contain references with formulations such as ‘was active in …’ or similar expressions, in which cases I coded actors as members.

Finally, I limited the actors of the network to actors from the Six and the UK. In principle it would have made sense to extend this procedure to all OEEC / Council of Europe member countries. Thus, reportedly influential individuals – such as Denis de Rougement (Switzerland) or Joseph Retinger (Poland) – would have been included. It would also have included the Swiss and Austrian members of the NEI, and, more significantly, many more nationalities for the Socialist International. If there had been information on the complete population of the transnational network, it would have made sense to do otherwise. Nevertheless, the resulting data allows identifying possible structural underpinnings of transnational conflict among the transnational elite and the most central actors within that elite. With additional qualitative information on the actual ideological reflection of this structure and the dynamics following 1950 and throughout the bargain, it is possible to evaluate the impact on domestic conflict and governments.

**Analyzing the Network**

The main issue is that available possibilities to analyze two-mode networks are limited. To alleviate this problem, it is possible to ‘project’ the two-mode network into a one-mode network, that is, to create a standard network in one dimension (i.e. the nodes comprising either the individuals or the institutions) and utilize the information about membership to define the edges. Thus, common membership of two actors in a single organization will constitute an edge between these two actors, or conversely, at least one identical member in two organizations constitutes an edge between these two organizations. While this traditional projection would create a unipartite network (that can be analyzed more easily), it discards a large amount of information and heavily biases results in favor of actors in large institutions (say, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe) because every actor \( a \) being a member of institution \( \ell \) will create \( \frac{\ell (\ell - 1)}{2} \) pairwise ties between institutions.
Chapter 3 The EDC as a Case and the Rationale of the Research Design

The alternative chosen here is to assume that common membership in a small group should constitute a stronger link between individuals than membership in a large group and thus let the weight of the edge between two actors for a given common membership be inversely proportional to the number of members within that group or organization (Newman 2001). Creating a projection on this basis avoids the bias in favor of membership in large organizations and thus retains some information from the two-mode network that would otherwise be lost (Opsahl, et al. 2010).

3.2.2 Identifying the Central Actors, Identifying Cohesive Subgroups

The technical sophistication of Social Network Analysis has advanced significantly in recent years. Tapping this potential, in light of the theoretical framework, I consider, on a descriptive level, three centrality measures to identify the transnational elite and its composition with the transnational network. Analytically, I draw on methods that identify clusters of densely connected subgroups within the overall network to evaluate the degree to which substructures within the overall transnational network may be indicative of ideological polarization.

Centrality measures are, by and large, relatively robust to missing observations if networks are sufficiently dense, that is, if individuals have, on average, a relatively high number of ties to other individuals (Borgatti, et al. 2006). In terms of specific centrality measures, there is a large and growing menu available from which one may choose (compare Wasserman and Faust 1994; with Newman 2010). For the present purposes, three indicators are arguably sufficient. First, Degree Centrality, a ‘brute measure’ based on the number of connections a node has. It can easily be combined with edge weights – the strength and ties – and gives a basic understanding of the number of ‘connections’ a particular node had. Second, Eigenvector centrality takes into account both the number of nodes any particular node is connected to as well as their centrality and is mathematically closely related to the Page Rank measure employed by Google. More importantly, it is, as shown in the previous chapter (section 2.3.4), directly related to the notion of the weight of influence employed by Golub and Jackson (Golub and Jackson 2010). Finally, I propose to consider the measure of Betweenness Centrality that emphasizes the ‘bridging position’ of a specific node between different sparsely connected clusters of a network and thus heavily focuses on the structural position of a specific node in the network. Betweenness...
Centrality thus measures how important a given node is in connecting all other nodes of the network to each other (Jackson 2008, 37 ff.). While the measure cannot be used to compare actors across different graphs as its value is heavily dependent on the specific graph structure, it is useful to consider for comparing the positions of individuals in a particular graph with a known structure.

In addition to centrality indices, there are methods that allow identifying subgroups of more densely and thus presumably closely related actors. Thus, the analysis of ‘clusters’ or subgroups of individuals has been successfully employed to reveal the ideological polarization in legislative chambers (Maoz and Somer-Topcu 2010). Finding the objectively ‘best’ partition of a network is difficult and, in particular for dense networks, “prohibitively costly in terms of computer time” (Newman 2010, 359). There are several different algorithms that seek to tackle this issue of computational complexity in different ways, thus returning different results. For the purposes of this dissertation, the choice of used algorithms was restricted to those applicable to valued networks and implemented in the igraph library that is available in R (Csárdi and Nepusz 2006; R Core Team 2012). These include: the ‘Springglass’ Community algorithm that is based on simulations of the network (Reichardt and Bornholdt 2006); the ‘greedy’ modularity optimizing algorithm (Clauset, et al. 2004); two algorithms based on random walks, namely the ‘walktrap’ community finding algorithm (Pons and Matthieu 2006) as well as the information flow mapping algorithm (Rosvall and Bergstrom 2008). In order to compare the results by reference to an objective criterion, it is possible to draw on the concept of modularity (Newman and Girvan 2004). The modularity score is a simple measure of the degree to which similar individuals are more strongly connected to each other than to dissimilar individuals. It can be interpreted similar to Pearson’s correlation coefficient, its range being defined from strictly less than one to strictly higher than minus one, with higher values indicating higher presence of clustering and thus a better separation of the network into separate groups (Newman 2010, 223, 224).

In addition, visual inspection is utilized since the projection of bipartite network to a unipartite network may result in loss of information and thus lead to misleading inferences concerning the underlying structure of the network (Spanurattana and Murata 2011, 835). For these purposes, I draw on the statnet library that is available in R (Handcock, et al. 2003). In terms of the visual presentation of network graphs, it
allows drawing on ‘force directed’ graphing methods that place nodes with similar structural properties close to each other (e.g. Fruchterman and Reingold 1991).

A Caveat on Causality

As already indicated in the previous chapter, the analysis of these network structures is useful to identify the carriers of ideological exchanges across states and to identify certain structural underpinnings of transnational ideological conflict. Such information can inform and enrich the analysis of preference formation within states and, as expressed in transnational hypotheses, serve as an independent source of information regarding government preferences and their change. At the same time, however, it is important to point out that, when speaking of the ‘impact of the transnational conflict’, it is difficult to establish the precise direction of causality, as it is in the analysis of political networks in general, in particular when dealing with a ‘snapshot’ view of these structures (Fowler, et al. 2011). Analytically, the general problem in observing network structures is that “homophily and contagion are generally confounded” (Shalizi and Thomas 2011). Thus, actors may have opted to engage in certain organizations rather than others because of preexisting ideological convictions and dispositions (homophily), or the mutual exchanges may have reinforced, amplified, altered, or perhaps even transformed such dispositions (contagion). With the present design, there is no way by which one can determine, beyond ex post speculation, whether the former or the latter or both occurred. While the qualitative analysis of the dynamics of coalition formation over time may provide additional insights, it is not among the central tasks in this dissertation to deal with this original question of causality as there are multiple confounding factors across states and time. Rather, the question is whether the analysis of structure of the network may inform an analysis of the degree of transnational conflict and the ways in which the domestic politics and the governments of the states negotiating the EDC may have been responsive to that conflict.

3.3 The Independent Variables

The present section describes the data-sources relied upon in operationalizing the explanatory factors that both theoretical frameworks imply beyond transnational
networks. Stated, briefly, there are three kinds of factors: one concerns the material structures, i.e. state defensive capabilities meaning – military and economic capabilities states have or do not have objectively. The second concerns domestic party conflict, party programs and the shifting composition of governments as a result of domestic conflict. The third concerns subjective beliefs – or ideas, ideologies, ‘mental models’ – and the ways in which they impact processes of preference formation and behavior. Section 3.3.1 deals with the first two kinds, section 3.3.2 with the latter.

3.3.1 International Structures and Domestic Conflict

This section addresses the structural geopolitical factors as well as domestic variables. The structural aspect relates to the objective side of ‘threat levels’. The subjective element concerns beliefs and assessments of other actors’ intentions and will be treated below. The objective elements concern the relative military capability of states and their geographical proximity, i.e. the ease and speed by which available military capability can be used by state A to attack state B. The higher the material capabilities and geographical proximity, the higher the ‘violence interdependence’ among two states.

Since the number of states under considerations is low and territorial changes absent, geographical proximity is trivial to assess.

The standard indicator of relative military capabilities – the Composite Index of National Capability – has been maintained by the Correlates of War project for several decades (Singer, et al. 1972; Singer 1987). It is based on six ‘raw’ indicators attributable to individual states: their military personnel, military expenditures, total population, urban population, iron and steel consumption, energy consumption. In order to compute relative defensive capabilities, the indicator for each state is the mean of a state’s percentages of the global total in each category, for every year. In other words, it represents a state’s share in the global defensive capabilities of every year. The six categories used for the index represent a mixture of a state’s potential capabilities (i.e. population, energy consumption, etc.) as well as the degree to which that potential is mobilized. For the purposes of this dissertation there are two minor issues. First, the data-set includes values for Germany only from 1955 onwards, as this is the first year in which West-Germany was recognized as a sovereign state. Of course, potential defensive capabilities existed before 1955. However, since the value
for 1955 represent German potential plus the amount that could be mobilized within a year – after the WEU Treaty went into effect – the value for 1955 is a good proxy for German capabilities in the previous years. The second issue concerns nuclear weapons that are excluded from the index. This issue is somewhat problematic: the US had a nuclear monopoly until 1949, when the first Soviet nuclear bomb test was conducted and both sides intensified their testing programs thereafter. Hence, threat assessments have to take into account the question of nuclear weapons when analyzing the subjective element, i.e. beliefs regarding Soviet intentions.

The second aspect – domestic conflict – relates to two issues. The first aspect is relatively straightforward: domestic political changes, especially government composition. A useful resource is the Parlgov dataset, containing information about parties, coalitions, election results, and a categorization of party families that I adopt as well (Döring and Manow 2011).

In order to acquire information regarding party commitments and programs with regard to security issues and European integration at the time, I draw on the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data (Budge, et al. 2001). This information is required to add additional plausibility to the question whether the issue of ‘Europe’ was a conflict largely between states, different party families, or whether the issue cut across these dimensions transnationally. The dataset contains information on party programs of all countries under consideration throughout the time period, including party scores on a left-right scale, an item with regard to international politics as well as an item on European integration. In particular, the items used in this context are

- **International Peace**, a constructed category containing positive/ negative declarations with regard to peaceful international cooperation, peaceful solutions of international crises, negative/ positive references to the use of military power, and negative/ positive references to imperial behavior (Budge, et al. 2001).

- **Europe** counts favorable or negative mentions of European integration and union aggregated from the two items on European Community as contained in the dataset (Items 108 and 110, see Budge, et al. 2001)
• **Nationalism** counts favorable/ unfavorable references to national values and symbols as reconstructed from two items on nationalism in the dataset (Items 601 and 602, see Budge, et al. 2001)

• **Left-Right** is composite index constructed by the CMP team from multiple items of the coding scheme to place parties along an socio-economic left-right spectrum (Budge, et al. 2001).

Although the dataset has received some criticism – in particular regarding the question whether it measures political positions or political salience (Gabel and Huber 2000; Franzmann and Kaiser 2006) – it constitutes a useful additional source of information.

### 3.3.2 Ideas, Beliefs, Trust, Networks, and Process-Tracing

The idea of mixed methods stems from the consideration that both quantitative and qualitative approaches have their distinct strengths and shortcomings. The rational for combining methods is to have each one complement the other. For present purposes, qualitative techniques – as usually employed by historical scholarship – are employed since a crucial part of this dissertation involves the subjective element of decision-making. In this sense, there are two functions. First, I need to complement the structural analysis of the transnational networks with an account of the actual exchanges, in particular ideological similarities and differences within and across the transnational organizations, to provide an analysis of transnational coalition-building in the early 1950s beliefs, while looking for evidence of coalition formation and strategic coordination across states that is indicative of mutual trust or distrust. Second, I need to evaluate the implications of that conflict for national preference formation and the choice of bargaining strategies. Do actors engaged in similar transnational communities adopt similar – if not identical – positions in the domestic conflicts? Do actors draw on strategic assessments coordinated in transnational circles while in leading governmental positions?
Subjective Factors: Beliefs, Trust, and Threats

The core qualitative information I will draw upon are actors revealing their assessments of threats, their beliefs, and trust and distrust. This information is taken from published primary sources, such as published editions of records of Foreign Ministries and Government Cabinets, the collections, speeches and documents relating to the European transnational organizations and European political parties (e.g. Braunthal 1971, 1974; Lipgens 1984a; Lipgens and Loth 1988, 1990), the documentation of the exchanges in the NEI and the Geneva Circle published by Wolfram Kaiser and Michael Gehler (Gehler and Kaiser 2004), additional collections of documents relevant for the topic (e.g. Jacobson 1962), available memoirs, collections of letters and diaries of key actors (e.g. Eden 1960; Acheson 1969; Spaak 1969; Baring, et al. 1974; Monnet 1976; Speidel 1977; Massigli 1978; Adenauer 1980; Blankenhorn 1980; Adenauer 1983, 1984; Mensing, et al. 1985; Adenauer 1987; Mensing, et al. 1987; Adenauer 1995; Mensing, et al. 1995), and the collection of interviews conducted in the EUI in late 1980’s and early 1990’s with key actors that is available online. A full list of the consulted primary and secondary sources may be found in the bibliography. This information is complemented with information gleaned from historical scholarship.

The task is thus to assess whether actors consistently, both publicly and privately, adhere to certain ‘typical’ lines of reasoning. Such typical lines of reasoning can be identified and assigned to actors or group of actors as their ideology’, ‘ideas’, ‘mental models’, or ‘beliefs’. Following Goldstein and Keohane (1993a, 8), I distinguish between world views (religion, sovereignty, the nation), principled beliefs (political values such as democratic values), typical causal beliefs expressing ‘causal stories’ or narratives about cause and effect relationships in the political world that inform actor preferences by linking actions to outcomes, and add strategic beliefs, i.e. beliefs about the motives, preferences, and beliefs of other actors.

Second, using the above mentioned qualitative sources allows identifying subjective threat assessments fairly easily. The issue of trust is more elusive as I can only rely on direct evidence of voiced trust or distrust or indirect evidence as to what information from what source is credible, mutual affirmations of trust, and, finally, credible signals of trust such as sharing of sensitive information that puts the actor sharing information at political risk. At the same time, assessments of trust will have to rely on the interpretation of incomplete evidence.
**Process-Tracing and Impact**

The term ‘process tracing’ has varying labels and many critics. When taken too literally as ‘Causal-Process Observation’, the term is indeed an oxymoron (Beck 2006). Causality is, after all, a theoretical concept. It does not come knocking on the door. A prominent definition thus defines ‘process-tracing’ as a technique that “attempts to identify the intervening causal process […] between an independent variable (cause) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett 2005, 206). As a principle, it relies on multiple sources of information and their interpretation in light of competing theories linking causes to outcomes. In more prosaic terms, process-tracing means reconstructing processes from the available evidence which is inherently incomplete. By generating multiple observations from different sources and confronting them with alternative hypotheses as to the contours of the process to be reconstructed, it allows addressing the problem ‘equifinality’ arising when expectations from differing theories ‘expect’ similar outcomes (Van Evera 1997, 65, 66; George and Bennett 2005, 224). The underlying principle of research design is often compared to the work of a detective as it implies identifying key observations or “a new fact [that] will dramatically support a theory (much like a smoking gun) or dramatically undermine a theory (much like an air-tight alibi)” (Mahoney 2010, 128). Thus, it is not so much a ‘technical method’, but more of an approach to ‘data’ gathering and interpretation. In this sense, it conforms to historical research with the added requirement of formulating explicit hypotheses (Collier 2011).

There are disadvantages: interpretation is less constrained than in quantitative approaches, associated errors and uncertainties cannot be quantified, and the operationalization and measurement of concepts is less reliable. The assertion of the presence of a particular causal mechanism can thus be equally misleading, especially as the empirical record consulted is incomplete. This, however, is almost by definition a problem for the explanation of single case studies of historical outcomes (Gerring 2007, 187 ff.).
3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has had two objectives. First, to give an overview of the current research on the EDC in particular and, second, to give an account of the EDC as a case. It was shown that the vast historical literature that operates within an intergovernmental perspective emphasizes very different aspects of post-war Europe and the international landscape. First, there is the argument stressing the geopolitical context and national interest, stating that the heightened threat induced by the Korean War produced radical conceptions for a European Army whereas a lessening of the threat after the end of the war and Stalin’s death made sovereignty concerns more salient and thus led to the WEU. Second, there is the argument regarding changing domestic coalitions: it holds that in the early 1950’s, governmental coalitions were positively disposed towards European solutions advocating substantial pooling and delegation, whereas changes in domestic coalitions – particularly in France – in the mid 1950’s were less positively disposed and thus renegotiated the WEU solution. Third, there is an argument in the literature adding that the internal conflicts in France may have led to the French delegation overstepping its mandate and thus negotiating a Treaty that did not muster domestic support. At the same time, both classic and contemporary analyses point out that, first, there is evidence of significant ideological conflict in France across multiple parties and that, second, the mid 1950’s saw a peculiar convergence of attitudes among the governmental elite in Europe, an apparent convergence that is not addressed in the literature.

The analyses operating within a transnational perspective stress the significance of ideas exchanged in the transnational European organizations. There is scholarship emphasizing the role of European transnational, Christian Democratic, and transatlantic transgovernmental networks as constituting a source of political capital for the construction of transnational coalitions that become a source for ‘political entrepreneurship’ and thus afford influence. A systematic analysis of the impact of these transnational organizations and networks, however, is lacking. This fact is peculiar since prominent arguments emphasize a ‘convergence’ of attitudes among the European political elite that is unexplained. In conjunction with the observation of cross-cutting conflicts in France, these facts point to the possibility that transnational factors may have been influential across the European states, an issue addressed in this dissertation.
In addition, this section has characterized different frames of reference for the analysis of the EDC. As a critical juncture in European integration history, a ‘sufficient’ and exhaustive understanding of its failure constitutes worthwhile knowledge. I argued further that the EDC bargain is a ‘most likely’ case for both the ideational and the realist intergovernmental narratives since its topic was security cooperation. In addition, it is a most likely case for explanations focusing on the impact of nationalist and federalist ideologies on the formation of state preferences since the delegation and pooling of ‘core state powers’ touched the most basic symbols of national sovereignty. For similar reasons, one should not expect explanations focusing on clearly identifiable economic interests and significant interest group activity to fare well. In terms of the generality of the framework developed, the insights produced may or may not travel beyond the EDC. At the same time, the argument related to transgovernmental networks potentially being sources of bargaining inefficiency is not predicated on a particular time and place. Moreover, it is largely an argument related to the existence of the mechanism and thus its significance is not affected by the fact that it is established in a single case study. If confirmed, this insight would merit further attention.

The second task of this chapter was to lay out the logic of the research design. The design follows a logic of ‘mixed methods’ (e.g. Greene 2007). It combines qualitative historical evidence to reconstruct patterns of rhetorical commitments to particular political and ideological institutional concepts of post-war Europe, the nature and content of beliefs circulating publicly and behind the political stage, domestically as well as transnationally. Due to the emphasis on uncertainty and learning as bound together with issues of power and influence, the ‘process analysis’ of the bargain (Hall 2006), while drawing on game theoretic concepts, is more in line with what has been termed ‘negotiation analysis’, focusing on aspects of learning, the usage of beliefs in efforts to ‘change the game itself’, processes that are central to bargaining dynamics (see Sebenius 1992). In addition, qualitative ‘process tracing’ allows drawing on wide sources of information which becomes central in cases of ‘equifinality’, i.e. when the used hypotheses produce identical outcome expectations (George and Bennett 2005).

This qualitative information is combined with a quantitative analysis of transnational networks in post-war Europe in order to identify central actors and offer alternative evidence of transnational conflict structures. In particular, this chapter presents the
way in which the network data was sampled. In order to reconstruct transnational networks among the political elite in post-war Europe, this dissertation draws on the sociological analysis of interlocking electorates (Mizruchi 1996), combining several sampling strategies to yield networks based on individuals’ overlapping memberships in the eight transnational organization that existed in post-war Europe in 1950. These are: the European Movement, the European League for Economic Cooperation (ELEC), the European Union of Federalists (UEF), the European Parliamentary Union (EPU), the Mouvement Socialiste pour les États-Unis d'Europe (MSEUE), the Socialist International (COMISCO/ SI)\textsuperscript{22}, the Christian Democratic Nouvelles Equipes Internationles (NEI), and the Christian Democratic Geneva Circle (e.g. Braunthal 1971; Lipgens and Loth 1988, 1990; Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993; Gehler and Kaiser 2004; Kaiser 2007; Vayssière 2007).

The toolkit of network analysis has significantly expanded over the last decades (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Newman 2010). Traditional analyses of centrality measures allow identifying prominent and hypothetically influential individuals and groups within transnational and transgovernmental networks. Second, methods of identifying structural clusters of more densely connected actors are particularly useful (Newman 2010, ch. 11). Combining the analysis with qualitative information on the conflicts within and across these organizations and their impact on domestic conflicts within states yields the evidence needed for the transnational argument.

\textsuperscript{22} The International was reconstituted after the war in London as COMISCO, until 1951, when it was relabeled Socialist International at its inaugural congress in Frankfurt, Germany.
4. The EDC Bargain: Explanandum and Intergovernmentalist First Cut

The present chapter has two tasks. The first task is to describe the *explanandum*, i.e. the ‘negotiation dance’ of the EDC/WEU bargain between 1950 and 1954, focusing on the positions on institutional design espoused by the governments under consideration (section 4.1). The second section (4.2) will specify the degree to which a plausible intergovernmentalist explanation can be offered. The last step is necessary because the existent scholarship provides influential arguments for the case of the EDC but does not explicitly and consistently address the issues raised by the specification of the problem as a ‘negotiations dance’. Thus, I evaluate the basic geopolitical incentives that the governments under consideration were faced with over time. In addition, I evaluate changes in the composition of domestic cabinets and whether there are discernible differences in party positions on nationalist values between countries and whether there are discernible differences. The finding that none of these factors offer a consistent intergovernmental explanation sets the stage for evaluating the transnational explanation in the subsequent chapters and provides a more refined yardstick by which to evaluate the added value of an alternative explanation based on the transnational framework described in the previous chapter.

4.1 Characterizing the Explanandum: Bargaining Positions between 1950 and 1954

This section describes key aspects of the *explanandum* by presenting the EDC bargain in terms of its main sequences of changes in bargaining positions of the negotiating countries. It presents the EDC as a ‘negotiation dance’ mainly by recurrence to governments’ main bargaining ‘positions’ in terms of their expressed preferred institutional designs. What institutional provisions were argued for by which governments at what points in time? What was the course of the bargain and what were the main conflict constellations between 1950 and 1954?

In order to answer these questions, it is useful to divide the bargain of the EDC into four periods that correspond to turning points in which major compromises between several states lead to a shift in the constellation of conflict between the negotiating countries around the most salient issues. A first period, beginning with the outbreak
of the Korean War, in which the institutional proposals on the bargaining table were so far apart in terms of their provision, that two ‘negotiation tracks’ – an intergovernmental ‘package deal’ and the supranational ‘Pleven Plan’ – were pursued simultaneously as no substantial agreement on the terms of German rearmament seemed available; a second period, beginning in mid-1951, in which substantial compromises – largely between the three larger continental European governments and the United States – led to an exclusive focus on the supranational alternative, eventually culminating in the signing of the EDC Treaty in May 1952. The third period between, lasting until the rejection of the EDC Treaty in August 1954 in the French Assemblée Nationale was marked by domestic ratification conflicts and international efforts to renegotiate the terms of the treaty and substantially bolster its institutional structure with a European Political Community. The final period, lasting no longer than five months, was marked by a new intergovernmental conference in London, the outcome of which was the WEU Treaty that, having been ratified in all countries by December, finally solved the problem of German rearmament and integration into the Western Alliance.

4.1.1 A German Army or a European Army? The EDC Negotiations, 1950-1951

Serious negotiations over German rearmament started with the outbreak of the Korean War and the US proposal of the ‘package deal’ to integrate German forces into NATO in September 1950. Although the institutional debate in post-war Europe, in particular after the Brussels Treaty of 1947, had introduced the question of German rearmament in the international discussions, the Korean War was the clear turning point: a heightened fear of a Soviet attack caused immediate concerns and demands for an increased American troop presence on the continent while US officials sought for ways to tap German resources for the Alliance. The result was the so-called ‘package deal’ (FRUS 1950 III, 273 ff.). It was proposed to the European states on September 12th 1950. Its core was, on the one hand, the bolstering of European defense by increased European military expenditures and US aid. On the other hand, it called for the rearmament of German troops and their integration in the Alliance.

Being concerned for the efficiency of a multi-national (and multilingual) force that would be composed, inter alia, of troops that had fought against each other not long-
er than five years ago at the time, the US Department of State proposed that German units should be mobilized and made available under NATO institutional structure that would have to be created, including a supreme commander and central decision-making boards that would oversee the recruitment and the mobilization of European Armies and thus constituting part of the organizational core of NATO. These proposals were part of an initiative to raise the military spending of all NATO countries. In order to oversee German compliance with international treaties, these boards would oversee both the production and procurement of weaponry throughout NATO and they could make sure that ‘vital armaments’ would not be produced by Germany. Moreover, the package deal stipulated that German divisions would be at the direct disposal of the NATO commander: no integrated German units higher than this operational level were to be allowed, no German ‘General Staff’ would exist that could, even in principle, coordinate all the German divisions autonomously. The German army would thus be monitored and integrated, at the operational level, into the Alliance without the organizational or material capabilities that armies of ‘sovereign’ nations could in principle possess. In return for a German contribution to Allied capabilities, Germany would be given the prospect of becoming a NATO member.23

23 The package deal proposed the “[…] creation of a European defense force within the North Atlantic Treaty framework […] the best means of obtaining the maximum contribution from European nations and to provide as well a framework in which German contribution of a significant nature could be realized.” (FRUS 1950 III, 274). It stipulated that that “national contingents [operate] within overall NATO control and under immediate commanders of their own nationalities[…].” and that “German units larger than the balanced ground Division should not initially be authorized. […] These German Divisions, at least initially, would be integrated with non-German units in the corps and higher units but should be nationally generated and so integrated as not to impair their morale or effectiveness.” (FRUS 1950 III, 275). In addition, there “[…] should eventually be a Supreme Commander for the European Defense Force who would be provided with sufficient delegated authority to insure that the separate national forces are organized and trained into one effective force in time of peace and who would be prepared to exercise the full powers of the Supreme Allied Commander over that force in time of war” (FRUS 1950 III, 274/275). Thus, the “nations concerned should make firm commitments as to the forces that would pass immediately to the control of the Supreme Commander, when appointed, and additional commitments as to-the forces which would be placed under his command in event of war” (Ibid.). In terms of the supply of weaponry and the coordinated production of military goods, the package deal argued that “greater central direction should be provided in the fields of military production and procurement of major items of supply. This should be done within the framework of the present NATO Military Production and Supply Board by-necessary changes in its terms of reference and by setting up an executive, directing a group highly qualified in the production field, and supported by an integrated staff so as to be able to provide the-necessary guidance for military production and supply. While the maximum contribution would be expected from Germany in the production field, we believe that German forces should be dependent upon other nations for certain vital military equipment which should not be produced by German industry” (FRUS 1950 III, 276). The upshot of this proposal was German membership in NATO “as soon as possible” (FRUS 1950 III, 277).
While the European governments warmly received the implied organizational and material commitment of the US to a Western Alliance in the form of a US commander and additional troops on the continent, none of them were enthusiastic about the creation of German armed forces. Taking the ‘package deal’ as a proposal to begin negotiations, almost all Cabinets, with various qualifications, reluctantly agreed to negotiate along its principles (Herbst 1996, 88; Creswell 2006, 30). Even Konrad Adenauer indicated to the Allied High Commissars at the Petersberg that the American proposal was a useful starting point for negotiations Germany provided that German troops were treated on an equal footing and negotiations on Germany regaining its sovereign status would equally begin (AAPD 1949/50; FRUS 1950 III, 355; 1950 IV, 658).

In sum, European governments reluctantly agreed to the American ‘Package Deal’ in principle, whereas the French government wholeheartedly rejected the idea. Taking issue with both German NATO membership and the prospect of setting up German divisions, the French government responded with the proposal of the Pleven Plan on 24th October 1950 in which French Minister of Defense René Pleven proposed a supranational army, whose institutional structure resembled the ECSC that was being negotiated at the time (Pleven 1950). The core of the plan was the creation of a European Minister of Defense, responsible to a Council of States and an Assembly, who would implement the directives he received, thereby overseeing the recruitment, mobilization, and integration of a supranational army. While the proposal itself was vague, its main outlines caused serious concerns regarding the efficiency and even sincerity of the idea. Pleven stipulated that only German troops should be fully integrated in the new army, whereas the other participating states would retain the sovereign control over a large amount of theirs. Moreover, the Plan called for troops to be integrated at “the smallest possible unit”, in effect, a level significantly lower than

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24The package deal was first proposed at a meeting of the foreign ministers of France, the UK and the US in New York in September 12th 1950 (FRUS 1950 III, 1191). Protocol records Schuman as saying “Regarding the participation of Germany in the defense effort, Mr. Schuman said it would seem illogical for us to defend Western Europe, including Germany, without contributions from Germany. He said that there was a serious psychological problem in France, however, and that it would create serious difficulties if we force the French to take a position too early. He said that the French felt that there were limited resources available for common defense. In their opinion, these resources must be distributed between the NATO countries. Only when a minimum level is reached in these countries would it be easy for the French to take a definite position on the matter. When the combined staff and the Supreme Commander have been created the difficulty will be much lessened for the French and the Government might be in a position to consider the German matter on a different basis. Mr. Schuman urged that the other Foreign Ministers be patient on this matter.” (FRUS 1950 III, 1200).
the threshold of nationally homogenous divisions as called for in the US package deal, thereby raising serious concerns regarding the military efficiency of the plan.\textsuperscript{25}

The reaction was uniform. US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, upon the announcement of the Pleven Plan, echoed widespread sentiments by stipulating that “France has put forth a plan which is considered militarily unsound by military experts of NAT[O] countries” (FRUS 1950 III, 428). Reactions by the British cabinet were altogether more hostile: here was a rejection of the Pleven Plan ‘in principle’, without indicating any willingness to ‘study’ the Pleven Plan.\textsuperscript{26} The Dutch government shared that view (Harry van and van der Harst 2000, 171). Although the German and Italian governments were far less hostile to the idea of a supranational army, the plan’s military ineffectiveness and its blatant unequal treatment of Germany implied rejection by both governments (Adenauer 1950; Varsori 1992, 273).

After US Secretary of State Dean Acheson explicitly threatened that the US would withhold any additional troop commitments to Europe (FRUS 1950 III, 426-431, 429, 430), negotiations continued in the North Atlantic Council, chaired by US representative Charles M. Spofford. These negotiations lead to a weak compromise that would largely remain in place until mid-1951. It was decided that the negotiations should continue along two ‘tracks’. One the one hand, the Allied High Commissioners in Germany would negotiate with the German government the possible military contribution to the Alliance, to be anchored in a peace treaty that would specify the terms under which the country would regain its sovereignty (‘Deutschlandvertrag’). Negotiations would take place on the Petersberg (FRUS 1951 III-b, 990, ff.). At the same time, the French government would invite ‘interested countries’ to a conference, to be held in Paris, that would discuss the possibility of creating the European Army called for in the Pleven Plan. As France accepted the Spofford compromise, the United States agreed to provide additional US divisions and appointed a supreme

\textsuperscript{25} Specifically, battalion sized German units would be integrated in divisions, divisions being the lowest possible union size capable of autonomous operation. The result would have been that every division in the European Army – nationally homogeneous – would have its own one or two German battalions. This would obviously create serious problems of communication and coordination, national resentment notwithstanding, thus seriously impeding the military effectiveness of such troops (Elgey 1993a, 573).

\textsuperscript{26} “The French plan is entirely out of line with the broad principles of the North Atlantic Treaty. [...] it seeks to divide the North Atlantic forces into American and Canadian forces on the one hand and ‘European’ forces on the other. [...] The plan also appears designed to postpone for a long time any possibility of German contribution.” Preparatory memo for a meeting of the British cabinet, October 26\textsuperscript{th} 1950 (DBPO II: III, 217)

In sum, one could characterize the conflict constellation throughout the first year informally as ‘France versus the rest’. Few of the Western governments thought the EDC to be a viable option. Even Germany and Italy, the two countries that expressed at least some sympathy with the idea, did not endorse the French proposal as its inefficiency and intention to delay the negotiations seemed obvious. The Dutch government – as the British – only sought observer status for the negotiations in Paris. However, no serious offers of compromise on the key issues, such as German troop size and institutional equality – were put forth until March 1951.

4.1.2 Negotiating and Signing the EDC Treaty, 1951-1952

Due to the delay produced by this situation, it became clear rather quickly that the compromise formula suggested by Spofford was counterproductive. As the first talks on the Petersberg – the first track of the Spofford Compromise – began, it was still unclear what exactly should be agreed upon, since the three Allied powers represented by their High Commissioners (France, UK, US) did not agree among themselves, even in principle, on the institutional terms under which Germany would be rearmed. Additionally, the leader of the German delegation at the Petersberg, Theodor Blank, stipulated from the beginning that larger division sized national troops – including armored vehicles and tanks - were the *conditio sine qua non* for an effective military alliance and thus of German participation (FRUS 1951 III-b, 1000). Since the issue of German sovereignty was inextricably linked to German rearmament, the German delegation immediately sought a concrete revision of the occupation statute in exchange for such a military contribution, a request Adenauer had expressed to the High Commissioners already in August 1950 (Adenauer 1976, 358 ff.). First concrete results were obtained only in March 1951, allowing the creation of a German Foreign Ministry.²⁷

The negotiations showed little signs that other agreements could be found quickly by early 1951. The contents of the ‘Spofford Compromise’ had scheduled two ‘interim reports’ – one from the negotiations in Paris, one from the High Commissioners in Germany – to be distributed in early 1951, before the impending French elections on June 17th 1951. Several developments coincided with the report issued from Petersberg. On April 19th 1951, the ECSC Treaty was signed in Paris. French Foreign Minister Schuman and Adenauer started making headway into a resolution of the Saar question (Poidevin 1986, 283). With the impending publications of both reports, the main line of conflict started to shift drastically.

The interim report on the negotiations on the EDC in Paris contained several compromises. It stated that the “treaty will involve no discrimination whatever among the member states.” (FRUS 1951 III-b, 844). The five negotiating states thus agreed that “the final aim is the fusion, under joint supranational institutions, of the armed forces of the participating countries with a view to assuring the defense of Europe on a permanent basis.” (Ibid.). The key qualification had become that the “forces necessary for the defense of the overseas territories of the participating countries would be excluded.” (Ibid.). The last provision was to ensure that troops responsible for the control of European colonies could be retained under national control whereas German troops would be integrated into the new organization completely. The negotiations between military experts in NATO produced the desired compromise regarding the military effectiveness of a supranational army, stipulating that the size for military effectiveness was a ‘groupement du combat’ of about 12,500 to 14,500 men.

Remaining institutional differences were, however, still considerable. The Belgian government had by no means abandoned its position on the limited character of ‘supranational institution’ it would agree to. Moreover, the amount of resources, possibly a budget as demanded by the French delegation, under centralized control was still disputed. The report merely stated that the “European Defense Community will

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28 Ulrich de Maizière, military advisor to the German delegation at the EDC negotiations, described the initial situation in an interview with Richard Griffiths in Florence in 1990, “I didn't feel that all European countries in this conference were very enthusiastic. […] And I told you that in the first months it was Franco-German talk and the others were listening [...] Italy and the Benelux, they had doubts that mixed divisions and non-national homogeneous divisions could function [...] they had the possibility to wait and not to expose themselves with assessments.” (De Maizière 1990).

have at its disposal certain resources” (FRUS 1951 III-b, 844). Nevertheless, the US, including the highly reputed NATO supreme Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower, not only approved of but started actively lobby and apply diplomatic pressure for the European Army solutions which proved decisive for subsequent events (e.g. Creswell 2006, 61). Because of these compromises, as an American observer of the negotiations noted in August 1951, a consensus in principle was emerging by mid-1951 to ‘copy’ the key institutional features of the recently signed ECSC treaty and apply it to the EDC (FRUS 1951 III, 862 ff., FRUS 1951 III-b; Adenauer 1976, 461, 462; Götze and Rittberger 2010). Thus, a broad outline of a possible agreement was emerging, entailing the institutional blueprint of the ECSC and applying it to the European Army.

Once this agreement in principle had been obtained, two new lines of conflict formed that persisted for over two years: one relating to the powers and specific institutional design of the EDC; the second one relating to the relationship between the European Army and NATO, including the UK and the US. Both persisted for the remaining three years and, essentially, were only resolved through the WEU in late 1954.

The question of institutional design – and thus the powers and the resources that the new organization would yield – was the major cleavage among the prospective EDC member states themselves. Once the troop level question had been resolved, the Dutch government joined the negotiations as participant and now declared that the “the Netherlands Government are prepared to support the idea of linking the European armies together, although on a basis different from that proposed during the Paris Conference”. 30 Both the Belgian and the Dutch government adopted a similar stance with regard to this question. 31 In essence, both the Dutch and the Belgian governments sought to limit the delegation and pooling of state powers: both countries were against the formation of a common budget, both sought a multi-member college of

30 As the Dutch delegation put it, it “would seem imperative to limit, at least for the time being, the responsibilities of the High Authority to such harmonization of the organization, tactical procedures and technical measures as is strictly necessary to ensure the effective cooperation of national contingents in a balanced and integrated force. […] A complete common budget appears to be unnecessary […]” in the same way as the Dutch governments declared a common armament program unnecessary. (Dutch Government 1951).
31 As a member of the Belgian delegation wrote to Brussels in December 1951, “As regards the powers of the Commissioner: he can only have an executive role, though without being reduced to the status of chairman of some delegate authority, hence more of a coordinator or director.” (Papeians de Morchoven 1951).
commissioners instead of a single European ‘Minister of Defense’, both sought toreduce its prerogative to an agency responsible for coordinating common standards of production, armaments, and training, and both insisted on a powerful Council of States within the European Army that would decide, on all matters of importance, unanimously. Due to the little amount of pooling and delegation on offer, both did not envisage a common assembly with substantial rights. The Dutch delegation even proposed to limit the institutions to a Council of Ministers and an Executive Board only, preempting a common budget altogether, keeping the mobilization and maintenance of troops a national affair, and delegating operational control to the Allied headquarters within NATO.  

Against this ‘minimalist’ stance that sought a low level of centralization and representation, the three larger countries – Germany, Italy, and France – adopted a difference stance and this confrontation almost lead to a failure of the negotiations by the end of 1951. The Italian government, to begin with, adopted a radically different stance toward the question of institutional design by announcing that the institutional blueprint advocated by the Benelux violated “every sense of responsibility as well as the fundamental rules of the parliamentary system of government”. The Italian delegation further stated that, to fill this gap, one needed “a parliament, appointed through general and direct European elections” (Lipgens 1984b, 666). The Italian delegation further stated that this parliament could “exert comprehensive control over the European budget and the office of the High Commissioner. The High Commissioner would be responsible to the parliament in the same way as a minister to his national parliament.” The German government was largely in agreement: the ‘partial federation’ that was being constructed essentially required the parliamentary con-

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32 “1) The armed forces allocated or to be allocated to SHAPE by the States, participating in the European Defence Organisation, shall be grouped in an integrated European Force in accordance with principles to be laid down in a Protocol annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Defence Organisation. The principles will provide for integration above division level. As organs of the European Defence Organisation will be established: a Council of Ministers and an Executive Board. 3) Suitable provisions will have to be made with regard to the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaty” (Dutch Government 1951).


control of the executive.\textsuperscript{35} The French delegation had already acknowledged that its key demand – a common budget – required a minimal degree of parliamentary control.\textsuperscript{36} Schuman, insisting on majority decisions, hesitantly argued that an influential parliament was required, but he was unsure about the concrete normative implications.\textsuperscript{37}

These differences between the minimalists and the maximalists, so to speak, were entirely incompatible, and extended over multiple issues: whether or not there would be a common budget, whether the central authority would be composed of a single or multiple commissioners, the degree to which majority voting would be used in the Council, the decisions on the procurements of contracts and awarding promotions, the degree to which NATO headquarters would direct the Army (Fursdon 1980, 105 ff.; Rittberger 2006). In all of these cases, the line of conflict had shifted since the beginning of the negotiations: the early isolation of France was replaced by a conflict between Belgium and the Netherlands (the ‘minimalists’) on the one hand and the larger ‘maximalists’ (Germany, France, and Italy) on the other hand.

The three maximalist countries had an important ally, however. Ever since Eisenhower had endorsed the EDC as a viable military option, the US increased its pressure, via conditionality threats related to continued economic and military aid, that a

\textsuperscript{35} Calling for a ‘decisive contribution’ to European Unity in his speech in front of the Assembly of the Council of Europe, Adenauer argued that with the requirement of a common budget “stellt sich auch unabweisbar die Frage nach einer europäischen parlamentarischen Kontrolle der Exekutive […]. Schon das Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik enthält eine Bestimmung, die die Übertragung von Souveränitätsrechten auf größere Gemeinschaften vorsieht, und darin liegt zugleich ein Auftrag an die Bundesregierung […]. Noch können wir kein exaktes Bild dieser Föderation zeichnen, [aber man] muß, wenn das Ganze nicht erreichbar ist, den Teil davon verwirklichen, der möglich ist.“ He further pointed out that “all diese Einzellösungen auf eine Koordinierung, ja Verschmelzung hindrängen […]. Handeln wir rasch! Morgen könnte es zu spät sein!” (quoted in Lipgens 1984b, 658). Lower level officials functioning as Adenauer’s representatives, such as Blankenhorn, Hallstein, and Ophüls, agreed that the design of EDC institutions had to conform to the Italian demands for a constituent including executive control exercised through parliament (AAPD 1951,538 ff., 556-559, 603-606).

\textsuperscript{36} “The budget, adopted by the Commissioner in conjunction with the Council, acting by a majority to be determined, and approved by the European Assembly, will determine the total burden” (French Delegation 1951).

treaty on the EDC should be signed by May 1952 (Duchin 1992). It was only through US pressure and substantial compromises from all sides that he remaining differences were resolved until the ECC Treaty was signed in Paris on May 27th 1952. The treaty, in essence, was a compromise between the three larger states on the one hand and Belgium and the Netherlands on the other hand.

The disagreement over the role of a parliament was resolved with the so-called ‘federalist’ Article 38 of the EDC Treaty. No federal organization of powers would be used as the Italian delegation had demanded. Rather, the article stipulated that within a specified time of six months after the signature of the EDC Treaty, EDC parliament should study the possibility of a final constitutional design of the EDC “capable of constituting one of the elements of an ultimate Federal or confederal structure” (Art. 38, EDC Treaty). The EDC Treaty endowed the EDC parliament itself with relatively wide-ranging powers (see Rittberger 2006). Apart from its ability to call on the court (Art. 57, EDC Treaty), it was invested with powers of censure: by a two-thirds majority of all members of the assembly, it could force the commissariat to resign as a whole (Art. 36, EDC Treaty). In terms of the legislative process, it could only suggest measures, without obligations of on part of the Council to follow its lead (Art. 36, EDC Treaty). It had, however, significant rights in the budgetary process: once the Council had approved the budget unanimously, the Assembly by “a two thirds majority of the votes cast and a simple majority of its membership may propose the rejection of the entire budget” (Art. 87, EDC Treaty). The maximalists and the minimalists had, essentially, met in the middle.

The EDC budget, included in the EDC Treaty against the initial skepticism of the Benelux, was composed of member state contributions – not taxes as the maximalists had initially proposed – and military aid from other countries (Art. 93, EDC Treaty). The budget would serve to purchase “common armament, equipment, supply, and infrastructure programs of the European Defense Forces” (Art. 101, EDC Treaty). Contracts for procurement of weapons, standardization, supplies, infrastructure, and programs for research and development were issued by the Council with a two-thirds majority, prepared under a two-thirds approval of the Commission as well (Art. 102 and 106, EDC Treaty).

The Benelux had some substantial success in safeguarding a few but salient institutional provisions such as a multimember commissariat consisting of nine commissioners, appointed by unanimous agreement of the member states for six years, with
no more than two commissioners of the same nationality (EDC Treaty Art. 21). On their insistence, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), i.e. the NATO headquarters, would be Supreme Commander of the European Force (EDC Treaty Art. 13 and 18).

Finally, the Council became a relatively powerful institution. It shared agenda setting powers with the Commissariat, deciding either by call from the Commissariat or on ‘invitation of one of its members’ (Art. 46, EDC Treaty). Its highest prerogative was the issuing of binding directives, always unanimously, ‘for the action of the Commissariat’ (Art. 39, EDC Treaty). Otherwise, it was to take decisions and concurrences with a two thirds majority “which the Commissariat shall be bound to obtain before making decisions or issuing recommendations” (Art. 39, EDC Treaty). Finally, the level of adjudication was initially uncontested entailing direct transfer of the responsibilities of the Court of Justice inaugurated with the ECSC Treaty to the new community (Art. 8 and 52, EDC Treaty). An extensive jurisdictional protocol was added to the treaty, regulating in a more detailed manner the cooperation procedures. It concluded several sensitive issues such as the question of regulating the authority of the Military Police in one state over soldiers of the EDC from a different nation. The conclusion was that this authority was to be negotiated separately under the maxim that the authority of the Military Police was to “be subordinated to an agreement with the authorities of the receiving State and shall take place in liaison with these authorities.”

Insofar as the EDC constituted a compromise, it was a tenuous one. Partially because the agreement was drawn up under US pressure, the closing days of the negotiations saw a second issue appear that would stay with the negotiating governments until finding its resolution in the WEU Treaty, namely the UK troop presence. A credible commitment of UK troops was demanded by many as a proper balance against a recovering Germany that still possessed economic dominance on the continent. Hence, a French parliamentary debate on the EDC on February 11th 1952 set forth two conditions for ratification: proper democratic control and the ‘participation of the United Kingdom’, a solution that ‘would greatly contribute to assure the success’ of the trea-

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38 The distribution of votes within the Council was as follows: Germany, France, and Italy three votes, Belgium and the Netherlands two votes, Luxembourg one vote (Ibid.).
ty.\textsuperscript{40} Essentially all countries sought some form of guaranteeing of a continental troop presence that would mitigate fears of a possible German dominance and, at the same time, serve as an additional deterrent against the Soviet Union, and thus sought by all prospective EDC members. Partially due to Churchill becoming Prime Minister again in November 1951, there was some hope that the UK would associate itself with the EDC in a manner. This hope, however, was ill placed: internally, Churchill himself had expressed grave reservations against the ‘military efficiency’ of the ‘sludgy amalgam’, as he had labelled the EDC.\textsuperscript{41} Before the treaty was signed, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to attach a declaration of support to the EDC Treaty that was unilateral in character, thus, non-binding and non-enforceable (Massigli 1978, 317, 318; Parsons 2003, 76). Thus, the treaty was signed under difficult circumstances on May 27\textsuperscript{th} 1952 partially as a result of an ultimatum put forth by US secretary of state Dean Acheson. The French government, unknown to the other partners, decided to sign the treaty knowing that it could and would not ratify it in that form (e.g. Fauvet 1956, 28; Duchêne 1994, 233; Creswell 2006, 90).

4.1.3 Ratifying the EDC: European Democracy, a Common Market, and the Cold War, 1952-1954

Thus, once the treaty had been signed, it was already becoming clear that its ratification would be an up-hill battle. Paradoxically the country that initiated the supranational army – France – rejected the treaty while the country demanding a complete federation initially – Italy – was the only country left not having ratified the treaty. In

\textsuperscript{40} The key points in the resolution were, “L’Assemblée demande que tout soit mis en œuvre pour assurer: (1) la subordination de l’armée européenne à un pouvoir politique supranational à compétence limitée mais réelle, responsable devant des représentants des Assemblées ou des peuples européens, et invite le gouvernement à prendre dans ce sens toutes initiatives nécessaires. (2) la stricte limitation et l’énumération précise des cas où peut jouer la règle d’unanimité, ainsi que l’établissement d’un budget commun est voté par l’Assemblée et non soumis à un droit de veto. Elle maintient son opposition à la reconstitution d’une armée allemande et d’un état-major allemands. Elle invite le gouvernement à renouveler tous ses efforts avec la volonté profonde d’aboutir en vue d’obtenir la participation dans a Communauté européenne de Défense autres nations démocratique, et notamment de la Grande-Bretagne; cette solution constituant une garantie qui répond pleinement aux soucis exprimés par l’Assemblée national et comporterait naturellement l’étude et la mise au point des institutions et des modalités les plus susceptibles d’en assurer la réussite.” (quoted in Fauvet 1956, 26, 27, original italics).

\textsuperscript{41} A cabinet protocol from November 29\textsuperscript{th} 1951 records Churchill, “I should doubt very much the military spirit of a sludgy amalgam of volunteers or conscripts to defend the EDC.” (quoted in Jansen 1992, 65).
addition to shifts in the Dutch government’s position and later in the Belgian government as well, the cleavage between the big and small states dissolved by 1953.

In order to achieve ratification throughout the subsequent two years, three avenues were tried: First, bolstering the political superstructure by democratically controlling the generals as provided for in Article 38 of the EDC Treaty; second, France sought revisions of the treaty, largely related to the escalating war in Indochina and the possibility of, limited in the treaty, of withdrawing troops from the army into national control; third, all countries, repeatedly, urged the UK the commit at least some of its troops to the EDC.

Focusing on Article 38 of the EDC Treaty, the Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi circulated a memo on June 11th 1952 to the foreign ministers of the Six, calling on the ECSC Council not to wait for the ratification process and to begin consultations immediately. In reaction, Schuman and De Gasperi submitted a joint memorandum to the ECSC Council meeting in July 1952 and the Council agreed to convene an Ad Hoc Assembly to draft a treaty on a European Political Community in the manner specified in Article 38 (FRUS 1952-1954 VI, 182, Jacobson 1962, 921-923; Griffiths 2000, 69; Kim 2000, 75, 76). This initiative by the three larger powers was heartily welcomed by the US. The resulting document – the EPC draft treaty – corresponded to radical federalist demands by calling for a political community, respecting the separation of powers and downgrading the rights of governments to their representation in a senate that had similar rights as the parliament (see EPC Treaty, and chapter 6, section 6.2.2).

The reluctant reception of this draft treaty by governments in early 1953 not only caused wide-spread irritation in the Ad Hoc Assembly but also indicated that the old line of conflict between the three larger and the three smaller states was dissolving by early 1953. Whereas the Italian and German governments – represented by Adenauer and De Gasperi – suggested that the Treaty was suitable for ratification as presented, the Dutch, Belgian, and French governments disagreed. In December 1952, Dutch Foreign Minister Beyen had circulated a memo calling for the addition of a project for the construction of a common market into the EPC (Beyen 1952). Within a short period, Beyen was supported by the Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland arguing that any mandate to negotiate the EPC Draft Treaty should include matters of economic integration, in particular a customs union (Griffiths 2000, 69; Kim 2000, 75, 76). Making economic integration a conditio sine qua non for the formation of a
political community, both countries clashed heavily with the French government that utterly refused to contemplate any form of expanded liberalization of trade among the Six within the EPC (Ibid.). In addition, the new French Foreign Minister Bidault complained that the EPC Draft Treaty exceeded the original mandate by constructing ‘une Europe presque totale’ (Griffiths 2000, 113). Due to this difficult constellation, it became clear that the Draft Treaty would not be passed on directly to national parliaments. Bidault and Van Zeeland initially even sought to exclude the original members of the Ad Hoc Assembly completely from the agreed upon process of further discussing the Draft Treaty in intergovernmental meeting. These differences stalled any progress in the series of Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) that were held sporadically throughout late 1953 and early 1954 on the EPC Draft treaty. The only significant agreements in these negotiations largely centered on the ‘Senate’ which, in the Draft Treaty, was composed of delegates elected by national members of parliament. Agreement was reached by early 1954 that the Senate would be composed of national ministers and that the Senate, rather than the parliament, that would appoint and invest the Executive Council (Griffiths 2000, 158; Rittberger 2006, 1225).

However, the divisive nature of the ratification debates, especially but not only in France, increasingly proved that these negotiations were futile, although initially, progress towards ratification was made against significant opposition. In Germany, the early debates on the EDC and the ‘Wiederbewaffnung’ had already produced an

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42 The United States Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community (Bruce) in Paris to the Department of State on March 12th 1953, “Ministers meeting in Strasbourg under Bidault's chairmanship was something of a fiasco. Van Zeeland was real obstruction, but because of Bidault's attitude, blame was unanimously attributed to him. Advisers present say that Bidault arrived 40 minutes late, was ill-mannered; distorted and confused discussions intentionally; indulged in frivolity and bad jokes; and seemed to wish to be as disagreeable as possible. I understand that both Adenauer and De Gasperi left Strasbourg irritated and angry. 2. No mention was made of EDC Treaty or ratification problems. Adenauer-Bidault talks on Saar were apparently without results except that Bidault concluded by stating he would like to talk to Hallstein about question in Paris. Ministers were only in Strasburg Monday afternoon and evening. 3. Van Zeeland, apparently motivated by fear of Spaak's role, prevented any decision on further participation of members of Ad Hoc Assembly in development of EPC Treaty. He insisted task of Ad Hoc Assembly was now completed and that it should be disbanded. He would admit that exact language of Article 38 of EDC Treaty should be followed calling for a conference within three months to examine proposals made by Ad Hoc Assembly and that each government could consult its representation in Ad Hoc Assembly if it wished. 4. De Gasperi, Adenauer and Beyen, with De Gasperi taking the lead, managed to keep question open for continued participation by members Ad Hoc Assembly. They also pressed for immediate consideration by governments of Assembly's proposals and succeeded in imposing a decision for Council of Ministers to meet again in Luxembourg on May 12. This was only positive decision of entire meeting.” (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b, 296).
acerbic debate. Even before the EDC Treaty was formally submitted to be read in the Bundestag, the SPD had filed a complaint with the German Constitutional Court challenging the constitutional legality of rearmament (Large 1996, 155 ff.). The ongoing debate as well as the legal challenge were unsuccessful, especially as the CDU/CSU around Adenauer overwhelmingly won the Bundestag elections in late 1953, giving the coalition the power to change the constitution (Ibid.). Thus, despite demonstrations in the streets against the ‘Wiederbewaffnung’, the treaty was finally ratified by early 1954.

Efforts to achieve ratification were, in all cases, accompanied by significant US pressure making continuing aid dependent on successful ratification of the EDC Treaty (cf. FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 577). As a result, the two countries that had been the most skeptical towards the treaty submitted it for ratification to their respective parliaments rather quickly: the Dutch government did in July 1953, the Belgian government in November 1953. In both instances, ratification was accompanied by notable references to the ‘necessity’ of ratification in terms of the respective ‘national interests’ (Van der Veen 2009).

In contrast, the two countries that had been at the forefront of pushing for a supranational army – Italy and France – now seemed to have become its highest stumbling blocks as the EDC, in both cases, became linked with disputes over, in the Italian case, national territory, in the French case, a colonial war.

Shortly after the EDC had been signed, Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi had already insinuated to US officials that the question of an eventual return of the territory of Trieste to Italy would have to be resolved before the treaty could be signed.43 Having been divided between the two blocks after the war, this conflict risked a potential confrontation between the blocks, as Yugoslavian leader Tito seemed more inclined towards escalation than Stalin was. Escalation fueled nationalist sentiments in the Italian public debate until the issue was resolved in a memorandum of understanding in October 1954 (Judt 2005, 174). As the conflict over the EDC ratification became

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43 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State in London on September 25th 1952, “FonOff advises that Eden asked De Gasperi in Strasbourg if Italian ratification EDC ‘could not be accelerated.’ De Gasperi, taking advantage of the fact that they had been previously discussing Trieste, replied that so long as the problem of Trieste remained unsolved there wd be difficulty in persuading the Italians that their armed forces cld be merged in a European defense community. According to Eden's report of the conversation, the matter was left there.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 692).
linked to the issue of Trieste and disputes over budgetary allocations, conflicts within the Italian Christian Democrats during the national elections in June 1953 made it impossible for De Gasperi’s longstanding coalition to sustain power (see chapter 7, section 7.2.2). Suffering from ailing health, De Gasperi relinquished power and the Christian Democrats entered a coalition with the Italian right who argued even more forcefully against binding troops in the EDC before the conflict around Trieste had been resolved (Di Nolfo 1992, 531, 532).

The ratification conflicts were worse in France. Increasing political pressure had started to build up once the treaty had become known domestically. The escalating colonial war in Indochina provided further fuel for fears that the EDC would institutionalize a permanent disadvantage against Germany. Already by January 1953, the French government had put forth new conditions for an EDC ratification which would henceforth come to be known as ‘additional protocols’ or, named after then French Prime Minister René Mayer, the Mayer protocols (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 702-704). These stipulated that the weights of the votes in the EDC council should remain at their current level independent of a country’s financial or military contribution to the European Army. The protocols called for the right to withdraw French troops from the EDC in case of emergency without an a majority veto in the council. The longer the ratification debates took, the more the French chamber seemed to perceive in the EDC as a loss of national sovereignty rather than a gain. Mounting voices in the domestic debates started to warn of a possible German hegemony on the continent that was enshrined in the EDC Treaty (Clesse 1989, 147; Soutou 1993, 503). To combat these trends, the Mayer protocols, again, asked for a British security guarantee, a ‘binding’ guarantee for the duration of the EDC Treaty. Finally, the French government let the United States know that “a general understanding would have to be reached with the United States on administration, organization and procedures in connection with end-item assistance.” – a blatant call for increased military support in the escalating war in Indochina (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 702-704; Elgey 1993b, 365). All of these stipulations were granted through negotiations in mid-1953, except the demand for a British troop guarantee. Ensuing negotiations in London only resulted in a new ‘declaration’ by the British government that British troops were to be maintained ‘as long as necessary’ (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 746-747). There was no significant British commitment beyond such ‘cheap talk’ (Massigli 1978, 361, 369).
In addition, the relationship between Germany and France was increasingly taxed by the ongoing dispute over the Saar territory that raged, *inter alia*, within Germany as well (Elzer 2008, 909 ff.). A proposal to turn the Saar a European territory – proposed by the Dutch Socialist Marinus van der Goes van Naters – was linked to the electoral fate of the EDC and the EPC and thus lingered in the background awaiting a resolution (Ibid.). The delay was further complicated by events that were triggered by Stalin’s death in March 1953 that set in a short period of uncertainty over his successor and the course of Soviet policy. Thus, some thought it possible that the Soviets would acquiesce to a truly neutral Germany. On May 11th, Churchill delivered a speech in the House of Commons calling for an ambiguous ‘Locarno’ solution to the German question, essentially advocating a four-power conference exploring this option (Larres 2002, 223).\(^{44}\) In reaction to the Churchill speech on May 11th, the *anti-cediste* fraction of the SFIO introduced a motion in the *Assemblée Nationale* obliging the government, which was by April still opposed to Churchill’s advances, to approach the US government and follow Churchill's proposal (Elgey 1993b, 373; Young 1996, 166). Probing Soviet intentions, the Allies thus issued a call for another four-power conference to the Soviets. Further progress was delayed because the Soviet Union took its time to respond. The four-power conference on Germany finally opened in Berlin in January 1954 and American officials were anxious to prevent the Soviet Union from disrupting efforts to leverage the obstinate Europeans into ratification of the EDC Treaty (e.g. FRUS 1952-1954 VII, 781). Even by January 1954, Italy and France had not yet scheduled a ratification debate as the treaty was still not out of parliamentary committee in either country.

\(^{44}\) Churchill had in April 1953 started to write repeated personal notes to Eisenhower, asking to hold a four-power conference; US policy was to wait for a reaction to that speech and Eisenhower became increasingly less diplomatic in rebutting Churchill’s demands (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b, 975, 976; 1952-1954 VIII, 1167; Young 1996, 153). On May 11th, Churchill then held a speech in the Lower House asking for a four-power conference, and exploring the solution of a neutralized Germany. On insistence by French Prime Minister Mayer – obliged by a vote in the *Assemblée Nationale* – and partly because of the effect the speech had on the German public, the US administration agreed to coordinate on the possibility of a four power conference (Young 1996, 167; Larres 2002, 238).
4.1.4 Endgame 1954: A European Army (EDC) vs. NATO (WEU)

In sum, by early 1954, the situation was paradoxical. On the one hand, four of the six states that signed the EDC Treaty had successfully ratified it. On the other hand, the ratification prospects in Italy and especially in France were becoming increasingly uncertain and, domestically, increasingly tied to international geopolitical issues. The mounting opposition against the EDC, contrary to the successful ratification efforts in four of the Six signatories, increasingly cast doubt on the ambitious project. While the US administration reiterated its insistence that the EDC should be ratified if military aid should continue to flow, this insistence was met, especially by the French government, with repeated pleas for British or American troop guarantee.\(^{45}\) Italy and France were especially dependent on US support: Italy depended on US diplomatic help in resolving the Trieste conflict, whereas France heavily depended on US military aid to conduct an escalating colonial war in Indochina. Other skeptical voices, especially the UK government, repeatedly urged the consideration of any alternative, including a neutral Germany. These incentives contributed to the EDC to lingering in bargaining deadlock (Fleischer 2013).

The deadlock unraveled in May 1954. On May 7\(^{th}\) 1954, the defeat of French troops at Điện Biên Phủ caused motions in the Assemblée Nationale to topple the French government. On June 9\(^{th}\), Pierre Mendès France from the Radicals led the assault on the government (Elgey 1993b, 636). On June 17\(^{th}\), Mendès France was invested as a Prime Minister assembling a new government based on a coalition with the Gaullists. The aftermath of the French defeat was negotiated at an international conference in Geneva – separating North and South Indochina at the 38\(^{th}\) parallel, a settlement that was rather satisfactory, given that the French forces had just been utterly defeated (Eden 1960, 117; Roussel 2007, 242).

However, solving the EDC issues seemed an impossible task. Without a colonial war to pursue, opponents of the EDC no longer needed to appeal to the US administration for immediate military help. Given that his Cabinet contained a sizable number of ‘cedistes’ as well, Mendès France tried to find a compromise between EDC propo-

\(^{45}\)Dulles send a long telegram to the US embassy in France commenting – in the manner of in-depth literary criticism – on what the apparently ‘new’ US position was. He basically rearranged some formulations and commented on the choice of words in the US ‘declaration’ - paragraph by paragraph, word by word - and demanded that this should be conveyed to the French government. (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 959-965).
ments and opponents within his government to mobilize sufficient support for ratification (Elgey 1992, 205; Roussel 2007, 291). That compromise stipulated not to reject the EDC outright, but to seek renegotiations with the Allies. Apart from asking Britain again for a formal troop commitment on the continent, the French offer called for a purely intergovernmental transition period for eight years in which the powers of the EDC Commissariat were limited and majority voting would be suspended. In addition, the compromise called for the deletion of ‘federalist’ Art. 38 of the Paris Treaty and thus to abort the lingering EPC Treaty negotiations (Hitchcock 1998, 254; DDF 1954, 147-150). These proposals were submitted to the Allies in order to renegotiate the EDC at a conference in Brussels. The ensuing conference in Brussels ended in a short but painful disaster leaving Mendès France totally isolated: none of the French conditions were accepted, further negotiations refused, and European governments urged the French government to ratify the EDC Treaty as it stood (Massigli 1978, 448; Elgey 1992, 216 ff.; Roussel 2007, 306).

In hindsight, the utter rejection of the French offer is puzzling. It must have been apparent to any observer at the time how explosive the issue of the EDC ratification in France had become by early 1954. Subsequent statements by decision-makers, quoted in the introductory chapter, indicate that even a toned down EDC would have been preferred, if not by all, certainly by several key decision-makers such as Adenauer and Schuman. In his memoirs, Paul-Henri Spaak reveals not regret but anger and a feeling of betrayal, accusing Mendès France of not ‘being enough of a Europe-

46 One July 30th, Bourgès-Maunory, associated with the ‘cedistes’ in the Radical Party, suggested to ‘avoir un drame’ with the proponents of the EDC to win over the moderate opponents of the EDC by proposing a temporary suspension of the supranational powers of the commissariat and demanding a transitional period in which the EDC would remain purely intergovernmental (Roussel 2007, 292, 293). This was, in effect, a compromise that strikingly resembled the conditions called for by the French generals throughout 1953. The proposals that Mendès France suggested to the Cabinet a couple days later followed this prescription.


48 After the rejection of the EDC in the Assemblée Nationale, Schuman held a speech at a congress of the German section of the federalist UEF, Europa Union, in Hannover, calling the WEU “une façade londonienne en style anglais, décorée a la parisienne” (quoted in Poidevin 1986, 382). He went even further at an MRP congress in 1956, explaining that the WEU “[…] est un animale utile, mais qui pareil au mulet n’a pas de fécondité procréatrice […]” (quoted in Poidevin 1986, 383).
an to fight the battle'. 49 In retrospect, the core contents of Mendès France’s offer - the deletion of Art. 38 and the call for a transitionary period during which all majority decisions in the Council were suspended - is certainly in line with, for example, the agreements reached in the Treaties of Rome. The main obstacle, as voiced by the participants, was that the French offer was too expansive and would have required a second round of ratification moves in the countries that had signed the Treaty. 50 While formally reasonable, it is difficult to ascertain how problematic that move would have been. It seems a far stretch, however, to categorize it as impossible: after all, the Benelux governments had already successfully submitted the EDC Treaty to ratification despite major misgivings, the German CDU coalition had a sufficient majority in Germany to even effect constitutional changes after the elections in late 1953, and the Italian parliament had not voted yet.

If the idea behind the rebuff of the French offer was to increase pressure on the French government to effect ratification of the treaty, the strategy backfired. Mendès France had arranged for talks with Eden and Churchill after the Brussels conference in Chartwell on August 23rd 1954 (MAE 1955, 135-138). In these talks, Mendès France indicated that he was not going to turn the vote on the EDC into a vote of confidence and that a quick alternative solution would have to be found to prevent the US from adopting a ‘peripheral’ strategy and withdrawing military support from its European Allies. 51 Thus, it was only after the Brussels conference, when it had become clear that the conditions for the EDC would never be met, that the eventual WEU solution began to take shape behind closed doors. Although no explicit records of the meetings exist, the following events indicate that the British signals – explicitly or implicitly – surely must have been positive.

49 Spaak wrote in his memoirs “Mendès-France war nicht genug Europäer, um den Kampf zu führen. Hätte er, anstatt sich über den ihm zuteil gewordenen Empfang zu beklagen, wie er es tat, besser zu schätzen gewußt, was seine Partner ihm alles zugestanden hatten, dem wirklich guten Willen, seinem Standpunkt entgegenzukommen, dann wären die Dinge wohl anders verlaufen.” (Spaak 1969, 215).


51 In a memo to the US ambassador, Mendès France is reported of saying that “there was no possibility of posing the question of confidence as that required prior agreement of the Cabinet and that the Cabinet would not be able to reach agreement on the question of confidence in any form. He then said that this posed an embarrassing situation for him as the members of the government would then have to decide how they would vote. […]” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 1074).
Provided that he knew that alternatives were indeed available, it is no wonder that Mendès France did not press for a vote of confidence on the EDC. Instead, the French government refrained from challenging a motion in the Assemblée Nationale that demanded that the EDC Treaty be removed from the legislative agenda. There is no need to recount in detail the well-known and tumultuous process by which the EDC was rejected in the Assemblée Nationale (Roussel 2007, 312).

The British government was more or less prepared and the obvious conclusions from the failure of the EDC were reached quite fast (Mager 1990, 49; Jansen 1992, 172). A week after the French vote, the British cabinet was already debating to revive the Brussels Treaty, to create a “European box inside an Atlantic box” (Dockrill 1991, 142; Macmillan 2003, 353). The Brussels Treaty had the advantage of not ‘seeming’ supranational, whereas the nutshell of the institutional solution was, in fact, partially supranational. Britain would station troops on the Rhine to allay French security concerns; the right to withdraw these troops, as well as control over German military organization would be exercised by the NATO, the Council of the Brussels Treaty and an associated agency. The essential solution had materialized. While the Quai d’Orsay had reached the same conclusion (Creswell 2006, 160; Massigli 1978, 461), Eden toured European Capitals to mobilize support for German integration into NATO under the control of the Council of the Brussels Treaty. Although Eden and Churchill still had doubts – thus Eden did not mention the specific stage of planning to Mendès France in Paris – the British cabinet, with the exception of Churchill, slowly began realizing the necessity of a British troop commitment (Mager 1990, 113; Deighton 1998, 191; Hitchcock 1998, 198). Meeting with Mendès France in Paris, Eden obtained a tentative French acceptance of German NATO (Large 1996, 216 ff.). Once this agreement in principle had been obtained, the negotiations on the WEU went relatively smoothly. The WEU Treaty was signed on October 23rd 1954 and went into effect in May 1955.

The WEU thus provided a way for Germany to enter NATO. The governments signing the WEU Treaty – including the UK - pledged mutual assistance in case of attack

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52 When the EDC was voted down “Communists and Gaullists alike locked arms and serenaded the chamber with the Marseillaise.” (Creswell 2006, 158).

53 On September 27th 1954, Eden prepared the memorandum for the Cabinet, “[…] it will be necessary for the French to face some unpleasant realities. They will have to accept German sovereignty and German membership of N.A.T.O. and withdraw or drastically reduce their safeguard proposals. If they are to do this, they must be given some striking quid pro quo.” (Mager 1990, 118).
Core institutions of the WEU were: the Council of Western European Union that would convene only at the request of one of the member states; the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe reduced to the delegates of WEU member states whose rights were limited to receiving an annual report on WEU activities; the International Court of Justice responsible for dispute settlement; and the Agency for the Control of Armaments (WEU Treaty Protocol No. I 1954). Given that German troops would be mobilized autonomously by a German Minister of Defense, the key purpose of the organization was to provide institutional and material safeguards. Rights to inspect and verify German capabilities were given both to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, i.e. NATO, and the Agency for the Control of Armaments (WEU Treaty Protocol No. II 1954; WEU Treaty Protocol No. IV 1954). The main purpose of the Agency was to inspect whether the deployment and status of WEU member states forces complied with the rules set forth by SACEUR and agreed to by the WEU Council. Its personnel was “accorded free access on demand to plants and depots, and the relevant accounts and documents shall be made available to them.” (WEU Treaty Protocol No. IV 1954). Thus WEU and NATO officials could, at least formally, inspect German troops at will. These inspections were to make sure that the size, composition, and armament of German troops, stipulated to be similar to those foreseen in the EDC Treaty, complied to the WEU Treaty. (WEU Treaty Protocol No. II 1954).

The second key element was that the UK was not to withdraw its committed troops of four armored divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force “against the wishes of the majority of the High Contracting Parties who should take their decision in the knowledge of the views of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.” (WEU Treaty Protocol No. II 1954). This was the only matter envisioned to be decided by majority within the Council. The sole purpose of the WEU was thus to provide a credible and trustworthy German commitment to the rules of the Alliance, while equally providing a credible safeguard for British troops to remain on the continent. It did so successfully.

4.1.5 Summary

With the WEU Treaty entering into force in May 1955, the western bargain over the terms of German rearmament had come full-circle since 1950. While key issues –
unrelated to institutional issues such as the terms of German sovereignty – had to be agreed upon throughout the four years, the institutional dimension had produced shifting lines of conflict between the negotiating states: the ‘end result’, the WEU treaty was not altogether different in nature from the ‘package deal’ proposed by the US in 1950. It differed in terms of its institutional setup of limited centralization and oversight as well as the implied British troop commitment. However, the main conflicts had been fought over an architecture that was different ‘in principle’, namely a supranational army. Only when it was discarded after four years of arguing, did the Allied governments return to the intergovernmental option, producing an agreement on the WEU in extremely efficient fashion. In other words, there is a distinct ‘course of the bargain’ or ‘negotiation dance’, that can be divided in distinct periods that are associated with different structures of conflict between the bargaining states, summarized by Table 4.1 below. The table seeks to illustrate the paradoxical bargaining course that was aptly described as a ‘comedy of errors’ by the contemporary French ambassador in London, Massigli (Massigli 1978). In particular, it illustrates the shifting conflict constellations on issues related to the EDC/WEU bargain.

In the first period between 1950 and 1951, all countries except France accepted the idea in principle that Germany was to enter NATO, under restrictions to be negotiated. These restrictions would come in the form of some contractual arrangement that was to follow the lines of the nascent NATO arrangements. The French government objected, and instead insisted on a supranational army, i.e. a proposed level of hierarchical centralization resembling a ‘national army’. Although the German and Italian governments indicated openness towards the idea, they agreed with the remaining negotiating governments that the proposal was militarily ineffective and discriminatory. In order to prevent the breakdown of the negotiations, a temporary compromise was reached that lasted until mid-1951. Until that time, all governments except the French pushed for a solution of relatively low centralization – envisioning only low and limited degrees of pooling and delegation, whereas the French proposal, although asymmetrical in nature, advocated the opposite: a high level of centralization in the form of a European Minister of Defense, whereas the remaining dimensions of institutional design where still left vague.
### Chapter 4 The EDC Bargain: Explanandum and Intergovernmentalist first cut

#### Table 4.1 State Bargaining Positions, 1950-1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>GER</th>
<th>Benelux</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-1951</td>
<td><strong>State Bargaining Positions, 1950-1954</strong></td>
<td><strong>Salient Issues</strong></td>
<td><strong>Pleven Plan:</strong> Highly centralized mobilization and recruitment of a European Army; integration of units at lower Battalion Level; unequal rights for Germany</td>
<td><strong>Package Deal:</strong> US financial and military aid in exchange for mobilization of German resources. Low centralization, no pooling, overall very little delegation: integration of rearmed Germany into NATO command structure; integration of units at higher division levels (efficiency); autonomy of mobilization/recruitment; agreement in principle with France on restrictions of weaponry available to Germany</td>
<td><strong>Eden Plan:</strong> No membership of or troop commitment to a supranational EDC, possible alignment through the Council of Europe, efficiency concerns</td>
<td><strong>“Spofford Compromise”: Negotiations continue for the Package Deal and the Pleven Plan simultaneously</strong></td>
<td><strong>EDC Treaty for Europe:</strong> military aid conditional on a signing of the EDC Treaty, no permanent US troop commitment, efficiency concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-1952</td>
<td><strong>Negotiating the EDC Treaty</strong></td>
<td><strong>Degree of Centralization of the EDC; Democratic Control and finality of the Union ('Art. 38'); common budget; national exemptions for colonial troops; UK troop presence</strong></td>
<td><strong>EDC Treaty:</strong> similar positions on equal rules, high centralization and pooling, medium representation (France) to high (Italy, Germany), a common budget; UK troop commitment</td>
<td><strong>EDC Treaty:</strong> low centralization, pooling, and representation; high control through staffing and NATO; UK troop commitment</td>
<td><strong>Eden Plan:</strong> No membership of or troop commitment to a supranational EDC, possible alignment through the Council of Europe, efficiency concerns</td>
<td><strong>EDC Treaty for Europe:</strong> military aid conditional on a signing of the EDC Treaty, no permanent US troop commitment, efficiency concerns</td>
<td><strong>EDC Treaty for Europe:</strong> military aid conditional on a ratification of the EDC Treaty, no permanent US troop commitment, efficiency concerns</td>
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<tr>
<td>1952-1954</td>
<td><strong>Ratification of the EDC?</strong></td>
<td><strong>EDC Treaty compromise among the continental countries; ‘federalist’ EPC Draft Treaty and Beyen Plan for a common market; ‘emergency’ withdrawing rights; UK troop presence</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ratification conflict:</strong> withdrawing rights for colonial troops; lower EDC centralization; no common market for the EPC; UK troop commitment</td>
<td><strong>Ratification conflict:</strong> solving Trieste conflict before EDC ratification; common market no sine qua non for the EPC; UK troop commitment</td>
<td><strong>EDC Treaty ratified:</strong> Common Market no sine qua non for the EPC; UK troop commitment</td>
<td><strong>EDC Treaty for Europe:</strong> military aid conditional on a ratification of the EDC Treaty, no permanent US troop commitment, efficiency concerns</td>
<td><strong>EDC Treaty for Europe:</strong> military aid conditional on a ratification of the EDC Treaty, no permanent US troop commitment, efficiency concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td><strong>Endgame: A European Army (EDC) vs. a German army in NATO (WEU)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Failure of the EDC Treaty; Renegotiation in form of WEU Treaty; oversight mechanisms for German mobilization and weapons production; UK troop presence</strong></td>
<td><strong>WEU Treaty:</strong> Low centralization, pooling, and delegation. Creation of a semi-sovereign German army with autonomous mobilization and recruitment; German entry into NATO in exchange for UK troop presence. Independent oversight of mobilization, recruitment, and weapons production in Germany through WEU agency. Continued US military and financial aid in exchange for the mobilization of German capabilities and their integration into NATO.</td>
<td><strong>Failure of the EDC Treaty; Renegotiation in form of WEU Treaty; oversight mechanisms for German mobilization and weapons production; UK troop presence</strong></td>
<td><strong>EDC Treaty ratified:</strong> Beyen Plan and a Common Market as sine qua non of the EPC; UK troop commitment</td>
<td><strong>EDC Treaty for Europe:</strong> military aid conditional on a ratification of the EDC Treaty, no permanent US troop commitment, efficiency concerns</td>
<td><strong>EDC Treaty for Europe:</strong> military aid conditional on a ratification of the EDC Treaty, no permanent US troop commitment, efficiency concerns</td>
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In the second period between 1951 up to the signing of the treaty in 1952, Germany, Italy, and the US adopted the French point of view of preferring a supranational – centralized – army in response to two concessions by the French government which accepted the principal of institutional equality and raised the level of nationally homogenous units above thresholds deemed necessary to ensure the military functionality of the army.

As a result, negotiations concentrated on a supranational alternative and a new conflict constellation emerged: the three larger continental governments, backed by the US, sought much higher levels of centralization and particularly representation than Belgium and the Netherlands whereas the UK refused to consider even limited direct involvement in the organization.

The negotiations leading up to the signing of the treaty were thus characterized by a prolonged conflict over institutional design issues. The compromise, produced under significant US pressure, resulted in the EDC Treaty. Contrary to initial French calls for a single European Minister of Defense, the EDC would be administrated by a multinational ‘Commissariat’. Against the initial strong Belgian and Dutch objections, the EDC would have its own budget. Its composition, against the wishes by the larger states, would not be made up of taxes but of individual contributions from the member states and directly allocated military aid. The core institution for decision making, the Council, would, against the wishes of the larger states, issue binding directives unanimously, including the uses of the budget, which the Commissariat was bound to adhere to. Other decisions and concurrences – for example regarding contracts for equipment, would be made by a two-thirds majority. Additionally, the Dutch and Belgian governments succeeded in inserting in the treaty that the EDC would be directly integrated into the military hierarchy of NATO. With regard to representation, the EDC was a compromise as well: the three larger states, and in particular Italy, had tied the demand for a budget to the direct institutionalization of a federalist system of representation including significant rights for the prospective parliament. The EDC compromise retained the principle of a powerful parliament. Although it would not be directly elected, it had a veto over the annual budget and was powerful enough the force the Commissariat to resign. Finally, the EDC Treaty was explicitly incomplete. Upon requests by the three bigger states it contained the controversial Article 38 that required the signing states to task the parliament with
proposing a complete political ‘superstructure’ that would review and complete the ‘final’ design of the organization. In sum, the period leading up to the EDC Treaty had been characterized by differences between the smaller and the larger countries on virtually all institutional dimensions.

Once the treaty had been signed, views of governments that were closely aligned during the negotiation phase drifted apart over the main issues debated during the ratification period, except one aspect, namely the British troop commitment. In fact, the only issue on which the signing states agreed was the demand for British or American troops to be credibly and permanently stationed on the continent. Neither the UK nor the US were to grant this wish. Instead, the ratification conflicts within the signing countries were associated with a shift in the positions of their governments. Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany ratified the treaty, whereas Italy and France, amid mounting domestic resistance, did not. Not being able to secure a ‘balancing’ troop commitment to the EDC by the UK or the US, efforts to secure ratification and appease domestic resistance focused on the federalist Article 38, leading to the convocation of an Ad Hoc Assembly that produced a draft treaty for a European Political Community which, in terms of its level of centralization and representation, went far beyond the initial EDC Treaty. The Belgian and the Dutch governments insisted on the inclusion of provisions of a Common Market, a proposition that was utterly rejected by the French government(s). The latter delayed ratification of the treaty and sought to renegotiate its terms by securing, *inter alia*, additional unilateral rights to withdraw troops from the EDC. Thus, the coalition of the big three continental governments had dissolved. The German and Italian governments remained steadfast, insisting on taking the EPC draft Treaty as a basis for further negotiations whereas the Belgian and particularly the French government delayed progress towards an agreement on these matters to the point of being perceived as obstructionist. On the other hand, the Dutch government, supported by the Belgian Foreign Ministry, put forth a proposal to create a customs union under the umbrella of the new political union, a proposal which was utterly rejected by the French government. In sum, there was no longer a clear line of conflict. As the ratification conflicts intensified, pressure on the French government to ratify the treaty as it stood increased to the point that the offer for a revised EDC Treaty put forth by the French was unanimously rejected in 1954. Although based on a hard won domestic compromise within the French cabinet, the remaining European countries – as well as the
US—no longer saw it necessary to acquiesce the repeated French pleas for a revision of the Treaty.

The final period in which the EDC Treaty was rejected by the French Assemblée Nationale resolved the seemingly intricate problem of German rearmament relatively quickly. Remarkably, the terms of the WEU Treaty, negotiated within a couple of months at a conference in London, resembled the initial package deal in so far as the main substantial provision of the US offer of 1950—German entry into NATO under terms of limited sovereignty, restrictions of available weaponry and operational autonomy—were taken up. The French government accepted the terms it had vehemently opposed in 1950: instead of German soldiers in European uniforms, there was to be a German Army and a German Defense Ministry. Institutionally, the WEU provided two mechanisms that sealed the deal. First, it added to NATO inspection prerogatives an agency that was to oversee German compliance with the terms of the treaty. Second, although decisions were on the whole made by unanimity, the WEU Council provided a means for the UK to credibly commit a limited amount of troops on the continent. Both solutions solved the bargaining gridlock. Simple as they were, these solutions seem to have eluded the negotiators for about four years. On the other hand, the dismay over the WEU solutions voiced by figures such as Adenauer and Spaak indicates that a number of key individuals would, nevertheless, have preferred even a weak EDC solution to the one which actually transpired.

In short, the overall course of the bargain was characterized by a remarkable inefficiency. Given that the institutional solution found in the end was so simple, it is thus puzzling why the negotiating states took four years debating a complicated and risky solution. Moreover, the shifts in the bargaining positions are remarkable, indicating that substantial shifts either in government ideologies or external circumstances were at work so as to effect major reconsiderations of the ‘national interest’.

4.2 Re-Evaluating Intergovernmentalist Explanations, Realist and Liberal

In order to identify more clearly what, in terms of the EDC bargain, can be sufficiently explained by the intergovernmental hypotheses, the present section tries to pinpoint more precisely what aspects of the bargain are puzzling at all and what should be expected in terms of actors’ threat perceptions and domestic beliefs.
As already summarized, in the intergovernmental paradigm state preferences and state bargaining behavior respond to three kinds of factors. First, material-structural differences between the negotiating countries imply differences in available and feasible outside options, and thus their affect states’ institutional preferences (in terms of material threat levels and power asymmetries) and bargaining influence. Second, domestic political changes, in particular changes in governing coalitions and interest group influence may produce domestic shifts and, accordingly, changes institutional preferences. Finally, bargaining behavior is based on causal and strategic beliefs that provide threat level assessments, assessments of institutional efficiency and assessments of possible bargaining solutions. Thus, changing beliefs result in changing behavior without changing bargaining goals.

### 4.2.1 Material Context

The present section reviews the material and geostrategic context of the Western countries of post-war Europe. There are several major but stable structural differences between the Allies in post-war Europe that were conducive to produce conflict at the bargaining table. First, there was the asymmetry between the European countries and the US, the former being utterly dependent on American financial and material aid for the reconstruction of their economies and, accordingly, for the maintenance of their defensive capabilities as well. A second major difference concerns the European countries themselves, namely the distinction between large and small countries, that is, the UK, France, Germany, and Italy on the one hand, the Benelux countries on the other. Finally, there is a geographic factor, as a conventional Soviet attack would threaten Western Germany immediately whereas the barrier of the Rhine, being the first natural line of defense, would at least somewhat shield the Benelux and France. Finally, the UK was more sheltered by the channel and thus less threatened both by the Soviet Union and Germany (e.g. Himmenroder Denkschrift 1950, 9-16).

The dependence of the formerly imperial European powers on the resources of the United States is obvious. On the economic plane, the post-war reconstruction efforts were predicated on the flow of US dollars to the continent in the form of Marshall Plan aid, institutionalized through the OEEC and the European Payments Union (Killick 1997; Eichengreen 2007, ch. 3). In terms of the distribution of material ca-
pabilities constituting a credible deterrent against the Soviet Union, the picture is similar. The asymmetry between the US and the continental states can be illustrated by considering the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores that factor in economic, technological conditions as well as the degree of the mobilization of armed forces (Singer, et al. 1972; Singer 1987; Sarkees and Wayman 2010).

![Figure 4.1 Correlates of CINC Score Averages, 1950-1954](image)

*Note: The graph displays CINC scores from the Correlates of War project (Singer, et al. 1972; Singer 1987; Sarkees and Wayman 2010). The values represent the average values between 1950 and 1954. The value for (West)Germany is taken from 1955 as there are no previous recorded values since Germany was formally still occupied territory until 1955. The value “Six + UK” adds the relative score of the Six signatories of the Paris Treaties and the UK. “Five + UK” is the same figure without Germany."

From the point of view of the US, mobilizing a dormant German potential potentially implied that the Western European could create a credible deterrent to a Soviet attack on their own, provided that the US extended a nuclear commitment (Six and UK). From the point of view of the continental European states, a credible commitment by the US or the UK was needed to preempt the material possibility of German continental hegemony.

In short, the German problem was one of trade-offs. An economically prospering Germany was needed for continental trade-flows and economic recovery but too much prosperity, as illustrated by the figures above, might reconstitute German continental dominance. German military capabilities resources were, if not desperately needed, nevertheless in demand, for it would mean fewer burdens to other states for
defense and more resources for their reconstruction. On the other hand, allowing the resurgence of a German army might invite worse problems, incentivize Germany to seek reunification, and geopolitical destabilize the continent. This is the basic structural situation that did not change significantly in the 1950s, as Figure 4.2 below demonstrates.

The situation for the individual countries created different incentives for institutional demands. American global hegemony implied that the American government had the only feasible ‘exit option’: based on initially global nuclear superiority, it could provide limited ‘nuclear cover’ to the European allies, and withdraw its troops from the continent, a view that was particularly popular among isolationist factions within the Republican Party (Reichard 1975). From the point of view of realist intergovernmentalism, this material preeminence and asymmetric dependence should translate into a overwhelming American influence and bargaining power.

![Figure 4.2 CINC Scores over Time](image)

The second notable difference separates the smaller Benelux in opposition to the larger continental states, both on security and economic issues. In terms of continental trade, both countries, being smaller, were structurally and traditionally more dependent on continental trade patterns (Milward 1984; Griffiths 1990, 12ff.). Additionally, having little room to maneuver in terms of an autonomous foreign policy and being more vulnerable to threats of aid withdrawal, both countries should be
more susceptible to US leverage than the larger countries. Due to their small size and high vulnerability and geographical proximity both to Germany and the Soviet Union, the geopolitical situation of the Benelux is relatively precarious. On the demand side, the call for US troops and common institutions should be most vocal. On the supply side, they should insist on rules preventing the dominance of the alliance institutions by larger powers. Traditional fears of continental dominance, not just by Germany but also by France, were thus heavily present in Foreign Policy circles in both countries.

For the larger winners of the war, the UK and France, the situation was only slightly different. Although disposing of higher capabilities relative to the Benelux, the relative inferiority to the US was still substantial. A major difference between the UK and France concerns their geographical positions as France shared a direct border with Germany and was much more vulnerable to a potential Soviet threat. The British situation, being separated from the continent, structurally implied less of a threat than the French situation, both with regard to Germany as well as with regard to the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the trade-off between utilizing German capabilities for the Alliance and establishing security from Germany is more salient for France. Moreover, France in particular was hit substantially the destruction of the war and quickly launched itself into an escalating colonial war in Indochina by 1946 (Wall 1991). Exacerbating the material dependence on the US, American military support began by 1950 as the war increasingly escalated without the French army being able to achieve its objectives (Ibid.). French governments hardly had the resources to back the increasing escalation of the war in Indochina and survive a vote on the costs that such a decision would have entailed. Figure 4.3 shows the origins of the material resources used in the war. It is estimated that, overall, the United States ended up providing about 80 per cent of the resources committed in Indochina (Rioux 1983, 35; Wall 1991, 188).
Note: According to Bossuat, the American percentage does not entail material help in form of ‘end items’. The reason for delivering material aid can be found in the ‘dollar gap’. In order not to drain French foreign reserves, it was simply more expedient economically as well as politically if the US bought the material and delivered it to France. Adding the financial aid and the net value of the ‘end item’ delivery roughly accounts for the 80% of total expenditure mentioned above. Source: (Bossuat 1992, 856).

In sum, the demand for centralized institutions should be lowest in the UK and at least as high in France as it is in the case of the Benelux countries. In the French case, being larger than the Benelux countries implies the prospect of relative gains of influence through the pooling of decision-making and institutionalization of representative institutions. Thus, French governments should be less worried about control: seeking power gains, it is clear why French leaders would seek to institutionalize a French advantage over German rights as long as a beneficial post-war disparity in power and influence persists.

The remaining two countries, Italy and Germany, were in the most precarious situation as insofar as they emerged from the war weakest and their geographic exposure to the Soviet Union was largest. For Italy, the situation was, relatively speaking, better than that of Germany by the late 1940’s. In 1948, there had been Peace Treaty between the Italian government and the Allies, settling the sovereign status of the Country and providing for eventual military remobilization and allowing Italy to become one of the initial members of NATO (Mistry 2014, 143). Territorially speaking, however, there was still the issue of the, formerly Italian, ‘Free Territory of Trieste’ that involved Italy in a direct territorial dispute with Yugoslavia under Tito. Being officially a territory of the United Nations, half of it was administrated by an Allied Military Government under US leadership whereas a second ‘zone’ was under administration of Yugoslavia. The majority of the population of Trieste being Italian,
this territorial dispute remained an extremely contentious issue in Italy, much like the issue of the Saarland in Germany (Hametz 2005). Being larger than the Benelux, but sharing a border with the Soviet sphere of influence, the geopolitical situation of Italy is thus roughly the same as that of France.

