Beyond Profits? An Inquiry about Media for Social Transformation in Argentina and Brazil

Dissertation

zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde

durch den

Promotionsausschuss Dr. phil.

der Universität Bremen

vorgelegt von

Maximiliano Facundo Vila Seoane

aus

Buenos Aires, Argentinien

Bremen 2016
Zusammen setzung der Prüfungskommission:

Prof. Dr. Anna-Katharina Hornidge  
(Betreuerin und Gutachterin)

Prof. Dr. Andreas Hepp  
(Gutachter)

Prof. Dr. Michael Flitner  
(weiteres prüfungsberechtigtes Mitglied)

Dr. Anna Lisa Müller  
(weiteres prüfungsberechtigtes Mitglied)

Dr. Friederike Gesing  
(nicht stimmberechtigtes Mitglied)

Dr. Rapti Siriwardane  
(nicht stimmberechtigtes Mitglied)

Tag der mündlichen Prüfung 21/10/2016
# Contents

**Contents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>xiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Introduction</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Modernity and Development</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Culture and Development</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1 The Culture Industry and the Cultural Industries</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2 The Knowledge Economy, Creative Industries and the Creative Economy</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Media for Development</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Research Question</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Methodologies Applied</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 Structure of the Thesis</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Conceptual Framework</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Media System and Media for Social Transformation</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Policy Discourses and Imaginaries</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Media for Social Transformation</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Context: Argentina and Brazil</strong></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Demography and Geography</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Argentina and Brazil</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 History, Economy and Politics</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1 The 19th century</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.2 From the Beginning of the 20th Century to the End of Dictatorships</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.3 The Return of Democracies and the Neoliberal Decade</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.4 The Post-Neoliberal Decade?</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Culture and Media</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Culture and Media Policy Discourses in Argentina and Brazil

## Culture and Media Policy Discourses

### 4.1 Culture as an Economic Resource

- **4.1.1 Creative Industries and the Creative Economy in Brazil**
- **4.1.2 Cultural Industries versus Creative Industries in Argentina**

### 4.2 Culture as a Social Resource

- **4.2.1 Cultura Viva in Brazil**
- **4.2.2 NGOs in Law 26.522 of Argentina**

## Discussion

### 4.3 Concluding Discussion

## Imaginaries

### 5.1 Synthetic Comparison Among Cases

### 5.2 CPEtv, Argentina

- **5.2.1 CPE’s Foundation**
- **5.2.2 The Long Road to the Channel**
- **5.2.3 Imaginary**

### 5.3 Barricada TV, Argentina

- **5.3.1 Context and History**
- **5.3.2 The Channel and its Imaginary**

### 5.4 Wall Kintún TV, Argentina

- **5.4.1 The Mapuches and the Road to the Channel**
- **5.4.2 The Imaginary**

### 5.5 Fora do Eixo and Mídia NINJA, Brazil

- **5.5.1 History of Fora do Eixo**
- **5.5.2 Toward Mídia NINJA**
- **5.5.3 The Imaginary**

### 5.6 Concluding Discussion

## Technologies

### 6.1 CPEtv, Argentina

### 6.2 Wall Kintun TV, Argentina

### 6.3 Barricada TV, Argentina

### 6.4 Fora do Eixo and Mídia NINJA, Brazil

- **6.4.1 Fora do Eixo and their ‘Social Technologies’**
- **6.4.2 Mídia NINJA**

### 6.5 Concluding Discussion
7 Content Production and Reception 187
  7.1 Content Production ........................................... 187
    7.1.1 Imaginaries and Themes .................................... 187
      7.1.1.1 CPEtv, Argentina .................................. 188
      7.1.1.2 Barricada TV, Argentina .............................. 191
      7.1.1.3 Wall Kintun TV, Argentina ................................ 194
      7.1.1.4 Mídia NINJA, Brazil .................................. 195
    7.1.2 Quality ............................................. 198
      7.1.2.1 CPEtv, Argentina .................................. 199
      7.1.2.2 Barricada TV, Argentina ................................ 203
      7.1.2.3 Wall Kintun, Argentina ................................ 206
      7.1.2.4 Mídia NINJA, Brazil .................................. 208
  7.2 Participation ............................................. 212
  7.3 Audiences and Content Reception ................................ 217
  7.4 Concluding Discussion ....................................... 223

8 Resources and Violence 227
  8.1 Violence ................................................ 227
    8.1.1 Co-operatives and CPEtv, Argentina ....................... 228
    8.1.2 Barricada TV, Argentina .................................. 229
    8.1.3 Wall Kintun TV, Argentina ................................ 231
    8.1.4 Mídia NINJA, Brazil .................................. 233
  8.2 Resources ............................................... 238
    8.2.1 Financial ........................................... 240
    8.2.2 Legal ............................................. 243
    8.2.3 Human ............................................ 244
    8.2.4 Political ............................................ 245
    8.2.5 Relational: Networks .................................... 247
    8.2.6 Technological and Infrastructural ......................... 252
    8.2.7 Knowledge .......................................... 253
      8.2.7.1 Knowledge of Audiovisual Production .................. 253
      8.2.7.2 Institutions for Knowledge Replication ............... 256
    8.2.8 Audience Reach ....................................... 260
  8.3 Concluding Discussion ....................................... 262

9 Conclusions and Policy Advice 266
  9.1 Policy Advice ............................................ 280
    9.1.1 Development ........................................... 280
    9.1.2 National Policies ...................................... 284
      9.1.2.1 Argentina ..................................... 286
      9.1.2.2 Brazil .................................... 287
  9.2 Further Lines of Research ................................... 287
## Appendices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Interview partners in Argentina</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interviews partners in Brazil</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Interview questions</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Elaboration of statistics from videos list</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Video from CPE tv, Argentina</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Video from Barricada TV, Argentina</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Video from Wall Kintun TV, Argentina</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Video from Mídia NINJA, Brazil</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Local terms</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Figures

1.1 Thesis structure. .................................................. 19

2.1 Conceptual framework to analyze media for social transformation. .................. 21
2.2 Model to understand the production of audiovisual content, part of the media system in a capitalist economy. Source: Adapted from (Bolaño 2000). .............................. 23

3.1 Map of Argentina. The numbered squares indicate the cities where I conducted fieldwork: 1) Buenos Aires; 2) Santa Rosa; 3) Córdoba; 4) Resistencia; 5) Bariloche. ................. 46
3.2 Map of Brazil. The numbered stars indicate the cities where I conducted fieldwork: 1) São Paulo; 2) Ubatuba; 3) Rio de Janeiro; 4) Belo Horizonte; 5) Brasília; 6) Recife; 7) João Pessoa; 8) Fortaleza; 9) Belém. .............................................................. 47
3.3 GDP per capita in Argentina, Brazil, Latin America and World averages from 1975 to 2013. Source: World Bank Data. ................................................................. 53
3.4 GINI index for Argentina and Brazil from 1985 to 2010. Source: World Bank Data. .... 53
3.5 The advertisement includes several phrases that characterize the government discourse. From top to bottom and left to right, it says: a) the won decade; b) all voices; c) democracy or corporations; d) + freedom, + democracy, + diversity, + employment, + plurality. ...... 60
3.6 Percentage of a total of 1.511 media owned or associated with national networks (31 in total). Source: (Donos da mídia 2009). ..................................................... 66

4.1 Cover from the magazine “Pequenas Empresas & Grandes Negócios” dedicated to the creative economy. The translated subtitle says “Creative economy: how to earn money with fashion, video games, design, blogs, music, cinema, gastronomy ...”. Source: (Adán Gil 2012). ................................................................. 76
4.2 The advertisement says: “The training that helps you to plan, develop and communicate your business”. Translated by the author. Source: Transform program, British Council. . 81
4.3 The advertisement says: “The British Council together with the Metropolitan Design Center from the City of Buenos Aires will gather a group of international young entrepreneurs from different creative industries, through the Young Creative Entrepreneur program. The winners will travel to London to meet the most relevant actors of the British creative scene”, translated by the author. ........................................... 88
4.4 Leaflet distributed before the event ‘Buenos Aires Creativa: ideas for inclusion’, which says: “Creative Buenos Aires arrives in August, a space that gathers professionals from the area of culture, urbanism and technologies to exchange and reflect about creative practices for the development of cities. It is an opportunity to live ideas and experiences (local, national and international) put at the service of inclusion”, translated by the author.

4.5 Leaflet from a point of culture in the city of São Paulo that diffuses the cultural agenda of activities in peripheral communities. In this case, it highlights cultural events of Afro-Brazilian music, hip-hop, samba, etc. At the same time, it makes evident the state support that recognized the experience as a Ponto de Mídia Livre (free media point, a specialized point of culture).

5.1 Mobilization of CPE associates and supporters in favor of their own media, repudiating the legal intervention against their project of free TV access. Source: (La Arena 2003a, p. 10).

5.2 IMPA’s entrance door, where Barricada TV operates. The sign from top to bottom, and left to right says: “IMPA: The factory. Cultural City. Struggle, Work and Culture”. Above each of the four men in the mural, from left to right, it says: “Culture, Work, Resistance and Education”. Source: (Barricada TV 2012e).

5.3 Logo of Barricada TV. Source: Barricada TV 2009b.

5.4 Logo of Wall Kintun TV. Source: Wall Kintun TV.

5.5 Mídia Ninja’s logo. Source: Mídia NINJA.

6.1 Classification of the cases according to the relevance of the concepts of ‘script’ and ‘multi-stability’ in explaining their technological configuration.

6.2 Technological configuration used by CPEtv to receive, produce and distribute audiovisual signals.

6.3 The studio of CPEtv. Source: CPEtv.

6.4 Paper money used by one of the founding collectives of FDE, the Goma collective. Source: (Goma Card 2009).

6.5 Illustration of the technology used by Mídia NINJA to cover events and mobilizations. In this case, they were covering a meeting between the governor of Minas Gerais, Antonio Anastasia, and professors. Source: Mídia NINJA.

7.1 CPEtv TV programs classified by the researcher according to their main object of concern.

7.2 Barricada TV programs classified by the researcher according to their main object of concern.

7.3 Mídia NINJA’s streamings organized according to their main object of concern.

7.4 CPEtv’s news program and its scenography 07/08/2013. Source: CPEtv Noticias.

7.5 TN Noticias, the main news program of the Clarín mass media firm in Argentina. Source: TN Noticias online streaming 16/03/2015.

7.6 Noticiero Popular elaborated by Barricada TV. Interview with the editor of the THC magazine, during the program broadcasted on 22/06/2011. Source: Barricada TV.
7.7 Wall Kintun TV interview with a werken (Mapuche messenger), conducted part in Mapunzugen and subtitled in Spanish, and the rest completely in Spanish. Source: Wall Kintun TV. 207

7.8 Mídia NINJA's coverage of a strike by garbage collectors from the city of Rio de Janeiro.
Date: 08/03/2014. Source: Mídia NINJA. 210

8.1 Spider diagrams of main types of links that each case has with ten different types of actors. The numbers correspond to the assessment of the researcher of the intensity of the links with each type of actor (strong: 3, medium: 2, weak: 1, no connection: 0).
Compiled by the author. 249

8.2 Banner prepared by Mídia NINJA that explains how to stream videos. It was distributed during 2013 through online social networks to stimulate new collaborators of Mídia NINJA.
Source: Mídia NINJA and translated by the author. 255

9.1 Interview partners in Argentina. 329
9.2 Interview partners in Brazil. 330
List of Tables

4.1 Comparison of the main dimensions of contrast among policy discourses in Argentina and Brazil, dividing them into two groups. The first four comprehend culture mostly as an economic resource, while the last two stress the uses of culture to address social issues. ........................................ 74

5.1 Main dimensions of contrast among the imaginaries of the four studied media for social transformation. Compiled by the author ........................................ 117

5.2 Principles from the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA 2014a). ......................................................... 124

7.1 Classification of the cases according to the different dimensions of the minimalist and maximalist models of participation sketched by (Carpentier 2011). Compiled by the author: 213

7.2 Number of videos, number of visits of most and least viewed videos in the three YouTube channels associated with Wall Kintun TV. Source: Compiled by the author from YouTube 02/02/2015. ......................................................... 219

7.3 Facebook followers by channel. Source: Statistics compiled by the author from Facebook on 19/12/2014. ......................................................... 220

7.4 Total number of videos, total number of views, average views per video and number of views of most watched videos over the total, per platform and comparing different experiences. Source: compiled by the author after querying YouTube’s API in November 2014. ......................................................... 221

7.5 Top ten most viewed Barricada TV videos on YouTube. The table includes the titles of the videos translated to English, the total number of views, the program under which they were produced and the type of video. Source: Compiled by the author from YouTube 27/11/2014. ......................................................... 222

7.6 Top ten most viewed Mídia NINJA’s videos on YouTube. The table includes the titles of the videos translated to English, the total number of views, and the type of coverage. Source: Compiled by the author from YouTube 27/11/2014. ......................................................... 223

8.1 Types of violence suffered by each of the analyzed case studies and related organizations. The cross indicates the type of actor that initiated it (state or private firms). Compiled by the author. ......................................................... 228

8.2 Resources acquired by the four media for social transformation. The classification was compiled by the author. The cells correspond to the amount of points that the author assigned to each case (Very much: 3, Moderate: 2, Few: 1, Nothing: 0). ......................................................... 239
8.3 Number of Mídia NINJA's streamings classified by the author based on the city of filming. Out of 1,248 videos, 1,080 offered geographic information to compile the table. Source: Twitcasting.