The losses due to the war as well as the post-war situation were worst for Germany. By 1950 the country was still occupied and, although a formal government was in office, sovereign power in Germany – both de jure and de facto – resided on the Petersberg in Bonn where the three Allied High Commissioners had set up their shop. Moreover, being territorially divided, it was directly and immediately exposed to a potential Soviet threat. By the late 1940’s, military planners in NATO still did not believe that a Soviet attack could be halted before it reached the natural barriers of the Rhine or the Alps (Himmenroder Denkschrift 1950, 9-16). Hence, the threat level for Germany was, structurally, highest among the Allies. Given that there were no German defensive capabilities whatsoever, German dependence on US aid and support was highest among the Allies as well. Apart from that, there was still the unresolved territorial question of the Saarland that was still under French control. At the same time, the potential capabilities of the West German state and its prospect for recovery were sufficiently high to pose a long-term threat to the continental European states, east and west. On the economic front, although the German economy had been badly hit late in the war, the German industrial capital stock was in good shape and there was some scope for growth as productivity was relatively high and wages relatively low in the early 1950’s (Eichengreen 2007, 96). The whole recovery, however, rested upon a peace treaty with the Allies. Production quotas for security sensible products (such as Coal and Steel) were still in place by 1950. Given this situation, German demands for centralized institutions and additional balancing capabilities should be highest among the European countries insofar as its security situation is weakest. Additionally, given the situation of the country, any form of institutional recognition that alleviates its formal situation and grants additional rights should be welcomed.
### Table 4.2 Material Position and Expected Institutional Demands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material position, security threats</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>BL/NL</th>
<th>Germany</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lowest</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
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<td><strong>High</strong></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demands for External Balancing and Centralized Institutions</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>BL/NL</th>
<th>Germany</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Low/Medium</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>German resources required for deterrence. Little threat from Germany.</td>
<td>Low Bargaining Power/ influence</td>
<td>Medium Low Bargaining Power/ influence</td>
<td>High Bargaining Power/ influence</td>
<td>Medium High</td>
<td>Medium High</td>
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<td><strong>Medium/High</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>German resources required for deterrence. Direct exposure to both Soviet and potential German threat.</td>
<td>Low Bargaining Power/ influence</td>
<td>Medium Low Bargaining Power/ influence</td>
<td>Medium High</td>
<td>Medium High</td>
<td>Medium High</td>
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<td><strong>High</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>German resources required for deterrence. Direct exposure to both Soviet and potential German threat.</td>
<td>Low Bargaining Power/ influence</td>
<td>Medium Low Bargaining Power/ influence</td>
<td>Medium High</td>
<td>Medium High</td>
<td>Medium High</td>
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Table 4.2 above summarizes the expected link between material positions and their expected institutional demands based on objective material factors: the weaker the material and geopolitical position of a country, the higher the expected demands for central institutions and balancing within the alliance. Comparing Table 4.2 with the bargain described in the first section of this chapter, it is relatively obvious that material factors can account for the outcome of the bargain but not for the way it was reached.

In principle, the WEU treaty is easily explicable on the grounds of the material structures alone. Sufficient deterrence from a potential attack of the Soviet Union on the continent was in theory available in the form of American and West European capabilities. For obvious reasons, the US was not inclined to shoulder that burden alone. Mobilizing German troops for balancing purposes, however, created a problem of particular salience to the continental states as there was little reason to trust the professed motivations of German leaders. Placing British and US troops on the continent to allay such security fears was insufficient without being accompanied by a credible commitment that these troops were there to stay. Mobilizing even limited German troops without adequate institutional safeguards was equally insufficient. As long as there was no reason to suspect a Soviet attack, there was, accordingly, little reason to run the risk of recreating a German army. The Korean War changed this assessment: surely, if Stalin had allowed North Korea to attack the US backed regime in South Korea, there was at least some reason to suspect similar moves in Europe, at least given the Soviet Union’s conventional superiority. Under such conditions, an immediate WEU style outcome would have been perfectly reasonable. As explained in the previous section, the treaty provided for both a credible commitment by the UK to keep troops on the continent that safeguarded France and the Benelux from a resurgence of German ambitions, it contained provisions that limited the weaponry available to Germany and tied the mobilization and operation directly into NATO command, and it created an independent agency that could oversee German compliance with its provisions. In sum, the outcome of the negotiations does not constitute a puzzle at all.

However, it is unclear why the bargain took the path the EDC Treaty negotiations. With regard to the first phase of the negotiations until 1951, it is unclear why France and not the weaker Benelux and particularly Germany issued the most intense demands for a European centralized military organizations; with regard to the second
phase, it is unclear why the US, Germany, and Italy assented although the transient conflict between the larger and the smaller continental powers over issues of institutional control is expected. Finally, it is inexplicable why the ratification failure emanated from France, having insisted on the European Army in the first place. The only feasible account for these patterns from an intergovernmental point of view consists in an explanation that considers domestic aspects.

### 4.2.2 Domestic Politics

Seeing that the geopolitical material conditions do not add up to a sufficient explanation of the key aspects of the EDC bargain, the present section probes the domestic political conditions in the countries negotiating the EDC Treaty. Thus, the present section evaluates, first, changes in the governing coalitions of the negotiating states to identify the timing of potential new assessments of the ‘national interests’ due to governmental changes and coalitional realignments. Second, using qualitative information on interest groups positions, this section rules out interest group politics as a possible source of shifting positions. Third, using revealed positions of party manifestos at the time, this section investigates whether there are consistent differences between the European party families on European issues or whether there are national discrepancies.

**Domestic Coalitions between 1950 and 1954**

In order to evaluate the composition of domestic coalitions, Figure 4.4 below provides a first approximation to the domestic changes occurring the in the negotiating European countries between 1950 and 1954 by listing governments according to their dominant party family. It plainly illustrates Christian Democratic dominance on the continent. Moreover, it gives a first indication that the party compositions of the government coalitions of a number of countries remained stable. Notably Italy, Germany, and Belgium were dominated by Christian Democratic parties. Belgium saw a major change brought about by domestic elections in early 1954 only, after the EDC had been ratified. A second major shift occurred in the UK in late 1951, when the Conservative Tories won the British elections, giving war time Prime Minister Win-
ston Churchill a last term in office. None of these shifts are, in terms of their timing, associated with major shifts in the bargaining positions of these countries.

Figure 4.4 Dominant Party Families in the Governments of the Seven, 1949-1954

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<td>GER</td>
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<td>LUX</td>
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<td>BEL</td>
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<td>NL</td>
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<td>FRA</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
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Note: The graph displays the party family of the party having the majority of seats within the governing coalition as well as the leadership of the government. ‘No dominance’ implies that majority of seats in the governmental coalition and government leadership are not held by the same party (Source: Döring and Manow 2011).

In two countries, the Netherlands and France, government coalitions were never dominated by any particular party. In the Dutch case, domestic institutions – ‘verzuiling’ (Lijphart 1975) – implied that governments were necessarily composed of members from across the different ‘pillars’ of Dutch society. In the Netherlands, however, the governing coalition remained stable, with the Christian Democratic KVP sharing government with the Christian Democrats as the two strongest governing parties throughout the period. In the case of France, governmental instability was the norm in the French Fourth Republic. French politics throughout the period is a veritable case of ‘cycling’ in which the institutional structure fails to stabilize against voting cycles and to induce roughly predictable politics (Browne and Hamm 1996).

Hence, there is a discrepancy in terms of political stability of governments and their composition between France and the remaining negotiating countries. Table 4.3 below displays the composition of the Cabinets in the five European states negotiating the EDC between 1950 and 1954. In terms of the Cabinet leadership – not considering smaller coalition parties or parties on whose votes government majorities had to rely on – there are no additional notable changes beyond the ones just mentioned. Again, there are only two cases in which government leadership changed: the UK in late 1951 and Belgium in early 1954. In the British case, new government leadership
did not produce reappraisals of the ‘national interest’, as the first section of this chapter already indicated: the UK government did not begin to contemplate joining the EDC or committing troops to the EDC in 1951. In the Belgian case, the Belgian government had negotiated and signed the treaty by 1952, lobbied for the inclusion of Common Market provisions in the EPC in 1953 and ratified the EDC Treaty before the new government was sworn in early 1954.

Table 4.3 Cabinet Composition of European Governments, 1949 - 1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BEL</th>
<th>Cabinet Name</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>GER</th>
<th>Cabinet Name</th>
<th>Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Eyskens I</td>
<td>PSC-CVP LP-PL</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Adenauer I</td>
<td>CDU CSU DP FDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Duvieusart I</td>
<td>PSC-CVP</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Adenauer I</td>
<td>CDU CSU DP FDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Pholien I</td>
<td>PSC-CVP</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Adenauer I</td>
<td>CDU CSU DP FDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Pholien I</td>
<td>PSC-CVP</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Adenauer I</td>
<td>CDU CSU DP FDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Houtte I</td>
<td>PSC-CVP</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Adenauer I</td>
<td>CDU CSU DP FDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Houtte I</td>
<td>PSC-CVP</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Adenauer II</td>
<td>CDU CSU DP FDP GB/BHE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acker IV</td>
<td>BSP-PSB LP-PL</td>
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<tr>
<th>LUX</th>
<th>ITA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Dupong IV</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Dupong IV</td>
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<td>1951</td>
<td>Dupong IV</td>
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<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Dupong V</td>
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<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Dupong V</td>
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<td>Bech I</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Bech I</td>
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<td>Bech II</td>
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<tr>
<th>UK</th>
<th>NDL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Attlee I</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Attlee II</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Attlee II</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Churchill III</td>
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<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Churchill III</td>
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<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Churchill III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Churchill III</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table displays Party Composition of governmental coalitions. Parties are displayed according their share of the vote. In all cases except the Netherlands, the largest share would imply governmental leadership. In the case of the Netherlands, leadership was retained by the PvdA by agreement. Thus, formal Cabinet leadership in the Dutch case is marked by an * (Source: Döring and Manow 2011).
There are more subtle shifts in the composition of these governments. The two most important to be noted concern the Netherlands and Italy. It was mentioned above in section 4.1.3 that the Dutch government initiated the call for the inclusion of the Beyen Plan in 1952: this development coincides with a new composition of the Dutch government in 1952: as the KVP switched its coalition partner, (the VVD for the ARP,) a new Foreign Minister (Beyen) was appointed who was, however, not affiliated to any party. In Italy, there are two noteworthy shifts. In 1951, there was a coalitional realignment by which the moderate Socialist PSDI left government. In 1953, long-term Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi left office in 1953 and was replaced first by Giuseppe Pella, followed by Amintore Fanfani, followed by Mario Scelba. Moreover, these cabinets, as already argued, relied on votes from the proto-fascist party MSI for their majority in the Italian Chamber of Deputies.

In comparison, the leadership of French governments changed frequently and more drastically, as Table 4.4 below illustrates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cabinet Name</th>
<th>Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Bidault II</td>
<td>MRP* SFIO PRL PRR/RS UDSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Bidault II</td>
<td>MRP* SFIO PRL PRR/RS* UDSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Queuille III</td>
<td>MRP* PRL PRR/RS* UDSR*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Pleven I</td>
<td>MRP* SFIO PRR/RS UDSR* CNIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Queuille IV</td>
<td>MRP* SFIO PRR/RS UDSR* CNIP</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pleven II</td>
<td>MRP PRR/RS UDSR* CNIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Faure I</td>
<td>MRP PRR/RS* UDSR CNIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Pinay</td>
<td>MRP PRR/RS UDSR CNIP*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Mayer</td>
<td>MRP PRR/RS* UDSR CNIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Laniel</td>
<td>MRP PRR/RS UDSR CNIP*</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Laniel</td>
<td>MRP PRR/RS UDSR CNIP*</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Mendès France</td>
<td>MRP PRR/RS* UDSR CNIP RPF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table displays the party composition of French governmental coalitions between 1949 and 1954. Parties are displayed according their share of the vote. Due to frequently shifting bargains between different factions of French parties, governmental leadership rarely coincided with the strength of the respective party. Thus, governmental leadership is marked by an * as well (Source: Döring and Manow 2011).

Throughout the years under consideration, French cabinets switched leadership about two times per year, although the party composition of the governing coalitions was
more stable. Additionally, there is a basic shift in the composition of French governments: the last Cabinet supported by the Socialist SFIO went out of office in 1951. The break-up of the so-called ‘third force’ coalition of Christian Democrats (MRP), Socialists (SFIO), and Liberals (PRR/RS) has been argued to have constituted a major domestic realignment that proved fatal for the fate of the EDC as the attitudes of subsequent governments were increasingly ‘anti-EDC’ (Parsons 2003, 74). As already mentioned, the leadership of subsequent governments changed with similar frequency, but their composition was largely stable, comprising the Christian Democratic MRP, the largely liberal Radicals, the centrist UDSR, and the conservative CNIP with government leadership changing intermittently between the latter three parties. The last government, ‘responsible’ for the rejection of the EDC Treaty under Mendès, then included, for the first time, Gaullist ministers from the RPF.

In short, there are a number of domestic shifts that give rise to the possibility of preference changes due to domestic realignments. There is a clear-cut shift in the UK in 1951 from left to right. There is a clear-cut left right shift in Belgium in early 1954, as well as minor shifts in the composition of the domestic government in the Netherlands in 1952, and in Italy in 1951 and Italy 1953. However, none of these shifts coincide, in terms of their timing, with the major changes in the conflict constellation of the EDC bargain in 1951.

In the case of France, the picture is obviously rather complex. The asymmetry of governmental instability in France versus relative stability in the remaining negotiating countries makes it clear that the main source of strategic uncertainty in terms of the ratification constraint were clearly the vagaries of available French majorities. Additionally, it provides a possible ‘liberal explanation’ of French influence over the negotiations by recourse to the ‘Schelling conjecture’.

_Domestic Sources of Preference Shifts: Interest Group Influence or Party Ideology?_

There are three potential sources by which changing compositions of governing coalitions can result in shifting state preferences. First, party ideology, as argued in chapter two, may affect the subjective assessments of the causal implications of specific institutions and preferred foreign policy objectives between parties; second, different susceptibility of parties to interest group influence may affect their stance
Chapter 4 The EDC Bargain: Explanandum and Intergovernmentalist first cut

towards international institutions; third, as Hoffman has emphasized, there may have been differences in the degrees to which nationalist values dominated the preference formation processes in the countries under consideration.

Take the question of interest group influence first. Assessing the degree of interest group influence in the context of the EDC implies, at a first approximation, to assess the incentives for domestic producers of weaponry and equipment of national armies resulting from the EDC Treaty. Just as interest group pressure may induce governments to seek or block arrangements for the liberalization of trade and the construction and regulation of common markets, industries producing arms and weapons may have pushed or sought to prevent the EDC for fear of losing potential contracts with their own national ministries. In principle, national producers of arms and weapons compete domestically for governmental contracts. The EDC Treaty would have changed that environment as the treaty stipulated that contracts for procurement of weapons, standardization, supplies, and infrastructures, and programs for research and development for the European Army were issued by the Council with a two-thirds majority prepared under a two-thirds approval of the Commission (Art. 102 and 106, EDC Treaty). As a result, European producers of arms and weaponry were potentially affected by the EDC.

However, the incentives for interest group lobbying from the armament industry in post-war Europe, especially for the continental countries, are much more ambiguous than in the case of treaty negotiations involving economic liberalization, the creation of a common market for coal and steel, or the liberalization of agriculture (Green Pool), cases in which strong lobbying efforts with varying success are well documented (Gillingham 1991; Thiemeyer 1999). The first reason stems from the peculiarity of the situation in post-war Europe: defense spending was highly dependent on flows of US aid (Wall 1991; Killick 1997). There was a clear distributional conflict within the Alliance that showed itself in the simultaneous negotiations over the amount of defense spending in the European countries involved. As the continental countries in particular were still involved in expansive reconstruction efforts, defense spending was increased only slightly and caused constant irritation for American officials who perceived European states to be overtly relying on US deterrence. The first years of NATO – and indeed the EDC – were marked by recurrent conflicts that the European Allies were not nearly spending enough of their budgets on defense
although European Defense spending peaked in the early 1950’s (Kaplan 1994, 22; Judt 2005, 151, 152).

Moreover, the only countries in Europe that still contained globally significant arms production independent from the US immediately after the Second World War were the UK and Sweden (Moravcsik 1991, 33). Traditionally powerful industries producing arms and weapons were in France, Germany, and to a much lesser extend Italy and the Benelux – but these countries had been ravaged by the war. Combined with their dependence on US aid, they were utterly dependent on American resources in order even to begin domestic production: for example, the US purchased the entire first post-war production series of French Dassault airplanes for the French army (Kolodziej 1987, 40 - 49). In other cases, US or British models were obtained by European countries (Buzan and Herring 1998, 40, 41). In short, European producers were more dependent on US decisions than on the availability of procurement contracts given out by their national governments.

Moreover, the incentives resulting from a possible EDC Treaty were not uniform for national industries, to the extent that they existed. For the German industry - given that Germany had lost the war, was formally under occupation and subject to tight production constraints for the basic materials for weapons construction – any agreement that promised US aid and the permission to begin production anew had to be first priority, rather than lobbying for specific institutional solutions (Schwengler 1997). The support of industrial representatives for the ‘Wiederbewaffnung’ was of higher significance for the domestic debate, than for the question of whether a national or European Army would exist (Ibid.).

In the French case, the EDC procurement system was hotly debated. Especially the French aircraft industry actively lobbied for a common procurement system: with the EDC offering strong restrictions on German production, those producers specializing in weaponry Germany would not be allowed to produce actively lobbied for the EDC. The eventual problem was that the EDC Treaty included a rule according to which each country was to receive arms orders of no less than 85 % and no more than 115 % of its contribution to the EDC (Ibid., 58). The result, coupled with the restraint on German rearmament, was the agreement that the German contribution was to focus on light equipment. Thus heavy French industry was generally supportive of the Plan whereas the staunchest and most outspoken critics were French light producers who expected to lose in competition with German or other counterparts
Opponents of the EDC largely came from those sectors (i.e. clothing, logistics) which the Germans were allowed to have. Thus, the French industry was divided (Pitman 2000). For the duration of the negotiations, there is little evidence that any significant influence was exerted as Étienne Hirsch, member of the French delegation and presiding over the commission of armaments negotiating the issues most sensitive to industry attested to. In sum, a decisive role of interest groups, or shifting interest group influence connected to shifting conflict constellations, is implausible.

The alternative factor influencing party preferences is party ideology. As pointed out in chapter 2, the factors that cause different party positions on institutions may stem from ideological differences related to subjective views of the world. Hypothetically, the most pertinent issues for the present purposes are differences related to Hoffman’s argument about nationalist values and nationalism as well as differences on the left-right spectrum (chapter 3, section 3.1.1). The data available from the Comparative Manifesto Project provide the basis for a first approximation of the issue across the countries negotiating the EDC Treaty (Budge, et al. 2001). The CMP coding scheme contains two additional items that are relevant in this context: besides the left-right score and positive versus negative positions about the national way of life, the dataset contains two items: international peace, and Europe (see previous chapter, section 3.3.1).

In order to gain a first approximation, Figure 4.5 draws on electoral commitments in party programs between 1950 and 1954 to evaluate the relationship between party positions on the left-right scale and the ‘International Peace’ score in the Comparative Manifesto project, introduced in the previous chapter.

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Figure 4.5 Aggregate Relationship between Party Commitments for International Peace and Left-Right Dimension, Western Europe 1949-1954

Note: The graph displays the positions of party manifestos towards international peace and their position on a left-right dimension as published in West European elections between 1949 and 1954. Both categories are computed from individual categories in the CMP Coding scheme (See previous chapter, section 3.3.1 and Budge, et al. 2001)

It displays that there may have been a systematic link between party positions on the left-right scale and their ideological beliefs that are relevant for foreign policy choices. According to this figure, the more a party was positioned on the left side of the spectrum, the stronger it expressed sentiments for international cooperation, international institutions, and peaceful cooperation as opposed to an emphasis on national foreign policy ($r(t_B): -0.39, p(z): 0.001$). The extreme cases with very high values for International Peace on the left are uniformly composed of Communist parties from Italy, Luxembourg, and France. Moreover, this relationship holds, to varying degrees across the states negotiating the EDC Treaty.
Figure 4.6 Relationship between Party Commitments for International Peace and Left-Right Dimension in Individual Countries, 1949-1954

Note: The graph displays the positions of party manifestos towards international peace and their position of a left-right scale as published in West European elections between 1949 and 1954. Both categories are computed from individual categories in the CMP Coding scheme (See previous chapter, section 3.3.1 and Budge, et al. 2001)

In this sense, it appears that conflicts on Foreign policy issues and international cooperation should have been structured in particular between parties on the left and parties on the right. Thus, government changes across the left-right spectrum may have contributed to shifting government preferences. In particular the fact that communist parties seem to express the most extreme preferences for international cooperation suggests that the issue of international cooperation was heavily influenced by Cold-War related ideological conflicts.

However, Figure 4.7 below contrasts this finding by drawing on a ‘Europe’ score composed of positive mentions of European institutions minus negative mentions the CMP data set. Europe Score’ reconstructed from the two ‘Europe items’ in the Comparative Manifesto project as described in the previous chapter.
A simple glance at the scatter-plot below reveals that there is no relationship between party positions on the left-right scale and their expressed sentiments for ‘Europe’ in their respective party manifestos ($r(\tau_B) = -0.01, p(z): 0.89$). Parties that do express positive attitudes about European integration can be found on both sides of the left-right spectrum. Negative mentions of European issues are virtually absent. Moreover, there is a relatively high number of parties, on both sides of the political spectrum, who express no position whatsoever on Europe. This may be due to problems with the data set itself: the varying lengths of party manifestos implies a high variance of existent or absent sentences about low salience issues and thus a large number of values of zero when in fact there was a position (Hans and Hönnige 2008). Alternatively, research on party position taking suggests that the absence of positions about an issue may suggest either irrelevance (lack of salience) or the existence of internal conflicts (Parsons and Weber 2011).
This relationship, however, is not consistent across countries (see Figure 4.8). Although there are too few data points to draw definitive conclusions per country, it is clear that the tendency is highly disparate. Parties left of the political spectrum tend to express more positive sentiments towards Europe in Belgium and to a lesser extend in France, while in the UK the relationship is the opposite. In Italy and Germany there does not seem to be any relationship whatsoever, while in the Netherlands, the tendency is somewhat similar as in the UK. Given this inconsistence, it seems that the issue of Europe was highly country-specific, requiring a more detailed examination of domestic politics as well as intra-party conflict.

Figure 4.8 Relationship between Party Commitments for Europe and Left-Right Dimension in Individual Countries, 1949-1954

Note: The graph displays the positions of party manifestos towards Europe and their positions on a left-right dimension as published in West European elections between 1949 and 1954. Both categories are computed from individual categories in the CMP Coding scheme (See previous chapter, section 3.3.1 and Budge, et al. 2001)

What is the relationship between expressed positions for or against Europe and expressed nationalist values? According to Hoffman’s analysis as described above, there are two possible observable implications. First, more positive expressions towards the ‘national way of life’ should imply more negative sentiments towards Eu-
rope. Second, there should be discernible differences between countries. As Figure 4.9 indicates, this was certainly not the case either \( r(\tau_B) = -0.04, p(z): 0.66 \).

**Figure 4.9** Aggregate Relationship between Party Commitments for the Nation and Party Commitments for Europe, Western Europe, 1949-1954

![Graph showing the relationship between nationalism and European integration](image)

*Note: The graph displays the positions of party manifestos towards nationalism and European integration as published in West European elections between 1949 and 1954. Both categories are computed from individual categories in the CMP Coding scheme (See previous chapter, section 3.3.1 and Budge, et al. 2001)*

The remarkable feature of Figure 4.9 is that, in the upper right quadrant, there are a number of parties who express positive attitudes towards Europe, and, at the same time, positive attitudes towards the ‘national way of life’. The relative lack of a definitively identifiable relationship between nationalist position and positions about Europe largely holds across the negotiating countries, with the exception of Italy.

Thus, in the case of Italy, the relationship is as expected, but, again, largely diluted by the absence of positions on Europe for a number of parties. In the Netherlands, there is an obvious extreme case, namely the Christian Democratic KVP, displaying very high values on the nationalist item (2,3) and scoring among the highest on the European issue as well (3,5). In Italy, the Liberal PRI and the PLI are the only parties
mentioning Europe positively, the communists negatively, and the remaining parties (including the Christian Democratic DC) do not voice any position.

Figure 4.10 Relationship between Party Commitments for the Nation and Party Commitments for Europe in Individual Countries, 1949-1954

![Graphs showing relationship between nationalism and Europe scores for Belgium, Netherlands, France, Italy, Germany, and UK.]

Note: the graph displays the positions of party manifestos towards nationalism and European integration as published in West European elections between 1949 and 1954. Both categories are computed from individual categories in the CMP Coding scheme (See previous chapter, section 3.3.1 and Budge, et al. 2001)

The argument put forth by Hoffman entails another observation, namely that the two countries that lost the war display low nationalist values and associated high preferences for European integration. Consequently, the winners of the war should display higher nationalist values and consequently lower preferences for European integration. In order to ascertain whether this argument leads in the right direction, Figure 4.11 below presents boxplots of the party scores on nationalism and on Europe per country. According to these data, Hoffman’s thesis of a direct connection between geopolitical position, war experience, and the significance of nationalist values in the political space of a particular country appears dubious.
Figure 4.11 Cross-National Comparison of Nationalist and European Party Commitments as Expressed in Party Manifestos in European Countries, 1949-1954 (Boxplots)

Note: the graph displays boxplots of the positions of party manifestos towards nationalism and European integration as published in West European elections between 1949 and 1954. Both categories are computed from individual categories in the CMP Coding scheme (See previous chapter, section 3.3.1 and Budge, et al. 2001)

In the case of Germany, the reasoning seems correct. Sharing the lowest median value of party scores on nationalism, Germany has the highest median value on Europe as well as the highest scores in the upper quartile of the distribution. For Italy, however, this reasoning is suspect. Sharing a low median and a low upper quartile for nationalist values, Italian parties are virtually silent on the European issue, indicating either low salience of the European issue or internal party divisions leading to party leadership ‘muffling’ the issue. The values of French parties seem in line with Hoffmann’s argument, displaying the highest median for nationalist values and sharing the lowest median for pro-European party positions. It is odd however, that the median
value for positive mentions of Europe is lower than in Great Britain. Again, a possible explanation may be found in intra party conflicts.

Thus, a comparison of national party position only partially confirms Hoffman’s argument about the association of national values and ‘state-preferences’ about European integration.

One possibility to make sense of these data is to consider the negotiating countries, along with the intergovernmental framework, as enclosed states where the peculiarity of the national political context and its ideological space produce disparate results as just presented. The other possibility is that internal party conflicts conflate these data by inflating the number of absent positions. Categorizing party family differences equally points to these two possible conclusions. Comparing expressed sentiments toward Europe by party family shows little differences with the exception of liberal parties having overall more positive expressed positions.

Figure 4.12 Comparison of Party Commitments toward Europe According to Party Families as Expressed in Party Manifestos in European Countries, 1949-1954 (Boxplots)

Note: The graph displays boxplots of the positions of party manifestos towards Europe grouped according to party families as published in West European elections between 1949 and 1954. Both categories are computed from individual categories in the CMP Coding scheme (See previous chapter, section 3.3.1 and Budge, et al. 2001)
Comparing expressed positions towards the nation equally identifies a single party family – conservative parties – as scoring higher than the remaining parties, while there appear to be no systematic differences between Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, and Liberal parties.

Figure 4.13 Comparison of Party Commitments toward Europe according to Party Families as Expressed in Party Manifestos in European Countries, 1949-1954 (Boxplots)

Note: The graph displays boxplots of the positions of party manifestos towards Nationalism grouped according to party families as published in West European elections between 1949 and 1954. Both categories are computed from individual categories in the CMP Coding scheme (See previous chapter, section 3.3.1 and Budge, et al. 2001)

The conclusion is thus the following: interest group influence as decisive factor switching government preferences on the EDC is unlikely; expressed party positions about Europe in the early 1950’s are not reducible to party positions on the left-right spectrum. Nor is there a discernible relationship with expressed positions about national way of life. Finally, the argument put forth by Hoffman, implying that the war experience of a country and its geopolitical position and capabilities after the war had a discernible effect on nationalist values as expressed in the party political space and, as a result, on party preferences for or against European integration cannot readily be corroborated for the party political space of post-war Europe as there is a clear lack of an identifiable and consistent relationship between nationalist values and ex-
pressed party positions on Europe. Two alternative explanations seem equally likely, pointing either to irreducible national peculiarities of political discourse or, alternatively, transnational ideological influences cutting across states and parties.

**Summary**

This section has provided an intergovernmentalist first cut to explain the shifting lines of conflict that characterized the EDC bargain. As a first approximation, it was argued that there were meaningful shifts in the distribution of material power that would provide an explanation for shifting preferences. Thus, if geopolitical concerns mattered, they should be related to subjective assessments of geopolitical threats.

In terms of explanations focusing on domestic shifts, there are a number of governmental changes throughout the period: some of them could conceivably have been associated with changes in the conflict constellation in 1952 and 1953, none of them capture the 1951 shift towards the EDC track. In addition, there is little indication of plausible interest group influence. Moreover, an examination of party ideologies finds no discernible relationship between party left-right ideologies and the issue of European integration in the early 1950’s nor is there a discernible relationship between party positions on Europe and party positions on the preservation of a national way of life. Thus, the analysis of the party positions leaves only two possible interpretations: either domestic shifts were associated with intricate domestic differences not captured by party ideology or national consciousness –pointing to a possibly intergovernmental explanation – or intra-party conflicts, due to a transnational conflict over Europe cutting across states and party families that preempted consistent positions of parties from the left and the right on European issues. The last finding thus sets the stage for evaluating the transnational networks in the subsequent chapters.

### 4.3 Conclusion: Implications of an Intergovernmental Explanation

The purpose of this chapter was twofold. First, it has identified the *explanandum* of this dissertation by reconstructing the EDC bargain in terms of a ‘negotiation dance’ with a particular focus on the institutional positions taken by the negotiating governments. This reconstruction yielded a characterization of the bargaining process as consisting of four stages. In the first period between 1950 and 1951, all countries
except France accepted the idea in principle that Germany was to enter NATO, under restrictions to be negotiated. The French government objected and instead insisted on a supranational army, i.e. a level of hierarchical centralization resembling a ‘national army’. In order to prevent the breakdown of the negotiations, a temporary compromise was reached, lasting until mid-1951. Until that time, all governments except the French cabinet, pushed for a solution of relatively low centralization – envisioning only low and limited degrees of pooling and delegation – whereas the French proposal, although asymmetrical in nature, advocated the opposite: a high level of centralization in the form of a European Minister of Defense, whereas the remaining dimensions of institutional design where still left vague.

In the second period between 1951 up to the signing of the treaty in 1952, Germany, Italy, and the US adopted the French point of view of preferring a supranational – centralized – army in response to two concessions by the French government that accepted the principal of institutional equality and raised the level of nationally homogenous units above thresholds deemed necessary to ensure the military functionality of the army by some military experts. As a result, negotiations concentrated on a supranational alternative and a new conflict constellation emerged: the three larger continental governments, backed by the US, sought much higher levels of centralization and particularly representation than Belgium and the Netherlands whereas the UK refused to consider even limited direct involvement in the organization. The negotiations leading up to the signing of the treaty were thus characterized by a prolonged conflict over institutional design issues. The eventual compromise, produced under significant US pressure, resulted in the EDC Treaty. Upon requests by the three bigger states it contained the controversial Article 38 that required the signing states to task the parliament with proposing a complete political ‘superstructure’ that would review and complete the ‘final’ design of the organization. In sum, the period leading up to the EDC Treaty had been characterized by differences between the smaller and the larger countries on virtually all institutional dimensions.

Once the treaty had been signed, views of governments that were closely aligned during the negotiation phase drifted apart over the main issues debated during the ratification period, except one aspect, namely the British troop commitment. In fact, the only issue on which the signing states agreed was the demand for British or American troops to be credibly and permanently stationed on the continent. Neither the UK nor the US were to grant this wish. Instead, the ratification conflicts among
the signatories were associated with a shift in the positions of their governments. Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany ratified the treaty, whereas Italy and France, amid mounting domestic resistance, did not. Not being able to secure a ‘balancing’ troop commitment to the EDC by the UK or the US, efforts to secure ratification and appease domestic resistance focused on the federalist Article 38, leading to the convocation of an Ad Hoc Assembly that produced a Draft Treaty for a European Political Community which, in terms of its level of centralization and representation, went far beyond the initial EDC Treaty. The Belgian and the Dutch governments insisted on the inclusion of provisions of a Common Market, a proposition that was utterly rejected by the French government(s). The latter delayed ratification of the treaty, seeking to renegotiate its terms by securing, inter alia, additional unilateral rights to withdraw its troops from the EDC. The coalition of the big three continental governments had dissolved.

The final period in which the EDC Treaty was rejected by the French Assemblée Nationale resolved the seemingly intricate problem of German rearmament relatively quickly. Remarkably, the terms of the WEU Treaty, negotiated within a couple of months at a conference in London, resembled the initial package deal in so far as the main substantial provision of the US offer of 1950 – German entry into NATO under terms of limited sovereignty, restrictions of available weaponry and operational autonomy – were taken up. The French government accepted the terms it had vehemently opposed in 1950: instead of German soldiers in European uniforms, there was to be a German Army under a German Defense Ministry. Institutionally, the WEU provided two mechanisms that sealed the deal. First, it added to the NATO inspection prerogatives an agency that was to oversee German compliance with the terms of the treaty. Second, although decisions were on the whole made by unanimity, the WEU Council provided a means for the UK to credibly commit a limited amount of troops on the continent. Both solutions solved the bargaining gridlock. Simple as they were, these solutions seem to have eluded the negotiators for about four years. On the other hand, the dismay over the WEU solutions voiced by figures such as Adenauer, Spaak indicates that a number of key individuals would, nevertheless, have preferred even a weak EDC solution to the one which actually transpired.

In order to grasp this course of the bargain, this chapter then turned to intergovernmentalist explanations to provide an explanatory first cut by examining the geopolitical incentives, domestic shifts and party positions in the negotiating countries over
time. As a first approximation, it was argued that there were not meaningful shifts in the distribution of material power that would provide an explanation for shifting preferences. Thus, if geopolitical concerns mattered, they should be related to subjective assessments of geopolitical threats.

In terms of explanations focusing on domestic shifts, there are a number of governmental changes throughout the period: some of them could conceivably have been associated with changes in the conflict constellation in 1952 and 1953, none of them capture the 1951 shift towards the EDC track. In addition, there is little indication of plausible interest group influence. Moreover, an examination of party ideologies finds no discernible relationship between party left-right ideologies and the issue of European integration in the early 1950’s nor is there a discernible, consistent relationship between party positions on Europe and party positions on the preservation of a national way of life. Thus, the analysis of the party positions leaves only two possible interpretations: either domestic shifts were associated with intricate domestic differences not captured by party ideology or national consciousness – pointing to a possibly intergovernmental explanation, or intra-party conflicts, due to a transnational conflict over Europe cutting across states and party families that preempted consistent positions of parties from the left and the right on European issues. The last finding thus sets the stage for evaluating the transnational networks in the subsequent chapters.
5. Transnational Networks in Post-War Europe I: A Structural Assessment

The task of this chapter is to present, describe, and analyze the affiliation data behind the organized transnational networks in post-war Europe up until 1950. Hence, this chapter primarily informs the preconditions for the ‘transnational hypotheses’ presented in chapter 2. The information thus gained will be important for the subsequent steps of the argument.

The purpose of the first section (5.1) is to evaluate the composition of the sampled network and to identify influential actors within the network to establish its ‘transnational character’. According to the reasoning put forth in chapter 2, the most central individuals presumably had a high standing or reputation and thus significant potential ‘political capital’ from contacts in the transnational network and served as key brokers of influence of transnational ideas. Moreover, this section shows that there are little differences between individuals’ centrality values when grouped according to their party family or country, the main exception being Italian actors. Finally, it is demonstrated there are very little differences in the centrality values of actors grouped by their party families, with the exception of conservative actors, who appear to be less well integrated into the transnational network. Both observations demonstrate the genuine ‘transnational’ character of the network, spanning across states and party families.

In addition, the argument advanced throughout the thesis presupposes a degree of transnational ideological conflict that is a suitable basis for transnational coalition building. As already mentioned, ideological conflict and polarization have been associated in a wide body of literature with identifiable network structures. Utilizing the network data, the second section of this chapter (5.2) thus identifies five clusters of ‘actor communities’ constituted by their patterns of overlapping membership in eight transnational organizations. Combined with a visual analysis of the graphs of these clusters, this section produces three results. First, the clusters exhibit, to varying degrees, signs of internal differentiation. The indications are the most robust for Social Democratic actors who fall into two distinct groups. Visual analysis suggests that one group, through overlapping affiliations with the federalist organizations, contained more radically federalist actors, whereas the second group, assembling
party representatives to the Socialist International, comprises two types: actors with cross affiliations with the European Movement and actors with affiliations to the Socialist International only. Subsequent analyses (chapter 6) will confirm that these structural divisions reflect a deep ideological conflict within Social Democracy over post-war European institutions across European states. Second, Christian Democracy – clustering heavily around genuine Christian Democratic organizations – seems more unified, visible through the relatively higher degree of overlapping affiliations of Christian Democratic actors with federalist organizations and the European Movement. The remaining clusters are composed of actors who have no affiliation with party related organizations: a group of actors engaged in the European Movement only, primarily consisting of Conservative and British actors, a group of actors with predominant affiliations with the federalist organizations and the European Movement, predominantly consisting of Italian actors, and a small group of actors engaged in the European League for Economic Cooperation (ELEC), primarily consisting of Dutch, Belgian, and British actors. Although the sampling procedure does not allow drawing concrete generalizations, these results may suggest self-selection and, as a result, a different strengths dominant ideologies in the countries under consideration.

The third section (5.3) of this chapter draws on the sampled network data to reconstruct transgovernmental networks among the European states negotiating the EDC between 1950 and 1954. Assuming that the communities so identified contain distinct dominant ideologies, the results indicate a potential alternative explanation for the shifting conflict constellation in the EDC bargain. The embeddedness of the French and Italian governments in particular undergoes a significant shift: between 1950 and 1952, both governments were linked to the transnational Christian Democrats, the Federalists, and the European Movement whereas, from 1953 onwards, these attachments vanished, most significantly for the French government in 1954 that had no longer a single affiliation with any transnational community whatsoever.

Section 5.4 summarizes the results and concludes by briefly summarizing the implications for the subsequent chapters.
5.1 The Structure of the Transnational Network: Individuals and Centralities

The purpose of this section is to present the basic properties of the sampled transnational network and to conduct a first analysis of the centrality values of the individuals in the network. The first part of this section (5.1.1) establishes that there is an ‘elite’ of individuals within the transnational network. Both a visual inspection of the overall network as well as a comparison with random network of similar size and density reveal that there is a notable presence of individuals with disproportionately high centrality values. Additionally, this section evaluates two broad patterns within the overall network that are of particular interest. First, it is investigated whether there are overall differences between actors’ centrality values when grouped according to their party family or according to their nationality. Second, it is investigated whether there is a tendency for actors sharing a similar party affiliation or nationality to connect with similar types of actors, i.e. whether the network exhibits a tendency towards homophily among actors from a similar party family or country. The latter examination establishes that the network is truly ‘transnational’ across states and, indeed, party families.

The second section (5.1.2) presents the individuals with the highest centrality values, adding some information on their biographical backgrounds. The purpose of this section is twofold. First, presenting information on the domestic positions and careers of these actors allows evaluating whether the transnational elite was, at the same time, part of the domestic political elite and thus influential in their countries, be it by having a seat in their respective domestic parliaments or by leading a ministry in the respective governments. Second, information on these individuals’ biographies may provide additional clues as to the intellectual and biographical factors that propelled them towards their activities in the transnational sphere. A conclusion (5.1.3) summarizes the findings of this section briefly.

5.1.1 A First Look at the Overall Network

As explained in the previous chapter, the sampling procedure followed several steps. The basic dataset comprising individuals from all institutions data consisted of a bipartite network of the sampled 1209 individuals and their affiliations with the eight
sampled transnational organizations. Due to the sampling approach, this dataset contains a large number of ‘isolates’, that is, individuals having no affiliation with one of the eight transnational organizations, only with one or more of the international institutions and organizations. Removing these individuals yields a bipartite network of 222 individuals with a possible membership in eight organizations, realizing 355 edges overall. Figure 5.1 presents the composition of the dataset by party families and country of origin.

Figure 5.1 Composition of the Transnational Network

Note: The graph shows the composition of the network dataset. The upper row displays the number of actors assigned to each party family; the lower row the number of actors for each country included in the sample.

These organizations, introduced in the previous chapter, are: the Committee of the International Socialist Conferences (COMISCO), refounded as Socialist International (SI) in 1951; the Christian Democratic Nouvelles Équipes Internationales (NEI); the Christian Democratic Geneva Circle; the Mouvement Socialiste pour les États-Unis d’Europe (MSEUE); the European Parliamentary Union (EPU); the European Union of Federalists (UEF); the European League for Economic Cooperation (ELEC); and the European Movement.
In terms of membership of party families, the two dominant party families in post-war Europe – Christian Democracy and Social Democracy – are the most prevalent within the transnational sphere, whereas, in terms of nationalities, French actors dominate.

In order to gain a first understanding of its structure, Figure 5.2 below displays two bipartite graphs of the network. In both cases, the unlabeled nodes represent individuals whereas the eight white labeled nodes represent the eight organizations. A grey edge represents an individuals’ membership in the respective organization. If an individual is a member of a domestic party, the respective colors and shapes indicate the respective party family. In the upper figure each node is displayed similar in size. The lower figure illustrates individuals ‘centralities’, that is, the measure of how well connected an individual is by drawing individuals’ node sizes proportionate to their Eigenvector centrality as computed from the projected unipartite network (as discussed in chapter 3, section 3.2.1). By comparing the two figures, one can see that some actors are attached to only one group whereas there are a number of individuals – roughly visible as a half-circle in the middle of the graph – possessing multiple memberships and thus higher centrality values, thus comprising the transnational ‘elite’ this section is interested in.

Figure 5.2 Cross Membership and Centrality in the Transnational Groups
Note: The graph displays two bipartite visualizations of the complete transnational network comprising 222 individuals (represented by the shaded nodes with their respective colors representing actors’ party families) and the eight sampled transnational organizations (white nodes). The grey lines represent an individual’s membership in the respective organization. The upper figure displays all nodes with equal size. In the lower figure, individuals’ node sizes are proportional to their Eigenvector Centrality computed from the projected weighted network.

Visual inspection of the above figure demonstrates the implications of overlapping memberships. There is a ‘half-moon’ shaped group of individuals in the center of the graph comprising the most ‘central’ individuals with a disproportionately high number of ties to the various organizations.

A projection of the bipartite network to a unipartite network is useful for analysis. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this projection is achieved by using the procedure introduced by Newman to obtain a weighted network among the individuals only, taking individual memberships in similar organizations as an indicator of the strength of a tie between individuals (Newman 2001; Opsahl, et al. 2010). The projection results in a very dense network of 222 nodes and 11352 edges, with a mean degree (mean number of adjacent edges of each node ) of 102.27 and a graph density of
0.46, implying that about half of all possible edges are present in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 143).

The first step to identify central individuals is to compute the three centrality indices introduced in the previous chapter, namely Degree Centrality, Eigenvector Centrality, and Betweenness Centrality. As explained in chapter 3 (section 3.2.2), the different indicators focus on aspects of the notion of network centrality and therefore imply somewhat different interpretations. Figure 5.3 below displays the bivariate correlation of the three indicators.

Figure 5.3 Relationships between the Centrality Measures

Note: The graph displays pairwise linear correlations between the three centrality measures to illustrate the differences between the three centrality indicators.

The differences in the correlation between Betweenness Centrality and the remaining two centrality indicators are due to the different emphases of the centrality indicators. Whereas Degree Centrality is a ‘brute measure’ based on the number of connections a node has, Eigenvector centrality takes into account both the number of nodes any particular node is connected to as well as their centrality. Betweenness Centrality on the other hand emphasizes the ‘bridging position’ of a specific node between different sparsely connected clusters of a network thus heavily focuses on the structural position of a specific node in the network. Thus, both Degree and Eigenvector Centrality focus more on the number of ties whereas a node with only a few but ‘unusual’ ties will score a high in terms of its Betweenness Centrality but low in terms of its Degree Centrality or Eigenvector Centrality.
In order to gauge the structure of the network, Figure 5.4 below compares the histograms of the three centrality distributions of the actual one-mode network – shown in the second row – with the equivalent centrality distributions of a simulated random network of the same size and density as shown in the first row of Figure 5.4 (Erdős and Rényi 1959; for more detailed information see Newman 2010, ch. 12). Since about half of all possible edges are present in the actual network, the simulation of a random network based on this structure amounts to tossing a coin for every possible connection between the actors to decide whether an edge exists or not. The centrality distributions exhibited by such a random network are markedly different from those in the actual network.

**Figure 5.4 Histograms of the Centrality Distributions: Comparison with a Random Network**

![Histograms of the Centrality Distributions: Comparison with a Random Network](image)

*Note: The graph above compares the distributions of the centrality indicators of the sampled network (lower row) with that of a simulated random network (upper row) of the same size (222 nodes) and density (0.46). The comparison shows that, whereas the distributions of all three centrality indicators of the random network in the upper row reflect an approximately equal shape, the histograms of the sampled network in the lower row display ‘long-tailed’ distributions that are characteristic of networking processes according to the preferential attachment model, thereby giving rise to a small group of disproportionately well connected actors that form the end of the ‘tail’ at the left-hand side of the histogram.*

A comparison to the actual network in the second row shows that the centrality distributions of the actual network are heavily skewed to the right, depending on the respective centrality indicator. In comparison to the random network, the transna-
ional network clearly exhibits a ‘long’ tail of the distribution – a tendency most strongly pronounced for betweenness centrality – that assembles individuals with much higher centralities, a fact that is markedly absent in the random network. In sum, these individuals thus can be considered disproportionately ‘well connected’ and thus presumably making up the influential transnational elite. 56

Before the subsequent section takes a closer look at the individual composition of these elite, the remainder of this section briefly focuses on its composition in terms of individuals’ party family and their nationality in order to assess whether actors of a certain nationality or party ideology are disproportionately well connected in the overall network. Finding that members of a particular party family have disproportionately high centrality values would be a first indication that a particular party ideology drives participation in transnational networks more than others. A similar conclusion would apply to actors’ nationality: finding that individuals from a particular country possess disproportionately higher centrality values than other actors would lead to the conclusion that it is the nationality of actors - including the possibility of nationally specific ideational circumstances – that drive network activities. Finding neither would suggest that the degree of overlapping membership – and thus network activity - is driven by factors different from nationality or party family, warranting to further investigate the finer structure of the network, the biographies of highly central individuals and their particular ideological affiliations that go beyond ideational party discourses.

As a first visual approximation, Figure 5.5 below presents boxplots of two centrality measures - Degree Centrality and Eigenvector Centrality - ordered by party family and nationality. A similar visual display of the values of the Betweenness Centrality measure is difficult because of its extremely skewed distribution that was already demonstrated in Figure 5.4 above. Beyond a purely visual inspection, it is imperative to take into account the probability that merely ‘visible’ differences are produced by chance. This is somewhat difficult because of the highly skewed character of the distributions: normal parametric comparisons are infeasible and standard non-parametric alternatives such as the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are infeasible as well.

56 Note that the histograms show considerable ‘gaps’ that are largely explained by the fact that the network was projected from a bipartite network based on only eight organizations; every additional membership in an organization in the bipartite network will thus result in a great number of additional edges, depending on the number of members.
since there are too many equal centrality values between the respective actor groups (‘ties’), producing imprecise p-values (Dalgaard 2008, 100). A feasible alternative used below is a Bayesian equivalent of the t-test that does not presume any specific sampling distribution and seems to be more robust to outliers and many ties (Kruschke 2011, ch. 18; 2013).

Figure 5.5 Centrality Measures by Country and Party Families (Boxplots)

Note: The graph displays boxplots of the centrality distributions (Degree Centrality and Eigenvectors) grouped according to actor’s party family (upper row) and nationality (lower row).

The two boxplots in the first row of the above figure compare the composition of actors’ centrality values (Degree Centrality and Eigenvector Centrality) according to their party affiliations. It appears that differences between the two largest party families – Christian Democracy and Social Democracy – are visible but relatively small. In fact, the only significant difference between party families – excluding the numerically irrelevant radical Socialist/Communist actors – is the discrepancy between members of Conservative parties on the one hand and members of Liberal, Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties on the other hand. Comparing the latter party families in terms of the Degree Centrality measure on the left hand side of Fig-
Figure 5.5, both the median values as well as the interquartile ranges are relatively similar. In terms of the Eigenvector Centrality measure, the only credible mean difference between the party groups within the 95% posterior highest density intervals (HDI) – and thus unlikely to be produced by chance – is between the Social Democratic and the Conservative party groups both with regard to Degree Centrality and Eigenvector Centrality. The remaining pair-wise comparisons do not return credible differences according to this criterion. In sum, there are little differences between party families. Conservative actors appear to be less well integrated into the transnational network, whereas the embeddedness of Liberal, Social Democratic, and Christian Democratic actors is remarkably similar.

The differences in terms of actors’ nationalities – displayed in the second row - are more pronounced. While the median Degree Centrality values – shown on the left hand side - are relatively similar, Italian individuals have a much larger interquartile range, indicating that individuals from Italy tend to score consistently higher than individuals from other countries. This tendency is more pronounced when comparing the Eigenvector centrality values, where both the median value as well as the number of Italian individuals possessing higher values is much higher than the values of individuals from the remaining countries.

Using the same test for credible differences between the centrality values of national groups as above reveals a similar picture. Disregarding the numerically irrelevant French and German actors from the Saar, a pairwise comparison reveals that Italian actors’ Eigenvector Centrality scores are credibly higher than those of any other actors grouped by their country of origin. Thus, Italian actors are disproportionately more ‘central’ and thus, presumably, in a more influential position within the transnational network than actors from other countries. Finally, there appears to be a very small credible difference between British and French actors, in terms of their Eigenvector centrality values. It is remarkable, however, that no other pair wise comparisons return credible differences. In sum, the sampled network is largely ‘transnational’.

Beyond the composition of the network, chapter 2 implied that the formation of transnational networks might follow the principle of homophily, that is, actors of similar ideological dispositions or interests will be more likely to form connections among each other than actors with differing interests or ideological predispositions. With regard to actors’ party families or nationalities, such a tendency might be ex-
tected in our case, especially since the sampled organizations include explicitly party family related organizations, such as the Socialist International and the Christian Democratic transnational organizations, the NEI and the Geneva Circle. Thus, an interesting question is whether there is a tendency in the overall network for individuals of a similar party family or a similar country to be more connected to each other than to individuals having a differing party family or nationality. A tendency for homophily along predominantly national lines would indicate that actors link up with actors of a similar nationality because of national similarities in the ideational or other preference related variables, which would go against the idea that transnational networks contribute to cross-national formation of ideologies and trust. In the same vein, a tendency for homophily along party families would be a first indication – barring the qualitative examination in the subsequent chapter – against a possible contention, first advocated by Craig Parsons (Parsons 2002, 2003), that similar ‘ideas of Europe’ cut across party lines.

Answering this question structurally is difficult due to the density of both the bipartite network and its unipartite projection. An additional complication is the fact that the latter consists of valued ties. Several considerations at least indirectly support the conclusion that the present network does not exhibit a tendency towards homophily along party family or nationality lines. A standard measure for homophily is the assortativity coefficient (Newman 2010, 223, 224). It can be interpreted similar to Pearson’s correlation coefficient: a value of 1 indicates perfect homophily, a negative value of 1 indicates that no ties between similar types of actors exist. However, the assortativity coefficient is not defined for valued networks. Nevertheless, it can be computed by dichotomizing the valued ties between individuals. Computing the coefficient for actors’ nationalities in this way returns a negative value of -0.006, suggesting there is little to no tendency for actors enter into relationships with actors from the same country. Computing the similar value for party families returns a value of 0.153, reflecting the fact that there are several genuine transnational party or-

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57 An effort was made to use extant methods for simulating bipartite networks to assess the role of party family and country of origins for explaining tie formation and deviation from a random realization of the network (Admiraal and Handcock 2008). However, due to density of the graph, these estimation techniques become computationally ‘expensive’ to the degree that they are unfeasible: the density of the network implies that many ‘possible’ random networks conforming to the size and density of the actual network. Hence, even simple model specifications did not converge even after long computing times, a well-known problem, especially for bipartite graphs to which solutions only for small graphs are feasible (Ibid., 2).
ganizations in the network. The value is still relatively small, perhaps reflecting the fact that dichotomizing valued ties between individuals result in a significant loss of information.

To summarize this section, three observations are noteworthy, some of which suggest first and still tentative conclusions with regard to the presence of the preconditions for the ‘transnational hypotheses’ advanced in chapter 2. First, the structure of the sampled network reveals that there is a well-connected ‘elite’ of actors with disproportionately more cross-affiliations than most actors in the networks, suggesting that there is a clearly identifiable group that, presumably, had disproportional influence within the transnational sphere. A second observation is that there are some small differences between actor groups when comparing their centrality values: members of conservative parties seem, overall, less well integrated into the transnational network than their peers from the remaining party families whereas Italians are, overall, more central than their peers. The comparison via boxplots of actors’ centrality values suggests that there are little other differences between either party groups or nationalities. The fact that there are relatively small differences between the remaining groups of actors suggest a need to focus on finer substructures within the network in order to draw conclusions of possibly different channels of influences on processes of domestic demand formation. The structural aspect of that task that will be tackled in section 5.2, its qualitative dimension, that is, an analysis of the differing ideologies of clusters of actors identified in the transnational network, will be undertaken in the subsequent chapter.

A third and final observation is that there does not appear to be tendency of homophily, that is, assortative tie formation among actors from either a similar party family or similar nationality. Connections between actors, at least in the overall network, display a tendency to cut across nationalities and party family lines. In order examine the factors that may explain high activities within the transnational sphere, the following part of the present section will focus on this issue by taking a closer look at the individual biographies of those actors with the highest centrality values, i.e. the ‘transnational elite’ of post-war Europe.
5.1.2 Central Individuals in the Transnational Network

The present subsection presents the individuals of the transnational elite identified within the complete transnational network, i.e. those individuals comprising the right hand ‘tails’ in the histograms of the centrality value distributions shown above (Figure 5.4 above). A second goal is to examine, by way of comparing information about the most central individuals’ biographies, the degree to which there are biographical commonalities that may have played a role in their transnational activities.

This section demonstrates that the most central individuals in the dataset are not only well-known figures from the historical literature on the transnational movements but also that a large proportion was, at the same time, part and parcel of the political and governmental leadership of their respective countries between 1950 and 1954. Second, examining these individuals’ biographies, it appears that a majority of these actors share similar experiences during the war in the resistance organizations in their respective countries. Hence, this section provides independent evidence for claims in the historical literature concerning the influential role that the resistance movements played in the formation of the post-war European Movements (Lipgens 1968, 1984a).

Beginning this examination, Table 5.1 assembles the highest scoring individuals in terms of the valued Degree Centrality measure. Recall that, as explained in the previous chapter, this measure merely adds up the number of valued ties an actor has in the network and therefore does not take into account the position of the actor within the network.
### Table 5.1 Degree Centrality: Highest Scoring Individuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Party Family</th>
<th>Degree Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>von Brentano, Heinrich</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brugmans, Henri</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>Social Democracy</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spinelli, Altiero</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Malfa, Ugo</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courtin, René</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adenauer, Konrad</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bichet, Robert</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>MRP</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cingolani, Mario</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sassen, Emmanuel M. J. A.</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>KVP</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serrarens, Petrus J.S.</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>KVP</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teitgen, Pierre-Henri</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>MRP</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Zeeland, Paul</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>PSC-CVP</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zijlstra, Jelle</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>ARP</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table displays individuals with the highest valued Degree centrality values in the overall transnational network. See the footnotes below for biographical information.

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58 **Von Brentano, Heinrich**: A practicing Catholic and strong proponent of the ‘Abendländische’ conception of Europe (Kroll 2004; see also the next chapter). After the war, he became a Hessian delegate to the Bundestag and, from 1949 onwards, became the Fraktionsvorsitzender of the CDU/CSU Fraktion in the German Bundestag. A Co-founder of the ‘Parlamentarische Gruppe des deutschen Rates der Europabewegung’ in 1949, he would succeed Adenauer as the German Foreign Minister in 1955. He participated in the meetings of the Geneva Circle and was a speaker at several NEI Congresses. A founding member of the federalist UEF and its German section (“Europa-Union”), he was a delegate to the ECSC Common Assembly and would chair the influential constitutional committee of the Ad Hoc Assembly that was tasked with the institutional design of the EPC Draft Treaty (Griffiths 2000, 73). As an aspiring Foreign Minister, he was an important and trusted conduit between Adenauer and the Bundestagsfraktion especially when there was opposition to Adenauers’ policies, both foreign and domestic (Kroll 2004). **Brugmans, Henri**: Imprisoned by the Gestapo in 1942 and a member of the Dutch resistance, Brugmans became a founding member of both EPU and the UEF and leader of its Dutch section. Brugmans was an active publishing voice for a ‘United States of Europe’ for both social and geopolitical reasons (Brugmans 1966). A participant of the Congress at The Hague in 1947, he also became a key founding member of the European Movement, participating in its Executive Committee during its foundation (Hick 1990a, 11). In 1950, he became the founding rector of the College of Europe in Bruges (See Munzinger Archiv 2015h). **Spinelli, Altiero**: Leading member of the Italian Resistance, he co-authored with Ernesto Rossi the Ventotene Manifesto, the foundational programmatic document of the Italian and European Federalist Movements. A key organizer of the European conference of the European Resistance Movements in Geneva 1944, he was one of the leading initiators of the federalist UEF, leading its ‘constitutionalist’ wing. A Communist in his youth, he broke allegiance with the party during the war and did not become a member of another party although he retained close ties to the Socialists. Due to his prominent position in the resistance and his radical federalist positions, he developed a strong reputation in the transnational scene after the war, spearheaded the European organization of the UEF at meetings in France shortly after the war, lead the Italian section of the UEF, and took part in meetings of the MSEUE, and European Movement. His close connection to De Gasperi and his reputation led to him playing a key role in influencing Italian positions, especially the inclusion of the federalist Art. 38 in the EDC.
Treaty (Palayret 2008). **La Malfa, Ugo:** Founding member of the resistance organization “Partito d’Azione” in 1941, he returned to Italy from Swiss exile after the end of the war, joined the Italian Republican Party (PRI) and entered the Italian Chamber of Deputies. He participated immediately in Alcide De Gasperi’s cabinets, first as Minister of Transport, then as Minister for Foreign Trade until 1953. A high profile figure in Italy, he would, after a short tenure as Italian Foreign Minister, head on to become long term Minister of Industry and Commerce and played a leading role in the negotiation of the Treaties of Rome. He participated in the meetings of the federalist UEF, the Italian section of the EUP as well as the ELEC. He was a member of the Italian Council of the European Movement (CIME) and a delegate to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe from 1949 to 1953 (Munzinger Archiv 2015). **Courtin, René:** Member of the French resistance who joined ‘Combat’ in 1942 (Belot 2003, 250). He became a Professor of Law in Paris and the founding editor of *Le Monde*. Courtin was an early advocate of a small European Union on geopolitical grounds (Courtin 1949). He participated in congresses of both the NEI and UEF, where he would be in the midst of the emerging conflicts between British Unionists and Federalists in the European Movement (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 420). An influential figure in France with close contacts to French conservatives and Christian Democrats (such as Teitgen and Menthon), he was the long term president of the French section of the European Movement (Courtin 1964). **Adenauer, Konrad:** The German chancellor was a regular at the annual NEI meetings in the early 1950’s and participated in the first clandestine meetings of the Geneva Circle until October 1948 (Kaiser 2007, 211). Having taken part at the Congress at The Hague, he was a founding member of the “Deutscher Rat der Europäischen Bewegung”, the German section of the European Movement (Schwarz 1982, 558, 560). **Bichet, Robert:** Secretary General of the French Christian Democrats (MRP) from 1949 onwards and long-term member of the Assemblée Nationale. He was a founding member and long-term head of the executive of the NEI (Kaiser 2007, 202). A regular participant at the Geneva Circle meetings, he was a founding member of the Executive Bureau of the European Movement and, additionally, a member of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (Hick 1990b). **Cingolani, Mario:** A prominent Italian Christian Democrat, a close associate of De Gasperi, and long standing member of the Italian Senate. He had a short stint as Italian Minister of Defense in 1947 under De Gasperi and as Undersecretary at the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (Minister Guiseppe Spataro) from 1951 to 1953 during De Gasperi’s tenure. He was a regular at meetings of the Geneva Circle and the NEI, a founding member of the Italian Section of the European Movement, a member of the Italian Delegation to the ECSC assembly and EPC Ad Hoc Assembly (Christian Democratic Group) as well as a delegate to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (See <http://www.degasperi.net/scheda_fonti.php?id_obj=4070> (Last accessed 02-03-2014) as well as <http://www.senato.it/leg/01/BGT/Schede/Attsen/000009245.htm> (Last accessed 02-03-2014). **Sassen, Emmanuel M. J. A.:** Member of the catholic precursor of the post-war KVP – the Roman-Catholic State Party – before the war, during the war he had contacts with and wrote for the Nederlandse Uni, an organization forbidden by the Nazis in 1941, that continued ‘illegal’ publishing and organizational activities (Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 132). He became the vice president of the Dutch Christian Democrats from 1946 to 1948, and was a member of the Dutch Second chamber from 1946 to 1948 and member of the first chamber – the senate – from 1952 to 1958. A regular participant of the Geneva Circle, member of the executive committee of the NEI (Kaiser 2007, 202), and member of the Dutch section of the European Movement, he was a member of ECSC Common Assembly and EPC Ad Hoc Assembly, becoming the first head of the Christian Democratic Party Group in the ECSC Common Assembly. He went on to succeed Hans van der Groebe as Commissioner for Competition in 1967 (Munzinger Archiv 2015b). **Serrarens, Petrus J.S.:** A prominent Dutch catholic politician before the war, he became the first general secretary of the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU) in 1920. He joined the second Dutch chamber in 1937, leading the parliamentary group of the Roman-Catholic State Party – the precursor of the post-war Christian Democratic KVP (Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 99-116). He rejoined the Dutch Second Chamber in 1948 until 1952. Having joined the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1949, he participated in meetings of the Christian Democrat Geneva Circle, Congresses of the NEI, and in congresses of the European Movement. He was a strong advocate of the ‘abendländische’ conception of Western Europe as well as promoting European federation within the Dutch second chamber. He would never join a cabinet and would go on to become one of two Dutch judges at the European Court of Justice from 1953 -1958 (Rasmussen 2010, 647). **Teitgen, Pierre-Henri:** A prominent figure of the French ‘Résistance intérieure française’ and associated with the French resistance organization Liber-
The individuals in Table 5.1 above comprise a relatively prominent group of actors well known from the historical literature. Note that the listing of the last five actors is arbitrary, as the subsequent three actors – all Christian Democrats – possess similar Degree Centrality values of 519. Some of these actors, such as Altiero Spinelli or Henri Brugmans, are highly prominent federalist figures who, however, did not play a formally significant role in the domestic politics of their respective countries. Others had – apart from their role in the transnational network – important governmental or parliamentary roles: among the most prominent overall are Konrad Adenauer, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Van Zeeland, and Dutch Minister of Economics Jelle Zijlstra. Others, such as Heinrich von Brentano, Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Ugo La Malfa, and Emmanuel Sassen fulfilled important roles within their parties or parliamentary groups: apart from René Courtin, Henri Brugmans, and Altiero Spinelli, all of the actors listed above where members of the parliaments of their respective countries. Somewhat surprisingly, the highest ranking actor is the CDU/CSU Fraktionsvorsitzende Heinrich von Brentano, due to his participation in the transnational Christian Democratic groups as well as the German section of the UEF (“Europa-Union”). In sum, all of these actors belonged to the political elite of their countries and were clearly in a position to be influential in the domestic political process, both in terms of the demand conditions – due to their influential presence within their parties and parliament – as well as in terms of the supply conditions due to their presence within the domestic governments of their respective countries. Finally, it is notable that most of the actors above are associated with Christian Democracy.

té and later joined Combat (Teitgen 1988; Belot 2003, 250). A long term member of the Assemblée Nationale, president of the MRP from 1952 to 1956, and a frequent member of French cabinets, he participated at the Hague Congress in 1947 and was a member of the French Section of the European Movement. A frequent participant at meetings of the Geneva Circle and the NEI, a member Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Common Assembly of the ECSC and the Ad Hoc Assembly for the EPC (Munzinger Archiv 2015g). Van Zeeland, Paul: A prominent Belgian politician and member of the Belgian Christian Democratic CVP. Before the war he became Belgian Prime Minister for the first time from 1935 until 1938. He spent the war in exile in London, becoming head of the Belgian Committee on Refugees and Belgian Commission on post-war issues. Being well connected in international financial circles, he was a leading founding member of the ELEC. After the war, he became Belgian Foreign Minister from 1949 to 1954. In addition to his involvement in the ELEC, he occasionally participated in the NEI congresses and, as leading member of the ELEC, in meetings of the Executive Bureau of the European Movement congresses (Munzinger Archiv 2015f). Zijlstra, Jelle: A student during the war, he became a lecturer and professor in economics in Rotterdam and Amsterdam shortly after the war. He joined the smaller Dutch protestant Christian Democratic ARP, and became Dutch Minister of Economics in 1952 which he remained until 1963. During and after the war, he became active in federalist youth organizations and, subsequently, he became involved in the ELEC and through the ELEC, in the Dutch section of the European Movement (Zijlstra 1998; Munzinger Archiv 2015a).
Examining these individuals’ biographies, it appears that five had links to resistance organizations within their respective countries (Altiero Spinelli, Henri Brugmans, Ugo la Malfa, René Courtin, and Pierre-Henri Teitgen). Spinelli played a key role in the foundation of the Italian MFE (Movimento federalista europeo) – the nucleus of the Italian section of the federalist UEF - together with several members of the Italian resistance organization ‘Partito d’Azione’ and spent much of the war in forced exile (e.g. Palayret 2008, 331). Henri Brugmans was editing a well-known underground paper from 1941 onwards (Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 52). Pierre-Henri Teitgen and René Courtin joined the French resistance organization Combat, led by eventual federalist leader Henri Frenay, in 1942 (Belot 2003, 250). Ugo La Malfa joined the Partito d’Azione and had to flee to Swiss exile in 1943 to avoid being captured by the Gestapo (Der Spiegel 1963; Munzinger Archiv 2015i).

The prevalence of actors with reported ties to resistance organizations is equally found among the actors possessing the highest Eigenvector Centrality Values, as shown in Table 5.2 below.

### Table 5.2 Eigenvector Centrality: Highest Scoring Individuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Party Family</th>
<th>Evcentrality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spinelli, Altiero</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>0.1728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brugmans, Henri</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>Social Democracy</td>
<td>0.1728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tosi, Enrico</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>0.1639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Malfa, Ugo</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>0.1580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>von Brentano, Heinrich</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>0.1507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benvenuti, Lodovico</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>0.1325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asquini, Giuseppe</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>0.1325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bastianetto, Celeste</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>0.1325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camposarcuno, Michele</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>0.1325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giacchero, Enzo</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>0.1325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lang, Gordon</td>
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<td>Labour</td>
<td>Social Democracy</td>
<td>0.1325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parri, Ferruccio</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>0.1325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table displays the individuals with the highest valued Eigenvector centrality values in the overall transnational network. See the footnotes below for biographical information. 59

59 **Tosi, Enrico:** Prominent Italian Christian Democrat. During the war, he became associated with the Italian resistance organization CLN (Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale). A member of the post-war Italian constitutional assembly as well as a long term member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies for
the Christian Democratic DC (1948–1958), head of the foreign policy department of the DC (Gehler 2001, 686). He was a founding member of the Italian section of the federalist movement, a member of the Italian parliamentary group for European Union (EPU) and occasional delegate to meetings of the Christian Democrat Geneva Circle and NEI conferences, as well as a member of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and a member of the committee in the Italian Chamber of Deputies that was formed to treat the EDC ratification question (See <http://storia.camera.it/deputato/enrico-tosi-19061229/gruppi> Last accessed 03-05 2015).

Benvenuti, Lodovico: Long-term member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies and member of the Executive Committee of the Italian DC. Active in the Italian resistance movements during the war, he was elected to the Italian constitutional assembly in 1948 and remained in the Italian Chamber of Deputies until 1953. From 1951–1953, he was undersecretary in the Ministry of Foreign Trade under Ugo La Malfa. In 1953, he became undersecretary in the Foreign Ministry after De Gasperi left office as Italian Prime Minister. Having taken part in the Congress at The Hague, he was a member of the Italian section of the federalist movement, the Italian parliamentary group for European Union and the Italian section of the European Movement. A delegate to the ECSC Common Assembly and the Ad Hoc Assembly (Christian Democratic Group), he was also a member of Spaak’s Action Committee for a European Constituent (see the subsequent chapter). He went on to be a member of the Italian Delegation in Messina (Münzinger Archiv 2015k).

Asquini, Giuseppe: Member of the Italian Senate from 1948 to 1953, originally a member of Ugo la Malfa’s illegal Partito d’Azione but later joined the Socialist Party Group. A member of the Italian Section of the European Movement, the Italian parliamentary group for European Union (EPU), and the Italian Council of the European Movement. A member of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (See <http://www.senato.it/leg/01/BGT/Schede/Attsen/00006542.htm> Last accessed 03-05 2015).

Bastianetto, Celeste: A member of the Italian Senate from 1949 until 1953, he had close connections to the Italian resistance movement during the war. He was a founding member of the Italian section of the federalist movement, the Italian parliamentary group for European Union, and the Italian section of the European Movement. Additionally, he was a member of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (see Forlenza 2009).

Camposarcano, Michele: A Christian Democratic member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies from 1948 until 1958, he was a founding member of the Italian parliamentary group for European Union and a founding member of the Italian section of the federalist movement, the Italian parliamentary group for European Union (EPU), and the Italian section of the European Movement (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 202, 226). See also <http://storia.camera.it/deputato/michele-camposarcano-18920212/gruppi> Last accessed 03-05 2015.

Giacchero, Enzo: Giacchero enlisted with the Allied Air Forces during the war, and returned to Italy in 1943, joining the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (CLN). After the war, he was elected to the Italian Constitutional Assembly for the DC, remaining in the Italian Chamber of Deputies until 1952 (See <http://storia.camera.it/deputato/enzo-giacchero-19120225/att#nav> Last accessed 03-05 2015). In contact with Coudenhove-Kalergi during the formation of the EPU, he was a founding member of the Italian Parliamentary Group for European Union, that was founded upon initiative of the Italian section of the UEF 1947 (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 202; D’Urso 2005, 225, 226). A strong federalist and Christian Democrat by conviction, he was a frequent member of Italian delegations send to Congresses of the European Movement and the UEF (D’Urso 2005, 229). After the foundation of the ECSC, he joined the ECSC High Authority under Monnet, leaving the ECSC in 1959 (D’Urso 2005, 238).

Lang, Gordon: A member of Parliament for Labour, he was a member of the federalist ‘group of the somewhat influential Labour Party in Parliament and, heading the equally small ‘federalist group’ (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 683; Pistone 2008, 39). He was a member of the British parliament’s ‘cross-party group for European Union’ (EPU section) and a member of the British section of the European Movement (Wurm 1988, 638).

Pari, Ferruccio: A very prominent leader of the Italian resistance organization CLN during the war, as well as leading a member of the illegal Partito d’Azione during the war, he was Italy’s first post-war Prime Minister before the convocation of the post-war constitutional assembly. After being selected to the constitutional assembly, he became a member of the Italian Senate in 1948 – having joined the Italian Republican party (PRI) – and remained in the Senate until 1983. A founding member of the Italian section of the federalist movement (MFE), he was a member of the federalist group in the Italian Senate (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 225). He joined the Italian parliamentary group for European Union (EPU) – taking part at its first congress at Interlaken – and the Italian section of the European Movement. He was a member of the ECSC Common Assembly, the EPC Ad Hoc Assem-
In the listing above, three actors - Altiero Spinelli, Henri Brugmans, and Ugo la Malfa – reappear, suggesting that their prominent standing in the network is robust to choice of centrality indicators. Another remarkable feature is that eight of the ten highest scoring individuals are Italian, reflecting the observation made previously that Italian actors have disproportionally higher Eigenvector centrality than actors from other countries. While the high Eigenvector centrality values these actors possess suggest a relatively prominent standing in the transnational sphere, their domestic standing seems less prominent compared to the previous group of actors.

Only two of the actors displayed in Table 5.2 above had governmental functions between 1950 and 1954; Ugo la Malfa as Italian Minister of Industry and Commerce and Lodovico Benvenuti as undersecretary in La Malfa’s Ministry until he switched to the Foreign Ministry as undersecretary in 1953. Apart from Brugmans and Spinelli, however, all of these actors are elected members of the legislative branch of their respective countries. In sum, while individuals with the highest Eigenvector centrality scores are not in a position to exert strong influences on the governments of their respective countries, they are nevertheless present in their domestic parliaments and thus, presumably, have been able to influence processes of demand formation, especially in the case of Italy. Additionally, most of the actors with high Eigenvector Centrality scores are Christian Democrats as well. The biographies of these actors reveal their shared experiences in the resistance organizations of their respective countries. This tendency is particularly obvious in the case of Italian actors for who a tendency to develop a sort of militant ideological federalism in Swiss exile is well documented, both ideologically as well as organizationally (e.g. Vayssière 2002, 43 ff.). Thus, Enrico Tosi, Ugo La Malfa, Celeste Bastianetto, Enzo Giacchero and most prominently Enrico Parri – were leading figures in the Partito d’Azione (PdA) that formed the nucleus of the Italian Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (CLN) after the armistice in Italy in 1943 (Corni 2000).

Table 5.3 below provides a list of the highest scoring individuals in terms of the Betweenness Centrality indicator. Recall from section 3.2.2 in chapter 3 that Betweenness Centrality primarily takes into account the structural position of the individuals, particularly how important their position in connecting otherwise sparsely connected
components is. Recall further that the distribution of Betweenness Centrality was highly skewed and had the ‘longest tail’, that is, exhibited an extreme difference in centrality values between the highest values and the remaining actors.

There are three ‘new’ individuals: Paul-Henri Spaak, *inter alia* the Belgian Prime Minister from 1947 to 1949 and Foreign Minister from 1954 to 1958; André Philip, an influential French Socialist (SFIO); and Michel Rasquin, the leader of the Luxembourgish Social Democrats and Minister of Economics between 1951 and 1958. The relative international and domestic prominence of these individuals reinforces the observation that the members of the transnational political ‘elite’ were, by and large, influential figures in the domestic political scene of their respective countries, certainly in the position to affect the course of domestic conflicts over the ‘national interest’.

Table 5.3 Betweenness Centrality: Highest Scoring Individuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>PartyFamily</th>
<th>betw</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tosi, Enrico</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>3517,5238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brugmans, Henri</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>Social Democracy</td>
<td>2247,4419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spinelli, Altiero</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>2211,4419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Malfa, Ugo</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>2037,4792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>von Brentano, Heinrich</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>1591,3664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spaak, Paul-Henri</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>BSP-PSB</td>
<td>Social Democracy</td>
<td>977,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raquin, Michel</td>
<td>Lux</td>
<td>LSAP</td>
<td>Social Democracy</td>
<td>977,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip, André</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>SFIO</td>
<td>Social Democracy</td>
<td>977,7000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courtin, René</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>431,8664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zijlstra, Jelle</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>ARP</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>403,6524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Zeeland, Paul</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>PSC-CVP</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
<td>403,6524</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The table displays the individuals with the highest valued Betweenness centrality values in the overall transnational network. See the footnotes below for biographical information.*

60 Spaak, Paul-Henri: Belgian Prime Minister from 1947 to 1949, and Belgian Foreign Minister from 1954 to 1958. First president of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe; first president of the ECSC Common Assembly, president of the EPC Ad Hoc Assembly, president of the European Movement between 1950 and 1954, president of the Belgian section of the MSEUE, and delegate to the Socialist International. Inaugurated the first Spaak committee setting up a study group for the EPC Treaty and, obviously, co-author of the Spaak report in the run up to the Messina conferences 1957 (See also Munzinger Archiv 2015e). Rasquin, Michel: A Luxembourgish Socialist before the war, he became the president of the Social Democrat LSAP after the war in 1945. Elected to the Luxembourgish Chamber of Deputies in 1948 until 1951, he joined Luxembourgish governments under Dupong and Bech as Minister of Economics between 1951 and 1958. He joined the MSEUE at its inaugural
5.1.3 Summary

To sum up, this section has presented a first overview of the transnational network. It was shown that the structure of the network different from a random network in that there is a marked tendency towards the formation of a few highly connected individuals, a ‘transnational elite’. It was shown that, in the transnational sphere, there is no marked difference between the centrality values of the different Party Families, with the exception of a relative lack of strength of Conservative actors. Comparing actors’ centralities according to their nationalities revealed that Italian individuals seem systematically better connected than their peers from other countries, particularly with regard to their Eigenvector Centrality Score. In general, the structure of the cross-affiliations seems indeed ‘transnational’: there is no observable tendency for individuals from similar countries to enter similar organizations. A further issue worth observing is the prevalence of individuals with ties to resistance organization during the second world war, reflecting potential research on influence of federalist tendencies in resistance movements on post-war efforts for European unification (Lipgens 1968; Brugmans 1970).

In order to contextualize the information on individuals’ centrality values, a better understanding of the overall structure of the network is needed. In order to make some headway in this direction and put the information regarding individuals’ centralities into context, the next section looks more closely at the community structure of the network to identify clusters and groups of more densely connected individuals. Section (4.2) will focus on this issue after the subsequent conclusion briefly summarizes the main results of this section.
5.2 The Structure of the Transnational Network pt. II: Group Detection, Group Membership, and Group Composition

Having described the central individuals within the overall structure of the network, this section analyzes the ‘community structure’ in the network. Are there more densely interconnected subgroups – i.e. ‘clusters’ – in the network? If so, what is their composition? The question is significant because it was hypothesized in chapter 2 that diverging patterns of transnational networking may be indicative of ideological divergence. Actors with similar ideological convictions should join similar organizations, thus constituting ‘subgroups’. As a result, groups of actors with different ideological convictions should be, roughly, identifiable. The degree to which these groups in fact do reflect ideological differences will then be described and analyzed in the subsequent chapter 6. Under the assumption that more densely connected communities share similar ideologies, the composition of these groups in terms of actors’ nationalities is interesting, since the tendency of a particular country to be overrepresented in a particular group indicates that individuals from that particular concentrated their transnational activities on a specific group. Thus, once such subgroups as well as their ideological dispositions are identified, possible differences in the composition of these groups in terms of their members’ nationalities and party families give first indications about differences and similarities between countries that should translate, observably, into similarities in the domestic conflict over preferable institutions in post-war Europe, the analysis of which is undertaken in chapter 6. Finally, having assigned individuals to such groups allows establishing the degree to which the governments under considerations were embedded within the transnational network in post-war Europe; section 5.3 of this chapter will address this issue.

Thus, in order to inform the subsequent analysis this section proceeds by presenting the best partition of the network in five distinct groups and gives summary descriptive statistics with regard to their composition in terms of members’ nationalities and party families. In addition, each identified group will be presented visually, which allows to the information regarding individuals’ centralities into context of their position within the network.

As described in chapter 3, all community detection methods seek to identify groups or clusters in networks. Such clusters or ‘communities’ share the property that the individuals within them are more densely connected to each other than to all other
individuals in the network (Newman 2010, 371 ff.). Table 5.4 below displays the modularity scores for the different algorithms used, indicating that the ‘Springglass’ Community Detection algorithm performs best.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Modularity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Springglass</td>
<td>0.395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast greedy</td>
<td>0.382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walktrap</td>
<td>0.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infomap</td>
<td>0.365</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table presents the Modularity Scores of the used Community-Detection Algorithms. Higher scores indicate better separation of the network (see chapter 3, section 3.2.2).

In comparison to other empirical networks – such as friendship networks in multi-ethnic high schools – these modularity scores are sufficiently high in order to suggest that there is a real separation between individuals (Newman 2010, 224).

The resulting division reduces the eight organizations into six clusters or ‘communities’ of actors. Three clusters gravitate around the European pressures groups, the first group being composed of actors with only a single affiliation in the European Movement (57 members), a second group centered around the European League for Economic Cooperation (18 members), and a third cluster of actors with cross-affiliations in the two federalist organizations (44 members). The three remaining clusters are composed of actors with strong ties to the transnational party organizations. The transnational Christian Democrats form a unified cluster of 55 members whereas the transnational Social Democrats are split into two clusters, one gravitating around the proto-federalist MSEUE (24 members), the other composed of delegates of the Socialist International (aka COMISCO), comprising 21 members.

The next subsection presents and analyzes the composition of the identified groups more closely.

5.2.1 The Transnational Community Structure

In order to present these groups and describe their composition, this section presents each group in a similar manner. First, it presents a bipartite network visualization of
the cluster under consideration; second it compares the proportions of actors from different nationalities and party families within the five communities with their respective proportion in the whole sample. As indicated in the third chapter, (section 3.2.2), the visual presentation is necessary because the projection from the bipartite network to a unipartite network implies a certain loss of information, particular with regard to the sources of the ties and the exact patterns of actors’ cross-affiliations. Hence, the visual inspection of the bipartite network makes the basis for calculating centrality values transparent and provides a better understanding of the internal structure of the identified clusters as well as their overlap with the remaining clusters. The visual layout is composed utilizing a widely used algorithm that situates nodes with similar membership structures in vicinity to each other (Fruchterman and Reingold 1991). The graphs were adjusted manually for better visualization. Individuals’ node sizes are always displayed proportionately to their Eigenvector centrality: actors with the highest centrality values can be easily identified visually.

Comparing the composition of the identified groups faces a similar difficulty as above, namely taking into account the fact that observed differences in proportions may be the result of chance, or a result of the sampling procedure. For example, one identified community comprises only 18 actors as opposed to the 222 actors in the total network. Naturally, the uncertainty with the proportions of the smaller communities will, by default, generally be much larger than the associated uncertainty with the respective proportions in the whole transnational network. In order to gauge the associated uncertainty in such cases, I compare the actor proportions in the complete network with actor proportions in the identified subgroups according to their nationality and party family. In particular, I consider the proportions as a result of a binomial experiment – for example a coin toss – with a number of N trials (the population) and associated successes giving rise to the binomial distribution and its associated confidence intervals (e.g. Walpole 2011, 144 ff.). The used bounds of confidence are, for similar reasons as described above, Bayesian Highest Density Intervals, following the recommendations to use the equal tailed Jeffrey's prior for smaller sample sizes in binomial proportion tests (Brown, et al. 2001).

Having discussed the preliminaries, this section proceeds to describe the community structure resulting from overlapping memberships in the eight organizations, focusing on the five communities identified by the ‘Springglass’ algorithm, beginning with the two party family related clusters.
Transnational Christian Democrats

Several members of the transnational Christian Democratic community, as section (5.1.2) has shown, were among the best ‘connected’ actors in European transnational space as well as in highly influential domestic positions, both in terms of their parliamentary and governmental access at the time. A visual bipartite graph of this group is shown in Figure 5.6 below.

Figure 5.6 Community Detection I: Transnational Christian Democrats

Note: The figure above displays the bipartite graph of the cluster of Christian Democratic actors as identified by the Springsglass algorithm. Node sizes are displayed proportional to their Eigenvector centrality.

Apart from two genuine Christian Democratic organizations – the Geneva Circle and the NEI – several members of the Christian Democratic community possess cross-affiliations with notable transnational and, in particular, federalist organizations. Inspecting the internal structure of this community reveals, however, some differentiation. There is a visually noticeable pattern of clustering around the genuine Christian Democratic organizations, the Geneva Circle and the transnational NEI. Of the 55 actors, 47 share an affiliation within the NEI, whereas 23 actors are participating in
the informal Christian Democratic Geneva Circle. Thirty of the 55 actors are affiliated only with either the NEI or the Geneva Circle, whereas the remaining 25 actors are active within at least one of the transnational European pressure groups. The differentiation between actors engaged only in party related activities versus actors engaged in both party organizations as well as the European pressure groups suggests the possibility of internal differentiation. It is quite possible that those actors who are only active in the two party organizations may not share similar European ideology of their otherwise engaged peers.

The actors that were identified above (section 5.1.2) as having very high Degree centrality scores are in the latter group that connects the Geneva Circle, the NEI, and the European Movement, whereas Heinrich von Brentano and Enrico Rosi are members of both federalist organizations (the EPU and the UEF). Note the relatively low score of Robert Schuman that is due to a missing affiliation with the Geneva Circle, an affiliation that has been frequently but erroneously assumed, although Schuman reportedly received verbal protocols of the proceedings (Gehler 2001, 659). His successor in the Quai d’Orsay, Georges Bidault is contained within this cluster as well, affiliated with the NEI and the Geneva Circle. What can be said about the composition of this community? Figure 5.7 below presents the composition of this group.
Figure 5.7 Composition of the Christian Democratic Community

Note: The figure evaluates the composition of the Christian Democratic community according to actors’ nationality and party family. The grey bars represent the respective proportion of actors in the whole network. The white bars represent the respective proportion of actors in the Christian Democratic Community. The proportions within the respective populations are presented with Bayesian Highest Density Intervals at the 0.95 level.

Evaluating this group by party family is not meaningful: it is an almost exclusive Christian Democratic group, with one individual without affiliation – René Courtin – having attended NEI congresses. British actors are absent since Christian Democracy as a political tradition does not exist in the UK. Some of the remaining differences present slight but not ‘credible’ cases of overrepresentations: French and Luxembourghish actors represent a share in the Christian Democratic Community that is slightly higher than the upper bound of the HDI of their share in the overall network. Italian actors seem relatively absent from the Christian Democratic Community as compared to their presence in the overall network. These differences may be due to chance, however. Overall, it is apparent that this group indeed connects the sampled actors relatively widely across the continental European states.
Transnational Social Democracy

The next community to be examined is Transnational Social Democracy. Contrary to the Christian Democratic Community, transnational Social Democrats are partitioned into two clusters, suggesting considerable internal polarization based on different patterns of cross-affiliations of its members.

Figure 5.8 below displays the first cluster that might be labeled ‘Federalist’ because of the strong overlapping membership patterns with the federalist UEF and then MSEUE. Several members of the cluster below belong to the most central Social Democrats in the whole network. This group of actors on the lower right of the graph exhibits overlapping memberships with the federalist UEF, the European Movement, as well as the MSEUE. Its members, such as the French Henry Frenay and Marc Alexandre in particular, were in formally important and influential positions in the UEF, being involved in its foundational congresses. Overall, although some of the individuals assembled here are well known from the historical literature, none of these individuals were in influential governmental positions.
Figure 5.8 Community Detection II: Federalist Social Democrats

Note: The graph above displays the bipartite graph of the cluster of Federalist Social Democratic actors as identified by the Springglass algorithm. Node sizes are displayed proportional to their Eigenvector centrality.

This is drastically different for the second cluster of transnational Social Democrats, displayed in Figure 5.9 below. This group assembles figures such as long-term German SPD leader Kurt Schumacher, the long-term Dutch Prime Minister Willem Drees, the French Minister of Defense Jules Moch, Paul-Henri Spaak, the Dutch Minister of Agriculture Sicco Mansholt and the head of the French SFIO Guy Mollet.
Chapter 5 Transnational Networks I: A Structural Assessment

Figure 5.9 Community Detection III: Internationalist Social Democrats

Note: The graph above displays the bipartite graph of the second cluster of Social Democratic actors as identified by the Springglass algorithm. Node sizes are displayed proportional to their Eigenvector centrality.

A closer look reveals why this is the case. The second group largely assembles national delegation leaders to meetings of the Socialist International, whereas the first group assembles affiliates of the MSEUE that were active in the European Movement, and the federalist organizations. Additionally, a visual inspection of the community displayed above reveals a similar pattern as observed for the Christian Democrats: a number of the most prominent Social Democrats representing their countries at the Socialist international have no cross-affiliations with the European pressure groups whatsoever. In addition to the fact that Social Democrats in general form two distinct clusters, this observation suggests that transnational Social Democracy was far more polarized, across Europe, than Christian Democracy.

What about the composition of these groups? Figure 5.10 below examines the federalist cluster of Social Democrats. Due to the small number of actors in both clusters, these comparisons need to be treated cautiously.
Chapter 5 Transnational Networks I: A Structural Assessment

Figure 5.10 Composition of the Federalist Social Democrats

Note: The graph evaluates the composition of the ‘Federalist Socialist’ community according to actors’ nationality and party family. The grey bars represent the respective proportion of actors in the whole network. The white bars represent the respective proportion of actors in the ‘Federalist Socialist’ community. The proportions within the respective populations are presented with Bayesian Highest Density Intervals at the 0.95 level.

Figure 5.10 above demonstrates that no particular nationality is credibly overrepresented in this cluster. As was the case for the Christian Democrats, there are some cases of weak differences: Dutch and to a lesser degree Belgian actors are less present in this group than in the overall network. In contrast, German and, surprisingly, British actors are more present. The remaining nationalities are equally present as in the overall network.

The composition of the second Socialist group displays a similar picture, although containing a historical artifact with the absence of Italian actors. As noted in chapter 3, the sampling method focused on formal membership patterns in the organizations until and including 1950 – Italian Social Democracy was, by that time, experiencing a number of internal conflicts largely revolving around their allegiance to the Communist cause. Thus, thus no Italian members for the International were recorded.
Note: The graph evaluates the composition of the ‘Internationalist Socialist’ community according to actors’ nationality and party family. The grey bars represent the respective proportion of actors in the whole network. The white bars represent the respective proportion of actors in the ‘Internationalist Socialist’ community. The proportions within the respective populations are presented with Bayesian Highest Density Intervals at the 0.95 level.

The remaining differences in composition are equally minor and, to the degree that they exist, they mirror the differences to the first group of Social Democrats. Hence, Belgian and Dutch actors seem slightly overrepresented in the group of Internationalist Social Democrats, mirroring their relative absence in the Federalist Social Democrats. None of these observed differences, however, are credibly different from differences created by chance.
The Federalists

The remaining three clusters of actors, as already mentioned, gravitate around the transnational pressure groups. The first cluster, displayed in Figure 5.12 below, presents the ‘federalist’ community whose actors are affiliated with the two federalist organizations (UEF, EPU) and the European Movement.

Figure 5.12 Community Detection IV: Federalists

Note: The graph above displays the bipartite graph of the cluster of Federalist actors as identified by the Springglass algorithm. Node sizes are displayed proportional to their Eigenvector centrality.

The first pronounced feature of this group is the relatively balanced pattern of membership across the three main organizations. Of the 44 actors within this group, 30 share an affiliation with the European Movement, 30 share an affiliation with the UEF, and 29 are affiliated with the EPU. Accordingly, this community is the most densely connected of all five communities, having the highest clustering coefficient of 0.327. Moreover, this group includes most of the actors with the highest Eigenvector Centrality scores: of the ten highest scoring individuals presented above (section 4.1.2), eight are assigned to this group. These actors (such as Spinelli, Brugmans, La Malfa, Parri, Giacchero) share an affiliation with all three of the core organizations in this community.
Since those actors are the most influential, there are some cases of organizational overlap with other communities. Thus, Ugo La Malfa is the only individual in the federalist group with an affiliation in the ELEC, an organization that assembles its own transnational community that will be presented below. Additionally, both Al-tiero Spinelli and Henri Brugmans took part in Congresses of the MSEUE, indicating an organizational overlap with the transnational Social Democrats.

Taking a look at the composition of this group (Figure 5.13) below, there is strong evidence of an overrepresentation of Italian actors, withstanding the scrutiny of a two-sided comparison. This is not a surprising result indicating that the transnational activities of Italian actors focused heavily on federalist organizations, a conclusion that concurs with much of the historical literature on post-war Europe.

There are other differences, but these are weaker and not credibly different from a chance result. It is notable that the proportions of actors from the smaller Benelux countries within the federalist group are lower than the lower bound of the confidence margin in the overall network, German actors seem somewhat underrepresented, but not credibly so. Contrary to what might have been expected, British actors are not clearly underrepresented either.

In terms of party families, there is no clear cut difference either. There are cases of weak indications of differences in proportions for the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats but this must be qualified heavily since the proportions of both party families in the overall network are ‘inflated’ due to the fact that there are Christian Democratic and Social Democratic organization with exclusive membership. Liberals are relatively strongly present within this group as well as Conservatives. In sum, federalist dispositions should have been present in all party families across Europe across the left-right divide.
Chapter 5 Transnational Networks I: A Structural Assessment

Figure 5.13 Composition of the Federalist Community

Note: The graph evaluates the composition of the ‘Federalist’ community according to actors’ nationality and party family. The grey bars represent the respective proportion of actors in the whole network. The white bars represent the respective proportion of actors in the ‘Federalist’ community. The proportions within the respective populations are presented with Bayesian Highest Density Intervals at the 0.95 level.

The ELEC Group

The second transnational pressure group is organized around the ELEC and the European Movement. It is displayed in Figure 5.14 below.

Relatively speaking the smallest group in the network with eighteen actors, it comprises all individuals associated with the European League for Economic Cooperation, with the exception of Ugo La Malfa who is assigned to the Federalist community. This group is by far the smallest community in the network, comprising only 18 actors.
Figure 5.14 Community Detection VI: ELEC Group

![Graph of ELEC Group]

Note: The graph above displays the bipartite graph of the cluster of actors connected to the ELEC group as identified by the Springglass algorithm. Node sizes are displayed proportional to their Eigenvector centrality.

Hence, any conclusion drawn here needs to be treated with caution. As can be seen below, this group shows a similar tendency of internal differentiation as the party family communities. Of the 18 actors within this community, eight possess only a single affiliation with the ELEC and do not exhibit any further transnational activities, whereas ten actors are active within the European Movement.

In the graph above, there are two highly prominent figures with a relatively high Eigenvector Centrality, namely Paul van Zeeland, the former the Belgian Foreign Minister between 1949 and 1954, and Jelle Zijlstra, the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs between 1952 and 1959. Both were sporadic participants in the congresses of the Christian Democratic NEI. Both share membership in the European Movement with a number of actors – among Étiéenne de la Vallée Poussin, a prominent Belgian senator. At the left hand side of the graph, there is the only individual in this group
possessing a cross-affiliation with the UEF. In sum, the ELEC community displays similar signs of potential internal differentiation as did the two party family communities.

Focusing on the composition of this group (Figure 5.15 below) presents a particular difficulty due to the fact that this group is relatively underrepresented in the sample. Thus, while there are several stark differences in the proportions of actors, the associated uncertainty for such a small N is correspondingly large.

**Figure 5.15 Composition of the Transnational ELEC Group**

![Graph showing composition of ELEC group by nationality and party family]

*Note: The graph evaluates the composition of the transnational ‘ELEC group’ according to actors’ nationality and party family. The grey bars represent the respective proportion of actors in the whole network. The white bars represent the respective proportion of actors in the ‘ELEC group’. The proportions within the respective populations are presented with a Bayesian Highest Density Intervals at the 0.95 level.*

Starting with the comparison by countries, the proportion of Belgian, Dutch, and British actors in the ELEC group is about twice as high as their share in the whole network, but the small sample size makes drawing definitive conclusions difficult.
similar conclusion applies to the relative absence of Italian actors. German actors joined the ELEC only in 1950.

Looking at the respective differences in terms of actors’ party families, there is a similar problem: it appears that Conservatives and actors without any party affiliation are relatively overrepresented but not credibly so, whereas, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats are underrepresented, the latter by a sufficient margin so that a two-sided comparison supports a conclusion of underrepresentation.

The European Movement

The last community to be examined is centered on the European Movement. As mentioned in the first section, the European Movement did have a structurally prominent role within the post-war transnational network in Europe. Virtually all of the actors that accumulated the most cross-affiliations were active within this organization as well. However, there are a few actors within the sampled network who did not become active in any organization beyond the European Movement. Figure 5.16 below assembles these individuals for whom an active membership is only recorded for the European Movement.

Accordingly, these individuals’ centrality values are all similar and at the lower end of spectrum with a Degree Centrality of 135, a Eigenvector Centrality of 0.033, their Betweenness Centrality being zero. Thus, this ‘European Movement’ community is largely a residual category: it assembles actors with a only a single membership in the European Movement, whereas most of the influential actors in the remaining groups, as demonstrated below, are affiliated with the European Movement as well.
Figure 5.16 Community Detection VI: European Movement

Note: The graph above displays the bipartite graph of the cluster of actors only connected to the European Movement as identified by the Springglass algorithm. Node sizes are displayed proportional to their Eigenvector centrality.

Nevertheless, as can be seen from the graph above, this group includes several prominent actors, including two Prime Ministers of the period, namely Winston Churchill (UK) and Alcide De Gasperi (Italy), and René Mayer (France). Other notable figures include Carlo Sforza, a long-terms Italian Foreign Minister; Harold Macmillan, member of the British cabinet from 1951 onwards (UK); Édouard Herriot (France), president of the Assemblée Nationale between 1947 and 1953; Maurice Faure (France), General secretary of the French Radical Party (PRR/RS).

The fact that this ‘community’ is largely a residual category creates a difficulty for interpretation. Indeed, the fact that key individuals in all communities analyzed below share an affiliation with the European suggests the conclusion that the European Movement – as an organization – was ideological among the most divided in the transnational sphere.

In order to gauge the composition of the residual community of its members by actors’ nationalities and party family affiliations, Figure 5.17 below compares the pro-
portions of actors’ nationalities (upper row) and party families (lower row) between the European Movement Community and the whole network.

**Figure 5.17 European Movement Community Composition**

![Graph showing the composition of actors in the European Movement Community and the whole network. The graph compares the proportion of actors (in percent) with differing nationalities and party affiliations in the 'European Movement' community with their proportion in the whole network. It displays the actual proportion of each actor group in the European Movement Community (white bars) and its respective proportion in the whole network (gray bars) in percent. The error bars delimit the respective 95% Highest Density Interval.]

Note: The graph compares the proportion of actors (in percent) with differing nationalities and party affiliations in the 'European Movement' community with their proportion in the whole network. It displays the actual proportion of each actor group in the European Movement Community (white bars) and its respective proportion in the whole network (gray bars) in percent. The error bars delimit the respective 95% Highest Density Interval.

In terms of actors’ nationalities, no other differences appear to be credible, British actors seem relatively overrepresented in this group: while representing an overall share of 0.13 percent in the whole network, 13 of the 57 actors in the Movement Community are from the UK (0.23 percent).

In terms of actors’ party families, there is a small discrepancy visible for members of Conservative parties, another case in which the share in the community is twice as high as the respective share in the transnational network. In the same vein, Liberals appear to be slightly overrepresented whereas both Christian Democrats as well as Social Democrats are relatively underrepresented.
Centralities of the Identified Groups in the Transnational Network

Before a brief conclusion summarizes the composition of these clusters, a brief comparison of their centrality values is useful. Figure 5.18 below compares boxplots of the centrality values of all transnational clusters.

Figure 5.18 Boxplots of Centrality Distributions by Transnational Groups

Note: The graph displays boxplots of the distributions of two centrality indicators – Degree Centrality and Eigenvector Centrality – of actors grouped according to the identified clusters in the transnational network.

Starting with the Degree Centrality measure, there is a single exception, namely the European Movement community whose residual status implies similarly low centrality values for all its members. For the remaining actors, there are visible distributions between the centrality values, but a similar test for credible differences as used above does not return any credible discrepancies. The picture is clearer when turning the Eigenvector Centrality indicator, in which both the Federalist Socialists as well as the Federalist communities have credible higher centrality values than the remaining clusters of actors. Thus, at the transnational level, both the Federalist Community as well as the Socialist Federalist Community are by far the most active and connected individuals, which would lead to the expectation that Federalist individuals should by and large influence ideological conflicts in a disproportionate manner at the transnational level.
5.2.2 Conclusion

This section has identified clusters of individuals within the transnational networks. Assuming that similar patterns of cross-affiliations suggest similar ideological convictions, the analysis suggests a certain measure of ideological differentiation within the transnational network.

More specifically, transnational Social Democracy seems relatively strongly fragmented as the membership of actors engaged in two genuine Social Democratic organizations – the MSEUE and the Socialist International – clusters into two distinct groups. As the composition of both groups covers every country in an approximately similar manner, this result indicates significant that there may be significant ideological conflict within Social Democratic Parties in every country under consideration.

Transnational Christian Democracy appears to be more uniform structurally, as actors committed to genuine Christian Democratic organizations cluster into a single group. Although the visual inspection suggests a certain level of internal differentiation between actors only committed to Christian Democratic organizations and actors with cross-affiliations in the Europeanist organizations, these results indicate less of an internal divide and more similar ideological convictions within Christian Democratic parties than in Social Democratic ones.

Third, there appears to be a distinct ‘Federalists’ group within relatively homogenous membership patterns, whose actors span the party spectrum assembling Social Democratic, Liberal, Christian Democratic and Conservative actors in an approximately similar manner. Thus, federalist ideas should be observable within every party in every country across the left-right cleavage. Moreover, as the single credible result, Italian actors seem to concentrate their transnational activities on this group.

Finally, there were two clusters of individuals that are more difficult to interpret. One group of actors centers around the ELEC. Although the results indicate that British, Dutch, and Belgian actors focused their transnational activities disproportionally on this community, the small number of actors contained within that group prohibits more substantive conclusions.

Finally, there is residual group of actors with a single affiliation in the European Movement. As cross-affiliations with the European Movement are present in every community, the overall results strongly suggest that the overarching transnational organization should have been characterized by substantive ideological differences.
spanning across states and parties. The subsequent chapter will then approach this result from a qualitative angle.

5.3 The Embeddedness of Governments in Transnational Communities: Transgovernmental Networks

This section reconstructs the embeddedness of governments in the transnational communities identified in the previous section between 1950 and 1954. Under the assumption that the transnational communities identified in the previous chapter share distinct ideological assumptions, values, and normative commitments for constructing common international institutions in post-war Europe, identifying the patterns of embeddedness of governments within these communities allows informing the supply side of the transnational hypotheses. Similar patterns of embeddedness of governments within these transnational clusters should translate into a similarity of institutional preferences, irrespective of the material context. Changing affiliations of governments should, similarly, imply observable shifts in government preferences. In the sequence of the argument of this dissertation, the subsequent qualitative chapters will then link the transnational communities with specific ideological content, whereas the final chapter will trace whether the influence as hypothesized was voiced and what its success was within the domestic politics of the negotiation states. Finally, this section provides information about the structure of transgovernmental networks between 1950 and 1954. As chapter 2 has argued that structural imbalances are related to the dominant influences on learning outcomes exerted by ‘central’ groups, this section identifies whether, to what degree, and during which periods such an imbalance can be observed in the transgovernmental networks of post-war Europe. The subsequent qualitative chapters will trace the impact of this imbalance on the course of the negotiations.

To reiterate the discussion of the sampling strategy from the previous chapter, there are two caveats to the evidence presented in this section. Since the affiliation networks used are based on formal membership within the ‘European organizations’ that formed until 1950, both the actual strength of interactions as well as informal contacts between individuals, in particular informal transatlantic networks are excluded from the present considerations. As the network sample was restricted to contacts made before 1950, the present reconstruction does not take into account dynam-
ics of possibly changing contacts and the formation of new groups and coalitions within the transnational and transgovernmental sphere. Rather, the present section is based on the assumption that the identified communities largely present groups of individuals that collaborated closely before 1950 and therefore know each other. Furthermore, it is assumed that the period of collaboration before 1950 was sufficient for actors with similar ideologies to develop mutual trust or mistrust. These assumptions are neither implausible nor impossible to verify. Both of these issues can be addressed in the subsequent qualitative chapter that will draw on a variety of documentary evidence to study both the main ideas of Europe advocated within the transnational clusters identified above as well as the changing forms of interaction and concrete evidence of the presence (or absence) of close interaction and collaboration, including informal patterns of interaction such as transatlantic elite networks. Thus, the information presented in this section will be ‘triangulated’ by drawing on alternative archival sources.

The next section will proceed (5.3.1) by briefly explaining how the transgovernmental networks were reconstructed from the dataset. Section 5.3.2 will then present an overview of the centralities of the transnational communities within the transgovernmental networks in order to assess which communities had the most ties to the negotiating governments between 1950 and 1954, showing that the period between 1950 and 1952 displays a marked ‘imbalance’ in favor of the Christian Democratic Community. The subsequent section (5.3.3) will then present each identified transgovernmental network between 1950 and 1954 in order to describe the affiliations for each individual cabinet in order to differentiate the possible sources of ideological influence on the negotiating governments.

5.3.1 Constructing the Transgovernmental Networks, 1950-1954

In order to reconstruct transgovernmental networks from the dataset, individuals’ membership in the eight organizations in the complete dataset were replaced with their recorded membership in the six communities’ transnational clusters. Based on this information, the second step consisted of recording individuals’ memberships in any of all governmental cabinets of the Six and the UK between 1950 and 1954. Recording individuals’ membership in the respective cabinets introduces a diachronic dimension that is impractical to deal with: since governmental changes among the
seven countries do not occur in ‘regular’ and synchronized intervals, the division of these five years into similar periods is difficult, particularly because Italian and French cabinets had a tendency to be very short-lived. At the same time, reconstructing a distinct network for every French and Italian cabinet is not particularly useful. A useful division into discrete time intervals turns out to be a division into six months separating each year into two and utilizing the respective Cabinet for each period that was the most days in office. The resulting division leaves out two French and one Italian Cabinets, totaling about three months in office in the French and the Italian case.

Table 5.6 displays the names of the used Cabinets between 1950 and 1954, labeling them according to the respective head of the government. All government members at the ministerial level were included among the actors of the network, leaving out lower ranking political appointments (i.e. ‘Undersecretaries’ or ‘Staatssekretäre’) because their number and roles in the political systems of the various countries vary too widely.

The third step was to create, for each half year period, a respective bipartite network of all actors, recording their cabinet membership and their affiliation with one particular transnational cluster. The final step consisted of creating a unimodal network for every period: the vertices within these networks are the seven cabinets and the respective five communities. The edges are valued and represent the proportional share of the members of each Cabinet in any of the five communities: the higher the proportion of transnationally connected actors within a cabinet, the stronger the link of the cabinet to a particular cluster (Adapted from Messing 2012). The resulting ten networks – two for each year – allow tracking both the embeddedness of the seven Cabinets within these communities as well as the centrality of the six communities in terms of the strength of their linkages to cabinets.

In order to analyze the results, the next section (5.3.2) presents the computed centrality values of the transnational communities in the transgovernmental networks between 1950 and 1954. The subsequent section (5.3.3) presents the transgovernmental networks visually to trace the changing ‘embeddedness’ of respective Cabinets over time.
Table 5.5 West European Cabinets Used to Reconstruct Transgovernmental Networks, 1950 to 1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Luxembourg</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950a</td>
<td>Eyskens I</td>
<td>Adenauer I</td>
<td>Bidault II</td>
<td>De Gasperi VI</td>
<td>Dupong IV</td>
<td>Drees I</td>
<td>Attlee II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950b</td>
<td>Pholien I</td>
<td>Adenauer I</td>
<td>Pleven I</td>
<td>De Gasperi VI</td>
<td>Dupong IV</td>
<td>Drees I</td>
<td>Attlee II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951a</td>
<td>Pholien I</td>
<td>Adenauer I</td>
<td>Queuille IV</td>
<td>De Gasperi VI</td>
<td>Dupong IV</td>
<td>Drees II</td>
<td>Attlee II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951b</td>
<td>Pholien I</td>
<td>Adenauer I</td>
<td>Pleven II</td>
<td>De Gasperi VII</td>
<td>Dupong V</td>
<td>Drees II</td>
<td>Churchill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952a</td>
<td>Houtte I</td>
<td>Adenauer I</td>
<td>Pinay</td>
<td>De Gasperi VII</td>
<td>Dupong V</td>
<td>Drees II</td>
<td>Churchill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952b</td>
<td>Houtte I</td>
<td>Adenauer I</td>
<td>Pinay</td>
<td>De Gasperi VII</td>
<td>Dupong V</td>
<td>Drees III</td>
<td>Churchill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953a</td>
<td>Houtte I</td>
<td>Adenauer I</td>
<td>Mayer</td>
<td>De Gasperi VII</td>
<td>Dupong V</td>
<td>Drees III</td>
<td>Churchill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953b</td>
<td>Houtte I</td>
<td>Adenauer II</td>
<td>Laniel</td>
<td>Pella</td>
<td>Dupong V</td>
<td>Drees III</td>
<td>Churchill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954a</td>
<td>Acker IV</td>
<td>Adenauer II</td>
<td>Laniel</td>
<td>Scelba</td>
<td>Bech I</td>
<td>Drees III</td>
<td>Churchill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954b</td>
<td>Acker IV</td>
<td>Adenauer II</td>
<td>Mendès France</td>
<td>Scelba</td>
<td>Bech II</td>
<td>Drees III</td>
<td>Churchill</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3.2 Group Centralities in the Transgovernmental Network, 1950-1954

Computing the centrality values in the transgovernmental networks relies on the three centrality values used so far: Degree Centrality, Eigenvector Centrality, and Betweenness Centrality. Recall that the three indicators focus on different aspects of the concept of centrality: Degree Centrality captures only the number of ties a particular node possesses; Eigenvector Centrality incorporates the positions of the nodes to which a particular node is tied, so that a tie to a more central node is valued higher than a tie to a less central node; Betweenness Centrality captures the degree to which a particular node connects groups of nodes that are otherwise unconnected.

Figure 5.19 below displays the Degree Centrality of the six transnational communities within the transgovernmental networks between 1950 and 1954. Since the edge weights are proportions that, *inter alia*, depend heavily on the different sizes of Cabinets, the computation of the simple Degree Centrality measure disregards the information contained in the edge values, effectively showing the number of Cabinets a particular transnational Community had access to throughout those four years.

![Figure 5.19 Degree Centrality of Transnational Communities in Transgovernmental Networks, 1950-1954](image)

*Note: The graph displays the binary Degree Centrality of the five transnational communities between 1950 and 1954 calculated from the reconstructed transgovernmental network.*

As Figure 5.19 shows, between 1950 and 1952, the transnational Christian Democratic Community has by far the most number of ties to governments. Thus, through-
out the years of the negotiations of the ‘Paris Treaties’ – the ECSC and the EDC – all the Six cabinets, excluding the UK, had ties to the Christian Democratic community, twice the number of ties as the next highest community has. By 1952 – when the EDC Treaty was signed – this figure drops to four governments. By the end of 1954, differences effectively disappear: the Christian Democratic Community has the same number of ties as the International Social Democrats. Throughout those four years, there are little differences between the remaining clusters, certainly none that are comparable to early Christian Democratic dominance.

This picture of early Christian Democratic dominance is equally reflected by the two alternative centrality indicators. Figure 5.20 below displays the Eigenvector Centrality scores computed by including edge values.

**Figure 5.20 Eigenvector Centrality of Transnational Communities in Transgovernmental Networks, 1950-1954**

![Graph showing Eigenvector Centrality](image)

*Note: The graph displays the binary Eigenvector Centrality of the five transnational communities between 1950 and 1954 calculated from the reconstructed transgovernmental network.*

As Figure 5.20 shows, the Christian Democratic Community has the highest Eigenvector Centrality scores throughout 1950 and 1951 until the first half of 1952 when the EDC Treaty was signed. Although the discrepancy is not quite as high, the general picture of early Christian Democratic dominance is clear enough. A second interesting feature is that between late 1951 and early 1953, the Federalist Community and the ‘residual’ group of actors form the European Movement acquire a relatively prominent standing as the values for the Christian Democratic Community decline. Subsequent cabinet changes in early 1954 show a strong decline of the values for the
Christian Democratic Community and a steep rise of the values for the international Social Democrats suggesting that, by late 1953 governmental changes drastically altered the pattern of embeddedness of the European governments.

Comparing the Betweenness Centrality scores over time gives essentially the same picture, although the discrepancies are more extreme (Figure 5.21 below). Recall that Betweenness Centrality measures the structural position of a node rather than the number of ties.

**Figure 5.21 Betweenness Centrality of Transnational Communities in Transgovernmental Networks, 1950-1954**

![Betweenness Centrality Chart](image)

*Note: The graph displays the binary Eigenvector Centrality of the five transnational communities between 1950 and 1954 calculated from the reconstructed transgovernmental network.*

Figure 5.21 demonstrates a similar predominance of the Christian Democratic Community between 1950 and 1952 as the previous two centrality measures indicated. The early discrepancy is much more pronounced, the subsequent decline as well. There is a more pronounced increase in the values of the European Movement and the cluster centered around the ELEC group, but their interpretation requires more information on specific governments, information that is given in the next section.

Overall, there are a few conclusions that can be drawn at this point without knowing the affiliations of particular governments. Between 1950 and 1952, all three centrality scores indicate a possible imbalance in the transgovernmental networks privileging the Christian Democratic Community. The early imbalance suggests that the patterns of influence that were described in chapter 2 (section 2.3.4) are likely: to the
extent that the negotiations over the EDC were conducted in an uncertain strategic and causal environment, the beliefs shared by those individuals should have a dominating influence on the governments conducting negotiations that produced the EDC Treaty in 1952. Hence, the centrality indicators potentially provide a clear, albeit qualified support to the claims by Kaiser and colleagues (Gehler 2001; Gehler and Kaiser 2001; Kaiser 2007). It appears that the influence of the transnational Christian Democratic community was, at least in terms of its structural conditions within the transnational sphere, much higher than that of any other transnational group. After 1952, however, this privileged position of the Christian Democratic Community wanes, so that by the end of 1954, cabinet changes lead to the Social Democratic Community – or parts thereof – having more overlap with the European governments.

The subsequent section examines these changes in more detail, focusing on the embeddedness of individual governments over time.

5.3.3 Transgovernmental Networks, 1950-1954: A Second Look

After the previous section has focused on the transnational communities and their centralities, in effect studying the overall preeminence of the communities within the transgovernmental networks, the present section focuses more on the individual governments and cabinets between 1950 and 1954 in order evaluate to what degree there were differences in the overlap between specific cabinets and the respective transnational communities. This information is presented through visualizations of the ten respective transgovernmental networks. The individual network graphs were constructed so that the respective edges are valued and directed from Cabinets to Communities, their values representing share of members of each Cabinet being affiliated with any one of the six communities. Visual inspection of these graphs then allows drawing conclusions as to possible transnational influence on specific cabinets over time. In the visual representations below, the thicker the visualization of an edge from a respective government to a transnational community is, the higher the share of the respective cabinet member participating in meetings of the respective community.
Figure 5.22 Transgovernmental Networks 1950

Note: The graph above presents the embeddedness of the Cabinets of the Six and the UK within the transnational networks throughout 1950. The governments appear in nodes colored and shaped according to the dominant party family. The transnational communities appear as white circles. The edges are directed, their width representing the proportion of members of a particular cabinet sharing an affiliation with a particular transnational community.
Beginning this evaluation in chronological order, Figure 5.22 represents the transgovernmental network for 1950, the year both the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan were proposed by the French government. The dominance of the Christian Democratic Community that was mentioned before can be seen in the graph above. By late 1950, all governments of the Six were, to varying degrees, associated with the Christian Democratic cluster of the transnational network. A second notable feature is the association of the Italian and French governments with the Federalist Community and the European Movement cluster. Irrespective of individual shifts and the high turnover rate of cabinets in both countries, these ties remain in place until late 1953. Finally, the single affiliation of the German government to the Christian Democratic community remains in place throughout the whole period.

The main change in mid-1950 is due to a cabinet change due an internal political change in Belgium brought two new members into the Belgian government: Paul Van Zeeland from the Christian Democratic PSC-CVP took over the Foreign Ministry and Albert Coppé (PSC-CVP) took over the Ministry of Economics. The former is affiliated with the ELEC group, the latter with the transnational Christian Democrats. Finally, a new French cabinet under René Pleven (UDSR) took over. Jules Moch (SFIO) entered the Cabinet as a Minister of Defense and Guy Mollet (SFIO) as special Minister for the Council of Europe. This move connected the Pleven Cabinet to both the transnational Christian Democrats and to the transnational Social Democrats.

The next graph displays the transgovernmental networks in 1951. In the early period of 1951, the structure of the network is similar to late 1950. The only shift that affects the embeddedness of governments in 1951 is, due to the British election that brings in a new conservative government under Churchill in 1951 that has some affiliations with the ELEC group and the European Movement.

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61 For the Italian government of De Gasperi, the overlap consists of Ugo La Malfa (Minister without Portfolio, PRI) and Ivan Matteo Lombardo (Minister of Industry, PSDI). For the French Cabinet of Bidault, the overlap consists only in Yvon Delbos (Minister of National Education, PRR/RS).
Figure 5.23 Transgovernmental Networks 1951

Note: The graph presents the embeddedness of the Cabinets of the Six and the UK within the transnational networks throughout 1951. The governments appear in nodes colored and shaped according to the dominant party family. The transnational communities appear as white circles. The edges are directed, their width representing the proportion of members of a particular cabinet sharing an affiliation with a particular transnational community.

The new British cabinet changes picture slightly, but the general structure remains in place despite the fact that an election in France in mid-1951 substantially altered the composition of the Assemblée Nationale. Its new composition is not reflected in the
transgovernmental networks. The embeddedness of the French and Italian cabinets in the federalist community and the European Movement remains untouched; the dominant position of the Christian Democratic community persists throughout 1951.

**Figure 5.24 Transgovernmental Networks 1952**

![Diagram showing transgovernmental networks in 1952 with nodes for the cabinets of the Six and the UK, colored and shaped according to the dominant party family. The transnational communities appear as white circles. The edges are directed, their width representing the proportion of members of a particular cabinet sharing an affiliation with a particular transnational community.]

*Note: The graph presents the embeddedness of the Cabinets of the Six and the UK within the transnational network throughout 1952. The governments appear in nodes colored and shaped according to the dominant party family. The transnational communities appear as white circles. The edges are directed, their width representing the proportion of members of a particular cabinet sharing an affiliation with a particular transnational community.*
Throughout 1952, the year the EDC was signed, additional shifts occur (see Figure 5.24) above. Compared to the embeddedness of other transnational communities, the Christian Democratic Community loses some access, most notably to the Belgian government. Additionally, by late 1952, British, Belgian, and Dutch cabinets share an affiliation with the ELEC group.

By early 1952, the new Belgian government under Jean van Houtte (PSC-CVP) no longer shares an affiliation with the Christian Democratic Community as Albert Coppé (PSC-CVP) is replaced by Jean Duvieusart (PSC-CVP) as a Minister of Economics. As a result, Belgian transnational affiliations are reduced to a membership in the ELEC community, represented by Foreign Minister Paul Van Zeeland (PSC-CVP), who, as shown above, took part in yearly congresses of the Christian Democratic NEI. An additional shift affected the Netherlands. By late 1952, an internal shift excluded Theo Rutten (KVP) who was replaced by Jo Cals (KVP) as a Minister for Science and Education, leaving the Dutch government without a member affiliated with the Christian Democratic Network. Thus, by late 1952, as already indicated by the centrality indicators, the privileged position of the Christian Democratic Network wanes, as it now connects only the ‘big’ three of the Six (Italy, France, Germany) and Luxemburg. Moreover, Dutch prime Minister Willem Drees in mid-1952 included a new Foreign Minister Johan Willem Beijen\(^{62}\), originator of the so-called Beyen Plans for a common European Market of 1953 and 1955, as well as the was the new Dutch Minister for Economics and ELEC affiliate Jelle Zijlstra (ARP). The affiliations of the Belgian and Dutch governments now converge on the ELEC Community – consistent with the relative overrepresentation of both countries in that community observed in section 5.2.1 above. The embeddedness of the three large countries remained unaffected. Both France and Italy remain the only two countries affiliated with both the European Movement and the transnational federalists.

This structure remains unaffected by cabinet changes in the first half of 1953 (Figure 5.25 below), when difficulties regarding the ratification of the EDC came to the forefront and the EPC Draft Treaty was presented to the Six.

\(^{62}\) Beijen is sometimes also referred to as Johan Willem Beyen.
Figure 5.25 Transgovernmental Networks 1953

Note: The graph presents the embeddedness of the Cabinets of the Six and the UK within the transnational networks throughout 1953. The governments appear in nodes colored and shaped according to the dominant party family. The transnational communities appear as white circles. The edges are directed, their width representing the proportion of members of a particular cabinet sharing an affiliation with a particular transnational community.

As the ratification difficulties for the EDC intensified in the second half of 1953, domestic changes in France and Italy lead to significant changes in their ties to the transnational communities (see Figure 5.26 above). Although the Christian Democratic DC remained the governing party in Italy, domestic changes due to the 1953
election produced a new government under Giuseppe Pella (DC) that consisted of a coalition with two right of center parties (the monarchist Partito Nazionale Monarchico and the nationalist MSI) and decoupled the Italian government from the Federalist Community, in spite of the fact that Italy was particularly overrepresented in the Federalist community. Since Alcide De Gasperi was no longer Italian Prime Minister, the new composition of the Cabinet equally implied that the hitherto strong ties to the European Movement had been reduced as well. In France, the shift from the Mayer Cabinet to the cabinet under Laniel severed the ties to the European Movement that every French government had until this point. Georges Bidault replaced Robert Schuman as Foreign Minister. The linkage with the Federalist community, constituted by Edgar Faure (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, PRR/RS) and André Mutter (Ministry of Veterans and War Victims, CNIP) remained. Both shifts alter the embeddedness of the Italian and French governments that persisted during the foundational years of the ECSC and the negotiation of the EDC Treaty. As will be shown in the subsequent chapters, they were directly tied to the EDC ratification debate.

Towards the beginning of 1954, more drastic changes occurred. As Figure 5.26 below demonstrates, the new Italian cabinet under Mario Scelba (DC), consisting of a similar coalition as the previous government under Giuseppe Pella, severed its ties with the European Movement as well. Moreover, an election in Belgium brought in an entirely new Social Democratic government under Achille Van Acker (BSP-PSB), including Paul-Henri Spaak as new Belgian Foreign Minister, implying that the Belgian government now had overlapping memberships with the European Movement and the transnational Social Democrats. All of these changes in late 1953 and early 1954 reflect the relative decline in dominance of the Christian Democratic community as well as that of the Federalists and the relative rise in centrality of the transnational Social Democrats, during a time when the ratification debate – particularly in France – intensified.

The most drastic change that is introduced by late 1954 is the final eradication of any semblance of Christian Democratic dominance. As the overview of the centrality indicators in the previous section implied, by late 1954, there is little difference between the access available to the Social Democratic and the Christian Democratic Community.
An entirely surprising aspect of the second half of 1954 is the relative isolation of the French government under Mendès France. For the first time, the link between the French government and the Christian Democratic Community is severed. Second, the French government had no longer any minister from the federalist community. Both
facts may suggest a profoundly different set of preferences of the French government. In conjunction, the changing nature of embeddedness of the Italian and French governments may provide an indication of an alternative explanation for the shifting preferences and conflict constellations throughout the EDC bargain.

5.3.4 Conclusion

This section has utilized the results of the cluster analysis to investigate the transnational embeddedness of the governments negotiating the EDC Treaty. On the assumption that these different clusters subscribed to different ideological analysis and institutional prescriptions, two results are worth mentioning.

The most important result established is somewhat unsurprising: the Christian Democratic cluster presents the transgovernmentally best connect group of actors between 1950 and 1952 by a rather wide margin, irrespective of the centrality indicator used to establish the result. Connecting most of the governments of the Six most of the time between 1950 and 1952, it is argued that transgovernmental networks reconstructed in this dissertation were ‘imbalanced’ between 1950 until 1952: the dominance of the Christian Democratic cluster was sufficiently high to expect their influence over the basic beliefs and arguments structuring the bargain in during this time to be predominant. Due to a number of domestic changes, this dominance declines rapidly by the end of 1952. Thus, in 1953 and 1954, no distinct group can be said to have had a similar sort of influence. In addition, more subtle differences exist: based on their governments’ embeddedness within these clusters, one would expect clear differences between France and Italy on the one hand, and Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK on the other hand. Whereas the former share a similar affiliation with the Federalist community and the European Movement between 1950 and 1953, the latter exhibit a primary attachment to the European Movement and the ELEC community. Most importantly, these results point to an alternative explanation for why French and Italian governments were ardent supporters of a European supranational army in the early stages of the bargain whereas the ratification of the EDC stalled subsequently.
5.4 Conclusion and Implications for the Subsequent Chapters

The present section has provided an analysis of the network data of the transnational networks constituted by actors’ activities in eight transnational organizations in Europe until 1950. Three results are significant.

First, it was shown that there is no marked difference between actors’ centrality values between different Party Families, with the exception of a relative lack of strength of Conservative actors. Comparing actors’ centralities according to their nationalities revealed that Italian individuals seem systematically better connected than their peers from other countries, particularly with regard to their Eigenvector Centrality Score. In general, the structure of the cross-affiliations seems indeed ‘transnational’. In this sense, the overall network connected European states and parties and provided a potential ‘transmission belt’ for transnational conflict among the European elite into all European states under consideration.

Second, this chapter has identified clusters of individuals within the transnational networks. Assuming that similar patterns of cross-affiliations suggest similar ideological convictions, the analysis suggests a certain measure of ideological differentiation within the transnational network. Transnational Social Democracy seems relatively strongly fragmented as the membership of actors engaged in two genuine Social Democratic organizations – the MSEUE and the Socialist International – clusters into two distinct groups. As the composition of both groups covers every country in an approximately similar manner, this result indicates that there may be significant ideological conflict within Social Democratic Parties in every country under consideration. Transnational Christian Democracy appears to be more uniform structurally, as actors committed to genuine Christian Democratic organizations cluster into a single group, indicating less of an internal divide and more similar ideological convictions within Christian Democratic parties than in Social Democratic ones. Additionally, there is a distinct ‘Federalist’ group with relatively homogenous membership patterns, whose actors span the party spectrum assembling Social Democratic, Liberal, Christian Democratic and Conservative actors in an approximately similar manner. Thus, federalist ideas should be observable within every party in every country across the left-right cleavage. Italian actors seem to concentrate their transnational activities on this group. Finally, one group of actors centers around the ELEC. Although the results indicate that British, Dutch, and Belgian actors focused
their transnational activities disproportionally on this community, the small number of actors contained within that group prohibits more substantive conclusions. In addition, there is a residual group of actors with a single affiliation in the European Movement. As cross-affiliations with the European Movement are present in every community, the overall results strongly suggest that the overarching transnational organization should have been characterized by substantive ideological differences spanning across states and parties.

Third, analyzing the embeddedness of the European governments negotiating the EDC Treaty points to two conclusions. First, the Christian Democratic cluster presents the transgovernmentally best connect group of actors between 1950 and 1952 by a rather wide margin, irrespective of the centrality indicator used to establish the result. Connecting most of the governments of the Six most of the time between 1950 and 1952, transgovernmental networks reconstructed in this dissertation were ‘imbalanced’ between 1950 until 1952: the dominance of the Christian Democratic cluster was sufficiently high to expect their influence over the basic beliefs and arguments structuring the bargain in during this time to be predominant. Due to a number of domestic changes, this dominance declines rapidly by the end of 1952. Thus, in 1953 and 1954, no distinct group can be said to have had a similar sort of influence. In addition, more subtle differences exist: based on their governments’ embeddedness within these clusters, one would expect clear differences between France and Italy on the one hand, and Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK on the other hand. Whereas the former share a similar affiliation with the Federalist community and the European Movement between 1950 and 1953, the latter exhibit a primary attachment to the European Movement and the ELEC community. Most importantly, these results point to an alternative explanation for why French and Italian governments were ardent supporters of a European supranational army in the early stages of the bargain whereas the ratification of the EDC stalled subsequently as Italian and French governments were increasingly disconnected from the transnational communities.
6. Transnational Networks in Post-war Europe II: A Qualitative Assessment

The present chapter builds upon the analysis of the previous chapter. Taking political speeches and rhetoric as its primary qualitative source of evidence, this chapter will provide the outlines of a transnational conflict of ‘ideas of Europe’ between that was already implicit in the clustering of the transnational networks presented in the previous chapter. Behind a vague consensus on the need for ‘European unity’, there were multiple causal narratives and different institutional prescriptions that this conflict entailed. The implications of these narratives can, roughly, be reduced to three different types of rhetorical commitments that actors subscribed to across the transnational communities: an intergovernmental model, a supranational model, and a federalist model, circulating in both the transnational organizations as well as in transatlantic relationships between the European and a distinct American political elite.

The first section (6.1) of this chapter thus focuses on the transnational groups introduced in the previous chapter and, in addition, includes the transatlantic linkage. At a superficial consensual level, the basic terms through which the notion of ‘Europe’ was understood had shifted and ‘European unity’ and peaceful cooperation had become a universally accepted goal. The concrete ‘causal stories’ behind that consensus and their implied institutional prescriptions differed widely.

Until 1950, early superficial commitments to ‘European unity’ as well as loyalties to transnational party families held together a loose consensus among the European transnational political elite at the lowest common ideological denominator resulting in the creation of the Council of Europe. Subsequently, the wide differences between actors regarding the actual institutional implications of ‘European unity’ contributed to a decisive break and the emergence of a temporary transnational coalition of supranationalists and federalists in the early 1950’s. The second section of this chapter analyzes the emergence this coalition in the early 1950’s. The transnational organizations themselves, however, were relatively fragile, constituting only loose associations. Moreover, the similarity of goals within the transnational coalition varied providing for a temporary alignment that seemingly evaporated with the failure of the EDC in 1954. It was constituted by key individuals from the transnational Chris-
tian Democrats, Socialists, federalists as well as individuals within the ‘Foreign policy apparatus’ of the US. Grounded partially in similar deeper level causal and normative beliefs as well similar strategic assessments, their common ground was a similar political goal: a European Army with supranational institutions. Through its privileged access to governments in the US, France, Germany, and Italy, it was able to insert its reasoning into the processes of preference and strategy formation of key bargaining governments. Tracing the rhetorical content of these beliefs and the exchanges of strategic information on the transnational and transgovernmental level is the task of the second section of this chapter (section 6.2).

“All the States represented here have, I think, now accepted the principle that some form of European integration must be achieved. Opinions differ only on the question of how this is to be done.”

Alcide De Gasperi
to the Assembly of the Council of Europe,
December 10th, 1951.

6.1 Transnational Networks and Post-War ‘Ideas of Europe’

The most remarkable feature of the political world in post-war Europe was undoubtedly the extent to which major political voices in all of Western Europe seemed united and committed to the creation of a ‘United States of Europe’, as Winston Churchill put it in Zurich in September 1946 (Churchill 1946). Old political forces like the Social Democrats just as well as the recently founded Christian Democrats equally denounced the European past of national competition; new transnational organizations, some of them founded by former resistance members in the rubbles of the post-war world, dedicated themselves programmatically to a European federation (Lipgens 1968; Lipgens and Loth 1977). The continued advocacy of ‘European economic federation’ (Healey 2011, 233) by high level US officials during the negotiations of the Marshall Plan suggest a virtual unanimity among European and American political elites on the future institutional shape of post-war Europe. European ‘unity’ was ubiquitous.

63 (Quoted in De Gasperi 1951)
As a result, claims about the ‘idea’ of a united Europe having influenced the post-war integration project abound in the literature. Asserting that Europe was a distinct region whose societies shared a set of similarities that gave rise to the ‘West’ and thus possessed a distinct sense of unity was certainly nothing new. From Rousseau to Tocqueville to lesser figures such as Coudenhove-Kalergi, such abstract reasoning has perhaps a longer ideological history than the idea of the nation-state itself (e.g. Voyenne 1964). At the same time, much of the historical work on the long-term history of the European idea suffers from a generality that tends to take any historic utterance of ‘European unity’ out of its specific context and leaves ‘European unity’ as concept without any specific meaning (Swedberg 1994, 383).

The post-war discourse on European unity suffered from a similar problem. The mere fact of post-war unanimity about the necessity of an abstract form of European ‘unity’, however superficial, is not puzzling at all since the European countries were faced with a similar daunting problem: the West European socio-economic reconstruction and political reorganization in the emerging Cold War (i.e. Loth 2014). As an answer, a vague notion of closer European unity made sense structurally because it implied solving economic problems such as the ‘dollar gap’ (e.g. Eichengreen 1995) as well as the geopolitical problem of how to integrate Germany in the western alliance. Thus, materially - economically as well as geopolitically – some form of ‘unity’ implemented through a new and effective institutional environment became ever more urgent, the more the tensions with the Soviet Union grew.

Thus, the meaning of ‘European unity’ had acquired a novel quality, at least when compared to the ‘classical’ notion of Europe. In the classical sense, the very meaning of the European ‘concert of states’ connoted both unity and discord. It implied that war was one of the many ordinary ways in which states conducted their business and resolved conflicts (Deudney 2007, 136 ff.). War was part and parcel of any particular European national identity, even a desirable component. Thus, violent conflict and European unity, in the old image, were hardly perceived as contradictions. As Edward Gibbon put it in his classical comparison between Europe and ancient Rome,
“It is the duty of the patriot to prefer and promote the exclusive interest and glory of his native country: but a philosopher may be permitted to enlarge his views, and to consider Europe as a great republic, whose various inhabitants have attained almost the same level of politeness and cultivation. The Balance of Power will continue to fluctuate, and the prosperity of our own or the neighboring kingdoms may be alternately exalted or depressed; but these partial events cannot essentially injure our general state of happiness, the system of arts, and laws, and manners, which so advantageously distinguish, above the rest of mankind, the Europeans and their colonies” (Quoted in Deudney 2007, 141).

Global material superiority, ‘cultural superiority’, empire, and recurrent but benign wars among its nations to whom ‘European citizens’ owed their primary allegiance: these were elements of a notion of Europe that had dominated the ‘age of Empire’ (Hobsbawm 2007). The idea of nationalism, in this sense, was intricately wound up with a ‘certain idea of Europe’. The First World War had already shattered that image; the Second World War, the emerging conflict between the two non-European global superpowers, an unprecedented vulnerability, and the apparent dependence of all Western Europeans on the United States for their own survival: these hallmarks of the post-war era had rendered the old notion of Europe useless as a guide for political action for good. In an era of unprecedented interdependence in terms of basic security needs for European peoples, the established means for dealing with interstate-conflicts were no longer suitable and ‘reinventing’ Europe became a practical necessity.

In addition, a new image of Europe was strategically convenient. In Italy and Germany, reconstruction implied reconstructing democracy on the ruins of a fascist and genocidal state; in the formerly occupied countries of Western Europe, reconstruction implied dealing with the experiences of occupation, collaboration, and resistance. Reconstruction thus required the legitimation of cooperating with former enemies or collaborators, both internationally and domestically. In this sense, ‘Europe’ would come to represent a rhetorical commitment to cooperation based on a certain set of values, defined both in opposition to the fascist past as well as in opposition to the emerging communist bloc (see Judt 2002). A part of this construction was thus entirely intentional and strategic, to mobilize and engage those that were needed, that is, to “[…] show the rising generation that there was a job to be done worthy of their ambitions and to give them their place in a really great community, no longer attainable by one nation, but only by a free association of peoples”
(Courtin 1949, 9). ‘European Unity’ was thus, from the beginning, conceived from a strategic point of view as well.⁶⁴

However, the concrete implications of the new ‘European unity’ were highly contested among the Western political elite. Differences were related to different narratives concerning the causes of the previous two wars and the current situation that European states found themselves in. There were vast differences as well as an inherent vagueness, both in terms of the geographical meaning of ‘Europe’ as well as what the institutional implications of European ‘unity’ actually were, leaving ample space for mutual misunderstandings and deep conflict over post-war European institutions as well as the policy areas that required such novel solutions. The first transnational conferences – for example in The Hague in 1948 – already revealed that the unanimity was as superficial as the ideological sources of the post-war ‘Eurocant’ were disparate (Judt 2002, 167). To be sure, there were the obvious culprits. The political resolution of the congress at The Hague denounced the “progressive evils of nationalism” and recognized that “in the present emergency the organizations created are by [European states] themselves [are] insufficient to provide any lasting remedy” to the “unprecedented menace to the well-being and the security of the peoples of Europe”.⁶⁵ While this concern was similar to most, actors were steeped in different political traditions, national contexts, possessed different biographies and had made different experiences during the war. As a result, concrete institutional goals differed as well.

To order those inherent differences across multiple narratives circulating in the existent political traditions, David Mitrany had, already in 1948, proposed to distinguish between three different types of ‘remedies’ that were discussed in post-war Europe, namely “(i) a general and fairly loose association, like the League of Nations and the United Nations, (ii) a federal system and (iii) functional arrangements.” (Mitrany 1948, 351). This distinction is implicit in much of the existing literature on ‘ideas of

⁶⁴ As De Gasperi put it while defending ‘European federalism’ in the Italian Senate “[…] some said that the European federation is a myth. It’s true, it is a myth in the Sorelian sense. And if you want to there to be a myth, then please tell us what myth we need to give to our youth concerning relations between one state and another, the future of Europe, the future of the world, security, and peace, if not this effort toward unification? Do you prefer the myth of dictatorship, the myth of power, the myth of one’s nation’s flag, even if it is accompanied by heroism? But then, we would create once again that conflict that inevitably leads to war. I tell you that this myth is a myth of peace” (quoted in Müller 2012, 19).

⁶⁵ Political Resolution, The Hague Congress, 7-10th May 1948 (Congress of Europe 1948).
Chapter 6 Transnational Networks II: A Qualitative Assessment

Europe’ (e.g. Jachtenfuchs, et al. 1998; Thiemeyer 1998; Jachtenfuchs 2002; Parsons 2003’). As already described in chapter 3, ideal-types, by themselves, are not causally relevant social facts: instead they are reconstructions that, by ordering different observations or facts allow the meaningful explanation of purposeful behavior (Weber 1988a, 193). The literature thus distinguishes several different ‘ways of talking and thinking about Europe’, the most useful of which is found in Craig Parsons’ work (Parsons 2002, 2003). According to this argument, there were three distinguishable French models for post-war Europe that crystallized after the initial setbacks of French policy seeking to contain the German reconstruction. A traditional model that “appealed to legitimacy rooted in the nation-state as an inseparable whole” associated with prescriptions for a policy of balancing (Parsons 2003, 43). A confederal model sharing similarities with the traditional model but “qualified this with Anglophilic ‘pragmatism’ and a liberal view of international politics” and hence prescribing “a strategy of cooperation in broad, multilateral, intergovernmental organizations” (Parsons 2003, 43, 44). Finally, a ‘community model’ that “rested on ‘functionalist’ notions of political legitimacy” and prescribed “supranational institutions” and “real integration” that would lead “perhaps to a United States of Europe as powerful and rich as America.” (Parsons 2003, 44).

A differentiation into three broad ideal typical categories is useful but their logic can be refined. Building upon the literature, a useful distinction relates central values contained in the various causal stories to two central political values or “conception of the desirable” in post-war Europe: (Van Deth and Scarbrough 1995, 28): the nation and democracy.

The first model, following Parsons, is a ‘traditional’ model, since its main corollary is the preservation of the nation-state; the autonomy and sovereignty of the nation is seen as a value that takes literally the “principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 1983, 1). Hence, those attached to the values and political norms implied by nationalism, when confronted with the problem of post-war reconstruction, had to find ways to preserve the nation state and its sovereignty, the result of which, in Mitrany’s words quoted above, was a preference for a ‘loose association’ of nation-states. A persistent commitment to national sovereignty does not imply a skeptical attitude towards international institutions per se. As argued above, essentially all actors participating in the transnational exchanges over the design of post-war Europe shared the basic concern that some novel form of dis-
pute resolution had to be found in Europe. The distinguishing feature of this model is a preference for as little centralization – i.e. pooling and delegation – as possible. Thus, international institutions are the means to preserve the viability of national sovereignty which, at the same time, is the guarantee of democratic sovereignty. Although actors following a traditional model share the concern of finding suitable international institutional arrangements for post-war Europe, the departure from the assumptions contained in the classic European notion of interstate conduct is relatively small. Recognizing the need for institutions and close intergovernmental cooperation, actors prefer unanimous decisions to voluntarily submitting sovereign decision-making rights to a supranational body deciding by majority. The reasons for this skepticism may be numerous: a principled attachment to the nation, concerns for the normative implications of delegating democratically legitimated sovereign rights, and a skepticism towards the necessity thereof. This is not to say that traditionalist actors reject the delegation of sovereignty in principle, but rather tend to prefer minimalist solutions to given cooperation problems. Thus, they may seek assurances of the credibility of commitments, they may advocate the institutionalization of agencies for monitoring purposes, but, in general, they prefer the institutionalization of ‘Councils of States’ that decide unanimously. In general, this tendency applies both to ‘low’ as well as ‘high politics’.

The natural opposite of this model – a ‘federalist model’ – leads to a different set of principles. The ideological point of departure, here, is little or only weak attachment to the nation-state and the normative principles of nationalism. Confronted with post-war Europe, the source of that detachment was the declaration that the nation-state had “[…] become a divine entity, an organism that has to consider only its own existence […]” and that the “[…] absolute sovereignty of national states has given each the desire to dominate […]” without showing “[…] the least regard for the damage this might cause to others.” (Spinelli and Rossi 1941).

It is probably no coincidence that the main advocates of this model came from various resistance organizations: the practical requirement of organizing trust and cooperation between actors with different nationalities and political convictions under extreme political repression during the war may have turned the notion of a united
Europe into an attractive ideological device (Florath 2005). Thus, federalists drew the most radical conclusion: since it was precisely national sovereignty that had led Europe into the post-war quagmire, national sovereignty had to be abolished. Due to democratic commitments, federalism thus transplants national sovereignty: as a logical conclusion, it reinstates democratic institutions at the supranational level. Hence, there is no systematic distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics. The concrete institutional implications of ‘federalism’ however are less clear. Since the ideological history of ‘ideas of democracy’ is not uncontested, even the term federalism does not necessarily imply unanimity about the concrete design of federalist institutions. As Michael Burgess has put it, federalism “has many faces: political idea, strategy, influence, process and goal. Federalism is all of these things.” (Burgess 2000, 28).

Provided that actors embrace norms of constitutional democratic government, a federalist conviction leads to direct applications of (liberal) democratic and federalist principles of constitutional design for a wider political community, including the “the proper checks and balances between the different departments” as James Madison put it (Hamilton, et al. 2014, 253). Federalist thinking along these lines thus harks back to the mainstays of modern democratic constitutional design. A different lineage growing from this tradition, however, stems from a more radical skepticism towards the state and leads to the rejection of any centralized form of government and instead turns towards particular federalist versions of anarchist-syndicalist thought, the modern day origins of which can be found in Pierre Joseph Proudhon (Voyenne 1981). Concrete institutional prescriptions within this tradition are difficult to formulate. As will be seen below, this tradition, whose supporters described themselves as ‘Personalists’ in the federalist community, nevertheless played a certain role within the federalist movement.

A third model called for a novel institutional hybrid form – ‘supranationalism’ – that emerged in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s (Thiemeyer 1998; Rittberger 2009). While refraining from federalist radicalism, this model entails the call for ‘functional’ cooperation that implied some transfer of sovereignty, a view that is perhaps best exemplified by David Mitrany’s work on ‘functionalism’ (Mitrany 1944). Mitrany is a representative of a wider debate in Anglo-Saxon academic and economic elites at

66 For example, a well-known group of German resistance actors, including communists such as Robert Havemann, went by the name of ‘Europäische Union’ (Florath 2005).
the time (Anderson 1998). The view that some check on national sovereignty – credible commitments in modern parlance – was required for a lasting peace was widespread, shared, for example by the alleged ‘realist’ E.H. Carr, who, reacting to the demise of Imperial Europe, equally advocated international functional agencies to regulate economic affairs (Carr 1942; Deudney 2007, 76). Though borne out of skepticism towards the nation-state, these actors did not share the radical detachment of the federalists: they did not seek the foundation of a new political community. On the other hand, they equally rejected the view that ‘Councils of States’ are effective in providing the institutional means to restructure international cooperation in post-war Europe in a permanently peaceful manner. Sharing part of the federalist diagnosis – that absolute national sovereignty tends to systematically produce violent conflicts in Europe – these actors seek a containment of national sovereignty. This goal results in a conscious effort at designing an institutional lock-in that is supposed to remain in place to constrain the choices of leaders’ political choices in the future. The immediate institutional implication is a rejection of unanimous forms of decision-making: at least some durable form of substantial delegation and pooling of national sovereignty was seen as essential. The institutional reasoning is thus susceptible to concerns for transaction costs, the distribution of power, as well as normative concerns. As a distinct institutional form, it was supported by a variety of centrist actors, for a variety of motivations, be it economic and geopolitical concerns as well as concerns for democratic norms of appropriate representation (Thiemeyer 1998; Rittberger 2009). In this sense, supranational institutions are a hybrid design which, though in certain respects ‘sui generis’, emerges from systematic arguments that combine the goals of efficiency, effective control of power asymmetries, and ‘sufficient’ democratic legitimation. Its hybrid nature therefore invites difficulties of classification. There may be some ambiguity regarding the status of the judiciary and the ‘Community law’ as either being subject to the principles of International Law or a fundamentally new type of supranational law (Boerger-De Smedt 2012). In this sense, the distinction of a supranationalist view from the federal and the intergovernmental view is a matter of degree, not of kind. It involves different attitudes as to the extent to which sovereign transfers are viewed as desirable, whether delegation of sovereignty to international agencies should be accompanied by the pooling of decision-making, and whether its suitable scope entails both security and economics, or merely the latter. Genuine functionalist reasoning largely restricted supranational cooperation to the economic sphere. As Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker put it in 1951 “[it] should be borne
in mind that Europe is not a building which can be pulled down and rebuilt. It is a living organism which can be altered only gradually. Let us proceed step by step, then, always with a practical end in view.” (Stikker 1951, 444). Before 1950, there were few voices – besides the radical federalists – that would advocate the immediate extension of radical pooling to defense issues: that dynamic would change.

**Figure 6.1 Attachment to the Nation-State and Institutional Preferences for Security Cooperation in Post-War Europe: an Idealized Picture**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weak attachment to the nation-state</th>
<th>Medium attachment to the nation-state</th>
<th>High attachment to the nation-state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Goal:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Political Goal:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Political Goal:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abolishment of national sovereignty</td>
<td>containment of national sovereignty</td>
<td>preserving national sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared democratic values</td>
<td>Shared democratic values</td>
<td>Shared democratic values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founding a new political community: direct application of democratic principles of constitutional design</td>
<td>Institutional 'lock-in' of peaceful cooperation: institutional solutions to concerns for transaction costs, the distribution of power, and democratic legitimacy</td>
<td>Preserving national (democratic) sovereignty: balancing through material capabilities and alliances; institutional solutions to concerns for transaction costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Federal Democracy&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Supranationality&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Council of States&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two chamber legislative branch, accountable executive, independent and supreme judiciary</td>
<td>Hybrid System with sectorally limited but substantial pooling/delegation, a parliament with limited rights, and an independent judiciary</td>
<td>Institutionalized cooperation, no/very little pooling (unanimity) and limited delegation (oversight)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.1 above summarizes these differences in terms of their relationship to nationalism, its ideological underpinnings, and associated preferred institutional blueprints.

These institutional models allow a broad orientation and classification of the degrees to which transnational groups were characterized by ideological homogeneity or heterogeneity. Behind these institutional prescriptions were – and still are – multiple causal stories and ideas result in diverging goals, place different salience on the at-
attachment to the value of national sovereignty and grew out of diverging beliefs regarding the causes of European conflicts. In essence, the causal stories constructed on the basis of an analysis of the two wars in the preceding decades predisposed actors towards a distinct ideological outlook. This pattern can be traced across the variety of transnational groups steeped in different political traditions across Europe as well as across the Atlantic.

6.1.1 Transnational Pressure Groups

As argued above, post-war Europe was characterized by surge of transnational groups that emerged in order to find political responses to the challenges of economic and social reconstruction after the Second World War. In many cases, they continued developments from the inter-war period that had emerged in reaction to the First World War. During the Second World War, the common experience of exile – usually in London – or close collaboration between individuals in various resistance movements helps explaining the relatively quick establishment of a number of European transnational organizations after the end of the war (Lipgens 1968, 1984a). Almost exclusively founded during 1947, they differed in character. The European Union of Federalists (UEF) and the European Parliamentary Union (EPU) were transnational assemblages of clear cut federalists. The European League for Economic Cooperation (ELEC) was a collection of political and economic elites, spanning British and continental actors advocating the creation of a European market and the liberalization of trade without predominant programmatic commitment to particular institutions. Finally, the European Movement would become the most inclusive organization of all Europeanist pressure groups, recruiting its members from all programmatic groups (UEF, EPU, ELEC) as well as representatives from the transnational Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats Christian Democrat NEI and the Social Democrats.

The foundation of these organizations in post-war Europe naturally required resources. Voluntary organizations are classically burdened by problems of collective action: whereas the availability of transnational contacts – and thus political capital – constitutes a public good within the organization, they needed financial resources for setting up the required organizational structure, staff, as well as the organization of
European congresses activities (Pernet 2011). Such resources were, in the post-war context, hard to acquire. One primary reason for the heightened activity of Europeanist transnational groups was that essentially all of these organizations – the European Movement, the UEF, the EPU, and the ELEC – received funds via the American Committee on United Europe (ACUE) (Aldrich 1995, 1997). Founded in 1948, it became a key organization in the transatlantic networks to be discussed in the subsequent pages. Leading figures of the ACUE included, among others, actors such as Allan Welsh Dulles\(^{67}\) and Walter Bedell Smith,\(^{68}\) i.e. actors that were well integrated into the US foreign policy establishment and directly involved in the operations of the OSS during the war and the setting up the CIA after the war and thus had access to the necessary funds. In sum, transatlantic contacts, made either while European leaders were in exile during the war or had had contacts to OSS operatives while in the resistances of their respective countries, were the inaugural ‘hard currency’ of post-war transatlantic networks (Aldrich 1997, 193). Thus, leading figures of the European transnational organizations repeatedly sought US help in Washington on various trips between the late 1940s and early 1950s, often under the condition that these contributions do not become public. These included, initially, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi and subsequently Winston Churchill, Henri Frenay, or Paul-Henri Spaak (e.g. Aldrich 1995, 1997). These funds were significant and provided the backbone for much of the activities of the European Movement and the Federalists in the early 1950’s. As a French delegate from the UEF reportedly stated to the ACEU, “it is simply impossible for us to carry out the enterprise without your help.” (quoted in Aldrich 1997, 214). Aldrich contends that ACEU funds accounted for half of the expenses of the European Movement (Ibid.).

As the previous chapter has indicated, these organizations attracted distinct individuals. Members of the EPU and the UEF clustered together, indicating the largely similar federalist predispositions its members had. ELEC affiliates clustered separately, indicating their distinct ideas that exclusively focused on economic integration and advocated a limited supranationalism. Finally, the membership patterns of the Euro-

\(^{67}\) *Alan Welsh Dulles*: Head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Bern, Switzerland during the war and from 1953 onwards head of the organizational heir of the OSS, the CIA, as well as the brother of eventual US Foreign Secretary John Foster Dulles (Munzinger Archiv 2015l).

\(^{68}\) *Walter Bedell Smith*: Member of the Allied Supreme Command during the war under Dwight D. Eisenhower, he became the head of the CIA in 1950 and Undersecretary in the State Department under President Eisenhower in 1953 (Munzinger Archiv 2015m).
pean Movement reflected its status as an ‘umbrella’ organization of the existent transnational organizations, indicating its ideological heterogeneity. Analyzing available documents, the subsequent pages assess the primary motivations and dominant post-war concerns as expressed publicly, as well as describe the degree of internal consistency of these transnational groups regarding their expressed ideal institutional blueprints. To what degree did the transnational organizations express consistent concerns, political goals, and institutional demands? Does the picture of structural fragmentation presented in the previous chapter correspond to ideological fragmentation on the institutional level?

**The Federalists**

The federalist group identified in the previous chapter consisted of strong cross-membership patterns of two decidedly federalist organizations, namely the UEF and the EPU. The strong cross-membership is reflected in the fact that their main programmatic contents are largely similar, as both organizations were heavily influenced by the federalist ideology described above. The origin of both organizations is very dissimilar however: whereas the EPU focused its activities mainly on parliamentarians, the UEF was an ‘umbrella organization’ of federalist organizations all over Europe, organized by leading figures of war-time resistance organizations.

The European Parliamentary Union (EPU) was more short-lived and less successful. Its initiating founder, Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi, the founder of the Pan-Europa movement of the inter-war period, had started lobbying parliamentarians in Western European parliaments in 1946 to organize parliamentary groups. In July 1947, the founding congress of the EPU could mobilize 114 MP’s across the continent (Gisch 1990a, 114). During these years, Coudenhouve-Kalergi drew on contacts in the US academic circles and the Foreign Policy establishment – he was acquainted with then US Foreign Secretary Marshall – to secure the funding for his organization (Gisch 1990a, 118).

Comprising prominent members such as Henri Brugmans and Ludovico Benvenuti, its programmatic goals, set up in the Interlaken Plan of 1948, subscribed to the defining feature of the early federalist movement: the call for a European Constituent to establish a European federation (Gisch 1990a, 135). Initially, the idea was that such a
constituent would not have the status of a constitutional assembly but rather to “re-
ommend to the European Governments practical steps to be taken to promote the
political and economic union of Europe.”\(^{69}\) The recommendations contained in the
Interlaken Plan, however, were radical. Explicitly calling for broad membership of
the ‘European federation’ for those European countries “who accept the principles
contained in the Declaration of Human Rights prepared by the United Nations Or-
ganization, which will form part of the Constitution of the Federation.” (Lipgens and
Loth 1990, 142). The plan in effect called for membership by Austria, Switzerland,
Scandinavia, the UK, Greece, and Turkey. Offering a blueprint for the constitution of
the European constitution, the plan called for a two-chamber system – a ‘Senate’ and
a ‘Chamber of Deputies’ – wielding the legislative powers of the federation; an Ex-
cutive – a ‘Federal Council’ – to “be elected by both Houses of Parliament”, which
“should be collectively and personally responsible to them”; finally, a Court filling
the judicial branch that would deal with “all questions of the interpretation of the
Constitution.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 142). The plan enumerated the ‘powers of
parliament’ according to two ‘schedules’: the first schedule – exclusive powers of
both chambers – included all ‘core state powers’: external Affairs and Defense, that
is, the control of all “military, naval, and air defense of the Federation”, “the pres-
ervation of law and order”, “immigration and emigration”, “duties of customs”, “bor-
rowing money on the public credit of the federation”, and “the issue of paper or other
forms of money and or credit” (Ibid.). These extensive po-
wers of the federal government were matched with ‘concurrent powers’ of the federal
government and the states, including taxation and economic regulation of commer-
cial activities (Ibid.). In short, the Interlaken Plan called for a new highly centralized
European federal state.

The diagnosis underlying this institutional blueprint referred to a common federalist
narrative: peaceful cooperation in Europe was held to be unattainable “[…] so long
as the world tries to rebuild Europe on the same obsolete foundations which have
twice ruined our generation: those of unrestricted national sovereignty, national tar-
iffs and currencies, nationalistic hatred and the arms race.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990,
123). The conclusion was the abolishment of nationalist sovereignty within a ‘United
States of Europe’. In the discussion of the result of Interlaken, as Ludovico Benvenu-

ti put it, the delegates “pledge[d] solemnly [...] to defend federalist policy in our respective parliaments.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 163). Thus, parliamentarians committed to the EPU transnationally committed to a radical federalist cause. Although some of the members of the EPU, such as British Ronald Mackay were destined for political obscurity in their respective parliaments, the efforts of the parliamentary groups seemed initially successful: in 1948, EPU parliamentary groups in cooperation with similarly disposed MP’s from other transnational groups were successful in mustering the support of majorities in the parliaments of the UK, France, the Netherlands, and even Greece for motions which, however, had to be significantly adapted to gather support. In the Netherlands, for example, the motion adopted by the Lower House on March 19th 1948 ‘invited the government’ to consider

“[…] a permanent association of states […] by means of various functional institutions, wherein, so far as may be possible and desirable, authority should be conferred on supranational bodies, especially in monetary, economic, and social fields and that of defense […] and thus contribute to the creation of a true community governed by the rule of law” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 390).

It turned out quickly that federalists were rarely in the majority in their own states. Political expedience sat ill with the radicalism of the EPU leadership, especially Coudenhove-Kalergi and Georges Bohy. As the negotiations for the Council of Europe drew to a close in 1949 – and its Consultative Assembly, by agreement of the negotiating states turned out to be no more than that, a Consulting body – Coudenhove-Kalergi sought to prevent EPU members to coordinate with UEF federalists in an emerging campaign to advance federalist projects (Gisch 1990a, 120). This decision delegitimized EPU leadership and its mobilizing capacities declined: the third yearly congress of the EPU in Venice in 1949 already drew a much smaller attendance than the previous congresses and prominent members such as Giacchero Enzo had decided to stay away altogether (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 160). Its resolutions reflected the merely reactive role the EPU congresses could play: in absentia, EPU delegates criticized the Council of Europe and the lack of direct elections for its Consultative Assembly (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 164, 165). In September 1950, the last conference organized by the EPU noted similar points in reference to the Schuman Plan (Ibid., 169). Subsequently, Coudenhove-Kalergi unsuccessfully sought to resurrect the Pan-Europa Movement of the inter-war years. Since the EPU had a large amount of overlap in terms of individuals’ activities with the UEF, leadership of the federalist community would largely fall to the UEF.
The latter organization would, throughout the late 1940’s and early 1950’s be the center of distinct federalist campaigning for European governments to follow broadly federalist blueprints for institutional change in Europe. Although ideologically similar in outlook to the EPU, the sociological origins of the UEF were somewhat different as its leadership had been active in various resistance movements during the war (Lipgens 1968; Brugmans 1970). The UEF was founded as an international umbrella organization from these federalist resistance contacts that, early on, converged on the central federalist narrative of the main causes of the European wars. As early as 1942, the French resistance outlet ‘Combat’ contained an article by eventual prominent French federalist leader Henri Frenay arguing that ‘the minimal result of the war has to be the creation of a Europe that is politically, economically, and spiritually united.’ The well-known Ventotene Manifesto, a pamphlet written by Altiero Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi, and Eugenio Colorni while being imprisoned on a small volcanic island of Ventotene contained similar reasoning and was distributed along clandestine channels throughout the continent (Vayssière 2005, 70). It called for a ‘free and United Europe’ and echoed similar sentiments expressed in all leading resistance organizations (Spinelli and Rossi 1941). Hence, these writers shared a basic diagnosis: the problem was the nation-state having “the power to decide matters of war and peace, the power to control national armies, the power to divide the world into separate economic areas, the power to create despotism in a state, without outside interference,” by the surprising agreement of our thinking. Indeed, it seems that across the various countries, there was a general agreement on the necessity of organizing post-war Europe along federal lines. A number of preparatory meetings culminated in the Geneva declaration of European Resistance Movements from May 1944 that argued for a European federal union. After the war ended, the first transnational confer-

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70 “Le résultat minimum de la guerre doit être l’instauration d’une Europe, politiquement, économiquement, et spirituellement unie, étape vers l’unité mondiale” (quoted in Belot 2003, 468).
71 Foundational Convention of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, Milan, Aug. 28, 1943 (quoted in Lipgens 1968, 10)
72 “frappé, comme eux, par l’étonnante concordance de nos pensées” (quoted in Belot 2003, 469).
73 For Germany, a leaflet from the Kreisau group from 1941 stated, “Europe is a federal state with uniform sovereignty […] responsible for foreign policy, defense, and economy” (Quoted in Lipgens 1968, 13).
74 The second section of the declaration, “European peace is the keystone in the arch of world peace. During the life time of one generation Europe has been twice the centre of a world conflict whose chief cause was the existence of thirty sovereign States in Europe. It is a most urgent task to end this international anarchy by creating a European Federal Union. Only a Federal Union will enable the
ence by federalist resistance members was organized by the German Europa-Union and the Dutch *Europeesche Actie* (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 13). Subsequently, national section of the European federalist movement were founded in most states European states (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 99; Vayssière 2007, 388 ff.).

The subsequent year then revealed internal ideological differences at the first annual UEF congress in Montreux in 1947. The rejection of the nation-state was shared in all quarters, both economically as well as geopolitically. As Henri Brugmans put it at Montreux, “We believe the German problem is insoluble except by federalist methods and by fighting nationalism in all its forms.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 33). This radicalism separated the federalists from the remaining groups and traces back to the influence of resistance movements (Lipgens 1984a, 19).

Although the rejection of the nation-state was shared in all quarters, there were two sources of federalist ideology that separated two distinct factions with the federalist movement, the so-called integralists on the one hand, the so-called constitutionalists on the other (Greilsammer 1975, 42; Vayssière 2007, 33 ff.; Pistone 2008, 38) The integralist or so-called personalist federalists drew on work of Socialist-anarchist writer Proudhon (especially Proudhon 1863; see also Voyenne 1981). Its central philosophy relied on the ‘*politique de la personne*’: an ‘organic’ image of a relationship between society and individual that was, for example, highly suspicious of the division of labor between a political class and its citizens leading to a quasi-anarchist rejection of centralized government in the form of the state (Vernon 1981, 782). The implication for institutional demands was, accordingly, a rejection of centralized forms of power, be it in the form of the nation-state or at a higher federal level. As Denis de Rougement put it at Montreux, “[…] federalism entails the renunciation of any particular kind of political system. […] a federation is formed little by
little, by combinations of persons and groups, not from a single centre or by the agency of governments.” (Lipgens and Loth 1985, 24-26). Its most prominent proponents being Denis de Rougement, Alexandre Marc, Henri Brugmans, and André Voisin who headed the French UEF member organization ‘La Fédération’ (Hick 1990a; Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 46).76

On the other side of the spectrum, there were the so-called ‘constitutionalists’: following the classic reasoning as laid out, for example, in the Federalist papers, these figures, including Henry Frenay and Altiero Spinelli, their positions closely resembled the demands voiced by the EPU, its core being the idea of a European constituent assembly as the nucleus of a European federation.

The conflicts between both camps culminated for the first time in November 1948. Hitherto, discussions about concrete institutions had been left vague within the official resolutions of the UEF. As competing transnationalist organizations were drawing up their recommendations for governments and sought to influence the negotiations over the Council of Europe, constitutionalists within the UEF sought to implement a ‘campaign for a European constituent’, which explicitly called for the creation of a ‘federal state’, against the wishes of the integralists (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 61). This constituent, explicitly, was not an intergovernmental exercise: it would constitute “an Assembly of peoples and not of states” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 63). As contents of the negotiations for the Council of Europe were becoming more apparent, it turned out that the constitutionalists were more influential within the UEF: in September 1949 the central committee passed a resolution that members of the UEF should campaign for a federal pact within the institutions of the Council of Europe (For members of the UEF central committee at the time see Lipgens and Loth 1990, 100-102). An extraordinary session of representatives of UEF member organizations from all over Europe passed a resolution arguing that “the defence of Europe is impossible so long as each state remains sovereign, and is prepared to consider such defence only from a national standpoint” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 85). The federal pact resolution thus echoed the Interlaken Declaration of the EPU from 1948. Although suggesting a gradual approach it demanded a European authority with a

76 As Henri Brugmans pronounced at Montreux in 1947, “Let us end by quoting our master Proudhon, who wrote in 1866: ‘To end the irreparable abuse of sovereignty, I demand once and for all the dismemberment of sovereignty’. In this ‘dismemberment of sovereignty’ lies the real politique de la personne.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 33).
two-chamber legislative branch, an executive of ‘civil servants’ controlled by both Assemblies, and a “European Supreme Court” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 89). As implied above, the responsibility of the European Authority, according to these views, extended from economic matters to defense: “The European Authority must take over full responsibility in this sphere [defense] as in others.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 87).

Thus, both the ‘constitutional campaign’ launched by the UEF as well as the core elements of the Interlaken Declaration adopted by the EPU reveal a certain consistency and cohesiveness in the federalist ideology after the Second World War. Both declarations contain the ideal-typical logic. The renunciation of the nation-state – its normative implications of an overlap between national territory, its people, and its political authority – were complete. The new European institutions had to be built across the either dangerous or obsolete national borders. The dominant institutional demand thus called for a political authority to be implemented through a European constituent. To be sure, internal ideological differences persisted. As the previous chapter had demonstrated, the federalist community contained individuals from across the European political traditions. Thus, conflicts within the federalist camp existed as well: the conservatism of a figure such as Coudenhouve-Kalergi turned out to be incompatible with the more left-leaning leading figures of the UEF. Even within the UEF, radical ‘personalists’ differed in the most basic understanding of institutional goals from the constitutionalists. In the years following the initial programmatic declarations, these conflicts would repeatedly ignite in particular over questions of political strategy to achieve federalist goals. Moreover, the dispute between the constitutionalists and the personalists overshadowed any potential conflict between the former enemies during the war. Perhaps the resistance background of major German federalist figures such as Eugen Kogon – founding member of the German section of UEF, the Europa Union – implied that Nazi Germany was the common enemy.

The ELEC Group

The European League for Economic Cooperation (ELEC) was predominantly an organization comprising members of the European political and economic elite that had its sources in exile contacts made during the war in London. Its basic consideration, namely that European welfare would benefit from the abolishment of the nu-
merous intra-European trade barriers, had been prevalent among certain circles of the European economic elite before the war. ‘Economic order’ presupposed liberalization. The initiative for its foundation was, *inter alia*, largely due to Paul van Zeeland, Belgian Prime Minister before the war and Foreign Minister in the early 1950’s, Daniel Serruys, French Minister for Economics before the war, and Joseph Retinger, a Polish exile in London (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 13). Shortly after the war, van Zeeland sought out several contacts he had made during the war with figures such as such as Ugo La Malfa, Peter Adrian Kersten, Roger Motz, and Edward Beddington-Behrens. These were usually members of the financial community, including future French president Giscard d’Estaing (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 43). Dedicated to the liberalization of the post-war European economy, a provisional committee was founded in 1947, and national sections were founded in the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg within the same year (Gisch 1990b, 188; Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 18, 23). In van Zealand’s words, the goal of the ELEC was “[…] to bring order and a cohesive economic fabric to the Continent, where even one of them tries […] to disrupt the Continent by dividing [it] into two zones, both antagonistic to each other” (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 23). Its impetus being focused on economic reconstruction and not grand institutional schemes, its members, were initially wary to be associated with the European Movement, which, in Van Zeeland’s word ‘ought to be and remain distinct’. Their long-term goal is similar. But their immediate preoccupations and the means they employ are different. As Van Zeeland put it, “Our organization proposes a more modest but also more immediate goal, namely reconciliation [rapprochement] on the economic front.” The differences concerned both the radicalism of the federalists as well as the presence of federalist socialist ideas (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 55). An indication of this tendency was already given in terms of the party composition – largely from the liberal and conservative party family of this group relative to the other transnational organizations.

An elite group in character, its purposes was to provide policy suggestions for the solution of economic problems of the reconstruction of post-war Europe. Not projecting a public appearance directed at organizing mass support, it focused on organ-

77 “L’organisation présidée par M. Churchill et celle dont nous occupons sont et doivent […] rester distinctes. […] Leur but très éloigné est le même. Mais leurs préoccupations immédiates et les moyens qu’elles emploient sont différents. La première travaille sur le plan politique et vise d’emblée la Fédération de l’Europe. Notre organisation se propose un but plus modeste mais plus immédiat, à savoir rapprochement sur le plan économique.” (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 29).
izing conferences and exchanges that sought to bring together officials from across Europe to debate possibilities for closer economic collaboration, primarily through liberalization of trade in the whole continent. Even in reactions to the Schuman Plan, there were few public declarations (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 268 ff.). Thus, the raison d’être of the ELEC was not to push publicly for grand institutional designs that would revolutionize international politics. Its purpose, as Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs Jelle Zijlstra recounted, was to focus on concrete policy instruments and to provide an opportunity for elite exchange,

“I attended all kinds of international conferences, in which we explicitly dealt with questions like: what kind Economic Union, what kind of monetary union should come? And with the question of which policy instruments would be required. I traveled from one conference to another. It was always interesting. And I built many international contacts, networking, we would say today. So when I took up [the ministry of] Economic Affairs, I was in a sense there already prepared.”

Institutionally, few recommendations were made that went further than ‘closer collaboration on the economic front’ (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 29). In this sense, the advocacy of the ELEC focused on questions of functionalist cooperation, i.e. concrete economic measures such as programs for trade liberalization within the OEEC and the European Payments Union, examinations of currency convertibility, etc. In the same way as federalist convictions and resistance experiences shaped the predispositions of the federalists, actors engaged in the ELEC shared the same concern and conviction, namely that nationalist competition had led to protectionism and thus the absence of international regulation of trade and financial flows: their reconstruction in the post-war era was the primary concern and goal of ELEC actors. In this sense, the Europe that the ELEC sought to produce was almost exclusively based on economic cooperation. Thus, the thrust of the policy ideas of the ELEC was entirely different from the ideas put forth by the federalists. As Van Zeeland out it in 1946, “I believe that a regional grouping, in order to achieve all its economic aims, must go straight for radical solutions, namely a customs and a monetary union.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 193). Hence, the outlook of the ELEC, i.e. its self-professed radicalism, largely covered ‘economic rapprochement’ (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 268 ff.).

78 Own translation from “Ik nam deel aan allerlei internationale conferenties, waarop we ons uitdrukkelijk bezighielden met vragen als: welk soort Economische Unie, welke soort Monetaire Unie moet er komen? En met de vraag welke politieke instrumenten daarvoor nodig zouden zijn. Soms reisde ik van de ene conferentie naar de andere. Het was altijd interessant. En ik heb er veel internationale contacten opgebouwd, netwerken, zouden we tegenwoordig zeggen. Dus toen ik op Economische Zaken aanspoelde, was ik in zekere zin daar wel op voorbereid.” (Zijlstra 1998, 2).
199). As Paul van Zeeland expressed it at the 1949 ELEC conference in Westminster, London,

“We want to remake Europe, want to give it peace and prosperity and restore it to what it was. We want to create a huge market in which goods can be exchanged freely, or almost so. We want a large area in which capital can be used wherever it is of most benefit to the masses. We want to see men freed from the present hindrances so that they can move wherever they like, wherever they will be happiest and most useful. Finally, we want the free interchange of ideas of all kinds, provided they are sincere.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 253)

The concrete institutional implications, however, remained vague. Early suggestions for institutional designs suggested ‘intermediary institutions’ that assured the ‘equilibrium and stability’ of the nation-state: in Paul van Zeeland’s words, the goal was not to abolish the nation-state but to assure its survival by liberalizing trade in Europe and to construct the necessary institutions for international cooperation.79 These institutions would constitute “a compromise between national and international aspirations” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 200). They would be designed to administer common policies for technical areas such as “electricity, transport, and European ports” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 251). Daniel Serruys, in a speech in 1949, pointed to “agreement that an organization must be planned not on the basis of associations and agreements among the states of Europe, but as a single European economic union. That is the first of our desiderata.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 255). As a fellow Belgian ELEC delegate put it, the efforts to “create a mystique or stir up consciences in favor of a crusade […]” were simply not in the Belgian ‘national interest’, at least from this particular point of view. What mattered in his view was “to make men feel the hard necessity […] of creating an economy […] requiring […] the most vigorous action to prepare plans for production, organization and equipment in the new European economy” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 316).

Thus, the institution of a single European market was seen as an ‘indispensable necessity’ (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 50). In this sense, the ELEC delegates unequivocally welcomed the Schuman plan from the economic point of view, particularly welcoming an institution that would inaugurate a competitive European market for

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79 In Van Zeelands conception, which he had published as early as 1946 it looked like this “A la base, l’Etat nationale. Au sommet une Ligue universelle. Entre les deux, les organes intermédiaires, qui doivent assurer l’équilibre et la stabilité du grand corps politique national.” (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 22).
coal and steel, tackle current regimes of ‘protection’ and ‘subsidization’ and, for that
matter, create a European political authority with ‘precise supranational powers’. Noticeable is the absence of suggestions for democratic institutions: different from
the demands for a European constituent, ELEC exchanges spoke of ‘vertical’ institu-
tions such as courts, committees, and international banks that were supposed to enact
the ‘economic rapprochement’ without specifying precisely what those institutions
might be. Instead, the early speeches preeminently focus on policy areas and debat-
ed in which policy area liberalization was advisable, invariably returning to their
‘agreement for the need of a real economic union’ in Europe (Lipgens and Loth
1990, 254). Hence, the ELEC can be properly associated with functionalist ideas
leading to a supranational model of Europe, advocating limited transfers of sover-
eignty in economic policy fields.

An important corollary was the emphasis on British participation, the absence of So-
cialist actors as well as a notable absence of German actors. Political reconciliation
as a topic was equally absent. Thus, French, English, Luxembourgish, Dutch and
Belgian national committees had been established by 1950. Italian and German
committees – the latter under the leadership of Herman Abs – were only established
by 1951 (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 41). The absence of transnational socialists
was politically motivated as the group was composed primarily of actors from the
conservative and liberal party families. Van Zeeland, for example, initially contacted
Belgian Socialists such as Henri Brugmans and Victor Larock who refused to partici-
pare in the organization (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 32).

The proximity to British actors, the relative agnosticism towards grand institutional
schemes, and the liberal emphasis on free trade help explain the subsequent reaction
of the ELEC group towards the proposal of the ECSC: once details of the Schuman

80 An ELEC publication from July 11th 1950 stated that the ELEC “[…] approuve sans réserve la pro-
position faite par le Gouvernement français d’instituer au plus tôt un marché unique concurrentiel
Européen pour le charbon et pour l’acier dont le développement soit recherché par l’expansion de la
production et la réduction des prix.” (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 49). At the same time, it demand-
ed that principles of market competition would be adhered to so that factories “[…] inaptes à vivre
autrement que sous le régime de protection et de subvention” were closed down (Dumoulin and
Dutrieue 1993, 49). Institutionally, it welcomed “[…] l’institution d’une autorité politique européenne
dote de pouvoirs précis et supranationaux” (Ibid.).
81 A note from August 14th 1950 proposed, for the Schuman Plan, the creation of three political com-
mittees, specialized in distinct policy fields, with powers of oversight and a high authority to coordi-
nate the work of the committees. The composition of the committees was to be chosen by member
states (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 273).
plan emerged, the institutional issue was secondary as the ECSC was seen as a “menace of a directed economy”.\textsuperscript{82} ELEC publications thus insisted on British participation as an ‘essential condition for success’. The proposed ECSC institutions were judged from the point of view of achieving the goal of realizing the European market and economic efficiency goals hence demanding that ‘the attributes and the powers of the High Authority should be limited to what is strictly necessary for the coordination of industrial and commercial policies as well as the concerned companies. It should be avoided to surround the High Authority with institutions that have a political character’.\textsuperscript{83}

In sum, the ELEC, contrary to the far-reaching designs of the federalist movements, was from the beginning characterized by a relatively narrow and technical focus on the economic reorganization of European trade. Contrary to the federalist position, the focus in the ELEC conferences is entirely on economic issues. The absence of leading German figures equally implied that the security relevant issue of reconciliation after the war was relatively absent from the concerns of the ELEC conferences. Additionally, the liberalization of trade in Europe was supposed to aid and serve the stability and integrity of the nation-state. In this sense, the main concern corresponded to what Milward has termed ‘the rescue of the nation-state’ (Milward 2000). Institutions are evaluated from a technical and functional point of view, seeking to design effective administrative procedures to maximize European welfare. In the vague pre-1950 language, these concerns and goals translated into demands for rudimentary supranationality: so-called ‘intermediate bodies’, staffed by politicians and experts. There is little indication that these issues were contested within the ELEC.

\textit{The European Movement}

The European Movement was the initial nucleus of early efforts to put the terms of European interstate cooperation on novel terms after the Second World War had ended. Organizationally, it was the starting point emerging as the organization uniting all of the heretofore mentioned organizations was based upon an initiative by

\textsuperscript{82} “[…] une menace d’économie dirigée […]” (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 59).

\textsuperscript{83} “[…] les attributions et pouvoirs de la Haute Autorité devraient être limité à ce qui est strictement nécessaire au fonctionnement d’une coordination des politiques industrielle et commercial des entreprises en cause. Il faut éviter également d’entourer la Haute Autorité d’autres institutions qui auraient un caractère politique […].” (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 53).
Winston Churchill and his son-in-law Duncan Sandys. After Churchill’s speech in Zurich in 1946 in which he called for the ‘United States of Europe’, Sandys had founded the British United Europe Movement, a collection of British Tories and ‘honorary figures’ that seemed to feel some enthusiasm for the idea. Initially, the European Movement was the primary recipient of US funds from the ACUE, initially channeled primarily through Sandys (Vayssière 2007, 233).

In early 1947, a meeting between the leading figures of all emerging Europeanist transnational organizations took place to seek to coordinate their activities. By December 1947, the decision was taken to establish a joint transnational organization, the core of which would be an executive secretariat with Sandys becoming the first executive secretary (Hick 1990b). Its members being in leading roles in their respective organizations, the Movement’s first action was to send out letters to selected political, cultural, and economic elites calling for a congress at The Hague in 1948 in which to discuss the institutional reorganization of post-war Europe. The first honorary presidents of the newly founded European Movement were leading political figures comprising the widely respected Léon Blum (SFIO) – the first French Prime Minister of the post-war period – Paul-Henri Spaak as well as Alcide De Gasperi (Hick 1990b, 322). Thus, the European Movement had the potential of becoming the key hub to connect the European political elite under a common program across nations and parties. Schuman and Adenauer met for the first time at The Hague in 1948 (Kaiser 2007, 212). Against the wishes of several of their transnational fellow party members, Social Democratic representatives, such as Gérard Jaquet, joined the European movement. Hence, the European Movement became the most widely connected pressure group committed to European ‘Unity’.

Moreover, the presence of a German delegation at The Hague was a significant event. In this sense, the commitment to ‘European Unity’ fostered reconciliation: as Winston Churchill put it at The Hague,

84 UEF (Marc, Brugmans), EPU (Maccas), Retinger, Serruys (ELEC), Sandys (United Europe Movement), Courtin (Hick 1990b, 321).
“Europe requires all that Frenchman, all that Germans, and all that every one of us can give. I welcome therefore here the German delegation, whom we have invited in our midst. For us the German problem is to restore the economic life of Germany and revive the ancient fame of the German race without thereby exposing their neighbors and ourselves to any rebuilding or reassertion of their military power. United Europe provides the only solution to this two-sided problem and it is also a solution which can be implemented without delay”. (Churchill 1948).

Applause ensued. European reconciliation required, such was the consensus view, more than national reconstruction efforts. As the political declaration at The Hague expressed it,

“The ravages wrought by six years of war and by the occupation, the diminution of world food production, the destruction of industrial capacity, the creation of huge debts, the maintenance of military expenditure out of all proportion to the resources of the people, the shifting of economic power, the rancours left by war, the progressive evils of nationalism and the absence, despite the work of U.N.O., of an international authority sufficiently strong to provide law and order, constitute an unprecedented menace to the well-being and the security of the peoples of Europe and threaten them with ruin.” (Congress of Europe 1948).

Reconstruction required thus overcoming nationalism as well as an ‘international authority’ that would ensure that the conduct of states in Europe would be governed by law. In this sense, there was certainly unanimity. Beyond this agreement, however, the discussions at The Hague revealed that there were widespread and, to a degree, irreconcilable differences between the delegates and groups engaged in the European Movement. To the degree that the European Movement had the potential to connect the political elite in a central organizational hub, conflicts that would later plague the Council of Europe emerged already here.

Most British actors, already at this stage, never went beyond vague calls for ‘unity’ while, at the same time, expressing a reluctance to engage in far-reaching institutional discussions. Winston Churchill declared,

“The movement for European Unity must be a positive force […] deriving its strength from our common spiritual values. It is a dynamic expression of democratic faith based upon moral conceptions and inspired by a sense of mission. […] Mutual aid in the economic field and joint military defense must be accompanied step by step with a parallel policy of closer political unity.” (Churchill 1948).

The repeated insistence on European ‘unity’ thus earned this position the label ‘unionist’. Although sharing the general concern for the need of an international authority, the advocated goal of ‘European unity’, for these actors, did not translate into anything that perturbed national sovereignty. Duncan Sandys summarized this position in 1948, by explaining that the “[…] first stage in the process is to foster the
habit of regular consultation. […] When a firm basis of confidence and joint experience has been laid, it would be reasonable to ask the nations of Europe to abrogate at any rate some part of their separate sovereignties.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 333). ‘Regular consultation’, in this view, sufficed for the time being. A consultative machinery should foster a common understanding and trust: in the future, delegating sovereignty was possible. This is the intergovernmentalist interpretation of functionalism (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 333). Thus, the British Unionists’ interpretation of ‘European unity’ definitely entailed a concern about the divisive force of nationalist competition, but did not seek to abolish or even decisively constrain the nation-state: “the larger synthesis will only survive if it is founded upon coherent natural groupings.”

Notions of the old European notion, for example as Georges Le Brun Kéris insisted on the fact that it remains a national prerogative to ‘develop’ and administer European colonies.