9.1 Synthesis of policy advice for the development community, Argentina and Brazil.
# Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFSCA</td>
<td>Autoridad Federal de Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual (Federal Authority of Audiovisual Communication Services)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANT</td>
<td>Actor Network Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Centro Cultural de la Cooperación (Co-operation Cultural Center)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMD</td>
<td>Centro Metropolitano de Diseño (Metropolitan Design Center)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODECI</td>
<td>Consejo de Desarrollo de Comunidades Indígenas (Council for Development of Indigenous Communities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLSECOR</td>
<td>Cooperativa de Provisión y Comercialización de Servicios Comunitarios de Radiodifusión (Cooperative of Supply and Marketing of Broadcasting Community Services)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMFER</td>
<td>Comité Federal de Radiodifusión (Federal Broadcasting Committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPE</td>
<td>Cooperativa Popular de Electricidad de Santa Rosa (Popular Electric Co-operative of Santa Rosa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPEtv</td>
<td>TV channel from CPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Consejo Plurinacional Indígena (Indigenous Plurinational Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMS</td>
<td>Department for Culture, Media &amp; Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EATACP</td>
<td>Espacio Abierto de Televisoras Alternativas, Comunitarias y Populares (Open Space of Alternative, Community and Popular TV channels)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIESP</td>
<td>Federação das Indústrias de Estado de São Paulo (Federation of Industries of the state of São Paulo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIRJAN</td>
<td>Federação das Indústrias do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (Federation of firms of the state of Rio de Janeiro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNDC</td>
<td>Fórum Nacional Pela Democratização da Comunicação (National Forum for Media Democratization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDE</td>
<td>Fora do Eixo (Off Axis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBGE</td>
<td>Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPA</td>
<td>Industrias Metalúrgicas y Plásticas Argentina (Metallurgical and Plastic Industries of Argentina)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCAA</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Cine y Artes Audiovisuales (National Institute of Cinema and Audiovisual Arts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPR</td>
<td>Intellectual Property Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICA</td>
<td>Mercado de Industrias Culturales Argentinas (Argentinean Cultural Industries Market)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICSUR</td>
<td>Mercado de Industrias Culturales del Sur (Southern Cultural Industry Market)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MinC</td>
<td>Ministério da Cultura (Ministry of Culture of Brazil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNER</td>
<td>Movimiento Nacional de Fábricas Recuperadas (National Movement of Recovered Enterprises)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MST</td>
<td>Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (Landless Workers’ Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWICO</td>
<td>New World Information and Communications Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIPESS</td>
<td>Réseau Intercontinental de Promotion de l’Économie Sociale Solidaire (International Network for the Promotion of Social Solidarity Economy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNMA</td>
<td>Red Nacional de Medios Alternativos (National Network of Alternative Media)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEC</td>
<td>Secretaria de Economia Creativa (Creative Economy Secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKAD</td>
<td>Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STS</td>
<td>Science and Technology Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUDAM</td>
<td>Compañía Sud Americana de Servicios Públicos S.A. (South American Company of Public Services)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAMA</td>
<td>Argentinian network of co-operatives that aims to create audiovisual content nationally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNASUR</td>
<td>Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (Union of South American Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIPO</td>
<td>World Intellectual Property Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSIS</td>
<td>World Summit on the Information Society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thirty years after the return to democracy, Argentina and Brazil are still facing challenges to democratize communications. In both countries, a commercial approach to culture and communications prevails, with high rates of ownership concentration in few private firms, irrespective of the negative consequences this has for the existence of a diversity of media voices, particularly from underrepresented groups. Nevertheless, since the arrival to power of left wing governments in 2003, both countries have been experiencing changes that question this situation; for example, Argentina introduced a new audiovisual communication services law in 2009 regulating the radio spectrum and stimulating NGO media; whereas Brazil has been funding different cultural and free media networks through cultural policies. Yet, research has paid little attention to the processes of emergence of these media projects that try to depart from the for-profit culture and communication model of non-Western countries. In this context, this work offers a conceptual framework to understand the key dimensions that shape how nongovernmental audiovisual media projects striving for social transformation challenge a predominant commercial approach to culture and communication.

The conceptual framework divides the analysis into three levels: media system, policy discourses and the specific media cases under analysis. The first one considers the historical changes in the structure and actors of the media system in both countries, which help to comprehend the contemporary problems of ownership concentration and the most important actors. The second level examines the main and counter policy discourses in competition to change the existing media system, while the third level focuses on key dimensions that have been shaping (both enabling and restricting) the projects of new media experiences in both countries. In particular, it takes into account the important role of the specific discourses that these experiences create to challenge a for-profit communication model, which introduces context specific interpretation schemes and visions on how communications, culture, and more generally society, ought to be. Apart from the discursive dimension, the third level considers the potentials and limits that technologies put on new projects, together with the ‘soft’ constraints that quality patterns have in new media cases. Furthermore, the framework considers different types of violence from incumbents that the cases have to withstand, which is a relevant dimension to understand why these cases do not spur as fast as expected. Additionally, the conceptual framework proposes ways to study participation and the reception of content by audiences. Finally yet importantly, the conceptual framework incorporates a resource view of power to research about the different strategies for acquiring and mobilizing resources that media projects employ to keep in operation.

This conceptual framework builds on empirical data gathered in Argentina and Brazil covering both levels of interest. On the one hand, interviews with former and current policy makers span the policy discourse level, plus the analysis of policy documents and other sources. On the other hand, the empirical data of the four selected case studies was collected mixing both participant observation and
the material generated by and about each experience. In particular, in Argentina the thesis considers the first co-operative channel and the first Mapuche indigenous community channel under the new audiovisual communication services law. Moreover, the research covers a preexisting ‘alternative media’ channel operating in a factory recovered by its workers, which was legalized after the law had been passed. As regards Brazil, the thesis builds the argument on the experience of a media collective, Mídia NINJA, which represents practices of the ‘collaborative economy’ advanced by a network of cultural agents operating across the country.

In sum, this work makes empirical and theoretical contributions, stressing the importance of communication to the aims of the international ‘development’ agenda, and its importance to open up spaces for different visions and perspectives. This is not only academically relevant, but also practically for Argentina, Brazil, and other Latin American countries that are experiencing similar media change processes.
Acknowledgements

Any human project is a collective endeavor that owes a lot to those who participated and those who directly or indirectly contributed to it. Among those I can include in this space, I would first like to dedicate this thesis to my family in Buenos Aires and Spain. Without their support, the multiple chats and the encouragement to go abroad, this project would have never taken place.

Secondly, I deeply thank Anna Katharina Hornidge, my supervisor, who guided and supported me during the whole work. She gave me the indispensable advice, space for creative thought and trust that I needed to write this dissertation at the intersection of several disciplines. I particularly thank her for introducing me to a phenomenological approach to social science, which can address the shortcomings of the so much praised mainstream quantitative approach.

Additionally, I specially thank Maike Retat-Amin for all her kindness and support to survive in Germany. I will not forget Günther Manske for having trusted in someone not originally from the social sciences to achieve this project. Likewise, I thank DAAD for the generous scholarship that allowed me to accomplish this PhD, including fieldwork in Argentina and Brazil, and the opportunity to live and know a lot about Deutschland.

This work would have been impossible without the collaboration of all the partners, colleagues and social activists in Argentina and Brazil, who allowed me to get insights about their work and who patiently answered my questions and doubts. To all those who are fighting and acting to achieve their dreams of social transformation, I send my warm greetings. To all of them, muchas gracias! E muito obrigado!

I also thank my new friends during my stay in Germany who made this period survivable and enjoyable. My warm regards go to Aftab, Ahn, Alisher, Arda, Divya, Michaela, Min, Rapti, Tamer and Tim, with whom I shared different parts of the process of writing this thesis. I cannot leave aside all my friends and colleagues prior to coming to Bonn that also helped me before and during the process. I salute Anabel, Diego, Eleonora, Flavia, Gustavo, Juan Carlos, Nancy, Sebastián, Selina and Yamila.

Last but not least, I also thank the Zentrum für Entwicklungsorschung and the academics working there, for giving me the chance to know the colonial origins of the ‘development industry’. This experience convinces me that the industry will never achieve its aims unless its current structure is changed.
Chapter 1

Introduction

During the past 15 years, it is safe to say that the mainstream approach to culture and media policies for development has been shaped by the idea of the ‘creative industries’ emanating from the United Kingdom (UK), and later comprehended by the term creative economy, proposed by international organizations like UNCTAD as a ‘feasible development option’ (UNCTAD and UNDP 2010). In synthesis, this perspective advances a commercial approach to culture, stressing the importance of the contribution of such industries for exports, employment and economic growth, above any other type of alternative (Flew and Cunningham 2010; Hartley 2005). Accordingly, this strategy has been attractive to several governments around the world that need to boost their economic growth rates as part of an increasingly global and interconnected capitalist economy. For example, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Singapore and Tanzania, among others (Hornidge 2011; Prince 2010; Wang 2004). However, critiques stress that the original version of the creative industries emanating from the UK is a vague concept that represents particular interests oriented specifically to extend intellectual property rights that undermine the objective of ‘access’ to culture (Garnham 2005; Schlesinger 2007). These statements are important, because if the creative economy approach suffers such shortcomings in the industrialized nation where it was more strongly advocated, then the claims for a global development option based on such an approach needs to be even more seriously scrutinized.

In the context of these discussions on cultural politics, among all the sectors considered by the creative industries, in this thesis I put the focus on the tensions in the media sector. I made this selection because of two main reasons. First, they are essential in the creation, reproduction and distribution of knowledge, and consequently in shaping how humans view the world (McQuail 1983). In effect, research about human-media interactions indicates the existence of a ‘media equation’, which states that people treat and interact with media such as computers and TVs as if they were dealing with humans (Reeves and Nass 1996). This implies that there is more than just a utilitarian relation with media: “media can evoke emotional responses, demand attention, threaten us, influence memories, and change ideas on what is natural” (p. 251). This suggests that people can get used to media and forget all the mediations present in their production processes due to the emotional connections that they might establish among them. Consequently, how we choose and what we receive from media might influence, but not determine the way we perceive the world. Third, the importance of media has been continuously increasing in the last century and even more so with the expansion of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), which has been identified as a meta-process called ‘mediatization’, indicating how
changes in media are offering new possibilities of human communication and interaction (Krotz 2007; Hjarvard 2008). In sum, media play an important role in changing people’s perceptions given their ‘natural’ daily interaction with them. However, these influences are manifold and not linear, depending on the kind of content these media produce and how they produce it.

The second reason for studying media relates to its historical relevance within the ‘development’ project. Indeed, since its beginnings, communication and media have been considered as central to disseminate modernization models emanating from Western nations, but during the 1980s this Western-centric approach faced the challenge of a new perspective advocating for the right to communicate. This perspective was best illustrated by UNESCO and its MacBride report (UNESCO 1980). It advocated for the right to communicate, aiming to surpass the previous struggle for freedom of information by acknowledging the inequalities in the international flow of information between the industrialized and the rest of countries, and stressing the importance of NGO media compared to private and state owned media. Nonetheless, the commercial perspective defended by the USA and the UK prevailed, establishing the mainstream approach that considers information, and more generally culture, as just another economic activity, a source of profits or a mere commodity, which contributes to the economic growth of nations to achieve ‘development’. From a political economy point of view, this can be understood as a consequence of the end of the Cold War, giving rise to the unquestionable leadership of the USA and its strong allies, such as the UK, which in the field of culture and media globally disseminated commercial models convenient to their interests. Indeed, Enghel (2015) understands this as part of the more general process of ‘neoliberal’ globalization expanded by Western countries, which reinforces inequalities in media and culture. If this perspective is true, it might explain why the approach advanced by the MacBride report has lost prominence at the international level, but it does not say anything about the diverse social movements and civil society organizations around the world still striving for the ideals of participation in information production, distribution and access, and for communication as a human right (Hamelink and Hoffmann 2008). Accordingly, there is a gap between the mainstream and the global commercial approach to culture and media for development, with grassroots practices still opposing the former.

These international discussions set the stage for this thesis, which inquires about how media organizations that claim to oppose a commercial approach to communication can advance their projects, despite the predominance of policies and material structures not favoring such initiatives. Different scholars and activists have recognized that these organizations are under-researched, and stressed the need to advance a theorization of these different types of media (Thomas 2015; Lennie and Tacchi 2015; Enghel 2015; Pettit, Salazar, and Gumucio-Dagron 2009). Indeed, these authors focused on and suggested different dimensions to take into account in such endeavors. For example, the most evident one is to address the financial limits of these media (Carpentier, Lie, and Servaes 2008; Saeed 2009). Nonetheless, researchers have pointed out other dimensions as equally important, such as audiences and content consumption (Sandoval and Fuchs 2010; Fuchs 2010), the limits created by the existing media structure (Thomas 2015), power issues and the role of participation (Pettit, Salazar, and Gumucio-Dagron 2009; Huesca 1995; Gumucio-Dagron 2011). The more contemporary theorizations emanate from critical theory (Fuchs 2010), which departing from Marxist concepts aim to offer a universal approach to research what Fuchs calls ‘alternative media’. This strand of research is undoubtedly relevant given the focus on noncommercial and in many cases anti-capitalists experiences. Although I am sympathetic to such an approach, which is in the tradition of critical research trying
to eliminate the social obstacles that hamper the flourishing of humans (Schuurman 2009); I will not follow that path in this thesis for two reasons. First, such frameworks are not based on empiricism, but on seminal literature of the European Marxist tradition. Second, even though such theoretical constructions might be academically important, from my point of view they overlook the diversity of ways that media experiences can generate patterns of interpretation of their context and schemes of action to create noncommercial projects, different from those found in Western contexts. Contrarily, in this research I shall take an empirical approach mostly based on the sociology of knowledge, which from my point of view is more suitable to understand the diversity of human constructions of knowledge. Although it can also be criticized, because its creators were Western authors, I shall show that its concepts are less dogmatic, and thus, easier to adopt for the interpretivist perspective that I adopt in this research. Therefore, I depart with the hypothesis that there might be many interpretations on how culture and media ought to be put into practice, beyond commercial approaches. From this point of view, the critical frameworks inspired in the Marxist tradition might capture some aspects of the practice of these media, but from my point of view they do not match the practices of all, such as those advanced by indigenous community organizations or new social movements that mix collective and online practices in new ways.

Taking into account these research gaps, in this thesis I propose a conceptual framework based on empirical research to interpret how media projects striving for social transformation can challenge a commercial approach to communications. In particular, this research studies the global disputes on culture, communication and social transformation in Argentina and Brazil, focusing on non private and non state media because of two main reasons. First, both countries are good examples of what analysts call a ‘post-neoliberal’ period in Latin America (Grugel and Riggiozzi 2012), which refers to left-wing political parties questioning the so-called neoliberal policies in the 1990s that prioritized privatizations, reduced the role of the state and displayed a lack of concern for the poorest sectors of society (Grimson 2007). Additionally, the post-neoliberal period alludes to a challenge of the influence of international models to shape the ‘development’ of the region, in particular the USA and international development organizations. Although the extent up to which the neoliberal policies have been surpassed is not a closed debate, I assume that at least the rhetorical breakup indicates tensions worth researching. Particularly in Argentina, these tendencies initiated with the arrival to power of Néstor Kirchner in 2003; whereas in Brazil they began when Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva representing the Workers’ Party assumed the presidency in the same year. These political changes have opened up new spaces for grassroots demands; for instance, from indigenous communities and similarly from different ways of organizing the economy, such as the social and solidarity movement that operates in various countries of the region.

Second, Argentina and Brazil are good examples to consider change processes in the field of culture in general, and the media in particular. On the one hand, the commercial approach to culture and communication policies is still present and mainstream in both countries to varying degrees and, at different governmental levels. This is a clear contradiction to the description of a ‘post-neoliberal’ period, because it implies the continuity of the adoption of foreign concepts to justify a commercial approach to culture and communication, overlooking specific local issues. On the other hand, Argentina and Brazil have implemented culture and media policies that depart from this perspective, which generates spaces for innovation. For instance, in 2009 Argentina introduced a new audiovisual communication services law that allows co-operatives, trade unions, indigenous communities and other organizations to apply for television or radio licenses, something that was previously forbidden. As regards Brazil, it did not
break with old media policies, it rather introduced quite ‘revolutionary’ changes to its cultural policies that promoted networks of collectives, access to the internet and digital culture in general, which have spurred the establishment of several cultural and media collectives across the country operating as nonprofit organizations. Therefore, new actors emerged that are challenging previous private media elites. I do, however, not intend to stress that they are doing so in a substantial way to replace them, but rather showing incumbents that they are no longer going to lead the show alone. These points are particularly relevant in the context of Latin America, where despite the transitions to democratic political systems during the 1980s, in many countries the influence of structures established during military dictatorships still remained, with varied direct and subtle influences from state or media elites (Lugo-Ocando 2008). Argentina and Brazil are good examples of these changes and tensions taking place in the region, with different struggles among actors striving to change the inherited structures toward the so far bounded ideal of ‘freedom of speech’.