It is thus no surprise that there were vast differences in proposed strategies and institutional schemes with the federalists in the organization. Recognizing that “to establish a Federal Statute at once would [create] difficulties in Great Britain.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 422), the federalists found themselves at odds with the British Unionists on a number of occasions already at The Hague (Gisch 1990a, 118). Hence, the political resolution passed at The Hague was a political compromise, a negotiated settlement between the different ideological currents within the movement. Although calling for the abrogation of ‘certain’ sovereign rights to be exercised in common, the declaration remained ambiguous as to the definition of the proposed community, whether it would be a ‘union’ or a ‘federation’. Additionally, the resolution called

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86 As Winston Churchill put it in his Zurich speech in 1946, “The first step in the re-creation of the European family must be a partnership between France and Germany. In this way only can France recover the moral leadership of Europe. There can be no revival of Europe without a spiritually great France and a spiritually great Germany. The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important. Small nations will count as much as large ones and gain their honour by their contribution to the common cause.” (quoted in Larres 1996, 28).

87 As Le Brun Kéris put it at The Hague “je voudrais simplement insister pour demander que si nous prononçons très fermement sur la nécessité au point vue économique de cette collaboration, dans le domaine du progrès social, du progrès culturel, du progrès politique des territoires d'outre-mer que ce soit entièrement dans la ligne propre à chacune de nos nationalités.” (Le Brun Kéris 1948).

88 As the Political Resolution at The Hague declared “l’heure est venue pour les nations de l’Europe de transférer certains de leurs droits souverains pour les exercer désormais en commun, en vue de coordonner et de développer leurs ressources. […] l’Union ou la Fédération, dont le but sera d’assurer la sécurité des peuples qui la composeront, devra être indépendante à l’égard de toute puissance et ne constituer une menace contre aucune nation” (Congress of Europe 1948).
for the convocation of a European assembly, composed of national parliamentarians, which should study the form of the proposed ‘Union or Federation’.\textsuperscript{89} Finally, it called for the drafting of a Charter of Human Rights and the creation of an International Court of Justice.

This compromise formula left many disappointed. Especially the fact that the conference proposed that the Assembly should consist of representatives sent by national parliaments, instead of resulting from general European elections, seemed to rattle cages. As Paul Reynaud expressed it, direct elections were almost a ‘pedagogical means’ to disengage the European electorates from their nationalist sentiments and to create “a superior domain of thoughts and opinions”.\textsuperscript{90} The conflict however, went straight across nationalities: a French compatriot of Paul Reynaud, Paul Ramadier had apparently forcefully argued against the idea of direct elections, denouncing direct elections as progressing to early and too quickly (Reynaud 1948).

The compromise solution at The Hague was thus a distinction between immediate and long term goals, immediate goals including the creation of an ‘emergency council’ of governments, the creation of an international court of justice, as well as a ‘European Deliberative Assembly’ for the ‘exchange of views’, but without any real powers. Long-term goals, with a nod to the federalists, included the creation of a ‘complete federation’ with a ‘European Defense Force’ and ‘European Citizenship’ (Hick 1990a). How to get from the first step to the second was left open. Although federalists participants at The Hague such as Frenay, Brugmans and Gironella urged the Executive Bureau of the Movement to embrace the idea of a federal pact, subse-

\textsuperscript{89} As the Political Resolution at The Hague declared “une Assemblée Européenne qui, élue – dans leur sein ou au dehors – par les Parlements des nations participantes. a) contribuera à créer et exprimera l'opinion publique européenne; b) recommandera les mesures immédiates propres à établir progressivement, tant sur le plan économique que sur le plan politique, l'unité nécessaire de l'Europe; c) examinera les problèmes juridiques et constitutionnels posés par la création d'une Union ou d'une Fédération, ainsi que leurs conséquences économiques et sociales.” (Congress of Europe 1948).

\textsuperscript{90} Own translation from “un domaine supérieur de pensées et de sentiments”. Paul Reynaud declared «Dès lors, notre seul moyen d'agir, c'est d'obtenir le consentement des peuples. C'est notre doctrine, c'est notre foi, mais c'est une tâche immense. Ce sont les peuples qu'il faut convaincre. C'est à eux qu'il faut insuffler l'esprit européen et, vous le savez tous, leur jugement est encore trop souvent faussé par un nationalismes étroit. Lorsque nos ministres des Affaires étrangères se réunissent autour d'un tapis vert et lorsqu'ils ne tombent pas d'accord, cela n'est pas de leur faute, c'est parce que chacun d'eux songe à son Parlement auquel il aura des comptes à rendre. Or, il sait que celui-ci est l'image du pays qui l'a élus. C'est là que gît la difficulté. Le problème est donc de convaincre le pays ; c'est le peuple qui doit changer d'esprit. Pour faire une Europe, il faut élever au-dessus de lui-même chacun des peuples qui la composent. Il faut le faire accéder à un domaine supérieur de pensées et de sentiments” (Reynaud 1948).
quent public resolutions on the question of a European Assembly continued to embrace vague wording such as “shall exercise in common certain rights” and “to increase the influence and extend the functions” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 424).

The European Movement, due to its central position assembling key representatives from European countries and governments, did inspire the creation of the council of Europe who, nevertheless, be plagued by ongoing disputes. Within the Executive Bureau as well as in subsequent congresses, disagreements quickly arose over the question whether countries willing to engage in an immediate federal pact should go ahead or not (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 420).

Summary

In sum, the differences and conflicts between minimalist British Unionists and radical federalists were the foundational flaw within the European Movement that would unravel soon enough. Many embraced the middle and wavered strategically between the maximalist and the minimalist position. Apart from the federalists, disagreements arose equally with actors espousing the supranational models engaged in the party related member groups of the European Movement such as the Christian Democratic NEI and the Social Democratic MSEUE and thus were equally influenced by party ideology and question of strategic expedience. The next section will review those.

6.1.2 Transnational Party Families

As mentioned, apart from the genuine Europeanist transnational groups, several transnational organizations with distinct ties to European party families were engaged in the European Movement. Transnational contacts had always played an important part in the history of the dominant European party families. Christian Democracy’s precursor, political Catholicism, was organized on a transnational scale from the beginning through its affiliation to the Catholic Church in the 19th century (Kaiser 2007, 15 ff.). After the war, Christian Democracy emerged as an initiative for the foundation of interconfessional Christian parties and to mirror the internationalism of Social Democracy. Social Democracy – or Socialism – had been originally founded as a transnational movement, the various ‘Internationals’ being the site of ideological conflict and coordination throughout the 19th and early 20th century.
(Braunthal 1974). Electorally speaking, during the post-war years, particularly at the time of the negotiations of the treaties on the ECSC and EDC, Christian Democratic governments dominated in the democratic continental members of the Council of Europe, whereas Social Democratic governments dominated ‘non-continental’ Europe, i.e. Scandinavia and the UK.

Figure 6.2 Political Map of Post-War Europe late 1950

Note: Map of Post-war Europe in the second half of 1950 including all democratic European OEEC Members. Countries are shaded according to the party composition of governing cabinets according to their party family in late 1950. Mixed cabinets are those in which the governing coalition in which Social Democratic, Christian Democratic and other party families share government responsibilities. The continental prevalence of Christian Democracy extends to the mixed Cabinets. On the continent, the Netherlands were governed by a coalition of Social Democratic, Christian Democratic, and Liberal parties; France by a coalition of Liberal, Christian Democratic, and Social Democratic parties; Switzerland by a coalition of Christian Democratic, Social Democratic, Liberal and Conservative parties. The government in Finland was based on a coalition of Agrarian, Liberal and Social Democratic Parties.

Other political families did not match the degree of transnational organization in Europe outside of supranational parliaments, i.e. the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and the ECSC parliament. Members of conservative parties did not develop a distinct transnational organization, their transnational activities being largely confined to the European Movement. Liberal parties on the other hand, initi-
ated a process for the foundation of a Liberal international, the so-called ‘Liberal World Union’. Upon the foundation of the European Parliament, an independent group called ‘Mouvement Liberal pour l’Europe unie’ (MLEUE) was founded (Hrbek 1988, 455). Publications of the ‘Liberal World Union’ suggest only highly sporadic and unevenly attended meetings that did not concern themselves to a significant degree with questions of European integration (Jacobson 1962, 585 ff.). Liberal thought, however, played a distinct and highly important role, partially in the form of actors engaged in the ELEC, partially in the form of actors distributed across the remaining transnational groups – as the previous chapter has already indicated – and partially by influencing the political thought that was relevant in the transatlantic context. Christian Democracy as well as Social Democrats, on the other hand, were engaged under the banner of distinct groups within the European Movement and engaged the question of Europe, inter alia, explicitly as a question of transnational party strategy. Their different traditions, geographical spread and distinct ideologies, however, implied that the views about the best organizations of post-war Europe differed.

**Transnational Social Democracy**

Social Democracy as a political tradition was founded in the 19th century with an explicit commitment to internationalism. In this sense, the history of Social Democracy can be narrated in terms of the histories of the various ‘Internationals’. Beginning with the foundation of the Second International in 1889 in Paris, internationalist commitments in Socialist ideology were reflected in frequent attempts at coordination of Socialist party strategies against their respective domestic governments. Much to the bewilderment of left radicals, these efforts failed spectacularly as Socialist parties did not adhere to a widely accepted transnational pledge to oppose national mobilization for the First World War (e.g. Trotsky 2012, 233 ff.). The inter-war period then put international Social Democracy in the middle of the ideological conflict of the 20th century, which was reflected in a sometimes violent struggle with Communist parties organized in the so-called ‘third international’, the COMINTERN, whereas Social Democratic parties entered governmental responsibilities and founded the Labour and Socialist International (LSI) to continue efforts of transnational coordination. This effort, however, was comparatively feeble and failed to achieve
similar successes as before the First World War (Sassoon 1996, 27). The concomitant rise of fascism never allowed transnational socialism to regain its prewar prestige (Hobsbawm 1995, 105). However, internationalism as an ideology retained a prominent place in Social Democratic party programs. For example, an inter-war party program of the SPD, the so called ‘Heidelberger Program’ of 1925, called for ‘the creation of European economic unity in order to create the United States of Europe and thereby accomplish a solidarity of interests of the peoples of all continents.’

Efforts to take up the internationalist tradition were continued immediately after the Second World War. Because several continental Social Democrats had spent the war in exile in the UK, the first conferences were organized in London by Labour leaders under the label COMISCO in 1946 (Loth 1977, 67). The Socialist International (SI) was formed in 1951, with global membership of Social Democratic parties, at a highly publicized congress in Frankfurt (Braunthal 1971, 237). It comprised delegates from the continent, the UK, the Scandinavian countries, and initially Eastern Europe, instead of the continentally limited Christian Democrats (Braunthal 1971, 177). Delegates were usually prominent party representatives from the participating countries, usually comprising respective country party leaders and their deputies. The universal and broader appeal, however, produced a heterogeneity of views, especially on the question of Europe.

Initially, the debate among Social Democrats centered on the possibility of establishing a distinct ‘Socialist Foreign Policy’ along a so-called ‘third way’ in Europe between the capitalist West and the Communists East, both in terms of its socio-economic order as well as its foreign policy (e.g. Sassoon 1996, 167 ff.). Early principled debates did not center on the European questions but were more concerned with differentiating themselves from communism by establishing that Marx was no longer the single basis of socialism and that Democracy was the prerequisite of Socialism (Braunthal 1971, 245). As the future bipolar world order became increasingly obvious by the late 1940s, it became clear very quickly that transnational Social Democracy was highly divided on the question of the question of Europe, ranging from seeing in a united Europe the only answer to current geopolitical challenges on the

91 The German program demanded “die aus wirtschaftlichen Ursachen zwingend gewordene Schaffung der europäischen Wirtschaftseinheit, für die Bildung der Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, um damit zur Interessensolidarität der Völker aller Kontinente zu gelangen.“ (SPD 1925).
one hand, to considering these efforts as ‘capitalist traps’ on the other hand (Griffiths 1993a). Although the founding congress of the Socialist International in 1951 in Frankfurt explicitly stated that the principle of undivided sovereignty in International relations had to be overcome, the concrete implications would cause deep divisions among European Social Democrats.\footnote{“Das System uneingeschränkter nationaler Souveränität muß überwunden werden.” (SPD 1951, 4).} Consistent with the divided pattern of group membership that the transnational Social Democratic group exhibited in the analysis of the previous chapter, transnational Social Democracy was strongly influenced by all three models of Europe described above.

An additional factor contributed to the lack of a cohesive transnational Social Democratic strategy. The inclusion of delegates from Italy and then Germany into the International was a hotly contested issue from the beginning. In Italy, coexistence with the relatively strong presence of the Communist Party resulted in a Socialist Party that was divided over its allegiance in the emerging Cold War, with some of its members attending the COMINTERN. As a result, the Italian radical Socialists from the PSI were excluded from the International (Braunthal 1971, 231). In the case of Germany, the positions taken by SPD leader Schumacher – in particular on the question of German unity – did not sit well with several Social Democrats, particularly those, such as Jules Moch, who had lost family to the Gestapo. German delegates were only admitted in late 1947 (Loth 1990, 438). Ideological differences compounded personal animosities: rumors indicate that French SFIO leader Guy Mollet had privately reported that if the SPD under Schumacher came to power, it would be the “supreme catastrophe” whereas Schumacher referred to Mollet as “Oberlehrer” (Orlow 2000, 144). Mutual accusations of egoistic nationalism accompanied the difficult relationship (Ibid.).

Thus, ideological heterogeneity went hand in hand with strained trust. On one side of the ideological split of transnational Social Democracy were those leaning towards federalist models identified in the previous chapter as the Federalist Social Democrats. Apart from their activities in federalist organizations, these individuals founded a separate Social Democratic federalist organization, the Mouvement Socialiste pour les États-Unis d’Europe (MSEUE) in 1947 (Loth 1977, 165). The MSEUE remained a formally autonomous organization, allowing members of other parties to participate in its congresses (Jacobson 1962, 545). Part of the original motivation was the fact
that the Socialist International had refused to send official delegates to the Hague conference in 1947 (Griffiths 1993a, 12). Thus the final resolution of the inaugural MSEUE congress in Montrouge in June 1947 called for a complete “transfer of national sovereignties to a federal organism” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 293). The resolution included an explicit link of the federal project to the German question by formulating an “Appeal to the German people” claiming that avoidance of future wars could only be achieved “by integrating [Germany] in a wider community with other peoples, into which she will merge the lager part of her sovereignty.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 295). Moreover, the resolution further stated, “That a socialist, therefore peaceful Europe, which will have no hostility towards any country, will not serve as the instrument of any policy of hegemony, no matter from whence it comes. In face of the growing dangers it makes an appeal to the peoples of Europe to realize their community of interest and destiny, of their essential unity in order to bring to the actual problems the imperative solutions which present themselves and which may be summed up in two words: Socialism and Federalism.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 291)

Institutionally, the professed goal was the creation of a European political authority and election for a European constituent assembly (Jacobson 1962, 546; Loth 1977, 201). The thinking was both geopolitical – seeking Franco-German reconciliation and European independence – as well as striving toward the creation of a socialist Europe. Thus, the MSEUE fused socialist ideology with federalist ideology, a fact that is reflected in multiple cross-memberships of key individuals in the MSEUE with the transnational the federalist group identified in the previous chapter, and their

93 Gérard Jaquet about the aims of the MSEUE and the European left in his interview, “Nous avons combattu, dès le début de mouvement européen et donc la Gauche européenne qui en faisait partie, ont combattu pour une Europe de caractère fédéral. Une véritable fédération européenne dans les domaines les plus essentiels de la vie de nos nations. Nous avons demandé l'élection d'un Parlement européen élu au suffrage universel.” (Jaquet 1997).

94 As Gerard Jaquet explained it later “J'étais partisan de l'Europe pour plusieurs raisons. D'abord, je crois que c'était la possibilité d'une réconciliation franco-allemande. On sortait de la guerre, la France et l'Allemagne s'étaient battues à plusieurs reprises, et cruellement, et je pensais qu'il fallait arriver à une réconciliation véritable, et qu'on ne pourra' aboutir à cette réconciliation véritable que si la France et l'Allemagne se retrouvait dans une même communauté. Une communauté assez forte pour s'im- poser dans le monde. Et que le jour ou les intérêts français seraient lies aux intérêts allemands, toutes les vieilles querelles disparaîtraient. Deuxième raison: je pensais également que dans le monde mo- derne qui naissait de la guerre, l'avenir allait appartenir aux grands ensembles économiques, et qu'une Europe unie serait probablement plus facilement orientée vers le progrès économique et la prospérité. Une troisième raison, c'est que devant les deux superpuissances, l'Amérique d'un cote, et la Russie de l'autre, je pensais que l'Europe unie aurait plus d'influence dans le monde pour s'imposer, et avoir une diplomatie commune réelle. Et puis j'étais Socialiste, et je pensais que cette Europe qui devait être une Europe de caractère fédéral devrait s'orienter dans la voie du socialisme, et qu'il fallait créer un mou- vement qui représente cette politique. C'est ainsi que la Gauche européenne a été créé et est devenue membre du mouvement européen.” (Jaquet 1997).
documented activities in resistance movements, such as Henri Frenay, Claude Baurdet, Gerard Jaquet, and Henry Marc (Loth 1977, 199; Lipgens and Loth 1990, 282).

Nowhere, however, did the federal view dominate in any Socialist party in Western Europe. In the Netherlands, leading Social Democrats such as Marinus van der Goes van Naters and Henri Brugmans constituted prominent voices because of their positions within the party but did not attract overwhelming rank and file support and their proposals were criticized on grounds of lack of realism in official party memoranda in the late 1940’s (Asbek Brusse 1993, 108). Moreover, these attitudes found strong resistance within the larger transnational Social Democratic Community. Prominent national Social Democratic leaders such as Kurt Schumacher and Erich Ollenhauer in Germany, most of the British Labour party under Prime Minister Ernest Bevin, key French figures such as Salomon Grumbach and Jules Moch, Victor Larock, and the long-term Dutch Prime Minister Willem Drees were largely opposed (Sassoon 1996, 168, 212). Kurt Schumacher’s denunciation of the ECSC institutions as ‘conservative, capitalist, clerical’ is emblematic of this attitude (Ibid.). Due to this opposition, the Socialist International did not participate in the European Movement whereas the MSEUE officially send delegates in November 1948 to the Liaison committee (Loth 1977, 201). German SPD members Fritz Erler and Carlo Schmid had received personal invitations to attend the congress at The Hague, but did not do so at the behest of the SPD Präsidium (Orlow 2000, 142). Paul-Henri Spaak, despite being invited as then Foreign Minister of Belgium, did not participate at The Hague Congress since the Bureau of the Belgian BSP-PSB recommended to its members to abstain (Mommens and Minten 1993, 141). 25 members of the British Labour Party participated unofficially against the official decision of the party (Dumoulin 1999, 417). Paul Ramadier of the French SFIO participated in the first congress of the European Movement in 1948, which was ill-received by SFIO leadership under Mollet (Orlow 2000, 142). In reaction to the first initiatives for the Council of Europe, the 1949 Socialist International rejected an initiative introduced by proponents of supranational institutions welcoming the Council of Europe initiative (Steininger 1979b, 152). Socialist French Minister of the Interior Jules Moch rejected the participation of a German delegation in the Council of Europe which in turn contributed the rejection of the very idea of the Council of Europe by the German SPD (Steininger 1979, 147). These quarrels within transnational Social Democracy largely prevented the Socialist
International from playing a critical role in the early integration process. Accordingly, initial meetings of the COMISCO were largely characterized by efforts to contain the internal conflict (Bossuat 2003, 418). When the Socialist International was re-founded in Frankfurt in 1951, the debate about its core principles virtually ignored the European question for lack of agreement among the participants (Braunthal 1971, 245).

Thus, while the concern for reconstruction and workers’ welfare remained the common denominator, the heterogeneity of Socialist views on Europe differed widely. In the UK, opposition to early European initiatives dominated partly because these originated from Churchill and the conservative Tories (Wurm 1988, 632). The perception was that a united Europe would be a ‘bourgeois’ undertaking detrimental to European workers’ interests (Morgan 1984, 392; Ceadel 1992 32). As Labour’s promise had been based programmatically on the founding of an economically just welfare society, a ‘new Jerusalem’ after the hardships of the war, workers’ welfare was valued higher than lofty European ambitions (Judt 2005, 161). As Labour had governmental power, European supranational institutions would only be a potential obstacle. For example, Denis Healey, then head of the international department of the Labour Party, wrote in 1951 in an official party document that

“[…] the nation is by far the most important entity in world affairs. […] To the extent that the internal structure of a given state satisfies the need of the workers within it, to that extent its socialist party will tend to put the national interest before international solidarity. It is no accident that in their approach to European Unity since 1945 the socialist parties of Britain and Scandinavia have been most conservative – for they have the most to conserve.” (quoted in Wurm 1988, 633, 634).

In this sentence, Healey had characterized a position that tended to take prevail among British and Scandinavian Social Democrats, a conception that is radically different from the resolution of the MSEUE quoted above. The main reasoning infers, from the goal of securing workers’ welfare, that national sovereignty is valued higher than international, and by extension, European solidarity. This view was dominant within the Labour party. While the previous chapter has indicated that a notable proportion of elite members of the Federalist Socialist Community was British, these figures were in a minority in the UK and more of a nuisance to Labour party leader-
ship and never attained influential positions (Morgan 1984, 390). Nor did it ever gain influence in the Scandinavian countries, who, to the contrary, grew ever more suspicious of the Socialist merits of the European rhetoric of their continental counterparts (Sassoon 1996, 197). Hence, Hugh Dalton, who presided over the Labour delegation to the Council of Europe, understood his role as actively working against deeper erosion of sovereignty. In fact, Dalton and Healey published a pamphlet in 1950 arguing for socialist opposition to the Schuman Plan (Newman 1993, 166).

On the continent, the German SPD was, in terms of the pronouncements of its leadership, more in tune with the intergovernmental rhetoric put forth by Labour. Thus, although its rhetoric internationalist, the position of the SPD within the Socialist International was largely tenuous because Schumacher insisted on unification as one condition of German participation in international institutions (Steininger 1979, 171). Moreover, Schumacher’s rhetoric was acerbic at times. For example, he publicly rejected the widespread ‘European enthusiasm’ which, according to Schumacher, was deliberately created so that Germany could be “dragged by the tail of the French nag through the gates of Strasbourg”. Needless to say, the nationalist innuendo in the SPD leadership’s public rhetoric was not lost on their French, Dutch, and Belgian counterparts; certainly not five years after the Second World War had ended. Some even questioned the value of the Socialist International for these reasons (Steininger 1979b, 177).

95 The MSUE was founded with active participation of British Socialists such as Bob Edwards (Independent Labour Party) and F.A. Ridley largely in opposition the Foreign Policy of the Labour Party (Loth 1977, 165).

96 In a speech at the Bundesparteitag of the SPD in May 1950, Kurt Schumacher stated “Die heutige Zerreißung Deutschlands ist nicht nur eine nationale Schwächung der Deutschen. Die Illusion, daß ein geteiltes Deutschland ein leicht beherrschbares und ungefährliches Deutschland sei, geht allmählich auch bei den Opportunitätspolitikern und bei den Alliierten zurück. Ein geteiltes Deutschland ist doch ein geteiltes Europa und eine geteilte Welt, mit all den wunden Stellen und Krankheitsherden, die eine solche Zerreißung mit sich bringt. Die Teilung Deutschlands ist ein Unglück für Europa und die Welt, und die Einheit Deutschlands ist die Aufgabe der Demokratie in Europa und der Welt.” He stated further “Wir Deutschen bekennen uns offen zu dem guten Willen der Aufgabe von Souveränitätsrechten zugunsten einer übernationalen staatlichen Ordnung in demselben Umfang, in dem die anderen Beteiligten ihre Souveränitätsrechte auch reduzieren.” He qualified this commitment, however, by naming German reunification a condition for any assent to further European Institutions “Ja, wir bejahen diesen Staat, in dem wir jetzt leben, als Ausgangspunkt einer höheren nationalen Einheit, und wir bejahen diese höhere nationale Einheit als Ausgangspunkt für eine noch höhere internationale Verbindung.” (Schumacher 1950).

97 Kurt Schumacher in the same speech at the Bundesparteitag of the SPD in May 1950 “Es ist dieser Hurra-Enthusiasmus, der jetzt in Deutschland zu dem Zwecke erzeugt wird, um sich am Schwanz des französischen Gauls durch das Portal des Europarates in Straßburg schleifen zu lassen.” (Schumacher 1950).
The relatively dominant position of the *Präsidium* under Schumacher, Ollenhauer and Wehner – representing Germany at the Socialist International - ensured that these staunchly intergovernmental commitments remained the core party line in the Bundestag. However, there was substantial opposition to this course, particularly around the mayors of the city states of Bremen (Wilhelm Kaisen), Hamburg (Max Brauer) and Berlin (Ernst Reuter) who had an independent power base (Hrbek 1993, 68; Olow 2000, 165). Kaisen and Schmid were leading members of the German Federalist section of the *Europa Union* (see previous chapter, section 5.2.1). While the mayors of the city states could afford to be more vocal critics of the SPD’s official course of rejecting European developments such as the Council of Europe, Carlo Schmid, as a member of the *Präsidium* and the Bundestag was in a more difficult position, sometimes leading to rhetorical ‘embarrassments’ in the German *Europa Union* that were usually instigated by CDU member Heinrich von Brentano because of an official SPD position on Europe Schmid had to defend in the meetings of the *Europa Union* (Weber 1996; 434). Public opposition to Schumacher’s course never went ‘unpunished’.98

In Belgium and the Netherlands, similar internal divisions were visible. Differences in assessments of the Council of Europe in the Dutch PvdA, for example, prevented an official resolution on the party’s position on the Council of Europe throughout its first years. When MSEUE member Marinus van der Goes van Naters lobbied in early 1950 that this issue should finally be decided, the party’s leadership declined out of fear that this would “expose party differences to the public and might result in a binding resolution” (quoted in Asbak Brusse 1993, 112). The Dutch PvdA leadership, most notably Willem Drees, was absent from all transnational organizations, and thus largely followed the intergovernmentalist lines of their British counterparts (Asbak Brusse and Griffiths 1993, 137). In Belgium, a similar pattern was visible, pitting intergovernmentalist ‘unionists’ such as Henri Rolin, Edouard Anseele of Ghent, and Achille van Acker Belgian Unionists, against the BSP-PSB leadership such as Paul-Henri Spaak and Max Buset, and Raymond Riffler (UEF, MSEUE) (Mommens and Minten 1993, 142).

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98 For example, Wilhelm Kaisen’s advocacy for the SPD sending delegates to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe resulted in Schumacher preventing Kaisen to be reelected to the SPD *Präsidium* (Orlow 2000, 166)
In between the extremes of federalism and intergovernmentalism, a number of Social Democrats went along a more pragmatic route. Social Democratic leaders such as Guy Mollet or Paul-Henri Spaak remained committed into the early 1950’s to the creation of a wider Europe, including the UK and were willing, due to a wider socialist solidarity, to compromise on the institutional plane, a move that socialist federalist leaders, like Gérard Jaquet or André Philipp, were not willing to make (Steininger 1979, 151). These differences led to confrontations within the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (Loth 1977, 271). Initially, the more pragmatic actors represented inter alia by Paul Henri Spaak, preferred the diplomatic venues in order to advance towards the goal of limiting sovereignty institutionally. Spaak thus acquired an early decisive role within the European Movement. Even these positions were sufficient to generate conflict: far from subscribing to the broad federalist principles espoused by the MSEUE, figures such as Spaak or Van der Goes van Naters sought to advance, step by step, the institutional ‘lock-in’ of cooperation and thus to convince their British and Scandinavian colleagues in the Socialist International to accept the limited application of majority decisions, without success (Steininger 1979, 148).

The fact that transnational Social Democracy was divided among all three ideal-typical institutional dispositions was particularly felt in France. For the SFIO, the division was exacerbated by its internal structure into partially independent district organizations (‘fédérations’): districts in areas of heavy industry competed with communists whereas districts in central France largely relied on lower middle class and public service employees (Orlow 2000, 61). The party resembled the threefold

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99 As Gérard Jaquet explained in his interview “Nous avons eu des discussions sérieuses sur la manière de faire l'Europe qui m'ont notamment opposées à Guy Mollet. On parlait de ce qu'on appelait alors les ‘autorités spécialisées’. On parlait du plan Schuman, notamment. Les anglais avaient dit ‘Nous n'irons pas’ […] Et moi je disais ‘C'est insuffisant, il faut faire une véritable communauté européenne de caractère fédéral, avec une véritable diplomatie commune, avec une défense commune, et avec une communauté sur le plan économique’. Mais on ne pourra le faire qu'a six parce que les anglais ne marcheront pas. Mais Guy Mollet nous a répondu ‘Pour une véritable communauté européenne, il faut les Anglais. Sans les Anglais on n'ira pas’. Il y a eu de sérieuses controverses entre nous, notamment a l'Assemblée du Conseil de l'Europe, même en séance publique, des controverses avec Guy Mollet et quelques autres sur l'idée: Est-ce qu'on fait l'Europe sans les Anglois ou pas?” (Jaquet 1997).

100 Referring to the Congress at The Hague from which Spaak abstained out of loyalty to his party line, he pronounced “Lorsque le comité du congrès de La Haye aura étudié son projet et l’aura mis au point, il faudrait qu’il communique aux différents gouvernements. Je crois pouvoir m’engager, au nom de gouvernement belge, à soutenir ce projet et à aider à sa réalisation en le soumettant, au besoin, aux gouvernements des autres pays et en tâchant de soutenir le projet par la voie diplomatique.” (Dumoulin 1999, 418).
division into intergovernmentalists, such as Jules Moch, or Vincent Auriol that were from the beginning sceptical towards delegations of sovereignty in the context of the Council of Europe. Their reasoning was largely related to aftermath of the war. During the early reconstruction period, they had instigated the campaign “First us, then Germany”\textsuperscript{101}, that drew heavy intra-party criticism from leading SFIO figures such as André Philipp and Léon Blum (Loth 1977, 197, 285). On the other end, the SFIO contained several prominent federalist such as Gerard Jaquet and André Philipp, who had played a key role in the foundation of the MSEUE, whereas the party leadership and specifically Guy Mollet was in the paradoxical position of emphasizing supranational organization, the need for majority decisions, democratic control, and British membership alike (Loth 1977, 250).

In short, at both the national and the transnational level, transnational Social Democracy was uniform in terms of its main concern – workers’ welfare and post-war reconstruction- but ideologically divided about the question of Europe, confirming the conclusion reached in the previous chapter based on the affiliation data for transnational Social Democrats. Partially as a result of these differences, Socialist parties as well as the Socialist International became the most vocal critics of the democratic credentials of the European institutions, much more vocal than the Christian Democrats, for example. It was the least common denominator that the clashing factions were able to find, proponents of integration because they subscribed partially to the ideal of a federal democracy whereas for opponents it was a convenient rhetorical device by which to discredit a political development they opposed (see Jacobson 1962, 559, 581; Bossuat 2003, 425).

\textit{Transnational Christian Democracy}

A novelty in the political landscape in post-war Europe, transnational Christian Democracy emerged from a programmatic recast of European confessional parties seeking to appeal to all Christian voters, Catholics and Protestants alike (Papini 1996; Kaiser 2007; Kaiser and Leucht 2008). Its origin lay in inter-war considerations within Political Catholicism and the Vatican contending that the unity of Christian parties was a necessary counterforce to Communist parties. Thus, domestic initiatives to

\textsuperscript{101} Own translation from “Nous d’abord, l’Allemagne après.”
found genuinely Christian Democratic parties had a transnational dimension from the beginning: Christian Democratic actors explicitly perceived themselves in direct competition with transnational Social Democracy (Gehler 2001; Gehler and Kaiser 2001).

As the map displayed in Figure 6.2 had shown, Christian Democracy was largely a continental phenomenon, including Christian Democrats from Austria and Switzerland. Organizationally, transnational Christian Democracy had two main pillars. The main organization was the ‘Nouvelles Équipes Internationales’ (NEI). The NEI were intended as public ‘device’ to influence public opinion and key decision-makers as well as to coordinate national party strategies by releasing programmatic statements intended as summarizing the positions of all participating parties as well as preparing annual congresses to which the leadership of all Christian Democratic parties was invited and appeared regularly (Gehler 2001; Gehler and Kaiser 2001). Intended to become the direct competitor to the Socialist International, official membership of European Christian Democratic parties was, however, inconsistent as there were differences regarding the necessary degree of institutionalization at the foundational congress of the NEI in Lucerne, Switzerland (Papini 1996, 51; Kaiser 2007, 196). Differences largely concerned the degree of its formalization and purpose: the French MRP and Belgian PSC-CVP were opposed to the NEI being a formal party organization to which the national parties had to establish a formal link which was exactly the project the more conservative Austrian ÖVP – represented by Felix Hurdes – and the Swiss SKVP – Martin Rosenberg – had sought to build (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 47). The latter sought concrete a formalization of the structure with official party membership, the former sought loose informal contacts in order to meet and exchange information “between fellow Christian Democrats who enjoyed a certain influence in their respective countries”.102 French Christian Democrats in particular feared losing votes by being officially associated with religious catholic conservatives with close to ties the Vatican, i.e. their Swiss and Austrian counterparts (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 46). As Dutch representative August De Schryver put it, the NEI was supposed to become “a center of influence and a community of ideas” while

102 As expressed by Belgian PSC-CVP General Secretary Désirée Lamalle “sous la forme d’échanges d’informations, de rencontres et d’amitié entre personnalités qui jouissent dans leur nation respective d’une influence sérieuse” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 46).
avoiding the perception of being “an organization under Roman authority”. As a result, it was left open to individual parties whether to name official representatives or allowing for individual attendance. As a result, all continental Christian Democratic parties with the exception of the Belgians (PSC-CVP) and the French (MRP) became official members.

In the late 1940’s until the early 1950’s, NEI meetings and congresses were well visited by delegates from NEI member parties as well as regularly accompanied by French and Belgian members, most notably the prospective head of the MRP Teitgen and, on rare occasions of annual conferences, by Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland. However, increasingly lackluster attendance led to complaints by the early 1950’s about the lack of involvement of the national parties as the focus of their activities shifted to the European parliament (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 47, 276). By the mid 1950’s, the status of the NEI declined as the Christian Democratic Group in the ECSC parliament gained importance and complaints about lack of attendance start to occur relatively often.

While the NEI were founded to organize political party strategies and advocate common Christian Democratic policy, the second arm of the Christian Democrat was the so-called Geneva Circle. Initially constituted through personal contacts between Victor Koutzine and Johann Jakob Kindt-Kiefer, it developed into a clandestine meeting of representatives of Christian Democratic parties in Geneva. The meetings were so suspicious that they even caused speculations by the Swiss police about their nature (Gehler and Kaiser 2001; Kaiser 2007, 206). The purpose, declaratively, was to build “a non-public contact committee of relevant European party representatives […], making an effort to discuss concrete political tasks and enforce the agreed measures”.

Its existence being denied at the time, its first clandestine meetings were held on the initiatives of the head of the Swiss CVP (Altermatt 2000, 95). The participants initially included high profile figures such as Konrad Adenauer, George

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103 Own translations from “une centre de rayonnement et une communauté de pensées” and “une organisation sous l’obédience romaine” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 48).

104 Blankenborn noted in his diary in September 1951 “Mit dem, was die zentrale Leitung der NEI sich unter dem Kampf um das Abendland vorstellt, ist es nicht getan; auch der Plan Bichets, das Generalsekretariat in Paris durch einige Vertreter der führenden christlichen Vertreter zu verstärken, erscheint mir nicht ausreichend.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 284).

Bidault, the Dutch Emmanuel Sassen, the French Robert Bichet, the Dutch August de Schyver, and the Italian Enrico Tosi. Reportedly, Adenauer attended the first meeting by entering Switzerland – in 1948 – with false papers (Ibid). Adenauer later regularly sent two of his closest associates, namely subsequent CDU/CSU and German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano and his first aide (‘Persönlicher Referent’) and later head of the ‘Grundsatzabteilung’ in the ‘Auswärtige Amt’, Herbert Blankenhorn. Robert Schuman and Alcide De Gasperi never attended the meetings (Gehler 2001). They were, however, reportedly provided with protocols of the meetings regularly as the exchanges were perceived to be important for the creation and maintenance of trust between the leading European Christian Democrats (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 60). The purpose was to serve as an opportunity to meet secretly and build trust among key figures of Christian Democracy without exerting direct influence on the interstate bargains (Gehler and Kaiser 2001, 777).

As suggested by the network analysis mentioned earlier, transnational Christian Democrats were, relatively speaking, far more ideologically cohesive than transnational Social Democracy. Moreover, this relative ideological cohesion was accompanied by a more concerted and much more successful effort to rebuild trust between the German side and the Western European Christian Democrats than was the case for Social Democracy. The first NEI Congress in Lucerne in 1948 was already largely successful in this regard. As Adenauer expressed it in his speech at the Congress,

“[We are] deeply touched by the friendly reception […]. This reception gives us the impression that this convention takes place among Christians and is carried by the Christian ideals of justice and love. I welcome it with great gratitude that neither in the presentations nor in the debate the question of a German collective guilt was raised. As a German, as a European, and first and foremost, as a Christian, I would have to refuse this accusation of a collective guilt since large parts of the German people, and particularly its Christian parts, put up bold and brave resistance against the Nazi regime.”


As Adenauer indicated, three elements seemed to have been important. A key part was the construction of myth of ‘the good’ vs. ‘the bad’ German. The Dutch representative P.J.S. Serrarens, for example, concurred with Adenauer, stipulating that there was not only Catholic opposition to the Hitler Regime but a veritable resistance movement in which Catholics played an important role. This distinction contributed to a relatively straightforward moral rehabilitation of German Christian Democrats after the war (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 64). The second element can be found in the ideological roots of political Catholicism: contrary to Protestantism, Catholicism had never unabatedly embraced the main organizational form of industrialized political life in the 19th and 20th century, namely the nation-state (Boyer 2001, 25). Third, the context of the Cold War lead to a strong reassertion of notions of Europe as the Christian ‘Abendland’ – thus a common identity and heritage – which required steps towards unification in defense from the ‘Soviet’ or ‘Bolshevik threat’ (Müller and Pflichta 1999; Gehler and Kaiser 2001). Thus, Adenauer could claim that the German Christian Democrats constituted “the only reliable stronghold against communism and materialism.”

“I [believe] it necessary to present you in all detail the extent of danger that Christianity, the Christian culture, the entire Western Europe is facing. Because only if one really understands the extent of this threat, one can deal with it. […] [The] integration of Europe has to be accomplished, if we want to save the occidental culture and a Christian Europe. The European integration is the only salvation of the Christian Abendland.”

The sense of impending threat is palpable, the connection to a felt cultural threat from the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War apparent. The integration of Germany into the West was thus essential to ensure the survival of European civilization and European integration became the solution to the main ‘pedagogical’ problem.

\[108\] He expressed it on NEI in Luxemburg in 1948 “[…]il faut dire, il y a eu une opposition catholique contre le national-socialisme; il y a même eu, plus tard, une résistance allemande dans laquelle les catholiques on joue un rôle.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 116).

\[109\] Own translation from “das einzige zuverlässige Bollwerk gegen den Kommunismus und den Materialismus” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 118).

of post-war Europe. As the Belgian Christian Democrat Désirée Lamalle put it in Lucerne,

“Without a true and peaceful recovery of Germany, Europe is open to the barbaric Orient. Without the European hope, Germany can only hope for revenge. In brief, a European resurgence is not possible without a German resurgence, which in turn is not desirable if it is not in line with a new European order.”

As a result, the first NEI Congress called for a ‘federated Germany in a federated Europe’. The institutional implications, moreover, seemed clear and different from those of the British unionists as well as the radical federalist blueprints. As Bidault put it in the Geneva Circle in December 1948 at a time when the term ‘supranational’ had not yet acquired significance in distinction to federalism,

“Concerning the political base of a European Union, the French theory proposes an elected Parliament whereas the British theory postulates a simple consultative council. We have to provide for an embryonic Parliament and an executive organ. Above all, the idea of abandoning national sovereignty in favor of international power has to be put in practice.”

Adenauer agreed. In his terms “[…] the European Federation is the only means to solve the German problem […].”

The relative ease by which the German Christian Democrats were welcomed was thus partially a matter of ideological disposition and common views regarding a certain ‘spiritual unity’ of the Western European ‘Abendland’ and its ‘natural enemy’ in the Communist East. Common appeals to the Christian and Catholic common ground as well as to Europe formed a key aspect in the rhetorical mutual affirmation of

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111 As Pierre Frieden put it at an NEI Congress in 1948 “Au fond, le problème est la: faire retacher le peuple allemand dans le courant chrétien […].” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 112).
112 Own translation from “Sans un relèvement plausible et harmonieux de l’Allemagne, l’Europe est ouverte a la barbarie orientale. Sans l’espoir européen, l’Allemagne ne peut songer qu’a une revanche […] En bref, la renaissance européenne n’est pas possible sans renaissance allemande, mais celle-ci n’est pas souhaitable si elle ne se fait dans la ligne d’un nouvel ordre européen.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 113)
113 “Ein föderativ strukturiertes Deutschland soll die Schaffung eines föderativen Europa begünstigen” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 122).
115 Own translation from “ […] la Fédération européenne est le seul moyen de résoudre le problème allemand […]” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 149).

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common political goals. Moreover, in personal exchanges, the commitment to Europe was constructed in distinction to nationalistic sentiments, in all countries, against which, according to their self-perception, Christian Democratic political strategies were directed. In addition, these commonalities within the NEI and the Geneva Circle were partially a matter of self-selection: more nationally inclined actors – which existed in all Christian Democratic parties – were unlikely to participate neither in the NEI or in the Geneva Circle (Van Kemseke 2006, 29). In the German case in particular, it was also a result of straightforward politics: those who happened to disagree in any way with Adenauer’s foreign policy course were excluded from the illustrious circle at the behest of the Chancellor himself. This was the case for Josef Müller, the founding chairman of the CSU: once he publicly considered neutralist conceptions of Foreign Policy during the early 1950’s, Adenauer excluded him from further attending the Geneva Circle and explicitly tasked Brentano with communicating with Müller’s contacts to Italian Christian Democrats such as Taviani and Piccioni (Guiotto 2006, 184, 185).

The general concern for ‘unity’ of the Abendland and thus the ‘German question’ among Christian Democrats implied distinct institutional positions that differed from the intergovernmentalist positions of the British Unionists and the radicalism of the federalists. As the main thrust of the political goals of transnational Christian Democracy was never to completely ‘overcome’ the nation-state, the terms federation and confederation were frequently used interchangeably. Christian Democratic notions thus differed from the radical federalist conceptions. Although Teitgen rejected

116 As Adenauer wrote in a letter to Schuman in August 1951 “Ich brauche kaum zu betonen, dass in den nächsten Wochen und Monaten Aufgaben und Probleme zu lösen sind, die für die Zukunft unseres europäischen Kontinents im Ganzen und das Schicksal unserer Völker im Einzelnen von außerordentlicher, vielleicht entscheidender Bedeutung sind. Ich werte es hierbei als ein besonders günstiges, ja glückliches Zeichen, dass die ganze Last der gestellten Aufgaben auf den Schultern von Männern ruht, die wie Sie, unser gemeinsamer Freund Ministerpräsident De Gasperi und ich von dem Willen erfüllt sind, den Neuaufbau der europäischen Welt auf christlichen Grundlagen zu entwickeln und zu verwirklichen. Ich glaube, es hat wenige Kombinationen in der europäischen Geschichte gegeben, die so günstige Voraussetzungen für das Gelingen eines solchen Werkes bieten, als der gegenwärtige Augenblick; nie aber hat die Zeit so gedrängt wie heute und nie waren gegnerische Kräfte, die übereinanderwunden werden müssen, so stark wie heute.” (Schuman 1951a).

the ‘federal pact’ approach pursued by the federalists in front of the French Assemblée Nationale, he argued for an “an organized Europe with a structure similar to that of a state with mandatory powers, leading eventually to a confederation or, better, federation of Europe.” They “must possess the power to apply and execute decisions” but not constitute a fully-fledged federation. “We cannot immediately set up the federal Europe which is our ideal. We must be content to advance more slowly […]” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 103). Teitgen’s rhetoric was faithful to a resolution accepted at an NEI congress in The Hague the year earlier, which had proposed,

“[…] the convocation of a European assembly […] that exclusively had a consultative character and no executive or legislative powers. Its role should consist of proposing practical measures that were to be put in place as soon as possible to establish an economic and political Union in a free and democratic Europe. […] Concerning mutual relationships, states should overcome their nationalisms and build a federation or confederation that achieves unity but preserves diversity.”118

The Christian Democratic position thus embraced the idea of democratically overcoming European nationalist competition by forming a European Assembly in order to constitute a political union without wholeheartedly supporting the federalists in the quest for a federal pact.119 In sum, the consensus view called for the containment of national sovereignty that concurred with the design of the Council of Europe and rejected radical federalist notions.120 Hence, words of caution and opposition to the extreme federalist proposals were repeatedly uttered in the Geneva Circle.121

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118 Own translation from “die Einberufung einer europäischen Versammlung [...], die ausschließlich beratenden Charakter und keinerlei ausführende oder gesetzgebende Befugnisse haben soll. Ihre Rolle soll darin bestehen, praktische Maßnahmen vorzuschlagen, die möglichst bald durchzuführen wären, um eine wirtschaftliche und politische Union des freien und demokratischen Europas zu verwirklichen. […]Auf dem Gebiete ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen müssen die Staaten den Nationalismus überwinden und eine Föderation oder Konföderation bilden, die Einheit verwirklicht, ohne jedoch die Verschiedenheit zu beseitigen.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 138, 140).


120 Bidault stipulated in the Geneva Circle in March 1949 “L’union, c’est la simple affirmation d’une bonne volonté réciproque. La fédération ou la confédération suppose au contraire des institutions politiques stables devant lesquelles les États abandonneront une part de leur souveraineté nationale. Il va y avoir un Conseil de Gouvernement de l’Europe et une Assemblée Consultative dont les membres sont seront désignés par les parlements nationaux. Il est fâcheux que le Mouvement Européen à Bruxelles ait demandée que n’importe qui puisse être membre de l’Assemblée Consultative: il faut des hommes qualifiés, responsables et résolus à faire l’Europe.” Adenauer agreed (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 167).

121 In October 1948, Bidault said to Adenauer, “Bei der europäischen Zusammenarbeit soll man vor allem auf wirtschaftlichem Gebiet sehr fortschrittlich, auf politischem Gebiet sehr vorsichtig sein. Mit einem europäischem Parlament soll man nicht zu weit gehen, man muss vor allem auch die Schwie-
Although Christian Democracy was much more unified ideologically about the question of Europe, there were differences as well. In the same vein as Social Democrats differed on the question of how to achieve workers’ welfare in their specific national contexts, there were differences within Christian Democracy as well. Clear-cut cases in point are the Swiss and Austrian Christian Democrats who participated in the meetings of the NEI and the Geneva Circle but never seriously considered joining the European project through their respective countries. Thus, the Swiss representatives within the Geneva Circle such as Rosenberg were wholly uninfluential minority with regard to the foreign policy considerations of the Swiss Catholic SKVP, whose members were simply uninterested in abrogating Swiss sovereignty (Salzmann 2006, 64 ff.). Austrian Christian Democrats did not officially send delegates until the mid-1950’s and, despite professions to the common Christian Democratic heritage, did not seriously contemplate membership in the European institutions to be created (e.g. Judt 2005, 260 ff.).

Additionally, there were differences in emphasis between the German, Italian, and French representatives on the one hand, and those from the Netherlands and Belgium on the other, both with regard to the concrete political matters which should be decided upon as well as over institutional questions. For example, in December 1948, Bidault and Adenauer agreed in the Geneva Circle on the necessity of abandoning the principle of national sovereignty. Belgian CVP member Robert Houben replied that the CVP had not yet formed a position on the subject and was curious about concrete institutional provisions and the possibility of British participation. Bidault and Adenauer proceeded to speculate on the possibility of a German defense contribution in a European Army, which Houben rejected. Thus, the Geneva Circle al-

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123 In December 1948, Adenauer rejected German rearmament as dangerous but speculated that the Russian danger might make it necessary and that the only viable path was to create a European Army, “Cette armée allemande devrait être intégrée dans une armée européenne pour éviter les risques due militarisme allemand. L’idée de l’Europe est accueillie en Allemagne avec chaleur non seulement
owed German representatives such as Adenauer and Blank to speculate very early speculate a German contribution to defense within a European without repercussion (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 69). Other examples reveal that - during the height of the EDC negotiations - Dutch representative Sassen complained that

“[…] we were offended by the attitude of the great powers vis-à-vis the small ones […]. Those, especially France, gave the impression to think of the small states as satellites. It was a disappointment for the Dutch, but also for the Belgians. This attitude of the big powers stands in stark contrast to a European federalism […].”

Summary

In sum, there was a significant difference in the ideological cohesiveness between Christian Democracy and Social Democracy, as already indicated by the structural analysis of the previous chapter. For Christian Democrats, the common concern for the ‘unity’ of the Abendland seemed to ease reconciliation with German Christian Democrats. Whereas the institutional blueprints advocated in transnational Social Democracy were spread across the three models introduced early, the scope for conflict within Christian Democracy was narrower. Unity of the Abendland implied a containment of the nation-state and nationalist competition, not is abandonment: thus, Christian Democrats, by and large, thought that only some degree of sovereignty had to be abandoned; at the same time, Christian Democrats supported, very early, that the delegation of sovereignty had to be matched by some form of representation at the supranational level as well. Social Democrats, on the other hand, could be found among radical federalists – in particular around the MSEUE – as well as among ‘traditional intergovernmentalists’, in every state, that sought the preservation of sovereignty as a safeguard for the preservation – or indeed the creation – of the welfare state, in particular in Britain. Concerns for the unity of Social Democracy had more moderate supranationalists ‘caught in the middle’: while supporting the delegation of sovereignty in principle, figures such as Spaak, Mollet, or Van der
Goes van Naters stuck to the gradualist approach in preference for the creation of a wider Europe including Great Britain. Within Christian Democracy, ‘supranationalism’ became a consensus view albeit not uncontested in terms of its breadth and scope, application to policy fields or the precise degree of envisioned pooling and delegation. Moreover, this view still left sufficient room for disagreement between representatives from the smaller and the larger states. Figures such as Van Van Zeeland were more closely linked, ideologically, to the ELEC and advocated a limited supranationalism in the economic sphere only.

6.1.3 The Transatlantic Context: Ideas and Transgovernmental Networks

Whereas the previous sections have focused on ‘communities’ of actors constituted by contacts established through transnational organizations in post-war Europe, the present section considers the ideational background and the personal informal contacts that have been analyzed as ‘transatlantic networks’ (Kaiser and Leucht 2008; Leucht 2010; Chira-Pascanut 2014). The importance of these contacts is crucial insofar as US policy – due to US hegemony – naturally carried weight. These contacts, in so far as they influenced US policy through transgovernmental networks – thus have significance for the institutional design of post-war Europe. Additionally, as mentioned already, historical research has revealed that these organizations channeled significant funds – private or via the CIA – to the Europeanist ‘pressure groups’ (Aldrich 1997; Vayssière 2007, 233 ff.). Although the overall sums cannot be pinpointed precisely, they were of a magnitude to ensure competition for such funds between the European Movement and the UEF that can be traced back to visits to Washington *inter alia* by Spaak for the European Movement and Henri Frenay for the UEF (Vayssière 2007, 237). According to one estimate, the Ford Foundation, between 1949 and 1952, transferred approximately three million dollars to support the activities of the European Movement and its associates, roughly “two-thirds of its post-1952 budget” (Grosbois 2009, 471).

In a certain sense, then, the transnational organizations constituting the ‘transnational network’ were indeed predicated on US ‘hegemony’ (Cox 1987). From a sociological perspective, speaking of a post-war US Foreign Policy Establishment is to speak of a distinct type of individuals who “were upper-class Ivy League graduates with
law degrees and came from white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant backgrounds. They and some of their close friends frequently moved from one position to another in education, private enterprise, and government, thereby weaving an intricate network of connections between American government, the private sector, and academia.” (Winand 1993, 2). At the same time, these individuals, within the American administration, would possess sufficiently distinct views on post-war Europe, and thus to conform to the definition of transgovernmental networks put forth in chapter 2, section 2.3.3 (Keohane and Nye 1974, 44).

The ideological make-up of an influential segment of this generation has to be seen in the context of the development of US foreign policy before the war. The original foundation of isolationism, as famously expressed by George Washington in his Farewell Address in 1796, rested on a view of Europe that formed part and parcel of the original argument for US federalism. The isolationist conception of US foreign policy, a long-standing principle, had always relied on the denunciation of European national conflicts,

“Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence therefore it must be unwise to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.” (Washington 2000 [1796], 26).

As Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist No. 7,

“[..] America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive, would, by the operation of such jarring alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of the parts into which she was divided, would be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them all. Divide et impera must be the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us.” (Hamilton, et al. 2014, 31).

Thus, the founding myth of US federalism was, from the beginning, conceived of as a new solution to old European problems (Deudney 1995). One foreign policy implication, dominant in the 19th and early 20th century, was to remain isolated from the alliances and power politics of European states. A different set of prescriptions was already implicit in the Progressive movement of the late 19th century out of which grew Wilsonian internationalism grew eventually (Smith 2012, 84 ff.). Contrary to the isolationist retreat of the US Public and Congress after the Treaty of Versailles, a number of both American as well as British liberal thinkers remained influential proponents of international institutions and began to consider larger forms of political
unification (Deudney 2007, 216 ff.). Students of International Relations refer to this tradition as ‘idealism’ during the so-called first great debate (e.g. Schmidt 2013). A particular case in the 20th century was H.G. Wells, an unusual but by no means exceptionally radical proponent of that view, who speculated about a European confederation based on the Swiss model in 1902.\footnote{Wells wrote in 1902, “I imagine that the German Empire – that is, the organized expression of German aggression to-day – will be either shattered or weakened to the pitch of great compromises by a series of wars by land and sea; it will be forced to develop the autonomy of its rational middle class in the struggles that will render these compromises possible, and it will be finally not Imperial German ideas, but central European ideas possibly more akin to Swiss conceptions, a civilized republicanism finding its clearest expression in the French language, that will be established upon a bilingual basis throughout Western Europe, and increasingly predominant over the whole European mainland and the Mediterranean basin, as the twentieth century closes. The splendid dream of a Federal Europe, which opened the nineteenth century for France, may perhaps, after all, come to something like realization at the opening of the twenty-first.” (Wells 1902, 259).} Thus, in the US and the UK, the “League of Free Nations Associations” was founded by respective centrist republican, liberal, or social democratic sections of the political establishment in 1918 to support the global institutionalization of international politics: the US section was founded by Paul Kellogg and subsequently included Herbert D. Croly (founding editor of The New Republic), Columbia Political Scientist Henry Raymond Mussey, and Columbia Historian Charles A. Beard, with Congresses being attended by, \textit{inter alia}, John Foster Dulles, and Franklin D. and Eleanor Roosevelt (Dennis 2002). The British section included H.G. Wells, and, among others, Norman Angell among its members (Wells and Grey of Fallodon 1919; Dennis 2002). The project, from the start, was to interfere “with national aggression and competition” contributing to war and preventing institutional agreements to abolish war (Wells and Grey of Fallodon 1919, 36). As Henry R. Mussey saw it, it was predominantly “nationalistic ideas of commerce” which had been responsible for the outbreak of the First World War.\footnote{“Nationalistic ideas of commerce, of which we have had our full share, have contributed to those conceptions of national rivalry and hostility that are now bearing such bitter fruit. Possibly we may yet forsake these ideas, and in time come to stand with that small number of nations that believe international commerce to be not economic warfare but actual international cooperation.” (Mussey 1914, 625).}

With the outbreak of the Second World War, these considerations regained influence once preparations of plans for the post-war period were made. Within the US foreign policy establishment, a number of voices maintained very early on that for European construction to be successful, some form of European Unity had to be fostered. This view was shared by influential figures such as George Kennan (Mayers 1988, 149). Kennan, among others, explicitly shared the view that the basic root of the problem
lay in national sovereignty being the organizing principle of European politics and that European unity was the appropriate ‘pedagogical’ answer to the German problem. As future US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles put it in September 1942, “Germany ought to be integrated into a unified Europe.” (Winand 1993, 7). In Washington, such ideas were advocated by think tanks such as the Ford foundation and the American Committee on a United Europe (ACUE). As already pointed out, the latter organization in particular – headed by Senator J. William Fulbright – was one of the prime channels of funds to the Europeanist transnational organizations, due to its members having close connections to the US intelligence community and the US economic elite (Vayssière 2007, 233). These actors combined progressive republican and liberal ideas with the US federalist tradition and applied it to problems of US foreign policy with regard to European reconstruction. Their reasoning, conforming to basic US interest in the emerging global confrontation, would become highly influential. Thus, in devising the resolution inaugurating the funds and institutions of the Marshall Plan, the 80th US Congress declared,

“Mindful of the advantages which the United States has enjoyed through the existence of a large domestic market with no internal trade barriers, and believing that similar advantages can accrue to the countries of Europe, it is declared to be the policy of the people of the United States to encourage these countries through a joint organization to exert sustained common efforts [...] which will speedily achieve that economic cooperation in Europe which is essential for lasting peace and prosperity.” (1948)

In sum, there was an influential segment in the US administration as well as in Congress that saw suggestions ‘European unity’ – no matter how vague – in a positive light (Wall 1991, 192; Schwabe 1993, 43).

Organizations such as the Ford Foundation or the ACUE were key carriers of the most radical interpretation of his line of thinking. Key individuals associated with the ACUE included Paul G. Hoffman, former OSS operative and first Head of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) administering Marshall Plan aid; John J. McCloy, US High Commissioner for Germany from 1949 to 1953; Robert R. Bowie, Harvard Professor of Government, later affiliated member of the Spaak committee

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127 In a paper prepared for the Policy Planning Staff Paper of the US State Department, Kennan wrote in 1949 “We see no answer to German problem within a sovereign national framework. Continuation of historical process within this framework will almost inevitably lead to repetition of post-Versailles sequence of developments [...]. Only answer is some form of European union which would give young Germans wider horizon and remove introverted, explosive, neurotic quality of German political thought [...]” (quoted in Pruessen 1996, 60).
for a European Constitution and member of the Policy Planning Staff in the Eisenhower administration from 1953-1957; Allen Welch Dulles, former OSS operative and later Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as well as his brother, John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State under the Eisenhower administration; Lucius D. Clay, Military Governor of the US Zone in Germany; Walter Bedell Smith, Secretary to the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the US military during the war and Director of the CIA from 1950 to 1953; David K. E. Bruce, US ambassador to France 1949-1952 and US special representative to the ECSC 1952-1957, William H. Donovan, a former OSS operative who succeeded Senator Fulbright as president of the ACUE (see Aldrich 1995; Aubourg 2003; Vayssière 2007, 233 ff.; Grosbois 2009, 471). As a result, a number of mid-level US representatives in Europe had a clear policy agenda and repeatedly urged European leaders to take steps towards ‘European unity’ (Aubourg 2003). Thus, McCloy had pronounced the Schuman Plan as “a test of whether the European countries are yet prepared to work together in creating a progressive European community which will advance the interests of all and overcome the cleavages of the conflicts of the past.” (quoted in Pruessen 1996, 64).

The failure of the Versailles settlement was an important background as well, not merely in terms of the political reasoning. Thus, Jean Monnet had met John Foster Dulles as well as Alan Welsh Dulles for the first time during the Versailles negotiations in 1919, at which both participated (Duchêne 1994, 40). All three would henceforth look for solutions to the “world’s worst firetrap” (Dulles quoted in Pruessen 1982, 12-13; 1996, 67). Additionally, the relationship between John Foster Dulles and Jean Monnet was apparently marked by significant trust. A former aide to Dulles stated in an interview in 1966,

“I think Dulles had the greatest respect for Monnet and valued his advice. What became of the advice, I can’t tell you. They dealt only privately, because they were close personal friends. And then they came out and I never knew what the result was. But I’m sure that Dulles listened to him with great care“ (Dwan 2000, 71)

In their first contact made after Dulles’ nomination as Secretary of State in 1953, both reassured each other of their common goal. Even official exchanges between

128 In the inter-war period, John Foster Dulles and Monnet worked at the accounting firm Sullivan & Company (Duchêne 1994, 40).
129 Upon appointment of Dulles as Secretary of State, Monnet wrote to Dulles, “My dear Foster, the news of your nomination has moved me deeply […] The burden is heavy but the task ahead is great and the reward full of promise of peace can not only be kept but developed. […] To attain this goal, I
Dulles and Monnet would at times violate protocol dramatically with both individuals using each other’s’ first names. In the same vein, McCloy, Adenauer, and Dulles apparently developed a similar relationship over time.130

A key member of this structure is obviously Jean Monnet. The consensus is that Monnet was clearly an individual with an exceptional quality of informal contacts, both within the French government as well as to the governments of the Six and the US administration (e.g. Duchêne 1994; Roussel 1996).131 According to Étienne Hirsch, one of Monnet’s assistants in France and at the ECSC, the success and the influence that Monnet supposedly wielded in behind the scenes of the European negotiations in the early 1950’s was “due to his American friends.”132 Apart from alleged individual qualities, Monnet thus occupied an strategically important position connecting the US, the French and henceforth the European elite at the lower – echelon transgovernmental level (Bossu 1996a; Chira-Pascanut 2014). These contacts were partially due to his biography: as a banker in the inter-war period and through his position in the administration of the Allied Victory arms program he established durable contacts with figures such as George W. Ball, Robert R. Bowie, Shepher Stone from the Ford Foundation, McGeorge Bundy, Eisenhower, Robert Nathan, John McCloy, Harry Hopkins, Eugene Rostow, and many others (Bossuat 1996a, 75). Already before the war he became a close friend with William Tomlinson, an assistant to the US ambassador in France, David Bruce (Winand 1993, 40).133 There believe that a prompt creation of a United States of Europe is essential and I know how much you share these convictions.” To which Dulles responded “Greatly appreciate your cable and look forward to our continuing association. I share your conviction that it is of the utmost importance promptly to create greater unity politically, economically, and militarily in Europe. This, as you know, has been my conviction for years.” (Winand 1993, 41)


131 A close collaborator, Georges Berthoin, for example, points out that Monnet always knew “the one who is preparing the paper or sometimes the man who is going to speak on the basis of the paper”, and, by thus ensuring that his point of view would be presented to the actors in power – for example by ensuring that his “letter would be on top of the pile” of a minister’s desk - he would be able to spread his ideas through the political hierarchy without necessarily speaking to the actors and convincing them himself. Interview in the documentary”. “Jean Monnet, The Father of Europe” by Don C. Smith available at <http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/jean-monnet-father-of-europe/documentary> Last accessed 10-05 2015.

132 “[…] grâce à ses connaissances, ses amis américaines […]” (Hirsch 1987).

133 De Maizière, German delegation in Paris about Bruce “David Bruce was a friend of France, a good friend of France, his heart was with the French. His feeling was that the European unity, the European
are documented repeated and close contacts with Robert Murphy, William Draper, as well as Walter Bedell Smith (Winand 1993, 41). Additional acquaintances already made in the inter-war period in the financial section included Henry Stimson, Felix Frankfurter, Dean Acheson, and W. Averell Harriman (Duchêne 1994, 88).

In how far is it justified to speak of a sufficient similarity of ideas among within the US Foreign Policy apparatus and of Monnet? Is it at all proper to speak of transgovernmental networks?

On the US side, it is possible to broadly distinguish three viewpoints. Individuals around the ACUE “[…] were either themselves determined federalists […] or else viewed American federalism as an ideal political model which could be deployed elsewhere.” (Aldrich 1997, 186). Their basic reasoning directly builds upon the same reasoning as described in the Federalist papers and applies it to characterize basic American post-war security interests along these lines. This scheme, along the economic dimension as expressed in the most basic ways by the Senate resolution for the Economic Cooperation Act quoted above, was generally shared by Democrats and played a significant role in garnering support for Marshall Plan aid (Hogan 1987, 455). 134 Thus, the initial line of conflict in 1947 in setting up the OEEC was the US insistence on the creation of a European organization with the power to decide on the distribution of the funds whereas the European governments sought to safeguard national forms of distribution (Milward 1984, 61 ff.). Once that failed US officials heavily but unsuccessfully lobbied for Spaak to assume the chairman of the ministerial council in the hope of endowing the institution with a more supranational character (Milward 1984, 173).

For geopolitical issues, there was much more reluctance. The general consideration was obvious enough: if the West European countries were to integrate and pool their resources, the United States could safely withdraw its troops as a sufficient balance in Europe would be achieved (Trachtenberg 1991, 164). This consideration became ever more salient, especially among Republicans, as the amounts of military spend-

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134 Accordingly, a State Department paper reacted to the Schuman Plan thus “The political advantages of the plan are potentially tremendous, if it’s essential principles […] are retained in the final treaty and are implemented in practice” (FRUS 1950 III, 722).
ing called for in the context, escalated into a ‘second phase of state-building’ (Hogan 1998, 1).

Among officials in the State Department, however, a majority emphasized the need for British participation in any institutional structure to be constructed (McAllister 2002, 176). Additionally, voices in Congress calling for the necessity to integrate Europe were met by initial reluctance in the State Department. While Kennan in the Policy Planning staff advocated European Unity without the British, these proposals were received sceptically by Acheson and other officials (Schwabe 1995, 123). In addition, the application of ‘supranational’ measures in security matters was still seen by some as unrealistic, dysfunctional or even dangerous; a ‘third force’ in Europe was generally seen as clashing with basic American interests (Mai 1993, 98; Trachtenberg 1999, 119).\footnote{In the same paper, the State Department warned of ‘third force tendencies’ that might be implicit in the Schuman Plan “The greatest safeguard we have against the perversion of the plan in a "third force" direction rests in the existence of NAT[O] itself, and in fact that the stronger Western Europe becomes economically the more capable it will be of handling its own fifth columns and of withstanding Soviet pressures.” (FRUS 1950 III, 722).}

Thus, the scope of the applicability of ‘European unification’ over different policy fields was disputed. This is best illustrated by the different reactions in the State Department and the Pentagon to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. In the State Department, members of the Policy Planning Staff devised their own conception of how to rearm German - in consultation with US High Commissioner in Germany McCloy – and developed the ‘Byorade Plan’ that proposed not just operational but organizational supranational integration by pooling controls over the German army and European troop contingents (FRUS 1950 III, 167-168, 180, 211-219). It called for an integrated and “really effective European Defense Force” (FRUS 1950 III, 213). The plan was met enormous resistance from the Pentagon fearing delay and military impracticability. The State Department did not press the matter further but accepted the Pentagon proposal on President Truman’s insistence since the proposals seemed impractical, would not be accepted by the Pentagon, neither by the Allies and certainly not meet the timing demands imposed by Congress (Acheson 1969, 438).

In summary, there was an influential segment in the US Foreign policy elite whose thinking about the basic US security interests in the emerging Cold War naturally led
to seeing in supranational institutional proposals the solution of the German problem and economic reconstruction. There is little evidence of radical federalist thinking along the same lines as the European radical federalist groups on the continent espoused it. Calls for ‘European unity’ resonated with the basic cultural toolkit for understanding Europe that US officials were equipped with. Although this line of reasoning was by no means in the majority, it would prove to remain a highly influential current.

Regarding Monnet, it is equally difficult to connect his personality to a distinct institutional blueprint. Before the negotiations on the ECSC in Paris, it seems that there was no hard-wired institutional plan in his mind. What is clear, however, that he concurred wholeheartedly with the concern for greater European Unity very early on. Already in 1941, Spaak recalls a meeting with Monnet in which Monnet expounded in his thinking about the necessity of integrating the European Market for Coal and Steel (Duchêne 1994, 182). In an interview with Fortune magazine in 1944 he spoke of the necessity of a “true yielding of sovereignty” and “some kind of central union” (Duchêne 1994, 183). However, the build-up to the ECSC Paris conference amply suggests that Monnet was never a full-fledged federalist nor that he was wedded dogmatically to a particular blueprint. His main concern was to build durable institutions that allowed durable and peaceful cooperation between European states (Monnet 1976, 460). Concerns for democratic legitimacy only entered the picture afterwards.136 In this sense, his main concern as well as the institutional flexibility concurrent with this concern fit nicely into the basic considerations that the Europeanist segment within the US administration shared: to find a solution to the European and the German problem via the containment of the nation-state through common institutions that implied the abrogation of at least part of their sovereignty.

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136 Étienne Hirsch recalls “Monnet avait une idée fondamentale, c'était qu'il fallait tenir compte de l'existence de l'Allemagne, qu'on ne pouvait pas la laisser en dehors comme ça, et le problème consistait à savoir par quel mécanisme on pouvait aboutir à ce résultat. un objectif : l'introduction de l'Allemagne dans le circuit d'Europe de l'Ouest, et il faut chercher comment le faire. […] Donc, la notion de Monnet d'institutions lui vient en réalité plus tard. On ne peut pas dire qu'il y a une pensée institutionnelle là-dedans. […] Il y avait l'institution fondamentale, c'était la Cour de Justice. […] En ce qui concerne l'Assemblée, c'est sur une suggestion d'André Philip. J'en ai parlé a Monnet qui a commencé par me renvoyer, en me disant, ‘Vous n'y connaissez rien, vous ne comprenez rien, ça n'a rien à voir’. Et trois jours après, il m'a rappelé, en disant, ‘Ecoutez, vous m'avez parlé d'une Assemblée ... Si on en reparlait?’ […] Au bout de trois jours, il m'a rappelé […] ‘Ecoutez, voyez vos collègues et préparez un statut d’une Assemblée Européenne’” (Hirsch 1987).
6.1.4 Conclusion

This section has characterized the ideas circulating within the transnational groups in post-war Europe. The challenges that the European post-war environment posed had been anticipated through different traditions of political thought available in the varied cultural and social milieus described above. Thus, ideological ‘toolkits’ utilized to meet the post-war challenge consisted of different values and concerns and, accordingly, different solution for the basic geopolitical structural challenge had been foreseeable for several decades. ‘Ideas of Europe’ came from political traditions and ‘world views’ as diverse as the conservative Pan-Europa’ movement, the quasi anarchist federalism of Proudhon, the constitutionalist federalism of the Federalist Papers, academic economic theory, as well as internationalist Socialist thought. Their commonality consists in the reflection on a similar challenge, namely the profound change in the global geopolitical status of Europe (Loth 2014). The end of the Second World War seemingly required a novel invention of the basic notion of Europe. The concern was survival. Thus, ‘European unity’, perhaps for the first time went deeper than the abstract sense of a common European identity that had prevailed for centuries. A new sense of interdependence – both economically as well as in terms of Europe’s survival – was emerging and began to impact the thinking about the future prospects of Europe and its institutional implication.

As this section has made clear, however, even in the late 1940’s already, there were clear differences in the ways in which the common political problem was perceived as well as in the concrete institutional goals put forth. The differentiation into distinct overlapping communities across the network of organizational cross-affiliations in the transnational organizations considered here – described in the previous chapter – reflected that heterogeneity. The differences in basic concerns as organized into the distinct transnational groups were reflected in their distinct ideological heritage. Thus, the federalist community – the most radical – had identified the nation-state as

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137 Own translation from “Rien ne se crée sans les hommes, rien ne dure sans les institutions.” (Monnet 1976, 460).
the root of the European problem and sought its abolishment in the foundation of a new federal political community. For the ELEC, the problem of nationalism lay predominantly in its force to hinder liberalization of trade and prevent taking advantage of welfare gains that a liberalized European market would provide for the economic recovery of Europe. The goal was not to abolish the nation-state but rather to find efficient institutional ways to construct a European Market that would stabilize the nation-state and ensure its survival, resulting in a focus on economic fields of cooperation alone. For the ELEC actors, supranational institutions implied merely the control of ‘committees of experts’ that were to oversee the gradual liberalization of trade. No significant centralization was envisioned, no forms of ‘democratic representation’ of European citizens were sought.

Apart from the federalists and the ELEC, the remaining transnational actors within the European Movement come from transnational party related organizations representing transnational Social Democracy and transnational Christian Democracy. Both had distinct views and concerns largely growing out of the history of their ideological precursors. For Social Democrats, the only common concern after the war was the reconstruction of the welfare state in their respective countries. Apart from that, views differed widely. A significant portion of transnational Social Democrats thought that these goals required the radicalism of the federalists, added, by a concern to rebuild Europe as a ‘third force’ in the emerging confrontation between the blocks. At the same time, there were Social Democrats in virtually every country under consideration who opposed substantial delegation and pooling, denounced the European project as conservative and sought national sovereignty to maintain or create a welfare state and reconstruct European economies. Concerns for the unity of Social Democracy had more moderate supranationalists ‘caught in the middle’: while supporting the delegation of sovereignty in principle, figures such as Spaak, Mollet, or Van der Goes van Naters stuck to a gradualist approach in preference for the creation of a wider Europe including Great Britain. In addition, these internal divisions made the reconciliation made French-German reconciliation difficult.

Comparatively speaking, Christian Democracy was much more uniform. A shared concern for the unity of the Abendland, the most intense sense of imminent threat from the Bolshevik East led to similar views on the necessity of a containment of the nation-state and nationalist competition, but not its abandonment: thus, Christian Democrats, by and large, thought that some degree of sovereignty had to be aban-
doned. As that concern grew out of a sense of threatened security, the envisioned future scope of European institutions would be quite broad, encompassing security as well. As a result, Christian Democrats held that the delegation of sovereignty had to be matched by some form of representation at the supranational level as well.

Finally, there was an influential transatlantic network connecting US actors that subscribed to a classic causal story of the American political tradition on the vicissitudes of the old continent. While there was an overwhelming cross-party consensus on the need for closer cooperation between European states, in particular on the economic plane, federalist and supranationalist ideas were subscribed to by a distinct set of actors that organized in the ACUE and, having ties to the Foreign Policy establishment and the Intelligence community, accordingly effected a significant flow of funding for the Europeanist organization that provided a significant boost to their organizational capabilities.

Table 6.1 below illustrates the core concerns shared by these distinct groups, the implied institutional prescriptions and the degree of ideological divisions.

As the table shows, the ideological divisions, in particular in the transnational European space are considerable. In line with the results of the previous chapter, the European Movement, as the overarching organization assembling the most influential transnational pressure groups and individuals, was characterized by an extreme divide. As a result, although it may have disposed of the most significant resources, no uniform political pressure in a single direction would emanate from this organization. Thus, the dominant conclusion is one of a complex overarching transnational conflict that cannot be reduced to party ideologies and provided ample room for conflict dynamics. Moreover, even the federalist community – largely seen as ideologically homogenous in the previous chapter – was based on a political compromise between rather diverse factions. Combined with the relative organizational weakness of these organizations, any transnational coalition formed on the basis of the transnational networks would be temporary, formed to achieve a specific political goal and dissolve afterwards rather quickly. The next section traces these dynamics between 1950 and 1954.
<table>
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<tr>
<td>Transnational Social Democracy</td>
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6.2 Changing Allegiances: the Politics of Transnational Influence and the EDC

The previous section has described the ways in which actors within the post-war transnational and transgovernmental networks had developed typical institutional solutions to the question of international cooperation in post-war (Western) Europe. The main concerns were abstractly similar, the derived political goals differed widely across and within the transnational organizations, ranging from preservation of the nation-state, its containment within supranational arrangements, to its complete abolition.

In sum, there was ample room for conflict: the tenuous commitments voiced by the leadership of the European Movement under Duncan Sandys in the late 1940’s suggested that the institutional compromise of the Council of Europe would be temporary. Moreover, the rhetoric about European unity and the pathos that Churchill had employed in his 1946 speech in Zurich contributed to certain expectations: by the late 1940’s, the perception that the British unionists failed to adhere to such solemn pledges grew consistently.

Accordingly, this section will trace the emergence, persistence and decline of a transnational coalition of supranationalists and federalists in the early 1950’s. Formed against in the aftermath of disappointments over the inconsistency between rhetorical commitments and political actions of the British unionists, Christian Democratic and Social democratic supranationalists, federalists, and, significantly, a number of US actors with similar convictions formed a loose transnational and transgovernmental coalition in the early 1950’s. Sharing similar values and ideas as well as exchanging information, this coalition sought to lobby and convince the negotiating governments of its approach to European integration in general and German re-armament in particular. The convergence of national viewpoints that Hoffman and Haas had noted for the mid 1950s (chapter 3, section 3.1.1), correlated, at the transnational level, with an increased activity and documented access to key European governments.
6.2.1 Formation, 1947 - 1951: the Council of Europe, the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan

Seeing that the differences between the various transnational groups were substantial, it is no surprise that the first signs of the limits of an institutional compromise between the different groups within the European Movement already emerged at the congress of The Hague in 1948. On the one end of the spectrum, British Unionists insisted that the first step to European Unity was continuous intergovernmental consultation; on the opposite end of the spectrum, federalists sought the foundation of a European constituent and thus a new European quasi-state. Thus, the resolutions at the Hague were a political compromise, that was particularly painful for the radical federalists. The federalists in particular agreed to the compromise because they shared

“[…] the same fears and contradictory desires, however unequally divided: breaking with the party of leading personalities, which held the purse strings and the press, meant, on one hand, to run the risk of courting rapid destruction or of becoming a sect […] and […] to condemn the Hague to be simply a trompe l’oeil congress, without any European future.” (De Rougemont 1967, 337, 338).

Initially, these compromises seemed well founded insofar the arguments set forth by the unionists seemed to merely imply a different time scale. The rhetorical commitments voiced in the European Movement still suggested that the political goals for a ‘united Europe’ were similar: the unionists simply preferred an initial period of mere intergovernmental consultation. As Duncan Sandys had expressed it in the Executive Committee of the European movement, “the first stage […] is to foster the habit of regular consultation between Governments on inter-European and international affairs.” (Lipgens and Loth 1991, 333). Since the European Movement assembled key delegates from all major transnational organizations sharing that commitment, this line became the least common denominator for it was recognized that the leadership of the European Movement afforded significant influence.138

The political compromise at The Hague and the work of the European Movement initially seemed to pay off. The conference in The Hague assembled key figures who met for the first time, including Adenauer and Schuman (Kaiser 2007, 212). The po-

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138 As the Executive Committe of the NEI stated in 1948, “dass in diesem Koordinationskommittee von unserer Seite die aktivste Mitarbeit von unserer Seite erforderlich ist” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 131).
political resolution of the Congress stipulated that “the European nations must transfer and merge some portion of their sovereign rights”, demanded “the convening, as a matter of real urgency, of a European Assembly chosen by the Parliaments of the participating nations […] to advise upon immediate practical measures” and suggested that “the Assembly should make proposals for the establishment of a Court of Justice with adequate sanctions.” (Congress of Europe 1948). A delegation led by Churchill presented the resolution to the British government; in France, a delegation led by Paul Reynaud presented it to the French government (Vayssière 2007, 225, 226). As a result, the governments of the European Brussels Treaty signatories set up a study committee that comprised key actors from the transnational sphere, including, *inter alia*, Paul Reynaud, Guy Mollet, Francois de Menthon, Hugh Dalton, Gladwyn Jebb, Pieter Kersten, J. Bruyns Slot, Max Buset, August de Schryven, Fernand Dehousse. (Vayssière 2007, 227). Robert Schuman passed the results directly on to the French Cabinet for consideration (Poidevin 1986, 231). Paul-Henri Spaak, still being Belgian Foreign Minister, passed it directly to the Belgian Cabinet (Spaak 1969, 226). As other governments equally took up the resolutions, the resolution of the Political Committee of the conference instituted a Council of States as well as a Consultative Assembly, a fact only grudgingly accepted by the British Labour government under Ernest Bevin (Hick 1990b, 336, 337). A process started by the diverse transnational coalition of the European Movement had provided the blueprint for a European organization that looked like a promising starting point for European integration (Spaak 1969, 266). Rhetoric, it seemed, was followed by action.

However, the internal conflicts within the European Movement were reproduced in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe as well as between governments. Key members of the transnational European pressure groups were among the delegates, Spaak became the first president of the Assembly. As a result, a major line of conflict emerged between radical federalists, intergovernmentalists, and more tentative proponents of supranationality that sought to advance the European project step by step and keep the Unionists on board (Loth 1977, 245; Dumoulin 1999, 26 ff.). Rhetorical efforts to maintain unity persisted but the divisions became appar-

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139 Gérard Jaquet on French German contacts in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe Assembly “A propos des rapports entre Français et Allemands? Oui, les rapports entre Français et Allemands dès la deuxième session du Conseil de l'Europe ont été excellents. On s'est trouvé devant des amis, avec qui on a pu discuter très librement, très franchement. Il n'y a pas eu de véritables dé-
In the rhetorical engagements, the exchanges were already cast in the form of normative arguments that centered on the ‘democratic deficit’. As Winston Churchill put it in the Consultative Assembly,

“We do not possess executive power and, at this stage in our development, we could not possibly claim it. […] We must feel our way forward and, by our good sense, build up an increasing strength and reputation. But we must not attempt on our present electoral basis to change the powers which belong to the duly constituted national Parliaments founded directly upon universal suffrage.” (Churchill 1949a, 282).

The tentativeness of the unionists was accordingly denounced by federalist leader Henri Frenay as a ‘Europeanism out of fear’ (Vayssière 2007, 228). The discontent of the federalists was exacerbated by envy: plagued by continuing financial problems, the leaders of the UEF started to realize that the European Movement was well-financed through its US contacts. Complaints were followed by active competition for US funds between the organizations (Vayssière 2007, 228).

The conflicts mainly between the British Unionists and the continental federalists saw their first culmination in the campaign for a ‘federal pact’, undertaken by radicals from the UEF in 1949 who sought to transform the Consultative Assembly into the ‘constituent’ envisioned in their programs to form the nucleus of a European federation. It was launched by the steering committee of the UEF – at the time including Ugo La Malfa, René Coty, André Philip, Paul Ramadier, and Eugen Kogon – that drew up a resolution calling for assembly and federal pact to reform the Council of Europe (Vayssière 2007, 252). A straightforward application of the federalist blueprint, it called for a two-chamber legislative branch representing European voters and states, an executive Political Authority controlled by the legislative branch and widely responsible for economic matters as well as defense, and an independent judiciary.

140 For example, in one of first speeches as a delegate to the Consultative Assembly, Winston Churchill warned “Les dangers qui nous menacent sont grands, mais grande aussi est notre force, et il n’y a aucune raison de ne pas réussir à réaliser le but et à établir la structure de cette Europe unie.” (Churchill 1949b). Spaak’s characterization of the situation within the Consultative Assembly “Eine föderalistische Minderheit verlangte, man solle unverzüglich das Statut eines europäischen Staatenbundes aufstellen. Die Vorsichtigen hingegen behaupteten – als anderes Extrem – man müsse Europa Schritt für Schritt, Etappe um Etappe, und ohne übertriebene Eile aufbauen. In der Mitte stand eine Mehrheit, der auch ich angehörte, prinzipiell mit den Föderalisten einer Meinung, jedoch darum besorgt, sich nicht von den Engländern abzusondern.” (Spaak 1969, 273).
It was adopted by an extraordinary assembly of the UEF in October 1949 (UEF 1949).

The result of this campaign was disappointing in two dimensions: first, the efforts to organize mass-demonstrations in Europe were a failure, with the exception of Italy where over 500,000 signed the petition, with over 141 deputies and 105 senators (Vayssière 2007, 252). Elsewhere, it became obvious that the federalist efforts to organize a European constituent ‘bottom up’ style would fail and the notion of a federal Europe was the affair of a faction of the political and cultural elite, because the resonance in the remaining countries was negligible (Greilsammer 1975, 63; Vayssière 2007, 253). Within the Consultative Assembly, its members put forth a successful resolution that demanded that the Committee of Ministers to renounce their veto rights and create an executive political authority (Brunn 2009, 65). The resolution was vetoed in the Committee of Ministers and the federalist members of the Consultative Assembly abstained from its session scheduled for November 1949 and organized a parallel ‘protest’ meeting in Strasbourg, seeking to voice their objection against the supposed rejection of the will of ‘European peoples’ (Vayssière 2011). It remained an empty gesture. Hugh Dalton decried the external pressure within the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

However, not only radical federalists such as Spinelli but also more pragmatic actors who nevertheless sought to institutionalize the limitation of national sovereignty grew increasingly frustrated with the Council of Europe (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 94). The main frustration within the Council of Europe grew partially from the gulf that separated the Social Democrats. Thus, in January 1950, the British Foreign Minister Bevin contemplated an appropriate timing for “standing up frontally to the pretensions of the Strasbourg Assembly” (DBPO II: I, 381). The failure of more limited reform initiatives – such as the assignment of the right to initiate decisions in the Committee of Ministers to the Consultative Assembly as sanctioned by the leadership of the European Movement – caused “profound disappointment within the Ex-

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141 A federalist pamphlet thus pronounced that the UEF “se réserve d’agir à Strasbourg selon les circonstances sans exclure des actions de caractère révolutionnaire.” The goal was to “mettre les parlementaire face à leurs responsabilité” (Vayssière 2007, 270 ; 2011).

142 He complained about the campaign for a federal pact in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe “Des personnes étrangères à cette maison essayent de nous influencer. C’est incompatible avec la dignité de élus” (Vayssière 2007, 240).
ecutive Committee of the European Movement (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 419). Reas-
surance came through rhetoric. As Spaak put it in a speech in the Consultative As-
ssembly, “We must have faith in the Council of Europe and – you may think it is in-
terested advice – we must have faith in the European Assembly.” (Lipgens and Loth
1990, 331). So long as the main ‘obstruction’ came from a British Labour govern-
ment, leading Social Democrats, Spaak and Mollet in particular, were unwilling to con-
template a smaller union.

The protocols of meetings in the Christian Democratic Geneva Circle, however, pay
testimony to the growing impatience with the lack of progress in moving away from
mere intergovernmental consultations. By early 1950, the protocols began to decry
‘British obstruction’ in the Council of Europe (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 254). At the
same time, the tensions within the European Movement itself grew. Thus, frustrated
by the continuing tensions between the British Unionists and their continental coun-
terparts, Duncan Sandys resigned from his position as head of the European Move-
ment and Spaak, no longer the Belgian Foreign Minister, became head of the Euro-

The Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan

The announcement of both the Schuman and the Pleven Plan fell into this environ-
ment of increased tensions between the three ideologies in the transnational sphere.
However, the Schuman Plan did not abolish the coalition built around the European
Movement altogether. For a considerable time, there were continuing efforts to figure
out some form under which the envisioned ECSC, a European Army, and the Coun-
cil of Europe could coexist in a meaningful and productive way. However, as it be-
came clear that a British government led by a formerly leading figure of the Europe-
an Movement – Winston Churchill – would pursue exactly the same line as it had
under Bevin, the main proponents of the transnational federalists, Christian Demo-
crats, as well as the federalist Social Democrats broke with the Council of Europe
and shifted their attention towards the nascent supranational institutions being nego-
tiated among the Six.

Both the origins as well as the content of the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan had
a number of features in common. The timing of both proposals followed a similar
logic: the Schuman Plan was proposed in response to an expiring deadline at which point the quotas on German Coal and Steel production were to be renegotiated, with the American government pressing for higher quotas for the German industry. The proposal of the Pleven Plan was a response to the Korean War and American insistence on German rearmament. Moreover, the main institutional elements that were combined in the Paris Treaties had been amply discussed or proposed in the preceding years. Both the content of the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan had been discussed explicitly or implicitly within the Christian Democratic Community, specifically the Geneva Circle, before the announcement of the respective treaties. (Kaiser 2007, 225, 273). Thus, the Schuman Plan was a coordinated affair. Schumacher had sent a draft to Adenauer in a personal letter, assuring the consent of the German chancellor before the announcement (Adenauer 1976, 327). Owing to this situation, the French initiatives have been described by Lothar Herbst as ‘not particularly original’.143

With regard to the issue of rearmament, it was no secret that the German government would, if rearmament was necessary, prefer a European alternative. In December 1948, Adenauer had already proposed in the Geneva Circle that if German rearmament may become necessary, it would have to be integrated in a European Army.144 Adenauer had expressed this view publicly in an interview with the American Newspaper Cleveland Plain Dealer in 1949. At that time, the fact that a German head of state was already contemplating rearmament publicly caused widespread irritation (Large 1996, 54, 78). Three weeks before the announcement of the Pleven Plan in 1950, Adenauer’s personal ‘Referent’ in the Kanzleramt and later head of the ‘Politische Abteilung’ at the Auswärtige Amt Herbert Blankenhorn (see Ramscheid 2006), again recounted in the Geneva Circle the position of the German government: it “would refuse national rearmament” and it “hoped that a European Army would be created.”145 Contrary to the hostile public reactions to Adenauer’s interview – placat-

143 Own translation from “[…] nicht besonders originell” (Herbst 1996, 75).
145 Blankenhorn in the Geneva Circle on October 2nd 1950, three weeks before the Pleven Plan was announced “Nous refusons le réarmement national. Nous espérons qu’une armée européenne sera créée […]” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 252).
ing domestic fears of German rearmament – the proceedings within the Geneva Circle were open and frank. For example, the Dutch MVP representative Emmanuel Sassen – contrary to the strong rejection of the EDC by the Dutch government – reacted positively to Blankenhorn’s reasoning (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 253). Three weeks before the announcement of the Pleven Plan, Bichet noted that the representatives in Geneva were ‘unanimous’ that a European Army German with participation would have to be created. It is notable that the Geneva Circle allowed very open expression of viewpoints, testimony to the trust between those present. As German delegate Schröter put it, “If I speak about this question, this is only because we are a restricted circle where one can speak openly.” The early discussions brought to the table essentially all problems that would plague the negotiators in Paris for the years to come: the question of equality of rights, the size of German units, the problem of democratic control, as well as the question of how realistic the French Plan was (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 261, 262).

Reactions to the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan within the Council of Europe were mixed and reflected the early divisions within the European Movement. A study group set up by the Council of Europe concluded with the hope that

“[…] the Conference of six will seek to set up a system of mutual exchange of information and means of eventual association with countries not participating in the Schuman Plan with a view to extending as far as possible the field in which the essential economic aims of the Plan can be realized” (Council of Europe 1950a, 428; 1950b).

There was still a considerable ambiguity regarding the Tories in the European Movement. Thus, during the debate on the Schuman plan in the Common Assembly – under the impression of beginning war in Korea – Churchill called for “the immediate creation of a unified European Army, under the authority of a European Minister of Defence, subject to proper democratic control and acting in full cooperation with the United States and Canada.” (Council of Europe 1950a). At the same time, ongoing conflicts within the European Movement lead to resolutions throughout 1950 and 1951 that are full of contradictions: one the one hand, the Movement maintained that countries wishing to do so may associate with each other more closely

146 Bichet at meeting of the Geneva Circle on October 2nd 1950 (the Pleven Plan was announced on October 24th) “Je crois que nous aboutissons a une conclusion très satisfaisante. Nous sommes d’accord sue une participation de l’Allemagne dans le cadre d’une armée européenne.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 254).