In the rest of the chapter, I will first briefly review the main conceptual changes in development, in order to understand the corresponding connections with culture and media in the next subsection. These links trace the historical political discussions at the international level, which have influenced policies and practices in Argentina and Brazil. In Section 1.4, I will state the main research question of the thesis, followed in the next section by the methods employed. Finally, I will delineate the content of the rest of the thesis.

1.1 Modernity and Development

Development can be understood as a product of modernization (Quijano 2000), which was a term introduced in the 1950s that re elaborated the concerns of social sciences about modernity (Habermas 1990); where the latter can be understood as the “amalgam of new practices and institutional forms (science, technology, industrial production, urbanization), of new ways of living (individualism, secularization, instrumental rationality) and of new forms of malaise (alienation, meaninglessness, a sense of impending social dissolution)” (Taylor 2002, p. 91). However, such definitions of modernity and modernization tend to forget that such projects were inseparable from the expansion of European powers to ‘civilize’ the rest of the world, leading to colonialism all around the world, with the terrible consequences for those who suffered the conquest. As it is known, this situation changed after World War II with the emergence and competition of the USA and the USSR as global superpowers, displacing the former European powers. In that context, President Truman’s address in 1949 initiated development as a discourse, when he uttered the need to help the economically less advanced nations in the world to catch up with the most advanced (Escobar 1995), which Escobar interprets as a USA strategy to reduce the influence of the USSR and advance capitalism in the ideological struggle with communism. This development project assumed that economic growth would catalyze modernization in ‘underdeveloped’ countries, thus stopping them from becoming communist. The central idea was to ‘catch up’ with ‘developed nations’, an idea clearly stated by Rostow (1960), who subtitled his work ‘a non communist manifesto’ that organized societies in five stages of ‘development’: traditional society; pre take-off; take-off; the drive to maturity; and finally the age of high-consumption, which reflected the USA model of the time. This style of thought assumes that modernization and development are linear and universal processes, composed of a set of stages where the top ones are based on the examples of pioneer countries. Their followers then have to reluctantly accept to ‘catch up’ with them; something that still
prevails in much of contemporary literature.

This simplistic and naive image of modernization and development has been challenged from different perspectives. First, post-colonial authors stress that the association of modernity with ‘The Enlightenment’, is just one side of the coin, which hides the other one: coloniality. This encompasses oppression, colonialism, racism, environmental destruction, and the general cruelty of European modernization projects that began with the conquest of the Americas (Mignolo 2002; Dussel 1993). The expansion of these ‘universal’ ideas was not by chance, but a deliberative effort of Europe and later the USA through their military and economic strength. For these reasons, authors criticize the colonial inheritance of development, though less explicit, because it still considers the West as the yardstick against which to compare the ‘rest’ (Hall 1996). Second, empirical evidence casts doubt on the success of the lineal development project, because a simple count of the number of wars, refugees, different sorts of inequalities and crises still tormenting the contemporary world, shows that the results of the project at a global scale have been futile so far. In many cases, military and economic interventions to stimulate ‘development’ have only worsened the problems they intended to solve, which led to “the loss of an illusion, in which many naively believed” (Escobar 1995, p. 4). Third, development practice and research has not been exempt of critics that point to their failure to break with dependence chains. For example, the high dependence on ‘experts’ who tell the ‘underdeveloped’ nations how to develop (Edwards 1989), which is based on a strong concentration of technical knowledge production in the few countries of the ‘North’ as against those of the ‘South’, ignores local, context specific knowledge of the people on the ground where the problems occur (Edwards 1989). These imbalances lead to a top-down approach to interventions, defined by experts in the ‘North’ to be applied in the ‘South’; therefore, preserving the idea of civilizing the ‘uncivilized’ central to the notion of modernity (Dussel 1993), though in a more subtle way.

Dependency theory is another development paradigm that was relevant between the 1960s and early 1980s (Servaes and Malikhao 2008). In synthesis, the authors from this tradition advanced a critical perspective of the development project, stressing that the processes of development and underdevelopment are linked. In other words, this tradition postulates that the ‘backwardness’ of nation-states is not a product of inner causes, but rather of their position in the international system, where there are actors that generate divisions between the center and the periphery. Several Latin American authors advanced such an approach, such as Prebisch (1981), Cardoso & Faletto (2002) in Brazil, Sunkel et al. (1973), and also others from outside the region, such as Gunder Frank (1966) and Wallerstein (1974), among others. The consequence of this perspective is that the solution to ‘development’ issues is not just a matter of nation-states taking the right national policies, but rather a change in the global unequal structure favoring some nation-states over others. Despite the success in challenging the initial conception of ‘development’, Servaes (2008) highlights that this strand of research could not offer practical ways to tackle existing problems. However, the importance of this research strand is that it inspired the Non-Aligned Movement of nation-states within the context of the Cold War, which initiated the struggles for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) that I shall detail in Section 1.3.

These criticisms have led to different re conceptualizations of development and modernity, among them post-modernity, which has been influential in arguing the end of grand narratives and stressing the importance of the subjective over the objective; thus, the impossibility of the existence of any sort of linear objective road to ‘progress’ or ‘development’ (Lewellen 2003). Within this paradigm, ‘post-
development’ emerged as a critic to development and an inquiry into new alternatives (Sidaway 2007; Lewellen 2003). From this perspective, development has been defined as a buzzword, usually understood as a better future compared to the current situation, and more generally as an empty signifier filled with varying signifieds (Ziai 2009). In other words, development is not something fixed, but a shibboleth that has to be dismantled in its specific context of use to understand what actors intervene, what purposes they pursue and how they are planning to put forward their visions (Cornwall 2007). This might not necessarily lead to the so claimed desired and heralded better futures. This plastic nature of the concept has paved the way for interventions claiming to be apolitical and having good intentions to shape ‘underdeveloped’ countries according to the image of ‘developed’ ones, despite the real political consequences that such actions might have in shaping the subjects of their interventions through the power-knowledge connections they make (Ziai 2009; Lewellen 2003). Although this post-development approach contributed to understand biases and historical change in development discourse, it has been criticized for not acknowledging the ‘cultural turn’ in development, overstating the influence of a unique Western model silencing local cultures, and ignoring the role of national and grassroots projects in adopting, adapting or opposing global development discussions (Radcliffe and Laurie 2006; Lewellen 2003). Furthermore, the lack of ‘grand narratives’ might be central to a few industrialized nations, but for many middle and low income countries it is hard to accept that the concept of ‘development’ and ‘modernity’ no longer is of political relevance. Indeed, ‘catching up’ with ‘developed’ nations is still one of the main concerns of politicians of non-Western countries. Nonetheless, in this thesis I take the post-development approach to the subject, which implies that there is not just one type of ‘development’, but various possible projects. Additionally, to address the mentioned shortcomings, the focus of this thesis is on how ‘development’ projects at the national and grassroots level interact in the area of culture, regardless of the influence of international organizations in the area. This last perspective requires to answer how culture has been related to the ‘development’ project.

1.2 Culture and Development

Although culture is a polysemic word that has varied interpretations (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952), what matters for this research are those influential concepts applied in cultural policies in relation to development. In particular, this section discusses a set of concepts employed by academics and international organizations, such as the culture industry, the cultural industries, the creative industries and, more recently, the creative economy.

1.2.1 The Culture Industry and the Cultural Industries

Horkheimer and Adorno (1947) introduced the concept of ‘culture industry’ as part of a cultural critique of capitalism, precisely against ‘high-consumption societies’ that Rostow considered as the most ‘developed’. The concept captured the tensions between the mass production of culture at the end of WWII with the previous more artisanal ways of cultural production. A decade before, Benjamin (1935) had already described the problem of the mechanical reproduction of works of art as an elimination of their uniqueness and specific history (what Benjamin called ‘aura’), or more generally, how the technical reproduction detached objects from tradition. Adorno and Horkheimer went further and described the culture industry as a mechanism of social control that introduces the for profit principle above everything else in the sphere of culture, limiting its previous autonomy from a pure economic rationality.
and leading to a standardization of contents (Adorno and Rabinbach 1975, p. 14). In this scheme, the culture industry and its technical process of reproduction define what is ‘culture’ and what should be expressed (Horkheimer and Adorno 1947, p. 103), prioritizing the diffusion of the ideology of the status quo and conformity (Adorno and Rabinbach 1975, p. 17). Therefore, the authors understood that the culture industry immediately created barriers between those who follow such a system and comply with its rules, and those who do not. Within this critique, Adorno and Horkheimer identified advertising as a central mechanism of the culture industry, which guides consumers to obtain some products over others. However, the authors pointed out that in a capitalist economy those who have more economic resources are the ones that have more advantages of using advertising at a large scale; therefore, if used repetitively, it ends up working as a propaganda machine to manipulate the masses (Horkheimer and Adorno 1947, p. 131). In sum, the central argument of the authors is that the culture industry produces an “anti-enlightenment effect” (Adorno and Rabinbach 1975, p. 18), by creating dependent individuals, chained to follow the ‘examples’ that the ‘stars’ of the culture industry offer to them. In this way, the critical attitude of ‘individuals’ to think differently in democracies is trimmed, and also the notion of individuality, if after all it is guided by the prototype the culture industry offers. Consequently, the authors’ perspective rejects the glorification of mass consumption present in ‘developed’ societies.

The closed picture of the ‘culture industry’ controlling human consciousness does not leave any space for optimism, and for this reasons the perspective was soon challenged by Miège and other authors of the French school of cultural sociology, who introduced the term cultural industries (Hesmondhalgh 2013). The plural in the term points to the main difference between concepts; the cultural industries approach remarks that these industries have diverse types of logics of operation. For instance, the publishing industry works with an editorial model aimed to produce cultural commodities, in contrast to the television sector that operates under a continuous flow model; thus, requiring programming and a quasi-industrial organization (Miege 1987). Consequently, this research tradition stressed that each industry needs to be analyzed in more detail to consider the ambivalences and complexities of their production processes, before uttering categorical assertions claiming that the capitalist logic has already colonized everything in the cultural sphere without leaving any space for alternative ways of organization (Hesmondhalgh 2013). Beyond this difference, the cultural industries concept shares the critical political economy approach of the culture industry, that is to say, it analyzes the tensions between production and consumption, patterns of ownership concentration, and the role of different types of workers in the production process, among others.

Exorcised from its initial negative connotations, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) adopted the term cultural industries. It is important to underscore that, since the Second World War, this organization has been one of the most relevant in articulating international cultural policies (Canelas Rubim 2011, p. 81), which is evident in the number of initiatives since the 1950s, such as the Declaration of Principles of International Cultural Co-Operation (1966), and the Convention for the Protection and Promotion of Cultural Diversity (2005), among others (p. 81). Specifically with respect to the cultural industries, between 1979-1980 UNESCO financed a project that elaborated a report for cultural industries policies (UNESCO 1982a), which was an input for the Mexico Declaration of 1979, that globalized the concept of cultural industries and expressed the need to introduce policies to support them around the world in order to avoid ‘cultural dependence'.
and alienation” (UNESCO 1982b, p. 4). At the same time, the report advocated a broader definition of culture that included a set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and affective features that characterize a society or social group (UNESCO 1982b). Such policies were mostly associated with the promotion of national culture and nation-states (Canelas Rubim 2011). During the last decade, UNESCO passed the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (UNESCO 2002) and the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO 2005), which introduced relevant ideas for this research mixing culture and development. First, the adoption of cultural diversity as a concept that considers development to go beyond economic growth, including “a more satisfactory intellectual, emotional, moral and spiritual existence” (p. 13). Second, the need to respect human rights, cultural rights and minority rights to defend cultural traditions and diversity. Third, the need for media pluralism and free speech. Fourth, the relevance of including civil society actors besides firms and states to support cultural diversity. Fifth, to ensure the protection of copyrights and related rights, and at the same time to facilitate the right of public access to culture. Last but not least, both the convention and the declaration understand cultural industries as those sectors that produce and distribute cultural goods or services “considered as a specific attribute, use or purpose, [and that] embody or convey cultural expressions, irrespective of the commercial value they may have” (p. 5). Therefore, their definition does not stress the commercial side of culture, although it acknowledges it. Despite the importance of these declarations for resource-scarce groups around the world, it is also true that since the 1980s UNESCO has lost prominence and support in the area of cultural and media policies at the international level. This can be explained by an increasing commercialization of culture and media policies, associated with the expansion of neoliberal thought (Kozul-Wright and Rayment 2007), which was contrary to UNESCO’s position, together with a conflict related to media policies that I shall explain in Section 1.3, but first I will continue to detail more recent concepts linking culture and development at the international level.

1.2.2 The Knowledge Economy, Creative Industries and the Creative Economy

During the 1990s, policy discourses adopted academic concepts such as the information society (F. Webster 2002; Castells 2010), the knowledge based economy (Drucker 1994) or the knowledge society (Stehr 1994; Hornidge 2007). Although their definition has not been consistent, these concepts point to societal changes related to the expansion of ICT, the increase of new types of jobs beyond industrial ones (often, but incorrectly labeled as ‘service sector’), and the general relevance of knowledge in products and services. The herald of new economies and societies that these concepts referred to, had an influence on the emergence of new terms in cultural policies; specifically the ‘creative industries’ that have been described as a new policy discourse attuned to such presupposed social changes.

In 1994, Australia was the first country to introduce the term ‘creative industries’ into its public policies, but it was the UK experience under the New Labour government that globally expanded the concept (UNCTAD and UNDP 2008). In a post-industrial context, the Department for Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS) introduced the creative industries as a concept for cultural policy and defined the term as “[...] those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property” (DCMS 1998). This definition covered the following arbitrary and disparate sectors: advertising, architecture, the art and antiques market, crafts, design, designer fashion, film and video, interactive leisure
software, music, the performing arts, publishing, software and computer services, television and radio”.

Their selection can be understood in relation to the areas of influence of the department; while others that would satisfy the condition of being ‘creative’ were left aside. This original definition became the cornerstone of further conceptualizations during the global expansion of the ‘creative industries’, which has features in common with another popular idea of the time, the ‘creative class’. This concept, introduced by USA economist Florida, refers to ‘creative people’, such as engineers, artists, cultural figures, opinion makers, among others (Florida 2005), whose attraction and retention is central for regions to achieve economic growth. According to Florida, this ‘class’ chooses cities or regions where there is respect and openness to difference in terms of race, sex, religion, etc.; talent (measured in terms of people with at least a bachelor’s degree); and a concentration of innovation and technological change (Florida 2005). This concept remarks the importance of formal training of the ‘creative class’ and the individual effort in achieving proficiency in their respective fields of expertise (Florida 2005). There are parallels between the creative industries and the creative class, because both terms stress the commercial importance of culture and the importance of ‘talent’ and ‘individual effort’, which already shows tensions with the position that UNESCO defends in terms of cultural policies.

The term ‘creative economy’ generalized the ideas of the creative industries, stressing the importance of creativity and the creative sectors for overall economic growth; for example, by stating that it would surpass all other non-creative sectors in terms of growth rates (Howkings 2007). This seductive hypothesis was adopted by the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which altered and globalized the concept by publishing two influential flagship reports on the creative economy, portraying it as “a feasible development option” (UNCTAD and UNDP 2008, 2010). Specifically, it defined the creative economy as:

“[…] an evolving concept based on creative assets potentially generating economic growth and development; it can foster income-generation, job creation and export earnings while promoting social inclusion, cultural diversity and human development.; […] at the heart of the creative economy are the creative industries” (UNCTAD and UNDP 2008, p. 15).

The report defined the creative industries as:

“[…] the cycles of creation, production and distribution of goods and services that use creativity and intellectual capital as primary inputs; constitute a set of knowledge-based activities, focused on but not limited to arts, potentially generating revenues from trade and intellectual property rights; comprise tangible products and intangible intellectual or artistic services with creative content, economic value and market objectives; are at the cross-road among the artisan, services and industrial sectors; and constitute a new dynamic sector in world trade” (p. 13).

Similarly to the UK definition, this concept fictitiously grouped a variety of quite different sectors under the same tag in the following four categories: Heritage, Arts, Media and Functional creations (UNCTAD and UNDP 2010, p. 8). For example, Media includes audiovisuals (film, television, radio and other broadcasting), new media (software, video games), design, publishing and printing media; whereas Heritage encompasses cultural sites (archeological sites, museums, libraries, etc.) and traditional cultural expressions (art crafts, festivals and celebrations). Despite the different names and the variance in terms of sectors, the concepts of creative class, creative economy and creative industries share a common denominator, the importance of something called ‘creativity’, although never defined,
which is present in specific groups of people or sectors to contribute to economic growth in the midst of changes toward a knowledge society (and similar concepts) (Flew and Cunningham 2010; Hartley 2005).

The main difference of UNCTAD’s approach is its claim that the creative economy is a ‘feasible development option’ for ‘developing’ countries, by associating it with words such as ‘social inclusion’, ‘cultural diversity’ or ‘human development’. Nevertheless, most of the language and recommended instruments are focused on economic growth and ‘development’; but never touch on the delicate and debated questions of what kind of development is meant, whom it will serve and how it shall be implemented (Ziai 2009; Escobar 1995). UNCTAD’s economic focus is evident in a similar defense of intellectual property rights, although in their definition with the adverb ‘potentially’ they use an ambiguous term to be open to alternatives too, yet it undermines the heated discussions around whether intellectual property rights contribute to middle and low income countries or not. This economic orientation is not a surprise, given that UNCTAD understands international trade as “the main driver of development” (UNCTAD 2013). Besides, the report was written in collaboration with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which strives for a global intellectual property rights system, including copyrights. In the end, I understand that UNCTAD became one of the central actors to implement a top-down global diffusion strategy of the creative economy and creative industries policy discourse through the organization of workshops, content diffusion through the internet and conferences, etc., which stimulated countries or cities, such as Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, Korea, Mozambique, Singapore, among others, to follow such strategy (UNCTAD and UNDP 2010). What is important to remark is that the creative economy policy discourse follows the typical strategy in the development project: It defines an object, the ‘creative economy’; sets up an assumed globally valid and apolitical ideal based on the experience of ‘developed’ Western countries (in this case the UK and the USA); then, it tries to measure how the objects or units of analysis depart from that ideal, so as to finally suggest measures to catch up with it. This is evident in the conclusions of both flagship reports, in which the organization suggests actions to stimulate a creative economy, clearly subordinating cultural practices to economic objectives; for example, by recommending to support the training of creative entrepreneurs who need to acquire skills for business, knowledge about intellectual property rights mechanisms, funding, etc., to develop small and medium sized enterprises (UNCTAD and UNDP 2008), implying that culture has to be seen as just another commodity.

Despite pompous claims of the contribution of the ‘creative economy’ to ‘development’, these assertions do not withstand a serious analysis, because even research from within the UK has already shown the shortcomings of the concept and the practices of the creative industries and the political projects it represents. For example, authors cast doubt on the creative industries policy discourse and even argue it is a doctrine, because it fictitiously connects culture with the ‘knowledge economy’, to justify a shift toward commercially-oriented cultural policies and the protection of few firms’ copyrights (Garnham 2005; Schlesinger 2007). This trend is problematic, because it undermines the argument of public support of culture to guarantee access, at the cost of increasing inequality (Galloway and Dunlop 2007; Booyens 2012), which according to analysts in Britain took place in a period of deregulation and privatizations inherited from the Thatcher government of the 1980s (Garnham 2005). Empirical evidence sides with this perspective; for instance, an analysis of English regional audio-visual policy showed how the replacement of the term cultural industries with creative industries, went hand in hand with a progressive commercialization of private assets and the emergence of neo-liberalism (Newsinger 2012).
With respect to the insistence on intellectual property rights, and in particular copyrights, this claim is also dubious given the lack of conclusive evidence showing its positive effect on creativity (Towse 2010), besides ignoring other mechanisms for cultural distribution, such as creative commons. Indeed, there are examples that flourished without it, such as the case of Nollywood, the Nigerian film industry (Lobato 2010). Furthermore, Oakley (2006) observes that the creative industries policy discourse makes optimistic connections between economic and social development, arguing that an increase of GDP does not necessarily lead to more jobs and better social conditions. Conversely, evidence shows a concentration of firms in London and South East England, the growth of informal employment, together with an evident disadvantage of ethnic minorities in these jobs due to scarce social networks and a lower representation of women (Oakley 2006). Similarly, Vötsch and Weiskopf (2009) understand the creative industries as a discourse that shapes a specific type of worker: self-sufficient, oriented to projects, innovative, flexible and mobile, among other adjectives. This suggests a top-down approach to pattern workers toward an ideal that resembles the ‘free’ and nomad artist, but hide the precarious conditions of these types of ‘creative work’: long working hours and a lack of union representation that may lead to strained emotional states (Vötsch and Weiskopf 2009; Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2008; Gill and Pratt 2008). In sum, it might be true that the creative industries and the creative economy foster economic growth, but the literature casts doubt on the utopian claims of the creative industries to be a ‘feasible development option’ that contributes to ‘social inclusion’ and ‘human development’.

Apart from this criticism, it is worth to point out that the creative industries and creative economy concepts have lost the critical perspective of mass culture that Adorno & Horkheimer introduced. Besides, the concepts overstate the importance of individual creativity, which might be the case in the context of the UK and other Western countries where individuality, for several socioeconomic and historical processes is highly developed. Given the influence of Thatcher on UK policies, it is worth to remark her view on this issue: “[...] who is society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and women [...]” (Keay 1987). Nonetheless, this approach does not at all match other contexts where collective practices and values are equally or more important than individual ones. In addition, the focus on talent associated with high education or formal training makes sense in industrialized regions of the world, but becomes difficult to transfer to other contexts where there are fewer opportunities to access higher education. Therefore, this and the notion of a ‘creative class’ suggest an artificial and quite discriminatory divide between people who are ‘creative’ and those who are not. These issues are present, to varying degrees, in the so-called creative sectors, but I shall further argue that the creative economy policy discourse is particularly problematic in the media sector, because its economic orientation directly sides with the position that information is understood as just another commodity. In the process, issues such as the problems of media concentration and the struggles for freedom of speech for resource scarce and minority groups, among other points that require to follow the historical links between media and development, are being undermined.

1.3 Media for Development

The creative industries and the creative economy cultural policy discourse consider media as just another extra industrial sector subject to its economic program. However, this approach overlooks the specificities and the distinctive role that media has historically occupied in relation to development and modernization.
In effect, one of the seminal works connecting both was published by Daniel Lerner in 1958: “The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East”, which based on surveys claiming that every society could be ‘modern’ if Western ideas and values flowed through mass media. According to Lerner: “What the West is, the Middle East seeks to become’, ‘Islam is absolutely defenseless’ against ‘a rationalist and positivist spirit’ embodied in Western-style democratic institutions” (Lerner 1958, quoted in Shah, 2011, p. 2). This book initiated a research tradition that believed media could have a direct and lineal influence on development and modernization. It expanded globally and in a top-down approach, what the ‘Western’ experts had to offer and classified societies with respect to how far away they were from the Western (more precisely USA) experience (Lerner and Schramm 1973; Rogers 1976). At that time, the concept of media alluded to the press, radio and cinemas, because they could concentrate the attention of large audiences and disseminate new practices for imitation (Lerner and Schramm 1973). As Lerner and Schramm 1973 acknowledged, the aim of diffusing images through media was to change ‘behaviors’ in a way that they contribute to modernization. They understood this process as a struggle in ‘developing countries’ between the ‘traditional elites’ trying to keep their privileges, and other elites siding with modernization.

These pioneering works of the 1950s and 1960s defined the initial orientation of communication for development as a research field monopolized mostly by USA scholars, who adopted a universalistic and instrumental model of communication that claimed to be objective, rational, scientific and apolitical. However, from the 1970s onward, this lineal model of communication for development was heavily questioned theoretically and empirically in several ways. First, critics highlighted that the theories relied on the modernization experience in the USA and the need of its industrial sector to export products worldwide, but hiding such particular political interest (Barranquero 2011; Gumucio-Dagron 2011). For example, the survey that Lerner used in his pioneering work to gather empirical material was recollected thanks to the support of Voice of America, the international broadcasting organization of the USA State Department, which was interested to know more about Middle Eastern audiences (Shah 2011). This elucidated the clear connection between geopolitical interests and the ‘objective’ research exalting the USA modernization model. By the way, this shows a resemblance between Lerner’s ideas of communication for development and Rostow’s linear development model, because both stressed the need for ‘developing’ countries to ‘catch up’ with ‘developed’ ones (Lerner and Schramm 1973). Second, critics opposed the presumed direct lineal influence of mass media on behaviors, inspiring their arguments by Freire’s dialogic approach to teaching and communication, questioning the aseptic, apolitical and uncritical perspective used by Western communication scholars in Latin America (Beltrán 1975; Díaz Bordenave 1976). Third, even USA researchers in the field of communication for development acknowledged mistakes in the original paradigm, particularly that the role of mass media was less relevant than originally thought in innovations diffusion, because people also use other information sources, such as peer networks (Rogers 1976). Additionally, Rogers stressed the importance of structural change over mere content in mass media to stimulate broader changes. These societal critiques led to participatory and horizontal communications experiences and approaches (Barranquero 2011), and most importantly, they inspired new international discussions about the role of communication for development.

At the end of the 1970s, in the midst of critiques of the ‘development’ project in general and of its approach to communications in particular, UNESCO assumed the leadership to advance toward a NWICO, whose vision was expressed in the report Many Voices, One World (1980), also known as the
MacBride report. This document questioned the prevailing commercial approach to communications in view of the imbalances it had generated both within nations and between “developed and developing nations” (UNESCO 1980, p. 260). Its aim was to reduce the high concentration patterns in mass media that gave excessive influence to media firms and journalists from ‘developed countries’, leading to what analysts called ‘cultural imperialism’ (Roach 1997; Mattelart 2006). Conversely, the MacBride Report falls into line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by stating that “freedom of information - and, more specifically the right to seek, receive and impart information - is a fundamental human right; indeed, a prerequisite for many others” (UNESCO 1980, p. 253). Indeed, in its recommendations the MacBride Report advocated a new right, the right to communicate (UNESCO 1980). This aimed at surpassing the right of freedom of information by acknowledging the inequalities in the international flow of information between the industrialized and the rest of countries. Therefore, in the MacBride Report UNESCO strived for a more participatory and egalitarian global communication system, where communications were considered as an essential part of ‘development’ policies, respecting cultural diversity and human rights, promoting audience participation and popular access to media, and stressing the importance of media for democratization processes (Carpentier 2011; UNESCO 1980).

From a (geo)political point of view, UNESCO’s position in the MacBride Report sided with the Non-Aligned Movement (Hamelink and Hoffmann 2008) by giving human rights, cultural diversity and democratization priority over profits and a commercial view of culture and communications, challenging the stance of Western powers. Indeed, the USA and the UK opposed the report, arguing it did not respect the ‘freedom of press’, and even left UNESCO in retaliation (Canelas Rubim 2011), only to return in 2003 and 1997 respectively. Regardless of the interpretation of these events, analysts say the result was that the right to communicate and the NWICO disappeared from the agenda of international organizations (Hamelink and Hoffmann 2008; Mansell and Nordenstreng 2006). Since then, it can be argued that the role of communications in international development policies has remained off the radar, which is evident in their lack of inclusion in the Millenium Development Goals (MDG) and the discussions of the next Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). Despite this failure at the international level, UNESCO’s initiative stimulated projects and social movements to strive for a human rights approach to media in different countries (Hamelink and Hoffmann 2008). This has been the case in Latin American countries that were in transition to democratic political systems during the 1980s. In those years, new projects started to emerged that departed from the lineal view of the previous decades, giving a voice to previously ignored sectors of the population by means of horizontal and participative organizational designs (Gumucio-Dagron 2011), but still in a context where the inheritance of dictatorships and the commercial approach to communications prevailed.

During the 1990s and in the beginning of the 21st century, the concepts of information society, knowledge society, knowledge economy, and similar ones, once again pointed to the importance of information and communication technologies in changing social practices and economies. The diffusion of technological innovations like the so-called new media based on the internet and cell phones, are a promising opportunity to finally democratize communications. These tendencies prompted the United Nations to revisit concerns about information and communication during the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), which stated in its Declaration of Principles: “[…] Our common desire and commitment [is] to build a people-centred, inclusive and development-oriented Information Society, where everyone can create, access, utilize and share information and knowledge, enabling individuals, communities and peoples to achieve their full potential in promoting their sustainable development and
improving their quality of life” (WSIS 2003b). As Mansell and Nordenstreng remark, despite these
good intentions, the geopolitical situation in which this initiative was written was completely different
from the one of the MacBride Report. In the latter, there was at least some opposition and a struggle
between the USA and other Western allies versus the Non-Aligned Movement of countries, whereas
at the beginning of the 21st century USA unilateralism was uncontested. Therefore, as Mansell and
Nordenstreng (2006) remark, “this brought with it an overriding concern for U.S. interests in the media
and communication field, rather than a desire to support development initiatives aimed at the disad-
vantaged”. Consequently, despite the hopes of some civil society actors to resume the struggle for the
right to communicate, there was no space for such claims (Hamelink and Hoffmann 2008). Indeed,
in the final texts of the WSIS principles such as participation - a key word for less advantaged actors
have a stance in the access, production and distribution of information - “only played a minor role”
(Carpentier 2011, p. 93). Similarly, Costanza-Chock (2003) concludes that WSIS defends the interest of
private corporations striving to privatize common resources and ignore communication rights, under-
mining the position of civil society actors. Given such a global political context, it is not a surprise that
the creative industries and the creative economy became the strategy for ‘development’, considering
culture and communications as a mainly commercial enterprise.