147 Own translation from “Si je parle cependant de cette question, c’est que nous sommes dans un cercle restreint, ou l’on peut s’exprimer avec franchise.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 259).
under a special political authority; on the other hand, no institutional changes to the Council of Europe are deemed necessary (Jacobson 1962, 539, 540). With an election looming in the UK in 1951, many still seemed to expect a change in British policy provided that Labour would be replaced by the Tories in government and were thus unwilling to entirely bank their strategy on a small Europe, especially on the basis of ‘military integration’ (Spaak 1969, 213).

In analogy to the conflicts within the Consultative Assembly and the European Movement, the reaction of transnational Social Democracy to the Pleven Plan was divided. Within the Socialist MSEUE, the Pleven Plan was seen positively. The main criticism of the proposal largely followed federalist principles by demanding a unified European High Command and a European Defense Minister, it insisted that all institutions should will be responsible to a European parliamentary Assembly (Jacobson 1962, 559). At the same time, the Socialist International was unable to agree on any substantive common reaction to either the Schuman Plan nor the Pleven Plan for months (Loth 1977, 268). The fact that the SPD explicitly rejected the Oder-Neiße Line as final border between a potentially united Germany and Poland certainly did not help (Steininger 1979b, 171).

The reaction of the federalist community was enthusiastic. Spinelli thought that Pleven’s declaration had the same significance as the Marshall Plan speech (Vayssière 2007, 265). The UEF immediately convened a conference in November 1950 in Strasbourg that was attended by leading members of the UEF and the MSEUE. The resolution of the conference reflected basic federalist reasoning: in order for the construction of a European Army to be valid, it would need to be founded through a constituent congress. Since the Strasbourg Assembly of the Council of Europe was no longer suitable for these purposes, the UEF passed a resolution demanding the convocation of a new constituent on the continent (Pistone 2008, 62). As Henry Frenay put it, “The battle against national sovereignties has to be fought” More importantly, the UEF for the first time advocated a pragmatic

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148 The resolution further demanded representation of the working classes and requested that the governments of both supranational efforts to pass a diplomatic agreement that a required European assembly was to be elected until July 1951; that this assembly should produce a treaty for a European political authority; that this treaty is to be negotiated and signed by governments; and then to be submitted to participating electorates to approval via a referendum (Jacobson 1962, 561).

149 Own translation from “La bataille contre les souverainetés nationales doit donc être engagé.” (Belot 2003, 581).
course, accepting the diplomatic venue and seeking to influence the negotiations by lobbying governments to pass treaties, hitherto an anathema to the integralists within the UEF.

This radicalization meant that conflicts within the European Movement began to escalate quickly. Because the majority of members of the Executive Committee was still intent on keeping in line with a larger and more modest solution including the British Unionists, the Federalists (Henry Frenay, Frances L. Josephy, Altiero Spinelli, and André Voisin) stormed out of a meeting of the Executive Committee late 1950, largely because not even an an agreement on a supranational authority could be reached (Vayssière 2007, 278). Estranged from the European Movement, an MSEUE resolution from November 1950 explicitly expressed the realignment:

“[…] in the eye of the fundamental problem in the current stage of the uniting of Europe, the creation of a real international authority, the European Movement […] unfortunately had to face the total failure in taking a position […] In consequence, the Forth Congress of MSEUE cannot consider the European Movement as any other than a center of relationships between the movements […]. However, the MSEUE declares itself willing to start common actions with all other organizations that are ready to fight for the creation of supranational European authorities […], especially with the UEF and NEI.”

The view was becoming widespread as irritation grew. As Schuman put it in March 1951, the separation of Europe into nation-states, in the European post-war environment “had become an anachronism, nonsense, a heresy.” The common denominator of ‘supranationality’ on the continent thus began replacing the vague goal of ‘European unity’. In April 1951, a conference convened by the federalist UEF in Lugano, Italy, assembled delegates from the Socialist MSEUE and the Christian Democratic NEI send as well (Lipgens 1984b, 653). It passed a resolution laying down “principles for a pact on a federalist Union” stipulating that “current or emerging European authorities should only be expanded and coordinated under the leader-

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150 Own translation from “face au problème essentiel dans l’étape actuelle de l’unité européenne, la création d’une réelle autorité internationale, le Mouvement Européen […] a du malheureusement constater l’échec total d’une prise de position. […] En conséquence, la IVe Congres du MSEUE considère que le Mouvement Européen ne peut plus être qu’un centre de relations entre les mouvement […] La MSEUE se déclare par contre disposer à entreprendre une action commune avec toutes les organisations qui sont prêtes à lutter pour la création d’autorités européennes supranationales […] notamment avec l’UEF et les Nouvelles Equipes Internationales.” (Quoted in Vayssière 2007, 279).

151 “[…] devenu un anachronisme, un non-sens, une hérésie” (Quoted in Poidevin 1986, 240).

152 As Schumann continued in his opening speech of the EDC negotiations in Paris “[…] coordonner les activités des pays européen, accroître leur efficacité en les libérant des égoïsmes à courte vue, les orienter vers un bien commun supranational, en un mot, grouper ces pays en vue d’une action positive, commune et concertée […]” (Quoted in Poidevin 1986, 241).
ship and control of the Federal government and the Federal parliament.”. It called on all European sections of the European Movement to immediately lobby their governments to abandon any efforts to seek compromises in Paris that did not involve a European constituent (Pistone 2008, 63). As Fernand Dehousse put it, “It is indisputable that the Logano conference was a major success since the Federalists now finally had a text worth fighting for.”

Considerable lobbying was a result. On July 6th 1951 – at a time when the EDC negotiations were in a critical stage – Schuman received Henri Frenay and Eugen Kogon in the Quai d’Orsay, the result of which was a public declaration by Schuman, reprinted in Le Monde, calling for “the creation of a European political organization, having supranational authority, to lay the basis for a common foreign policy.” In Italy, federalist deputies issued a demand to the Italian government that

“[it should] decisively overcome the domestic pressure of nationalistic sentiments that propose half-provisionary measures for supranational, autonomous armed forces under the coordination of an illusory European commando, and that the government should support without reserve the thesis of a unified European Army and all implied sovereignty constraints.”

The activities of the Christian Democrats equally suggested that the middle of 1951 would be a crucial window of opportunity. French German exchanges between Fontanet and Blankenhorn suggested that the conflict between Germany and France – still the major obstacle to the EDC – could be overcome. In September 1951, an

153 Own translation from “Grundsätze für einen Pakt für eine föderalistische Union […] die bestehenden oder in Bildung begriffenen europäischen Fachbehörden nur unter der Leitung und Kontrolle einer Bundesregierung und eines Bundesparlaments ausgebaut und koordiniert werden” (Lipgens 1984b, 653; Loth 1996, 97).
154 Own translation from “la conférence de Logano a été incontestablement un succès parce qu’enfin les Fédéralistes possèdent un texte pour lequel il vaut la peine de se battre.” (Vayssière 2007, 284).
155 Own translation from “la création d’une organisation politique européenne, ayant une autorité supranationale, pour la formation d’une politique étrangère commune.” (Quoted in Vayssière 2007, 287).
156 Own translation from “[…] die italienische Regierung entschlossen, den Druck nationalistischer Strömungen in ihrem Innern überwinde, die halbe, anscheinend provisorische Maßnahmen übernationale Streitkräfte unter der Koordination eines illusorischen europäischen Kommandos vorzuschlagen, und daß die Regierung ohne Vorbehalte die These einer einheitlichen Europa-Armee und alle daraus entstehenden Begrenzungen der Souveränität unterstützt.” (Magagnoli 1998, 40).
157 In April 1951, Fontanet recounted in the Geneva Circle that “l’opinion française est beaucoup moins défaitiste. La bataille n’est pas encore gagnée, mais il y a de gros progrès depuis six mois.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 278). Blankenhorn responded, “Nous avons des divergences de vue avec la thèse française, surtout en ce qui concerne les groupes de combat. Mais nous espérons qu’une conclusion commune aboutira. […] Nous croyons qu’une armée européenne est nécessaire. Nous sommes donc d’accord avec le plan Pleven sur ce point. […] Nous sommes convaincus que le Plan Pleven est une solution. […] L’idée de sortir des frontières, de défendre un bien commun, est très universelle-
NEI congress debated the question of Western defense at which Adenauer stated, “In the creation of a European Defense Community, I see the only safe way to the creation of an integrated Europe, the only possibility to build a stronghold against the Soviet Russian pressure.” MRP president Teitgen approved and expressed his disdain for British obstruction: „[…] certain British and Scandinavians want to turn Europe into a ‘Conversation Saloon’“. At the same time, the links between the US ambassadors in Paris and Bonn, Bruce and McCloy – members of the ACUE – and Monnet provided a key factor in pulling the EDC negotiations in Paris ahead. Coordinating with the French and German governments, both Bruce and McCloy had to convince the State Department that a European Army was the only possible solution, against Acheson, for example, who initially seemed to prefer a German entry into NATO (FRUS 1951 III-b; Schwartz 1991, 223, FRUS 1951 III, 801-803). Monnet was among those who supported both the threat tactics of the US government throughout and repeatedly stated to Bruce, Bowie, and McCloy that there was no alternative to the EDC (Dwan 2000, 76). Thus, Monnet had pointed out to Eisenhower that the issue was “more of a human problem than a military one”. To constitute a “solidarity of destiny”, “the French and the Germans should wear the same uniform” (Quoted in Winand 1993, 28). As a result, Eisenhower publicly endorsed the EDC on July 3rd 1951, Eisenhower speech, advocating European economic and political integration, thus the EDC (Ibid.). Additionally, because of the trust Monnet enjoyed among US officials, several sources agree that a meeting set up with him and Eisenhower was crucial in overcoming doubts regarding the military effectiveness of the EDC (e.g. Elgey 1993, 288; Dûchene 1994, 231; Creswell 2006, 61; Bossuat 1996, 197; Hitchcock 1998, 155). Bruce and McCloy took care that Adenauer would be made aware of those
developments, whereas the head of the French delegation, Hervé Alphand had already indicated to the American ambassadors that he would compile a report for the French government which would contain the necessary compromises to make successful negotiations possible – on Schuman’s permission. Similarly, Spinelli had personally submitted a memorandum to De Gasperi in August 1951, in which he explained that the position adopted by the Italian government was ineffective, that the parliament envisioned in the Interim report of June 1951 was a “shadow without a body” that had “no possibility to make a successful contribution” to the new army, and that without submitting the European army to a European federal system it would be under the influence of the Atlantic community (Magagnoli 1998, 40). A few weeks later, De Gasperi replaced Count Sforza as Foreign Minister, appointed Lombardo (UEF) as a new member of the Italian delegation in Paris, and the insistence on the creation of a federal system with extensive rights for the parliament became the new doctrine of the Italian delegation.

Summary

Thus, the shifting lines of conflict described as a key feature of the EDC bargain in mid-1951 coincided with considerable transnational activity. While one cannot speak of a centrally coordinated affair yet – and without any evaluation of the actual impact of those activities on the diplomatic stage – a considerable number of initiatives within transnational Christian Democracy, the Federalist, and the federalist socialist coincided, in terms of timing, with the governments of key countries in the EDC bar-

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162 Lombardo demanded the creation of an assembly as a condition for assent, since without it, neither the Italian government nor the Italian parliament would agree to the EDC “sans créer en contrepartie sur le plan fédéral un organisme auquel serait confiés les pouvoirs dont les Assemblées Nationales se dessaisiraient et qui auraient l’autorité de les exercer au même titre que les Parlement nationaux.” (Quoted in Magagnoli 1999, 101).
gain, notably France, Italy and the US, reevaluating their positions at the bargaining table. Moreover, actors from the transatlantic network – sharing similar basic conceptions of post-war Europe – equally displayed considerable activity to lobby their governments to throw in their lot for the realization of the proposed EDC. In sum, substantial transnational pressures and demands coincided with the shifting of government positions on the EDC institutions and the resulting changing conflict constellations. The radicalism that the course taken in Paris entailed was observed, *inter alia*, by Sassen in the Geneva Circle in October 1951, who maintained that the creation of a European Army as intended required the creation of a Federation, which, being done under the impression of a threat, ‘could be dangerous’.\(^\text{163}\) Such warnings went unheard, however.

“[…] the trouble is […] that in England the statesmen are pro-European when they belong to the Opposition, and anti-European when they are in power.”

**Paul Reynaud\(^\text{164}\)**

### 6.2.2 Second period, 1951 - 1953: Towards a European Political Community?

Although the contacts between the Europeanist transnational groups and the emerging supranationalist coalition were loose, there are plausible signs that it was politically influential. At the same time, the continuing insistence of the leadership of the European Movement on a compromise with the Unionists and to use the Council of Europe as the primary site for the advancement of European ‘unity’ had caused a seemingly permanent rift within the larger organization of the Movement. This, however, was about to change. Paul Reynaud’s words, quoted above, indicate the disappointment – and in a nutshell – the betrayal of the rhetoric commitments made by

\(^{163}\) Sassen pointed out in the Geneva Circle on October 16\(^\text{th}\) 1951 “Je vous présenter une observation: c’est sous une menace que l’Europe est en train de se créer une défense commune. Il ne faudrait pas que les homes laissent les événements les conduire ; cela pourrait être fort dangereux. A mon avis, il est faux de traiter la question de l’armée européenne de la même façon que le plan Pleven. L’institution d’une armée européenne implique l’établissement d’une politque extérieur commune de l’Europe. Si on veut instituer l’armée européenne, il faut créer une fédération.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 308).

\(^{164}\) (quoted in Larres 1996, 15).
British unionists during the first years of the European Movement that was felt by many within the European Movement at the end of 1951. As a consequence, being ‘a good European’ would become a normative expression that was endowed with a commitment to European institutions that, at a minimum, went beyond intergovernmental exchanges.

The source of the felt betrayal were the solemn pledges, made by unionists and particularly Winston Churchill, that seemed to suggest that, once the Conservative party was in power, UK positions towards the institutional developments on the continent would change. Until the end of 1951, the British Labour party had been among the most vocal sources of skepticism towards integration and the Council of Europe. When the UK elections in October 1951 produced a new conservative majority in Parliament, the hopes were that a government led by a main foundational figure of the European Movement, would effect a change in the British stance towards the negotiations in Paris and the Council of Europe. The disappointment in the lack of any change in the UK stance towards the negotiations was exacerbated by a coordinative embarrassment within the new British government. After receiving Cabinet instructions, a member of the Tory group in the Consultative Assembly in Strasbourg, Maxwell-Fyfe delivered a speech in Strasbourg on November 29th 1951, and indicated a personal ‘opinion’ that the Kingdom might participate in the EDC. In response, the new Foreign Secretary Anthony, at a Press conference in Rome, announced that the British government ruled out any form of British units participating in the EDC but that “there might be some other form of association.” (quoted in Dockrill 1991, 86). This produced quite a stir, as members of the Conservative party complained to Churchill about the negative attitude on the EDC and its effect on their reputation in Strasbourg (DBPO II: I, 769-772, Eden 1960, 33). Not that the ‘pro-European’ Tories had a clear program. Nevertheless, Eden was widely criticized as ‘anti-European’ (FRUS 1951 III-b, 843-6, 856-865).

These events were accompanied by a vote, initialized in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in December 1951 by Spaak and a number of deputies from the European Movement, that called for the institutionalization of a “a federal European political authority” (Vayssière 2007, 293). It was overwhelmingly rejected in the Assembly and finally demonstrated how little support there was among the delegates for such far-reaching designs, despite the fact that figures like Adenauer and
De Gasperi had spoken for it with heavy ‘European’ pathos.\textsuperscript{165} In reaction, Spaak resigned in a much publicized event from his position as president of the Consultative Assembly. ‘British obstructionism’, in Spaak’s view, had led to a disaster, “The Europe we are speaking of is a Europe we have heavily mutilated.”\textsuperscript{166} He added in the Consultative Assembly, “Today, the cause for a United Europe is not present in this assembly.”\textsuperscript{167}

Once Spaak had resigned, he initiated a shift in the strategy of the European Movement and a realignment with its federalist members. Whereas the Federalists had so far been unable to influence the official decisions of the Executive Bureau of the European Movement, in February 24\textsuperscript{th} 1952 the Executive Bureau passed a resolution recommending that, in order for the European Army and the European institutions to be legitimate, the new institutions should be embedded in a ‘quasi-constitution’ to be worked out by a European constituent (Belot 2003, 599). The proposal took up the dispute between the EDC delegations in Paris over the eventual political structure in which the European Army would be embedded – eventually enshrined in Article 38 of the EDC Treaty – and interpreted it according to the federalist blueprint. As Henry Frenay put it after the session, “[…] the propositions we have defended over a year have just received a major recognition.”\textsuperscript{168} Spaak proposed that the European Movement should constitute a study group to explore the outlines of a European constituent (Dumoulin 1999, 446). The goal now was, as a resolution of the Executive Committee of the European Movement from May 23rd 1952 put it, to prevent the emergence of a “European military technocracy, insufficiently dominated

\textsuperscript{165} “Which road are we to choose if we are to preserve all that is noble and humane within these national forces, while co-coordinating them to build a supranational civilization which can give them balance, absorb them, and harmonize them in one irresistible drive towards progress? This can only be done by infusing new life into the separate national forces, through the common ideals of our history, and offering them the field of action of the varied and magnificent experiences of our common European civilization. It can only be done by establishing a meeting-point where those experiences can assemble, unite by affinity, and thus engender new forms of solidarity based on increased freedom and greater social justice. It is within an association of national sovereignties based on democratic, constitutional organizations that these new forms can flourish.” (De Gasperi 1951).

\textsuperscript{166} Own translation from “Das Europa, von dem wir hier sprechen, ist ein Europa, das wir schwer haben verstümmeln lassen” (quoted in Weber 1996, 433).

\textsuperscript{167} Own translation from “aujourd’hui […] l’intérêt de la cause de l’Europe unie […] ne se trouve pas dans cette assemblée.” (Quoted in Dumoulin 1999, 444).

\textsuperscript{168} Own translation from “les thèses que nous avons défendues depuis un an viennent de recevoir une consécration éclatante.” (quoted in Belot 2003, 599).
by political organs established in a democratic way. “The federalist ‘constituent’, it seemed, was about to be inaugurated.

**The Formation of the ‘Action Committee for a European Constituent’**

Thus, shortly before the EDC Treaty was signed in May 1952, the ‘Action Committee for a European Constituent’ was set up on March 7th 1952 under Spaak’s leadership with funds from the European Movement. It met continuously to work out a recommendation for an institutional structure that would incorporate the – as its participants saw it – essential democratic and constitutional principles to be respected for the creation of a European Political Community. Its members were selected from within the European Movement, appointed by a proportional rule from all member organizations. A number of its members would occupy key positions within the future Ad Hoc Assembly that worked out the Draft Treaty for the European Political Community. Spaak would become its elected president and other key figures within the broader transnational coalition, such as Brentano for the Christian Democrats and Van der Goes van Naters for the Social Democrats would become members of its constitutional committee charged with the core institutional design question. As a result, the Committee had sufficient means to feed its results into the Ad Hoc Assembly (Vayssière 2007, 306).

In addition, the shift in the strategy of the European Movement meant that support from the US transatlantic connections was now firmly behind the federalist strategy. After the inauguration of the Committee, Spaak toured the US for six weeks after the foundation of the group to utilize his contacts to obtain funding from the ACUE (Palayret 1995, 50, 51; Dumoulin 1999, 448). It’s two American Members – Robert R. Bowie and Harvard Professor of Government Carl J. Friedrich – managed to secure ACUE funds for the committee work and their assistants at Harvard (Winand 1993, 32). Already on January 31st 1952, the US Senate passed a resolution – spon-

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169 Own translation from “technocratie militaire européenne, insuffisamment dominée par des organes politiques établis de façon démocratique” (quoted in Belot 2003, 601).

170 Formal Members were Paul-Henri Spaak, Fernand Dehousse, Max Becker, Lodovico Benvenuti, Piero Calamandrei, Arthur Caltheux, Pierre de Félice, Henry Frenay, Hans Nawiasky, Herman Pünder, Altiero Spinelli, Cornelis van Rij, Robert R. Bowie, and Carl J. Friedrich. Spaak, Dehousse, Becker, Benvenuti, and Pünder would be members of the Ad Hoc Assembly (Europäische Bewegung 1953, 6).
sored by Fulbright and supported by Eisenhower – encouraging the US government to cooperate with any organization pushing for a European federation and a European political authority (Rebattet 1963, 303) In sum, the transatlantic contacts via the ACUE increasingly paid off. On March 2nd, Adenauer and the French High Commissioner in Germany, André François-Poncet attended a UEF congress in Aix-la-Chappelle on March 2nd 1952 that concluded that “only the creation of a genuine federal state will allow for the real organization of a European defense.”

The creation of the new political structure was supposed to build upon the EDC Treaty by working out recommendations for the institutions of the EPC, following Article 38 of the Treaty. Its purpose was deliberately framed in federalist vocabulary: under ‘the threat of enslavement’ a new foundation for a new Europe should come through a European constituent, whose results – a constitution – should be proposed for ratification to the national parliaments. The blueprint was, no doubt, the US experience. The radicalism of this procedure as well as the strategy to implement it was prepared, inter alia, in a further meeting in Lutetia on June 18th that assembled key representatives from the transnational communities, namely Paul-Henri Spaak, Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Rene Courtin, Henri Frenay, and Altiero Spinelli (Belot 2003, 612) As Spaak wrote to Frenay, “[...] we are going to do something really spectacular.” On May 1952, Eisenhower, then still SHAPE commander, publicly visited the headquarters of the Italian MFE section of the UEF. For Spinelli, this was the vindication and legitimation of UEF efforts as the visit “[...] underlined the importance taken by our movement. On the other hand, it put Eisenhower’s authority behind our claim in favor of the constituent assembly.”

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171 Own translation from “la création d’un véritable État Fédéral est la condition qui seule peut permettre l’organisation réelle de la défense de l’Europe” (Vayssière 2007, 296, 297).


173 Own translation from “[...] nous allons faire quelque chose d’assez spectaculaire” (Quoted in Belot 2003, 613).

174 Own translation from “soulignait l’importance prise par notre mouvement, d’autre part elle mettait l’autorité de Eisenhower derrière notre revendication en faveur d’une Constituante.” (Quoted in Vayssière 2007, 289).
publicly supported via a press conference at the MFE headquarters the federalist approach of convening a constituent assembly (Kim 2000, 90). On June 15th 1952, a conference of the European Movement in Rome, which De Gasperi and Reynaud (position) attended, made the same calls (Ibid. 92).

The UEF issued a memorandum on June 23rd that was passed to Jean Monnet and, as president of the newly inaugurated ECSC High Authority, urged him to propose the aforementioned procedure to the governments of the ECSC; Monnet who approved passed the note on to Schuman.175 The European Movement issued a declaration, calling on the ECSC Assembly to form the nucleus of a European Constituent and thus to draft a document for a treaty that can then be accepted by the governments (Vayssière 2007, 299). At the press conference were present, inter alia, members of the French EDC delegation (Hervé Alphand, and Étienne Hirsch) as well as the Italian Delegation (Ivan Matteo Lombardo and Ferrucio Parri) (Vayssière 2007, 301).

These events are significant because the imitative from the European Movement had competition. In May 1952, the British government equally took up the provisions of Article 38 of the EDC Treaty and suggested to use the existing institutions of the Council of Europe in order to create a very political superstructure: for EDC matters and concerns, only delegates of the Six would accordingly meet (i.e. ministerial Council of the Council of Europe composed of the Six; and delegates from the Six to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe). The proposition was put forth by UK Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, and accordingly christened the Eden Plan. For Eden, the goal was to speed up negotiations from the ‘outside’ and to allow progress for a European Political Community (DBPO II: I, 839-841). The Cabinet endorsed Eden’s perspective. A memorandum conveyed the idea on April 11th 1952.176 Within the Council of Europe, the proposal was initially welcomed: Stikker (Nether-

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175 He apparently passed it on to Schuman with the note “Je viens en discuter avec nos amis. Ils le trouvent en tous points excellent. […] J’ai en effet pense qu’il pourrait vous être utile de le connaitre en vue des conversations que, les cas échéant, vous allez avoir sur ce sujet.” (Quoted in Belot 2003, 613).

176 The memo said that “the Council of Europe should be remodelled so that its organs could serve as the ministerial and parliamentary institutions of the Schuman Plan, the European Defence Community and any future organisations of the same structure. At the same time, the Council of Europe would continue to serve as a consultative body and as a forum for inter-governmental and parliamentary cooperation in Western Europe.” (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b, 61). Moreover, it proposes a ‘two-tier’ system so that during negotiations relating to supranational institutions, only the Six would be present, whereas on other issues, 15 members would continue to be present (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b, 60-65).
lands), Van Zeeland (Belgium), and even Schuman suggested to at least study the plan further within the Consultative Assembly (Kim 2000, 86).177

By directly challenging the constituent approach it caused some concern for Monnet, Spaak, and their allies. To prevent the Eden Plan from acquiring significance in the transgovernmental plane, Monnet turned to the new US ambassador in Bonn, Tomlinson as well as Bruce, who agreed with his assessment (Kim 2000, 94) The main fear was that the Eden Plan would involve actors from the Council of Europe whose attitudes towards supranationality would again ‘dilute’ the whole project. Within the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, however, some of the delegates received the proposal more positively. As Julian Amery put it, “Under such an associative arrangement the continental Communities on the one hand and the UK and Scandinavia on the other could exchange and harmonize their plans, and the various countries could remain in contact with one another on an ongoing basis.” Moreover, he argued that,

“[…] there is no guarantee that the French Parliament will be persuaded to accept a European Defence Community with which the UK is not effectively associated. The technical details of such an association are a matter for the General Staffs but it is up to the Consultative Assembly to explore how it might develop at a political level. Let us hope that, by working along the lines proposed in the Eden Plan, the Assembly will turn the Council of Europe into a practical tool for reconciling the British point of view with that of the continental Communities, and that, in so doing, it will save the united Europe from the many perils that it faces.” (Amery 1952).

Amery had made an important point: on February 2nd 1952, a debate in the French Assemblée Nationale had passed, by a slim margin in a vote of confidence, conditions for approval of the EDC Treaty that contained a demand for democratically legitimated representatives to check the new central authority; a demand that unanimous decisions within that authority should be minimized; and a demand that, without being conditional, the UK should participate in the EDC to address the most basic concerns for the ratification of the treaty.178 The latter was a key element for

177 Pleased with this result, Eden cabled back from Strasbourg that “Things have gone better than we could have expected.” (Kim 2000, 86).
178 Among the chief elements in the ordre de jour, obligating the French government “de prévoir dans les protocoles annexes du traité la mise en place progressive des unités au fur et à mesure que pourra matériellement être établie l’organisation commune.” Moreover, “L’Assemblée demande que tout soit mis en œuvre pour assurer: (1) la subordination de l’armée européenne à un pouvoir politique supranational à compétence limitée mais réelle, responsable devant des représentants des Assemblées ou des peuples européens, et invite le gouvernement à prendre dans ce sens toutes initiatives nécessaires. (2) la stricte limitation et l’enumeration précise des cas où des peut jouer la règle d’unanimité, ainsi que
the SFIO, French Socialist leader Guy Mollet was still committed to the possibility of British participation, arguing that a small Europe of the Six was ‘unacceptable’ (Dumoulin 1999, 446). The Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe debated this question accordingly in May 1952: there was a direct competition between one proposal by Spaak suggesting to use the existing ECSC Assembly, while a different proposal, backed by the French Socialist leader Mollet suggested the creation of a special assembly of ‘potential’ members of the EDC. Spaak’s proposal was defeated, and Mollet’s proposal accepted and referred to the Council of Europe for approval (see Kim 2000, 109).

However, instead of drawing on the Eden proposals to combine a democratically appropriate political structure for the EDC with possible British association, the resolution of the Consultative Assembly was vetoed by Germany and Italy in the Council of Ministers. Instead, the governments of the Six took up the proposals emanating from the European Movement. Lobbied by Monnet to reject the Eden Plan and under the impression of an NEI congress in May 1952 at which Schuman and De Gasperi had participated, as well as hearing the demands voiced by the UEF and the European Movement, Schuman and De Gasperi issued an Italian-French memorandum in August 1952 that urged the ECSC Council to follow the proposal made by the European movement (Griffiths 2000, 69; Kaiser 2007, 283). In terms of the Luxembourg declaration, they took up the suggestion of Spaak, Spinelli, and Frenay that the Ad Hoc Assembly should liaise with parliamentarians from the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (Greilsammer 1975, 75). On the other hand, federalist insistence by Spinelli and Frenay for a direct parliamentary ratification of the results of the Ad Hoc conference failed the ECSC Council. After the US State Department had come out unequivocally against the Eden Plan (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b, 198), the Luxembourg Declaration stipulated that an IGC would review the draft treaty and have to sign it (ECSC 1952). Subsequently, the UK abstained from putting institutional alternatives on the agenda since the UK government was worried that this

l’établissement d’un budget commun vote par l’Assemblée et non soumis à un droit de veto. Elle maintient son opposition à la reconstitution d’une armée allemande et d’un état-major allemands. Elle invite le gouvernement à renouveler tous ses efforts avec la volonté profonde d’aboutir en vue d’obtenir la participation dans a Communauté européenne de Défense s’autres nations démocratique, et notamment de la Grande-Bretagne; cette solution constituant une garantie qui répond pleinement aux soucis exprimés par l’Assemblée national comporterait naturellement l’étude et la mise au point des institutions et des modalités les plus susceptibles d’en assurer la réussite.” (Fauvet 1956, 26, 27, original italics).
would make the United Kingdom a scapegoat for the failure of the European project (Dockrill 1991, 111; Jansen 1992, 70).

In the meantime, the ‘Action Committee’ had started preparing for the proceedings of the Ad Hoc Assembly. Instead of seeking to produce a definite blueprint for the constituent, questions regarding the European institutions were separated according to issues. Once debated and agreed upon, a text was drafted that would be submitted to the members of the Ad Hoc Assembly. Within the committee, there was a quick agreement that the organization would have to be based on democratic principles of the separation of powers, executive control, and a two-chamber system representing European voters and European states respectively. One chamber would consist of deputies representing the European people to be directly elected by European voter; the other chamber would consist of Senators representing European States to be appointed by national parliaments according to a procedure of their own choosing (Europäische Bewegung 1953, 234). Although the radicalism seemed to instill doubt in some members about its political feasibility, there were no objections. The policy areas the new organization should assume responsibility for were extensive and encompassing, ranging from basic rights, defense and foreign policy, to issues of transportation and postal affairs. The fact that a complete political union was envisioned is demonstrated by the fact that there was a debate over the right of secession (Europäische Bewegung 1953, 29). The central power would be invested in a directorate, whose members would be independent, whereas its leadership was to be elected, by majority, by both houses of the two-chamber parliament (Europäische Bewegung 1953, 123).

Thus, the institutional design that the Action Committee prepared clearly followed the federalist blueprint in order to address the basic ‘democratic deficit’ of the EDC Treaty. The origins of the Action Committee formed part of a coordinated attempt,

across the transnational and transatlantic connections, to preempt the advance, made by Eden, link the EDC and the Council of Europe. Instead, a Political Community was to be created among the Six.

*The Ad Hoc Assembly and the Draft Treaty for a European Political Community*

The core rationale of the Ad Hoc Assembly, as described above, was to provide the EDC with an appropriate and legitimate political ‘superstructure”, “federal or confederal in character” in a two-chamber system as stipulated by Article 38 of the EDC Treaty. The members of the Ad Hoc Assembly were largely recruited from the ECSC Common Assembly; others were members of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and selected by domestic parliaments to sit in the Ad Hoc Assembly (Griffiths 2000, 71). Transnationally active actors and members of the Action Committee of the European Movement managed to occupy key positions, particularly in the constitutional committee tasked with drawing up the basic institutions: Heinrich von Brentano would be its chairman, Bruins Slot (European Movement) and Ludovico Benvenuti (Federalist Community) would be its vice chairmen, and among the remaining 26 members of the Assembly were Teitgen, Dehousse, Becker, Van der Goes van Naters, and Delbos.¹⁸² Spaak himself was elected as the President of the Assembly (Griffiths 2000, 73).

There were by no means only actors within the Assembly that looked favorably upon federalist ambitions: a vocal critic, for example, was French Gaullist delegate Michel Debre in the constitutional committee. Conflicts between actors with differing points of view on the transnational ideological conflict combined with different viewpoints between actors from larger and smaller nations to produce complex lines of conflict across the transnational party groups. For example, a motion supported by Hans Joachim von Merkatz (*Deutsche Partei*) and the Belgian Christian Democrat Pierre Wigny argued that Senators should be delegated by governments and argued for equal representation of all states. This motion, however, was, *inter alia*, argued against by the Belgian Socialist Dehousse and Spaak as well as the Christian Demo-

¹⁸² For the members of the Assembly and the Constitutional Committee, see the documentation of the Draft Treaty (*EPC Treaty 1953*).
In many instances, the proposals by members of the Action Committee were met with considerable opposition. The most salient conflict arose over the question of the extension of competences over policy areas not covered by the EDC and ECSC Treaties, in particular economic issues. In line with the positions held by their government, the Dutch, led by Pieter Blaisse, sought to enshrine social and economic unification as a central purpose already in the preamble (Griffiths 2000, 86). The opposition, however, did not fall neatly into national categories either. Thus, Teitgen (French MRP) came out in favor of endowing the Community with monetary and investment powers, Guy Mollet (French SFIO) opposed it (Griffiths 2000, 86). The emerging compromise contained a preamble formula and stipulated that the EPC could adopt proposals and decisions to expand powers accepted unanimously by Council of Ministers (Griffiths 2000, 97). However, every step would require approval by governments and parliaments as well. Motions by Bergman, Becker and Van der Goes van Naters to relax these hurdles failed. When this compromise reached the floor, a fierce debate followed. As a result, the articles remained as they stood which only added to the discontent that was to characterize the final voting procedure. Thus, the Dutch representatives voted on the final Draft Treaty with a caveat,

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183 The most direct intervention from the European Movement and the Study Committee came with regard to the appointment of the executive. The initial motion that found some support within the Assembly called for the Executive to be appointed by the representatives of the European States. This directly contradicted the proposal worked out by the Action Committee – appointment by approval of both chambers - was also hotly contested internally within a meeting of the Executive Council of the European Movement in January 1953 that split into a vote of 22 in favor and 21 against the proposition that the Senate should suggest its members and then by invested by majorities in both legislative chambers (Griffiths 2000, 78). Even that proposal did not go through. After the January meeting of the constitutional committee, the compromise solution – stipulated that the Senate would appoint the president but that he was susceptible being ousted if a vote of no confidence in either the Senate or the co-called ‘People’s Chamber’ failed (Art. 27 – 31 EPC Treaty 1953). With regard to the budget, initially Belgian Wigny proposed that budget decisions be made only by Council of Ministers, Becker proposed that that after transition period, the community would decide on its own (income and expenditure) with consent of the parliament (Griffiths 2000, 85).

184 Article 2 of the EPC Draft Treaty stipulated the goal “to promote, in harmony with the general economy of Member States, the economic expansion, the development of employment and the improvement of the standard of living in Member States, by means, in particular, of the progressive establishment of a common market, transitional or other measures being taken to ensure that no fundamental and persistent disturbance is thereby caused to the economy of Member States” (Art. 2 EPC Treaty 1953).
“[…] because we cannot agree to a European Community being set up without adequate guarantees that integration in the economic sphere will be effected within a period which, in our view, should be short. What is missing is an undertaking, firmly rooted in the Statute, clearly to link the creation of the European Community in such a way that the Statute will represent the first concrete step on the path to the desired economic unity. This is not yet the case.” (Griffiths 2000, 90).

The final Draft Treaty conformed to the call in Art. 38 for a two-chamber system and its content was mostly in line with the general ideas set forth in Spaak’s Action committee envisaging a substantial amount of pooling and delegation elements, hitherto and since unseen in European Treaties (Rittberger 2006). A number of positions already elaborated in the Action Committee found their way into the treaty.\(^{185}\) In other cases, for example with regard to the rights of the People’s Chamber, the Draft Treaty stipulated only the ability to deny confidence to the Executive by a simple majority, effectively granting a veto over its composition. Community laws required a simple majority in both chambers (Art. 52 EPC Treaty 1953). Thus, it is unsurprising that the Ad Hoc Assembly proceedings proved controversial: more importantly, it sent ominous signs that one of the main objectives of setting up a democratically legitimate structure – namely to ease the ratification of the EDC Treaty – was not achieved. The French Socialist bloc in the Ad Hoc Assembly abstained in its entirety from the final vote on the Draft Constitution because parliamentary control was deemed still insufficient. The three French Gaullists deputies equally abstained for the opposite reason, thus signifying that the main purpose to ease ratification in France was not obtained (Kim 2000, 189).

Nevertheless, after the final vote in the Assembly, Spaak employed his usual rhetorical pathos, recounting “the mortal danger of our quarrels” and arguing that the EPC Draft Treaty will “allow us to save what we have in common that is most cherished and most beautiful” and that “We today have broached a new stage.” (Quoted in Griffiths 2000, 93). Quoting a passage from a speech by George Washington made when submitting the US constitution to Congress in 1787, Spaak thanked, in his function as president of the Ad Hoc Assembly, ‘the army of the good Europeans’ for

\(^{185}\) Thus, the ‘Peoples’ Chamber’ would be appointed by direct election (Art. 13 EPC Treaty 1953), the Senate delegates elected by Parliaments, not governments (Art. 16 EPC Treaty 1953). Both the Parliament (i.e. the Peoples’ chamber and the Senate) and Executive Council had a right to initiative (Art. 23 EPC Treaty 1953).
the work done within the Assembly. Spaak’s Belgian compatriot Fernand Dehousse equally spoke of a breakthrough reached with the EPC Draft Treaty. Adenauer congratulated with the “conviction that our common fatherland, the unified Europe, will come because it alone can ensure the future of the occident”. After the Draft Treaty had been submitted to the governments, the UEF held a conference in Venice in April 1953 under the impression of Stalin’s recent death, at which figures such as Hervé Alphand, Heinrich von Brentano, and Pierre-Henri Teitgen were present (Vayssière 2007, 213). Its resolution sought to take head-on the impression that Stalin’s death, providing for a potential détente, made a European Community less necessary. This event seemed increasingly worrying as it would incite principled opponents of German rearmament to oppose the Treaty. The more serious defects of the Treaty, having failed to garner the full support of the Dutch delegates and the French Socialists in particular, seemed less worrying. Given both defects, the EPC would die a slow death. Throughout late 1953, several IGC’s were convened without result. The first IGC for 1954, scheduled to take place in March 1954, was cancelled.

186 “Il serait peut-être présomptueux d'espérer la voir recueillir l'approbation sans réserve de tous les Etats, mais chacun d'eux considèrera sans nul doute que, si l'on n'avait tenu compte que de son seul intérêt, les conséquences auraient pu être particulièrement désagréables ou préjudiciables à d'autres ; nous espérons et croyons que cette Constitution ne soulèvera que le minimum d'objections auquel on pouvait raisonnablement s'attendre ; notre plus ardent désir est qu'elle contribue à assurer la prospérité durable de ce continent qui nous est si cher à tous et qu'elle garantisse sa liberté et son bonheur. […] Je félicite et je remercie – osrai-je dire que je cite à l'ordre du jour de l'armée des bons Européens - M. von BRENTANO, Président de la Commission constitutionnelle, les Présidents et rapporteurs de ses sous-commissions, MM. BLAISSE et BENVENUTI, pour ce qui concerne les attributions, MM. TEITGEN, DEHOUSSE et AZARA, pour les institutions politiques, MM. PERSICO et VON MERKATZ, pour les institutions juridictionnelles, MM. VAN DER GOES VAN NATERS, SEMLER et WIGNY, pour ce qui concerne les liaisons de la Communauté politique et ses rapports d'association avec les autres nations libres.” (Spaak 1953).

187 “Disons le mot : la Commission constitutionnelle et l’Assemblée ad hoc ont fait ce que l’on appelle-ra peut-être un jour, sur le plan de la science politique, une trouvaille, une «découverte» scientifique. Elles ont donné le jour à un type nouveau d'association d'Etats qui ne rentre dans aucune des catégories connues, quoiqu'il emprunte des éléments tantôt à la Confédération d'Etats, tantôt à l'Etat fédéral, tantôt même à l'Etat unitaire. C'est pourquoi le mot Communauté devient particulièrement précieux pour désigner l'œuvre accomplie” (Dehousse 1953).

188 As Adenauer expressed it in a personal letter to Spaak in 1953 “[…] in der festen Überzeugung, daß unser gemeinsames Vaterland, das Vereinigte Europa (sic!), kommen wird, weil es allein die glückliche und gesicherte Zukunft des Abendlandes gewährleistet.” (Adenauer 1987, 57).

189 “En présence des événements qui ont marqué la vie du monde soviétique et son attitude internationale, événements qui risquent faire paraître à l’opinion publique des différents pays d’Europe, moins nécessaire ou moins urgent les mesures d’intégration européenne prévue […] l’UEF déclare : Même en dehors de toute menace soviétique, la Fédération européenne est une nécessite politique, économique et social impérative” (Quoted in Vayssière 2007, 314).
Summary

In sum, the years between 1951 and 1953 provided for a ‘federalist movement’ motivated by the fact that, in order to prevent ‘technocratic military experts’ to rule, the EDC project had brought together transnational Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Federalists, and, with prominent US support in Eisenhower, had produced a federalist moment that sought, in terms of the indentations of the group around Spaak, to mimic the US experience and create a European constitution through the constituent approach. These actors coming from a supranationalist or federalist background, chose to pursue what in their minds was the ‘appropriate’ avenue for implementing an ‘appropriate’ institutional design and ratification procedure. As shown in the preceding pages, the coalition seemed to have significant access to both the European governments as well as the US administration, indicating that its actors had a privileged position within the dynamically evolving transnational and transgovernmental relations.

In addition, a concerted effort was made by that assembled transnational coalition to bypass the British Eden Plan, thus to avoid the Council of Europe and British association with the EDC altogether. Apart from this motivation, a second key motive was to ensure, through the creation of the democratically acceptable political ‘superstructure’ that the Treaty would find sufficient support in the national parliaments, especially the Assemblée Nationale. However, the deliberations in the Ad Hoc Assembly, and particularly the reactions of French Socialists in that chamber – abstaining from a vote on the draft treaty – suggest that this objective was hardly achieved. In fact, it is feasible that the opposite occurred: by ruling out the possibility, as suggested in the Eden Plan, of a British association to the EDC through the Council of Europe and by opening up a substantial conflict over the question of economic integration, the path taken was risky and, as it turned out, led nowhere.
6.2.3 Endgame, 1953-1954

The enthusiasm generated by the submission of the EPC Draft Treaty to the governments of the Six quickly proved to be the federalist trompe-l'œil that Denis de Rougement had warned against in 1949. By the time the Ad Hoc Assembly submitted the Treaty to the governments of the Six, it was already becoming apparent that the ratification of the EDC Treaty alone would pose a more complicated problem than anticipated. The governments of the Six, moreover, were no longer as enthusiastic about a Political Community as a year before. In 1953, a number of key actors, including Robert Schuman and Alcide De Gasperi had to leave office. Moreover, events in 1953 and 1954 gave rhetorical ammunition to the opponents of the EDC. Whereas in the previous years, proponents of the EDC could always point to the Soviet threat – in Spaak’s words ‘the mortal danger of our quarrels’ – the war ended in July 1953 without any accompanied Soviet provocation on the continent. When Stalin died in March 1953, a number of principled opponents to German rearmaments even saw the possibility for a neutralized Germany reappear. Thus, to the surprise of many, UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill advocated a renewed round of four-power conferences with the Soviet Union to explore that solution.

The Fate of the EPC, Ratification Problems and the Decline of the Transnational Coalition: No Alternative to the EDC?

When the EPC Draft Treaty was submitted to the ECSC Council by Spaak on March 9th 1953, the signs of an impending ratification crisis in France had become fairly. The Socialists, as Teitgen had related to the Geneva Circle, would play a pivotal role. Continuing its efforts to influence public opinion and governments, in Octo-

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190 “Es wird Schwierigkeiten geben” (Quoted in Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 325).
November 1953, the European Movement sought to organize a second congress at The Hague to push for the adoption of the EPC Draft Treaty. Individuals present were *inter alia* Brentano, Teitgen and Monnet Robert Schuman and Alcide De Gasperi, both having been forced to vacate left official positions in mid-1953 as well (Pistone 2008, 76). A core problem of the EPC draft Treaty itself continued as French Socialist leader Guy Mollet did not attend; instead, his radical federalist intra-party opponents Jacquet and Phillippe were present. Both Spaak and Brentano repeatedly demanded that the at least the Constitutional Committee should be able to partake in the IGC on the EDC Draft Treaty, to no avail. Moreover, even within the European Movement, the clash between the French and Benelux delegations over the creation of a Common Market under the auspices of the EPC had to be glossed over (Kim 2000, 322). This dispute – effectively one of national economic interests – affected the European Movement. Thus, a declaration of the ELEC executive pronounced that the European Movement had become “an organization maneuvered by the Socialists issuing interventionist propaganda for a European unification. If we were giving them less money, this propaganda would be less efficient.” In view of the apparent loss of influence over the governments, Spinelli, true to his Marxist past, attributed these disappointing events to a ‘European reactionary’ development, “De Gaulle, Togliatti, Ollenhauer […] have become three typical representatives of

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192 Paul-Henri Spaak and Heinrich von Brentano wrote in a letter to De Gasperi on June 1st 1953 “La Commission constitutionnelle estime devoir souligner l’importance extraordinaire que revêt la question de l’intégration européenne. Elle prie vivement le Conseil de ministres de poursuivre sans autre délai la voie qui a été ouverte par la résolution que, dans une claire vision de l’avenir, les six ministres des affaires étrangères ont prise le 10 septembre 1952” (Spaak and von Brentano 1953).

193 Own translation from “une organisation manœuvrée par les socialistes et qui fait la propagande d’une unification européenne selon les méthodes dirigistes. Si nous lui donnions moins d’argent, cette propagande serait moins efficace” (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 60).

194 By early 1954, ELEC conferences had become a mirror of national differences: thus, the Dutch delegate Max Kohnstamm declared that he had “auch kein Interesse an der Ratifizierung des EPC zu haben.” Moreover, he put the blame on the perception oft he pronouncements of German Socialist leader Kurt Schumacher “Für Frankreich ist aber Schumacher Symbol des Hasses, des Nationalismus und des Argwohns, daher im gesamten ein großes Mißtrauen.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 325).

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the European reaction recognized by all of their colleagues” \(^{195}\) As the emerging disagreements over the radical nature of the Treaty and the continuing disagreement between the French and the Dutch and Belgian delegations over its provisions for a common market stalled the recurring meetings between government delegates, the prospects for the EPC Treaty looked increasingly dim. Spinelli simply denounced the Six governments as traitors, “*trahison concertée*” as he put it (Vayssière 2007, 316). Moreover, the apparent failure of the ‘constitutionalist approach’ spurred tendencies toward disintegration within the federalists, particularly in France, as supporters of the ‘personalist’ tendency within the movement criticized the ‘*etatisme supranational*’ of Spinelli and Frenay (Vayssière 2007, 311). Fearing for the prospects of a democratically bolstered union, Fernand Dehousse wrote in April 1953,

> “Today, we have to hope that the ministers of the Six will have enough consistency and wisdom not to cancel each other out tomorrow. The precedent they established yesterday could open the door for serious improvement of democratic control in foreign policy, not only in the present case, but also in others, in the future.” \(^{196}\)

Moreover, whereas the prospects for the EPC were one thing, the ratification of the reason for the elaborate structure – the EDC itself – became a matter of serious concern. In order to ease ratification, the Christian Democrats continued to utilize the Geneva Circle for the exchange of information outside of official and institutionalized contacts between governments. On March 2\(^{nd}\) 1953, a discussion took place during which the French representative Fontanet explained the difficulties of the French Mayer government,

> “It is interesting to see that the Socialists, little by little, get closer to the government while the Gaullists are more and more hostile towards it. In the government, we notice a slow slide to the Left to continue their work with the support of the Socialists. Mayer is not all too popular. Until the debate on the ratification of the EDC Treaty, there will be some kind of truce in parliament. Additional protocols will allow for the ratification of the treaty with the support of the Socialists.” \(^{197}\)

\(^{195}\) Own translation from “De Gaulle, Togliatti, Ollenhauer […] ils sont devenus trois représentants typiques de la reaction europenne dans lesquels tous leurs collegues les reconaissent.” (Quoted in Vayssière 2007, 316).

\(^{196}\) Own translation from “Il faut espérer que les Six Ministres auront dès lors assez de constance et de sagesse pour ne pas annuler eux-mêmes, demain, le précédent qu’ils ont établi hier et qui pourrait ouvrir la porte à une sérieuse amélioration du contrôle démocratique de la politique extérieure non seulement dans le cas présent, mais dans d’autres, à l’avenir.” (Dehousse 1953).

\(^{197}\) Own translation from “Es ist jetzt interessant festzustellen, daß die Sozialisten sich nach und nach der Regierung annähern, während die Gaullisten sich mehr und mehr der Regierung [gegenüber] feindlich einstellen. Man bemerkt daher ein langsamtes Linksrutschen der Regierung, um mit der Unterstützung der Sozialisten weiterzubestehen. Mayer ist nicht allzu beliebt. Bis zur Debatte über die
Fontanet expressed the widely held theory that EDC ratification required the help of the French Socialists. Thus, he added in response to Blankenhorn, that one should try to avoid ‘difficult questions’.\textsuperscript{198} Such exchanges continued well into 1953. Christian Democrats decried the delay that the four-power conferences in late 1953 meant for the EDC ratification.\textsuperscript{199} In view of these developments, Teitgen lamented that French public opinion had become less positive towards the EDC because of “the propaganda on a ‘soviet peace’.”\textsuperscript{200} As a result, the talks reveal the similarity felt in terms of their common goal and the cooperative search for a suitable strategy against their common domestic enemies and the effort to coordinate the ratification processes in the smaller countries. As Teitgen put it,

“This does not mean that the game is over, but it will be hard to play. We have lost the unabridged direction of our foreign policy. The Soviets maneuver us. […] How should we continue our politics of European integration?”\textsuperscript{201}

Teitgen already had the answer, “There are possibilities immediately. We should ask our Dutch friends to ratify. This would already be one step ahead.”\textsuperscript{202} Dutch representative and PVP party group leader Margret Klompé, answered, “If the French and the Germans agree that this is politically important, I will push in this direction to the best of my abilities.”\textsuperscript{203}

The focus on the French Socialists was, in this analysis, intricately wound up with the ratification procedure in the remaining countries. Thus, Teitgen argued,
Christian Democrats in the Geneva Circle thus continued their coordinated efforts to pass the EDC Treaty in national parliaments. The sought after coordination thus covered domestic issues with regard to a possible successful ratification as well as extending towards sustaining common ground vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In addition, the consideration of alternative solutions to the EDC was brought up. Schlichting for example put it characteristically as a representative of the small countries, “We are not absolutely against an alternative solution if the EDC should take forever.”

Teitgen responded that the alternative would be the reconstitution of a German army that would pose a threat to France and that this would be the end of the German democracy. Blankenhorn replied that “this is the fundamental idea of Adenauer.” The EDC remained the only way to secure French-German reconciliation and, as Blankenhorn stated, “Germany would be prevented from playing ‘seesaw’ between the West and the East.” Like Ulysses and the Sirens, co-binding implied self-binding. As will be seen later, Adenauer still seemed to adhere to this view after the EDC Treaty had been rejected. In a further sense, these exchanges are significant as Teitgen, in his messages to both Blankenhorn and Brentano was, time and again, too optimistic on the ratification chances of the EDC.

By the end of 1953, the situation in France remained complicated and Teitgen reiterated the last hope for those seeking an EDC ratification.

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204 Own translation from “Il serait pour nous très avantageux de pouvoir dire a nos socialistes que les vôtres ont voté pour la ratification. De même en Belgique. Ce serait là un excellent exemple, et on montrerait que la procédure d’intégration n’est pas abandonnée.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 375). Moreover, Blankenhorn and Teitgen talked about their domestic enemies as their common problem: still before the German elections 1953, Teitgen refers to antipathy towards the nationalist innuendo from Kurt Schumacher. to which Blankenhorn replied, “La méfiance est réciproque” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 376). Teitgen added, “Ce qui nous a fait beaucoup mal, c’est la présence au Conseil de l’Europe de sociaux-démocrates allemands, hommes avec lesquels il n’y a rien à faire […]” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 378).

205 Own translation from “Nous ne somme pas absolument hostile a une solution alternative si la CED devait trainer indefiniment.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 377).


207 Own translation from “l’Allemagne sera empechée de jouer un jeu de bascule entre l’Est et l’Ouest” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 377).

208 “Il faut dire la vérité: si les élections allemandes avaient lieu et avaient abouti à la victoire de la coalition gouvernementale, demain le traite de la CED serait ratifie par 400 voix.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 376).
“Unfortunately, the future depends on the Socialists. This is because it is decisive whether they return into government and thus rebuild a strong majority in parliament. […] It has been some time since a great debate in parliament over European politics has been announced for the end of October. This was in summer. The parties then demanding such a debate now try to evade it. […] It is the tragedy of our politics that always one of our partners is involved in some important campaign.”

Houben noted, for the Belgian representatives, the determination to vote for the treaties and complained about the intransigence of domestic parliaments treating the European federalists as mere utopians.

**Decline and Disintegration**

The apparent lack of influence over the EPC negotiations by the federalists was exacerbated, by 1954, by internal divisions. Whereas the ELEC had disassociated itself from the European Movement by 1953, internal divisions within the UEF increased and the transnational Christian Democrats – increasingly replaced as a key venue for transnational contacts by the ECSC parliamentary groups – were in full-blown decline. As the EPC failed, by 1954, the tenuous nature of the transnational coalition had become apparent. Federalist sections continued their agitation but their influence seemed to fade: Spinelli, for example, reflected on the increasingly nationalist tones in Italy and attributed the decreasing standing of federalist reasoning and the demise of the EPC to Stalin’s death.

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211 “Les désarroi provoque dans la politique internationale du monde occidental part la mort du Staline a affaibli d’un seul coup l’influence que nous avions gagnée soit directement soit indirectement sur les gouvernements.” (Quoted in Vayssière 2007, 324).
In federalist circles, divisions over tactics vis-a-vis the EDC dominated internal discussions. Frenay, on his own part, suggested supporting the ‘supranational’ army. In an article in Le Monde, he sought to quell French criticism, “On this subject, it is in vain to recall that the commission is very moderately supranational.”\footnote{212} Such strategic support did not go down well with the more radical federalists. In France, a personalist section had split away from the French section of the UEF in early 1954. Frenay’s moderate position was welcomed by the German Europa Union for its ‘realism’ and ‘common sense’ whereas the Italian section of the MFE released a statement stating to “say no to all forms of rearmament that does not satisfy us.”\footnote{213} In France, the agitation against Mendès France and De Gaulle continued and left significant bitterness, in particular for radicals for whom Europe implied a European federation.\footnote{214}

Distrust towards Mendès France in all federalist circles was prevalent: in early August 1954, Mendès France was accused in publications of having entered a horse trade with the Soviets; his posture in the Brussels negotiations being described as “meticulously calculated rigidity.”\footnote{215} The concentration of the debate – and indeed the ratification chances - on the French Assemblée Nationale particularly implied that for the French federalists, influence was severely limited, as by 1954, only 24 deputies could be relied upon (Vayssière 2007, 327). Without any influence on governmental decisions, the UEF in France had been relegated to the status of a bystander. Frenay could only complain about the “outrageous abstention of the government and its leader”, committed to “support and encourage the French European members of parliament that did not intend to resign themselves to the end of European integration”\footnote{216}

\footnote{212} Own translation from “Il est futile a ce sujet de ce rappeler que ce commissariat est très modérément supranational.” (Quoted in Belot 2003, 452).
\footnote{213} Own translation from “dire non a toute forme de rearmament qi ne nous donne pas satisfaction” (Quoted in Belot 2003, 654).
\footnote{214} Alexandre Marc wrote about the EDC in 1965 “Combat mal engage, livre dans des conditions défavorable, et pendant lequel non seulement le projet de traite, mais encore l’idée même d’Europe uni ont été vilipendes par une fraction nationaliste de notre opinion publique. En disant ‘nationaliste’, je cède a la facilité ; il faudrait sans doute parle de la fraction passéiste et chauvine.” (Quoted in Greilsammer 1975, 78).
\footnote{215} Own translation from “intransigence exactement calculée” (Quoted in Vayssière 2007, 326, 327).
\footnote{216} Own translation from “candaleuse abstention du gouvernement et de son chef […] soutenir et encourager les parlementaires européens français qui n’entendent pas se résigner à la fin de l’intégration politique européenne” (Vayssière 2007, 329).
The European Movement shared a similar fate. One the one hand, individuals that had participated in, or were close to the transnational coalition, were still in key positions: Spaak had become Belgian Foreign Minister and was busy seeking to safeguard the EDC Treaty by brokering a last conference in Brussels in August 1954. Schuman, no longer French Foreign Minister, had to content himself with defending the EDC Treaty in the MRP and in public. Spinelli, and in particular the Italian federalists had lost influence over the Italian government after De Gasperi had lost a vote of confidence in mid-1953 and been replaced by Pella. The increased resistance against the Treaty that emanated, partially, from the DC amply demonstrated that the apparent influence had been predicated on their access to governments.

Transnational Christian Democracy equally was endangered by insignificance: after a although brief interlude of participation of with Swiss and Austrian actors in the Geneva Circle, its Belgian, Dutch, and Italian participations decided that they no longer needed the venue: complaints that it only served as a condition for French-German contacts coincided with the more important venue established through the European Parliament (Kaiser 2007, 266). Meetings within the NEI secretariat in 1954 no longer saw participation from notable party figures that had access close to governments. Private contacts persisted, however; in particular between Teitgen and Brentano, who continued to relay assessments of the dire situation in the French Assemblée Nationale (See the subsequent chapter).

No significant meetings of the Geneva Circle occurred in 1954. The NEI staged a congress in Bruges after the rejection of the EDC in the Assemblée Nationale in which Saassen thanked his “French friends for the energetic fight […] in favor of the European idea.”

In the last congress of 1954, an obstinate outlook, summarized in the Bruges Manifesto, called for supranational institutions with real powers, for direct elections for the ECSC parliament and the free circulation of ideas, goods, and services as preconditions for the security and wellbeing of Europe.

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218 The manifesto (Brügger Manifest) argued that “la nécessité est plus que jamais urgente pour les peuples européen de prendre conscience de leur solidarité, de maintenir aussi de construire des institutions supranationales avec des pouvoirs réels qui les rendent capables de diriger leur destin. C’est dans le cadre d’une Europe unique que ces peuples peuvent et doivent trouver l’amélioration de leur bien-être, le rétablissement ou le développement de leurs libertés, la garantie de leur sécurité et l’assurance de la paix” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 422). “Il est également nécessaire que les Gouvernements, les Parle-
Summary

The relative ease by which the coalition fell apart in 1954 indicates both an organizational weakness as well as the relative ideological tenuousness upon which its apparently influential actions between 1951 and 1953 had been predicated. As was already seen for 1953, the possibility of détente that emerged with Stalin’s death made life more complicated as opponents of the EDC picked up on the real possibility of détente that provided for a possible neutral unarmed Germany. Thus, late 1953 and early 1954 amply demonstrated both the organizational weakness of the transnational coalition and its constituent parts as well as the tenuous compromise it was based upon. Once the political goal of creating a genuine ‘Political Community’ was bound to fail, divisions within the federalist community led to the disintegration of the federalist community, whereas the organizational transnational Christian Democracy, increasingly replaced by the ECSC parliament as a site for coordination, was on the decline as well. The lack of influence over the fate of the EDC and the EPC thus demonstrate that the influence of the transnational coalition was largely based on access to negotiating governments. Once a realistic common political goal disappeared, the coalition dissolved quickly.

"...mements, les peuples et les nations de tous les pays de l’Europe libre réalisent aussi rapidement que possible d’élection au suffrage universel d’une Assemblée européenne et tout d’abord l’Assemblée commune de la CECA [...] ; la complète liberté d’échanges et de circulation des hommes et des idées ; la libération des échanges de marchandises, des services et des capitaux.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 423)."
6.3 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to give meaning to the structural analyses of the previous chapter by arguing that the indications of internal differentiation and polarization found in the previous chapter are best understood as indications of transnational ideological conflict. Thus, the main concerns of the federalist community – the most radical – had identified the nation-state as the root of the European problem and sought its abolishment in the foundation of a new federal political community. For the ELEC, the problem of nationalism lay predominantly in its force to hinder liberalization of trade and prevent taking advantage of welfare gains that a liberalized European market would provide for the economic recovery of Europe. The goal was not to abolish the nation-state but rather to find efficient institutional ways to (reconstruct) a European Market that would stabilize the nation-state and ensure its survival with a focus on economic fields of cooperation alone. As a result, supranational institutions implied merely the control of ‘committees of experts’ that were to oversee the gradual liberalization of trade. No significant centralization was envisioned, no forms of ‘democratic representation’ of European citizens were sought.

Apart from the federalists and the ELEC, the remaining transnational actors within the European Movement come from transnational party related organizations representing transnational Social Democracy and transnational Christian Democracy. Both had distinct views and concerns largely growing out of the history of their ideological precursors. For Social Democrats, the only common concern after the war was the reconstruction of the welfare state in their respective countries. Apart from that, views differed widely. A significant portion of transnational Social Democrats thought that these goals required Federalist radicalism in order to rebuild Europe as a ‘third force’ in the emerging confrontation between the blocks. At the other end, there were Social Democrats in virtually every country under consideration who opposed substantial delegation and pooling, denounced the European project as a conservative myth and sought national sovereignty to maintain or create a welfare state and reconstruct European economies. Concerns for the unity of Social Democracy had more moderate supranationalists ‘caught in the middle’: while supporting the delegation of sovereignty in principle, figures such as Spaak, Mollet, or Van der Goes van Naters stuck to the gradualist approach in preference for the creation of a wider Europe including Great Britain. In addition, these internal division made the reconciliation made French-German reconciliation difficult.
Comparatively speaking, Christian Democracy was much more uniform. A shared concern for the unity of the *Abendland*, a shared sense of imminent threat from the Bolshevik East led to similar views on the necessity of a containment of the nation-state and nationalist competition, but not its abandonment: thus, Christian Democrats, by and large, thought that some degree of sovereignty had to be abandoned. As that concern grew out of a sense of threatened security, the envisioned future scope of European institutions would be quite broad, encompassing security as well. As a result, Christian Democrats held that the delegation of sovereignty had to be matched by some form of representation at the supranational level as well.

Also, there was an influential transatlantic network connecting US actors that subscribed to a classic causal story of the American political tradition on the vicissitudes of the old European continent. While there was an overwhelming cross-party consensus on the need for closer cooperation between European states, in particular on the economic plane, less prevalent but influential positions subscribed to supranational blueprints, espoused by a distinct set of actors that organized in the ACUE and, having ties to the Foreign Policy establishment and the Intelligence community, accordingly effected a significant flow of funding for the Europeanist organization that provided a significant boost to their organizational capabilities.

Finally, the European Movement, as the overarching organization assembling the most influential transnational pressure groups and individuals, was characterized by an extreme divide as well. As a result, although it may have disposed of the most significant resources, no uniform political pressure in a single direction would emanate from this organization. Thus, the dominant conclusion is one of a complex overarching transnational conflict that cannot be reduced to party ideologies and provided ample room for conflict dynamics. Moreover, even the federalist community – largely seen as ideologically homogenous in the previous chapter – was based on a political compromise between rather diverse factions. Combined with the relative organizational weakness of these organizations, any transnational coalition formed on the basis of the transnational networks would be temporary, formed to achieve a specific political goal and dissolve afterwards rather quickly.

The second section built upon these divisions by tracing transnational dynamics of coalition formation between the late 1940’s and the early 1950’s. Up until 1950, a tenuous compromise organized in the European Movement had overshadowed foundational differences between intergovernmentalists and federalists in particular. Per-
sisting ideological differences – within Social Democracy and between the continent and the UK in particular – caused frequent conflicts that reached a climax by 1951 within its main institutional forum, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Spurred by the succeeding negotiations of the ECSC and the prospect of a continental parliament, mobilized by the prospect of a creation of a European Army, the strategies of the major federalists and supranationalists began to converge: Federalists put pressure on the Italian government to create a democratic federation; at the initiative of Paul-Henri Spaak, an alliance of Social Democratic federalists founded the ‘Action Committee for the European Constituent’ (Europäische Bewegung 1953); Christian Democrats put increasing pressure on Dutch and Belgian representatives to lobby for a European intergovernmental compromise on the EDC; finally, an identifiable elite of US officials positioned on the continent, in direct contact with Jean Monnet, successfully lobbied its government to endorse the EDC and use to leverage of aid conditionality to effect a compromise among the European governments. These transnational activities coincided with the timing of a basic shift in the EDC bargain that led the governments of France, Italy, Germany and the US to a wholehearted endorsement of the European army concept and brought a institutional conflict between these governments and Belgium and the Netherlands to the forefront. In sum, substantial transnational pressures and demands coincided with the shifting of government positions on the EDC institutions and the resulting changing conflict constellations.

The radicalism that the course taken in Paris entailed was observed, *inter alia*, by Sassen in the Geneva Circle in October 1951, maintaining that the creation of a European Army as intended required the creation of a Federation, which, being done under the impression of a threat, ‘could be dangerous’.

Such warnings went unheard, however. Documenting evidence from common written exchanges, meetings and conference attendance shows sufficient evidence of strategic coordination: the transnational coalition dominated the transgovernmental scene, in particular between

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219 Sassen pointed out in the Geneva Circle on October 16th 1951, “Je vous présenter une observation: c’est sous une menace que l’Europe est en train de se créer une défense commune. Il ne faudrait pas que les hommes laissent les événements les conduire ; cela pourrait être fort dangereux. A mon avis, il est faux de traiter la question de l’armée européenne de la même façon que le plan Pleven. L’institution d’une armée européenne implique l’établissement d’une politique extérieur commune de l’Europe. Si on veut instituer l’armée européenne, il faut créer une fédération.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 308).
1951 and 1953. Motivated by the objective to prevent the rule of ‘technocratic military experts’, the EDC project had brought together transnational Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Federalists, and, with prominent US support in Eisenhower, had produced a nascent federalist moment that sought, in terms of the indentations of the group around Spaak, to mimic the US experience and create a European constitution through the constituent approach. These actors coming from a supranationalist or federalist background, chose to pursue what in their minds was the ‘appropriate’ avenue for implementing an ‘appropriate’ institutional design and ratification procedure. The coalition seemed to have significant access to both the European governments as well as the US administration, indicating that its actors had a privileged position within the dynamically evolving transnational and transgovernmental relations.

In addition, a concerted effort was made by that assembled transnational coalition to bypass the British Eden Plan, thus to avoid the Council of Europe and British association with the EDC altogether. Apart from this motivation, a second key motive was to ensure, through the creation of the democratically acceptable political ‘superstructure’ that the Treaty would find sufficient support in the national parliaments, especially the Assemblée Nationale. However, the deliberations in the Ad Hoc Assembly, and particularly the reactions of French Socialists in that chamber – abstaining from a vote on the draft treaty – suggest that this objective was hardly achieved. In fact, it is feasible that the opposite occurred: by ruling out the possibility, as suggested in the Eden Plan, of a British association to the EDC through the Council of Europe and by opening up a substantial conflict over the question of economic integration, the path taken was risky and, as it turned out, led nowhere.

Thus, the relative ease by which the coalition fell apart in 1954 exposed both an organizational weakness as well as the relative ideological tenuousness upon which its apparently influential actions between 1951 and 1953 had been predicated. Only a temporary similar political goal had kept the coalition intact. As was already seen for 1953, the possibility of détente that emerged with Stalin’s death made life more complicated as opponents of the EDC picked up on the real possibility of détente that provided for a possible neutral unarmed Germany. Once the political goal of creating a genuine ‘Political Community’ was bound to fail, divisions even within the federalist community contributed to its disintegration, whereas the organizations of transna-
tional Christian Democracy, increasingly replaced by the ECSC parliament as a site for coordination, were on the decline as well. The lack of influence over the fate of the EDC and the EPC thus demonstrate that the influence of the transnational coalition was largely based on access to negotiating governments. Once a realistic common political goal disappeared, the coalition dissolved quickly.

In sum, transnational influence was not based on organizational strengths or a particular strong ideological cohesiveness but on a temporary agreement to pursue a similar political goal, the creation of a political community. Apparently, the early successes were based on an ability to convince key governments to pursue and support such a path in the same vein as the subsequent loss of influence indicates vanishing access. The conclusion is thus that if there is a tractable and effective impact, it should be found in the dynamics of domestic conflict and the consideration underlying the strategic choices made by the governments negotiating the treaty. The next chapter will turn to that question.
Chapter 7: Transnational Conflict, Domestic Conflict, and the EDC Bargain

7. Transnational Conflict, Domestic Conflict, and the EDC Bargain

The purpose of the present chapter is to pull the threads of the preceding chapters together by demonstrating that the course of the EDC bargain can only be sufficiently explained by considering the role of transnational networks for the preference formation and bargaining strategies of the negotiating states.

The first section (7.1) turns its attention to the implications of the transnational conflict for the domestic conflicts over European institutions in general and the EDC in particular. It demonstrates that there is a tractable impact, both within and across parties, that is mediated by the domestic political conditions and institutions. Geopolitical incentives certainly mattered as well. In every case, actors formulated their demands in the terms of perceived ‘national interests that had to take objective material and geostrategic realities into account.’ Thus, there is a recognizable difference between the larger and the smaller countries on the continent that accounts for common fears of autonomy loss in the smaller countries, a tendency already identified when analyzing the transnational conflict. Second, in both Germany and Italy there is a tendency to view the supranational institutions as a means to gain recognition and influence, as result that will be established in the subsequent section as well.

At the same time, the causal and strategic beliefs underlying the demand differences and thus the transnational conflict clearly influenced the link between material context and domestic demands. By themselves, geopolitical considerations cannot account for the content of domestic demands nor the variation in the domestic conflict patterns. Thus, consistent with the basic properties of the transnational conflict, all Social Democratic parties in the European countries were marked by relatively high degrees of internal conflict whereas Christian Democratic parties, in particular in the larger continental countries were more inclined to demand the creation of supranational institutions with appropriate democratic institutions for a European Army. Thus, domestic elites that were active in the transnational communities pursuing supranational or federal models of post-war Europe tended to do so, with exceptions, with regard to the problem of German rearmament within domestic political conflict. Domestic elites that were remote from these communities tend to fall within basic intergovernmental expectations: conservative Italian and German elites by and large perceived the EDC favorably from an instrumental point of view as increasing their
international influence, whereas others would favor classic Alliance solutions to the German problem that preserve National sovereignty (i.e. the Gaullists in France), or deny the existential threat posed by the Soviet government and thus the necessity of balancing efforts and associated institutions (i.e. some British, French and German Social Democrats).

In sum, domestic differences over preferred institutional designs for post-war Europe and the ‘German question’, within and across parties, were reflections of the transnational conflict. In this sense, the rationale for transnational networking, as described in chapter 2, can be seen relatively easily: amid a relatively clear geostrategic challenge for all European governments, there were sufficient domestic differences over the concrete measures of how to meet that challenge. Similarities between individual actors across states, as described in the previous chapter, were sufficient as to warrant strategic coordination and to constitute a nascent transnational conflict over European institutions.

Does the impact of the transnational conflict on domestic politics translate into the preference formation and strategic choice of the negotiating states? Does considering that impact contribute to a better understanding of the EDC bargain? The second section of this chapter evaluates these questions. From an intergovernmental point of view, as recounted in chapters 3 and 4, the shifting conflict constellations were attributed to the unstable French governments, inefficient institutions and the learning process of the remaining governments involved in the bargain having to find a possible agreement in a geopolitically unstable environment. From a transnational point of view, the information presented so far would point to a different direction. Chapter 5 has singled out at least two governments – France and Italy – whose shifting embeddedness in the inter-organizational networks suggests possible preference shifts. Second, the preceding chapter has demonstrated that the differences within the transnational networks contributed to the rise and fall of a tenuous and fragile transnational coalition that united actors with a clear-cut ideological preference for a supranational army. Mutual engagement and exchange of information within these circles repeatedly coincided with key shifts in the course of the bargain; its actors seemed to have either privileged access to negotiating governments or were in leading positions themselves. As a result, the way in which governments were affected by the transnational conflict had an independent impact on the course of the bargain.
7.1 The Domestic Dimension of Transnational Conflict

In how far was the transnational conflict and its participants, analyzed in the previous chapter, reflected in the domestic political conflict and thus the ‘demands’ for supranational institutions and a European Army in the negotiating states? As the previous chapter has demonstrated, the geostrategic ‘obviousness’ of the benefits of closer European cooperation did not translate into a wide consensus about concrete institutional designs. In as much as the domestic debates on the EDC reflected genuine conflicts over the respective ‘national interests’, the EDC itself as well as the degree of proposed centralization and representation of its respective institutions were as controversial issues nationally as they were transnationally. On the one hand, there was a wide acceptance of a vague notion of ‘European unity’. Polls from the United States Information Agency conducted between 1952 and 1963, suggest that responses categorized as supporting ‘European Integration’ in Germany were above 50% in 1950 and rose steadily towards 70% in the mid 1950’s. In France, positive answers to the same question were lower but in the majority, oscillate around 50% (Shepherd 1975, 69, 74). In the UK, responses to similar questions were even higher in the early 1950’s peaking at the time of the signing of the WEU (Shepherd 1975, 83). Reflecting on the results of these polls, this early period has famously been described as one of ‘permissive consensus’ about European integration (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, 41, 42). Behind that permissive consensus, there was disagreement, however, as the previous chapter has demonstrated. In particular, the view that the organization of post-war Europe should follow federalist principles implying the abolishment of national sovereignty was, by and large, the view of a minority, although by no means a small one (Figure 7.1).
Polls conducted in Belgium after the failure of the EDC suggest that domestic divisions were widespread as about one quarter (26.06 per cent) of respondents indicated that they did not regret the failure of the EDC whereas 28.49 per cent of respondents reported that they did (De Vos 1987, 111). Similarly, there was a remarkable difference in Germany between public opinion and elite support for the WEU and the EDC (See Table 7.1).
Table 7.1 Opposition and Support to EDC, Paris Agreements, and WEU in Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WEU Against</th>
<th>WEU For</th>
<th>Paris Agreements Against</th>
<th>Paris Agreements For</th>
<th>EDC Against</th>
<th>EDC For</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Elites</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Opinion</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Particular Elites</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Business</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Business</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big Business</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>High Civil Servants</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-Collar Workers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Data taken from Deutsch (1959, 167).*

Finally, French public opinion seemed equally divided over the issue, at least during the time period when ratification was imminent (See Table 7.2 below).

In sum, there seems to have been ample conflict over European institutions in general and the EDC in particular. Before investigating in how far these domestic divisions reflected the transnational conflict, the subsequent section briefly reviews institutional differences among the European countries that are relevant as mediating factors.

Table 7.2 Attitudes towards the EDC in France (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>July 1954</th>
<th>August/September 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definitely for</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slightly for</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total for</strong></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slightly against</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definitely against</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total against</strong></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No opinion</strong></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Data taken from Shepherd (1975, 77).*
7.1.1 The Mediating Effect of Domestic Structures

As argued in chapter 2, the conditions for a direct impact of the transnational conflict on domestic conditions are directly related to the ability of a government to act ‘as if’ it were the representative agent of a state: the more decision-making is carried out in an effective hierarchical manner and the higher the effective ability of party leaders to enforce party discipline over domestic dissenters, the lower the openness of the domestic political conflict and the less susceptible it is to be impacted by transnational conflict; conversely, the lower the capability of party and government leaders to impress their political supporters to actually follow their lead, the lower their impact on the formulated ‘state preferences’. Analyzing the domestic political systems of the main countries under consideration in this light, reveals a nuanced picture that allows qualifying the hypothesized impact that the transnational conflict may have had on the domestic politics of the negotiating states.

France

French politics throughout the period is a veritable case of ‘cycling’ in which the institutional structure fails to stabilize against voting cycles and to induce roughly predictable politics (Shepsle 1979; Browne and Hamm 1996). By dominating the agenda and informally but effectively holding specific ministers accountable for their policies, parliamentary committees could at any moment challenge the governmental coalition in power. Moreover, politics in the French Fourth Republic had two major political forces – the Communists and the Gaullists – who were staunchly opposed against the French constitution and thus acted as ‘anti-system’ parties that would regularly vote against any government in power. As the result, those parties that supported the French constitution – the MRP, the SFIO, the Radicals, and the UDSR – acting as the ‘Third Force coalition’ until 1952 – worked as ‘groupes charnières’: they had a potentially disproportionate access to power and influence but any disagreement among them whatsoever would topple the government (Lefort 1996, 62; Rosenthal and Voeten 2004). This fact was exacerbated by the fact that key parties within the ‘third force’ were more or less loose associations of voters. Thus, the Radical Party was more a political tradition left over from the aftermath of the French Revolution than a party organizations in the modern sense (O’Neill 1981; Hazareesingh 1994). It remained continuously plagued by divisions between a more...
liberal left and conservative right wing and traditionally did not enforce party discipline (Ibid.). As a result, some of the most ardent supporters of the EDC – such as Maurice Faure – and alleged opponents of the Treaty – such as eventual Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France – came from that party. The UDSR, the party of René Pleven, was equally an association of former resistance members without a distinct common political ideological program or platform and gave deputies freedom to vote on principle (Müller-Härlin 2008, 71). Other parties, such as the Christian Democrats (MRP), the communists (PCF) and the Socialists (SFIO) did enforce party discipline rigidly, albeit with varying success (Lefort 1996). Combined with the expansive procedural rights of the Assemblée Nationale, the result was governmental instability. French Cabinets and thus the Prime Minister changed on average twice a year. In sum, the relative lack of party discipline in conjunction with the institutions of the Fourth Republic meant that a considerable number of small intra-party groups was, potentially, in the position to exert considerable pressure over the governing coalitions without either the party leadership or the government having sufficient resources at its disposal to discipline dissent. Thus in France, domestic institutions and parties structured political conflict only to a relatively small degree. As a result, there was a relatively high potential for the expression of the transnational conflict in domestic demands.

Italy

A peculiarity of the post-war Italian political system was that the post-war dominance of the DC in electoral terms did not translate into governmental stability. Throughout his tenure as first President of post-war Italy between 1946 and 1953, Alcide De Gasperi had to reshuffle his cabinet seven times and ultimately fell to a vote of confidence in 1953. Afterwards, there were three different Prime Ministers from the DC until the WEU Treaty was ratified in 1955. Part of the reason for the lack of discipline within the DC may be found in the fact that the DC had strongly organized factions within the party that competed with each other for ministerial posts: as a result, the smaller coalition parties could force the reshuffling of Cabinets as well (Trautmann and Ullrich 2006, 561). The ‘right wing’ of the DC, a faction that positioned itself close to the Vatican, traditionally pushed against laissez faire capitalism and closely aligned its positions with the Vatican (Ginsborg 2003, 156). Led by Luigi Gedda and Giuseppe Pella, it pushed for neutralism and pressured continu-
ously for an alliance with the right wing – a coalition of Monarchists and right wing neo-fascists called “Blocco Nazionale della Liberta / Partito Nazionale Monarchico”. This section opposed the idealist conceptions of a federal Europe advanced by the centre of the party and adopted a more nationalist stance on the open issue of the free territory of Trieste (Masala 2001, 356). Left-catholic currents under Guiseppe Dossetti advocated coalitions with the Liberal PRI and the centrist Social Democratic PSDI while favoring more neutralist conceptions of Foreign policy instead of too closely binding Italy in the Western Alliance (Varsori 1992, 266; Masala 2001, 353). Caught between these factions, De Gasperi was thus faced with a more narrow power base than the electoral majority suggested. Violent confrontations between the left and the right were frequent: between 1947 and 1954, clashes on the Streets of Italy had left 100 dead (Woller 2010, 249). Thus, in Italy, domestic institutions were weak as well: although not as volatile as in the French Fourth republic, the internal divisions within the DC and the high polarization of Italian politics implied a relatively high potential impact for the transnational conflict on Italian domestic politics.

**Germany**

Domestic political institutions in Germany went through a complete rebuilding process, much like the country itself after the war. Being occupied, the process of party formation party preceded the procedure for arriving at these institutions through the Parlamentarische Rat in Bonn in 1948. While the formative period saw a surge of new parties formed, parties had to be granted licenses by the Allies, and only four obtained these on a nation-wide basis: the CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, and the KPD (Kreuzer 2009, 678). However, old cleavages and inherited party structures had remained relatively stable. The two dominant cleavages in Germany consisted in the divide between labor and capital and a religious divide between Protestants and Catholics. Labor was largely represented by the SPD; the latter was represented through the newly founded Christian Democratic Union of the CDU/CSU, whereas liberal milieu was represented by the FDP and the DP. The victory of a cobbled together coalition of the CDU/CSU with smaller liberal and conservative coalition partners in 1949 implied that the center of power in the Bundestag remained with Adenauer. At the same time, the institutional structure as it emerged gave the heads of state governments considerable power, positioning Germany midway between
confrontational logic of majority rule and consociational power sharing (Lehmbruch 2013). Political entry was in principle open to newcomers in the foundational years although the electoral results meant that there were two clear centers of power and the number of parties would consolidate rather quickly (Kreuzer 2009).

Due to their positions within the old cleavage structure, however, the CDU/CSU and the SPD quickly assumed central positions in the competition for power (Lehmbruch 2000). The CDU/CSU, as a new party, predominantly drew on older contacts of the pre-war Zentrum through local church networks: a key characteristic was a carefully calibrated system of appointments to assuage protestant and catholic leaders while political conflicts were not carried out openly but in a consensus oriented manner, combined, in the Bundestag, with strong party discipline (Zolleis and Schmid 2013, 423). The SPD was reconstituted by an ‘old guard’ of pre-war individuals and quickly acquired a large membership base; the early leadership had a dominant position, organized in a “full-time executive federal committee.”220 By implication, the two largest factions in the Bundestag were relatively tightly controlled.

Thus, while Schumacher could muster the organizational apparatus of the party to discipline the party, Adenauer quickly sought to leverage the position formally given to him as chancellor, exerting control over Cabinet action. The combination of agenda setting powers in the Bundestag, the effective party discipline of the CDU/CSU and the coalition, as well as his position and powers as chancellor gave the CDU leadership and Adenauer in particular considerable influence (Cary 1996, 240). As a result, German domestic institutions were relatively strong: the leadership of both dominant parties was able to control the political process to a significant degree, implying a more narrow scope for the expression of the transnational conflict in domestic party politics.

**Netherlands**

In the case of the Netherlands, the main peculiarity to be considered consists in the Dutch political tradition of ‘Verzuiling’ that had evolved as a Dutch answer to the emergence of political cleavages in Europe (Andeweg 2004). The consensual charac-

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220 Own translation from “hauptamtlichen geschäftsführenden Bundesvorstand” (Spier and von Alemann 2013, 441).
ter of Dutch politics implied that all major parties participated in Dutch governments, all of which were usually able to exert sufficient party discipline (Lijphart 1975). Decisions including foreign policy were decided by majority within the governing council. The personal responsibility of ministers before the parliament and implied personal leadership of ministries and, accordingly, a high leeway for any Foreign Minister (Lepszy 2006, 335). Heated debates about Foreign Policy were by tradition less practiced then in other parliamentary systems and open criticism of the foreign policy of the government unusual (Lepszy 2006, 353). Leadership of the party groups was an influential position because the delicate governmental balance between the pillars had to be maintained and that was a matter of negotiation and appointment (Ibid.).

Belgium

In Belgium, the most salient cleavage was constituted by the conflict between Walloon and Flemish populations of the country. As a historically salient conflict, it was amplified by the war due to accusations that the Flemish part of the country, in particular the radical Flemish Movement, was more active in collaborating with the German authorities during the war (De Wever 2013). The conflict was incensed by the Belgian royal question. In 1950, the Christian-Democratic PVC had passed a law allowing the return of King Leopold III which caused a violent strike particularly in the Walloon parts of the country that threatened the unity of the state. Apart from the Walloon-Flemish conflict, the religious cleavage as well as the class-cleavage were historically highly salient in Belgium as well. To cope with the multi-faceted and cross-cutting domestic divisions, Belgium had evolved a peculiar form of pillarization in order to forge political compromises that somewhat resembled the Netherlands (Rokkan and Flora 2000, 324). In post-war Belgium, the dominant political forces consisted in the Catholic-Christian pillar, represented by the PSC-CVP and the Socialist pillar represented by the BSP-PSB (Deschouver 2004). As a historically

221 The EDC was linked to a highly conflictual issue in post-war Belgian politics, namely the constitutional prerogatives of the Belgian king. As the return of Leopold from exile after the war had already sparked strikes and protests in the Flemish parts of the country, the conflict between Walloons and Flemish would reappear throughout the 1950’s, necessitating a constitutional change in the 1960’s (Woyke 2006). Since the prerogatives of the King included being the supreme commander of the Belgian army and appointing officers, the EDC required a constitutional change.
evolved system to mitigate multiple societal conflicts, the capacity of Belgian parties to structure politics and political conflict was relatively high and their influence reached beyond the legislative politics of the day. Belgian political institutions at the time are thus mostly described as ‘consociational’ as well: “government by elite cartel [would] turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy” (Lijphart 1969). In Belgium, these features were less pronounced than in the Dutch case: the confrontation between the Christian Democratic PSC-CVP and the BSP-PSB was much more open and direct, than in the Netherlands, forming a clear conflict between government and opposition - in particular on Foreign Policy matters as demonstrated below. Consociational power sharing was repeatedly employed in times of crisis; at other times, attempts to govern by majority were employed if the parliamentary situation allowed it (Deschouwer 2006). In sum, however, given the strong position of political parties, the scope for an expression of transnational conflict would seem relatively low.

UK

British institutions at the time formed the classic case of the Westminster model, characterized by executive dominance of the legislative agenda and a clear conflict line between government and opposition as well. Strong parties helped structuring political conflicts (Epstein 1980). Post-war British politics was a characteristic two-party system in which the class cleavage, represented by Labour and the Conservative Party, dominated. Both parties were organized in a highly hierarchic matter and generally highly effective at enforcing party discipline (McKenzie 1955; Epstein 1980).

There were, however, differences between both parties. Within Labour, British Unions traditionally exerted a strong influence dominating large chunks of the members, controlling candidate selection to a significant degree thus exerting a significant check on voting discipline (Eggers and Hainmüller 2009, 530; Driver 2011, 38). The positions of the party were thus formulated and enforced by “coalitions of parliamentary and union elites.” (Webb 1994, 110). Within the first labor government, to be sure, there were a number of internal conflicts: the most intense involved challenges from the left-wing of the party related to the parties’ ambitious welfare program, and in particular German rearmament and the rising defense expenditures with the esca-
lating Cold War. After the surprising landslide victory in 1945, Labour had embarked on a significant expansion of the British welfare state. Higher spending on defense made cuts in social programs necessary. The resulting intra-party conflicts led to the resignation of Aneurin Bevan, a popular figure of the left-wing of Labour, on April 22nd 1951 as Minister of Health (Middlemas 1986, 187). In general, party discipline was highly effective. The party leadership accepted a certain degree of rhetorical dissent within party parliament, but not when it came to voting.222

The Conservative party had developed out of the archetype of the 19th century cartel party to a modern mass-based politician organization. It had developed a highly centralized organization, in which the Conservative Central Office, directed by the leadership of the party, exerted central control the party and initialized and determined most programmatic decision: absent a powerful union influence, the primary resource of the Central Office was the selection of candidates together with local constituency committees (Eggers and Hainmüller 2009, 531). In sum, post-war British politics left little room for the expression of the transnational conflict in domestic politics.

Conclusion

As the preceding pages have shown, the domestic institutions of Western European countries offered varying potential for the transnational conflict over European institutions to affect the contours of domestic political conflict and thus the processes of demand formation. Thus, in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and the UK, domestic institutions were by and large effective in structuring political conflict whereas in Italy and France, this was much less so. In the Netherlands and Belgium, political cleavages where effectively expressed by political parties constituting the pillars of politically, religiously, and – in the Belgian case - linguistically divided societies. A long consociational tradition and effective party discipline imply that there is little scope for a transnational conflict among a small European elite to have a strong impact on the dynamics of domestic conflict. A similar picture holds for the UK and Germany. In the UK, the dominant class cleavage was organized into a two-party

222 As Morrison put it “Parliament would be a dull assembly if we overdid discipline” (Thorpe 2008, 145).
system wherein both parties were able to muster sufficient discipline to engage in a clear-cut conflict between government and opposition. In the German case, the leadership of the two dominant parties – the CDU/CSU and the SPD – was equally able to acquire the capacity of effective leadership, earn the loyalty of its followers and discipline dissent, leading to an equally clear-cut left-right conflict in the Bundestag between the governmental coalition and the opposition.

In Italy and to a larger degree in France, the situation was different. In France, the ‘third force’ coalition was composed, *inter alia*, of loose party groups such as the Radicals that were ineffective at enforcing party discipline. This situation was exacerbated by a strong systemic opposition to the institutions of the Fourth Republic from the communist left and the Gaullist right. Narrow governing majorities meant that the parties of the third force – such as the Christian Democratic MRP and the secular SFIO – had to enter coalitions despite the fact that they were divided over multiple issues. The frequent need of governments to resort to votes of confidence in the *Assemblée Nationale* – and the frequency of their failure – is indicative of the fact that French parties were clearly less capable of effecting discipline and the most susceptible for the transnational conflict to impact the domestic conflict across parties. A similar observation holds for Italy, though to a lesser degree. Caught in a similar fashion between a strong anti-systemic communist party and a vocal opposition from the right, the dominant Italian DC suffered from internal division between the left and the right of the party that was, for a time, abated by the De Gasperi’s leadership. In order to deal with these conflicts, frequent reshuffling of the Cabinet was necessary despite the fact that the DC was by far the most dominant party. De Gasperi eventually fell over these divisions in 1953.

In sum, while transnational political conflict, judging from the party affiliation and the nationalities of the actors in the transnational communities analyzed in chapter 5, should have affected every European country to some degree, their visibility in open domestic conflict and thus their significance for the formation of state preferences should vary. The next section seeks to uncover whether this was actually the case.

### 7.1.2 Impact on Domestic Conflict

I now investigate the degree to which the transnational conflict was reflected in the domestic conflict in the European states at the time. In how far did domestic confron-
tations during the processes of formulating demands for specific institutions reflect transnational influences? So far, chapters 5 and 6 have presented quantitative as well as qualitative evidence that transnational Social Democracy was much more divided ideologically than transnational Christian Democracy, and that Christian Democratic, Social Democratic as well as Liberal parties were equally present in ideologically diverse groups, i.e. the federalist community, the ELEC community and the European Movement. Thus, from the transnational perspective, there should a visible tendency of intra-party conflict over institutions and the associated ‘national interest’ in every country. As French actors were equally distributed over the transnational communities, weak French institutions should produce the highest degree of internal strife. In Italy, the predominant influence should emanate from the federalist community leading, inter alia, to internal quarrels within the dominant DC. In Belgium and the Netherlands, the most significant influence should emanate from the ELEC community, leading to more limited intra-party disputes. British politics should me mostly under the influence of the ‘unionists’ from the European Movement, German politics under the predominant influence of transnational Christian Democracy.

I proceed by characterizing the domestic conflicts in each country in this light.

The Domestic Activities of Transnational Organizations

The main contours of the transnational conflict that culminated into the battle for the EDC were felt in every country. In all countries, the early activities of the European Movement described in the previous chapter had led to coordinated initiatives by its national sections in the respective European parliaments that largely reflected the battle lines drawn within the European Movement. By 1950, the growing dissatisfaction of continental Europeanists had found its way into national parliaments. In France, Socialist leaders and SFIO delegates André Philip and Gerard Jacquet founded the “Conseil européen de vigilance” in September 1950, comprising members of the French sections of the MSEUE, the NEI, and the UEF called for “a European economy […], European diplomacy, […] a European army. […] We demand with all out might the unification of free Europe by the establishment of a federal government and a parliament at a very early date.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 126). The parliamentary group of the EPU in Italy stipulated that “the time has come for the nations of Europe to transfer part of their sovereign rights to be exercised in common […].”
calling immediately for “a European assembly (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 203). In the Bundestag, members of the Europa Union successfully initiated a resolution for a federal pact on July 26th 1950, stating that the Bundestag “advocates the establishment of a European Federal pact as envisaged in the Preamble and Article 24 of the Basic Law […]. to create a supranational federal authority based on free, direct, universal suffrage and possessing legislative, executive, and judicial powers.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 556). In the Dutch Tweede Kammer, there was a motion calling for a “permanent association” of states which should “be realized by means of various functional institutions, wherein, so far as may be possible and desirable, authority should be conferred on supranational bodies, especially in monetary, economic and social fields and in that of defence.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 390). It was only in the UK that a similar motion was not put forth successfully. Thus, while the transnational conflict clearly found its way into national discourse and the domestic conflict, it was expressed in different ways.

“[…] our dead, my General, are not dead so everything starts all over again.”

Pierre-Henri Teitgen

France

As Parsons has argued, there were at least three factions in France who differed with regard to their dominant ideological predisposition towards European institutions (Parsons 2002, 2003). Before the outbreak of the Korean War, there still seemed to be a sizable cross-party consensus in France that the institutions of the Council of Europe were insufficient. The consensus, initiated by deputies from the ‘Third Force’ after the first session of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe demanded that “a genuine European political authority may be defined and set up as soon as possible” and was passed the Assemblée Nationale with a majority of 325 to 249 votes (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 23). The cross-party appeal of the basic supranan-

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223 On May 4th 1948, a motion supported by Mackay who sought at least a statement of principle from Labour Prime Minister Attlee was rejected (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 704).
224 Own translation from “[…] nos morts, mon General, ne sont pas mort pour que tout recommence comme avant” (Quoted in Müller-Härlin 2008, 188).
tional reasoning implied by the idea of ‘co-binding’ was still evident in April 1950.225

However, as soon as concrete measures for German rearmament were on the table with the outbreak of the Koran War, domestic conflicts in France grew quickly, producing distinct labels for the proponents (‘cedistes’) and opponents (‘anti-cedistes’) of the Treaty.226 It quickly became a dispute over basic national allegiances and deep-seated values. The far-reaching nature of the EDC made the domestic conflict more divisive: some individuals, such as Lapie, who were supporters of early initiatives for abstract European unity, came out as vocal opponents (Parsons 2003, 93). The conflict engulfed highly prominent former members of the French resistance: some members of De Gaulle’s French government in exile during the war such as André Philip and Henri Frenay were among the most ardent federalists active in the transnational network and would be accused by De Gaulle of treason as these actors proposed to sacrifice French sovereignty in an institutional conglomerate with untrustworthy Germans (Belot 2003, 629, 630).227 In De Gaulle’s perspective, Europe lacked the quality of a nation, namely the ability of ‘obtaining the congenital loyalty of its subjects, which, at the limit, required that ‘millions would be willing to die for Europe’ (Belot 2003, 630).228 The theme was common among Gaullist deputies. As long as European unity implied a permanent enshrinement of a French advantage over Germany, figures like De Gaulle and Michel Serre had not opposed the measure publicly. As soon as the EDC put Germany and France on an equal level, the costs seemed too high and the agitation became vindictive (Fauvet 1956). Thus, Michel

225 In April 1950, the French Council of the European movement put forth an “Appeal for the creation of a European political authority”: reasoning “recovery is impossible on a national basis” calling for “the establishment of a common authority in which all the democratic nations of Europe are invited to join and which shall be empowered to take immediately enforceable decisions, by a majority vote, in strictly defined spheres.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 114, 115). The appeal was supported by Léon Blum (SFIO), Robert Bichet (MRO), Edouard Bonnefous (UDSR), Robert Buron (MRP), Coste-Floret (MRP), René Coty (CNIP), Gaston Defere (SFIO), Henry Frenay, Giscard d’Estaing (CNIP), Pierre Oliver Lapie (SFIO), Alexandre Marc, Guy Mollet (SFIO), André Philip (SFIO), Paul Ramadier (SFIO), Paul Reynaud, and Teitgen (MRP).

226 Derived from CED (Communauté Européen de Défense).

227 In fact, Phillip is reputed to have said to De Gaulle in one of their first meetings in 1942 already, “General, as soon as the war is won I shall part company with you. You are fighting to restore national greatness; I am fighting to build a socialist and democratic Europe” (quoted in Lipgens 1984a, 273). De Gaulle publicly accused the ‘cedistes’ in February 1953 of pursuing a “plan élaboré en cachette, intérêts financiers qui dépassent les frontières, influence américaine, hégémonie du ‘Reich’” (Vayssière 2007, 319).

228 Own translation from “[...] le loyalisme congénital de ses sujets, pour avoir une politique qui lui soit propre et pour que, le cas échéant, des millions d’hommes veillent mourir pour elle.” (Quoted in Belot 2003, 437).
Serre called on the ‘sane elements’ of the *Assemblée Nationale* and decried the ‘definitive renunciation of the whole national will’ that the EDC entailed. Paradoxically, the Communist PCF steered the same course and, employing a different vocabulary, argued that “the love of national independence” was now key for preventing “nations from becoming an easy prey for monopoly capitalism.” (Quoted in Lipgens and Loth 1988, 102).

Against the front of Gaullists and Communists, it was only the Christian Democratic MRP that was relatively united: MRP deputies by and large espoused essentially similar principles as advocated in transnational circles. Far from denouncing national values per se, key representatives such as Teitgen, Schuman, Coste-Floret or Bidault defended the European Army project in terms of French values. Consistent with the reasoning put forth by transnational Christian Democracy, the Soviet Union simply constituted the bigger and more existential threat than Germany (Müller-Härlin 2008, 94). While the leadership of the MRP was thus relatively close – both in terms of their ideological commitments as well as their transnational activities – to transnational Christian Democracy and the transnational coalition, the rank-and-file of MRP deputies was less enthusiastic. Thus, the MRP had never been able to officially become a member of the NEI, sending individual deputies to its meetings instead (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 31). These divisions were, however, relatively minor compared to other parties within the ‘third force’.

The French Social Democrats (SFIO), on the other hand, mirrored the internal divide indicated in the previous chapters. Although the SFIO was traditionally a party that would impose significant sanctions against deputies breaking party discipline, this was insufficient to keep the party united over the EDC. The motivations behind this split were multiple: some sought to retain the French army, some sought to prevent a German army through European institutions, whereas others were principled

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229 “les éléments sains” and “le renoncement définitive de toute volonté nationale” (Quoted in Müller-Härlin 2008, 76).

230 As Teitgen put it in the *Assemblée Nationale* “La France […] c’est quelque chose qu’elle a dans le sang qui est plus que sa fierté et quelquefois son cavalerie; c’est quelque chose qui est sa mission, sa vocation, son destin et son devoir, et qu’elle doit accomplir, même quand elle ne veut pas, si elle tient à rester elle-même” (Müller-Härlin 2008, 88). The same logic was employed by Bidault “il nous reste assez de moyens intellectuels et techniques pour tenir notre place, au premier rang d’une communauté européenne, elle-même intégrée dans la communauté atlantique.” (Müller-Härlin 2008, 89).
The two most influential factions consisted of principled opponents of German rearmament, who were largely remote from Europeanist organizations (i.e. Jules Moch, Salomon Grumbach, Vincent Auriol) and insisted on probing the issue of neutrality before approving of German rearmament (Loth 1977, 285). Others, such as André Philip and Guy Mollet, were engaged in or sympathetic to the transnational Europeanist activities, accepted German armament as a necessary evil and heavily insisted on proper democratic control of the new military entity but were split on the issue whether co-binding was sufficient (Philip) or whether British participation was necessary (Mollet) (Orlow 2000, 75). As a consequence, the EDC issue was the most divisive for the SFIO throughout the Fourth Republic (Featherstone 1988, 115). As the required majority within the Assemblée Nationale depended on Socialist votes, the breakdown of party discipline on August 30th 1954 – despite the widely issued threat of expulsion – sealed the fate of the EDC Treaty in the French Chamber.

The Radical Party experienced a similar internal divide: its deputies included eventual Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France, who would ‘oversee’ the rejection of the EDC in mid-1954 as well as such prominent ‘cedistes’ such as Edgar Faure (member of the European Parliamentary Union) or René Mayer (European Movement), who both had their own short stints as Prime Ministers. As Maurice Faure put it later, there simply was no coherent radical doctrine on European institutions. Many rad-

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231 As Gérard Jaquet explained it, “certains étaient contre la CED, parce qu'ils ne voulaient pas de réarmement allemand du tout. D'autres étaient contre la CED, parce qu'ils ne voulaient pas la disparition de l'armée française. Et puis il y avait ceux qui cherchaient une troisième voie, et qui disaient: "Il faut un réarmement allemand mais sous la forme d'une armée européenne intégrée ! Ce serait moins dangereux et plus efficace". En même temps, nous disions: "Si on crée une armée européenne, nous faisons un grand pas dans la voie de l'unification de l'Europe, car le jour où on aura une armée européenne, on aura forcément un pouvoir politique". Il n'y a pas d'armée sans pouvoir politique. Donc on aura franchi une étape. Voilà les raisons qui nous poussaient dans la voie de l'armée européenne, et à ceux qui nous disaient: “Pas de réarmement allemand, car nous ne voulons pas d'armée allemande sous quelque forme que ce soit”, nous répondions: “Mais si on ne fait pas l'armée européenne, vous aurez l'armée allemande. Et le groupe socialiste, la dessus, s'est divise, le parti socialiste dans sa majorité a pris position en faveur de la CED. J'ai même été le rapporteur de la motion en faveur de la CED au congrès du parti, mais le groupe parlementaire s'est divise par moitié.” (Jaquet 1997).

232 Faure was the last Prime Minister of the ‘third force’, a coalition of MRP, Radicals and Socialists, under whose auspices the ECSC was ratified. René Mayer’s government in 1953 was the last under which Schuman served as Foreign Minister. Other prominent cedistes included Maurice Faure (European Movement) and Edouard Herriot (European Movement) (O'Neill 1981, 55).

233 As Maurice Faure put it in an interview in 1987, “Alors, pour ce qui est des Radicaux, je vous répondrai en disant qu’effectivement ils étaient tellement divises qu’il est impossible de dire quel était la doctrine du Radicalisme.” (Faure 1987).
ical deputies who had supported the ECSC Treaty were opponents of the EDC because it would destroy a symbol of national identification, i.e. the French Army.\textsuperscript{234}

As a result of the key parties of the ‘Third Force’ being divided internally, the EDC rested on a shaky foundation in the French Assemblée Nationale. With the Gaullist and Communist Deputies opposed to the Treaty, transnational conflict over European institutions was amplified domestically by weak French domestic institutions and the political context of the Fourth Republic. Thus, domestic conditions provided fertile ground for the transnational conflict to impact French politics and thus produce highly contradictory and conflicting institutional demands. As the subsequent pages will show, the domestic divisions and the frequent changes in the French governing coalition contributed the absence of coherent French motives, goals, and bargaining strategies parties on the EDC Treaty and provided the main source of strategic uncertainty for the remaining negotiating partners.

\textbf{Italy}

Italian political conflict, as mentioned was characterized largely by the early dominance of the Christian Democratic DC. The revolt against Mussolini in 1943 had produced near civil war conditions and, after the liberation of the middle and the north of the country, US military governments oversaw its reconstruction. Upon the conclusion of the peace treaty with the Allies in 1947, the new Italian constitution was passed in 1947, after a referendum held in 1946, favoring a republic (54.3\%) over a monarchy (46.7\%) (Woller 2010, 221). The first post-war elections then gave the DC almost 48\% of the vote (Woller 2010, 239). The early post-war coalitions were composed of the DC, the republican PRI, the liberal PLI and the moderate Social Democrats (PSDI). A second key characteristic was the presence of a permanent and sizable leftist opposition composed of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the

\textsuperscript{234} As Maurice Faure put it in an interview in 1987, “Parce qu'il y avait beaucoup de gens qui s'étaient prononcés contre la Communauté Européenne de Défense, mais qui dans leur esprit ne s'étaient pas du tout prononcés contre l'Europe. Ils trouvaient que la Communauté Européenne de Défense arrivait trop tôt; que ce serait difficile à vendre à l'opinion publique; que probablement elle n'irait plus à la cause de l'unité de l'Europe, précisément par sa précipitation, par son ambition excessive; qu'elle devait être le bout de la route et pas la première étape, comme je viens de le dire. Par exemple, beaucoup de gens qui avaient voté la ratification de la CECA, en disant que c'est une bonne direction, mais il faut aller dans cette voie, mais il faut y aller en montant les marches de l'escalier une aune.” (Faure 1987).
left wing Social Democrats (PSI) led by Pietro Nenni as well as a significant right wing represented by the MSI – a collection of monarchists and former members of the fascist party. Both sides were strongholds of neutralism, the left especially had protested against Italy joining the Atlantic Treaty in 1949 (Magagnoli 1999, 36). Left Socialist leader Nenni argued forcefully that neutrality was a better option to ensure security for Italy from the Soviet Union.235

The left wing of the DC had similar proponents (Varsori 1992, 266; Masala 2001, 353). Forming around the Christian Democratic leader Guiseppe Dossetti who had close ties to the Christian unions, this faction was highly critical of the Atlanticist direction of De Gasperi’s foreign policy (Masala 1996, 148). Given the opposition from the left and the right, Italian membership in NATO was by no means preordained, passing the Italian Chamber by only a slim margin (Mistry 2014, 143). This disagreement existed right within the DC: for the neutralists, the conflict between Italy and Yugoslavia over Trieste was a particularly incendiary issue: the less the US and the UK supported Italian positions, the more vocal the right became in its criticism (Varsori 1992, 267).

De Gasperi and the federalist figures around him like Benvenuti, Giachero, Domenedo, Bastianetto, and Cingolani were associated with ‘centrismo’, the centrist stance within the DC, that was, from the beginning, a stronghold of federalist deputies in Italy (Preda 2008, 316). Thus, De Gasperi led the Italian delegation at one of the first congresses of the European Federalists in Aachen in 1948 (Masala 2001, 363). When the Italian section of the EPU joined the Italian federalists (MFE), one estimate of an eyewitness estimates that there were around 250 federalists in the Italian second chamber, 190 of these being associated with the Christian Democrats. The Italian federalists thus had a very strong influence among the DC as well as the Re-

235 Pietro Nenni asked in November 1948, “What is the European union of which Churchill and De Gasperi speak, and, alas, Léon Blum as well? It means German leadership of Europe. That is the object of American policy in Europe: to make Germany the arsenal and bridgehead of tomorrow’s war.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 215; 1990, 215). Opposition of joining the Brussels pact even, “we shall be isolated […] on the day when we join the Brussels pact, the Atlantic or the Mediterranean pact, or the European Union. We shall be thoroughly isolated, whereas now we still have a certain freedom of maneuver” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 217; 1990, 215), and “I believe that the history of the Soviet Union in the last thirty years teaches us that provided Italy does not turn her territory into a base of cooperation for other powers, he ports into safe shelters for Anglo-American navies and her airfields into launching grounds for attacks against the East we need have no fear of a Russian attack.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 218; 1990, 215).
publicans and Liberals. Their program closely resembled that of the transnational federalists: the parliamentary group of the EPU issued a statement in 1948 “The time has come for the nations of Europe to transfer part of their sovereign rights to be exercised in common […].” It called for the immediate creation of “a European assembly” (Lippens and Loth 1988, 203).

While the Italian federalists under Spinelli were among the most vocal in the transnational sphere for principled reasons, De Gasperi and many among the centrist DC subscribed to federalist principles in a more opportunistic fashion as an institutional tool to ensure Italian influence and recognition. The primary reference for the Italian governments and its representatives remained Italian interests. Figures such as the eventual leader of the Italian EDC delegation Benvenuti thus espoused federalist principles because they presented a way to avoid the isolation of the country. The primary justification for the application was that they furthered the influence of the Italian government and the county.

The ‘federalism’ of the Italian government thus constituted a means to an end and it was not universally shared: a significant number doubted the continental course and kept insisting on the Atlantic link as vital (Ellwood 1995, 43). Instrumental federalism implied that the key decisions by the Italian government related to the EDC bargain were associated with conflict. Thus, in December 1951, only Ugo La Malfa was unequivocally supportive of De Gasperi’s course in the Italian Cabinet and De Gasperi had to threaten that he would declare in Strasbourg that he was speaking personally and not in the same of the Italian government to discipline his colleagues (Magagnoli 1999, 111). As in most countries, the primary opposition to the EDC

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236 In 1999, Enzo Giacchero recalled the Italian Federalists as an influential group primarily among the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, and the Republicans, “Il Gruppo era visto favorevolmente, senz’altro. Difatti la maggior parte di quei 250 erano democristiani, perché soprattutto dopo il ’48, noi democristiani avevamo 300 deputati, mentre gli altri, i repubblicani e i liberali, tutti insieme avranno fatto 60-70 deputati, no di pili. Quindi, di quei 250, erano quasi... 180, 190 erano democristiani” (Giacchero 1999).

237 Benvenuti thought at the time that “[…] daß Italien allein einem Evolutionsprozeß, der sich auf allgemeiner Linie abzeichnet, kaum widerstehen kann” und “daß die Stellung eines isolierten Italiens ungünstiger als die eines an einem einheitlichen europäischen Organismus teilnehmenden Italiens (wäre)” (Magagnoli 1998, 31).

238 As Malagodi, a high ranking Italian representative at the OEEC, expressed it in August 1951, “Schließlich ist zu berücksichtigen […], daß besonders für ein armes, aber bevölkerungsreiches Land wie das unsere die Möglichkeit einer sich proportional zu seiner Bevölkerung vollziehenden Teilnahme an einer gewählten und direkt verantwortlichen Versammlung ein wesentliches Korrektiv zur Schwäche darstellt, die durch den Mangel an wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen verursacht wird.” (Magagnoli 1998, 30).
within the government came from the Ministry of Defense (Pacciardi) and the general staff (Marras) (Magagnoli 1999, 131).

As a result, although federalism was most influential in Italian domestic politics, it was by no means hegemonic. Federalist deputies formed a sizable and influential portion of the Italian Camera dei Deputati, but there was opposition to their central course both from the left and the right, within the DC as well as from other parties. In the same vein as in France, the differences concerned ideological divisions over the proper course of Italian foreign policy were significant and led to conflicts within the dominant DC. As a result, there were conflicting domestic demands regarding the institutional setup of the alliance and the role of Italy therein. Although the extend of domestic divisions – and in particular within the DC – was not as extreme as in France but led to similar internal divisions within the Italian government and the Foreign Ministry, as shown below.

**Germany**

In line with Germany’s precarious geopolitical position, European ‘unity’ was a rhetorical cross-party consensus in the post-war years (Müller-Härlin 2008, 197). Moreover, the German Council of the European Movement was well embedded among the parliamentarians, constituting a distinct parliamentary group that reflected the cross-party membership of the transnational organization. Its members included, *inter alia*, von Brentano and Schmid, Erler, and Adenauer (Stillemunkes 1988, 450). The Europa-Union, the German section of the UEF, had held its inaugural meeting on May 20th 1949, attendees having included Adenauer, Karl Arnold (CDU), Max Brauer (SPD), and Eugen Kogon (Stillemunkes 1988, 454). As in other countries, the German Council of the European Movement had initiated a resolution in October 1949 that recommended German delegates to be send to the Consultative Assembly since the “strengthening of the potential European parliament against the authority of individual sovereign states is extremely welcome.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 535).

Despite the cross-party composition of these groups, however, the design of European institutions was not a cross-party consensus and quickly became a relatively well-structured conflict between government and opposition. The leadership of the two principal parties in post-war Germany, the CDU/ CSU and the SPD, had acquired a dominant role in formulating the official party lines respectively: both Konrad Aden-
auer and Kurt Schumacher were capable of effectively disciplining renegade party members that were close to diverging from the official party position and did so on a number of occasions.

Adenauer had taken part in the congress at The Hague, was an early regular the meetings of the Geneva Circle, later attended the yearly NEI congresses, remained in regular close and personal contact with the transnational coalition emerging around Paul-Henri Spaak and Robert Schuman (e.g. Schwarz 1982, 558, 560; Adenauer 1984, 337, 998). Ideologically, his stance followed the mainstream assumptions of post-war transnational Christian Democracy: European integration and supranational institutions were a necessary response to the emerging Bolshevist threat (Schwarz 1979, 475). In Germany, the handling of external relations was dominated by Adenauer who took over the formal responsibilities of the chancellorship as well as the Foreign Ministry from 1949 until 1955 when he relinquished the post to Brentano. He had managed to appoint trusted figures in key positions who shared basic ideological convictions such as Blankenhorn, Blank, Hallstein, and Brentano. In the early years, he would exert considerable influence especially over external and defense policies and the selection of personnel (Knoll 2013, 80). Moreover, the Ministry of Defense ‘in nuce’ – the Amt Blank – was formally a part of the Kanzleramt as well. Thus Adenauer personally controlled hierarchically all aspects of German post-war Foreign and Defense Policy. As the leadership of the German government went largely unchanged throughout the 1950’s, the embeddedness of the German government, in particular the close connections to the Christian Democratic community and, via Brentano in particular, to the transnational coalition should be noted (see previous chapter). Adenauer’s dominance in particular led to repeated complaints from the Bundestagsfraktion over a lack of involvement in the formulation of German bargaining strategies and positions (e.g. Baring, et al. 1974, 412). Leadership continuity implied that the German government pursued a consistent set of objectives that was heavily shaped by a similar set of values and beliefs that the German Christian Democrats had advocated in transnational Christian Democracy. This preference, however, had to strategically contend with domestic criticism as well as international developments.

Kurt Schumacher, on the other hand, was remote from any transnational Europeanist aspiration. Firmly embracing a confrontational curse to the ‘conservative, capitalist, clerical’ undertaking of European integration, he emphasized national unity, inter-
governmental reconciliation and equality between nations as a precondition of his internationalism (Sassoon 1996, 168, 212). Thus, under his leadership, the SPD refrained from sending delegates to The Hague congress and even abstained from participating in the Ad Hoc Assembly.\textsuperscript{239}

Opposition to the leadership course existed within both parties, and both leaders had to exert their power. A sizable part of the old German military elite, including figures such as Guderian and Manteuffel, now in the FDP, would emerge as vocally critical of supranational designs and the EDC, suspecting that German soldiers would be ‘second class cannon fodder’ under Allied control (Large 1996, 104). Criticism from the left struck similar tones (See Der Spiegel 1951). In the CDU, a prominent source was directed against the radical West-integration pursued by Adenauer. Thus, Jakob Kaiser, Federal Minister of All-German Affairs and a leading proponent of the left wing of the CDU, repeatedly accused Adenauer of ‘abandoning’ Germans both in the Saarland and the East and, in pursuing the creation of a European Army, foreclosing available alternatives of neutrality and reunification that opened, for example, with the Stalin Note of March 1952 (Elzer 2008, 923, 924). Adenauer successfully ousted him from transnational activities, challenged him if his rhetoric endangered the government course or weakened its positions.\textsuperscript{240} Other opponents within the party at times centered on the principle of rearmament itself, such the Protestant leader Gustav Heinemann who left the government once rearmament was on the agenda and organized public demonstrations leading to a serious rupture with Adenauer.\textsuperscript{241}


\textsuperscript{240} Adenauer wrote in a letter to Kaiser on November 3\textsuperscript{rd} 1952, “[…] Dass ich sie bitten muss, keine selbstständige Politik dort zu betreiben oder betreiben zu lassen” and asked angrily for clarification whether Kaiser had said the words - reported by RIAS that “die Saar ist so deutsch wie Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt und Thüringen.” He concluded on January 8\textsuperscript{th} 1953, “Die Bemühungen ihrer Herren haben nicht nur keinen Erfolg gehabt, sie haben im Gegenteil geschadet.” (Adenauer 1987, 293, 303, 316).

\textsuperscript{241} Adenauer complained in the \textit{Kabinett} on October 17\textsuperscript{th} 1950, “Was mir aber am meisten Kummer macht, ist Niemöller und Heinemann. Ich muß Ihnen sagen, Herr Niemöller ist entweder geisteskrank oder aber, meine Herren, er ist ein Rückversicherer. Und das letztere wird sehr ernst behauptet. Was Herr Niemöller sich jetzt geleistet hat, das ist nackter Landesverrat und weiter nichts. Und wenn wir ein irgendwie gefestigtes Staatswesen hätten, gehörte er eigentlich hinter Schloß und Riegel.” (104. Kabinettssitzung am Dienstag, den 17. Oktober 1950 http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0000/k/k1950k/kap1_3/para2_2.html)
cism from other quarters was less virulent, and if it did surface, rarely challenged the official party line on the EDC. Members of the FDP, such as Blücher, vehemently emphasized the issue of institutional equality, rather than challenging the supranational principle per se (Large 1996, 55). Within the CDU/CSU institutional equality was a precondition for the abrogation of sovereignty. The felt threat from the Soviet Union thus overshadowed any ambition for reunification. With outbreak of the Korean War, by and large, the main question within the government focused on the principle of equality but did not question the overall course steered by Adenauer (Large 1996, 78).

The SPD, on the other side of the political aisle, challenged Adenauer’s course heavily. The nationalist tone struck by Schumacher – as described in chapter 6 – included criticizing Adenauer as ‘Kanzler der Alliierten’: the overall position of the SPD was to seek reunification and explore the possibility of a neutral and disarmed Germany, a strategy that had several critics within the party and that backfired on election day in 1953 (Orlow 2000, 73). The SPD accordingly opposed the ECSC and the EDC Treaty in the Bundestag. Overall, Schumacher and the SPD leadership questioned the principle of supranationality as well as the course of ‘Westbindung’. The key

242 Adenauer wrote in a letter to Blücher on September 24th 1952, complaining that Blücher had criticized publicly the small Europe solution, argued for economic contacts with the UK and Scandinavia, and wanted to hold this position at the FDP party congress. Adenauer was displeased and demanded clarification “aus einer derartigen Änderung ihrer politischen Haltung [würden sich] sehr bedenkliche folgen ergeben […] Sie zu bitten umgehend […] Stellung zu nehmen.” (Adenauer 1987, 278, 279). Adenauer was quick to reprimand nationalist rhetorical lapses.

243 A FDP resolution from March 1950 demonstrates the opportunistic element in ‘Europeanist’ reasoning in post-war Europe. It stipulated, “The continued existence and development of the Western way of life calls for the economic and political unity of Europe. […] The vitality of united Europe will depend on the enthusiasm with which the federal system is upheld. The sooner the principle of equal rights and mutuality are applied to the Germans also, the sooner will Germany be a dependable member of the European order. In a true federation there is no room for under-privileged nations.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 535, 536; 1990, 215).

244 Thus, Liberals such as Becker feared a “Vorstoß der Völkerchaften des asiatischen Raumes” (Müller-Härlin 2008, 190), conservatives such as Albers (CDU/ CSU) demanded that “Europa muss jetzt geschaffen werden, damit es ein Schutzwall für Freiheit und Menschenrechte sein kann” (Müller-Härlin 2008, 192) whereas Gerstenmeier (CDU) doubted “ob dem einheitlich organisierten […] kommunistischen Russland und Asien ein Haufen europäischer Nationalstaaten gegenüberliegen wird, die sich untereinander in häuslichen Fehden […] bekriegen.” (Müller-Härlin 2008, 192).

245 As Franz Josef Strauss put it in a speech in 1954, “Wir sind zu den schwersten Konzessionen bereit” (Quoted in Der Spiegel 1954a).

246 As Schumacher put it at an SPD congress in Hamburg in May 22nd 1950, “Charlemagne’s empire had an Eastern frontier, which was geographically very close to the present Iron Curtain. And we declare here and now that we shall fight this particular idea with the utmost determination for it implies recognition of the partition of Germany and would signify, moreover, that Germany herself desired and accepted that partition.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 537; 1990, 215).
opposition within the SPD to this course came from SPD members close to the transnational coalition which had independent power bases in the Länder, i.e. Wilhelm Kaisen of Bremen, Max Brauer of Hamburg, and Ernst Reuter of Berlin (Orlow 2000, 71). Others, in particular Carlo Schmid – elected vice-president of the Europa-Union in 1949 – lacked an independent power base. Schmid kept his differences with Schumacher to himself out of loyalty, but suffered accordingly (Weber 1996, 456). Those who publicly opposed Schumacher were disciplined: Brauer was effectively barred from the SPD Präsidium, and Wilhelm Kaisen was removed in 1950.

In sum, the interpretations of the implications of the West-German geostrategic position differed widely between left and right. For the governing coalition, rearmament was seen as a necessary counterweight for the Soviet threat and the principle of supranationality – provided that equality was assured – a key component of European unity (Müller-Härlin 2008, 165). As a result, the debate between the government and the opposition was cast by Adenauer and members of the CDU as an explicit decision for or against Europe. The criticism from the SPD largely sought to portray itself as for European integration but against a supranational army. A second dominant theme was the lacking democratic quality of the new institutions. As a result, the protracted ratification conflicts surrounding the EDC Treaty were a partisan affair, including the SPD fraction calling on the Bundesverfassungsgericht. Party

247 At the same congress, on May 22nd 1950, Max Brauer challenged Schumacher, stating explicitly in his speech that “I take a different view from comrade Schumacher. In my opinion, the decision against going to Strasbourg is mistaken and is a positive disaster […]” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 543; 1990, 215). Reporting to the German Council of the European Movement, on March 6th 1949, he called for the “260 million inhabitants of the new union of all European states, all of which should bring in, and I hope will bring in, their economic resources into this new supernational structure. […] We delegates now have the task, each in his country, to spread and popularize this common knowledge.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 523; 1990, 215). Max Brauer in the same speech equally expressed the idea of equality as it would benefit the national interest “Certainly, no leading role will devolve on the Germans in this movement. But we can, and we ought to, be a member on equal terms of this new community promoting the creation of a United Europe […]” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 524; 1990, 215).


discipline here held in the Bundestag and in the Bundesrat, with the exception of SPD Berlin under Reuter that voted for the EDC Treaty (Volkmann 1990, 393).

**Belgium**

In the case of Belgium, domestic conflict was equally a more structured affair, although intra-party divisions were prevalent among the Social Democrats. The main conduit by which the transnational conflict influenced Belgian politics was the Belgian Council of the Movement, founded in 1949 (Bott 1988, 277). As was the case with the European Movement in general, its participants subscribed to very different ideologies, and came from the whole Belgian political spectrum.\(^{251}\) The internal Belgian conflicts between the Flemish and the Walloons equally translated into divisions among the Belgian federalists and prevented the early foundation of a united Belgian faction in the federalist movement and particularly the UEF as frequent infighting between the Walloon and Flemish groups hampered cooperation (Bott 1988, 272). Genuinely federalist pressure groups were thus rather weak in Belgium.\(^{252}\)

As in Germany, the key difference for the formulated demands and domestic conflicts over the EDC between the two major Belgian political forces – the PSC-CSV and the BSP-PSB – was the role of the party leadership within the transnational Europeanist organizations. For the Christian Democrats, the party leadership, in particular the Christian Democratic Prime Ministers throughout the time were largely absent from transnational circles.\(^{253}\) The Christian Democratic Foreign Minister between 1950 and 1954 was Paul van Zeeland, who had been an influential figure in the foundation of the ELEC and, as described in the previous chapter, was a primary

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\(^{251}\) Some of the most prominent members included Christian Democratic Foreign Minister Paul Van Zeeland, Social Democratic leader Paul-Henri Spaak, Etienne de la Vallée Poussin (PSC-CVP), Willy De Clercq (PSC-CVP) et Charles Ferdinand Nothomb (PSC-CVP) as well as Jean Rey (LP-PL), Georges Bohy (BSP-PSB), Désirée Lamalle (PSC-CVP), abd Raymond Rifflet (BSP-PSB).

\(^{252}\) As the journalist Ram Linssen defended the personalist doctrine “European unity based on a federal and a democratic basis.” In the personalist view, according to him “Federalism has two characteristics: decentralization and freedom” […].” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 307, 308; 1990, 215).

\(^{253}\) The Christian Democratic PSC-CVP dominated the Belgian Chamber of Representatives between 1950 until the elections in 1954, disposing of the governing majority in parliament and relying on a sufficiently strong party apparatus to keep the differences between Walloon and Flemish Christian Democrats in check. At the same time, the four years saw three different Prime Ministers, none of which was engaged in the transnational networks: Jean Duvieusart who fell over the royal question in 1950 and was expelled by the party; Joseph Pholien who had to resign over internal party struggles over economic and education policy; and Jean Van Houtte who stayed on as Prime Minister until his party lost the election in 1954.
advocate of the functionalist model, skeptical towards the extension of supranationality towards security issues. Leadership of the Social Democratic (BSP-PSB) was occupied by Paul Henri Spaak and Fernand Dehousse, both having played a leading role within the transnational coalition pushing for the EDC and EPC Treaties, as described in chapter 6. While the Christian Democratic CSV did not experience severe internal conflicts, the issue was very different for the Social Democrats.

The PSC-CVP was well represented in the transnational Christian Democratic network. Its representatives had espoused distinct Benelux positions by intensely promoting supranationalist principles in the economic sphere, but only reluctantly accepted similar solutions for the EDC. Thus, for Vallée Poussin, supranationalism did “not mean doing away with nations or imposing a uniformity which would be contrary to the genius and diversity of each […]” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 316). As was typical of both Belgian and Dutch representatives, economic unification was the “rallying cry” of the PSC-CVP (Bott 1988, 271). Thus, Belgian Christian Democrats shared the general diagnosis, expressed by Vallée Poussin in the Belgian parliament, that “nationalism is everywhere a far more active force than reason, which warns us of the imperious necessity of creating Europe on a supranational scale […]” However, supranationalism did “not mean doing away with nations or imposing a uniformity which would be contrary to the genius and diversity of each” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 316). Similarly, for Paul van Zeeland, as a representative of the ELEC, the primary political objective in post-war Belgium was to find “a way to remodel and prepare the Belgian economy to save it from decline” (Dujardin and Dumoulin 2008, 195). In sum, virtually none of the Belgian Christian Democratic leadership espoused radical federalist principles in the security sphere: the proposition of pooling sovereignty with the larger continental states in this era was met with heavy skepticism (Coolsaet 2002, 104). As a result, the imposition of party discipline during the vote on the EDC Treaty weighted heavy on those who were skeptical towards the EDC Treaty. For Belgian Christian Democratic Deputy Frans Van Cauwelaert, voting ‘yes’ was an act that came close to ‘death within the soul’.255 The skepticism that was widespread in many quarters was shared by NEI representative Désirée Lamalle

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254 As shown earlier, core figures included Jules Soyeur (first General Secretary of the NEI), August de Schryver, Theo Lefèvre and by Etiénne de la Vallée Poussin, all representatives to the Geneva Circle.

255 “la mort dans l’âme” (quoted in Dumoulin 1987, 30).
who denounced the EDC/ EPC treaties in the Belgian chamber as ‘a destruction of national institutions’, in particular referring to the Belgian king, whose prerogative it was to appoint Belgian officers. Some of the Belgian delegates from the Geneva Circle or the NEI, such as Bernard Snoy et d’Oppuert and Auguste Schryver, put forth a more proactive wording, though hardly glittered with enthusiasm (Dumoulin 1987, 27).

The Social Democratic PSB however suffered from the same internal division as transnational Social Democracy did in general (Bott 1988, 280). A significant proportion of the party leadership with no ties to the Europeanist transnational organizations tended to agree with the reasoning of their British and Scandinavian comrades, opposing the surrender of sovereignty in particular in the field of defence. These included Henri Rolin, Endouard Anseele of Ghent, Achille van Acker, and Max Buset (Mommens and Minten 1993, 142). Their position was similar to the criticism that the European Integration project had received in the Socialist International: they vehemently opposed any German rearmament, seemed to prefer German neutrality and insisted on insisted on UK participation in the institutions and thus essentially on razing the treaty from its supranational elements, while, at the same time citing the lack of democratic control as a reason for rejection (Coolsaet 1988, 147; Featherstone 1988, 25; Mommens and Minten 1993, 149). The leadership under Spaak and Dehousse, however, advocated much more expansive designs in terms of the proposed centralization very early on (Mommens and Minten 1993, 142). The Belgian section of the MSEUE was even more radical. While Spaak had still

256 “la destruction des institutions nationales, de la vie nationale, de l’esprit national belge” (Dumoulin 1987, 29).
257 Max Buset wrote in 1949 that the “amiable visionaries who have already drawn up a written constitution for a superstate that does not exist and will not come into being for a long time are scarcely performing a service to the European peoples by offering them utopian dreams.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 320). Buset preferred a limited functionalism, “What we need are not utopian mergers and visionary federations, but an international synthesis of interlocking interests, a progressive unification closely linked to certain very precise objectives: the adjustment of customs duties, the coordination of transport, the joint development of resource and especially motive power, the planning of production and distribution, investment control […]. These are huge, vital, and pressing tasks and the socialist parties are certainly entitled to demand that they should have priority on the Council’s agenda.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 326).
258 Thus, Victor Larock stated in 1950 that “the political situation in the different countries is not stable enough for an extra-national institution to acquire the necessary authority in a short time.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 325).
259 Its main position was that “there can be no European federation until state sovereignty is done with.” The pamphlet further elaborated that “the most urgent task is to create a federal European state which will safeguard basic human rights and make no concessions to totalitarianism.” For these pur-
steered a course typical of the pro-European Socialist faction by seeking UK membership, he completely cast his lot on the supranational coalition by 1951 (see previous chapter). In a meeting with Eisenhower, he made unusually strong criticism of the behavior of the Belgian Christian Democratic government, calling Van Zeeland’s position was “week and inefficient” (FRUS 1951 III-b, 409). He continued by stating that,

“Europeans have no confidence in their national military establishments and hence our present effort should present objective not as rebuilding individual French, Belgian, German or Italian defense establishments but as new concept of united and fully integrated defense force for preservation West community.” (FRUS 1951 III-b, 409).

In addition, there were significant signs of internal divisions during the built-up of the ratification procedure. In November 1953, a Socialist BSP-PSB congress revealed similar demands that the French Socialists would insist on: British participation in the European Army, democratic control through the institutions of the EPC. During that congress, the decision to vote for ratification of the treaty received as 451 votes yes, 281 no, with 47 abstentions (Dumoulin 1999, 460). Motions put forth by Henry Rolin and Anseele considering the imposition of party discipline to vote against the treaty were rejected whereas Spaak’s motion, coupled with a threat to leave the party, convinced rank and file members that the ratification vote should be open (Mommens and Minten 1993, 153). The 77 delegates of the Socialist BSP-PSB split over the EDC vote, registering 47 positive votes, 29 negatives and one abstention (De Vos 1987, 113; Haas 2004 [1958], 156).

The skepticism of the Belgian Christian Democrats was overcome, as the subsequent pages will show, by a combination of Christian Democratic conviction and US conditionality. The Christian Democratic PSC-CVP, having held the majority of seats in the Chamber of Representatives between 1950 and 1954, had to live with 10 negative votes and one abstention while mustering the remaining 97 votes in favor of the

pose, the pamphlet stated that it was necessary to “win over […] not only the different socialist parties but also trade unions, cooperatives, Christian Democrats and federalists of all kinds” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 328, 329).

260 Recommending acceptance “[…] a la condition que le Gouvernement s’engage: 1) a fournir à la Chambre toutes assurances quant à l’association de la Grande-Bretagne avec la CED ; 2) a proposer immédiatement aux gouvernements cosignataires que les modalités fondamentales de la Communauté Politique soient convenus entre les six gouvernements dans le sens d’un contrôle démocratique avant que le traité de la CED ne soit mis en vigueur ; 3) à prendre aussitôt que possible, une initiative résolue auprès de nos allies pour la négociation ‘un pacte de non-agression et de sécurité mutuelle entre les Etats occidentaux et l’URSS’” (Dumoulin 1999, 459, 460).
Treaty despite a traditionally strong party discipline. The Belgian Liberals saw minor objections during the vote as 14 representatives voted for the treaty, four against, and one abstained. Belgium was among the first to formally ratify the treaty (De Vos 1987, 113; Haas 2004 [1958], 156).

**Netherlands**

In line with the consociational character of Dutch institutions, the degree of open domestic conflict over the EDC in the Netherlands was relatively narrow although the basic pattern of conflict fits into the general pattern. The domestic conduits of transnational influence were as well connected as in the other countries under consideration. The Dutch section of the UEF - the “Europeesche Actie” - was established in 1947 under founding president Henri Brugmans; the Dutch Council of the European Union, established in 1948, was composed of assorted members from virtually all parties present in the Dutch Tweede Kammer (Heinen 1988, 350). During the early days of the European Movement (April 1948), it introduced a motion calling for a “permanent association” of states which should

“[…] be realized by means of various functional institutions, wherein, so far as may be possible and desirable, authority should be conferred on supranational bodies, especially in monetary, economic and social fields and in that of defence.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 390).

It added that it required “a European Assembly making possible international supervision at a parliamentary level” (Ibid. 403). The motion was accepted, receiving negative votes only from the Communists.\(^{261}\)

The main ideological influence in the Netherlands was not the personalist federalist radicalism of Henri Brugmans.\(^ {262}\) Rather, there was a dominant cross-party consensus on the need for economic integration and thus the need for efficient institutions to achieve these aims. Thus, Dutch actors from very disparate political backgrounds

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\(^{261}\) The most influential figures in the Dutch Council of the European Union represented multiple ideological influences: ELEC members such as Zijlstra (ARP), Kerstens (KVP), Beyen (no party affiliation) and Monnet associate Kohnstamm (no party affiliation); Socialists such as Van der Goes van Naters, Mansholt and Ruygers (PvdA); Christian Democrats such as Serrarens, Sassens and Romme (KVP); and liberals and conservatives such as H.A. Korthals (VVD), Bruins Slot (ARP), and J.R. Schmal (CHU) (Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 71).

\(^{262}\) Thus, motion introduced by the “Europeesche Actie” to support the federal pact initiative of the UEF in 1949, did not pass the parliamentary vote in 1949 (Heinen 1988, 351).
proposed a series of plans aimed at economic integration of the continent, *inter alia* the Stikker Plan, the Mansholt Plan, and the Beyen Plan of 1952. Moreover, the heavy emphasis on economic integration equally implied a much more dominant functionalist tone. As a result, while matters of economic integration were largely a consensus matter, the atmosphere was more divisive with regard to the EDC although the conflict was by no means as intense and open as they were in France.\(^{263}\)

Internal conflicts existed nevertheless. Within the Social Democratic PvdA, the main representatives of transnational Europeanist influence were Marinus van der Goes van Naters and Rygers (Federalist Socialist Community). Their institutional demands called for a more functionalist version of federalists positions, more in line with the decentralized ‘personalist’ version of federalism as advocated by Henri Brugmans (Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 125).\(^{264}\) Van Naters was Chairman of the PvdA party group in the *Tweede Kammer* from 1945 until 1951 when Socialist Prime Minister Willem drees forced Van Naters to resign due to a fallout ignited over differences in the approach of the Dutch government towards the EDC negotiations as the Dutch government had, by mid-1951, still refrained from entering the negotiations (Orlow 2000, 77).\(^{265}\) Van Naters was supported by Socialist members of the “*Europeesche Actie*”. His main ally in the government was member of the Dutch Council of the European Union and Minister of Agriculture Sicco Mansholt (Van der Harst 1990). Opposition to this course came both from rank and file party members as well as

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\(^{263}\) As Jelle Zijlstra expressed it in an interview in 1989, “[…] European integration, starting in the form at that moment of the Coal and Steel Community, was not highly controversial in the Netherlands. People of almost all political parties, with the exception of the extreme Right and extreme Left, were in favor of European integration. (…) The discussion at that time centered around the European Defense Community. That was somewhat more controversial here than the broad idea of economic integration. Second, people like the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Stikker, were not very enthusiastic.” (Zijlstra 1998).

\(^{264}\) “Federalism wants a larger unit, but it will not let this unit result in a total collectivization […]. […] the principles of subsidiarity, spheres sovereignty and decentralization will play an important role in the field of international society”. Own translation from “Het federalisme wil een grootere eenheid, maar het wil deze eenheid niet laten uitmonden in een totale collectivering […].‘dat de beginselen van subsidiariteit, souvereiniteit in eigen kring en functionele decentralisatie ook iets te zeggen hebben op het terrein van de internationale samenleving” (Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 124).

\(^{265}\) Marinus van der Goes van Naters in an interview in 1993 to Asbek Brusse and Griffiths, “Our knowledge about the conflicts in the cabinet on European questions we learned from Mansholt and not from Drees himself. Drees kept everything secret; even from the party leadership and certainly from the parliamentary party; something which today sounds incredible. It simply never occurred to Drees to talk to the leader of the parliamentary party as I happened to be.” (Asbek Brusse and Griffiths 1993, 136).
from party leader and long-term Dutch Prime Minister Willem Drees. Willem Drees, as remote from transnational Europeanist organizations as Schumacher was, had already displayed a highly skeptical attitude towards the delegation and pooling of authority during the Schuman Plan negotiations. Partially due to Dutch institutions, these divisions were not exposed publicly: by mid-1951, there had still not been a parliamentary debate on the issue of German rearmament, although the issue had been on the international agenda for about a year. Given Dutch abstention from the negotiations, the Party leadership, and Drees in particular, refused an official discussion, as that would “(...) lead to a political fiasco, which would not contribute to the strengthening of the party.” (Asbek Brusse 1993, 112).

However, as ELEC delegate Zijlstra quote from above indicated, there were more conflicts than is suggested by the apparently smooth ratification outcome, both within the Cabinet as well as within the parties in the Second Chamber. The key to these differences, as suggested by Kohnstamm, lay in basic considerations about appropriate Foreign Policy strategy,

“For the Dutch to go into a continental organization was something which went against all our history. We had Indonesia, because we had the British fleet, the British gave it back after Napoleon. We were really a little boat towed by the British. The place of England was to some extent - in the mind for example of my friend van der Beugel, Hirschfeld, and Stikker - taken over by America. To be with the Americans, that was the thing. We had a split between the Atlanticists and the European integrationists. European integration had in Parliament quite a bit of support, because the Catholic party was strong, always in government, and was in favor; and a part of the Socialist party was in favor. Not Drees himself. He thought it was all nonsense (laughs).” (Kohnstamm 1986).

Long-term party head Willem Drees had remained remote from any transnational Europeanist activity. For security, he believed, the atlantic alliance and, in particular, the nuclear bomb was the key,

“The deterrent of an atomic bomb is the only guarantee for Western Europe. We must have an understanding of this situation and try to strengthen the forces of Western Europe. This can only be achieved by continuous consultations and cooperation with the other countries in Western Europe.” (Asbek Brusse 1993, 109).

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266 For example, socialist deputy Socialist Deputy J. Barents publicly called out the chairman of the Socialist party group “to escape from utopian federalism to reality”, noting that the “idea of European federation rests on false premises” (Lippgens and Loth 1988, 393).

267 “The realization of the Schuman Plan would bring more disadvantages than advantages to Dutch internal interests […]. Although the participation of the Netherlands was desirable from an international point of view, he [Drees] was not prepared to make every sacrifice.[…] National governments must retain some say.” (Asbek Brusse 1993, 115).
For the catholic KVP, Christian Democratic supranationalism was largely a consensus affair. Key KVP representatives, such as Serrarens, Sassen, and eventual parliamentary group leader Margret Klompé were active in the transnational Christian Democratic Community, in the Dutch Council for the European Movement and had supported the Dutch motion for a permanent ‘association of states’ of 1948 (Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 41). Thus, Serrarens complained in 1949 in the Second Chamber that the OEEC was “an intergovernmental body, on which the people through their elected representatives have no impact.” He had equal words of kindness for the Council of Ministers vetoing demands emanating from the Consultative Assembly. A second shared Christian Democratic trademark was the dominant sense of threat from the ‘Bolshevik East’, that Sassen described as an area “where unprecedented vaguely dangers press from the dark depths, so is Russia for us, people of the West!” (Quoted in Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 100). The assumption of Dutch Foreign Policy, according to Sassen, was that “egoism, chauvinism and nationalism can be overcome”. Thus “the consultative Council must be replaced by supranational bodies possessing authority” Parliamentary party group leader Romme and his successor Margert Klompé, both shared Sassen’s concerns (Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 135). At the same time, there were no calls for radical federalist schemes: in particular, Klompé and Romme were skeptical of significant delegation of authority that would entail a loss of control (Ibid).

Within the remaining parties, there were more visible signs of division. Within the liberal VVD, Dirk Stikker – Foreign Minister until 1952 and altogether absent from

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268 Thus, the party program from 1952 “supported the pursuit of European, where possible, Atlantic, and, in the future, global federal cooperation to realize collective interests, which, in modern circumstances, cannot be realized separately by the States or by cooperation at the state level […]”. Own translation from “[…] het streven naar Europese, waar mogelijk Atlantische en in en verwijderde toekomst mondiale federale samenwerking ter collectieve verzorging ter collectieve verzorging, die in de moderne verhoudingen onder de staat afzonderlijk, noch door un samenwerking op regeringsniveau […]” (Quoted in Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 32).

269 Own translation from “[…] een intergouvernementele orgaan, waarin de volkeren door hun gekozen vertegenwoordigers geen invloed hebben […]” (Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 109).

270 “The manner in which the Committee of Ministers wanted to halt the work of the Assembly is reminiscent of the attitude of some fathers who give their son give an electric toy, under the condition that the child is not allowed to play if Dad does not and as long as it does not do anything”. Own translation from “De wijze, waarop het Comité van Ministers het werk van de Assemblée wilde stilleggen, doet denken aan de houding van sommige vaders, die hun zoontje een electrisch spoortje geven, onder de conditie, dat het kind er niet mede mag spelen, als papa er niet bij is en deze niet alles doet” (Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 112).

271 “egoïsme, chauvinisme en nationalismus kunnen worden overwonnen en deze internationale rechtsgemeenschap, […] moet de Consultatieve Raad vervangen worden door bovennationale, met gezag beklede organen” (Quoted in Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 139).
the transnational scene – shared Prime Minister Drees’ scepticism of supranational institutions in general and the Pleven Plan in particular, believing it was a French means to ensure French continental dominance.\textsuperscript{272} His position, however, was challenged openly by VVD parliamentary group leaders Korthals – member of the Dutch Council for the European Movement – who had argued that “we should entrust military matters to a European Minister of Defence under democratic European control.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 433). Although Korthals was not enthusiastic about the specifics of the EDC Treaty by 1953, the Soviet threat in his view did not give the European states sufficient time.\textsuperscript{273} What was required was „No small talk, we do not need a paper organization, but a real device, ready at day and night to defend our people, its right and freedoms”\textsuperscript{274}

Discussions within the protestant ARP reveal a similar picture in which minor divisions pitted those engaged in the Dutch Council of the European Movement against skeptics denouncing federalist calls for the abolition of the nation-state.\textsuperscript{275} Those engaged in Europeanist organizations, such as Jelle Zijlstra and Bruins Slot took different positions, but interpreted the concept of a ‘federation’ in the same ways as Van Der Goeas van Naters, namely in line with the functionalist blueprints discussed predominantly in the ELEC and similarly opposed federalist ‘utopias’ (Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 129).\textsuperscript{276}

Thus, differences within the Cabinet were sufficient so that Kohnstamm felt deliberately excluded,

> “Then, between the end of the Schuman Plan and May 52, for a full year, I had a very disagreeable period, because I was on purpose kept out of the European army business. I was too European. Stikker had become Foreign Minister, and he was an Atlanticist. Added to that I must say I was not a good civil servant. I had very strong political views, and was in constant contact with people in Parliament, and so on. Quite rightly, they had a certain mistrust of what I was doing […] they said, "you'll get your salary, but there's nothing we want you to do" (laughs)” (Kohnstamm 1986).

\textsuperscript{272} In his memoirs, Stikker wrote, “Ich konnte mich daher nicht zu dem Glauben an die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft durchringen, die das nächste Mittel Frankreichs war, um die Diskriminierung Deutschlands aufrechtzuerhalten” (Stikker 1966, 364).

\textsuperscript{273} As he put it in a parliamentary debate in July 1953, “voor het te laat is, want wij hebben niet veel tijd meer!” (Quoted in Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 180).

\textsuperscript{274} Own translation from “Geen geklets hebben wij nodig, geen papieren organisaties, maar een reëel apparaat, dat dag en nacht klaar staat om ons volk, zijn recht en zijn vrijheden, te verdedigen” (Quoted in Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 180).

\textsuperscript{275} For example, the chairman of the ARP J. Schouten insisted in a parliamentary debate on the federal pact that “The division into nations and nation-states is god’s will.” (Heinen 1988, 357).

\textsuperscript{276} As Bruins Slot argued in 1949 in the debate over a federal pact, “A European federation would for the present mean the organization of European states in particular spheres, e.g. in economic and military matters” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 419).
In sum, the range of open diversity of institutional demands was, compared to other European countries, relatively low in the Netherlands, a fact partially explained by Dutch domestic institutions discouraging open conflict over foreign policy issues and the relative weakness of full-blown federalist radicalism as was the case in Italy. By the same token, the skepticism of the Dutch government to the negotiations in Paris stands in contrast to a relatively smooth ratification of the European Army project (Harryvan 2009, 65). Among the parties present in the second chamber, only one of the 12 members of the ARP voted against the treaty, whereas the Christian Democratic KVP, the liberal VVD, and the Social Democrats voted en bloc for the treaty without a single abstention (Haas 2004 [1958], 157). To the degree that there were divisions, these were negotiated behind closed doors, as the subsequent pages will show.

**UK**

Within the UK, there were only minute and largely negligible conflicts within parties over the question of European institutions. More importantly, although public rhetoric suggests serious differences between the Tories and Labour over the issue, actual differences were small as well. Among the Conservative Party, a number of actors – such as Winston Churchill – had been instrumental in the foundation of the European Movement but largely adhered to the views espoused by the British Unionists that had caused the initial divide within the European Movement itself. Labour leadership was largely absent from these initiatives. To be sure, there was a cross-party ‘Europe Group’ initiated by more ‘radical’ representatives such as Mackay, Hale, and Shawcross (Labour) and Boothby, Roberts, MacDonald (Tory) (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 539). However, their minority status was evident already in 1948 during the preparation for the creation of the Council of Europe. The affiliates of this group were thus in the overwhelming minority within their own party.

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277 Thus, as its continental counterparts called for significant delegation and pooling of sovereignty, the British United Europe Committee stated in its inaugural session under Churchill’s chairmanship January 1947 that “Britain has special obligations and spiritual ties which link her with the other nations of the British commonwealth. Nevertheless, Britain is a part of Europe and must be prepared to make her full contribution to European unity.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 669; 1990, 215).

278 In March 1948 the group sought to initiate a “motion on the creation of a federation of Europe”, the all-party group decided no vote should be sought in parliament, only a debate. (Lipgens and Loth
For Labour, the paramount conservative influence on the European Movement made Europe a ‘bourgeois’ undertaking that was to be opposed (Morgan 1984, 392; Ceadel 1992, 32; Judt 2005, 160). Most of the Labour deputies followed the party leadership by distrusting European institutions threatening to infringe upon parliamentary sovereignty and their majority. Moreover, in the parliamentary Labour group and in parts of the Cabinet opposition there was considerable opposition to any form of rearmament, leading to a split within Labour on the WEU Treaty (Dockrill 1991, 75). Contrary to the continental states, however, that split did not separate federalists from more intergovernmental actors, but principled opposition to German rearmament (neutralists from the left-wing of the party) from the supporters of leading figure Bevin’s course of confrontation and following the US in the Cold War (Deighton 1998). The most divisive issue was a British one. Having surprisingly won the first post war elections against Churchill with the promise of substantial increases in welfare spending, the envisioned defence expenses increased called for by the US in the aftermath of the Korean War compromised the available expenses for health care in particular. Consequently, on April 22nd 1951 Aneurin Bevan – a popular figure of the left-wing of Labour and Minister of Health – resigned in a “party civil war” over the issue (Middlemas 1986, 187). Given the slim majority and the hostility of the ‘Bevanite’ group, Attlee decided to schedule elections by the end of 1951 (Morgan 1984, 101). The opposition to German rearmament led, in 1954, to an alignment with the ‘Europeanist faction’ of Mackay, Butler and Lang: fearing the establishment of a German national army, a pamphlet entitled “In Defence of Europe” called for a limited British troop commitment to the EDC to convince their French Socialist counterparts to ratify the treaty and thus to prevent a German army (Deighton 1998, 185).

The motion sought “immediate and effective cooperation between the countries of Western Europe, and a long-term policy designed to bring into being a federation of Europe” First steps should have been a “Council of Western Europe consisting of representatives of the governments of the sixteen participating countries in the European Recovery Plan” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 699; 1990, 215). The goal, “long-term policy should be to create a democratic federation of Europe, with a constitution based on the principles of common citizenship, political freedom, and representative government” expansive policy fields “external affairs, defence, currency, customs” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 700; 1990, 215). At the debate in parliament, opened on May 4th 1948, there was a motion supported by Mackay who sought at least a statement of principle from Labour Prime Minister Attlee (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 704; 1990, 215). The argument supporting the rejection questioned the definition of sovereignty and maintained that interstate cooperation was sufficient. “As a matter of fact, anyone entering into an alliance or a treaty does take away to an extend their absolute power to do as they will.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 705; 1990, 215).

Thus, Herbert Morrison’s alleged reaction to the Schuman Plan was, “It’s no good, we can’t do it, the Durham miners won’t wear it.” (See Killick 1997, 153).
The Conservative party had seemingly adopted a different line towards European institutions. The rhetoric utilized by Churchill in parliament as well as Strasbourg— who had called for a European Army at the Strasbourg Assembly including a ‘European Minister of Defense’ (Dockrill 1991, 23; Ceadel 1992, 328) – falsely suggested that the Tories pursued a different course. Churchill himself certainly never contemplated turning the Consultative of Assembly of the Council of Europe into a federal institution to be joined by the United Kingdom (Larres 2002, 147, 148). A recurring notion was the model of the three global circles – the United States and the Western hemisphere, the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, and continental Europe – as guiding Tory thinking on the post war world (Kaiser 1996, 3). Churchill drew frequently on the concept (Jansen 1992, 173).

There were some internal differences within the Tories: In particular, the leading representatives of the European Movement repeatedly questioned the all-too willing abandonment of the Council of Europe and the loss of British influence. The main difference was rather strategic however, as Eden and Churchill were generally disposed to argue against any commitment towards continental Europe, placing NATO obligations on top of the agenda and sought to bind the United States in Europe (Larres 1996). Others, in particular MacMillan, were concerned to preserve British influence on the continent. These were not, however, significant differences over basic institutional preferences. Similarly, subsequent disputes within the British conservative government were, at their core, due to a disagreement between Eden and Churchill concerning the solution of the ‘German problem’: Churchill would continuously advocate a four-power summit with the Soviet Union to explore the prospects of ‘neutralizing’ the former enemy between the two blocks, which Eden opposed (Young 1996, 28).

In sum, there were serious conflicts within Social Democracy and minor differences within the Conservative Party. The conflict within Labour, however, had next to nothing to do with the transnational European conflict as its leading figures were as remote from the Europeanist organizations as most British Labour actors. Moreover, despite the rhetorical differences between Labour and the Tories, the substance of

\(^{280}\) Churchill had already by 1930, stated that Britain should be “with Europe, but not of it” (Larres 2002, 55).

\(^{281}\) Prominent Tory pro-Europeanists included Harold Macmillan, Maxwell Fyffe, Duncan Sandys, David Eccles as well as some backbenchers in Parliament such as Robert Boothby and Julian Amery (Massigli 1978, 267; Ceadel 1992, 323; Deighton 1998, 186).
these differences between the party leadership of the left and the right was relatively small as the absence of any significant change in the British position in 1951 amply demonstrated. For the Tories, as the subsequent pages will show, the differences were largely strategic as well, the dominant concerns being that the Alliance be preserved, the US commitment retained on the continent, UK commitments minimized as necessary, and UK influence over European institutions preserved.

7.1.3 Summary

To a certain degree, domestic conflict over international issues, both within and across parties, is to be expected and not a surprising aspect of state-preference formation at all. What the preceding section has demonstrated, however, is that there is a tractable impact of the transnational conflict on the domestic divisions, both within and across parties, that is mediated by the domestic political conditions and institutions. Geopolitical incentives certainly mattered. In every case, actors formulated their demands in the terms of the perceived ‘national interest that had to take objective material and geostrategic realities into account.’ However, by themselves, geopolitical considerations cannot account for the content of domestic demands nor the variation in domestic conflict.

Thus, consistent with the basic properties of the transnational conflict, all Socialist parties in the European countries were marked by relatively high degrees of internal conflict whereas Christian Democratic parties, in particular in the larger continental countries were more inclined to demand the creation of supranational institutions with appropriate democratic institutions to create a European Army. The extent of the conflict varied and depended on national conditions. In Italy and France, it divided the French SFIO heavily and reinforced divisions between the two existent Italian Social Democratic Parties. In Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the role of the party leadership seemed decisive: whereas the leadership in Germany and the Netherlands was relatively remote from the Europeanist transnational networks, the leadership in Belgium (Spaak) was part of its most active core. As a result, the German SPD enforced its core principles of objecting to the new European institutions and the pooling and delegation of sovereignty, the Dutch PvdA remained largely quiet over its internal divisions, and the leadership of the Belgian BSP-PSB, the party being divided as well, actively criticized the Belgian leadership of obstructing EDC.
negotiations in 1951. Moreover, the relative lack of influence of federalist Labour actors – who were certainly present transnationally (see chapter 5, section 5.2.1) – indicates that impact is dependent not on transnational but on national embeddedness and support.

At the same time, there are clearly identifiable differences that are seemingly related to geopolitical context. First, there is a recognizable difference between the larger and the smaller countries on the continent that accounts for common fears of autonomy loss in the smaller countries, a tendency already identified when analyzing the transnational conflict. Thus in the smaller European countries, radical federalist demands are much less prevalent, whereas demands for further economic integration are largely as consensus matter, reflecting an agreement on the ‘national interests’.

Second, in both Germany and Italy there is a tendency to view the supranational institutions as a means to gain recognition and influence, as result that will be established in the subsequent section as well. At the same time, the causal and strategic beliefs underlying the demand differences and thus the transnational conflict clearly influences the link between material context and domestic demands as well. Thus, the Christian Democratic leadership in Belgium pursued essentially similar objectives as the Dutch multiparty government but was challenged heavily by the Social Democratic leadership under Spaak. In sum, there is a disconnect between the distribution of capabilities and the geopolitical incentives on the one hand and the dominant demands on the other hand, different to the direct relationship put forth by intergovernmentalism (H1). Subjective assessments of threats where clearly related to institutional demands (H1). The effect, however, is dependent on the kind of causal stories individuals adhered to, in particular their stipulation of the intentions of other states. Geopolitical incentives and capabilities equally played a role as necessary factors (H2), but they do not sufficiently capture domestic conflict over institutional demands.

Thus, domestic elites that were active in the transnational communities pursuing supranational or federal models of post-war Europe tended to do so, with exceptions, with regard to the problem of German rearmament within domestic political conflict across all European countries and parties. Domestic elites that were remote from these communities tended to fall within basic intergovernmental expectations: conservative Italian and German elites tended to view the EDC favorably from an instrumental point of view as increasing their international influence, whereas others
favored classic Alliance solutions to the German problem that preserved national sovereignty (i.e. the Gaullists in France), or denied the existential threat posed by the Soviet government and thus the necessity of balancing efforts and associated institutions (i.e. some British, French and German Social Democrats). This picture is complicated by the extent to which domestic institutions amplified or reduced the impact of the transnational conflict. Thus, in as much as French domestic conditions were insufficient to structure domestic conflict, the effective consociational context in the Netherlands silenced existing differences between the government and the Tweede Kammer. In sum, geopolitical factors are necessary but insufficient without considering institutional conditions and transnational influences.

Thus, the degree of domestic conflict and differences over preferred institutional designs for post-war Europe and the ‘German question’, within and across parties, was sufficient to potentially affect governments and thus the formation of state preferences in its own right, albeit in a varied manner, depending on the quality of domestic institutions and mediated by the geopolitical context of every country. In this sense, the rationale for transnational networking, as described in chapter 2 can be seen relatively easily: amid a relatively clear geostrategic challenge for all European governments, there were still sufficient domestic differences over the concrete measures of how to meet that challenge. Similarities between individuals across states, as described in the previous chapter, were sufficient as to warrant strategic coordination and to constitute a nascent transnational conflict over European institutions. The next section will trace the impact of that conflict on the ‘bargaining behavior’ of governments and thus the EDC bargain itself.

7.2 Embeddedness, Changing Conflict Constellations and Strategic Choices: The Impact of the Transnational Conflict on the EDC Bargain

Does the impact of the transnational conflict on domestic politics translate into the preference formation and strategic choice of the negotiating states? Does considering that impact contribute to a better understanding of the EDC bargain? This section evaluates these questions. From an intergovernmental point of view, as recounted in chapters 3 and 4, the shifting conflict constellations were attributed to a domestically unstable French government, inefficient institutions and the learning process of the remaining governments involved in the bargain having to find a possible core in a
geopolitically unstable environment. From a transnational point of view, the information presented so far would point to a different direction. Chapter 5 has singled out at least two governments – France and Italy – whose shifting embeddedness in the inter-organizational networks suggests a possible preference shifts. Second, the preceding chapter has demonstrated that the differences within the transnational networks contributed to the rise and fall of a tenuous and fragile transnational coalition that united actors with a clear-cut ideological preference for a supranational army. Mutual engagement and exchange of information within these circles repeatedly coincided with key shifts in the course of the bargain; its actors seemed to have either privileged access to negotiating governments or were in leading positions themselves.

Recall that there were four basic conflict constellations that characterized the ‘negotiation dance’ of the EDC bargain. First, from 1950 to 1951, there was a period of French isolation, as virtually all governments doubted the military effectiveness and sincerity of the French proposal. From mid-1951 up until and including the signing of the EDC Treaty in 1952, there was a confrontation between the larger (Italy, France, and Germany) and smaller (Belgium, Netherlands) continental states over a number of salient issues, in particular questions of institutional design, i.e. the envisioned degree of pooling, delegation, and representation. Section 7.2.1 deals with that time period. After the treaty had been signed, government positions began to diverge over a number of issues related to the EDC Treaty itself, the issue of economic integration as entailed in the EPC Treaty, and the conditions for the ratification of the treaty, dealt with in section 7.2.2. As the French Assemblée Nationale rejected the EDC Treaty, the final period saw a convergence of bargaining positions resulting in a relatively quick signing and ratification of the treaty in 1954 (7.2.3).

7.2.1 Negotiating the EDC Treaty, 1950 - 1952

Seeking to explain why the EDC Treaty emerged as a viable option at the international agenda and why it was signed in 1952 involves explaining the shifting conflict constellations between the negotiating countries between 1950 and 1952. I proceed in four steps. I begin tracing the emergence of the Pleven Plan and the isolation of French insistence on a supranational army. I then turn toward the changing positions of the US, Germany, France, and Italy. Third, I discuss the reaction of the Dutch and
Belgian governments and, in particular, the conditions under which the French government decided to sign the Treaty. Finally, I explain why the governments of the Six chose a radical procedure – the drawing up of a quasi-federalist European Political Community to augment the EDC Treaty. I demonstrate that while geopolitical incentives and power considerations mattered, this dynamic cannot be explained sufficiently without considering the effect of key actors close to the transnational coalition, both within transnational and transgovernmental networks.

**German Rearmament: Supranational or Intergovernmental?**

No state within the Western Alliance would have pressed for, or agreed to, German rearmament without the outbreak of the Korean War. To be sure, that the issue would appear sooner or later was clear to any observer. Rhetorical calls for the creation of a ‘European Army’ with vague institutional implications as well as internal plans for German rearmament were ubiquitous before the Korean War, but never put into action: the French Foreign Minister of Georges Bidault made such suggestions in 1948; the federalists had repeatedly called for it in the late 1940’s, the British Chiefs of Staff had, in early June 1950, already contemplated the need for German rearmament in an internal memo (Larres 2002, 146). Adenauer had proposed a German contribution to a European Army in an interview with an American Newspaper in 1949. Sforza had put forward a suggestion to create a European Army and a European fond for weapons procurement in May 1950 (Magagnoli 1999, 37). But the timing of the concrete initiative for German rearmament is clearly related to the outbreak of the Korean War created. In this sense, the basic intergovernmentalist reasoning for demands based on threat levels is correct: if the North Korean regime was ready to risk a confrontation with the American hegemon on the Korean peninsula, there were little guarantees that the Soviet Union would refrain from capitalizing on

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282 An editorial article in *Le Monde* from April 6th 1949 said, “Qu’on en convienne ou non, le rearmement de l’Allemagne est contenu dans la pacte de l’Atlantique comme le germe dans l’œuf.” (quoted in Grosser 1961, 229)

283 George Bidault suggested to politically integrate Germany in the West and bind economic resources through the creation, within NATO, of a “civilian general staff for total diplomacy and coordinating political, economic, and military policies” (FRUS 1950 III, 54).

284 Adenauer said that Germany “soll zur Verteidigung Europas einen Beitrag in einer europäischen Armee unter dem Kommando eines übergeordneten europäischen Befehlshabers leisten” and that “eigene deutsche Streitkräfte würden nicht mehr als eine Abteilung unter einem europäischen Kommando bilden” (Adenauer 1949).
its existent conventional superiority on the continent. These fears induced immediate calls for US troops by France, the UK, Germany, and Italy as a large swath of Allied troops from the war had been demobilized. Moreover, the call for supranational institutions was obviously linked to a need for security from Germany: the talks culminating in the Brussels Treaty of 1948 do not reveal that the creation of supranational institutions was even contemplated (De Vos, et al. 1998, 237-242). Thus, geopolitical incentives (H1) clearly capture the necessary conditions for the serious consideration of a creation of a European Army.

However, even the initial US proposal to rearm Germany on a national basis had an internal competitor. Reviewing the situation in Europe, the Pentagon had concluded that Western Europe had to be ‘defended at the Rhine’ (FRUS 1950 IV, 353-356). Pentagon planners and a few prominent Congressmen were thus in favor of German rearmament to share the burden of increased defence expenditures entailed in remobilizing American troops (Large 1996, 36, 41`). The contents of the intergovernmental package deal emanated from the Pentagon and included restrictions on German autonomy with regard to mobilizing capabilities, operational controls and integration into Western military planning as well restrictions on arms production, such as heavy weapons, including tanks. German divisions would be integrated into a common operational structure so as to prevent German military autonomy and a German General Staff.

However, McCloy – the US High Commissioner in Germany and affiliate of the ACEU – internally opposed these plans and argued that the only effective defense would consist in the creation of a ‘genuine European army’. Thus, lower level officials in the State Department devised the ‘Byorade Plan’ that called for an integrat-

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285 McCloy thought that “to defend Western Europe effectively will obviously require real contributions of German resources and men. I am absolutely opposed to re-creating any German national army now or in the foreseeable future. In my opinion, to do so would be a tragic mistake. […] Also I think it is an illusion to suppose that the Germans have a burning desire to create a national army or that they would enlist or could be conscripted into such an army in substantial numbers. Indeed I am convinced they are opposed to such a step. […] If France were forced to accept such rearmament, she might contribute much less herself to effective defense. […] There is now a real chance to solve this difficulty by creating a genuine European army. If done quickly, this offers the best chance to convert our present weakness into real strength. The French appear eager for some such action giving them the hope of effective defense without the risk off a German national army. Moreover the German Cabinet and public opinion is believed to strongly favor such a course. […] Such a course would evoke much more enthusiastic support and energetic action from the Europeans than reliance on national armies and thereby reduce the time necessary for results.” The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State, August 3rd, 1950 (FRUS 1950 III, 180-182).
ed and “really effective European Defense Force” involving “the voluntary surrender of a degree of sovereignty in the most vital of all elements of sovereignty, i.e. the security field”. The plan met heavy resistance from the Pentagon fearing delay and military impracticability. The State Department did not press the matter further but accepted the Pentagon proposal on Truman’s decision who feared that the mobilization of Allied capabilities would be seriously delayed (Acheson 1969, 438; Dockrill 1991, 33). Acheson – contrary to his memoirs – dismissed the Byorade plan as impractical and emphasized British participation in the rearmament effort which would only become possible through ‘traditional’ alliance politics (Trachtenberg and Gehrz 2003).

The reactions by European governments to the US package deal, as described earlier, were not overtly enthusiastic but the *quid pro quo* it offered – German rearmament and increased European defense expenditures in exchange for a significantly increased US presence on the continent and US led Western command – were accepted. The French government was largely isolated and pressed for time: when the issue was discussed among the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Council in October 1950 in New York, Acheson singled out the French government to advance a concrete proposal for German rearmament by month’s end (FRUS 1950 III, 426-431).

This ultimatum sparked the first of many crises in French domestic politics over the issue of German rearmament and its concrete realization. Internally, the Quai

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286 The plan stated “The advent of the Schuman Plan for coal and steel and the general deterioration of the world situation has caused a rapid increase in the feeling to unite Europe in all fields possible, including the military. This situation can be further strengthened by evidence of a United States willingness to accept the responsibility inherent in full participation in the European defense effort. If such participation is forthcoming, it is believed conditions may now be favorable in Europe for creating a really effective European Defense Force which could assimilate a direct contribution by Germany in the common defense of Western Europe in a manner acceptable to all concerned. This involves in practice the voluntary surrender of a degree of sovereignty in the most vital of all elements of sovereignty, i.e., the security field. Such would follow from the establishment of an international Commander with real authority as the European Nations would, in such an arrangement, accept the fact that their own, units would be utilized for the common defense of Western Europe as contrasted to the protection of individual boundaries. If properly handled a partial surrender of sovereignty in the military field could become a driving force toward further unification in Western Europe.” *The Deputy Under, Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance (Burns)* (FRUS 1950 III, 211).

287 Bevin’s report to the Cabinet on October 6th 1950 argued that it was ‘necessary’ to accept the proposal in order to solidify the capabilities of the Western Alliance (DBPO II: III, 134). The Italian Foreign Minister Sforza feared a disintegrating alliance and thought that the package deal was the only viable way to ‘create Europe’ (Magagnoli 1999, 44).
d’Orsay had considered German rearmament by proposing that small German units (battalions) should be integrated into the national divisions of NATO members without mentioning supranational institutions.\(^{288}\) Moreover, the issue came at a time when the negotiations on the ECSC were in the closing stages and a successful resolution was not yet a foregone conclusion. A large portion of the French deputies vehemently argued against the specter of a resurgent ‘Wehrmacht’. In this situation – on September 3\(^{rd}\) 1950 – Monnet wrote the first note to Pleven advocating a supranational solution, following the same logic as the Byorade Plan advocated by McCloy earlier, by proposing a “plan Schuman développé” that could prevent the creation of a national German army (Duchêne 1994, 227, 228).\(^{289}\) The similarity was not accidental: Monnet had exchanges with McCloy and the US ambassador in Paris – David Bruce – who were observing the ECSC negotiations in Paris at the time (Duchêne 1994, 229). This reasoning was entirely in line with Schuman: in his mind, by creating a national German army, ‘mistrust and suspicions would be reborn’ and thus destroy the movements towards European reconciliation.\(^{290}\) Taking up Monnet’s suggestions, Pleven sought a domestic compromise between the plans in the Quai d’Orsay and a “plan Schuman développé”, proposing a supranational institution – a European Ministry of Defense – and adopting the restrictions of German rearmament proposed by the Quai d’Orsay (Bossuat 1996b, 192). This, however, would be so obviously ineffective that it was even opposed by the French military (Bossuat 1996b, 188).

\(^{288}\) The Quai d’Orsay issued an internal memo on August 10\(^{th}\) 1950. The Central Europe Office of the Foreign Ministry suggested that France “could insist that more American troops be deployed in Europe, that NATO members receive top priority in the rearmament process, that the German forces be limited to two-thirds of all French forces stationed in Europe and be placed in the smallest possible units, and that no German general staff or national army be established” (quoted in Hitchcock 1998, 137). These regulative dimensions reflect the considerations to prevent the resurgence of an autonomous German army. But there is no mentioning whatsoever of a supranational arrangement to achieve these goals.

\(^{289}\) “Je vous propose d’apporter à nos associés la contribution d’une pensée forte, constructive, déterminée à créer en même temps notre défense extérieure en Europe, notre développement social intérieur, la paix en Orient, la constitution organisée de notre monde libre, atlantique, sous les formes diversifies qui correspondent aux trois mondes qui le composent: les États-Unis, l’Empire britannique, l’Europe continentale de l’Ouest, fédérée autour d’un plan Schuman développé. Un état de paix ainsi crée devrait nous permettre en quelques années, de développer et de consolider nos forces et nos ressources […].” (Bossuat 1992, 311). Note that the proposal is framed in terms of ‘national interest’, ‘interpreted’ as requiring a supranational proposal. In a second note to Schuman on September 9\(^{th}\) 1950, while the latter was at the New York conference rejecting any agreement on German rearmament on principle, Monnet proposed that Germany should participate in a West European ‘federal’ security organization for rearmament (Bossuat 1996b, 188).

\(^{290}\) “[…] ferait renaitre méfiance et suspicions […]” (quoted in Poidevin 1986, 314).
Given the divisions in the French Cabinet – and particular the paramount resistance to German national rearmament by Minister of Defense Jules Moch from the SFIO, the military effectiveness of German troops was not the chief concern (Massigli 1978, 252; Elgey 1993b, 271). Thus, the Pleven Plan, as it was proposed, was a French political creature to prevent a German army. The resolution of the Assemblée Nationale that approved the Pleven Plan – stated this unequivocally. Schuman defended the proposal against critics: admitting that the plan was premature, there was no other choice for European states to ‘rid themselves of part of their autonomy for the sake of a collective authority’. In short, the key difference between the two plans for German rearmament proposed by France and the US was a relative disregard for military efficiency on the French side: the US government followed the recommendations of its generals, the French government, amid rampant fears of a resurgent Wehrmacht, did not. Predictably, the reaction to the official proposal was overwhelmingly negative. Omar Bradley, head of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, pondered whether it would be possible to reject the plan outright (FRUS 1950 III, 410-414, 457). In the UK and the Benelux, the reactions were similar (Coolsaet 2002, 104; DBPO II: I, 298, 304, 346). The British Prime Minister Bevin contemplated ways to get the Pleven Plan off the international agenda out of fear the development would weaken transatlantic ties. The Italian Minister of Defense Pacciardi (no transnational affiliation) was extremely skeptical deeming the plan entirely unrealistic, and dilettantish as did the Foreign Minister Sforza (Magagnoli 1999, 48). However, the reason for that assessment was that the Plan did not seem well thought through: the envisioned structure, it was feared,

Specifically, battalion sized German units would be integrated in divisions, divisions being the lowest possible union size capable of autonomous operation. The result would have been that every division in the European Army – nationally homogeneous – would have its own one or two German battalions. This would obviously create serious problems of communication and coordination, national resentment notwithstanding. In other words, this is clearly a way to purposefully create ‘transaction costs’ (Elgey 1993b, 573).


Schuman maintained that the plan “n’est ni une manœuvre dilatoire ni un subterfuge embarrassé […] Nous aurions désiré développer d’abord les soubassements économiques et politiques d’avant d’aborder la construction de l’édifice militaire [...].” He maintained that the time had come for the European states to “se dessaisir d’une parcelle de leur autonomie au profit d’une autorité collective.” (Quoted in Poidevin 1986, 316).

“We cannot afford to allow the European federal concept to gain a foothold within NATO and thus weakening instead of strengthening the ties between the countries on the two sides of the Atlantic. We must nip it in the bud.” (Trachtenberg 1999, 117).
would turn the European commissioner into a ‘dictator’ of sorts and thus required a ‘European political organization’.\textsuperscript{295}

The resistance from the Allies to the Pleven Plan was in vein: during the first discussions of the Plan, Jules Moch made it very clear that he was not inclined toward compromise.\textsuperscript{296} US Secretary of State Acheson in turn threatened to withhold any additional troops for Europe if negotiations on German rearmament did not proceed (FRUS 1950 III, 426-431, 429, 430).\textsuperscript{297} Out of options, the subsequent compromise – the co-called Spofford compromise – did little to improve the deadlock but allowed at least the continuation of talks (Fursdon 1980, 112, 115). Negotiations would be conducted along two tracks. At the Petersberg, the Allied High Commissioners would bargain with Germany on the terms of regaining sovereignty and its military integration in the West. In Paris, France would invite all ‘interested parties’ to negotiate the Pleven Plan. The only reason that even this compromise made it through the French cabinet was that the US would immediately move four divisions to Western Europe, as well as the agreement that no final decision on German sovereignty would be reached without French assent (Elgey 1993b, 281; Hitchcock 1998, 157). After intense threats to withhold US troop commitments (FRUS 1950 III, 426-431, 429, 430), the French decision to allow independent negotiations on German rearmament on the Petersberg came by way of a dramatic debate amid complaints of US pressure (Loth 1977, 288).

Part of the reason or the compromise was that French agreement to German rearmament was geopolitically essential.\textsuperscript{298} Thus, the need for continued negotiations. A

\textsuperscript{295} The conclusion was that “die Bildung europäischer Streitkräfte das Resultat einer europäischen politischen Organisation sein müßte, weshalb sich Italien nicht mit dem Konzept einer europäischen Armee identifizieren kann, wie sie von Frankreich zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt gewünscht wird.” (Magagnoli 1999, 58).

\textsuperscript{296} During the negotiations, Moch had placed his wife instead of the members of the French delegation behind him. She was dressed in black to remind everybody of the losses of the Moch family to the Gestapo, and she gave him advice rather than members of the French delegation (FRUS 1950 III, 426-431).

\textsuperscript{297} Secretary of State (Acheson) to Embassy in France, November 3\textsuperscript{rd} 1950, “If Moch’s position accurately reflects attitude Fr Govt, it seems clear that there is little hope agreeing on any mil sound plan for defense Western Eur including Western Ger since other Eurs themselves think plan polit and mil unsound quite aside from Ger aspect of problem. It therefore seems imperative you put problem squarely before Pleven and Schuman in order ascertain how Fr Govt intend proceed, and ascertain whether Moch’s quasi-dictatorial intransigence accurately reflects Fr Govt’s true attitude and position.” (FRUS 1950 III, 426-428)

\textsuperscript{298} “Militärisch könnte man etwas frech formulieren: man konnte Mitteleuropa verteidigen ohne einen französischen Soldaten, aber nicht ohne das französische Territorium, weil man die Tiefe dieses Landes braucht.” (De Maizière 1990, 38).
second reason was the ambiguous reaction by the German government despite the fact that the Pleven Plan contained openly discriminatory features vis a vis Germany. From the German point of view, the Pleven Plan explicitly entailed discriminatory features that left German units as potential ‘cannon fodder’ and second class soldiers and thus violated the demand for equal treatment that the Himmenroder Denkschrift had called for and that would be a corner stone of the German position (Himmenroder Denkschrift 1950, 5). More importantly, the negotiations at the Petersberg were clearly more salient, as they entailed the provisions of the eventual ‘Deutschlandvertrag’ that would return formal sovereignty to Germany and end the occupation. Thus, Adenauer opened these negotiations himself and staffed the German delegation with the nucleus of the Defense Ministry ‘in spe’, such as Blank, Speidel, and von Kielmansegg (Large 1996, 118).

However, both Adenauer’s public reaction as well as Brentano’s in the Bundestag session after the Pleven Plan was announced reflect the expressed desire to avoid setting up a national German army despite the fact that the US ‘package deal’ entailed that option.299 A key role consisted in the coordinating role that McCloy played: on October 28th 1950, McCloy telephoned Monnet, Schuman, and Pleven the conclusion of which was that the Pleven Plan sought no delay, that it guaranteed the prevention of a German national army and a General Staff, that it would be based on equality of rights, entail no discrimination, and that national armies should be left only in those countries that had ‘commitments overseas’.300 Thus, the principal task given to the German delegation was to gain time, but to negotiate ‘positively’ (Schwengler 1997, 393).301 The strong criticism that Adenauer’s course attracted


300 In his diary, Blankenhorn reports McCloy paraphrasing Schumacher thus, “Das Entscheidende sei, daß Garantien gegen die Errichtung einer nationalen deutschen Armee geschaffen würden. [...] Es sei aber selbstverständlich, daß eine deutsche Beteiligung an der Verteidigung Westeuropas [...] auf der Basis der Gleichberechtigung ohne jegliche Diskriminierung erfolge.” (quoted in Blankenhorn 1980, 116).

301 Instructions were, “Die deutsche Delegation sollte im Sinne einer positiven Einstellung zum Gedanken einer europäischen Armee verhandeln, aber Zeit gewinnen, ohne sich festzulegen” (131. Kabinettssitzung am 23. Februar 1951)
both in parts of the military circles as well as among the opposition led to intense secrecy around the negotiations.\(^{302}\) The German government kept its options open.

The governments of Belgium and the Netherlands made their preference for an intergovernmental solution known. Stikker proposed integrating all troops stationed in Germany under the NATO Command, responsible to the North Atlantic Council (Van der Harst 1990, 143) Van Zeeland proposed a plan that resembled the solution put forth by the Quai d’Orsay, suggesting that national armies be conserved and German units integrated into NATO divisions (see FRUS 1951 III, 762 and FRUS 1950 III; Coolsaet 2002, 112). Both plans went nowhere. The Dutch government decided merely to ‘observe’ the negotiations in Paris, as Drees and Stikker did not think the plan would ever materialize (Harryvan and van der Harst 2000, 173).

The Italian and Belgian governments decided to participate, but, in a similar fashion as the German delegation, were skeptical. The Italian Minister of Defense Paccardi intended merely to wait until the unavoidable failure of the conference.\(^{303}\) In sum, when the negotiations on the EDC opened in Paris, they did not begin with high hopes for an agreement. Robert Schuman, in his opening remarks of the Paris conference, admitted that the Pleven Plan seemed to generate much less enthusiasm than the Schuman Plan: mentioning the pervasive criticism that the proposal started with integration in the realm of defense before a political structure had been set up, he maintained that the proposal was to prevent Europe from returning to a ‘fragmentation that had become anachronistic and absurd.’ Europe had to move beyond an ‘outdated nationalism’.\(^{304}\)

\(^{302}\) The early exchanges between Adenauer and McCloy at the Petersberg were kept secret and even withheld from cabinet meetings. Documents from the EDC negotiations in Paris were kept secret in a safe in Blankenhorn’s office and could be consulted only upon request. (104. Kabinettsitzung am Dienstag, den 17. Oktober 1950)


\(^{304}\) In his opening speech at the EDC conference, Schuman pronounced, “Cette fois ci, il n’en est pas autrement, et je crois même démêler dans l’accueil qui nous a été fait, un peu moins d’enthousiasme et plus de scepticisme […] Allons-nous contrarier cet effort qui a été trop longtemps retardé, compliquer
Yet, the timing of the first steps of both the Petersberg negotiations and the negotiations in Paris suggests that the negotiations were based on an uneasy compromise: in both cases, ‘Interim Reports’ were scheduled to be compiled in June 1951, around the same time that elections for the Assemblée Nationale were expected (Leffler 1992, 413). There was little hope that any substantial result could be obtained before that date.

Summary

In sum, changing geopolitical circumstances were necessary conditions for the Allies to consider German rearmament, specifically at the time they did. Moreover, the fact that supranational institutions were considered as a solution equally follows the logic of ‘cobinding’ entailed in the intergovernmental view. It is notable, however, that such proposals emanated from a clearly identifiable source, namely Monnet and Schuman in France and the US officials McCloy and Bruce, individuals that had been linked to the transnational coalition and a distinct, shared institutional preference.

To be sure, similar and even more radical federalist proposals circulated in the transnational sphere. Their lack of influence in 1950 is, however, equally attributable to a belief in the lack of an actual possibility that such a radical new undertaking could yield effective and efficient deterrence on the continent. Thus, the US administration, following the Pentagon subscribed to that view, the Benelux did, even the French military thought so, and the Italian and German governments, although more cautious in their skepticism voiced for the Plan, did so as well. In short, a key concern was the efficiency and effectiveness of the Pleven Plan. As second concern was that the proposal was advanced by the French government merely to gain time. As shown above, this concern was valid: the Pleven Plan rested on an uneasy compromise be-

une entreprise si vaste et si difficile en elle-même? [...]Peut-on concevoir et mettre en œuvre une armée européenne avant que l'Europe soit constituée, au moins dans ses éléments essentiels? Comment, en d'autres termes, organiser une armée et l'entretenir avant qu'il y ait une autorité politique européenne, un Gouvernement et un Parlement européens ou les deux réunis? [...]Nous croyons qu'en tout état de cause, quelles que soient les solutions intercontinentales ou mondiales adoptées par ailleurs, il y a une Europe à organiser, une Europe à faire sortir d'un morcellement devenu archaïque et absurde, une Europe qui doit dépasser le stade des nationalismes surannés. Cette vérité, nous l'avons reconnue et nous la proclamons dans le domaine de l'économique et du politique; elle vaut aussi pour l'organisation de la défense, lorsqu'on recherche une structure militaire permanente.” (Schuman 1951b).
tween principled opponents of German rearmament, such as Jules Moch, lower level officials in the Quai d’Orsay who proposed intergovernmental solutions that held German forces to a level inferior to those of France, and individuals, such as Schuman and Monnet that sought to assuage fear of a resurgent German army by proposing a supranational solution. The severity of the French domestic conflict yielded a compromise to keep negotiating, without prejudging the result. Few outside of France expected the conference in Paris to succeed.