In short, contemporary development policies in the field of culture and communication at the inter-
national level retain a bias toward a commercial approach, opposing and overlooking previous discus-
sions during the 1980s. The prevailing ‘one size fits all’ model maintains a thread with the development
project described at the beginning, in the sense that is a top-down, apolitical intervention with global
claims to shape policies mirroring the experience of a few Western industrialized nations. An assump-
tion in this work is that this does not happen by chance, but rather in agreement with the hypothesis
that culture and media do in some way influence people’s ‘behaviors’, although not in a lineal way as
originally thought. Therefore, a commercial approach is functional for corporations and industrialized
nations in disseminating their visions of ‘development’ worldwide, and to similarly commercial firms in
other countries. Conversely, a challenge to such a perspective questions the economic and geopolitical
interests of states and firms, as the MacBride Report did in that time, and points to the inherent polit-
ical nature of culture and media in ‘development’. This type of contestation is becoming more relevant
in the 21st century due to the increasing interactions humans have with media, thanks to the expansion
of ICT. In this context, the interest of this research is to inquire about the tensions between a commer-
cial and a human rights approach to culture and communication in two Latin American countries, by
focusing specifically on the latter, something that has been undermined in international discussions
since the 1980s.

1.4 Research Question

The previous concerns about the role of culture and media in ‘development’, together with the specific
trends in Argentina and Brazil that have stimulated the emergence of civil society actors striving to-
wards varied objectives of social transformation, set the stage for the main research question of this
dissertation:

How do new nonprofit and nongovernmental audiovisual media organizations striving
for social transformation in Argentina and Brazil challenge a commercial approach to cul-
The aim of this research is to give insights on how new media experiences that are neither commercial nor directly state-dependent emerge and challenge the predominant culture and media discourses in Argentina and Brazil. This implies the study of how these experiences operating under different logics create discourses and practices to achieve a social transformation process, despite the constraining and adverse contexts they have to face, inherited from previous decades. It is worth to point out that I do not take a normative approach to define ‘social transformation’, but rather employ it as a term to embrace the diverse - and sometimes divergent - proposals and projects of disparate groups that aim to change the context they live in. In order to answer the research question, I elaborated a conceptual framework that I will detail in chapter 2, which introduces both structural dimensions (media system and policies) and a set of extra concepts to analyze the operations of the cases. The latter allow for an examination of the ways the selected cases operate, revealing their successful strategies and also obstacles to an implementation of their projects, such as those related to the access to technologies, power issues, the acquisition of resources and participation, among others; whereas the former highlight the structures that affect the emergence and existence of such cases. It is relevant to point out that I do not aim to establish a general causal model, but rather to interpret how cases that are supposed to be nonviable under a commercial approach to culture and communication, still operate, albeit with challenges. Accordingly, I shall shed light on the inconsistencies of a commercial approach to communications in particular, and to culture in general. It is also worth pointing out that by ‘new media’ I do not mean that this research is restricted to the experiences that emerge on the internet and because of the expansion of social networks, but more generally, to new projects created or inspired by a change in institutional conditions in the studied countries; for instance, the introduction of a new audiovisual communication services law in Argentina. Besides, audiovisual media refers to experiences that diffuse audiovisual material, either in a ‘traditional’ way by broadcasting the signal or in a ‘new’ way by using the internet as the means of content distribution. Although this excludes the press or radio from the analysis, this selection is based on the highest consumption rates television has among cultural sectors. For example, reports estimated that on average viewers in Argentina and Brazil spent 2h and 45 minutes (Infobae 2013) and 5h and 45 minutes respectively in front of the TV set every day (Ibope 2014). At the same time, with the expansion of ICT there is an increasing process of media convergence, which is blurring the differences between media platforms and generating new consumption patterns. For instance, in Brazil 43% of those who use the internet watch television at the same time (Ibope 2012). Taking these tendencies into account, this research analyzes the case studies of three television cases in Argentina and one online television experience in Brazil by employing diverse methods outlined in the next subsection.

1.5 Methodologies Applied

In order to answer the main research question the research works on two levels. One the one hand, it considers the role of discourses that have been shaping ideas about culture and communication at the policy level in both countries (from now onward ‘policy discourses’). I thus gathered empirical data that consists of primary sources such as policy documents, reports from different organizations, and interviews with key current and former policy makers, academics and practitioners in Argentina and
Brazil related to the policy discourses (see Appendix B and C). It is worth to point out that I did not aim to cover all policies, but only those strictly related to the selected media cases. I analyzed the data employing a discourse analysis perspective (more details in chapter 2 and 4) to examine the different schemes for organizing culture policies in general and communication policies in particular that the policy discourses offer. Some of them are in tune with international discussions, but others are quite autochthonous and in opposition to the global ones.

On the other hand, the research focuses on specific case studies of nonprofit and nongovernmental audiovisual media projects that illustrate counter policy discourses, departing from a commercial approach to culture and communication. In both countries, many experiences are spurring that meet these conditions; thus, I selected the case studies based on the information I expected to obtain from each of them (Flyvbjerg 2006), following the next criteria. First, I chose cases that communicate discourses of underrepresented groups in each country, striving for objectives of social transformation, such as indigenous communities and co-operatives. Thus, I selected small media projects in comparison to the size of mass media firms. Second, I selected cases that had received negative coverage from commercial mass media firms, assuming that this was an indicator of a latent or overt conflict of interests among incumbents and new experiences that represent alternative and non-commercial - at least according to their intentions - media practices. Third, as one of my initial interests was the kind of technologies used, I picked cases that employed diverse configurations of technologies for content distribution. For instance, cases that follow the typical TV air or cable broadcasting model and others that are in transition or completely working online. Taking into account such criteria within the scope of this research, the following four cases were studied: CPEtv, the first co-operative channel in Argentina under the new audiovisual communication services law; Wall Kintún TV the first Mapuche indigenous community channel in Argentina after the new law was passed; Barricada TV, an alternative channel in Argentina that has been fighting to be recognized after the new law was enacted; and Mídia NINJA, an online media experience in Brazil that has drawn national and international mass media attention during the riots of June 2013, not without causing controversies in the process. This group is broad enough to answer the research question, making evident the existence of niche practices. Nonetheless, I am aware that I could not cover other types of channels equally striving for social transformation that could offer extra dimensions for analysis; for instance, religious organizations, trade unions or extreme political organizations, such as terrorist groups.

In order to investigate about how the four cases challenge a commercial approach to communication, I had to understand the perspectives of the actors within these experiences. In each of the cases I thus employed participant observation to varying degrees to collect data on the emic perspective of practitioners and to find out how they cope with challenges they encounter in their daily practice. In this way, my aim has been to contribute with research that corrects what authors have identified as the bias in mainstream media research, described as a positivist, disciplinary and mostly theoretical approach, that ignores the discrepancies with media use in practice and the ongoing effects of new technologies (Martín-Barbero 1984; Horst, Hjorth, and Tacchi 2012). The only difference of this thesis and the previous claim is that I focused on the context of media production, rather than media use, because my research interest is to inquire cases that produce media content in ways that challenge the ones accepted by mainstream media literature. Accordingly, one evident limitation of this work is the scant research into the connection between the studied media cases and their audiences. Similarly, in this work I do not consider it enough to analyze the mere output of media projects, but rather
and most importantly their material conditions of production, such as their technologies, the resources employed, and the history of the organizations, among others. Thus, participant observation was the most adequate method for data collection, with varying duration and intensity of fieldwork depending on the cases. CPEtv and Mídia NINJA involved fieldwork of three and five months in Argentina and Brazil respectively. The remaining two cases in Argentina were studied with a focused ethnography approach that lasted two weeks on site in each case. This last type of method comprehends the gathering of multimodal data; that is to say, not only field notes as in the traditional ethnographic method, but also videos, images and reports from and about these experiences that complement the constrained personal observations of the previous two cases. The reason for this difference is that these cases were less complex in terms of structure than the first two, yet still offered important dimensions of contrast to shed light on the challenges that this type of media experience faces in practice.

The selection of participant observation led me to different types of data collection and analysis about the four studied media. First, I gathered my on site observations on how the different projects operate, which I systematically recorded in written field diaries and in a digitized blog; this was useful to better manage the data. Second, the personal observations and impressions were not only based on the different practices I saw, but rather relied strongly on in-depth personal and some group interviews with members of the experiences (see Appendix C for examples of the interview guides employed), and also with related ones I had access to through snowball sampling. Third, I collected not only documents related to the cases (from organizations officials or from newspapers), but also articles, images and videos that the studied media elaborated and disseminated through different channels (TV, online, newspapers, books, etc.). Fourth, I employed innovative methods to gather data about video statistics available online, such as scraping techniques that use algorithms to acquire large amounts of data from online sites (see Apendix D). In my case, I collected information about thousands of videos elaborated by the cases from online portals, which is a method scarcely explored in communication for development, but it is not risky to say that its use and complexity will increase given the ongoing expansion of ICT, new media and ‘big data’ techniques. With respect to data analysis, I kept all the gathered information digitized in Atlas.Ti and mostly analyzed it following a coding procedure based on grounded theory, but adapted to the needs of the discourse analysis approach that I shall introduce in the next chapter (Keller 2013). In chapter 8, I furthermore employed case-ordered displays to compare variables of interest among the case studies (Miles and Huberman 1994), which I will detail in the specific chapters. Moreover, to analyze audiovisual data, I experimented with videohermeneutics (Raab and Tänzler 2012), the coding and analysis of videos, which has been useful to compare the quality schemes of a selection of content produced by the studied media (for the examples see Appendix E-H). Further methods are explicated where necessary in the next chapters. All in all, the mixture of on site observations, video analyses and the digital collection of data, offered an empirical richness that is unusual in media research in Latin America.

1.6 Structure of the Thesis

Figure 1.1 shows that the rest of the thesis is organized in nine chapters. The next chapter introduces the conceptual framework employed to interpret the strategies of nonprofit and nongovernmental media to challenge or depart from commercial practices. The third chapter synthesizes relevant contextual events and factors (economic, historical, political, etc.) that have influenced the countries under
study. This covers a description of the culture and media systems in each country, detailing patterns of unequal access to culture and high levels of ownership concentration of media. In chapter 4, I will examine different policy discourses on culture and media that are present in Argentina and Brazil and that are relevant to understand the analyzed four media cases. On the one hand, I shall argue that there are mainstream discourses that I call the ‘creative economy’ policy discourses, which are widely disseminated in both countries. Their features vary and have recently been strengthened by foreign discourses and by previous local policies that side with a commercial approach to culture; for example, the private organization of television based on advertising. On the other hand, the chapter describes counter policy discourses that oppose and contest - to varying degrees - the main features of the creative economy policy discourses. In general, these are neither diffused nor supported as much as the former in both countries, and consequently, there is an imbalance in terms of resources and influence. Nevertheless, they are different constructions that offer alternative ways of thinking about culture, and communications in particular, and how to put these concepts into practice, which include alternative, indigenous and radical media, among others. Chapter 5 analyzes the ‘imaginaries’ of the four case studies that refer to their specific discourses. This is a necessary distinction to separate these examples from the general features of discourses described in chapter 4. In contrast, in this section the emphasis is on the interrelations between historical and contextual factors and the symbolic-material construction of shared knowledge in each media experience, which shape the interpretations these cases make to put forward their alternative practices for mainstream policy discourses. The remaining empirical chapters shed light on the limits the four case studies face to advance their noncommercial projects. For instance, chapter 6 inspects how technologies can both advance and hamper the implementation of the imaginaries of each case, making evident the way in which other types of discourses permeate counter-discursive practices. In chapter 7, I shall discuss issues related to content production and reception of the four case studies. This also covers up to which extent the cases have been able to generate content that matches their imaginary and stresses their contribution to social change issues. Additionally, this chapter considers the role given to ‘quality’ patterns, which similarly to technologies might either constrain or enable the imaginaries of the media projects. Furthermore, it discusses the role of participation in content production, and finally, it compares the reception of these materials among some of the cases in online media. Chapter 8 illuminates the role that different types of violence have in limiting the analyzed case studies. Moreover, I will examine the role of power by comparing the different types of resources that different media have been able to acquire and mobilize in order to advance their projects. Finally, the last chapter covers the conclusions of the research, delineates policy recommendations for media and culture in Argentina and Brazil, and outlines future research options.
Figure 1.1: Thesis structure.
Chapter 2

Conceptual Framework

In this chapter, I introduce the conceptual framework employed in this research to study media for social transformation. Figure 2.1 shows the main dimensions of interest of the framework to inquire about how media for social transformation advance their alternative practices in the context of Latin America. It essentially covers three levels of analysis: the media system, policy discourses, and specific dimensions about media for social transformation. In Section 2.1, I present the first level that gives an interpretation from the political economy approach to media research, explaining how a media system works in a capitalist economy, focusing on the production of audiovisual content. This allows to understand the mainstream commercial approach to media and to comprehend the usually neglected role of media for social transformation. Additionally, it takes into account the historical and policy changes that gave the media system in each country specific features of interest, which I will detail in chapter 3. The second level inquires about the cultural and media policy discourses that influence and strive for change in the media system. In Section 2.2, I introduce the approach to analyze discourses employed in chapter 4 to analyze those that reinforce the structure of commercial media in opposition to others that stimulate different types of media organizations and practices. Thus, I assume a competition among different policy discourses. In Section 2.3, I describe the last level that focuses on specific dimensions relevant to understand how media for social transformation are able to challenge the dominant commercial approach to culture and media or not. I selected the dimensions based on the suggestions in the literature synthesized in the introduction about the key dimensions that need theorization in these type of media (audiences, participation, resources, technologies), together with others that I included based on the results from my empirical data (quality and violence). The analysis of the three levels required the employment of key concepts and approaches from discourse analysis, media & culture research, peace research, philosophy of technology and science & technology studies, which I will thoroughly present in the rest of the chapter.

2.1 Media System and Media for Social Transformation

In this subsection, I describe a political economy perspective to understand the media system in a capitalist economy, which allows to comprehend the central role that the commercialization of information plays, in tension with the logic of public access to information. This explanation of the main logics of the media system also suggest why those media organizations that differ in their logics of operation
Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework to analyze media for social transformation.
tend to be neglected in international and national culture and media policies. I conclude the section by reviewing the different concepts that have been used in the literature to define these different group of media, and I explain why in this research I name them media for ‘social transformation’.

The political economy of communication gives a critical perspective on the role of media, economics and power (Mosco 2009). On the one hand, the research strand characterized by authors as Schiller, Chomsky or McChesney, focuses on analyzing the increasing concentration in media, the interrelations among business and politics and the negative effects derived from this (Hesmondhalgh 2013). For example, the simplistic view that through media the state ‘manufactures consent’ among the USA population to go to war or to blindly follow any other policy (Herman and Chomsky 2008). On the other hand, the ‘cultural industries’ research strand (Hesmondhalgh 2013), cultivated by European scholars such as Miège and Garnham (Miège 2006; Miège and Garnham 1979; Garnham 1979), and non-Europeans like Bolaño (Bolaño 2000). According to Hesmondahalgh, this school of thought offers better analytical insights to comprehend the complexities, contradictions and tensions in media production and consumption. I share this position and adopt a model proposed by Bolaño to understand how audiovisual production works in the context of a capitalist economy, which despite its simplifications offers insights for media dynamics and for contextualizing the research.

Figure 2.2 is an adaptation of Bolaño’s model, which explains how in a capitalist economy the audiovisual industry is guided by three functions: publicity or advertising, propaganda and programming. The first two emanate from the tensions existing in such systems between private firms and the state (Bolaño 2000), which in ideal terms diffuse content either to promote consumption or to attract audiences to particular political positions; whereas the third function refers to the process of content production to attract audiences. By reading the graphic from the bottom to the top, the diagram sketches the dynamics of the audiovisual industry system. The graphic shows that audiences offer their attention to specific contents that come together either with publicity or propaganda. The former shapes the preferences of the audiences to buy specific products, which can be consumer goods, electronics, financial services, among others; whereas the latter tries to persuade the receivers toward specific political views, which can be produced by the state, political parties or other organizations with political interests (this includes business firms, churches, etc.). But, how do publicity and propaganda arrive at their audiences? In the case of television, it is disseminated with the content that attracts the audience’s attention in the first place. This can be produced by different TV stations or acquired from others, such as private or public producers that elaborate fiction, news, soap operas, magazines and other genres, together with the transmission of entertainment events, like concerts, sport competitions, etc. Thus, those who transmit audiovisual content can generate and/or buy content, which requires financial resources to cover the operational costs and content production and/or acquisition. Such income can be obtained from the charges to transmit publicity or advertising and propaganda. Agents from varied economic sectors, such as consumer firms, electronic firms, banks, etc., pay for publicity to influence the audience toward their products or services, and trying to maximize their benefits, they invest in publicity that will reach the largest audiences. The same argument holds to me for organizations transmitting political propaganda.

Despite its simplicity, the model grasps the two predominant logics of operation in media: commercial versus public media. The former distributes content plus advertising, whereas the latter content with political propaganda. These are ideals, whereas in practice one finds a gradient between these two poles, because private firms distribute advertising and propaganda at the same time, furthering
Figure 2.2: Model to understand the production of audiovisual content, part of the media system in a capitalist economy. Source: Adapted from (Bolaño 2000).
their business interests\(^1\). The same can be argued for the state, which can promote consumption in national industries or internationally advance its business and political interests. If we add to this picture the fact that audiovisual production is one of the most technologically complex sectors of the cultural industries, because setting up a TV channel is an intricate task that requires technological investment, qualified human resources, content sufficiently attractive to retain audiences, among others (Millerson and Owens 2009). Then, these barriers favor concentration in mass media due to economies of scale (Hesmondhalgh 2013). In other words, the firms that attract greater audiences will generate more profit with a similar cost of production, which generates a surplus that can be invested to expand their operations to other cultural industries. On the private side, this is one of the reasons why in general the level of concentration in terms of ownership in cultural industries tends to be high, with large transnational corporations such as Walt Disney, Comcast, Sony or Time Warner with revenues higher than US$ 20 billion in 2011 (Hesmondhalgh 2013). Beside these transnational patterns, there are also high concentration ones in terms of regional or national corporations, which do not have such a big revenue as the latter, but still yield a strong influence in their specific regions of operation, like the case of Clarín in Argentina that in 2010 had a revenue of US$ 1.8 billion (Hesmondhalgh 2013).

On the public side, this might lead to state monopolies in media and limits concerning the distribution of critical content (Djankov et al. 2001). Therefore, the industrial organization of content production and its business model based on the competition for audiences puts constraints on what sort of media organizations can survive these selection mechanisms, which in part favors content that is attractive to masses.

It is worth to point out two important aspects in Figure 2.2 that are of central concern in this research. First, the role of the state that is in charge of distributing the concessions or licenses to broadcast on TV channels and telecommunication networks, and more broadly, on defining the cultural and media policies that regulate the media system, altering the balance between the commercial and the public actors. I shall argue that different policy discourses affect the media system, either by reinforcing the growth of commercial media or by opening spaces for other types of organizations to flourish that challenge a mostly for-profit perspective. Second, Figure 2.2 ignores the emergence of new media and the existence of a diversity of other types of media organizations that try to depart from the effects of advertising or publicity, and that neither classify themselves as commercially oriented nor as state funded. This neglect is understandable given the relatively recent introduction of new media, and also to the low number of resources and audiences that non-profit private media have in comparison to the others. For these reasons, in the next paragraphs I will review the definitions of what sort of media organizations these categories include to arrive at a new concept to group the type of media projects I studied in this research.

As regards new media, the tag refers to the expansion of the internet that introduced a new model of communication that challenges the previous top-down and linear ones prevailing in mass media. The growth of the internet's infrastructure offers the possibility of multiple ways of interaction and of information flows to take place. This, together with new practices, attitudes and values, defines the so called ‘cyberculture’ (Lévy 1999; Lemos 2002). Such a neologism refers to how ICT contribute to the emergence of new social practices, which are characterized by the blossoming of virtual communities of the most diverse topics (Rheingold 2000) or a diversification of ‘life-worlds’ (Lievrouw 2001), the emergence of collaboration practices and the appropriation of technologies for diverse means (Lemos 2002).

---

1. For example, the ‘neoliberal newspeak’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2001).
For instance, new sub-cultures challenging the digital infrastructure such as hackers, crackers and cypherpunks; new relations between bodies, desires and technologies like on online dating platforms, the expansion of erotism or wearable gadgets; new types of online-offline activism or cyberactivism (Illia 2002); sub-cultures mixing music, hedonism and technology such as ravers, among others (Lemos 2002). In the field of communication for social change, these changes allow a fast flow of information between those with access to ICT, and bloggers and journalists spurring all around the world, challenging the monopoly to knowledge that professional journalists and researchers once enjoyed (Harvey, Lewin, and Fisher 2012).

Besides new media, in the English speaking literature authors have used different names to categorize media experiences that depart from the logic of operation of mass media (aimed at mass audiences, for-profit or state funded, professional, etc.). However, these definitions are not coherent and vary even more in terms of how media experiences name themselves (Carpentier 2011). In the next paragraphs, I will briefly synthesize the following six terms as a sample of the different names that refer to these organizations: alternative media, community media, radical media, citizens’ media, indigenous media and communications for social change. Finally, I will introduce the term media for social transformation, which is the one employed in the thesis.

This first category, alternative media, at first sight seems unproblematic, suggesting these organizations offer something that differs from those of mass media. But, going into the details, wide variations emerge due to the ambiguity of what ‘alternative’ means and of the binary opposition between mainstream versus alternative. This can refer to the dissemination of different contents, which not necessarily imply an opposition to mass media or an advocacy for social change, but just the promotion of different lifestyles (Atton 2002) or even extreme right ideologies. Thus, the term is vague enough not to focus only on social change issues. Besides content, the adjective ‘alternative’ might refer to the different organizational structures that these media use, which go beyond for-profit oriented models (Waltz 2005). In addition, the alternative might refer to dissimilar content aesthetics and also to experiments on how to organize content production that do not strictly follow the professional and commercial patterns of mass media (Atton 2002). Yet, these divisions are problematic. For example, in terms of content The Guardian or Le Monde Diplomatique are widely read newspapers, thus mass media, but they distribute ‘alternative content’ written by professionals, and also use tools of the market economy such as publicity. In fact, Waltz mentions that the Guardian may publish articles criticizing air travel, while in another supplement they may just promote it (Waltz 2005). In sum, it is hard to find clear criteria to define what falls within this category.

The same can be argued with the next concept, community media, which presupposes an active participation of its members, co-operation, a sense of belonging (Krohling Peruzzo 2007). However, it is problematic given the ambiguities in the term ‘community’. What does it refer to? The general shortcoming with this concept is that it is not explicit who belongs to the community, where and for what motives. Thus, it might hide more than it reveals, even obscuring undemocratic ways of operation (Downing 2001).

In contrast to alternative media, radical media refers to those initiatives specifically concerned with social change issues and the participation of social movements (Downing 2001). According to Downing, the concept includes the group of media that is “relatively free from the agenda of the powers that be and sometimes in opposition to one or more elements in that agenda” (p. 8). However, he remarks this does not imply a clear-cut definition, because audiences might be radical in some aspects but not in others.
For example, he mentions the failure of organized labor to deal with the issues that female workers face (Downing 2001). Sandoval and Fuchs (2010) also consider alternative media as radical media if their content offers anticapitalist worldviews, independent of whether or not they have commercial strategies for their economic sustainability, professional practices or participatory production processes. In both cases, the approach is inspired by a counter information model and Gramsci’s work, which consider radical media as tools through which the cultural ‘hegemony’ of the capitalist class can be unveiled by subverting how and what information mass media journalists present (Downing 2001). But this approach suffers from the inaccuracies of the concept of ‘class’, its lack of applicability in communist states, and its lack of application to analyze radical right wing or religious media.

Citizens’ media is another variant that wants to depart from the binary thinking involved in mass or mainstream media versus alternative media. Instead, this concept refers to media that strives for social change, and keeps an organizational structure not based on profits and open to access and volunteerism of citizens (Rodriguez 2001), rejecting those media that are not ‘progressive’ or that do not include diversity within their aims (Waltz 2005), such as far right extremist groups. Once again, this is problematic for excluding ‘non-progressive’ groups, which just means those that are not close to the political stance of the author, implying that the authors do not consider them citizens! Thus, I could not disagree more with such division.

Indigenous media is another category that is not present in any of the lists made by the most cited works in the English speaking literature of alternative media, such as the contributions of Downing, Atton or Waltz. This term refers to all those experiences by indigenous communities around the world that try to resist foreign cultural influences (Alia 2012), challenging the concepts and structures emanating from Western experiences. In general, they are small-scaled, geographically constrained and have few financial resources (Ginsburg 1991).

Finally, Gumucio-Dagrón (2011) accepts the difficulty of capturing the diversity of these different media practices in a definition, and proposes his own tag of ‘communication for social change’. This concept covers media that satisfies the following five conditions or processes: First, there is community participation and appropriation of the project. Second, these media use local languages and transmit messages pertinent to the place of operation; in other words, not elaborated in the West just to be adapted in the South. Third, the content these media elaborate reflects local life. Fourth, these media use appropriate technologies favoring the process of putting forward the experience rather than the use of advanced technology that does not contribute much to it. Fifth, they construct networks and processes of debate with other experiences of communication for social change. This list is interesting, because it gathers many points that I shall later analyze in the cases. However, it is too normative and might leave aside other types of media interested in social change that do not satisfy these conditions.

This list could go on, for example by including the term ‘activist media’, which includes those that stimulate the action of their audience toward a specific goal or aim (Waltz 2005). Thus, this includes any sort of media that advocates a political program or a philosophical or religious system, but once again irrespective of their position or of the size of their audience. Furthermore, other media projects classify themselves as ‘free media’ or ‘independent media’, remarking that they are not dependent on corporate support (state and large firms) or that they can cover whatever they want without fearing editorial cuts. For example, Democracy Now from the USA. These and other concepts such as ‘rhizomatic media’ (Carpentier 2011), ‘popular media’, among others, show the diversity of categorizations and the difficulties in establishing a unified ordering scheme for all of them, which in part derives from
the particular perspective and the always bounded variety of experiences that each researcher knows about. Besides, each media in practice might use the previous tags in combination or just new ones that better reflect their experience. Given these differences between the local naming, and the ones that researchers apply in their academic work, in the next chapters I will adopt the local categories used in the four cases (co-operative media, alternative and popular media, indigenous media, independent media). Only when I speak of them as a group, I shall call them ‘media for social transformation’ to distinguish them from the previous concepts. However, I have no intention of defining a set of features that through induction would allow to decide which types of cases belong to such a group or not. I just employ the term to remark how these media want to challenge mass media, although in practice this intention will vary considerably from case to case.

2.2 Policy Discourses and Imaginaries

The media system described in Figure 2.2 is not static, but a dynamic structure that varies according to the ideas and concepts that key actors related or in the system have on how media ought to be organized and on the feasibility of implementing such changes. In this research, I shall understand such a set of ideas and their practical implications as policy discourses on culture in general and media in particular. For example, in the first chapter I already introduced the creative industries as one popular approach in international discussions on how to organize cultural industries, reinforcing a commercialization of culture and linking it to ‘development’. Taking into account the interpretation of the media system offered in the previous subsection, it is not difficult to comprehend that this discourse has been attractive to reinforce the practices of for-profit cultural and media organizations in capitalist economies, such as those in Argentina and Brazil. However, I shall show in chapter 4 that there are other discourses challenging this perspective and paving the way for different types of practices. To achieve this objective, in this section I will describe a discourse analysis approach, which suggests a method to study ideas, what they produce in practice and their relation to their particular context of emergence. Nonetheless, the term discourse has been used diversely by different disciplines during the last century, such as linguistics, anthropology, sociology, etc., which paved the way for different approaches. Some study the structure of grammar and its function in meaning in particular contexts\(^2\), whereas other approaches are concerned with utterances and their relation to social and political issues\(^3\). This research focuses on the last strand, due to the interest on how knowledge about culture and communication connects with political and social issues. In particular, I employ the Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse (SKAD) (Keller 2011a, 2011c, 2008a), which synthesizes ideas from post-structuralism and the sociology of knowledge.

Foucault pioneered discourse analysis to study how concepts, ideas and practices vary in time and affect practices, making the key connection of these changes with specific power relations and challenging the tenets of structuralism. For instance, his research on *Discipline and Punish* (1977) argued that with the emergence of the bourgeoisie and the industrial revolution in the 18th century, a discourse of discipline appeared in prisons, but also in schools, the military and other institutions to shape docile bodies, though in a violent way and marked by power relations. Another example is *The Birth of the
Clinic (1963), where Foucault explains that an epistemic change took place toward a new ‘objective medical gaze’, which in contrast to the prevailing perspective in the 18th century separated the subjective experience of the person from the diseases to analyze in his body. Thus, Foucault showed the instability of meanings and of structures associated with them. He introduced his approach to study discourses in The Archeology of Knowledge (1972), where he sketches his analysis of statements. According to Smith (2009, p. 117), this was an important approach for cultural research, because it disposed of the concept of ideology that was overcharged with Marxist associations and with the need of truth assessment. Instead, Foucault’s approach stressed the importance of describing what a given discourse implies in terms of knowledge, power relations and subjects created through discourse. Indeed, Foucault expressed that “to speak is to do something – something other than to express what one thinks” (Foucault 1972, p. 230), which suggests discourses shape subjects by introducing a mesh that enables and constrains practices. These ideas were incorporated into SKAD.