“[…] to have a European army, is to renounce a national army”
Robert Schuman

Paving the Way for a European Army

In early 1951, there were two options still on the table: a NATO solution, seemingly preferred by virtually every country in the Western Alliance and an EDC solution advocated by the French government. At the same time, signals from the German and Italian delegation suggested openness in principle to the supranational solution, but skepticism as to its feasibility prevailed. By the end of 1951, the lines of conflict had shifted, however. The EDC was the only ‘game in town’ and conflicts between France, Germany, and Italy on the one hand and Belgium and the Netherlands on the other hand almost brought the negotiations to a standstill.

In Germany, already the first secret conceptual preparations for rearmament, starting in 1948, assumed an eventual German contribution to a European force but did not specify concrete institutional configurations. Such preparations were conducted in conservative circles in Germany – with Adenauers’ allowance – and partially driven by military figures such as Speidel to emphasize the linkage between the Soviet threat in Europe and the need for German rearmament. These considerations overlapped with the later plans in the secret Himmenroder Denkschrift, emphasizing that the primary goal was equal recognition, both politically and militarily, but did not formulate an explicit institutional design, in particular not along supranational lines.

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305 Own translation from “[…] avoir une arme européenne, c’est renoncer à l’armée nationale” (Quoted in Poidevin 1986, 321).
306 The first notable such plans were made in the so-called Laupheimer circle by Hans Speidel: Ullrich Steiner, Max von Fürstenberg, Hans-Christoph und Friedrich Schenk von Stauffenberg, Paul Binder, Hans Speidel, Johann Kindt-Kiefer (NEI, Geneva Circle) (Häußler 1999, 194, 196).
The assumption was that Germany would mobilize its own troops. Thus, the military circles did not call for a supranational or federated army. Nor had Adenauer publicly specified what he meant by a ‘European army’ when he proposed in 1949 that German forces should participate in it (Large 1996, 48, 49). At the same time, Adenauer and his associates such as Blankenhorn and Brentano – for example in the Geneva Circle – had insisted that they did not want a national army, but made it clear that they sought recognition as equal partners. The Pleven Plan itself was at odds with these conditions: equality meant equal abrogation of sovereignty in military matters for all participants. A supranational army based on equality *mutatis mutandis* implied that France and the remaining partners would do so as well. It was only after the Pleven Plan was substantially altered, only after a supranational solution had become feasible, that the German government turned into a principled, even stubborn promoter of the idea. This stubbornness lasted well into 1954: in a recorded conversation between Adenauer and Spaak during the London conference – after the EDC had already been rejected in the French Assemblée Nationale – Adenauer told Spaak,

“I am truly convinced, one hundred percent indeed, that a German national army which Mendès France forces upon us will greatly endanger Germany and Europe – when I should not be any longer, I do not know what will become of Germany, if we are not able to bring Europe into being before that.”

The idea of co-binding and self-binding, repeated by Blankenhorn several times in the Geneva Circle – applied to both German as well as French ‘nationalists’, especially out of a geopolitical fear of a rapprochement with the Soviets (Schwarz 1995, 480). But in early 1951, the instructions for the German delegation reflected the

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307 Adenauer said that Germany “soll zur Verteidigung Europas einen Beitrag in einer europäischen Armee unter dem Kommando eines übergeordneten europäischen Befehlshabers leisten” and that “Eigene deutsche Streitkräfte würden nicht mehr als eine Abteilung unter einem europäischen Kommando bilden” (Adenauer 1949).

308 Own translation from “Ich bin fest davon überzeugt, hundertprozentig davon überzeugt, daß die deutsche Nationalarmee, zu der uns Mendès France zwingt, eine große Gefahr für Deutschland und Europa werden wird – wenn ich einmal nicht mehr da bin, weiß ich nicht, was aus Deutschland werden soll, wenn es uns nicht doch noch gelingen sollte, Europa rechtzeitig zu schaffen”, quoted in (Loth 2004, 47). This quote was part of a conversation overheard, unbeknown to Adenauer, by Spiegel journalist Lothar Rühl (Der Spiegel 1954b, 5; Loth 2004, 47).

309 “Verlassen Sie sich nicht darauf, Herr Bech. Es ist ein großer Irrtum, auf Frankreich zu zählen, wenn das Spiel der europäischen Nationalstaaten wieder beginnt. Die französischen Nationalisten sind ebenso wie die deutschen bereit, allen bösen Erfahrungen zum Trotz die alte Politik zu wiederholen. Denen ist Deutschland mit einer Nationalarmee lieber als Europa, wenn sie nur ihre eigene Politik mit den Russen machen können. Und die deutschen Nationalisten denken genau so; sie sind bereit, mit den Russen zu gehen” (Der Spiegel 1954b, 5).
fact that the Pleven Plan sought an interim period, in which Germany would not be an equal partner. As the French delegation showed no signs of a willingness to compromise, even in principle, on the issue of equality and troop sizes, the delay tactic initially worked, at least until the publication of the first summary reports on the state of the negotiations in Paris and the Petersberg on June 6th and 7th respectively. The ECSC Treaty had been signed in April 1951. The French elections on June 10th 1951 brought 97 Communists and a surge of 120 Gaullists in the Assemblée Nationale and weakened the parties of the Third Force significantly (Williams 1964, 494).

As two options were still on the table, the accompanying events and transnational activities steered the negotiations over the terms of German rearmament decisively in one direction, paving the way for a compromise. The Interim reports had agreed on a basic outline of the institutions that were to be created by copying the basic designs of the ECSC Treaty. Beyond that, the Interim reports contained no advance on questions of troop sizes, troop mobilization, and, in particular, the time frame for the complete equal treatment of German and Allied troops under the statute (Fursdon 1980, 112, 115). The conditions for agreement, inter alia, voiced openly in the Geneva Circle and other public outlets were quite clear: for Germany, equal treatment, for the US, military effectiveness and thus a change in the size of nationally homogeneous troop sizes.

The first reaction by US Secretary of State Acheson to the Interim Reports steered in the direction of a NATO solution combined with increased pressure on France to accept German troops (FRUS 1951 III-b, 801-803; Schwartz 1991, 223; Large 1996, 125). The US Ambassador in Paris, David Bruce, and US High Representative in Germany McCloy saw the issue differently. In a series of telegrams sent back and forth between the Department of State and the French embassy US ambassador Bruce charged Acheson to adopt the European Army solution – Bruce argued that France would accept all major concessions necessary for the US and the other Allies (Large 1996, 124, 125). In getting the French government to agree to these condi-

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310 They include: Acheson to Bruce, June 28 1951 and Acheson memorandum July 6, 1951 (FRUS 1951 III, 802, 804, 816) Bruce to Acheson, July 3, 1951 and Spofford to Acheson, July 8, 1951 (all ibid., pp. 803-804, 806, 814, 818, 822) Also see conversation between Hallstein and Bruce on Alphand and French tactics in June 1951 in which Bruce indicates that ‘he convinced’ Alphand (AAPD 1951, 340, 341). Note that Bruce and McCloy were associated with the pro-European unity Ford foundation whereas Spofford was among the Board of the American Committee on United Europe
tions, however, he had the same problem as Schuman had: the tenuous French domestic agreement on the Pleven Plan rested on conditions that made its international acceptance impossible. Most importantly, the most vocal opponents to German rearmament from the SFIO, such as Jules Moch, had only agreed to delay the decision. Similar maneuvering paved the way. In June 1951, when there was no acting French government in the aftermath of the elections, the head of the French delegation, Hervé Alphand – subsequently affiliated with the transnational coalition described in the previous chapter – was tasked by Schuman to indicate to the American ambassadors and to Monnet that he would compile a report for the next government which would contain the necessary compromises to make successful negotiations possible (Poidevin 1986, 320). Alphand shared the same views as Monnet had used: the EDC would “increase [French] security and power in Europe”.³¹¹

On August 8th, a new French government was invested. George Bidault of the MRP (NEI and Geneva Circle) replaced Moch as Minister of Defence and the overall position of the government slightly in a pro EDC direction (Massigli 1978, 280). On August 14th 1951, Alphand filed the ‘Alphand report’ containing the essential compromises, such as an acceptance of division sizes and the principle of institutional equality between France and Germany (FRUS 1951 III-b; Parsons 2003, 73; Creswell 2006, 63). Alphand and Schuman acknowledged the Alphand report as basis for further negotiations for the EDC in Paris on August 23rd 1951, partially side-stepping the French generals as well as the Conseil de Ministres who, apparently, did not see the complete report, in particular not the acknowledgment of French-German equality (Massigli 1978, 287; Parsons 2003, 73). The Cabinet, however, did insist that no single German soldier should bear arms until the EDC was ratified.³¹² Moreover, the

³¹¹ “The international position of a country like France will not be diminished in the slightest because she belongs to a united Europe. On the contrary, in increasing her security and power in Europe she will be better able to play the role of a great world Power with permanent interests in Africa and Asia.” (Alphand 1953). Alphand attended the press conferences of the European Movement in June 1952, calling for the ECSC Assembly to form the nucleus, to draft a document for a treaty that can then be accepted by the governments (Vayssière 2007, 301).

³¹² Parsons (2003, 73) does not mention that the military had seen the Alphand report (Creswell 2006, 64). According to Creswell, the Chiefs of Staff produced a ‘verbal report’ of their demands on August 27th 1951 (Ibid.). According to Auriol (Auriol and Nora 1975, 410), the meeting of the Conseil des Ministres on the same day makes no mention of the Alphand report. The decision reached (Ibid. 722) was to insist on the European Army, insisting that no German troops would be mobilized until the EDC was ratified, and “sans en faire une condition sine qua non, la France souhaite que l’Angleterre participe a la C.E.D.” According to Parsons (2003, 73), citing Elgey (Elgey 1993b, 295), no further
need for further British or American troops on the Rhine would not be dropped, neither by the Cabinet, nor did Schuman do so when acknowledging the Alphand report (Creswell 2006, 63, 65). Accordingly, Acheson grew weary because he doubted the military effectiveness of a supranational army and was sceptical of France retaining an effective veto-power over the outcome of the negotiations – a quite appropriate hunch as it turned out (FRUS 1951 III-b, 843-846).  

Within the American administration, the remaining skepticism of the Pentagon was swayed when SACEUR commander Eisenhower, a highly prominent figure, approved of the European army project after an alleged conversation with Monnet.” (Massigli 1978, 282; Elgey 1993b, 288; Duchêne 1994). Eisenhower had initially opposed the Pleven Plan rather vigorously (Sulzberger 1969, 615; Ambrose 1983, 508). Monnet had pointed out to Eisenhower that the issue was “more of a human problem than a military one”. To constitute a “solidarity of destiny”, “the French and the Germans should wear the same uniform” (Winand 1993, 28). The fact that Eisenhower – as Commander in Chief of US forces in Europe – endorsed the European Army project in the American National Security Council on August 1st 1951 was decisive in overcoming opposition from the Pentagon and the JSC regarding the military effectiveness of a supranational army (Duchêne 1994, 231; Bossuat 1996b, 197; Creswell 2006, 61). The new direction that the defense of Europe would take was fixed on August 9th 1951.  

At an ensuing tripartite meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the US, France, and the UK, it was agreed that German rearmament would be achieved through the creation of a supranational ‘European Army’. For Adenauer, the French move was credible as it corresponded to signals relayed to him earlier by McCloy and conformed to pledges made to Adenauer by both Bruce and McCloy that they would be able to convince the US administration to support it.

domestic consultations would take place until the debate in February. Massigli (1978, 287) – not cited here by Parsons – similarly ‘accuses’ Alphand and Schuman of bypassing the Cabinet. As Auriol – hardly a champion of the EDC – indicates that there was no serious disagreement concerning the further negotiations, and as the demands by the French generals were virtually ignored at the further negotiations, causing increasing resentment by the military – this interpretation seems highly plausible (Auriol and Nora 1975, 410).

Acheson insisted that the EDC had to be subsumed under NATO command structure and not ‘unduly’ interfere with military effectiveness, i.e. the EDC must not “constitute a separate European field army but would be based on the idea of European contingents which could be disposed of by the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe in accordance with military necessity” (quoted in Winand 1993, 27).  

Report of the Allied High Commissioners concerning the Establishment of a New Relationship between the Allied Powers and Germany on August 9th 1951 (FRUS 1951 III-a, 1501-1511).
This indication was sufficient for Adenauer to change course: the delegation that had hitherto negotiated the terms for German rearmament on the Petersberg was transferred to Paris (Large 1996, 131). This move caused some consternation as Blank had been instructed to insist on equality rather vehemently. French officials thus nick-named Blank’s arrival as 'La Bombe Blank' (Massigli 1978, 277; Schwartz 1991, 229). Moreover, there were still open issues: Adenauer continued to seek German membership in NATO but would be rebuked, time and again, by the Allies and specifically France (Gersdorff 1993).

In addition to shifts in the positions of the French and German governments, the Italian government reacted to these events in a radical manner. The Italian government, in part due to a significant presence of federalist deputies, faced domestic demands to advocate federalist solutions, in particular after the outbreak of the Korean War. This course of action was received skeptically, in particular by Foreign Minister Sforza. The fact that the US now supported the EDC alternative prompted reconsideration, initially out of fear for the reputation and influence of the Italian government in the Western sphere. Minister of Defense Pella continued to be skeptical. The head of the Italian generals Marras warned against the “fatal abrogation of a delicate and important element of our sovereignty.” (Magagnoli 1999, 77). Others doubted the necessity of giving up the “last remainder of political independence” (Magagnoli 1999, 76).


316 In reaction to Korean war, meeting of the Italian Parliamentary group for European union on October 12th with De Gasperi and Sforza, out of which came a resolution calling for a new federal pact, the radicalness of which was still approached cautiously by De Gasperi and Sforza (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 257; 1990, 215), stating that it “invites the government to support and promote every initiative that may lead to the early conclusion, as a first step, of an initial convention among the countries concerned for the constitution of a parliament and a federal Council of government.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 259; 1990, 215).

These views did not necessarily correspond to De Gasperi’s: his utterances reveal from the beginning a cautious approach to the Pleven Plan and the Italian delegation had taken a similarly cautious approach in Paris. The bad outing of the DC in lower level elections in 1951 prompted a reshuffling of the Cabinet during which De Gasperi replaced Foreign Minister Sforza (Bredebach 2013, 190). Spinelli had already submitted a memorandum to De Gasperi, in which he criticized the current state of the negotiations as inaugurating a “shadow without a body” that had “no possibility to make a successful contribution” without subordinating the European army to a European federal system (Magagnoli 1998, 40). The consideration of a complete political union, moreover, suggested to some a distinct advantage in term of Italian influence. Malagodi, an official in the Palazzo Chigi wrote,

“Finally, it should be taken into account that – especially for a a poor, but populous country like ours – the possibility of proportional representation in an elected and directly responsible Assembly is an essential corrective to the weakness caused by the lack of economic resources.”

For the Italian government the domestic shift brought a particular federalist interpretation into focus that, in addition, seemed to correspond to a particular interpretation of Italian advantage. Thus, when the federalist Ivan Matteo Lombardo (UEF) was appointed the new head of the Italian delegation in Paris he quickly pointed out that Italy sought a complete federation instead of a partial European Army. The proposals for the EDC – entailing, as it were, a European Minister of Defense and a common budget – were now unacceptable to the Italian government “without creating, in return, a body at the federal level to which the divested powers of the national Assemblies would be entrusted and that would have the same authority to exercise them like the national.” The creation of such a federal organization was now, in

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318 At a meeting with Pleven and Schuman in March 1951, De Gasperi welcomed the Pleven Plan as possible “base permanente per gli Stati Uniti d’Europa.” (Bredebach 2013, 188).
319 Own translation from “Schließlich ist zu berücksichtigen, daß besonders für ein armes, aber bevölkerungreiches Land wie das unsere, die Möglichkeit einer sich proportional zu seiner Bevölkerung vollziehenden Teilnahme an einer gewählten und direkt verantwortlichen Versammlung ein wesentliches Korrektiv zur Schwäche darstellt, die durch den Mangel an wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen verursacht wird” (Magagnoli 1999, 82).
320 “Die Bildung einer möglichst umfassenden europäischen Föderation sollte der Europa-Armee vorangehen oder zeitgleich mit ihr verlaufen, ihr aber auf keinen Fall folgen.” (Magagnoli 1999, 83).
321 Own translation from “sans créer en contrepartie sur le plan fédéral un organisme auquel serait confiés les pouvoirs dont les Assemblées Nationales se dessaisiraient et qui auraient l’autorité de les exercer au même titre que les Parlement nationaux.” (Magagnoli 1999, 101).
the Italian viewpoint, a precondition for any agreement. The new radicalism of the Italian government was not based on an overwhelming consensus. Apart from federalist members of the government - such as Ugo La Malfa (UEF, ELC) and Lombardo – the Cabinet, specifically Minister of Defense Guiseppe Pella agreed to the new course only reluctantly. As the Italian demands were opposed in Paris in particular by the representatives of the smaller nations, De Gasperi’s course was challenged repeatedly and he had to threaten with resignation in December 1951 (Magagnoli 1999, 111; Bredebach 2013, 194).

Summary

Thus, the shift from French isolation to a convergence, if not similarity, of the positions of the three bigger states was due, first and primarily, due to a shift in the US position that had begun to see in the EDC a more effective option for its long-term interest, a change that was not so much based on new information but on successful efforts to convince the US administration by McCloy, Bruce, and Monnet. At the same time, this shift was accompanied by maneuvering within the French government instigated by Schuman, Monnet, and Alphand. Without knowing the composition of future governments and parliamentary majorities, this move was based on a calculated risk as much as it was based on the ideological preferences of these actors. In a basic sense, their views corresponded to those of the German Christian Democratic leadership. Finally, seeing a path towards a viable compromise on a European Army and US support firmly behind it, federalist lobbying and domestic reshuffling in Italy brought additional supporters of the radical federalist blueprint into the fold. While in early 1951 two options for German rearmament had been on the table, in late 1951 the supranational solution was the only game in town. The necessary key was US power. Behind US power were the sufficient factors: the influence that Monnet could exercise on Eisenhower, the ability of Bruce and specifically McCloy to convince Adenauer of the intended equal treatment of Germany behind the French

proposal and, finally, the federalist influence over the Italian government to endorse radical institutional blueprints.

In all of these cases, actors sought to identify ‘national interests’: there is no evidence of a uniform move towards ‘identical’ interests in view of a ‘identical’ European ideal leading to actors discounting any notion of national power and influence. The German government clearly sought recognition, the Italian government anticipated increasing influence, and the reasoning endorsed by Schuman and Monnet equated European institution with French leadership of the continent. Yet, in the larger European continental countries as well in the US, those who had participated in or were closely linked to European transnational and transatlantic communities that had and would advocate supranational institutions as solutions to basic international cooperation problems in Europe had pushed their governments in a similar direction. In this sense, without considering the activities of Monnet and McCloy seeking to convince the US administration of the ‘necessity’ of an EDC are as important as the domestic divisions in France in steering the bargain along the EDC track. In hindsight, the French advance to accept the principle of equality between France and Germany would lead to serious domestic conflict.

The positions of the bigger three governments in Paris had thus shifted: partially as a result of maneuvering to convince the US government to reconsider its position on the European army; partially as a result of changing embeddedness as De Gasperi explicitly appointed a federalist leader of the Italian delegation and a principled opponent of German rearmament – Jules Moch – left the French government. This created a new situation in which the EDC was supported by the leadership of the US and the three larger continental countries.

**Negotiating and Signing the EDC Treaty, 1951-1952**

The shifting positions of the larger countries and the US had consequences for the smaller countries. The new position of the US administration meant that threats of aid cuts absent an agreement to German rearmament would henceforward be applied to both governments. Thus, the Belgian government, and Van Zeeland in particular, already feared that the EDC would have to be accepted “by political order” (De Vos, et al. 1998, 296). The Belgian decision to participate in the negotiations was, from
the beginning, associated with instructions to safe-guard as much sovereignty as possible, as Van Zeeland wrote to the Belgian delegation that “[t]he principle of unanimity can be the last backup, if only as a threat to national interests in danger.”323 The Belgian government insisted repeatedly that, in principle, it would not want to exceed the degree of military integration laid down in the Brussels Treaty of 1947, and that the complete application of the principles of the ECSC to defense – following a “modern theory held in France by Schuman, Monnet, and [the leader of French EDC delegation, B.F.] Alphand” – was unacceptable. In the words of a member of the Belgian delegation, De Staercke, the absence of the UK government from the treaty merely reinforced “suspicion [of the] long terms motives [of] both [the] French and Germans.”324 Thus, the Belgian delegation continued to vehemently reject the notion of an EDC command structure that was independent of NATO, and sought to preserve unanimity decisions in the Council as far as possible (Deloge 2000). Preserving a multi-member commissariat as well as subsuming the EDC forces under NATO command was a key precondition for the Belgian government for assent to the EDC Treaty (Coolsaet 1988, 152). In sum, the government preferences ‘supplied’ by the Belgian Christian Democratic government were in line with both the intergovernmentalist expectations for the smaller countries.

Equally so in the Dutch case. The Dutch Foreign Minister had, still in January 1951, made it very clear that he opposed the European Army and thought that its French masterminds were in way over their heads.325 Stikker concurred with Dutch Prime

323 Own translation from “Le principe d’unanimité peut être la dernière sauvegarde, ne fût-ce comme menace, d’intérêts nationaux en danger.” (Coolsaet 2002, 114).
324 Conversation noted on January 21st 1952 in the Belgian Documents, at a meeting between Belgian EDC delegation chiefs (de Staercke), Van Zeeland, and US ambassador in Brussels Murphy, “Monsieur de Staercke expose que la Belgique est prête à entrer dans l’armée européenne, mais seulement sur les bases qui ont été définis, dès le début, lors du Conseil Atlantique de Bruxelles et que le dégrée d’intégration militaire, financier et politique que la Belgique accepte est entièrement suffisamment pour constituer cette armée. Nous ne pouvons aller plus loin, dans un sens, sans violer la constitution. Il y a, en France, ajoute monsieur de Staercke, une théorie moderne dont le protagoniste est monsieur Schuman et une tendance absolutiste, qui est celle de messieurs Monnet et Alphand, consistant à transposer le plan Schuman dans la Communauté Européenne de Défense. C’est là une superstructure trop lourde.” (De Vos, et al. 1998, 313, 314).
325 He pointed out to the US ambassador that he believed that “Western Germany and closely tying it in with West essential. He would even be willing for them to join NATO but realizes this premature and French would oppose. He said German rearmament essential to “forward strategy” and defense as far to east in Germany as possible. Without rearmament German defense line would be on Rhine-Issel which is "totally unacceptable to Netherlands". He is opposed to concept of European army and also thinks it an error for French to call conference at this time since it will not succeed and will aggravate existing disagreements and divisions of opinion not only over Germany but also over French concept of European Federation which UK, Scandinavians and Dutch oppose. He believes that Pleven, FonOff
Minister Drees that the supranational inclination of the French delegation was far too radical for the French parliament and that the French government was taking considerable risks with regard to a possible ratification of such a radical proposal (Van der Harst 1990: 148). Moreover, it was both Drees’ and Stikker’s primary concern that the UK should participate in any defense organization tasked with the rearmament of Germany (FRUS 1951 III-b, 736). A significant source of disquiet was, as in the case of the Belgian governments, fear of dominance of the larger powers.

However, several Dutch deputies were more positively inclined towards the EDC – such as Van der Goes van Naters – and inquired why the Dutch government had refrained from participating in the negotiations as US support of the EDC prompted a reconsideration within the Cabinet. Spierenburg, the head of Dutch ECSC delegation, argued that “the creation of a European army had proved to be the only solution for the important problem of German rearmament” (Harryvan and van der Harst 2000, 174). Drees and Stikker were opposed, whereas Mansholt argued in favor (Ibid.). The memo that announced Dutch participation in the negotiations expressed the internal compromise: there was to be no common budget or at least the possibility of complete Dutch control over it by veto; at least one commissioner in a multimember Board would have to be Dutch, and EDC command should be in every respect subordinated to NATO. Such institutions did not require a parliament and are, again, entirely in line with intergovernmentalist expectations (H2).

Thus, both the Dutch and Belgian governments participated in the EDC negotiations for lack of a better option and sought to limit its supranational character and retain unanimity as much as possible.

governments, and the US administration now firmly behind the EDC, the lines of conflict had shifted and now conformed to the basic expectation from an intergovernmentalist point of view.\textsuperscript{329}

A major part of the reason that these differences could be resolved at all was US pressure to do so. By April 11\textsuperscript{th} 1952, Acheson started to press for faster negotiations as the appropriations of the Mutual Security Agency – controlling the flow of aid to Europe – were scheduled to be debated by Congress. Acheson thus wanted the EDC to be signed by May. In effect, US domestic politics set the deadline for the EDC Treaty (FRUS 1952-1954 VII, 26, 27).\textsuperscript{330}

A number of issues were, however, still unresolved. On the institutional level, the fact that the envisioned treaty would delegate substantial ‘core state powers’ raised the criticism that the treaty did not conform to basic democratic standards and presupposed a political organization, a sentiment that Schuman had already expressed at the beginning of the conference.\textsuperscript{331} Second, essentially all negotiating governments sought British association or closer participation in the Treaty. Both conditions emerged, \textit{inter alia}, as key hindrance in France for a successful ratification of the EDC Treaty.

In light of the continuing conflicts and the fragile domestic situation by early 1952, French Prime Minister Edgar Faure – member of the EPU and supporter of the EDC – sought approval of the \textit{Assemblée Nationale} for the impending signing of the EDC Treaty by a vote of confidence that barely passed, partially because a number of So-

\textsuperscript{329} Murphy’s report of the same conversation: \textit{The Ambassador in Belgium (Murphy) to the Department of State. [SECRET] Brussels, January 19\textsuperscript{th} 1952}, “Van Zeeland declared that as matters now stood some, members govt and parliament were lukewarm in favor of Eur army giving it lip service only and that it wld not take much talk to effect that larger powers pressuring smaller to make issue most unpopular in Belg. Brit abstention alone discouraged many and there is abundant suspicion long term motives both French and Germans. He has been sounding out key members of House and Senate and finds great reserve and much opposition. There is, he said, increasing sentiment that Swiss are in happy position and perhaps Belg cld copy them. Present govt instructions to deputy go as far as legal position permits and ‘if Belg next Tuesday is faced with a take-it-or-leave-it attitude Belg will leave it’ and in doing so govt is certain of parliamentary and public support.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 588).

\textsuperscript{330} Acheson to Bruce on April 11\textsuperscript{th} 1952, “this session of Cong will end at the very latest by Jul 3 and possibly several days earlier. If the contractual agreements with Ger are to be ratified at this session, they must, therefore, be laid before Senate by the middle of May at the very least. [...] I stress the point of signing both sets of agreements.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 641).

\textsuperscript{331} “Ceux qui avec nous admettent un tel objectif nous font une autre objection: peut-on concevoir et mettre en oeuvre une armée européenne avant que l'Europe soit constituée, au moins dans ses éléments essentiels? Comment, en d'autres termes, organiser une armée et l'entretenir avant qu'il y ait une autorité politique européenne, un Gouvernement et un Parlement européens ou les deux réunis?” (Schuman 1951b).
cialist and Radical deputies abstained from supporting their government.\textsuperscript{332} The vote was associated with a number of conditions for the ratification of the eventual treaty: that the army should be controlled by a supranational authority that had to answer to democratically legitimated representatives; that unanimous decisions within that authority should be minimized; and that, without being conditional, the UK should participate in the EDC to address the most basic concerns for the ratification of the treaty.

This was a circle that simply could not be squared.\textsuperscript{333} In particular, once the content of the Treaty was circulated, it became clear that the asymmetry between France and Germany no longer existed: French troops could not be withdrawn at will to conduct the ‘operations’ independently, for example in the escalating war in Indochina. The military was immediately opposed, and a figure like a Maréchal Juin, a living legend from the War, exclaimed his opposition to the EDC publicly (Soutou 1993, 503). Among the French Chiefs of Staff, some sought a transitional period in the establishment of the EDC, others began advocating German entry into NATO (Ziebura 1997, 99; Creswell 2006, 82). Repeated calls for British troop associations were never answered in a satisfactory manner. Accordingly, members of the Cabinet were outraged at US pressure to conclude the negotiations and French representatives tried to frantically obtain more conditions (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b; Massigli 1978, 323). With hindsight, the main defects of the EDC were in place when the negotiators rushed to an agreement over the distribution of forces. The situation in the US Senate would never allow committing further troops; never mind the commitment of troops

\textsuperscript{332} The outcome was positive outcome 327 to 287 in with deviations (MRP 7, Radicals 11, UDSR 1) most pronounced in the SFIO; here, against the party resolution, 20 deputies abstained (Elgey 1993b, 312).

\textsuperscript{333} Among the chief elements in the \textit{ordre de jour}, obligating the French government, “de prévoir dans les protocoles annexes du traité la mise en place progressive des unités au fur et à mesure que pourra matériellement être établie ;’organisation commune.” Moreover, “L’Assemblée demande que tout soit mis en œuvre pour assurer: (1) la subordination de l’armée européenne à un pouvoir politique supranational à compétence limitée mais réelle, responsable devant des représentants des Assemblées ou des peuples européens, et invite le gouvernement à prendre dans ce sens toutes initiatives nécessaires. (2) la stictie limitation et l’énumération précise des cas où des peut jouer la règle d’unanimité, ainsi que l’établissement d’un budget commun vote par l’Assemblée et non soumis à un droit de veto. Elle maintient son opposition à la reconstitution d’une armée allemande et d’un état-major allemands. Elle invite le gouvernement à renouveler tous ses efforts avec la volonté profonde d’aboutir en vue d’obtenir la participation dans a Communauté européenne de Défense s’autres nations démocratique, et notamment de la Grande-Bretagne; cette solution constituant une garantie qui répond pleinement aux soucis exprimés par l’Assemblée national comporterait naturellement l’étude et la mise au point des institutions et des modalités les plus susceptibles d’en assurer la réussite.” (Quoted in Fauvet 1956, 26, 27, original italics).
beyond the reach of the Senate’s constitutional prerogatives. In drafting a reply to France on May 3rd 1952, Acheson thus dutifully insisted on a precise wording concerning the placement US troops in NATO (that the US would ‘contribute its fair share’ (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 647).

British troops joining the EDC was totally out of the question as well. It was perceived as inconceivable by the British Chiefs of Staff and would not have gone through parliament (Dockrill 1991, 110). Churchill, although advocate of ‘European Army’, certainly did not have supranational institutions in mind believing that they were not an effective solution to the defence problem (Young 1996, 59, 91). Nor did anyone else in his cabinet for that matter.

Summary

As a result, the final treaty violated two of three conditions that the Assemblée Nationale had put forward. The Treaty reduced vetoes to a minimum and submitted the control of the budget to a parliament, but, as indicated by Art. 38, it did not submit the Army to a complete political authority yet, nor was British participation obtained. The resulting treaty bound French troops at a time when French colonial ambitions – in particular in Indochina – called for greater flexibility. Its virtual equality, rather than persistent French superiority over German forces, was the very state of affairs that the Quai d’Orsay had sought to prevent in 1950. As a result, the French government, including Schuman, decided to ‘accept’ because it decided not to ratify the treaty in that form (Fauvet 1956, 28; Grosser 1961, 243; Auriol and Nora 1970, 368; Duchêne 1994, 233; Creswell 2006, 90).334

334 A cabinet memorandum from November 29 1951 reiterates a favorite expression, “I should doubt very much the military spirit of a ‘sludgy amalgam’ of volunteers or conscripts to the defend the EDC.” (Jansen 1992, 65).

335 As the French government failed to obtain the conditions set forth by the Assemblée Nationale, Schuman was heavily criticized; an argument ensued in the Cabinet whether refusing the signature was possible (Auriol and Nora 1970, 357; Clesse 1989, 122). Schuman agreed that new conditions with regard to the British and US security guarantees would have to be obtained (Maier 1990, 448; Elgey 1993b, 323; Hitchcock 1998, 168). On May 21st 1952, the Commission des Affaires étrangères of the Assemblée Nationale even proposed to reject the Treaty entirely. The French generals approved signature provided that a transitional period would be subsequently introduced, and France acquired the right to withdraw troops in case of an emergency in the colonies (Creswell 2006, 94). All of the conditions above would subsequently be reiterated by French governments, including that led by Pierre Mendès France.
The risk that the governments had taken was thus considerable. The sentiment had already been expressed by Stikker before the Dutch government even sent its own delegation. Moreover, as in 1951, without US pressure to sign the treaty, several conflicts regarding the institutions could not have been resolved formally by a signed EDC Treaty, the most important being political and democratic control and British participation as called for, *inter alia*, by the *Assemblée Nationale*.

*A European Political Community? Two Options for Article 38*

As the preceding section has shown, the months preceding the signing of the EDC Treaty were accompanied by significant US pressure. The core problem consisted of, first, the unheeded calls for US or British troop commitments and, second, the unfinished nature of the institutions of the EDC as Art. 38 called for a ‘federal or confederal’ structure that was to take the place of the ‘present transitional organization’.

As already alluded to in the previous section, even before the Treaty was signed, efforts in the transnational sphere had taken shape that united the hitherto uncoordinated attempts from the transnational federalists, actors from the transatlantic transgovernmental network including Monnet, federalist members of transnational Christian Democracy, and the new leadership of the European Movement (chapter 5, section 5.2.2). Spaak reassembled the leadership of the federalists and the transnational Christian Democrats under the umbrella of the European Movement into a transnational coalition that pushed heavily for the federalist direction entailed in Art. 38. Criticism of the ‘undemocratic nature’ of the EDC institutions was by no means limited to these actors. The issue had already been discussed in ECSC negotiations (Rittberger 2001); it drew repeated criticism from opponents of the Treaty in domestic settings. Allusions to Art. 38 served as a suitable response. While the concrete

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336 Article 38 of the EDC Treaty stipulated that the “definitive organization which will take the place of the present transitional organization should be conceived so as to be capable of constituting one of the elements of an ultimate Federal or confederal structure, based upon the principle of the separation of powers and including, particularly, a bicameral representative system” (Art. 38 EDC Treaty 1952).

design of the Treaty followed the ECSC blueprint in its delineation of relatively extensive parliamentary powers, Art. 38 suggested explicitly that the EDC structure had to be temporary. As was the case with the decision for rearmament and the broad institutional outlines of the EDC, two paths were available for the road that the ‘institutional wrapping’ of the EDC was to take.

One path – following the federalist blueprint – consisted in calling for a constituent Ad Hoc Assembly on the basis of the ECSC institutions that would be established in August 1952 – was already discussed in the previous chapter, documenting the coordinated transnational attempts to push the negotiating governments in that direction. At the same time, in the UK there were internal strategic differences between Churchill, Eden, and MacMillan and the British Chiefs of Staff over the best way of addressing European developments. Churchill found the idea of a four-power summit more appealing to pursue the possibility of German neutrality, in particular in reaction to the Stalin Note in March 1952 but he was opposed by most of his cabinet (Young 1996, 54, 98-100). For Eden, the concern was rather to ensure that the basic security interests, in particular US interests, were met and a functioning Western Alliance created. During the scramble for the signing of the EDC Treaty he had already proposed to extend the NATO obligations of collective security to the EDC with approval from the Cabinet (Eden 1960, 40, 43; Creswell 2006, 89). The fundamental concern, apparently, was not to appear ‘anti-European’, thus motivating the series of unilateral declarations of EDC support by the Cabinet (Dockrill 1991, 92).

The considerations for the Eden Plan were developed on the basis of concerns for the ‘European credentials’ of the British government. Thus, Eden argued, it “might help to remove any remaining misapprehension that the United Kingdom Government had been lukewarm in their support of a European Defence Community.” (Dockrill 1991, 95; Young 1996, 86). Similar motivations guided the granting of an extension of the NATO articles specifying the extension of collective security to the EDC (Elgey

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338 Without at least a unilateral declaration, Eden expressed this worry in a Cabinet meeting, “the failure of the Paris conference would be blamed on us and we should incur, however unjustly, much odium […]. We thus have a strong interest in bringing the Paris conference to a rapid and successful conclusion.” (DBPO II: I, 839-841).
It would only come in the form of a ‘unilateral statement’ attached to the EDC Treaty and would certainly not exceed the already present security guarantees under NATO (Watt 1985, 89). Opposition within the Cabinet emerged from the COS and Churchill, maintaining that it was unwise to promise this unilaterally in advance of the United States, but ultimately concurred (Mager 1990, 21). Thus, for Eden, the goal was to speed up negotiations from the ‘outside’ and to allow progress for a European Political Community (EPC) (DBPO II: I, 839-841). The essentials of the Eden Plan would have set up the Council of Europe for the Six in matters for their concern and would have allowed continuous consultations among the Six and the other members. The Cabinet endorsed Eden’s perspective. A memorandum conveyed the idea on April 11th 1952. The British Cabinet thus began to actively consider alternative proposals against the EDC as signs were discernible that ratification might not succeed (Jansen 1992, 79; Macmillan 2003, 192). In Eden’s words, these would have to include “technical military arrangements agreed upon without a political superstructure.” (Eden 1960, 34). The Chiefs of Staff objected heavily against a potential commitment of British troops (Dockrill 1991, 110; Jansen 1992, 79). This was the first time that the Foreign Office, under the impression of repeated French pleas for a troop association, began to contemplate a UK troop commitment. To surmise whether the Eden Plan would have contributed more to the eventual ratification of the EDC Treaty than the aborted EPC project is speculation as it is unclear whether the COS – and Churchill – would have agreed at that point in time.

What is clear is that this path was never pursued. The US State Department was initially ‘of two minds’ about the pros and cons of the Plan and decided to ‘remain silent’ for the time being. It is instructive that Schuman’s initial reaction was tenta-

339 The memo said that “the Council of Europe should be remodelled so that its organs could serve as the ministerial and parliamentary institutions of the Schuman Plan, the European Defence Community and any future organisations of the same structure. At the same time, the Council of Europe would continue to serve as a consultative body and as a forum for intergovernmental and parliamentary cooperation in Western Europe.” (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b, 61). Moreover, it proposes a ‘two-tier’ system so that during negotiations relating to supranational institutions, only the Six would be present, whereas on other issues, 15 members would continue to be present (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b, 60-65).

340 On May 2nd 1952, in reaction to the Eden proposals Sec. State to Embassy in France, “Dept of two minds best method handling Eden proposals.” On the one hand, no ‘significant institutional development’, on the other hand, “plan might have important psychological effect by committing non-member countries to closer relations with EDC and Schuman Plan” Hence, “In view of foregoing, we inclined believe best course for US is not to comment on plan at this stage but see how discussion shapes up and proposals evolves in Depts mtg.” (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-bl, 73, 74).
tively supportive of the Eden Plan, advising his delegate at the COE Council, François Seydoux, that the Eden Plan proposal was to be submitted to the COE Assembly to study it (Kim 2000, 103). Within the Quai d’Orsay, opinions were split: a group around Alphand – former leader of the French EDC delegation who had close ties to Monnet and participated in the campaign of the European Movement described earlier – thought the Eden proposals were meaningless. The French ambassador in London, René Massigli, who had been skeptical of the EDC project from the outset, thought the proposals made sense as they addressed a basic French concern to tie the UK into the emerging institutions (Kim 2000, 103). The current French cabinet under Pinay, however, suffered from similar internal divisions as the previous governments: the Cabinet resolution was thus a compromise between these two views, as Pinay came down in favor of Monnet’s proposal (Kim 2000, 75, 105).341

For the German and Italian governments, the view of the Eden Plan was relatively clear: both essentially followed Monnet’s reasoning. Spinelli had begun to lobby De Gasperi and Lombardo already in February 1952, urging them to press for an early convocation of a constituent assembly without awaiting the signing of the EDC Treaty or its ratification (Magagnoli 1999, 140). From the point of view of the Palazzo Chigi, the Eden Plan would cause a loss of Italian influence over the negotiations and would only downgrade a ‘federalist initiative’ to a ‘talking shop’.342 The German reaction was similarly negative (AAPD 1952, 528). The Auswärtige Amt had institutionalized an “Allgemeinen Ausschuss” that was to discuss and advise on the EPC in spring 1952, members were Ophüls and the Federalists Kogon, Friedländer, Blessing (Kim 2000, 75, 323). In an internal paper, Ophüls justified this stance by warning of the danger that the Eden proposal would split the Six and prevent the foundation of a federation that had to be geographically limited (Kim 2000, 75, 100). The State Department finally followed Monnet’s reasoning, similarly recommending the rejection of the Eden Plan to “avoid any watering down of supranational principles.” (FRUS

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341 “1) Zwecks rascher Ausarbeitung eines solchen Entwurfs für eine politische Behörde ist die Versammlung der Montangemeinschaft auf diese besondere Maßgabe nach des Vertrags über die EVG zu erweitern; 2) Vertreter der Länder, die Mitglieder des Europarats und an der Montangemeinschaft nicht beteiligt sind, sind unter noch festzulegenden Bedingungen einzuladen.” (Kim 2000, 75, 96).

342 More importantly, Taviani thought that “der Europarat ist derartig entwertet, daß sich eine föderalistische Initiative zu sechst in seinem Schoß als der übliche Debattierclub präsentieren würde.” (Magagnoli 1999, 142).
As a result, the Eden plan was aborted and the approach advocated by the transnational coalition adopted in the ECSC Council.\textsuperscript{343}

The fact that the Quai d'Orsay was split as well as the fact the French Socialist leader Mollet initiated the vote in the \textit{Assemblée Nationale} reflects the fact the proposal was not as meaningless or dangerous as these reactions made them out to be. For the Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland, the solutions advocated, \textit{inter alia}, by his domestic rival Spaak certainly went too far.\textsuperscript{344} Van Zeeland resigned to ensuring that Belgian interests would be defended by delegate Wigny in the Ad Hoc Assembly (Coolsaet 2002, 117). The Dutch government remained silent for a while as the elections of June 1952 necessitated personnel changes. Once the Dutch government had been reassembled in September 1952, a change of personnel occurred as Jan Willem Beyen replaced Stikker as Foreign Minister. At the meeting of the ECSC Council that passed the Luxembourg resolution for the Ad Hoc Assembly, Beyen, to the surprise of everyone, assented and stated that he would himself participate in a lower level committee to prepare its work (Harryvan 2009, 40).

\textbf{Summary}

In sum, once the EDC Treaty was signed, there were two alternative paths for addressing the widely perceived ‘transitory state’ of the EDC institutions. In particular, the widely perceived lack of a proper subjection of the new military authority to

\textsuperscript{343} The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State in Paris on July 23\textsuperscript{rd} 1952 that the “Italian Emb informs us that in last night's talk with De Gasperi, Schuman accepted all major Italian amendments […] and that common French-Italian proposal on European political authority will be presented to six ministers probably tomorrow afternoon. De Gasperi also saw Adenauer this morning, and was very impressed with firm stand which Germans intend to take on importance moving rapidly ahead to create common political authority. Adenauer was also as strongly opposed as ever to use of Council of Europe Assembly. Our source seemed very encouraged by these developments. He believed that solid French-German-Italian front can be maintained on this issue at tomorrow's (Thursday's) meeting. Only serious difficulty he foresees will be Dutch effort to keep this matter completely off ministers agenda on grounds that in absence Dutch Government, Stikker cannot take any commitments. De Gasperi expressed himself as strongly in favor close United States association with work of Schuman Plan Assembly on political authority. De Gasperi discussed this question also with Adenauer, who agreed entirely. De Gasperi will probably make proposal […] when French-Italian proposal on political community is discussed by ministers.” (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b, 131, 132).

\textsuperscript{344} As Van Zeeland reported to Eden in October 1952, “La Belgique n’est pas prête, et en tout cas pas désireuse, de se laisser entrainer à des solutions qui fussent de nature à créer une autorité supranationale, de caractère susceptible de supprimer la souveraineté des différents États et à faire disparaître éventuellement le rôle de ces États comme intermédiaires entre les individus qui les composent et cette autorité supranationale.” (Quoted in Dumoulin 1999, 67).
democratically ‘appropriate’ institutions necessitated, as Article 38 put it, ‘confederal or federal’ structures. Accordingly, two alternative proposals were on the table: a confederal alternative with the Eden Plan and an avowedly federal alternative, advocated by the assembling transnational coalition. The confederal alternative was discarded, in favour of the path advocated by the new transnational coalition of federalists and European supranationalists around Spaak.

The irony is that although the intention behind the creation of the Ad Hoc Assembly was to increase the ratification chances of the EDC Treaty, it would arguably affect the opposite in France. Domestically, the course taken in Europe did not fare well for the French government, in particular with a few renegade Gaullist deputies that the Pinay government relied upon and whose votes were bitterly needed for survival. In October 1952, a congress of the Radical Party saw prominent party leaders such as Edouard Herriot and Pierre Mendes France publicly oppose the EDC Treaty (Kim 2000, 75, 196). This loss of support led to a failed vote of confidence in December 1952 and to the failure of the Pinay government (Elgey 1993b, 93).

Summing up, the first two stages of the bargain reveal that the factors emphasized by both the intergovernmental as well as the transnational perspectives are required to account for the course of the bargain sufficiently.

Thus, actors continued to pursue perceived ‘national interests’ and thus material circumstances and geopolitical incentives mattered. The German government and, more explicitly, the Italian government clearly perceived a supranational army to be in accordance with a particular view of the ‘national interest’. Without the Korean War and a perceived Soviet threat, negotiations on a European Army in particular and German rearmament in general would not have begun, conforming the necessary status of Hypothesis 3. Without US pressure exerted on European governments to come to an agreement, the negotiations would likely have taken longer, confirming the necessary status of Hypothesis 1. Without French internal differences that allowed the credible signal of domestic constraints, the negotiations would likely have taken the course that was seemingly preferred by all governments except the French in 1950, namely German entry into NATO accompanied by suitable institutional safeguards as suggested by the ‘package deal’, confirming the necessary status of Hypothesis 5. Finally, there are clearly discernible differences between the smaller
and the larger countries that, from 1951 onwards, clearly fall in line with intergovernmentalist expectations.

These considerations, however, equally demonstrate that key developments cannot be accounted for sufficiently from the intergovernmental point of view without taking into account the evidence in line with transnationalist hypotheses (H7 – H10). The French divisions implied that a particular version of the French national interest – shared by Monnet, Schuman and others – vehemently pushed for a European army against mounting domestic scepticism and at considerable risk, in particular whether it would be possible to muster sufficient domestic support for their own project. The supranational option, initially considered and discarded by the US government, was taken in 1951 then largely on account of the activities of Monnet and Schuman in France, McCloy and Bruce in brokering a French-German agreement on institutional equality and convincing their own government to pursue that course – the outlines of which had been exchanged freely for a while in the Geneva Circle as the previous chapter has demonstrated – and federalist pressure on the Italian government to reconsider its position. In every case, governments staffed with individuals that were ideologically close to the emerging transnational coalition deemed their choices in the national interests; in every case, there were other compatriots – especially in the military establishment of each country – who saw it differently. Thus, in as much as French domestic constraints and US power mattered, ideas and assessment transmitted and coordinated within transgovernmental and transnational circles pushed the bargain along a supranational track.

Moreover, as the rejection of the Eden Plan demonstrated, transnational influence was predicated on access to governments. Thus, Spaak’s proposal for a distinct constitutional Assembly was beaten in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe but accepted by the governments of the Six. Adopted as a strategy to improve the ratification chances of the EDC, this move would backfire soon.

7.2.2 The Battle for the EDC, 1952-1954

In as much as the EPC Treaty did little to increase the ratification chances in France, the ratification conflicts that followed the signing of the EDC Treaty and the submission of the EPC Draft to the governments of the Six was marked by contradictory developments. In Germany, the somewhat tortuous ratification process started in
March 1953 with the Bundestag’s first affirmative vote and ended in March 1954 when the Bundesrat approved a constitutional amendment. In the Netherlands, the Tweede Kammer voted affirmatively in July 1953, the Senate in January 1954. The Belgian Chambre des Représentants voted for the Treaty in November 1953 the Senate in March 1954 (Griffiths 2000, 166).

However, there was hardly any progress in Italy and France. In both cases, the EDC was withheld from the floor by parliamentary committees until June 1954. The relatively straightforward line of conflict between the three larger and the smaller continental states dissolved, as domestic changes changed the ideological compositions of both governments. In both instances, geopolitical incentives – such as the conflict over Trieste, the escalating war in Indochina, and the perspective of détente after Stalin’s death – combined to decrease the available support, both in parliament and in government, of the EDC Treaty. As governments shifted to the right, ideological distance came with lack of influence and the radicalism of the previous years backfired. As governments had inherited a Treaty they did not or could not ratify, the only option was delay.

In addition, whereas the US administration under Truman had been immensely skeptical of the EDC, the Republican presidency under Eisenhower – whose endorsement of the EDC had been critical in 1951 – implied a shift in preferences: whereas the previous administration preferred the fastest way to German rearmament over any particular solution, the Republican administration preferred the EDC over any alternative form of German rearmament. Personal ties to Monnet implied that it bought completely into the Manichean view of the transnational coalition. As a result, the planning for alternatives proceeded only in the UK. Internal considerations amply show that the British government perceived, accurately, that a troop commitment might become necessary but was not inclined, without further pressure, to offer such a commitment voluntarily. As a result, the fate of the EDC Treaty, became increasingly bogged down in France and Italy, amid increasingly obvious conflicts over the EPC.
No Alternatives to the EDC? British Preferences and German Rearmament

In hindsight, it is simple to point out that the missing link for French acceptance of German rearmament had been a credible British troop commitment in conjunction with sufficient oversight over German arms production and training. The repeated pleas for such a troop commitment were surely not lost on the British governments. What was the internal planning in the UK Cabinets?

British governments pursued a consistent set of objectives throughout the bargain, although the government leadership shifted in 1951 from a Labour government under Bevin to a new Tory government under Churchill. This shift implied that the relationship of the British governments to the European Movement changed. Whereas the Labour government had been among the most vocal critics of the European Movement and the Council of Europe, the Tory government, headed by Churchill, entailed the leadership of the British Unionists in the European Movement. There was, however, little consequence for the basic preferences that the British governments pursued. For the UK, although the country had been among the victorious powers of the Second World War, the challenge of decolonization, the financial strains of ‘Empire’, the emerging Cold War, the dependency on the United States for security from the Soviet Union, and the aspiration to remain a ‘great power’ provided the basic coordinates of British foreign policy that were based on a bipartisan consensus (Morgan 1984, 239; Adamthwaite 1995, 22ff.; Deighton 2002, 104). Thus, the most basic and continuously most salient objective for all British governments was to keep the US committed to the Western Alliance, both in terms of material and financial aid, to preserve the Alliance, and to minimize UK commitments to the continent while maximizing UK influence over European institutions and concomitant political developments (Deighton 2002). Basic preferences for associated institutional designs remained firmly within an intergovernmental model. The main source of differences, in particular within the Conservative government, was the question of how to best handle the EDC strategically to ensure these aims were met, as already seen with regard to the Eden Plan.

These concerns were already apparent in the reaction to the Pleven Plan. The British Chiefs of Staff had contemplated German rearmament quite early (Larres 2002, 146).
Foreign Secretary Bevin had already explicitly expressed his desire “for Germany to come into a more general framework than a pure European one.” (DBPO II: I, 9). As the Pleven Plan was proposed, the reaction of the British government was overwhelmingly negative, especially that of Foreign Secretary Bevin whereas Prime Minister Attlee and the COS were concerned not to appear as the ‘destroyer’ of the EU unity movement (DBPO II: I, 298, 304, 346). The initial gist of the internal deliberations was rather how to get the Pleven Plan off the international agenda out of fear the development would weaken transatlantic ties. As a result, subsequent British positions would largely follow the development on the continent and, in particular, US demands, agreeing to any necessary – and non-binding – unilateral commitments of support but refraining from substantial continental commitments.

Thus, the Labour government agreed to the Spofford compromise in late 1950, provided that limits on German rearmaments would prevent German dominance, no German staff would be created, and that substantial limits on arms production in Germany would be imposed (Dockrill 1991, 53). These ‘conditions’ did not significantly depart from American positions as put forth in the package deal. This basic attitude went unchanged when the Tories received the majority in parliament in late 1951. Churchill, although advocate of ‘European Army’, certainly did not have supranational institutions in mind believing that they were not an effective solution to the defence problem (Young 1996, 59, 91). This attitude persisted well into 1952.

The motivation behind the Eden Plan, as shown above as well, was primarily motivated by the concern that the issue of German rearmament was brought to a successful agreement.

However, the British government, as any government during the negotiations, received ambiguous information regarding the ratification chances of the EDC Treaty

345 The reactions caused some officials to retrospectively criticize their self-perceived outlook at the time, “We still were thinking in terms of Britain, and of standing between the United States and Western Europe and Russia and so on; as being an independent great power [...]. After all, for I don’t know how many hundreds of years Britain had kept out Europe. And suddenly to ask it to change, to give up its external, its worldwide role in order to join with a Europe which was down and out, required a vision which I am quite sure I hadn’t got, and I doubt whether very many people in the United Kingdom had.” (Quoted in Hennessy 1993, 401).
346 “We cannot afford to allow the European federal concept to gain a foothold within NATO and thus weakening instead of strengthening the ties between the countries on the two sides of the Atlantic. We must nip it in the bud.” (Trachtenberg 1999, 117).
347 A cabinet memorandum from November 29, 1951 reiterates a favourite expression, “I should doubt very much the military spirit of a ‘sludgy amalgam’ of volunteers or conscripts to the defend the EDC.” (Jansen 1992, 65).
quite early. As a result, internal preparations for the eventuality of a failure of the EDC Treaty had begun quite early as well. The alternative solution was already implicitly mentioned by Van Zeeland to Eden in a meeting between them in London in October 15th 1952, “It would have the advantage […] to make better use of the assets given in the Treaty of Brussels and to revive a little bit the organs of the Brussels Pact.”\footnote{Own translation from “l’avantage qu’il aurait […] à faire meilleur usage des atouts que nous donne le traité de Bruxelles and a revivifier quell-que peu les organismes du pacte de Bruxelles.” (De Vos, et al. 1998, 11).} Eden saw complications – as Germany was not a member, hence deliberations would be difficult. A memorandum by the COS from December 12th 1952 agreed that, “In the event of failure we must be ready to fill the gap with a new plan for the defence of Europe.” (Quoted in Jansen 1992, 65).

As a result, the British COS started planning for alternatives based on the assumption that France would eventually reject the EDC, opting for a NATO solution without 'open discrimination' against Germany taking over the operational, institutional, and material restrictions from the EDC (Mager 1990, 53). As a Cabinet memo of 1953 noted, “The crux of the problem is the French request for assurance that British forces and American forces will remain on the Continent in substantial numbers for a protracted period or in other words that Germany’s forces as they become available will not substitute for the British and American forces now on the Continent.” (Dockrill 1991, 136). For the British government, any solution that could even feasibly bind more troops on the continent would have to come, in Macmillan’s words, in the form of a “confederation and against the 6 Power Federation.” (Macmillan 2003, 276). By early 1953, British officials were internally busy with looking for possible alternatives to the EDC along these lines (Dockrill 1991, 130). By July 23rd 1953, a secret working paper had been circulated in the Foreign Office titled “Restrictions on German rearmament which might be feasible in the event of German admission into NATO” (Mager 1990, 71). It said, “The ideal solution would be to transplant into NATO as many of the essential EDC safeguards as we can persuade the Germans to accept as the ‘price’ of joining the leading Western ‘club’ as a full member.” (Ibid.). In November 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted a military agreement that would institutionalize operational cooperation between the EDC and British troops, not exceeding existing unilateral NATO obligations (Dockrill 1991, 134). These planning processes continued: the Western Organizations Department of the Foreign
Office on February 5th 1954 issued a statement on two alternatives to the EDC: either Germany would enter NATO directly and ‘agree’ voluntarily to limits on arms production; the other alternative was integration through a series of contractual commitments to limit German sovereignty on arms, operational and institutional autonomy; in effect, a German army should not be able to fight autonomously (Mager 1990, 63; Jansen 1992, 83). The proposal mentions that a British troop commitment – the withdrawal of which would not be based on sovereign decisions – might become necessary (Mager 1990, 66). The COS preferred – with regard to the FO – by March 3rd 1954 the NATO solution without troop commitment (Ibid., 68). As it turned out, strategic planning had already identified the salient alternatives. A key in these developments seems to have been Massigli, the French ambassador in London and a long standing EDC critic belonging who had begun in 1952 to report to the British Cabinet that the ratification chances of the EDC were eminently slim (Massigli 1978, 334).

Foreign Office officials, however, did not officially advance any proposal; it was argued that this would make the United Kingdom a scapegoat for the failure of the European project, a similar motivation as that behind the Eden Plan (Dockrill 1991, 111; Jansen 1992, 70). These effects were anticipated not only on the European scene but also in Anglo-American relations: Churchill himself seems to have almost personally offended prospective US Secretary of State Dulles on January 8th 1953 at a meeting in Washington by suggesting that NATO could provide an alternative to the EDC (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b, 884). Moreover, as long as the official line pursued by the US administration and other European cabinets – including the French governments – was that the ratification of the EDC was on the agenda, there was no sufficient incentive for the British government to consider more costly proposals. British concessions merely followed the intensity of the French ratification conflict. Thus, in 1953, the British government reacted to advances for a troop commitment issued by the French ‘Meyer protocols’ by issuing a public statement stating that troops would be maintained on the continent ‘as long as necessary’ and announced that it would support the demand that the NATO treaty is made coterminous with the EDC Treaty. Further, it was agreed to ‘consult’ the EDC Council in case the United Kingdom was considering a withdrawal of troops from the continent (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 746-747). In February 1954, on Eden's insistence, more concessions were made: a permanent British representative to the Council of the EDC, one armoured division
within EDC corps and participation of RAF units in EDC units (Dockrill 1991, 136). Yet, this would prove unsatisfying for the French representatives because these troops were integrated through the operational NATO command; they could thus be withdrawn by unilateral decision (Fursdon 1980, 253; Watt 1985, 98). Thus, these commitments, again, did not constitute credible commitments and failed to satisfy central French demands. The agreement was signed on April 13th 1954 (Massigli 1978, 424; Fursdon 1980, 256; Young 1996, 92).

**Summary**

As the preceding pages have demonstrated, the British government, in seeking to ensure both the successful resolution of the negotiations on German rearmament as well as minimizing the required restraints on its own autonomy, had identified the salient alternatives relatively early. By late 1952, already, it was determined that the EDC might fail and that, in that event, a new British offer would have to be made. At the same time, it is clear that the decision to submit British troops to ensure a successful resolution was, in the Foreign Office at least, considered very early and met opposition primarily from the Chiefs of Staff. In this sense, the British governments, from the Labour government to the Tories, arguably displayed a stable sense of the ‘national interest’: ensure that the negotiations on German rearmament succeed, compromise as little autonomy as possible. In light of the apparent anticipations of a failure of the EDC, the neglect of that eventuality, in particular by the US government, seem puzzling indeed.

**US Preferences and the Suppression of Alternatives**

On the other hand, progress reinforced convictions of a possible success that the new US administration would enforce with increasing vigor. In November 1952, the US presidential elections resulted in a watershed victory by Eisenhower for the Republican side (Ambrose 1983, 571). The majority in both Houses of Congress was now firmly in Republican hands. The fundamental content of Eisenhower’s campaign had been a ‘mandate for change’ that spoke to an ‘old-fashioned’ pre-Cold War Republicanism in which isolationist tendencies were coupled with a suspicion of an overtly strong security state (See chapter 5, section 5.3.1). Eisenhower’s main commitments
lay in rebalancing national security to address pressure from the Republican Congress – including McCarty – to adopt a more ‘hawkish’ stance toward the Soviet Union while trying to cut military spending (Reichard 1975, 15 ff.).

Eisenhower’s designated Secretary of State Allan Foster Dulles was, as described in the previous chapter, a long term ‘acquaintance’ of Monnet and shared the basic notion of the need for European states to delegate and pool sovereignty according to the supranational blueprint (see chapter 6, section 6.1.3). For both Eisenhower and Dulles, the EDC was a highly salient feature in their plans to balance security and resource commitments. Thus, Eisenhower argued that the necessary American “aid to Europe would be on the decline if we could get Europe to go in for political and economic union. If Europe would do what it should do, conceivably it could by itself defeat Russia.” (FRUS 1952-1954 II, 436). The insistence was based on a radical application of a federal principle sharing for material reasons, a somewhat radical vision of the federalist causal story of Europe. Thus, while the Democratic administration under Truman and Acheson had opted for the EDC as a second best option for a perceived lack of available alternatives, the new Eisenhower administration had an intense preference for a European Army, indeed, for a European federation. For Dulles, the EPC was the main key “to permit the ratification of the EDC” (Winand 1993, 32). Surely, it was not lost on US officials that the EDC’s prospects for ratification were slim, and some form of leverage over France had to be found (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 694). Moreover, the bargaining position of the US government was paradoxically precarious: the key to its European objectives rested with the ratification of the EDC that was, in turn, dependent on a few deputies in France. This fact was not lost on Dulles who initially asked his planners to ‘come with alternatives’ to improve the US bargaining position. But the search for alternatives was remarkably limited. The most notable of these strategies was the decision to threaten the Europeans with a US relapse into isolationism. The threat was partially credible: Republican members of congress would initiate several bills in accordance with that

349 Eisenhower proposed a budget for 1954 that was 8 billion less than Truman’s previous one (Hogan 1998, 386).
350 In the discussion, especially Dulles is asking for alternatives, outside options, to improve the bargaining position of the US since the decision to endorse the EDC earlier had simply given the initiative the Six in Paris, “We need something that is in our own control. The alternative may not be nice, but otherwise we are dependent upon the Europeans. We are not thinking of how to give up the EDC; the question is how to get the EDC. An alternative is necessary if we are to get it.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 713).
threat: among them the Bicker amendment that was rejected by the Senate partially on account of Democratic votes (Reichard 1975, 58; Tananbaum 1985).

The geopolitical core of this threat was a so-called ‘peripheral strategy’ in which the US would withdraw its troop to air bases around continental Europe and rely on nuclear deterrence. Aid cuts were ruled out as well. Eisenhower and Dulles, against the advice of Nixon (vice-president) and Stassen (Director of the Mutual Security Agency) doggedly maintained that France and aid for Indochina should remain the top priority for the Mutual Aid Program (FRUS 1952-1954 II, 288). Despite contrary internal pronouncements, the US was trying to ‘buy’ the EDC. Similar calculations even led to considerations that cutting military aid in the reduced budget for 1954 would be counterproductive and, in effect, lead to higher net expenditures in the long-term (FRUS 1952-1954 II, 457-463; Hogan 1998, 400, 401).

A second alternative was deliberately ruled out as impossible: threatening France with German NATO membership. That assumption of impossibility was not, however, universally shared: apart from Nixon and Stassen in the National Security Council, representatives from the Pentagon and the Chiefs of Staff were increasingly sceptical about the usefulness of the EDC (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 712). Moreover, some officials in the State Department itself disagreed. Already in March 1953, a ranking member of the Policy Planning Staff argued that the radical nature of the negotiated treaties should be recognized and thus alternative courses for German rearmament – such as the NATO option – be pursued. Dulles and Eisenhower con-

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351 The argument, advocated by Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dunn, was that aid was essential for Indochina – and that EDC success would establish the conditions under which Europe could become independent from US aid (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-a, 1298-1300).

352 Republicans, especially isolationists in the House were seeking to challenge that assessment. On June 16th, the House Foreign Affairs Committee introduced the ‘Bicker amendment’ demanding to withhold half of all aid to nations failing to ratify the EDC Treaty (Reichard 1975, 71). It would not be passed until 1954 when it was already becoming clear that the EDC was going to be rejected.

353 Paul H. Nitze, now head of the Policy Planning Staff, explicitly pointed out that the PPS had been preparing alternatives “on the assumption that EDC ratification was delayed so long as to be tantamount to rejection and that German participation in NATO was impossible.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 713).

354 Leon W. Fuller – author of the described Fuller report – departed from these assessments on the necessity of the EDC by issuing an memo on March 17 1953 entitled “An Alternative U.S. Course of Actions respecting EDC and a German settlement” The essential perception is, “An important aspect of EDC which Americans, perhaps, fail to perceive with sufficient clarity, is that it is basically a permanent, organic reform of a revolutionary nature but proposed as an emergency device to meet an urgent critically dangerous situation. It is obvious, for one thing, that we are pressing Europeans to do something that is inconceivable we would do ourselves. The British stand aloof for much the same
continued to pre-empt any secret planning for a NATO alternative within the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department. The Belgian ambassador in Washington thus pointed out that the EDC had become the ‘eleventh commandment of US foreign policy’.  

In part, the problem stemmed from the fact that Dulles and Eisenhower took seriously only those European voices that fit into a particular narrative of events. One key conduit were US officials David Bruce and Tomlinson, both having ties to the ACUE and both now liaised with the ECSC as special representatives on Monnet’s insistence (Winand 1993, 39, 40). Monnet had maintained from the beginning that there was no conceivable alternative to the EDC. Secretary of State Dulles and Eisenhower met repeatedly with Monnet discussion matters relating to the ECSC throughout the time (i.e. FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b, 248, 337). As indicated in the previous chapter, although the published record does not indicate prolonged discussions of the EDC, it was most certainly the case see (See chapter 6, section 6.1.3). The US policy to issue threats of withdrawal culminated when Foster Dulles, in early 1954, warned of an ‘agonizing reappraisal’ of US Foreign Policy. The speech was prepared, *inter alia,* reason – for them, as for us, a merger of national sovereignty respecting defense in a supra-national federation is unthinkable.” (Quoted in Larres 2001, 87).

355 The problem of lacking alternatives was brought up at the NSC on August 13th 1953. Dulles argued that to even consider alternatives would be dangerous in case of a leak. The Pentagon and the JCS wanted to advise the Planning Department to consider alternatives if the EDC would fail (FRUS 1952-1954 VII, 502, 503). The decision was made to advice the PPS to work out alternatives, yet by the end of September, these plans are called back (FRUS 1952-1954 VII, 540, 541). The main argument was that domestic developments in France, which are not mentioned in the record – had increased the chances of ratification. It is possible that a close survival of the new French government under Laniel in the Assemblée Nationale had influenced these considerations. However, shortly thereafter, on October 8th 1953, the new French Prime Minister Laniel wrote to Eisenhower that ratification was only possible after an agreement on the Saar had been obtained and a closer association of the British had been achieved (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 819-820). As a reaction, the administration again considered whether alternatives to the EDC should be prepared. Dulles declined. Stassen asked whether it was not prudent to make alternative plans. Finally, Eisenhower replied that he was extremely sceptical whether there was any real alternative to French EDC member ship (FRUS 1952-1954 VII, 542). Churchill explicitly expressed his preference for a NATO solution in mid 1953, he similarly receiving a rebuttal from Eisenhower (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 792).


357 Eisenhower on Bruce, “As for Ambassador Bruce, continued the President, he was one of the most loyal of our officials and perhaps the shrewdest judge of the French character he had ever met. The President said he wholeheartedly agreed with Bruce’s statement that we were trying to get timid men to overcome their own doubts. There were far too many Frenchmen who genuinely despaired of ever building an adequate defense of Western Europe against the Soviets.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 888).

358 “If, however, the European Defence Community should not become effective, if France and Germany remain apart so that they will again be potential enemies then there would indeed be grave
by Robert Bowie, member of the Spaak Committee (Winand 1993, 50). The view was reinforced in contact with actors sharing that mindset: the tone prevailed in conversations with Adenauer;\(^ {359} \) it marked the disapproval of advances by Churchill to consider a NATO alternative or a neutral Germany.\(^ {360} \) When in doubt, the conclusion inevitably returned to aid for Western Europe, to off-set the lack of ‘political determination’ of European States to build-up their military capabilities (FRUS 1952-1954 II, 215-218).

**Summary**

The assessment that there was no alternative to the EDC was, in hindsight, false. By dominating the strategic assessments in the American administration, the new Republican administration displayed a peculiar bias in terms of the threats and pressures issued to European governments. By concentrating the direction of aid conditionality on the EDC signatories alone, by pre-empting internal reconsiderations and revaluations of US policy towards German rearmament, and by linking the granting of aid to further support of the EDC ratification, the US government based its policy on a distinct view of the continent that it shared with key individuals in the transnational coalition. By preempting a reconsideration of this policy, this mindset was the key for not pursing alternative NATO solutions – as the British government did – and, as the subsequent section will show, generated incentives for opponents of the Treaty in France and Italy to delay the ratification of the treaty.

**Shifting Lines of Conflict in France and Italy**

In both France and Italy, domestic shifts in governmental coalitions altered the governments’ views of the EDC Treaty, as already suggested by the network analysis conducted in chapter 5. With linkages to the Federalist Communities and the transnational coalitions cut by late 1953 and early 1954, the French and Italian governments doubt as to whether Continental Europe could be made a place for safety. That would compel an agonizing reappraisal of basic United States policy.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 463).

\(^ {359} \) After Dulles had visited Germany, Adenauer wrote back to Dulles on February 11th 1953 confirming their mutual conviction that “[…] der eingeschlagene Weg allein die Vorraussetzungen für eine friedliche und gesicherte Entwicklung des europäischen Kontinents schafft.” (Adenauer 1987, 339).

\(^ {360} \) “Churchill himself feels that one can only fight for a nation and, therefore, feels that other people react the same way. He may very well be wrong about this.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 713).
were paradoxically paying lip service to the ratification of a Treaty they did not want in order to garner US support for unrelated Foreign Policy objectives. To be sure, there were differences between both countries. While there was probably a majority for the Treaty in Italy, this was much more doubtful in the French case.

In Italy, the conflict over the Free Territory of Trieste had been a lingering issue since the Peace Treaty of 1947 divided the city into two spheres of influence between the Allies and Yugoslavia that were supposed to come under control of the United Nation. This question remained unresolved until October 1954 as the UN Security Council could not agree on a common governor and the city remained divided between the two blocks (Hametz 2005, 35). The Allied decision to divide the territory caused violent clashes between nationalistic students and Allied security forces in Trieste in November 1953.\(^\text{361}\) Both the left and the right decried this state of affairs for different reasons: the more nationalistically inclined of the right wing of the DC vehemently advocated a return of the city under Italian rule and heavily denounced Allied policy. For many officials in the Pallazo Chigi, the Trieste question was an issue both of national identity and strategy, namely to preserve Italian influence in the Mediterranean area (Di Nolfo 1992, 533). The left, including DC representatives from the left wing of the party that had close ties to the Christian Unions, equally sought an independent Italian Foreign Policy (Kisatsky 2005, 112).

The conflict affected the EDC bargain largely because it contributed to the destabilization of De Gasperi’s position within the DC and the internal split hampered agreement within the parliamentary committee of the Camera dei Deputati that had begun to discuss the Treaty in February 1953 (Magagnoli 1999, 211). Both members of the right wing of the DC, as well as several officials in the Palazzo Chigi – such as Quaroni – had become increasingly weary of the lack of support from the Allies for the return of Trieste under Italian control (Di Nolfo 1992, 531, 532). As a result, within the DC, there were influential views to postpone the ratification of the EDC

\(^{361}\) This conflict was exacerbated by the fact that the Yugoslavia under Tito followed an increasingly independent policy from Stalin: as part of a strategy to exploit this difference, the British and American administrators announced in October 1953 that administration of Trieste would be divided into an Italian and Yugoslavian zone. The announcement led to a series of serious violent clashes between nationalistic students and Allied security forces in ‘zone A’ of Trieste (Ballinger 2003, 91).
until the ‘problem of Trieste was solved’. Thus, De Gasperi had to agree to a tortuous ratification procedure, requiring the assent of four committees within the Camera dei Deputati that would delay to process significantly (Magagnoli 1999, 213). Only two of those had submitted the Treaty to the floor by June 1954, both recommending acceptance.

The lingering divisions over the EDC intensified throughout 1953 as the Trieste issue became more salient (Magagnoli 1999, 207). The Italian Generals, for example, had from the beginning preferred a NATO solution and direct integration of German troops into NATO and now publicly started to reject the EDC in domestic newspapers. DC member close to the unions, such as Giulio Pastore, came out publicly against the EDC (Magagnoli 1999, 216). In the Italian elections of 1953, although the DC again came out as strongest party, the liberal Republicans (PRI) and the right wing Socialist (PSDI) lost a large portion of their votes. Having hitherto supported the ‘centrismo’ of De Gasperi’s Foreign Policy and the federalist turn of 1951, he could no longer rely on their votes. Losing a vote of confidence in late 1953, De Gasperi never returned to power.

His successors Giuseppe Pella proceeded to construct a coalition with the right wing coalition of the Monarchist and Fascist deputies (MSI). As Pella put it shortly after his investiture, Italy would demonstrate “the determination to defend national interests that arise from obvious and elementary principles of justice”. This was a different tone that was completely contrary to De Gasperi’s positions, as he did not shy away from threatening to leave the Allied Camp, lest Trieste would be returned to Italy. During these conflicts, Spinelli would decry the “hysteric nationalist

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363 Own translation from “die Entschlossenheit zu Verteidigung der nationalen Interessen, die offen-kundigen und elementaren Prinzipien der Gerechtigkeit entspringen.” (Magagnoli 1999, 239).

screams” and the “nationalist whims” of the Pella government. Federalists such as Tarchiani and La Malfa came out vigorously for the EDC Treaty (Magagnoli 1999, 278). De Gasperi wrote concerned public letters, whereas Christian Democratic newspapers were divided over the new position of the Italian government (Magagnoli 1999, 241).

Moreover, officials in the Pallazo Chigi were divided over the ratification chances of the EDC Treaty as well. In November 1953, the Italian ambassador in Paris, Quaroni, submitted that the ‘Interim Protocols’ or ‘Mayer Protocols’ for the EDC Treaties submitted by the French government in 1953 would have little effect, that the federalist approach of the EDC was dead and that there was a broad majority for a different ‘confederal’ solution in the French Chamber (Magagnoli 1999, 253). Quaroni recounted a number of rather pessimistic encounters in Paris, describing the ratification prospects of the treaty as highly dubious. The Italian ambassador in Brussels thought the same (Magagnoli 1999, 155). Both urged the Italian government that it should be prepared to accept revisionist offers that would detract from the “supranational element and strengthen the national part” and to signal such readiness to the French government (Magagnoli 1999, 257). Other voices in the Palazzo Chigi, such as the Italian ambassador in London Manlio Brosio, thought that supporting the EDC had proven counterproductive and that a “revised EDC is better than none”.

365 Own translation from “hysterisches nationalistisches Schreien” and “nationalistische Launen” (Magagnoli 1999, 277).
367 Suspicion of the ratification prospects was widespread: already after the signing of the EDC Treaty, “Tatsächlich hatten die Franzosen damals, als sie ihre Ideen lancierten, geglaubt, etwas Unmögliches zu erreichen: Deutschland die Nicht-Diskriminierung zu gewähren, ihm aber die substantielle Gleichberechtigung auf irgendeine Weise vorzuenthalten. Alles ist schiefgegangen – nach Ansicht derselben Franzosen, die eigenartiger Weise nicht wußten, auf welches Abenteuer sie sich einließen und die jetzt in Anbetracht der Wirklichkeit der Europa-Armee die Zähne zusammenbeißen.” (Magagnoli 1999, 139).
Quaroni, in turn, was heavily criticized in the federalist circles around Lombardo for his allegedly ‘ridiculous recommendations’.  

Despite these internal debates, the approach of the Italian government to the US and its stance on EDC ratification remained similar. Relying on a “damaged, shaky and disunited government”, Pella perhaps linked the Trieste issue more vocally to the EDC, but he was not able to maintain power for long (FRUS 1952-1954 VIII, 385). After a brief interlude, the next head of the Italian government would be Scelba, relying on a similar coalition. However, his approach to the US and EDC ratification remained similar: when in conversations with US officials, he seemed committed to the ratification of the EDC but continued to insist that no positive vote could be expected before the ‘Trieste question’ was resolved.  

In France, the domestic situation was even more dramatic. The issue of the EDC divided the parties and public opinion (Riboux 1983, 26). On March 31st, a major public éclat occurred when the ‘maréchal’ Juin, a living legend from the War, exclaimed his opposition to the EDC publicly (Clesse 1989, 147; Elgy 1993b, 588; Soutou 1993, 503). He was hence dismissed by the government which led to a public rally in Paris. Among the French Chiefs of Staff, some sought a transitional period in the establishment of the EDC, others began advocating German entry into NATO (Ziebura 1997, 99; Creswell 2006, 82). Several officials at the Quai d’Orsay, out of

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369 “[…] einige der lächerlichen Vorschläge Quaronis.” (Magagnoli 1999, 156). Only Lombardo reacted vehemently, coming out against such offers, writing to Benvenuti, “Es kann niemandem entgehen, daß dort, wo die EVG auf die eine oder andere Art […] durch die mehr oder weniger unsinnigen Ersatzlösungen […] beiseite gelegt wird, die gesamte Sicherheitskonstruktion zum Einsturz gebracht würde […]” (Magagnoli 1999, 258).

370 Scelba to Dulles, “[…] stated unequivocally and confidentially that unless Trieste solved satisfactorily for Italian public and Parliament, would be impossible pass EDC despite government and democratic parties full realization EDC essential to Italy. Added while he had tried to divorce EDC and Trieste, this proved impossible because of internal political factors.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 954).

371 Gaullist deputy Diethelm, “Nous ne sommes donc pas morts puisque nous pouvons encore détruire.” (Riboux 1983, 20). Prominent actors voice harsh opposition at the congress of the Radicals while at the simultaneous congress of the Socialist Guy Mollet fails to enforce traditional party discipline against prominent EDC opponents Jules Moch and Daniel Mayer. Guy Mollet concluded that the congress decides that the SFIO’s position towards the EDC is, “Ni refus ni acceptation” (Fauvet 1956, 28). The final decision at the MRP congress demanded the treaty “ne soit ratifié que s’il comporte les garanties demandées par l’Assemblée nationale, notamment une garantie efficace des Etats-Unis et de la Grande-Bretagne en cas de secession allemande.” (Ibid.).

372 General Ely, his sucessor, was less hostile to the idea of supranational defence (Vial 2000). He expressed the three circle idea, seemingly guided in his affirmation of the European army to be guided by the assumption to constitute a third power pole. However, a larger portion of the military coupled the opposition against the EDC with its general contempt for the regime. Juin represented the current in the army that could not envision a France, a Europe without colonies, a strong western link, a ‘impériaux-atlantiste’ (Vial 2000, 141).
fear for French great power status, began to openly advocate a national German army controlled by NATO (Kim 2000, 207). After the failure of the Pinay government in December 1952, subsequent governments would increasingly rely on Gaullist votes for their investiture, which made the prospects of ratification ever more unlikely as both the Meyer and Laniel Cabinets were essentially based on a domestic stalemate over the EDC. René Mayer was invested on January 8th 1953, gaining power through the eerie combination of votes from about 80 Gaullists and the M.R.P (Clesse 1989, 127). Thus, Mayer was forced to try “by ingenious equivocation to convince the M.R.P. that he favored the European Army and the Gaullists that he did not.” (Williams 1964, 419). Beginning with Meyer’s cabinet in 1953, every French government had to commit to not turn a vote on the EDC into a vote of confidence in order to muster the necessary votes (Rioux 1983, 20). Having made several commitments upon his investiture, first and foremost that France would retain control of its national army and that he would reiterate the requests for British security guarantees to the EDC, he submitted the ‘Mayer Protocols’ to be amended to the EDC Treaty. Although the Mayer protocols were essentially accepted, failing to achieve the British security guarantee as well as moratorium on qualified majority decisions in the council doomed his tenure. As soon as Mayer started to display a willingness to push for ratification once the additional protocols were signed, the Gaullist deputies he had relied on for his investiture voted against him on May 21st (Fauvet 1956, 34; Clesse 1989, 133).

Apart from a British troop commitment, the protocols submitted that the French government could withdraw troops from the common army in case of an emergency. One particular emergency at the time was the escalating war in Indochina. Retaining Indochina as part of the Union Française was a key issue in France, widely shared, for example, in the party of the most ardent Europeans, the MRP (Thomas 2003). As the war escalated, more French troops were needed, and, in particular, more aid from

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373 “The main elements included that the weights of the votes in the EDC council should be ‘frozen’, that is, remain at their current level independent of a country’s financial or military contribution to the European Army. Second, the protocols called for more autonomy French troops, specifically the right to withdraw them from the EDC in case of emergency without a being subject to a majority veto in the council. This had been subject to the necessity of agreement in the Council by a qualified majority of two thirds of the vote and a possible veto from SACEUR so far. Third, the protocols, again, asked for a British security guarantee, a ‘binding’ guarantee for the duration of the EDC treaty. Fourth, the French government let the United States know that “a general understanding would have to be reached with the United States on administration, organization and procedures in connection with end-item assistance.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 702-704).
the US to conduct the war successfully. The French government hardly had the resources to back the war and survive a vote on the costs that such a decision would have entailed. The link between the war in Indochina and the EDC became apparent even before the EDC was signed. Military officials were continually requesting more expenditure for their effort in Indochina and stipulated that France had to maintain relative dominance within the EDC, with increasing success (Creswell 2006, 86). The vulnerability of French governments, depending on US aid for their survival and their budgets, became ever more pronounced as the war in Indochina escalated. In effect, Indochina turned into an ambiguous source of bargaining leverage, both for the US and for France (Aimaq 1996, 2000). The Eisenhower administrations ‘no-holds barred’ insistence on the creation of a European Army implied that French governments managed, again and again, to sell the promise of eventually ratifying the EDC in exchange for commitments of increased resources and currency (Fleischer 2013). It is estimated that, overall, the United States ended up providing about 80 per cent of the resources committed in Indochina (Rioux 1983, 35; Wall 1991, 188). Thus, even opponents of the EDC Treaty did not have an incentive to press for a rejection of the Treaty.

After Mayer, the Laniel government pledged to seek another satisfactory commitment by Britain (Creswell 2006, 126). Although the new Cabinet relied on more Gaullists than the Mayer Cabinet, the deadlock was similar. Two ministers (Paul Reynard and Édouard Corniglion-Molinier) threatened with resignation, the latter if Laniel sought ratification, the former - affiliate of the EPU and the European Movement - if Laniel did not (Elgey 1993b, 374). Part of the deal that Laniel had struck with a number of Gaullist deputies, was to appoint Bidault instead of Schuman as Foreign Minister. While Adenauer wrote to Schuman with regret, the basic dilemma of the French government was unchanged.

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374 The Socialist Jules Moch and the Gaullist General Marie-Pierre Koenig – both opponents of the EDC - were appointed as parliamentary rapporteurs to the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee of the National Assembly (Clesse 1989, 129). This ensured that the EDC would be ‘bottled up in committee’ (Massigli 1978, 362; Creswell 2006, 103).

Summary

Thus, both in France and in Italy, domestic coalitions shifted increasingly to the right and cabinets inherited a Treaty they no longer sought. In Italy, while there was probably a narrow majority for the EDC, the Treaty became entangled in disputes between left and right parties and even within the DC: the less the Allies seemed willing to support Italy in Trieste, the louder the voices for neutralism as the conflict escalated into violent clashes between Italian students and Allied forces in Trieste itself. With the most ardent Italian federalists cut off from Italian cabinets, the EDC Treaty was no longer a priority. In France, subsequent coalitions increasingly relied on immediate US aid for Indochina as well as Gaullist deputies that were entirely opposed to ratifying the EDC Treaty. The domestic divide within the government precluded decisive action in either direction. As a result, the Italian and French governments who had been among the most ardent supporters of both the EDC and the EPC delayed the ratification of the EDC Treaty.

The EDC Treaty Delayed

Thus, the domestic developments in France and Italy dimmed the chances for ratification. In Italy, the federalist line of reasoning no longer seemed to fit with the government’s perception of Italian interests. In France, the increasing strength of the Gaullists and the public agitation against the EDC even among parties of the government decreased the influence that actors like Monnet, Schuman, Reynaud, and Mayer had on French positions. Moreover, the negotiations among the Six on the EPC Draft Treaty amply showed that circumstances had changed. In addition, Stalin’s death had consequences on the international scene that, if anything, delayed the EDC ratification in France and strengthened its opponents. Moreover, the strategy adopted in 1952 to bolster the ratification chances through the creation of a European Political Community backfired.

Even before the Ad Hoc Assembly of the Draft Treaty, a domestic shift occurred in the Netherlands that would complicate the reception of the EPC Draft Treaty among the Six. Due to domestic conflict over public schooling after the elections of June 1952, Dutch Prime Minister Drees had to rearrange the Cabinet: Dirk Stikker left his post as Foreign Minister, and the responsibilities of the Foreign Minister was split. A
member of the Catholic party Joseph Luns took over bilateral affairs and international organizations (NATO) whereas Beyen – who was not a member of any party – took over European affairs on the behest of Drees. Beyen had been economic advisor to the Dutch government in exile in London during the war, exposed to Mitrany, briefly engaged with the ELEC and left for Washington to work for the newly founded World Bank in 1946 (Harryvan 2009, 43). The shift meant that the Dutch Foreign office was no longer led by Stikker who had been eminently critical of the EDC Treaty. Stikker was a clear-cut functionalist, skeptical of supranationalism, sought technical delegation whereas political control was supposed to remain intergovernmental, as envisioned in the OEEC (Stikker 1951). Beyen’s case is peculiar: he did not participate in any transnational Europeanist organization due to his absence in Washington. Ideologically, he was close to ideas circulating in the ELEC: he participated in a ‘Studie-Groep for Reconstructie Problemen’, instigated by Paul Rijkens, head of the British Dutch Company Unilever and a close affiliate of Joseph Retinger, the Polish Exile who founded the ELEC with Paul Van Zeeland (Grosbois 2004, 354, 355). It is thus no coincidence that the results of the Study Group actively advocated European Monetary integration during the war already. When Beyen entered the Dutch government, his intense preference for economic integration became clear rather quickly and led to considerable conflict within the Dutch Cabinet as Beyen, although not an ardent supporter of the EDC banked on its ratification and sought to use the ongoing developments surrounding the EPC Draft Treaty to push for economic integration (Harryvan 2009, 43). Beyen immediately set up an interdepartmental committee in the Dutch government to work out the implications of what was to become the ‘Beyen Plan’, a call for gradual customs union as well as monetary integration and supranational institutions to regulate the merging of the economies (Harryvan 2009, 47). As a result, a Dutch memo to the Six of December 1952 made any Dutch approval of the EPC Treaty dependent on the Treaty incorporating these demands (Kim 2000, 192). The plan was thus in line with consensus Dutch economic interests. Already in June 1950, Stikker himself had promoted a

376 As Zijlstra put in an interview in 1998, “In 1952, Drees did not want a catholic Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Europe of the Six was in his opinion already so catholic-dominated, with Adenauer, Schuman, de Gasperi, he was against it. And Romme won. Now the compromise was to have two ministers of foreign affairs, with Mr Luns, who was Mr Romrite’s man, and Beyen, who was a countervailing power.” (Zijlstra 1998).
377 “La réalisation progressive, moyennant des délais préalablement fixe, d’une Union Tarifaire, devrait figurer dans ce traité.” (Harryvan 2009, 48).
plan that called for the sectoral expansion of free trade within the confines of the OEEC (Griffiths 1990, 22).

While the economic clauses were part of an overarching consensus within Cabinet and the Dutch chamber, there were conflicting views on the ratification chances of the EDC and thus the status of the EPC itself. The essential viewpoint of the Dutch government towards the EDC itself was unchanged. As Beyen explained during the ratification debate, the Dutch government “would have preferred to permit the German rearmament it considers essential to take place in a broader, i.e. Atlantic context.” (Van der Veen 2009, 18). It had “accepted the EDC because otherwise the issue of German rearmament was not acceptable to France.” (Ibid.). Moreover, the Dutch government, as all Western Allies, faced US pressure to ratify the EDC Treaty. While both Drees and Beyen shared the conviction that economic integration was the priority goal, Beyen thought that the EDC would pass, whereas Drees did not. In a Cabinet meeting in May 1953, Drees thus opposed further negotiations on the EPC Treaty because he thought that the EDC Treaty would fail and then the elaborate EPC structure without a real value and the ECSC only would be left standing. Beyen, Mansholt and Zijlstra thought differently (Asbek Brusse 1993, 124). Beyen banked on the EDC being ratified and defended his proposals going into the negotiations over the EPC (Harryvan 2009, 52).

The first intergovernmental congresses on the EPC Treaty, however, revealed relatively quickly that the renewed insistence on economic integration would stop the EPC Treaty in its tracks. Although the German and Italian delegations submitted their agreement in principle, the first conferences that reviewed the EPC Draft Treaty went nowhere (Fischer 1990, 293). One proposal was accepted quickly: the Dutch, French, and Belgian delegations proposed that the Senate of the EPC, instead of being appointed by National Parliaments, should consist of delegations of state governments (Fischer 1990, 297; Rittberger 2006). Apart from these tentative agreements, no further compromises could be reached. The Dutch government had made acceptance conditional on acceptance of the Beyen Plan, to which the French gov-

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government was opposed (Bossuat 1996b, 203). The Quai d’Orsay was entirely opposed to Beyen’s proposal on all three counts, fearing lower living standards in France as a result and recommended that the French government entirely abstain from the supranational proposals on economic integration currently circulating (Krüger 2003, 299). Bidault made it clear to Adenauer that the extreme treaty and the call for economic integration were counterproductive to appease the French Assemblée Nationale. Adenauer concurred. The counterproductive effect of the radical nature of the EPC for the EDC ratification had become apparent. Adenauer admitted as much to a disappointed Brentano. Nothing that would risk EDC ratification was to be undertaken. The extreme differences between the Dutch and French positions specifically made any further negotiations virtually futile.

There were other issues. In March 1953, news of Stalin’s death were followed by an internal power struggle in the Soviet Union and, subsequently, public signals by the political leadership that, at least potentially, suggested that a different course might be pursued by the Soviet leadership. Among the governments of the Six, this event did not change much; among skeptics of the EDC, the event suggested that German neutrality, after all, might be feasible. Churchill was particularly adamant, taking advantage of his temporary control of the Foreign office at the time.

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379 “Man kann die Politische Gemeinschaft so betreiben, daß daraus Schwierigkeiten für die Verteidigungsgemeinschaft entstehen. Man kann sie aber auch so betreiben, daß die Verteidigungsgemeinschaft dadurch gefördert wird“ to which Adenauer replied, “Wir müssen den zweiten Weg wählen.” (Fischer 1990, 289).


381 In his speech at Stalin’s funeral March 9th 1953, Malenkov used a tortuous interpretation of ‘Marxist-Leninist ideology’ suggesting that there was a chance for an agreement. Malenkov stated that “the Soviet Union has conducted and continues to conduct a consistent policy of the preservation and strengthening of peace, a policy of struggle against the preparation and unleashing of a new war, a policy of international cooperation and the development of business-like relations between all countries, a policy proceeding from the Leninist position concerning the possibility of prolonged coexistence and peaceful competition between two different systems—the capitalist and the socialist (sic!)” (Roberts 2008, 3, 4). Later at a session of the supreme soviet “there was no disputed or unresolved problem that could not be resolved on the basis of mutual agreement between interested parties. This applies to our relations with all states, including our relations with the United States of America. A state interested in the preservation of peace can be confident, now and in the future, of the durability of the peace policy of the Soviet Union” (Ibid., 4).