Apart from post-structuralism, SKAD employs insights from social constructivism, in particular from the sociology of knowledge of Berger & Luckmann (1966). In contrast to previous research, the authors focused not just on intellectual theoretical knowledge, instead they enlarged the object of analysis to include all knowledge employed by humans in what they called “the reality of everyday life” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 35). Berger & Luckmann claimed that the personal construction of meaning is done through three processes: externalization, objectivation and internalization. The first concept describes how subjective experiences are shared and communicated through language crossing the barrier of just individual experience. The second refers to the materialization of the subjective meanings that now are part of the common inter-subjective world. For example, Berger & Luckmann (1966, p. 49) mention the case of a weapon, which could represent the exteriorization as violence of a subjective feeling of anger far beyond the face-to-face expression. Finally, the concept of internalization refers to the process through which new generations retroject in their consciousness the available objectified meaning patterns as ‘given’ without questioning them. In parallel, Berger & Luckmann describe that the previous three processes take place through processes of: typification, institutionalization, reification and legitimation. First, typification is the process of creating schemes used in everyday life to deal with particular situations or interactions; for example, schemes that codify how to deal with a man in contrast to those to interact with a baby or a dog. Second, the process of institutionalization is composed of three subprocesses: habitualization, objectivation and sedimentation (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Tolbert and Zucker 1996), and produce institutions. The first one refers to the “[...] reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 72). In other words, when those intervening in the interaction routinize their actions, establishing “patterned problem-solving behaviors” (Tolbert and Zucker 1996, p. 181); for instance, someone who goes to a barber will expect to have his hair cut, whereas the barber will expect to get paid in return, or also the legal routinization of actions, between citizens and police enforcement. The second comprehends the process I described before, but now in terms of how the habitualized actions are repeated in time, that is to say, they acquire historicity; thus, for those not being part of their original creation, they appear as ‘objective’ or as a “social coercive fact” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 76). Finally, sedimentation refers to the transmission of the objectified stocks of knowledge to new generations through a sign language (Berger and Luckmann 1966); thus, replicating the institutional structure. The third process is called reification, which was defined as “the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that is, in non-human or possibly supra-human terms” (p. 106). Namely, the steps that led to the objectivation
of human action are lost and institutions are taken as something ‘natural’, or in other words, not built by humans! Finally, the process of legitimation tries to ‘explain’ and justify the established particular institutionalization of typifications to new generations. According to Berger & Luckmann “legitimation not only tells the individual why he should perform one action and not another; it also tells him why things are what they are” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 111).

Taking into account these two perspectives, SKAD considers a dialectic interaction between an objective and subjective ‘reality’ that is mediated by different types of knowledge (Keller 2011b). As Keller explains, “SKAD is not a method but rather a research programme embedded in the sociology of knowledge tradition in order to examine the discursive construction of symbolic orders which occurs in the form of conflicting social knowledge relationships and competing politics of knowledge” (p. 48). Thus, in the vein of Berger & Luckmann, it is based on a social constructivist perspective that states our understanding of the world is not completely objective, but instead mediated by systems of categories that are the product of social construction processes (Keller 2013). According to Keller “[…] everything we perceive, experience, sense is mediated through socially constructed and typified knowledge (e.g. schemata of meanings, interpretations and actions) - a knowledge, that is, to varying degrees, recognized as legitimate and ‘objective’” (p. 61). The central point for this perspective is that humans are not born with an innate set of concepts, but that these are instead acquired and changed through “socially created symbolic systems that are produced in and through discourse” (p. 61). In contrast to Berger & Luckmann’s approach that focused on everyday knowledge, SKAD “[…] is concerned as well with processes and practices of the production and circulation of knowledge at the level of institutional fields” (p. 63). Therefore, SKAD mixes the Foucauldian approach to study social and historical power effects of discourses with the insights of how this knowledge is created, distributed and internalized in different areas of contemporary societies.

SKAD is a research program mostly employed in the German speaking community of discourse analysis and has been applied in diverse research areas; for example, to analyze environmental issues, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, religion, among others (Keller 2013; Stuckrad 2013). These broad areas of application are in part a result of the clear suggestion of tools and procedures that SKAD gives to analyze knowledge production and circulation in different institutional spheres of contemporary societies (Keller 2013). Specifically, SKAD offers guidelines for an interpretative discourse analysis of statements, practices and dispositives. The first concept refers to the typifiable features of a set of utterances (Keller 2013), whereas SKAD divides the second concept in discursive and nondiscursive practices (Keller 2013). The former includes all forms of statement production that get materialized in texts, which are not only written, but also audiovisual, whereas the latter refers to actions that are not discursive, but influenced by a discourse; for instance, how a particular way of dressing is associated with a religious discourse. Finally, ‘dispositive’ is a concept that SKAD borrows from Foucault’s work, which comprehends the ways in which a discourse is (re)produced and the power-effects it can have. For example, formal rules for action, such as laws or a book of precepts, but also technologies, objects, educational procedures, among others, that lead to some sort of action related to the discourse (Keller 2013). It is worth to point out that the concept of dispositive has a rich variety of meanings (Meunier 1999), but the one employed here refers to a link between the structural features of a discourse with a specific set of practices (Peeters and Charlier 1999). This link does not imply a determinant relationship, but the creation of conditions that reinforce some practices over others, and I shall employ this concept in the next chapters to show how the commercial policy discourses prevalent in the me-
dia system under analysis influence and limit the expansion of alternative ones; for instance, through technology, quality classification schemes and different types of violence that form obstacles for media for social transformation.

In sum, SKAD is an approach suitable for studying different discourses that shape culture and media policies and structures in Argentina and Brazil, allowing to shed light on how knowledge is constructed in this area. However, the method has at least three shortcomings for tackling the research question of this thesis, which will require the employment of further theoretical approaches and concepts.

First, although SKAD employs the concept of dispositive to tackle the general shortcoming of discourse analysis that focuses more on the symbolic and texts as determinant factors, the procedures proposed by SKAD to analyze dispositives, such as meaning patterns, classification schemes, phenomenal structures and narrative structures (Keller 2008b), are still limited to the symbolic aspect of dispositives. Additionally, the concept of dispositive might be too broad to analyze specific material artifacts and their networks, which enhance or limit the media organizations under analysis and their practices. Therefore, a discourse analysis approach is not enough to unveil the role of artifacts and the material conditions of productions of the media cases under analysis, a shortcoming which I shall address in the following section.

Second, although discourse analysis has left aside the concept of 'ideology', given its previous negative connotations with particular research traditions, this more objective stance also lost the previous focus on the imaginary futures that challenge prevailing discourses. In particular, I refer to the concept of utopia4, which appears in tandem with the concept of ideology in the works of both Mannheim and Ricoeur. The former takes the view that utopias are those states of mind that when put into practice, would either completely or partially destroy the prevalent social orders (Mannheim 1979), and are the product of ideologists, belonging to specific social groups in reply to a particular context (Mannheim 1979). Ricoeur (1984) agreed with Mannheim that utopias aim to challenge preexisting power relations, but also added that they propose an 'alternative society' to transform 'reality', aiming to unleash a process of transformation, which might lead to schemes of action that are in the extremes unattainable, but still lead their followers to an all-or-nothing stance. To avoid loosing the dimension of building 'alternative futures' or 'other futures', in the analysis of discourses I employ the term utopian in the sense of offering guidelines for transforming the contexts in which the groups under analysis operate, and not with the negative connotation of unattainable.

Third, Keller (2005, p. 6) remarks about discourses that "we can’t enter the world and see ‘discourses’ in the way we see, for example, a piece of cake, a building, or even a concrete set of social interaction. [...] Discourse so far is nothing but a theoretical device for ordering and analyzing data”. Therefore, discourse research implies interpretative research, which means there are no clear-cut boundaries to decide whether something is a discourse or not, much less at which level. If a group of five friends has a crazy meaning pattern for understanding reality it has shared for 20 years and that is repeated in a set of statements and practices, in theory that would be a discourse. The same can be said of the global climate crisis presumably produced by human industrial activity. If such two different things, with diverse power-effects and reach can be explained with the same terminology, there clearly is a poor distinction between levels. Thus, in this research I shall refer to ‘policy discourses’ as those discourses that had repercussion at the national policy level, whereas I shall use the concept of ‘imaginary’ for

4. A word introduced by Thomas More to describe a fantasy place, but in fact it means no place.
those discourses that are part of the meaning patterns of specific projects or networks. This concept is not connected to the idea of social imaginary by Castoriadis (1975), who just spoke of a unique and dynamic social imaginary for each society, and mystified where the imaginary lies or who imagines, giving the impression that ‘society institutes itself’, forgetting the role of human agency (Strauss 2006). The perspective I adopt is closer to the idea of social imaginaries used in the field of multiple modernities as “the ways in which people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations” (Taylor 2002). Similarly, the concept resembles the idea of cultural models used in cognitive anthropologists, defined as “presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world that are widely shared (although not necessarily to the exclusion of other, alternative models) by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in their understanding of that world and their behavior in it.” ((Quinn & Holland, p.4) quoted in Strauss 2006, p. 331). Thus, my concept of imaginary is not an imagined, nonexistent mental object, but the discourse and the associated specific practices of networks of people, which includes their vision of a future, as in the concept of utopia.

For these reasons, the employment of SKAD was bounded to: the analysis of policy discourses in chapter 4, the imaginaries of the cases in chapter 5 and the description of dispositives that reinforce commercial practices that I will refer to throughout the remaining chapters, limiting media for social transformation. Some of these discourses have been disseminated as national policies, others as city policies only and some are just part of the imaginary of a network of actors. In the next subsection I will detail the remaining key approaches and concepts selected to thoroughly study media for social transformation cases.

### 2.3 Media for Social Transformation

Besides analyzing the specific imaginaries that each case adopts, my analysis focuses on a group of dimensions that introduces key concepts to understand how the media cases are restricted by commercial practices to culture and communication, and also how in some cases they have been able to challenge such boundaries. Therefore, in this section I will thoroughly discuss concepts from specific research strands that offer ways to analyze the six dimensions (audiences, quality, participation, technology, violence, and resources) that I proposed in Figure 2.1 to study media for social transformation. I shall first discuss concepts to analyze the role of technologies, which I will later employ in chapter 6 to show how they enable or limit the cases. Then, I will consider concepts to discuss the relativity of ‘quality’, and how the predominant classification schemes create barriers to new media experiences, which I shall later analyze in chapter 7. In the following subsection, I will discuss two further dimensions, where I discuss perspectives to examine the role of audiences and participation in media for social transformation. This is important, because it allows to contrast the claims that these media differ with their practice from those elaborating massive and standardized content in a nonparticipatory way. The remaining subsections propose concepts about violence, resources and power that I will analyze in chapter 8. As regards violence, I draw inspiration from peace research on the different types that these media cases have to struggle with. With respect to power, I will discuss research strands in media theory, to finally introduce an interdisciplinary approach employed to generate a typology of resources that media cases have acquired, to different degrees, to keep their projects operational. In sum, these
Technology

Discourse analysis methods, and more broadly philosophy and the founders of social science, have generally not given a central role to technology, constituting a sort of ‘technological somnambulism’ (Shields 1997). However, since WWII it has become evident that Science and Technology (S&T) were essential for the elaboration of new weapons to win the war and, at the same time, to foster economic change by introducing new technologies and expanding the technological frontier of firms. This advance of S&T is evident in the growing rate of scientific publications and of patents (Larsen and Ins 2010; WIPO 2014), or by the increasing number of inventions that were nonexistent 20, 50 or 100 years ago, and that are now taken for granted, such as the internet, airplane travel or pharmaceuticals. Media have not been an exception to the pervasiveness of technological change. Pioneers in the field have remarked its importance, like McLuhan (1964), who stated that technologies act like extensions of man, allowing to see, hear and perceive things far beyond what the natural senses allow, but also causing new numbness. This relentless process of technological change in media has been altering their modes of content production and how they are consumed by users, with most of the technological advances based on decades of progress in S&T. For example, electromagnetism and quantum mechanics that paved the way for radio wave transmissions and electronics or advances in computer science and algorithms that are the backbone of the participatory web. Thus, technological change has been an influential factor in media change (Harvey, Lewin, and Fisher 2012; Lemos 2002; Thornburn and Jenkins 2003), and in this research I follow the position of Carpentier (2011, p. 273) that states “media technologies are the objects of hegemonic projects that (aim to) fixate their meanings, and aim to normalize these always particular meanings. […] Media technologies are rigidly embedded in societal contexts, and in this sense they are never neutral”. This quote suggests that by just analyzing the content or discourses that flow through media, the important technological dimension is overlooked. If the focus on text analysis is not a useful tool to grasp technological complexities in general, nor in particular in media, how should such a shortcoming be addressed? A first solution would be to employ the concept of dispositive suggested by Keller in SKAD, following Foucault’s pioneering works. The general justification for this election is that the concept helps to mediate between the structural symbolic dimension of a discourse and the respective practices that it encourages. Indeed, in the French literature the concept has been used to highlight the technical aspects of social phenomena (Peeters and Charlier 1999). In this sense, the concept is useful to point to the existence of some sort of network of interrelated elements producing power-effects. However, the broadness of the concept might hide the specificities of the elements and actors present in those networks, and thus I shall use a more precise approach to analyze the role of technologies in media for social transformation experiences. Specifically, I adopt perspectives from science and technology studies and from the philosophy of technology, because the former allows to understand how technologies mediate actions, whereas the latter how they mediate perceptions (Verbeek 2006); and in this way, they offer a depth for inquiry that is lacking in the analysis of dispositives suggested by SKAD.