382 Eden was hospitalized on April 12th 1953 for five weeks because of a gallbladder of operation (Eden 1960, 51; Watt 1985, 96). In his diary, Blankenhorn recounts a conversation with Frank Roberts – the UK ambassador in Bonn – who was worried about Eden’s sickness, as Churchill apparently
took over command of the Foreign Office which would indicate a subtle shift in British policy for a time. He set out to lobby Eisenhower via repeated telegrams for holding a four-power conference with the Soviet Union to discuss the question of Germany, that were repeatedly rebutted (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b; Young 1996, 153). On May 11th 1953, Churchill, on his own initiative held a speech in the Lower House asking for a four-power conference, and exploring the solution of a neutralized Germany (Larres 2002, 223; Macmillan 2003, 231). In reaction to Churchill speech on May 11th 1953, a small faction of the SFIO – led by EDC opponent Jules Moch - introduced a successful motion against the will of the government to the *Assemblée Nationale* obliging the government to approach the US government and follow Churchill's proposal (Massigli 1978,372-380; Elgey 1993b, 373; Young 1996, 166). As a result, the French government argued – not entirely untrue – that the present government was most likely to ratify the EDC whereas, if power talks were not granted, the present government would fail (Wall 1991, 266; Young 1996, 190). While the Soviet reaction to these advances took time, the odd result was that in preparing for a four-power conference, the French and US delegations were entirely in agreement that this was, in all likelihood, futile. Bidault declared that without approval of the troop demands and a settlement of the Saar dispute with Germany, no ratification would be 'psychologically' possible. The Belgian government equally did not believe that Stalin’s death did anything to change Soviet objectives. The German government and Adenauer were highly worried about the prospect of a possible neutralization, the German opposition denounced the lacking effort to explore possibilities for reunification (Schwarz 1979, 480). This fear was unjustified.

worked on alone during that time and no one but Eden in the Cabinet had influence over him on Foreign Policy matters (Blankenhorn 1980, 155).

383 In the process Churchill increasingly alienated his Cabinet members, especially Lord Salisbury and Eden (Larres 2001, 93). John Colville, private secretary of Churchill noted that the speech was made without the FO seeing it (Young 1996, 159).

384 The French government had reissued proposal for the Saar is a settlement of the Saar issue and a guarantee – formally – of Anglo-American troop presence on the continent for at least 20 years (Clesse 1989, 76).

385 “En dépit d’un certain nombre de gestes rassurants faits par le nouveau gouvernement de l’Union Soviétique dans le domaine international, il n’y a encore à l’heure actuelle aucune raison de croire que les objectifs ultimes de la politique soviétique aient change le moins du monde.” (De Vos, et al. 1998, 419).

386 At the eventual four-power conference in Berlin in early 1954, Blankenhorn stated that it was Bidault who gave “die beste Rede über das westliche Sicherheitssystem und die Wertung der EVG und NATO […]. Man kann die Rolle Bidaults auf dieser Konferenz nicht hoch genug einschätzen.” (Blankenhorn 1980, 189).
Thus, Stalin’s death did not have a uniform or clear effect on the preferences of the Western governments. While it encouraged and certainly contributed to delay, so did other issues, for example the still unresolved conflict over the Saar. By late 1953, Adenauer and Bidault were busy working out a solution on account of a suggestion put forth by Van der Goes van Naters on the Europeanization of the Saarland. These efforts would initiate a last concerted effort involving prominent actors of the transnational coalition to save the EDC and ensure its ratification.\footnote{On November 25th, Laniel staged a vote of confidence. An \textit{orde de jour} against Laniel sought to initiate a vote prohibiting any debate on EDC without German acceptance of the Saar and formal British commitment. Laniel introduced an opposed proposal associated with a question of confidence showing the degree of division within almost all the parties at the time. The order introduced called for ‘continuity of government policy’, which was sufficiently meaningless to attain approval (Clesse 1989, 139; Elgey 1993b, 381).}

**Summary**

In sum, the developments after the EDC Treaty had been signed and the EPC draft Treaty submitted were paradoxical. First, although the EDC ratification in Belgium, the Netherlands, and even Germany made progress, the fate of the EDC seemed sufficiently uncertain to prompt the UK Cabinet to debate repeatedly about possible alternative solutions. France and Italy seemed particularly troubling. The underlying ideological convictions of both the French and the Italian governmental coalitions shifted. In Italy, the cabinets no longer subscribed to the federalist interpretation of the Italian ‘national interests’; seeking Allied support in Trieste and relying on increasingly nationalist deputies for support, the ratification procedure was delayed significantly. French Cabinets relied increasingly on Gaullist support and public agitation against the EDC Treaty. In both cases, thus, geopolitical incentives and a shifting proximity of governmental cabinets to the transnational coalition mattered. The latter ensured that ideological preferences for supranational solutions to the German problem became less salient as geopolitical developments such as Stalin’s death made it seem less and less imperative. Again geopolitical incentives, as summarized in H3 and H4, are necessary but insufficient: thus, Stalin’s death and the perspective of détente did not alter the ratification prospects in Germany, the Netherlands, or Belgium. In France and Italy, domestic instability shifted the control of parliamentary majorities and governments away from the influence of individuals in proximity.
to the transnational coalition and thus, in line with Hypothesis 8, shifted French and Italian bargaining positions.

Finally, the US government in particular exhibited a peculiar ideological bias: whereas Truman administration had been highly skeptical of the supranational army solution, Eisenhower and Dulles wholeheartedly followed the ideas that had, earlier, been advocated by McCloy, Bruce and Monnet. In particular, the refusal to consider, internally, possible alternative courses of action against the advice of senior officials in the Policy Planning Staff is a case in point. This bias in strategic planning preempted more serious consultations with the British government – which had in fact begun to prepare for the failure of the EDC – and produced incentives to delay ratification particularly in France and Italy. A similar picture of necessity and sufficiency emerges with regard to bargaining power: US power was an important constraint as was the domestic volatility of French governments (H4). The ability of the transnational coalitions to push the bargain along the supranational track was predicated on both. Without considering that coalition, however, the course of the bargain cannot be sufficiently explained. Thus, by 1953, the EDC ‘bargain’ had reached an impasse. The subsequent widespread regret over the inability to resolve that impasse before the rejection of the Treaty in 1954 testifies to the dysfunctional constellation of incentives that had come about.

7.2.3 The EDC in 1954: A Missed Chance?

In hindsight, it is puzzling that the troubling signals from Italy and most prominently from France were largely ignored. The remarkable feature of the events surrounding the rejection of the EDC Treaty and its resolution in the WEU Treaty is the repetition of a certain pattern. During the last days of the Laniel government, Monnet sought the cooperation of the leader of the French Socialists Guy Mollet to obtain the assent of the French Socialists to the Treaty. Despite obvious signs to the contrary, individuals in the German government (Adenauer, Brentano, Blankenhorn), the leadership of the French MRP (Teitgen, Schuman), Spaak, and the key figures in the US administration all thought that this last effort had been successful, only to be proven wrong once the EDC was voted off the parliamentary agenda in France. As this section shows, the failure of these individuals to take Mendès France by his word – that there was no majority for the EDC – was a paradoxical precondition of the quick resolu-
tion of the bargain thereafter. It showed, for the last time, the source of the main inefficiency, namely a tendency by governments led by actors ideologically close to the transnational coalition to process information in a rather biased manner, excluding – politically not cognitively – the viability of alternatives to the supranational army. It was only when Mendes France proved the failure of that strategy, that the European governments, facing the failure of the Alliance, produced the solution that had eluded them for four years although it had been, arguably, available throughout.

A Last Compromise? The Last Efforts to Save the EDC

By early 1954, the ratification procedures in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands seemed under way. At the same time, the impending difficulties in France were apparent. It was already described that the US government had based its activities on a particularly Manichean view of the EDC and German rearmament. In Italy, figures who had been sceptical – like Quaroni - of the whole undertaking from the beginning, assessed the likelihood of ratification negatively. Even Van Zeeland seemed to veer in on that interpretation. In and around the German government, a similar tendency prevailed: Adenauer followed Dulles in that he explicitly forbade any considerations of alternatives in written form in and around the Auswärtige Amt and the Amt Blank. As Ulrich de Maizière – member of EDC delegation and ‘Referent’ for the EDC in the Amt Blank – recalls, the fear was that it would leak out and torpedo the EDC ratification chances. Yet, there were ample signs from ‘German diplomats’ about the difficulties in France but, in his words, “the responsible people in the German government wouldn't believe it.” These negative interpretations started com-

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388 Assessments of alternatives to the EDC by Van Zeeland in an internal classified exchange to the ambassador on December 3rd 1953, “Les solutions autres que la Communauté Européenne de Défense sont l’entrée directe de l’Allemagne a l’Organisation du Traite Atlantique Nord, une Allemagne pleinement indépendante et libre de toute alliance, le recours par les Etats-Unis a la défense périphérique, une entente directe entre les Etats-Unis et l’Allemagne. L’examen de ces solutions de remplacement entraîne inéluctablement pour conclusion la nécessité de la Communauté Européenne de Défense qui, sans être parfaite, offre une solution pratique raisonnable et suffisante aux exigences de la situation telle qu’elle s’impose à nous” (De Vos, et al. 1998, 264).

389 Answering the question whether about the signs of impending ratification difficulties, he responded, “I would say we got some warning, many warnings, and German diplomats in France they told the government that France wouldn't agree and these warnings began in the end of ’53 and the beginning of ’54, but the responsible people in the German government wouldn't believe it. And we tended not to believe it, we had the hope till the last month, and Adenauer didn't allow that we made plans, or thinking about alternatives, because he knew that if we would think about the alternative within the Foreign
In 1953, Adenauer had briefly toyed with the EDC of a separate UK-US-German agreement which was utterly rejected by Eisenhower and Dulles: from then on, a failure of the EDC, in Adenauer’s mind, equaled a failure of the Alliance and Adenauer largely followed the advice from Blankenhorn and Brentano (Baring, et al. 1974, 137; Schwarz 1995, 96). Both had maintained the contact to Teitgen in the Geneva Circle.

The one-sided optimism still prevailed when the French Laniel government was in power. As the failure of the EPC was becoming apparent by early 1954, Monnet, Bruce, and Alphand undertook a last concerted to mobilize sufficient Socialist votes for the Treaty (Kim 2000, 90). The French Socialist leader Guy Mollet had been the primary Socialist opponent of Spaak in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, as he sought a British association and support in exchange for German re-armament with the Eden Plan. Seeing that the EPC was going nowhere, Monnet consulted with Mollet to make headway – again – to the two most important conditions for ratification that the Assemblée Nationale had put forth already in 1952: democratic control and British participation (Kim 1990, 90). Thus, apart from a renewed call for a more definitive British troop commitment, Monnet and Bruce brokered an agreement between Bidault and Mollet to take up Article 38 in a different manner: once the EDC Treaty was ratified, the governments of the Six were to draw on Article 21 of the ECSC Treaty to create a European Parliament, based on direct elections, to which both the ECSC High Authority and the EDC Commissioners would be responsible. This proposal was first agreed to by Adenauer in a personal conversation with Bidault in March 1954 and later accepted by the representatives of the Six

Ministry […] it would become public and then France would say, the Germans do not believe themselves on the EDC. And therefore, we didn't prepare any alternative.” (De Maizière 1990).

In February 1953, Botschaftsrat Walter maintained, “Entnehme aus Gesprächen, daß Beurteilung allgemeiner Lage ungewöhnlich pessimistisch.” (AAPD 1953, 205). In April 1953, he wrote, “[…] glaube angesichts der Entwicklung, der wir hier in Frankreich gegenüberstehen, nichts überflüssiges zu tun, wenn ich auch schriftlich nochmals auf die Gefahr hinweise, die der EVG – und der Europa-Gedanke laufen wird.” (AAPD 1953, 343). In December 1953, the Gesellschaftsrat Frank maintained that there were about 300 deputies for and 300 deputies against the Treaty. Thus, “könne man es nicht verantworten, die Hoffnung auf die Ratifizierung noch länger hinauszuschieben.” (AAPD 1953, 1085-1087). By early 1954, the Gesellschaftsrat Frank maintained that at least 30 votes were lacking in the Assemblée Nationale (Baring, et al. 1974, 410).

in the EDC interim committee (Kim 2002, 92). Moreover, on Eden’s insistence, the UK government agreed to send a permanent British representative to the Council of the EDC and pledged to contribute one armoured division and several RAF units to the EDC corps (Dockrill 1991, 136). Still, these troops were integrated through the operational NATO command; they could thus be withdrawn by unilateral decision (Fursdon 1980, 253; Watt 1985, 98). Nevertheless, the French Conseil des Ministres decided on May 18th that it would ask the party leaders to ‘prendre toutes dispositions’ concerning the Anglo-American guarantees, the Saar statute, the additional protocols, and the Bonn and Paris treaties (Fursdon 1980, 256).

The problem, however, was that the Socialist deputies were no longer inclined to see the EDC in favorable eyes. In April 1954, 59 of the 107 SFIO delegates in the Assemblée Nationale signed two public manifestos against ‘the small clerical and reactionary Europe’ and ‘against the EDC for the liberty of the vote and the fraternal unity of the fatherland’. The French Socialists reflected the division within transnational Social Democracy rather accurately. Mollet and the more federalist Socialist deputies such as Jacquet and Philippe decided on a confrontational course. They called for a party congress in May, and, submitting a resolution that would oblige Socialist deputies to vote for the EDC, they won by a margin of 1969 votes for, 1215 against and 264 abstentions (Loth 1993, 41). Mollet threatened with expulsion from the party for deputies straying from this line. Alphand and Monnet thought that sufficient votes for the EDC had been secured (Kim 2000, 96). Adenauer thought the same. Discussions between Bruce and the newly appointed Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak reflected the same assessment. This assessment is a perfect resemblance

392 “Contre la petite Europe cléricale et réactionnaire” and “Contre le traité actuel de la CED. Pour la liberté de vote et l’unité fraternelle du Parti” (Kim 2002, 96).
394 The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State on June 2nd 1954, “Had dinner in Brussels last night with Spaak, DeStaercke and Rothschild (Spaak’s Chef de Cabinet). Spaak thinks votes now available in French Assembly to pass EDC and that recent favorable events such as MRP and Socialist Congress and by-elections in Pas de Calais and Maine-et-Loire make it desirable and imperative for every effort be made to bring matter to vote in French Parliament sooner possible before this new impetus has spent its force. […] If by middle of June French Government has not disposed of above two conditions and definitely fixed early date for EDC debate, Spaak proposes to communicate with Secretary on subject discussed by them in Geneva-namely what constructive action might be taken by Benelux, German, British and American Governments to bring French to their political senses.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 965).
of what Teitgen related to Blankenhorn in the Geneva Circle in 1953 (chapter 6, section 6.2.3). He described a similar interpretation to Brentano on July 13th 1954 (Baring, et al. 1974, 39). This assessment would prove fatal: when the EDC Treaty was voted off the parliamentary agenda in France on August 31st 1954, 53 Socialist delegates concurred with the majority, even in the face of a threatened expulsion from the party (Haas 2004 [1958], 456).

One might speculate whether a similar vote, linked to the survival of the Laniel government, would have yielded different results. No clear answer can be given, for obvious reasons, but it seems unlikely. The SFIO was not in the governing coalition under Laniel and the more concrete threat of party expulsion did not have any effect. However, events quickly disposed of the Laniel government before the EDC Treaty could be submitted to the floor. French troops had been trapped by Viet Minh troops in Indochina at Điện Biên Phủ since March 1954. After the French government failed to convince the US government of the need for direct invention, Điện Biên Phủ fell on May 7th 1954 in the middle of the Geneva conference on Korea and Indochina (Elgey 1993b, 587). A huge outcry in France followed and the strategy prepared by the government quickly unraveled. On June 9th, the ‘Commission des Affaires Étrangères’ in the Assemblée Nationale submitted the EDC to the floor, publicly recommending to reject the EDC Treaty amid significant agitation against the government (Elgey 1993b, 636). On June 12th, the French deputies refused confidence in the Laniel government by 306 over 293 votes on the government policy in Indochina (Elgey 1993b, 174). On June 17th, Mendès France was invested as Prime Minister by 419 votes assembled from the Gaullists, the Radicals, the Independents, the UDSR (Roussel 2007, 227).

Upon his investiture, he had delivered the promise to ‘resolve’ the issue of Indochina and the issue of the EDC by August 1954 (Rioux 1983, 49). The settlement of the Indochina war at the Geneva conference was highly successful, splitting, after a disastrous defeat, zones of influence at the 38th parallel with Soviet Assent (Eden 1960, 117; Roussel 2007, 242).

As Mendès France had been amongst those radicals to have begun the charge against the French government, the outside pressure immediately intensified (Roussel 2007, 247). Most prominently, the Gaullist General Koenig was appointed as Minister of
Defense while Mendès France took over the Quai d’Orsay himself (Roussel 2007, 228). Thus, the Ministry of Defense, the Quai d’Orsay, and the French government itself were, for the first time, led by avowed opponents of the EDC Treaty, no longer by Christian Democrats or actors with other ties to the European Movements. Monnet’s influence had practically ceased to exist. Under previous governments, figures such as Mayer, Teitgen, Reynaud, and Schuman ensured that the reasoning of the transnational coalition and particularly Monnet had influence in the French governments, but this was no longer the case (Kim 2000, 324). No doubt, the new leader of the French government and the Quai d’Orsay did not seek or want the ratification of the unwanted treaty. However, in as much as the supporters of the Treaty were marginalized in his Cabinet, his government still relied as much on deputies with heterogeneous preferences as his predecessors. He was not free to reject or dismiss the EDC outright.

The new French Prime Minister would not be kindly remembered by the most ardent proponents of the EDC Treaty. The federalists and Christian Democrats were eminently suspicious of his intentions (chapter 6, Section 6.2.3). In his memoirs, Spaak complained that Mendès France was not enough of a ‘European’ to ‘fight the battle’ for Europe and appreciate the ‘goodwill’ others had shown. Blankenhorn did not trust his ‘European credentials’, Adenauer did not either: he even suspected Mendès France to relay French-German exchanges directly to Moscow. The French head of the MRP, Teitgen, spoke particularly negative about Mendès France to Brentano. The antipathy was still apparent in his memoirs. Both Dulles and Adenauer

396 “Mendès-France war nicht genug Europäer, um den Kampf zu führen, Hätte er, anstatt sich über den ihm zuteil gewordenen Empfang zu beklagen, wie er es tat, besser zu schätzen gewußt, was seine Partner ihm alles zugestanden hatten, dem wirklich guten Willen, seinem Standpunkt entgegenzukommen, dann wären die Dinge wohl anders verlaufen.” (Spaak 1969, 215).
397 Adenauer reported to have said after a conversation with Mendès France, “Jedes Wort, das heute gesprochen worden ist, ist jetzt schon in Moskau.” (Schwarz 1995, 153). And Blankenhorn wrote in his diary on August 23rd 1954, “Mendès France hat offensichtlich kein persönliches Verhältnis zu den europäischen Verträgen. Wie Ophüls mir erzählt, wirft er den Ausdruck ’international’ und ’supranational’ ständig durcheinander.” (Blankenhorn 1980, 192).
were highly suspicious that Mendès France had agreed with the Soviets in Geneva to scuttle German rearmament in exchange for Soviet assent (Guillen 1996, 81). There is no archival evidence supporting this assertion and subsequent events tell a very different tale (Ibid.). In as much as his government relied on heterogeneous preferences of the French deputies, he sought to broker a domestic compromise. As it turns out, the mistrust towards Mendès France ensured that this effort was sure to fail.

Because of these suspicions, Spaak, in apparent contrast to his predecessor at the helm of the Foreign Minister, sought a new compromise, sharing the basic assessment that there was no way by which France could accept German entry into NATO. To Spaak that scenario resembled the French occupation of the Ruhr after the First World War. Seeking reconciliation, Spaak met Mendès France at the end of June 1954: Mendès France pointed out that he did not believe that the EDC had a parliamentary majority and that he was searching for a compromise between those deputies that preferred the EDC and those that did not. He stated that that a modification of the treaty was necessary that would touch its substance. Spaak interrupted him and warned him that this would not be accepted by the other signatories. The discussion, according to Spaak, did not produce any result whatsoever. It was be-

400 Spaak about Mendès France, “[…] ich war bereit, ihm bis zur äußersten Grenze des Möglichen zu helfen. Leider sollten wir bald feststellen, daß sich diese Grenze oft schwer bestimmen läßt.” (Spaak 1969, 222).
401 “Il est absolument indispensable qu’on laisse les pays signataires de la CED faire une dernier effort afin de sauver celle-ci.” (Spaak to the Belgian ambassador in Paris, June 24th 1954 De Vos, et al. 1998, 367). The reason: Spaak shared the view that the available alternatives would be detrimental to everyone’s interests, “Il y a au moins deux politiques de rechange qui sont, à l’heure actuelle, prêtes de se concrétiser, l’une qui consiste à offrir immédiatement aux Allemands leur entrée au NATO sur un pied d’égalité. Vous savez que la France pourrait opposer à cette mesure son droit de veto et il n’est pas difficile d’imaginer les réactions qui se produiraient si la France, après avoir refusé la CED, refusait l’entrée de l’Allemagne au NATO. L’autre proposition qui est très certainement étudiée à l’heure actuelle, aussi bien à Washington qu’à Bonn, serait de rendre à l’Allemagne sa souveraineté absolue. Les Américains, et probablement les Britanniques, cessaient d’être puissances occupantes en Allemagne. La France seule le resterait. Nous serions ainsi ramenés, mutatis mutandis, à une situation, qui semblerait à celle de l’occupation de la Ruhr.” (De Vos, et al. 1998, 367, 368).
402 And repeats the same argument, that there is no real majority and, “Qu’à supposer, ce qu’il ne croît pas, qu’une toute petite majorité puisse se faire sur un vote affirmative, cette majorité est insuffisante pour imposer l’application du traité à l’ensemble de la France. Il [Mendès France, BF] recherche donc une solution de compromis en provoquant des discussion entre Français favorable et Français hostiles à la CED” (De Vos, et al. 1998, 370).
403 “Qu’à son avis [Mendès France, BF] ces formules de rechange pouvait aller depuis une ratification du Traité moyennant certaines conditions d’application, jusqu’à une modification profonde du texte même jusqu’à un changement de substance. A ce moment, je [Spaak] l’ai interrompu avec quelque
coming clear that a solution would be very difficult to find but both agreed it was worth the effort and called for a conference of the EDC signatories in Brussels in August 1954.

The amount of mistrust Mendès France generated is partially understandable as his tenure was based on public commitment, made in the Assemblée Nationale, that the EDC should be substantially revised (Roussel 2007, 247). By itself, this is not particularly remarkable given that staunch EDC opponents like Koenig were in his Cabinet. Without a colonial war to pursue, opponents of the EDC – like Koenig – no longer needed to appeal to the US administration for immediate help. At the same time, Mendès France’s situation was not significantly different from his predecessors: although he himself did not want the EDC, his cabinet – and particular his own party, the Radicals – contained a sizable number of ‘cedistes’, among them figures like Rene Mayer (European Movement) or Edgar Faure (European Movement and EPU), meaning that he could not bank on surviving a vote of confidence either way, no matter what he proposed. Thus, Mendès France tried to find a compromise between the two opposing forces to renegotiate the EDC Treaty and mobilize sufficient support for ratification (Elgey 1992, 205; Roussel 2007, 291). As these efforts failed, Mendès France would side with the cedistes led by Bourgès-Maunoury, stipulating not to reject the EDC outright, but to seek renegotiations with the Allies. 404

No doubt, Mendès France did make sure that his political alternatives remained intact. However, there is no evidence of plotting the demise of the EDC whatsoever. His maneuvers sought to secure all possible solutions: if the EDC could not be amended, a second-best NATO solution needed a British troop commitment. Knowing this to be the most important element to mobilize French assent to German rearmament, the French government made first tentative contacts with the British gov-

404 One July 30th, Bourgès-Maunory, associated with the ‘cedistes’ in the Radical Party, suggested to ‘avoir un drame’ with the proponents of the EDC to win over the moderate opponents of the EDC by proposing a temporary suspension of the supranational powers of the commissariat and demanding a transitional period in which the EDC would remain purely intergovernmental (Roussel 2007, 292, 293). This was, in effect, a compromise that strikingly resembled the conditions called for by the French generals throughout 1953. The proposals that Mendès France suggested to the Cabinet a couple days later followed this prescription.
The responses to such advances by Spaak and Dulles were, as seen above, rather hostile, as Mendès France’s assertion of a lacking majority was simply not taken seriously. The British response, on the contrary, indicated that they would welcome talks (DDF, 81; Roussel 2007, 295).

The essential problem of any alternative to the EDC that included the UK was that the British troop commitment would have to be credible: if the British government continued to insist on the right to unilaterally withdraw these troops serving as security chips against Germany, no progress over the status quo would be achieved. A credible commitment entailed some forming of pooled decision over the right to withdraw these troops. However, any form of pooling seemed to remind the British government of the European Army concept itself (Jansen 1992, 87). No wonder that the British Cabinet hesitated. As long as there was a possibility for the EDC ratification, there was no need to consider such a move.

Seeking alternatives, a secret Anglo-American Study Group of lower level officials had been set up in July 1954, tasked with studying what could be done if the French government rejected the EDC. The result was, oddly, that the seeking some deco-

\footnote{On July 30th 1954, Massigli, French ambassador in London, wrote that he had told Eden upon Mendès France’s request that the EDC would be put before parliament, and, in case it failed, that the French government had something ‘different’ mind, ‘être amené à envisager une solution différente, pour laquelle un échange de vue franco-anglais serait encore plus nécessaire.’ (DDF, 81).}

\footnote{At a tripartite meeting on July 13th 1954, Dulles made an explicit threat to Mendès France: he stated that aid would – due to Congress initiatives – no longer be forthcoming if the EDC would not be approved in its present form. When Mendès France answered that there was hardly a majority in the French Chamber, Dulles did not accept this. Both subsequently engaged in a historical debate, with Dulles comparing the EDC with the close ratification of the American constitution (sic!) (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-a, 1433-1436). Internally, Dulles even expressed the same suspicions that Mendès France had struck a secret deal with the Soviets to bring the EDC down in exchange for his diplomatic victory at Geneva (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 1030). The gloomy reactions documented are indicators that there was a certain ‘one-sidedness’ in the interpretations of possibilities that would soon somewhat ‘paralyse’ the State Department (Hoopes 1973, 247; Schwabe 1993, 53).}

\footnote{Again, différences accrued in the Cabinet concerning the policies to be pursued in case the EDC would fail. The discussion ensuing between Eden, Churchill, the Defense Minister Viscount Alexander, centered on the question of what would happen if France actually left NATO. Churchill proposed that the planning should go ahead, considering a NATO without prospective French participation (Mager 1990, 72). The Minister of Defense Viscount Alexander disagreed. He argued that, with regard to potential American reactions and the prospective loss of the French territory and its strategic significance for the defense of Western Europe, France had to be included. “With our worldwide commitments, we could not possibly offer additional forces to replace French forces withdrawn, and I am sure that the Americans would not be prepared to increase their forces in Europe.” (Mager 1990, 74). Churchill had proposed to have a trilateral alliance between the United States, Britain and Germany that Alexander rejected. Yet, no final resolution concerning formal commitment was made.}

ernment in order to probe what would happen in the event that no viable domestic compromise could be found. The responses to such advances by Spaak and Dulles were, as seen above, rather hostile, as Mendès France’s assertion of a lacking majority was simply not taken seriously. The British response, on the contrary, indicated that they would welcome talks (DDF, 81; Roussel 2007, 295).

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pling of Bonn agreements and EDC so that Germany be sovereign without rearma-
ment (Winand 1993,58). This, however, would be unacceptable to Adenauer.

In the end, Mendès France pursued both alternatives, that is, the possibility of a re-
vised EDC and talks with the UK about an alternative course of action with equal
vigor. On August 13th, the French Cabinet had a 7 hour discussion on the necessary
proposals to be added to the treaty in order to secure ratification (Roussel 2007, 297).
Apart from asking Britain again for formal troop commitment on the continent, the
agreement called for a purely intergovernmental transition period for eight years in
which the powers of the Commissariat were limited and majority voting would be
suspended. These suggestions were in accordance with the proposals from Bourgès-
Maunory’s ‘cédiste’ faction. In addition, the compromise called for the deletion of
‘federalist’ Art. 38 of the Paris Treaty (DDF, 147-150; Hitchcock 1998, 254). These
proposals would be submitted to the Allies in order to renegotiate the EDC at a con-
ference in Brussels. This decision split the Cabinet: the Gaullists Koenig, Lemaire,
and Chaban-Delmas resigned from their minister posts (Elgey 1992, 207). In sum,
the French government adopted the line conceived by Bourgès-Maunory. Mendès
France essentially tried to broker a compromise, accepting the Gaullists’ resignation
in the end.

The problem remained: Adenauer remained suspicious, and, in agreement with
Spaak, rejected a suggestion from Mendès France to meet with the German chancel-
lor before a decision would be made concerning the EDC (Creswell 2006, 154).
Mendès France reiterated his position to Dulles, provoking an even less diplomatic
reaction.\footnote{Dulles to Mendès France, “[...] if Germany would not be permitted to participate in Western Euro-
pean Defense, he believed that the next Congress would not appropriate a dollar for European military
aid connected with NATO.” He mentioned that that would result in ‘strongest pressure’ to have pe-
ripheral defense, with ‘incalculable’ damage (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-a, 1433 – 1434). Mendès France
insisted that there was, at present, no majority for ratification; he did not want to have the EDC ratify
with a ‘slender’ majority to which Dulles responded, “The Secretary said that he understood that the
Constitution of the Third French Republic had been passed by only one vote. With respect to the U.S.
Constitution, two of the key states, New York and Virginia, had ratified the Constitution with only
one vote. He therefore felt that history proved that a very small majority in such matters did not indi-
cate that the results would be disastrous. Mr. Mendès France said that the issues with respect to the
adoption of the Constitution of the Third Republic were oversimplified, and the Secretary said that he
had only repeated what he had heard and was not an expert on this matter. However, he believed the
reference he had made to the close votes connected with the adoption of the U.S. constitution was
approximately correct.” Mendès France responded he would not risk it, but try to get a larger majority
(FRUS 1952-1954 VI-a, 1435-1436).} In particular, Mendès France maintained that,
“[t]here was no possibility of posing the question of confidence as that required prior agreement of the Cabinet and that the Cabinet would not be able to reach agreement on the question of confidence in any form. He then said that this posed an embarrassing situation for him as the members of the government would then have to decide how they would vote. […]” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 1074).

Neither Spaak, nor Adenauer, nor Dulles believed him. Only Italian ambassador Quaroni believed Mendès France and suggested to consider his proposals, but the Italian Minister of Defense Taviani thought that the protocols deprived the Treaty of its nature (Magagnoli 1999, 288). Beyen’s reaction was similar.

As Mendès France’s proposal was relayed to the EDC signatories ahead of the Brussels conference, Hallstein complained to the Belgian ambassador in Bonn that these were a ‘Brüskierung’ of the previous efforts, highly ‘irritated’ the German government, and that Adenauer was still unsure whether he should even attend (De Vos, et al. 1998, 369). In his memoirs, Adenauer held steadfast to the view that the proposals were simply not earnest. 409 Although Adenauer participated in the Brussels conference, he refused a number of advances by Mendès France to have direct French-German discussions to work out a compromise (Gersdorff 1993, 317; Schwarz 1995, 108). Seeking a resolution, he followed David Bruce’s assessment that the proposals were unacceptable, would damage the ‘cause of Europe’ and that one now had to choose between the alternatives. 410 Only after the conference had closed and rejected the offer by Mendès France, did he meet with him.

The more interesting aspect of Mendès France’s proposals, however, is that the ‘united front’ against Mendès France rejected an agreement which, in essence, did nothing more than foreshadow the agreement contained in the Treaties of Rome and the subsequent ‘Luxembourg compromise’. As Spaak’s notes from the conference indicate,


“To this end, France has proposed a system that gives her, as indeed all other countries as well, a real veto power […] To the French system, I have three objections to make: 1) This system is in fact a provisional system since it devices a suspension of the Treaty for eight years in one of its most essential parts […] 2) For general reasons explained on multiple occasions, veto power paralyzes international assemblies. We have been through too many examples; 3) In the French system, the utmost arbitrariness rules, since each state is free at any time to make any decision when its vital interests are at stake [sic!].”

Anticipating the failure of the Brussels conferences, Mendès France had arranged for talks with Eden and Churchill after the Brussels conference in Chartwell on August 23rd 1954 (MAE 1955, 135-138). In these talks, Mendès France indicated that he was not going to turn the vote on the EDC into a vote of confidence, that the Cabinet would dissolve in that case, and that a quick alternative solution would have to be found to prevent the US from adopting a peripheral strategy. Eden agreed.
Churchill was surprised to hear that Mendès France “was much keener about NATO” (Winand 1993, 60). He concluded that the Americans “ought to have seen that EDC was hopeless a year ago.” (Winand 1993, 60). In essence, Mendès France proposed “a little box in NATO”, to contain German rearmament and to restore full sovereignty to Germany (Creswell 2006, 155). Thus, it was only after the Brussels conference, when it had become clear that the conditions for the EDC would never be met, that the eventual WEU solution began to take shape behind closed doors. As soon as the British realized that – if the EDC would in fact be rejected – a permanent troop commitment would be necessary in order to prevent the United States from adopting the peripheral strategy, UK officials starting considering integrating Germany and a limited number of British troops under the control of the Brussels Treaty of 1947.

It took four years of haggling over the EDC and the clear prospects of the failure of

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411 Own translation from “A cet effet, la France a proposé un système qui lui donne, comme d’ailleurs aux autres pays, un véritable droit de veto […]. Au système Français, j’ai trois objections à présenter: 1) Ce système étant un système provisoire en réalité, consacre une suspension du Traite dans une de ses parties essentielles pour huit ans […] 2) Pour des raisons d’ordre général expliquées à de multiple reprises, le droit de veto paralyse les assemblées internationales. Nous n’en avons eu que trop d’exemples ; 3) Dans le système français, l’arbitraire le plus complet règne, puisque chaque Etat est libre de décider à tout moment devant n’importe quelle décision que son intérêt vital est en cause [sic !].” (De Vos, et al. 1998, 374).
412 In a memo to the US ambassador, Mendès France is reported of saying that “there was no possibility of posing the question of confidence as that required prior agreement of the Cabinet and that the Cabinet would not be able to reach agreement on the question of confidence in any form. He then said that this posed an embarrassing situation for him as the members of the government would then have to decide how they would vote. […]” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 1074).
413 Macmillan asked how to make the NATO solution more appealing if “for this purpose, N.A.T.O. could be made at least appear to have been modified in the direction of the European idea. Was it possible, for example, for Germany formally to adhere to the Brussels Treaty which continued to subsist within the North Atlantic Treaty?” (Maier 1989, 225).
the Western alliance for the realization to take effect. Roughly similar solutions started to circulate in the French government.\textsuperscript{414} Thus, knowing that alternatives were indeed available, it is no wonder that Mendès France did not press for a vote of confidence in the French Assemblée Nationale. Supposing that his primary goal was to stay in power, and not risk his tenure because of a European Army, this makes sense indeed. There is no need to recount in detail the well-known process by which the EDC was rejected in the Assemblée Nationale (Roussel 2007, 312).\textsuperscript{415} It would, henceforth, come to be known as the ‘crime du 30 août’ (Clesse 1989). After the rejection, on August 31\textsuperscript{st}, former Gaullist ministers, Koenig, Lemaire, and Chaban-Delmas reentered the government, replacing three ‘cediste’ ministers who, disappointed over the procedure, left the government, among them Bourgès-Maunory (Rioux 1983, 55).

It is difficult to speculate whether an agreement on Mendès France’s conditions would have made the EDC possible. It is certain, however, that the immediate reaction was one of utter disappointment. A close advisor to Adenauer, Felix von Eckhardt, stated that ‘he had never seen the chancellor so depressed.’(Schwarz 1995, 112).\textsuperscript{416} Dulles congratulated his ‘dear friend’ Spaak for his ‘efforts’ to save the EDC.\textsuperscript{417}

\textsuperscript{414} When Mendès France eventual US reactions to a rejection of the EDC he suggested the possible alternative “This agreement would have no discriminations against Germany and would have no supranational features […] a little box in the big NATO […] He felt that because of the tie-up with England this would be a way of getting the French parliament and people to accept German entry into NATO.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 1074). Thus, the ‘tie-up’ with ‘England’ along an institutional dimension had already been established. On August 25\textsuperscript{th}, French ambassador in London Massigli indicated that, after having talked to British officials, he was told that the United Kingdom would be willing to enter into closer association within a ‘little box within NATO’ and was considering troop commitment that had been a crucial French demand all along (DDF, 209, 210, 217).

\textsuperscript{415} When the EDC was voted down “Communists and Gaullists alike locked arms and serenaded the chamber with the Marseillaise.” (Creswell 2006, 158).

\textsuperscript{416} In his memoirs, Adenauer wrote of a “Schwarzer Tag für Europa” (Adenauer 1980, 289).

\textsuperscript{417} Dulles wrote to Adenauer on August 31\textsuperscript{st} 1954, “My DEAR FRIEND: The action of the French National Assembly in rejecting, even without full debate, the European Defense Community Treaty is, I know, a bitter disappointment to you as it is to me. David Bruce has relayed your comments to me. You have done everything that anyone could do to bring about the realization of this bold concept which held such hopeful significance for the future of Europe and our Western Alliance. I want you to know how deeply I and my fellow Americans appreciate your strenuous and imaginative efforts over the years and in particular during these last critical weeks. The qualities of true statesmanship which you have displayed have won the admiration and respect of all of us.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-a, 1119).
Summary

In many ways, these events reveal the irreconcilable situation that had been created. The basic conditions that – during the heyday of the ‘third force’ in France – had been advanced by the French Assemblée Nationale had never been fulfilled to any extend acceptable even for these parties to ratify the Treaty. Adenauer and others at the Brussels conference put their last hope on the fact that the French Socialists would be able to successfully enforce party discipline although about half its deputies that had already committed publicly to vote against the EDC. Doubting the ‘European credentials’ of the new French government, the resulting refusal to negotiate seriously the conditions put forth by Mendès France made sure that the only politically viable strategy for the French government was to ensure that a politically viable alternative would exist once the EDC was rejected.

The ‘London Miracle’ and the WEU Treaty

The immediate reaction by the State Department was to reiterate that the “prevention of war between neighboring nations which have a long record of fighting cannot be dependably achieved merely by national promises or threats, but only by merging certain functions of their government into supranational institutions.” Despite such assertions, the eventual solution to the ‘German problem’ emerged relatively quick. Two days after the meeting at Chartwell, as already indicated, the French ambassador Massigli wrote to Mendès France reiterating the potential compromise (DDF, 209, 210, 217). On August 26th, Eden circulated a memorandum opposing what Churchill had contemplated earlier, namely the isolation of France to press the French into acceptance. Eden called for an eight-power conference followed by a

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419 “The French action does not change certain basic and stubborn facts: (a) the effective defense of Continental Europe calls for a substantial military contribution from the Germans; yet all, including the Germans themselves, would avoid national re-armament in a form which could be misused by resurgent militarism; (b) Germany cannot be subjected indefinitely to neutrality or otherwise be discriminated against in terms of her sovereignty including the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. Limitations on German sovereignty to be permanently acceptable must be shared by others as part of a collective international order. (c) The prevention of war between neighboring nations which have a long record of fighting cannot be dependably achieved merely by national promises or threats, but only by merging certain functions of their government into supranational institutions.” (Drafted by Dulles) (FRUS 1952-1954 V-a, 1120).
NATO conference. No mentioning of permanent commitments was made (Mager 1990, 79). What was clear, in difference to the United States, was that Eden thought it would be of prime importance to act swiftly if ‘Germany was not to be lost’ (Maier 1989, 225). On August 27th, the cabinet convened to discuss what to do after the French had rejected the plan. Churchill stated that France might accept a NATO solution. Macmillan asked how to make the NATO solution more appealing.

‘[…] if, for this purpose, NATO could be made to at least appear to have been modified in the direction of the European idea. Was it possible, for example, for Germany formally to adhere to the Brussels Treaty which continued to subsist within the North Atlantic Treaty?’ (Quoted in Maier 1989, 225).

Eden, Macmillan and the Foreign Office preferred this solution, since it might enable bipartisan consensus (Deighton 1998, 184). Thus, a quite broad consensus emerged within the Cabinet although some such as Minister of Commonwealth, Viscount Swinton, opposed any plans that would bind the British closer the continent. The Cabinet agreed to have Eden pursue the Brussels alternative (Mager 1990, 89).

Although there had been plans set up by the British and US governments for the contingency that the EDC would be rejected – essentially stipulating that German sovereignty should be restored, coupled with a unilateral renunciation of sovereign prerogatives of rearmament by Adenauer – the US High Commissioners “were taken by surprise when Adenauer rejected these proposals […].” (Noack 1977, 85; Dockrill 1991, 141; Deighton 1998, 189). Adenauer now insisted on German sovereignty, rejected a revival of the EDC and demanded entry into NATO, taking up the cautious promises made by Mendès France at the end of the Brussels conference (Herbst 1996, 101). He concluded that it was time to demand full sovereignty, “We adhere to our previous European stance. It was successful until now. It has led us to the foreign policy position we are currently taking. We can now issue demands to the three occupying powers […].” These demands took up the skepticism of the military

420 These conditions were developed in the Kabinett already on September 1st 1954, “1) Fortsetzung der Politik der europäischen politischen Integration. Zurückstellung der militärischen Integration in Konsultation mit den Ländern, die die EVG ratifiziert haben oder unmittelbar vor der Ratifizierung stehen. 2. Souveränität. 3. Teilnahme an der westlichen Verteidigung ohne Diskriminierung. 4. Abschluß von Verträgen über Aufenthalt von Truppen anderer Länder in der Bundesrepublik. 5” (Sondersitzung der Bundesregierung am Mittwoch, den 1. September 1954) <http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0000/k/k1954k/kap1_2/kap2_33/para3_1.html>.

421 Own translation from “Wir halten fest an der bisherigen Europa-Politik. Diese Politik hat Erfolge gehabt. Sie hat uns zu der außenpolitischen Stellung geführt, die wir einnehmen. Wir haben jetzt Forderungen an die drei Besatzungsmächte zu stellen […].” (Sondersitzung der Bundesregierung am
planners at the *Amt Blank*, who feared an ‘organizational disaster’ in the European army, mirroring similar assessments at the Allied headquarters in Europe (Large 1996, 214). Spaak, in a virtual reversal of his earlier position, now made the proposal to renegotiate the EDC Treaty by cutting the power of the Commissariat, to expand the range of decisions to be taken by the Council, and to institutionalize a similar moratorium on QMV as Mendès France had proposed (Gersdorff 1993, 320). In the *Assemblée Nationale*, Mayer, Pinay, and Reynaud initialized a motion that sought to oblige the government to take up Spaak’s proposal.\(^{422}\) Monnet would eventually warn Dulles that the British suggestions were “a camouflage and [a] dangerous decoy because it would give [the] impression that European unity can be achieved without transferring powers of decision to common institutions.” (Winand 1993, 62). Although Blankenhorn supported this view, Adenauer insisted on his line (Schwarz 1995, 112).

The British government reached its conclusions quite fast (Mager 1990, 49; Jansen 1992, 172). A week later, the British cabinet was already debating to revive the Brussels Treaty, to create a “European box inside an Atlantic box” (Dockrill 1991, 142; Macmillan 2003, 353). The Brussels Treaty had the advantage of not ‘seeming’ supranational, whereas the nutshell of the institutional solution was, in fact, supranational. Britain would station troops on the Rhine to allay French security concerns. The right to withdraw these troops, as well as control over German military organization would be exercised by the Council of the Brussels Treaty, thereby extending majority decisions to extremely limited issues. The essential solution had materialized.\(^{423}\) The only substantial objections came from Churchill (Mager 1990, 102; Jansen 1992, 174). While the Quai d’Orsay had reached the same conclusion, Eden toured European Capitals to mobilize support for German integration into NATO under the control of the Council of the Brussels Treaty. Although Eden and Churchill still had doubts – thus Eden did not mention the specific stage of planning to Mendès

\(^{422}\) “Strategy meeting of pro-EDC elements in Assembly had disclosed their growing cohesion and determination to block any alternative policy which Mendes might propose. Group led by Schuman, Rene Mayer, Pinay and Reynaud had decided to introduce motion for adjournment of debate and resumption of negotiations in the light of Spaak proposals […]” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 1084).

\(^{423}\) On September 27th 1954, Eden prepared the memorandum for the Cabinet, “[…] it will be necessary for the French to face some unpleasant realities. They will have to accept German sovereignty and German membership of N.A.T.O. and withdraw or drastically reduce their safeguard proposals. If they are to do this, they must be given some striking *quid pro quo.*” (Mager 1990, 118).
France in Paris – the British cabinet, with the exception of Churchill, slowly began realizing the necessity of a British troop commitment (Mager 1990, 113; Deighton 1998, 191; Hitchcock 1998, 198, 256). Securing ratification in France this time was the last chance to save the alliance and prevent the US from pulling its troops out of continental Europe. These fears were aggravated by continuing threats from Dulles to adopt the ‘peripheral strategy’. The last resistance in the British Cabinet were largely overcome when Foreign Secretary deputy Nutting and the British ambassador in Paris Sir Gladwyn Jebb agreed and told Eden that troops were necessary upon his arrival in Paris.424

When the Brussels conference convened, two announcements provided for a ‘breakthrough’, providing for the agreement that the Allies had missed for four years. Eden announced that All British armed forces currently on the continent – about four divisions and several hundred air planes – would not be withdrawn against will of a majority of members of the WEU (also Eden 1960, 166; Dockrill 1991, 145).425. Adenauer had agreed to a voluntary abrogation of the right to produce ABC-weapons and other heavy equipment – Germany had won a considerable amount of autonomy, and was now a member of NATO (Herbst 1996, 103). More importantly, given that the France’s gravest security concerns had been addressed, and that Germany had benefited from the new arrangement, an agreement on the Saar was finally found at the same time (Elgey 1992, 254). René Massigli’s reaction was, “for fifty years – ever since 1905 – French public opinion has waited for this announcement: and at last we have it.” (Mager 1990, 122). Spaak apparently related the Kielmansegg, “Tell your chancellor, he is a greater European than I am.” (Large 1996, 218). The Italian delegation was initially highly critical of Eden’s compromise proposals. However, as the objective was to avoid another breakdown of the negotiations, it had little choice but to accept the Treaty (Magagnoli 1999, 303). Beyen, disappointed, gave in to “a lamentable but undeniable reality” (Harryvan 2009, 71). Spaak, relieved about the breakthrough, sought to instill a rudimentary parliament as a last resort (De Vos, et al.

424 “Jebb and I had had a talk before Eden’s arrival and had found that we both agreed that the only hope of getting Mendès France to accept our Brussels Treaty solution was a British guarantee to leave our troops on the Continent for the duration of the Treaty. We put this to Eden who reacted like a kicking mule.”(Mager 1990, 110).
425 Macmillan in his diary, “So the great plan is launched for which we have worked at Strasbourg and elsewhere for more than 5 years. The federal system of the EDC is dead; the confederal system of Western European Union is very much alive […] It has been a real pleasure to see England leading Europe.” (Macmillan 2003, 363).
1998, 396). Blank maintained that the WEU was an immense success, having overcome French resistance to allow Germany “playing an equal role on the stage of international politics.” (Large 1996, 224).

Still, the ratification of the new arrangement did not go smoothly in France. Leaders from the right complained about insufficient safeguards on German rearmament (Roussel 2007, 372). Palewski (Gaullists), some leaders of the URSS, and Edouard Herriot demanded another effort for talks with before admitting Germany to NATO (Roussel 2007, 373). As the debate opened on December 20th, opposition emerged again in the ranks of the Radicals and other prominent members of the chamber (Massigli 1978, 489). Not linked to a vote of confidence, the rejection of the first motion on the Paris agreements ruined the deputies’ Christmas. As a reaction, there were Allied threats, most prominently from Eden, that German rearmament would proceed with or without France (Massigli 1978, 491; Roussel 2007, 374). After being turned into a vote of confidence the treaty initiating the new Western European Union was ratified in France on December the 28th (Roussel 2007, 375). Blankenhorn concluded, “I wish we had been in contact with this man for a longer time. A lot of misunderstandings could have been prevented. We have seen the things happening in Paris a bit too much through the eyes of our MRP friends.”

In Germany, opposition to rearmament mounted, before the vote on the WEU was passed by a comfortable margin in February 1954. Mendès France was ousted from government in February 1955 because of a failed vote of confidence before the WEU Treaty entered into force in May 1955.

Summary

In as much as the influence of supranational and federalist ideas advocated by core actors of the transnational coalition led the bargain along the EDC track, they effected a peculiar bias in the ways in which actors particularly in Germany and the US but other individuals such as Spaak processed information. US decision makers seemed to discard information regarding the dim ratification chances; the German leadership seemed to trust its sources in the Geneva Circle more than the increasingly bleak

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assessments from the embassy in Paris. Even Spaak, by 1954 Belgian Foreign Minister, converged on similar strategic assessments as these actors, providing evidence that these circles coordinated their strategic assessments. The one-sided way in which the strategic assessments reflected similar assessments as had been circulated by Teitgen to Blankenhorn and Brentano in the Geneva Circle.

They were on particular display when the governments of the Six received new conditions put forth by Mendès France. The isolation of the new French government from the transnational circles – as already suggested by the structural analyses in chapter 5 – certainly did coincide with altered preferences: Mendès France did not seek or prefer a supranational army. At the same time, he sought a sincere compromise. That sincerity, however, was doubted heavily, in particular among those actors in government who had heavily invested in the realization of the EDC. As a result, Mendès France was met with extreme mistrust and accusations of having made secret deals with Soviet leaders to demolish the EDC Treaty. The conditions that Mendès France put forward – most importantly the abolishment of Art. 38 and a moratorium of eight years on majority decisions in the EDC Council of Ministers – were not even considered seriously by the assembled foreign ministers in Brussels in early August 1954. By sticking to a widely held view that there was a majority in the French Assemblée Nationale, actors such as Adenauer and Spaak rejected an institutional compromise they would, *grosso modo*, agree upon four years later. In as much as these actors’ ideological proximity and mutual trust successfully may have been the precondition for the successful reconciliation among former enemies of the war, it provided for inefficiencies as well.

As it turned out, it was only through a round-about rejection of the ill-fated treaty that the broad basis for agreement could emerge. Faced with prospect of the failure of the Alliance, the French and the British governments engaged in a crucial quid pro quo: British troops for German entry into NATO. Moreover, Adenauer’s insisted to leave the EDC Treaty in its grave amply demonstrates that the strong preferences for a supranational army – still shared by his associates, Blankenhorn and Brentano a few days after the treaty was rejected – was not a question of principle. If German sovereignty could be had, national interests trumped European ambitions.
7.3 Summary: Power, Ideas, and Information

This chapter has drawn together the various threads of this dissertation. In the first section, I have demonstrated that the transnational conflict over European institutions described structurally and ideologically in chapters 5 and 6, was felt in all European countries, although to varying degrees. To be sure, geopolitical incentives certainly mattered. In every case, actors formulated their demands in the terms of the perceived ‘national interest’ that had to take objective material and geostrategic realities into account. Moreover, there are clearly identifiable differences that are seemingly related to geopolitical context. First, there is a recognizable difference between the larger and the smaller countries on the continent that accounts for common fears of autonomy loss in the smaller countries, a tendency already identified when analyzing the transnational conflict. Thus in the smaller European countries, radical federalist demands are much less prevalent, whereas demands for further economic integration are largely as consensus matter, reflecting an agreement on the ‘national interests’. Second, in both Germany and Italy, there is a tendency to view the supranational institutions as a means to gain recognition and influence.

At the same time, the causal and strategic beliefs underlying the demand differences and thus the transnational conflict clearly influenced the link between material context and domestic demands. There is a tractable impact of the transnational conflict on the domestic divisions, both within and across parties, that is mediated by the domestic political conditions and institutions. Thus, consistent with the basic properties of the transnational conflict, all Socialist parties in the European countries were marked by relatively high degrees of internal conflict whereas Christian Democratic parties, in particular in the larger continental countries were more inclined to demand the creation of supranational institutions with appropriate democratic institutions to create a European Army. The extent of the conflict varied and depended on national conditions. In Italy and France, it divided the French SFIO heavily and reinforced divisions between the two existent Italian Social Democratic Parties. In Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the role of the party leadership seemed decisive: whereas the leadership in Germany and the Netherlands was relatively remote from the Europeanist transnational networks, the leadership in Belgium (Spaak) was part of its most active core. As a result, the German SPD enforced its core principles of objecting to the new European institutions and the pooling and delegation of sovereignty, the Dutch PvdA remained largely quiet over its internal divisions, and the
leadership of the Belgian BSP-PSB, the party being divided as well, actively criticized the Belgian leadership of obstructing EDC negotiations in 1951. Moreover, the relative lack of influence of federalist Labour actors – who were certainly present transnationally (see chapter 5, section 5.2.1) – indicates that impact is dependent not on transnational factors (H6), but on national embeddedness and support (H7).

Thus, the Christian Democratic leadership in Belgium pursued essentially similar objectives as the Dutch multiparty government but was challenged heavily by the Social Democratic leadership under Spaak. In sum, there is a disconnect between the distribution of capabilities and the geopolitical incentives on the one hand and the dominant demands on the other hand, different to the direct relationship put forth by intergovernmentalism (H1). Domestic elites that are active in the transnational communities pursuing supranational or federal models of post-war Europe tend to do so, with exceptions, with regard to the problem of German rearmament within domestic political conflict. Domestic elites that are remote from these communities tend to fall within basic intergovernmental expectations: conservative Italian and German elites tend view the EDC favorably from an instrumental point of view as increasing their international influence, whereas others favor classic Alliance solutions to the German problem that preserve national sovereignty (i.e. the Gaullists in France), or deny the existential threat posed by the Soviet government and thus the necessity of balancing efforts and associated institutions (i.e. some British, French and German Social Democrats). This picture is complicated by the extent to which domestic institutions amplified or reduced the impact of the transnational conflict. Thus, in as much as French domestic conditions were insufficient to structure domestic conflict, the effective consociational context in the Netherlands silenced existing differences between the government and the Tweede Kammer.

In sum, the degree of domestic conflict and the differences over preferred institutional designs for post-war Europe and the ‘German question’, within and across parties, was sufficient to potentially affect governments and thus the formation of state preferences in its own right, albeit in a varied manner, depending on the quality of domestic institutions and mediated by the geopolitical context of every country. In this sense, the rationale for transnational networking, as described in chapter 2 can be seen relatively easily: amid a relatively clear geostrategic challenge for all European governments, there were still sufficient domestic differences over the concrete measures of how to meet that challenge. Similarities between individuals across
states, as described in the previous chapter, were sufficient as to warrant strategic coordination and to constitute a nascent transnational conflict over European institutions.

The second section then proceeded to ask whether the signs of the transnational conflict within the processes of ‘demand formation’ within the bargaining states translated into distinct patterns of preference formation and strategic choice of the negotiating states? Does considering the transnational conflict and its implications contribute to a better understanding of the EDC bargain? This chapter has shown that the relationship between the intergovernmental and the transnational hypotheses is one of necessity and sufficiency.

Thus, actors continued to pursue perceived ‘national interests’ and thus material circumstances and geopolitical incentives mattered. The German government and, more explicitly, the Italian government clearly perceived a supranational army to be in accordance with a particular view of the ‘national interest’. Without the Korean War and a perceived Soviet threat, negotiations on a European Army in particular and German rearmament in general would not have begun, conforming the necessary status of Hypothesis 3. Without US pressure exerted on European governments to come to an agreement, the negotiations would likely have taken longer, confirming the necessary status of Hypothesis 1. Without French internal differences that allowed the credible signal of domestic constraints, the negotiations would likely have taken the course that was seemingly preferred by all governments except the French in 1950, namely German entry into NATO accompanied by suitable institutional safeguards as suggested by the ‘package deal’, confirming the necessary status of Hypothesis 5. Finally, there are clearly discernible differences between the smaller and the larger countries that, from 1951 onwards, clearly fall in line with intergovernmentalist expectations.

These considerations, however, equally demonstrate that key developments cannot be accounted for sufficiently from the intergovernmental point of view without taking into account the evidence in line with transnationalist hypotheses (H7 – H10). The French divisions implied that a particular version of the French national interest – shared by Monnet, Schuman and others – vehemently pushed for a European army against mounting domestic scepticism and at considerable risk, in particular whether it would be possible to muster sufficient domestic support for their own project. The supranational option, initially considered and discarded by the US government, was
taken in 1951 then largely on account of the activities of Monnet and Schuman in France, McCloy and Bruce in brokering a French-German agreement on institutional equality and convincing their own government to pursue that course – the outlines of which had been exchanged freely for a while in the Geneva Circle as the previous chapter has demonstrated – and federalist pressure on the Italian government to reconsider its position. In every case, governments staffed with individuals that were ideologically close to the emerging transnational coalition deemed their choices in the national interests; in every case, there were other compatriots – especially in the military establishment of each country – who saw it differently. Thus, in as much as French domestic constraints and US power mattered, ideas and assessment transmitted and coordinated within transgovernmental and transnational circles pushed the bargain along a supranational track.

Moreover, as the rejection of the Eden Plan demonstrated, transnational influence was predicated on access to governments. Thus, Spaak’s proposal for a distinct constitutional Assembly was beaten in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe but accepted by the governments of the Six. Adopted as a strategy to improve the ratification chances of the EDC, this move would backfire soon.

Although the EDC ratification in Belgium, the Netherlands, and even Germany made progress, the fate of the EDC seemed sufficiently uncertain to prompt the UK Cabinet to debate repeatedly about possible alternative solutions. France and Italy seemed particularly troubling. The underlying ideological convictions of both the French and the Italian governmental coalitions shifted. In Italy, the cabinets no longer subscribed to the federalist interpretation of the Italian ‘national interests’; seeking Allied support in Trieste and relying on increasingly nationalist deputies for support, the ratification procedure was delayed significantly. French Cabinets relied increasingly on Gaullist support and public agitation against the EDC Treaty. In both cases, thus, geopolitical incentives and a shifting proximity of governmental cabinets to the transnational coalition mattered. The latter ensured that ideological preferences for supranational solutions to the German problem became less salient as geopolitical developments such as Stalin’s death made it seem less and less imperative. Again geopolitical incentives, as summarized in H3 and H4, are necessary but insufficient: thus, Stalin’s death and the perspective of détente did not alter the ratification prospects in Germany, the Netherlands, or Belgium. In France and Italy, domestic instability shifted the control of parliamentary majorities and governments away from the influ-
ence of individuals in proximity to the transnational coalition and thus, in line with Hypothesis 8, shifted French and Italian bargaining positions.

Finally, the US government in particular exhibited a peculiar ideological bias: whereas Truman administration had been highly skeptical of the supranational army solution, Eisenhower and Dulles wholeheartedly followed the ideas that had, earlier, been advocated by McCloy, Bruce and Monnet. In particular, the refusal to consider, internally, possible alternative courses of action against the advice of senior officials in the Policy Planning Staff is a case in point. This bias in strategic planning preempted more serious consultations with the British government – which had in fact begun to prepare for the failure of the EDC – and produced incentives to delay ratification particularly in France and Italy. A similar picture of necessity and sufficiency emerges with regard to bargaining power: US power was an important constraint as was the domestic volatility of French governments (H4). The ability of the transnational coalitions to push the bargain along the supranational track was predicated on both. Without considering that coalition, however, the course of the bargain cannot be sufficiently explained. Thus, by 1953, the EDC ‘bargain’ had reached an impasse. The subsequent widespread regret over the inability to resolve that impasse before the rejection of the Treaty in 1954 testifies to the dysfunctional constellation of incentives that had come about.

In as much as the influence of supranational and federalist ideas advocated by core actors of the transnational coalition led the bargain along the EDC track, they effected a peculiar bias in the ways in which actors particularly in Germany and the US but other individuals such as Spaak processed information. US decision makers seemed to discard information regarding the dim ratification chances; the German leadership seemed to trust its sources in the Geneva Circle more than the increasingly bleak assessments from the embassy in Paris. Even Spaak, by 1954 Belgian Foreign Minister, converged on similar strategic assessments as these actors, providing evidence that these circles coordinated their strategic assessments. The one-sided way in which the strategic assessments reflected similar assessments as had been circulated by Teitgen to Blankenhorn and Brentano in the Geneva Circle.

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Thus, the factors summarized by the intergovernmental hypotheses 1 to 5 are necessary to understand the general incentives characterizing the bargain but insufficient to explain its course. A sufficient explanation can only be achieved by considering the transnational framework. A similar picture of necessity and sufficiency emerges with regard to bargaining power: US power was an important constraint as was the domestic volatility of French governments (H4). The ability of the transnational coalitions to push the bargain along the supranational track – captured by hypotheses 9 and 10 was predicated on both. At the same time, without the privileged access of the transnational coalition to governments and its ability to insert its reasoning into the strategic considerations of the bargaining governments, the bargain would have played out differently.
8. Conclusion

Political integration in post-war Europe began with a rhetorical ambition. Although expressed in vague words and meaning and open to interpretation, the ambition of ‘European unity’ was ubiquitously subscribed in most elite circles in the European ruins of the Second World War. As the tensions of the Cold War nurtured an increasing sense of threat in Western Europe, that ambition resulted in two treaties being signed in Paris in 1951 and 1952. While the former – the ECSC Treaty – was and remains the historically recognized landmark that launched the integration project, the latter is a largely apocryphal part of the integration narrative. Some scholars interpret its intended scope as well as its failure to be a result of utopian federalist ambitions; others attribute it to a distinct geopolitical situation in post-war Europe. As the review of the available scholarly literature – undertaken in chapter 3 – pointed out – both versions fit within a larger grand explanation of European integration resulting from the distinct geopolitical environment of the Cold War and a need for credible commitments between the French and German governments as well generally converging economic interests. Despite different emphases in the scholarly literature, the agreement is that the EDC was due to peculiar circumstances. Some refer to an unusual geopolitical situation due to the Korean War, others point to a brief moment of exceptional influence of federalist ideas. The commonality in both views is expressed in a textbook introduction to European integration history which points out “[…] the collapse of [the EDC] and the failure of subsequent initiatives along similar lines clearly indicate the limits on European integration in the 1950s and beyond.” (Dinan 2004, 27). While superficially correct, the preceding chapters have demonstrated that the causes of the EDC were more intricate. Grappling with the puzzle of the EDC sheds light on a number of substantive questions, both with regard to the history of European integration in particular as well as more general issues pertaining to the role and impact of ideas and transnational networks in interstate bargaining.

The Puzzle of the EDC

As chapter 4 has pointed out, the EDC period presents an interesting puzzle for conventional theories of intergovernmental cooperation. Devised as a solution to the ‘German problem’ in post-war Europe, the contents of the EDC Treaty and the asso-
associated European Political Community were radical and went far beyond the degree of pooling, delegation, and democratic representation that is in place today (Rittberger 2009). On the other hand, the organization it was replaced with – the Western European Union – presents a text-book case to the credible commitments problem in interstate cooperation and fits remarkably well with conventional arguments that explain institutional design choice by recourse to efficiency arguments. Accordingly, the question that arose was: Why did the negotiating states pursue such radical course of action? Why propose the creation of a supranational armies among former enemies five years after the Second World War when an obvious institutional solution, expected by conventional theories of intergovernmental cooperation, was in plain sight all along?

As this dissertation has shown, seeking to understand these intricacies sheds light not only on the contingency within the historical trajectory of the European project but also on more substantive issues. As chapter 6 has demonstrated, the sources of that explanation lie in the fact that the political rhetoric about ‘European unity’ emanated from the first politically effective and transnationally motivated project of unification on the European continent. At the same time, the basic purpose of this project, its goals and its implied institutional solutions were disputed: the ‘idea of Europe’ was a transnationally contested idea and the center of attraction for a transnational political conflict among the European elite that cut across the inherited traditions of European party families.

The consequences and implications of that conflict, this dissertation has argued, cannot be sufficiently described by the standard intergovernmentalist framework of inter-state cooperation, be it related to European integration or to more general and global issues. The contours of that framework have been fleshed out in chapter two in detail. The general applicability and usefulness of intergovernmentalism is predicated on its core assumptions, most importantly the presence of an organizationally well-functioning nation-state whose population is united by a distinct national ideology. While these constraints still qualify intergovernmentalism for a large class of important issues, chapter 2 argued that there are fairly clearly identifiable conditions under which the framework less useful. Most importantly, it does not provide tools for understanding the emergence and the possible effects that influential transnational and transgovernmental coalitions may have on the preference formation and bargaining behavior of democratic governments. Thus, the case of the EDC amply
demonstrates that under conditions in which an intergovernmentalist explanation should fare reasonably well – namely explaining bargaining processes and preferences for institutional design in relation to security cooperation problems among democratic states – it is indeterminate. Lacking an account of the role of political conflict within that problem, intergovernmentalism offers little guidance to explain the emergence and the effect of transnational and transgovernmental coalitions.

**Theorizing the Role of Transnational Networks**

In order to better understand the impact that the multiple transnational networks have had on the EDC negotiations, chapter 2 devised an analytical framework for the explanatory problem of the EDC. I argued that transnational coalitions may be a political asset within domestic conflict as they provide information, allow the coordination of political strategies, and thereby may help achieving cooperative bargaining solutions that would be off the table otherwise. In addition, however, it was pointed out that the nation-state presents an institutional and ideological barrier to transnational coalition-formation: as national institutions for political competition provide the primary reward for political actors – vote and office through national parties and coalitions – the incentive to defect from agreed upon political strategies is relatively high. Nationalist ideologies create divergent and mutually exclusive values and thus make the formation of similar goals unlikely. Past histories of national conflict, differing languages hinder the formation of trustworthy reputations.

Thus, in the absence of supranational institutions for political conflict and decision-making (parties, parliaments, and governments), the rewards of engaging in transnational networking to form transnational coalitions are existent but limited. Only actors who put a high price on similar political goals for cooperation such as common institutions across differing states face strong incentives to engage in transnational activities that imply political commitments and strategic coordination.

The implications of the existence of transnational networks of actor coalitions make for observable implications that are distinct from intergovernmentalism. First, since sincere political agents commit to institutional solutions transnationally, their domestic political positions may put them at odds not only with actors from different political parties but also with actors from similar parties or party families who prefer different institutional solutions to the cooperation problem at hand. As a corollary, in-
teregovernmental factors accounting for state-preferences – power differences and domestic party coalitions – are insufficient without taking into account the transnational embeddedness of governments. Rather, it is the embeddedness of individuals within identifiable clusters of transnational networks that explains their positions in domestic conflict. Accordingly, it is the success or failure of transnationally embedded actors – rather domestic parties – that explains shifting state preferences.

Second, taking the effect of network structures seriously implies rejecting a naïve interpretation of networks as efficient information transmitters. Since trust is the main condition as well as the main currency of transnational coordination and commitment, the uses of strategic information by governments depart from an expected intergovernmental logic. If governmental actors are embedded in transnational networks with trusted actors that share similar valued institutional goals, they will tend to trust their information more than information stemming from domestic sources that are processed by actors who tend not to share similar goals. It was argued that such situations can induce patterns of learning that are described in current models of learning in trust networks: if actors trust only likeminded actors and discard information from sources that, in their view, do not share similar goals, a systematic tendency for biased information processing results. Thus, dominance of transnational networks by like-minded actors may create false assessments of basic political situations and prospects for success.

**The Structure and Dynamics of Transnational Coalition Building**

In order to assess these implications and the explanatory value added, chapters 5 and studied the Europeanist transnational network in post-war Europe from a quantitative and a qualitative perspective. Drawing on individuals’ affiliation with the dominant transnational organizations and the resulting information on overlapping memberships in post-war Europe, it produced three main results.

First, it identified the most central individuals within the transnational network, the clustering of the network, and inferred governments changing embeddedness within those clusters. It showed that the rather dense transnational network displayed a notable ‘elite’ of well-known individuals who were presumably influential in the transnational sphere. Both the density of the network as well as its composition suggest
that the transnational organizations constituted important ties among the political elite in post-war Europe across countries as well as across party families.

Second, chapter 5 identified six distinct transnational groups of actors that share more similar cross-affiliations with each other than with the rest of the network. Of the six clusters identified, three are distinctly oriented towards party families, the remaining three clusters are primarily based on non-party family related transnational pressure groups. In combination with the visual inspection of these graphs, chapter 5 thus showed that the network data reveal structural indications of a transnational conflict. Thus, whereas the Christian Democrats form a single group, the transnational Social Democrats are split into two, indicating a much stronger internal polarization of the Social Democrats than that of the Christian Democrats. Finally, the composition of these clusters reveals an interesting fact: on the one hand, their composition is sufficiently similarly distributed across countries and party families to warrant the conclusion that their influence – if it exists – cuts across state borders and party organizations within the respective states. At the same time, the federalist cluster is overwhelmingly dominated by Italian actors, whereas the distribution of Dutch and Belgian actors resembles the affiliations of British actors, not those of the three big continental states, although these conclusions are associated with considerable uncertainty.

Third, chapter 5 analyzed the embeddedness of the governments of the main European countries within these clusters over time. The most important result established was somewhat unsurprising: the Christian Democratic cluster presents the transgovernmentally best connect group of actors between 1950 and 1952 by a rather wide margin, irrespective of the centrality indicator used to establish the result. Due to a number of domestic changes, this dominance declines rapidly by the end of 1952. Based on actors’ formal memberships, there is no clear-cut cluster that dominates transgovernmental relations thereafter. In addition, more subtle differences exist: based on their governments’ embeddedness within these clusters, one would expect clear differences between France and Italy on the one hand, and Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK on the other hand. Whereas the former share a similar affiliation with the Federalist community and the European Movement between 1950 and 1953, the latter exhibit a primary attachment to the European Movement and the ELEC community.
In order to place the structural results in a qualitative context, Chapter 6 then focused on the actual content of the exchanges between the individuals identified in the previous chapter. Drawing on the existing literature on the main institutional ideas driving the European project in the 1950’s, it differentiates three sets of valued orientations towards the nation-state and associate institution blueprints allowing to distinguish in order to differentiate ideas and values committed to. These ‘models’ follow typical rhetorical commitments to certain values and common political goals. Where-as a commitment to democratic values is present in all cases, associated commitments to the normative implications of nationalism – the “[…] principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent […]” (Gellner 1983, 1) – and thus the post-war notion of ‘Europe’ differ. On one side of the extreme, intergovernmentalists praise the continuing relevance of national governments; on the other side, federalists denounce nationalism as the prime ‘evil’ that caused the war. Both extremes come with concrete institutional commitments: a ‘Council of States’ on the one hand, a completely new federated political community on the other hand. ‘Supranationalism’ is a more amorphous medium category that nonetheless contains distinct elements: partially sharing the federalist diagnosis, it seeks novel institutions to ‘preserve’ the nation-state. For this category, public commitments to curtailing the nation’s sovereignty – through pooling and delegation – are essential.

Analyzing the content of these commitments yields two results. First, in line with the structural analyses of the previous chapter, the ‘distribution’ of actors committed to any model cuts across party families and countries. Hence, Craig Parsons observation of cross-cutting lines of conflict in France generalizes across the continent, but significantly less so to the UK (Parsons 2002, 2003). The internal structural differentiation presented in the fifth chapter is consistent with this observation: whereas the transnational Social Democrats are characterized by intense internal conflicts between actors subscribing to all three models, the European right contains these differences unevenly distributed among Conservatives and Christian Democrats. Whereas the former are more present in the European Movement and ELEC cluster – mostly representing the intergovernmental model – Christian Democrats rarely committed themselves to nationalist principles and the intergovernmental solution. The internal conflict rather focused on differences between supranationalists and federalists. The remaining network clusters are equally divided: actors in the European Movement cluster are heavily polarized along those lines; the ELEC cluster is
shown to be divided between supranationalists and intergovernmentalists; the Federalist cluster, unsurprisingly, is relatively unified along these lines, although significant internal dissent exists between moderates and radicals. Finally, it is shown that transatlantic exchanges were dominated by the federalist and, to a certain extent, the supranational model.

As rhetorical commitments are conceptualized as the building-blocks of transnational trust, the sixth chapter equally demonstrates how that ideological similarity led to informal coalition building, with varying success, in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s. In particular, this chapter identifies an emerging loose transnational coalition between federalists and supranationalists from all major party families, which, by 1951 at the latest, began to coordinate. Up until 1951, a number of factors seemed to point towards a larger, less centralized Europe. In particular, the allegiances a number of previously identified central transnational Social Democrats had favored a wider Europe, reflecting their ‘internationalist’ solidarity with British and Scandinavian Social Democrats, which drove them at odds with Liberal and Christian Democrats that sought a supranational Europe. However, persisting ideological differences – within Social Democracy and between the continent and the UK in particular – caused frequent conflicts that reached a climax by 1951 within its main institutional forum, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Spurred by the succeeding negotiations of the ECSC and the prospect of a continental parliament, mobilized by the prospect of a creation of a European Army, the strategies of the major federalists and supranationalists finally began to converge: Federalists put pressure on the Italian government to create a democratic federation; at the initiative of Paul-Henri Spaak, an alliance of Social Democratic federalists founded the ‘Action Committee for the European Constituent’ (Europäische Bewegung 1953); Christian Democrats put increasing pressure on recalcitrant Dutch and Belgian representatives to lobby for a European intergovernmental compromise on the EDC; finally, an identifiable elite of US officials positioned on the continent, in direct contact with Jean Monnet, successfully lobbied its government to endorse the EDC and use to leverage of aid conditionality to effect a compromise. Documenting evidence from common written exchanges, meetings and conference attendance shows sufficient evidence of strategic coordination: the transnational coalition dominated the transgovernmental scene, in particular between 1951 and 1953. Most importantly, it became evident that within this transnational coalition, a certain interpretation of the EDC ratification chances
prevailed: actors with close ties to the transnational coalition – including leading figures such as Adenauer, French MRO President Teitgen, US Foreign Secretary John Foster Dulles, mutually assured each other that there was no alternative to the EDC and the chances of a ratification of the EDC Treaty were good enough. No substantial revision of the Treaty was required for it to pass, ignoring the information about the heated domestic conflict in the French domestic political arena.

**What Effect Did Transnational Networks Have on the EDC Bargain?**

In order to uncover the effect that transnational coalition-building had both on the preference formation and the formation of bargaining strategies, the final chapter 7 argued that it is only through considering the implications of the transnational framework that one can explain the puzzle of the EDC sufficiently. As argued in chapter 4, the institutions of the WEU that resolved the problem of German rearmament in lieu of the EDC are a ‘text-book’ case of the realist and transaction-costs based theory of institutional design, solving the issue of German rearmament through balancing and credible commitments through pooling (a permanent troop commitment by the UK to the continent controlled by a majority in the WEU Council) and a WEU ‘agency’ that, in theory, had the right of inspecting German arms at any time. From an intergovernmental perspective, it remains largely puzzling why the institutionally obvious solution (the WEU) remained elusive whereas an institutionally more risky and demanding option (the EDC) remained on the table between 1950 and 1954.

The general conclusion is that the relationship between the two sets of hypotheses largely boils down to a relationship of necessity and sufficiency. Thus, the intergovernmental hypotheses on demand formation (H1), supply conditions (H2), position shifts and strategic adaptation (H3) and bargaining power (H5, H6) capture important aspect of the bargain. Without considering their transnational counterparts, however, it remains elusive. The fate of the ‘EDC track’ in the negotiations is tied to the varying influence of the actors of the transnational coalition identified in the sixth chapter.

First, examining the domestic conflicts in the negotiating countries demonstrates that the interpretation of ideological conflicts within the transnational sphere is translated into the political systems of the negotiating states as actors more closely attached to
the national model did not participate in equal fashion within the transnational network. Domestic perceptions and rhetorical strategies of conflict still center on security, the nation, and democratic principles. Domestic conflicts, however, are largely fought over different preferred institutional models. Within these conflicts, actors engaged in the transnational sphere advocate similar ideas in the domestic setting. In sum, the fact that the three ideological ‘models’ of Europe cut across party differences in all continental states warrants the conclusion that the transnational networks identified earlier were ‘carriers’ or channels of ideologies that affected domestic politics. The scope for this impact varied as it depended largely on party leaders’ preferences and their institutional and personal ability to enforce party discipline (H7) and did not overtly depend on the ideological cohesion or the resources of a distinct transnational group (H8). For example, Socialist parties on all continental countries experienced significant internal conflicts. Few party leaderships, however, possessed institutional power and personal reputation like German SPD leader Kurt Schumacher, who followed a nationalist electoral strategy. On the other side of the aisle, Adenauer used similar measures to enforce party discipline, but employed them based on a different ‘preferred model’ of Europe. In contrast, French parties at the time were notorious – with a few exceptions – for their lack of party discipline. Hence, internal conflicts occurred in a more pronounced and open manner. Finally, the demands put forth by domestic political actors varied according to the degree that central supranationalist or federalist actors were in a position to employ domestic political organizations for their own advantage. Hence, the ‘input’ side to state-preferences is best explained by the transnational framework.

Second, turning to the supply side, it was shown that the changing constellations of conflict occurring throughout the five years are best explained by reference to – changing – governments embeddedness in transnational clusters (chapter 5), their ties to the informal transnational coalition (chapter 6), and the outcomes of domestic conflicts within governments.

Until the first half of 1952, the negotiations are marked by a clear line of conflict among the Six, namely between Germany, France, and Italy on the one hand, and the Benelux on the other hand, the former seeking substantial amounts of pooling and delegation within the European Army, the latter unified in their resistance against extensive pooling, insistence on control mechanisms through the EDC institutions and externally through NATO. This conflict can, obviously, be explained by refer-
rence either to power differences between states or to governments ideologies: both the Italian and French governments had substantial ties to the Federalist cluster, whereas the governmental leadership of France and Germany had strong ties to the most active supranationalist elements in the Christian Democratic Community. Dutch and Belgian leaders, as both the previous chapter showed, were transnationally much more reluctant in committing to the full-blown supranational idea. This line of conflict between the larger and smaller nations decreased significantly by late 1953 and early 1954. Since material conditions remain constant, this fact is best explained by shifting government ideologies linked to shifting embeddedness of all governments in the previously identified transnational clusters and their affinities to the transnational coalition. Hence, Italy and France delayed ratification motions as more nationally inclined Gaullists and (Italian) Monarchists entered the governmental coalition and caused significant internal conflict. The Belgian government became one of the most ardent supporters of the EDC once Paul-Henri Spaak became Foreign Minister in early 1954. It is thus shown that shifting material conditions or changing threat levels cannot account for these changes sufficiently.

Third, it is argued that only the transnational account captures the bargaining behavior and the observable patterns of influence, thus accounting for the paradoxical bargaining course. In particular, only a focus on the influence of the transnational coalition on states’ bargaining behavior can account for the fact that the negotiations honed in on the EDC alternative in 1951 rather than pursue the NATO alternative that most governments still sought most feasible by 1950. Taking the scheduled elections in France as an opportunity, the chapter reconstructs a coordinated attempt by members of the transnational coalition, including lower level US officials, the leadership of the French delegation in Paris, as well as Monnet, Schuman, and Adenauer, to effect a number of key compromises by the US and French governments that effectively eliminated the NATO option.

As a result, an intergovernmental compromise emerged, achieved by two means that, effectively, were used by key transnational and transgovernmental actors. First, by effecting a change in the official stance of the US government – that had hitherto planned along the lines of a German NATO membership – the conditionality of US aid would henceforth provide a powerful lever to bring more skeptical governments – notably the Dutch and the Belgian ones – in line with the new supranational option. The second means was based on beliefs: the most volatile and domestically uncertain
country was, by all accounts, France. Thus, any judgment on a feasible bargaining resolution implied some judgment what it would take to effect an agreement. By convincing the US government to push for an EDC solution as well as by a manipulative use of the negotiation mandate by the French leader of the delegation, the EDC track was presented as the most feasible option. Subsequently, as the transnational coalition grew in force, its main raison d'être was based on the assumption that it was steering a course without alternatives. This assumption was enforced: partially by US aid conditionality that made it potentially costly for the skeptics to pursue alternatives; partially through persuasion within transgovernmental circles – most notably the Christian Democratic community; and partially through domestic discipline within parties and, at times, within the Foreign Policy apparatuses.

Especially the latter undertaking became increasingly impossible against notable domestic opposition in all of the continental countries, especially in France. Already in 1952, the first skeptics started to argue that the signed treaty would never be ratified. There is certainly indirect evidence that the prospects of a failed ratification were feared, for example, as Adenauer forbade written considerations of the eventualities of such an occurrence within his own Foreign Policy apparatus. In the end, the conviction that the EDC was the correct course proved fatal since with conviction came bias.

Initially, though, there was success. The ratification in Belgium and the Netherlands went relatively smoothly, on account of persuasion and US pressure on the Dutch and Belgian governments to submit the treaty to their parliaments. The German election of 1953 gave an overwhelming majority to Adenauer and thus negated the efforts of EDC opponents, notably the Christian Democrats, to prevent the EDC by appealing to the **Bundesgerichtshof** (BGH). At the same time, ratification efforts stalled in France and Italy, as the respective governing coalitions became increasingly nationalist. Most notably in France, the issue became increasingly acerbic and volatile. However, those associated with the transnational coalition throughout Europe – whether in government or not – did not take these obvious signs seriously. The political trust that had accumulated through concerted efforts for the previous three years now backfired: by relying on biased information submitted through informal channels established through transnational contacts, the situation in France was perceived erroneously. It is shown that in July 1954, the new French Prime Minister Mendès France made an honest attempt to secure a successful resolution of the
issue by submitting a revision of the EDC Treaty that would have likely resulted in a successful ratification but would have entailed a significant decrease in the amount of sovereignty pooled at the European level. This effort was roundly rebutted as a number of European and American leaders – notably Adenauer and, by now, Spaak, suspected foul play: mistrusting the intentions of and being convinced that the EDC alternative would ultimately muster sufficient votes, they roundly rebuffed Mendès France’s offer. Finding a highly hostile international environment that accused the French leader of manipulation and dishonesty, Mendès France chose not to stake his governmental survival on an unpopular treaty and – secretly – explored an alternative solution, namely German integration into NATO in exchange for a British troop commitment. Obtaining a sufficient answer from the UK, the French government allowed the EDC Treaty to be voted off the agenda in the French Assemblée Nationale.

It was only after the EDC project had been thrown to shambles, that actors ‘discovered’ the supposedly ‘obvious’ solution. Actors subscribing to federalist and supranationalist ideologies were heavily disappointed, as the quotes above amply demonstrates. Once faced with the dilemma of either agreeing to a NATO solution or risking the survival of the Western Alliance, the ‘obvious’ solution of the WEU followed quickly. The disappointment subsequently expressed by ‘supranationalist’ actors demonstrates that they would have preferred even a more moderate EDC solution: their distrust towards the French government, however, proved fatal and produced considerable regret. Although the counterfactual consideration – what had happened had the European governments accepted is a difficult argument – there is a fairly consistent picture. The early successes that culminated the ECSC and EDC Paris Treaties were brought about the support and pressure of the powerful segment among the Western political elite. The failure of the EDC was largely due their overconfidence and the selective use of information that prevented a more modest institutional solution – encapsulated in Mendès France’s proposal during the Brussels conference – to materialize. There was no essential necessity in the failure of the EDC. The contents of the proposals put forth in Brussels – as far as the institutional dimension was concerned – did not deviate substantially from the Treaties of Rome. In fact, the EDC Treaty, although aborting the hugely ambitions EPC project, would still have entailed a more powerful parliament. British participation, from a formal point of view, could easily have been integrated into a reduced version of the Treaty along the
model entailed in the WEU. Early ambition and influence, in the case of the EDC, resulted in inefficiency, disappointment and regret. The subsequent steps towards the economic path of European integration were successful because the painful lesson of the EDC was heeded. Had leading governments in Bonn, Washington, Rome or perhaps Brussels and Den Haag heeded sceptic voices earlier, a Treaty on a European Army might have been ratified. The widespread utterances of regret after the alleged crime of August 30th – the day the French Assemblée Nationale rejected the treaty – suggest that this would have been the preferred outcome of most members – or actors close to – the supranational transnational coalition.

Contribution and Lessons Learned for Future Research

The primary implication is that the EDC bargain is not a period produced only by distinct geopolitical circumstances or short-lived influence of radical federalists. Rather it resulted from an intricate combination of geopolitical threats in the emerging cold war and the emergence and activities of a transnational coalition composed of Socialists, Christian Democrats, liberals, and radical federalists all seeking the same goal: a European supranational army embedded in democratic supranational institutions. Second, to the extent this can be said of past events, the EDC was not a project that was doomed to fail: rather, it was the persistent single-mindedness of the members of the transnational coalition who were in important places that prevented a more moderate compromise to emerge earlier and that would have made ratification more likely although still difficult.

Additionally, having analyzed the EDC from a transnational perspective adds additional credibility to the necessity of considering European integration as a transnational and supranational polity from the beginning (Kaiser and Starie 2005; Kaiser, et al. 2008). The present dissertation has sought to contribute to this debate by considering the EDC from a distinct analytical framework that allows for devising testable hypotheses that can be directly juxtaposed to the main theoretical rival of intergovernmentalism. Applying them successfully to the EDC case thus lends credibility to that perspective and provides a possibly fruitful future avenue to reconsider additional landmark IGC’s in the history of European integration in which historical work and the improvement and fine-tuning of the available theoretical understanding can go hand in hand. Thus, a primary result of this dissertation is that the conflict of ideas
that Craig Parsons has analyzed for the case of France was in actuality a transnational conflict among the political elite of Europe (Parsons 2002, 2003). That conflict did not manifest itself equally across the main party families of Christian Democracy and Social Democracy and was mediated by specific national contexts. In this sense, this dissertation has contributed to an emerging view of post-war Europe that reemphasizes the role of ideas and transnational networks for the origins of European integration (Lipgens and Loth 1977; Kaiser and Stare 2005; Kaiser, et al. 2008; Kaiser, et al. 2010). Thus, future research on the role of ideas and transnational networks in the history of European integration may benefit from combining a distinct theoretically informed approach with a mixed-methods design that identifies both the structural aspects of networks as well as the content of rhetorical exchanges transmitted within them. A particularly interesting question consists in continuing to trace the impact, if any, that transnational contacts and efforts at building and maintaining trust had during the negotiations on the Treaties of Rome and throughout the remaining key stages in the history of European integration.

An additionally interesting perspective for future research may be to inquire in how far that conflict structured political conflict across Europe. Whereas the present focus was limited to the political elite in Europe, the conflict identified strongly resembles similar lines of contemporary political conflict in Europe identified recently (Kriesi 1998; Kriesi, et al. 2012). Whereas the literature talks about the transformation of cleavages in Western Europe, having identified the outlines of a similar cleavage across the political elite in Europe opens up the question whether one of the source of currently identified transformations can in fact be traced back to post-war Europe.

Finally, it has drawn attention to the fact that the concept of transnational networks requires conceptual clarity and can profit from explicitly considering formal work on learning dynamics in networks in as much as the development of intergovernmentalism has profited from the consideration of formal game theory. At the same time, it has drawn attention to the fact that quantitative and qualitative empirical methods can be and should be beneficially combined. As it was beneficial for the specific historical problem to combine theoretically guided research drawing on theoretical arguments as well as methods across theoretical and methodological divides of the discipline, a similar approach is recommended for work study the role and impact of transnational networks on other problems. On the empirical plane, combining quantitative and qualitative methods may serve to correct insufficiencies as well as provide
independent information on a similar problem. Thus, varying transnational ideological fragmentation could be demonstrated both quantitatively – via the clustering of actor’s overlapping membership patterns – as well as qualitatively by analyzing ideas circulating within networks.

Third, the explicit consideration of the structural aspects of learning in networks yielded the consideration of a mechanism – related to the ‘wisdom of crowds’ effect (Galton 1907; Surowiecki 2004) – that showed that a naïve treatment of transnational or regulatory networks that discounts questions of trust structures as well as the lack of the heterogeneity of available, widely used in the current literature, is deeply problematic. Thus, situations in which key decision makers rely on ideologically homogeneous sources of information may tend to produce errors of judgment and suboptimal outcomes. In the present case, it produced an error of judgment that, essentially, prevented the creation of a specific configuration of institutional elements, judged from a normative perspective, was far more superior with regard to its envisioned degree of democratic representation, than any solution proposed thereafter.
## Table A Parties and Party Family Classification According to Parlgov

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Party Name English</th>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Party Family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>ARP</td>
<td>Anti-Revolutionary Party</td>
<td>Anti-Revolutionaire Partij</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
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<td>ARS</td>
<td>Republican and Social Action (Conservatives)</td>
<td>Action républicaine et sociale</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
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<td>BSP-PSB</td>
<td>Belgian Socialist Party</td>
<td>Belgische Socialistische Partij – Parti Socialiste Belge</td>
<td>Social Democracy</td>
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<td>CDU</td>
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<td>CHU</td>
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<td>Christian Democracy</td>
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<td>National Centre of Independents and Peasants (Conservatives)</td>
<td>Centre national des indépendants et paysans</td>
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<td>Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei – Parti populaire chrétiens sociaux</td>
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<td>Christelijke Volkspartij</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
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<td>Christliche Volkspartei des Saarlandes</td>
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<td>Deutsche Partei</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
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<td>DPS</td>
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<td>FU</td>
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<td>Föderalistische Union</td>
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<td>GER</td>
<td>GB/BHE</td>
<td>All-German Bloc/League of Expellees and Deprived of Rights</td>
<td>Gesamtdeutscher Block/Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten</td>
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<td>Gruppo Misto</td>
<td>Group of partyless members of the Italian Senate and the Camera dei Deputati</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
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<td>Indépendants d'outre-mer</td>
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<td>LUX</td>
<td>LSAP</td>
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<td>Lëtzebuerger Sozialistesch Arbeiterpartei – Parti Ouvrier Socialiste Luxembourgeois</td>
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<td>MIS</td>
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<td>Blocco Nazionale della Liberta / Partito Nazionale Monarchico</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>MRP</td>
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<td>Mouvement républicain populaire</td>
<td>Christian Democracy</td>
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<td>MSI</td>
<td>Italian Socialist Movement</td>
<td>Movimento Socialista Italiano</td>
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<td>PRR/RS</td>
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<td>Parti répulican radical et radical socialiste</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Rassemblement des gauches républicaines</td>
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<td>Rassemblement du peuple français</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Union progressiste</td>
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<td>Ulster Unionist Party</td>
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<td>VVD</td>
<td>People's Party for Freedom and Democracy</td>
<td>Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie</td>
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