The first research tradition from which I shall borrow approaches to interpret and gather data about technologies and concepts is Actor-Network Theory (ANT), which emanates from the broader field of Science & Technology Studies (STS). The latter flourished during the 1980s, when researchers
started to expose the dynamic interaction between humans and nonhuman actors and the construction of ‘scientific facts’, far from the previously held belief that facts and theories are objective (Latour 1988, 1993; Latour and Woolgar 1986). Similar ideas were applied to study technology, pointing to the instabilities in the process of design and use of artifacts (Bijker 1995; Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 2012). In both cases, these strands can be understood as extensions of the ideas of Berger & Luckmann to objects, showing how the apparent ‘naturality’ is nothing more than a specific stabilization of a set of arrangements, which depends on their context of origin, the actors that intervened in the process and the specific practices they had. Besides, this research tradition discarded clear-cut distinctions between human and nonhuman objects, such as the concept of the cyborg (Haraway 1990), which tries to capture the increasing symbiosis between the two and the uncertainty in defining who affects whom and how they interrelate. Specifically, ANT challenges what its proponents call ‘sociology of the social’ (Latour 2005), which is a name that comprehends sociological research that uses casual explanation factors created by analysts, employing accepted concepts and types irrespective of what the actors under study use; thus, respecting little what new associations detected in fieldwork might reveal. For example, something will be caused by ‘forces of society’, or the invisible hand of the market, or lobbies, etc. (Latour 2005). Although Latour acknowledges that fixed categories usually assumed in social science research, such as ‘actors’, ‘power’, ‘institutions’, etc, might be useful in many situations, he stresses that they become problematic in others where actors innovate in their collective associations (Latour 2005). For this reason, ANT proposes a method to conduct research that would ‘free’ the researchers from these preassumed concepts by advancing a similar approach to those employed by anthropologists during participant observation, focusing on tracing controversies and acknowledging different types of uncertainties. Among them, I mention those about the types of actors to consider and the source of action (Latour 2005). As regards actors, ANT made a radical departure from previous theories by putting human and nonhuman as actors on an equal stance, which is based on the fact that social interactions tend to be short-lived, but might have long-lasting effects (Latour 2005). Consequently, ANT states that material elements must be present to extend agency in time and space (Latour 2005), and thus ANT considers nonhumans as potential actors to accurately portrait the associations in any field research. The technical term used in ANT is actant, which is defined as “any thing that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference” (p. 71). Given this symmetry between human and nonhuman actants, ANT suggests to study or to trace the specific associations or ties among them to understand the sources of action (Latour 2005), which clearly broadens the scope of the ‘sociologies of the social’ restricted just to humans. This stance assumes that an actant is influenced by many others to act, and ANT differences between intermediaries and mediators, where the former just transport meaning without producing changes in the process, whereas the latter “transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry” (p. 39). In particular, in this research I shall employ the concept of ‘script’, which refers to the ways in which technologies can guide human action in some particular ways, and not in others. According to Akrich (1992), the script defines the “framework of action together with the actors and the space in which they are supposed to act”. For example, a speed bump in the middle of a road is a technological object, designed to be in a given road to reduce the speed of drivers. For these reasons, Akrich argues that scripts invite some types of actions and not others. This understanding of technologies is useful and is complementary to the idea of dispositif used in SKAD, because it suggests that the use of a technology depends on its ‘script’ that was embedded in a particular context, influenced by a particular group of discourses guiding action. Therefore, the use
of the resulting technological artifact in another context might lead to the enactment of the original script, reinforcing the discourses present in the context of creation but absent in the new one.

Despite the theoretical and empirical innovations that ANT introduced, the approach has received severe criticism when employed for media research; for instance, Couldry (2008, p. 96) remarks that ANT is useful to leave aside a functionalist perspective in media research that “speak as if media were the social, as if media were the natural channels of social life and social engagement, rather than highly specific and institutionally focused means for representing social life and channeling social participation” (Couldry 2008, p. 96). Particularly, ANT offers insights to open up the technological mediation in media, by following different associations among humans and nonhumans. However, Couldry argues that ANT has three shortcomings in dealing with media. First, in ANT time appears during the process of naturalization of an actor-network, but once established, Couldry (2008) remarks that the theory ignores potential future dynamics. Second, ANT has little interest in power issues and how long-term distribution of resources affects inequalities (Couldry 2008). In general, this is a central issue for research interested in social transformation and thus a considerable deficiency of ANT. In particular, in this thesis I shall show in chapter 3 that the historical and political changes in Argentina and Brazil indeed did create a considerable imbalance in the media system. Third, although ANT offers insights into how a network becomes structured and naturalized, it does not offer much insights on the potential subsequent processes of (re)interpretation by those in association with such actor-networks (Couldry 2008). Despite its shortcomings, I shall employ part of the methodological recommendations and concepts from ANT, such as the ethnographic study of the role that technologies have in the cases under analysis, and the concept of ‘script’.

Even though the concept of ‘script’ gives more precision to the idea of ‘dispositive’ by describing the precise supposed range of effects that a technology was thought to have; this perspective still assumes a determinate, linear influence of these designs over users, ignoring their potential for reinterpreting the technologies and altering their original designs. To discuss such processes of reappropriation, I shall employ a perspective from the philosophy of technology introduced by Ihde (2012), which is based on an extension of phenomenology’s concepts created by Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, among others. Specifically, Ihde describes two types of possible interactions between humans and technologies that he names the embodiment and the hermeneutic relation respectively. On the one hand, the embodiment relation points to the fact that once an artifact is taken for granted, it becomes a sort of extension of humans. For example, if I use a walking stick, the sensations I feel when I press on the ground with it are of a new nature that I do not experience without it. Therefore, there is a union between human and artifact, the embodiment relation, which leads to a new experience of the environment. On the other hand, the hermeneutic relation highlights that from technologies we get readings of something else happening in the world, which is not necessarily ‘objective’ but just one specific interpretation. For instance, a thermometer might give us the temperature of the external environment and make us adapt our clothes accordingly, but it might also fail and give us a wrong reading leading to inappropriate clothing. For these reasons, Ihde (2012) accepts that technologies might have an implicit design as ANT as the script concept describes. However, he adds that the establishment of the embodiment and the hermeneutic relation also imply a particular interpretation and appropriation of technologies by humans, which is not unique but multiple. For this reason, Ihde gives examples on how technologies have ‘multistability’, such as the different uses of cyberspace or the different ways in which bow technologies have been adapted according to their “specific cultural contexts” of use (Ihde 2012, p. 180).
Indeed, Akrich (1992) agrees that the concept of script is challenged when the context of use is quite different from that imagined by the designers of the artifact. I shall adopt this insight and discuss how the studied media for social transformation have been able to reinterpret or not media technologies under their specific contexts of production, which do not necessarily coincide with the ones they were designed for.

In sum, the perspectives of philosophy of technology and of ANT offer concepts to open up the role of technologies in the specific case studies under consideration, perfecting the broad focus on ‘dispositives’ that SKAD suggests. At the same time, it is worth pointing out that I do not accept the whole baggage of ANT, because in the field of development research, where many times the mediators and the networks are stopped from acting due to diverse types of violence and historical unequal distribution of resources, issues of power and context cannot be neglected as easily as ANT implies. Consequently, these dimensions cannot be dismissed easily, and I shall argue that the interpretationalist approach, together with power and violence concepts, is more suited to grasp the processes that media for social transformation experience.

Quality

Technology can be understood as a dispositive of discourses, but it is not the only one. This section raises awareness of another of the dimensions in Figure 2.1: the importance of the ‘quality’ schemes of news production as a dispositive, because it acts as a system of classification that elaborates a hierarchy of the type of content that is ‘good’ and ‘worthwhile to watch’ and the one that is not. It reinforces the practices of private, for-profit audiovisual firms, and neglects those of media for social transformation that want to depart from the established ‘quality’ patterns. To discuss these issues in the empirical chapters, in this section I will stress the social construction process behind ‘quality’ patterns, inspired by concepts from Bourdieu, in connection with discussions of journalism as a profession.

The online Cambridge Dictionary defines quality as something of ‘high standard’ or ‘how good or bad something is’, which are definitions that assume specific cultural products or expressions having essential features that can be compared based on a predefined standard. But the arbitrary definition of the standard of comparison makes evident that the classification scheme is not objective. Indeed, it can lead to and justify quite harmful systems of classification. For example, the outrageous patterns that emanated from the history of the conquest of the Americas and colonialism in the 19th century, which established chains of equivalence among quality, culture and civilization (Carpentier 2011), putting the views of the conquerors at the top of the hierarchy as if they were natural. This led to the pretext of civilizing the uncivilized, which unleashed processes of cultural destruction of indigenous communities and of those who survived, based on the supposed lack of ‘quality’ of their cultural expressions. This points to the fact that ‘quality’ is not an objective concept, but dependent on the specific system of classification.

Bourdieu (1984) elaborated a pioneering research showing this relativity of ‘quality’ by studying the variations of taste in terms of consumption patterns in France. From his point of view, the consumption patterns in a population can be explained by the interactions between two concepts: the position of people in ‘social space’ and their ‘habitus’. The first concept refers to the dispositions that people under similar conditions and conditionings share, thus leaving aside the fixed concept of ‘social class’ present in Marxist analysis (Bourdieu 1989). Bourdieu defined the ‘habitus’ as the relation between “the capacity to produce classifiable practices and works, and the capacity to differentiate and appreciate...
these practices and products (taste)” (Bourdieu 1984, p. 170). From his perspective, this leads to different ‘life-styles’, which are systems of classified and classifying practices, which emanate from specific conditions of existence. Therefore, the concept of taste reflects what people consume related to their specific position in social space, establishing particular hierarchies of values on what is interesting and what is to be rejected, which according to Bourdieu end up contributing to processes of social reproduction and ‘distinction’. The latter is an important term that remarks that the identity a group of people with similar habitus has is not only defined in terms of the general elements that the members of this group share, but also by the strong rejection of the taste of others. This perspective brings to the fore that the notion of taste, or what I shall call quality in this research, is the result of a social construction process that establishes hierarchies of what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’.

The previous tensions between the objectivity of quality and its relativity are present in discussions about journalism. Ideally, the profession in the West has been characterized by five shared values and aims (Deuze 2005). First, it aims to offer a public service to citizens, to inform them and act as ‘watchdogs’. Second, journalism wants to distribute information in an ‘objective’ and reliable way. Third, journalists want to report with autonomy. Fourth, journalists cultivate the sense of immediacy, which alludes to what ‘news’ is. Fifth, journalists aim to perform the previous points ‘ethically’. Empirical research confirms that there are shared values across different ‘journalism cultures’ beyond Western definitions, such as the aim to become a watchdog mainly of government, but also of business elites; or to report in an impartial way; or to avoid obtaining information through questionable methods (Hanitzsch, Thomas et al. 2011). However, there are also differences, like non-Western journalists being more prone to actively engaging in social change issues, and varied understandings on what to be ‘objective’ means (Hanitzsch, Thomas et al. 2011). This last ideal, in essence, assumes that there is an objective reality that can be observed and described without bias independent of the observer, which has its background in positivism (Giménez Armentia 2005). Contrary to this philosophical school, subjectivism claims that truth depends on the subject (Giménez Armentia 2005), but in its extreme position, it would defend truths irrespective of ‘hard facts’. A middle way is to accept a connected relation between subject and object, where the perceptions of the former about the latter are influenced by a particularly limited point of view (Giménez Armentia 2005). In this third case, the objective ideal would be impossible to fulfill. Nonetheless, many non-Western mass media tend to keep, at least discursively, the ‘objective’ claim as a pattern of news making. For example, Boyd-Barret and Xie (2008, p. 206) take the view that new regional networks, such as Al-Jazeera based in Qatar and Phoenix Satellite Television based in Hong Kong, do not depart much from a “Western-style formatting and greater commercial orientation”.

The important point of the previous concepts and discussions for this research is that there is a struggle over the definition of what defines the ‘quality’ of an audiovisual production. For instance, mass media tend to associate quality with professionalization, involving a particular and specialized training, which is useful for media professionals to generate entry barriers against others (Carpentier 2011). In contrast, Carpentier mentions that alternative media have challenged this with the production of content by amateurs. Following Bourdieu, I accept that there is a relativity in terms of the classification schemes that define what a quality audiovisual production is, and I additionally understand that the hierarchy of existing ones act as a dispositive that negatively classifies content that departs from what is considered ‘good’. Although in this research I did not aim to systematically study consumption patterns, Bourdieu’s insights inspired my discussion to show the hurdles that media for
social transformation face in elaborating content that differs from and challenges mainstream ways of news production. Thus, I focus on the production side, on the one hand, describing how some cases have followed the mainstream media quality schemes, and on the other hand, on cases that have challenged them. In both cases, I weigh the pros and cons of each strategy.

**Audiences and Participation**

In this subsection, I will discuss two more dimensions of the conceptual framework: audience and participation. These cover the reception of content by viewers, and the process in which they ‘participate’ in content production or in giving feedback, which are important points to touch on given the centrality of participation in discussions of communications for development (Pettit, Salazar, and Gumucio-Dagron 2009; Huesca 1995; Gumucio-Dagron 2011).

As regards ‘audiences’, there are varied ways of understanding the concept, which in general try to explain the interactions between what media organizations produce and the receivers of such information. Webster (1998) identified three types of speaking about audiences: as masses; as outcomes and as agents. The first type considers audiences as masses of people that follow a pattern in terms of what sort of media content they consume, whereas the second type thinks of audiences as outcomes of the contents that media organizations disseminate, that is to say, it focuses on the effects that media have, studying the reactions of viewers to the stimuli they receive. Finally, the third type argues that audiences are composed of active actors that decide what to do, depending on their specific social and cultural context. Although the third type of thinking would be more suited to the ethnographic approach I applied to study the context of media production, within the scope of this research I take the first perspective, because my interest is to estimate how many people have been watching the contents elaborated by media for social transformation I analyzed. This question is important to consider somehow, given that the argument of private or state firms against media for social transformation is precisely that they are not relevant given their reduced number of viewers. Therefore, in chapter 7 I will consider statistics about the access to content by viewers, and contrast it, whenever possible, with similar numbers that estimate the audiences of mass media firms in Argentina and Brazil.

As regards ‘participation’, the concept has varied connotations within and among different disciplinary fields. Within this section, I shall discuss its relation with democracy, media studies and in particular, the concept of public sphere. Finally, I consider the relation of new media based on ICT with participation, in order to delineate contrasting perspectives on whether these new technologies contribute to such an ideal or not.

Participation is a concept usually associated with democracy, and for this reason it is important to review for the research, given that I am considering media for social transformation in countries where the democratization of the media system has lagged behind similar such process as in their political systems. Nonetheless, democracy is a polysemic world that can refer to different democratic models with varied levels of participation (Held 2006). Following Carpentier (2011), the levels of democratic participation in a political system can be classified as a gradient between two poles of minimalist and maximalist models. On the one hand, the minimalist pole covers those models where participation is restricted to elites, who take decisions after power has been relegated to them, limiting the political5 and participation just to institutional politics, and with an homogeneity of actors involved in the decision.

---

5. Carpentier cites Mouffe’s distinction between the political and politics. The former refers to the inherent antagonist features that any social relation might have, whereas the latter just to those that appear in the field of institutional politics (Carpentier 2011).
process (Carpentier 2011). On the other hand, the maximalist pole includes models that try to balance representation and participation, not just delegating power to an elite. Besides macro-participation like in elections, they include micro-participation such as in participatory budgets. Another difference is that these models understand the political beyond just institutionalized politics and thus require an heterogeneity of actors involved in decision processes in diverse sites (Carpentier 2011). In sum, minimalist participation models seem democratic, but in fact tend to be quite tyrannical with reduced spaces of participation for the population, with many examples around the world. The maximalist pole can be represented by varied models, such as deliberative democracy, which, according to Carpentier (2011) (citing Elster, 1998), is characterized by decision processes in which all actors affected by the decision participate, and all can exchange arguments in a rational and impartial way. Another example is anarchism and its vision of participation, because authors defend anti-authoritarianism, decentralization, maximum participation and solidarity against the hierarchies established by governments, and against privileges maintained through individual property. A final example is the model of radical democracy advanced by Laclau and Mouffe, who consider the inclusion of a diversity of actors and struggles, such as anti-racism, anti-sexism and anti-capitalism as equally relevant (Laclau and Mouffe 2001; Carpentier 2011, p. 37).

These discussions have influenced media research, which also offers different models of participation in media that can be divided into a gradient between minimalist and maximalist poles. On the minimalist side, Carpentier (2011) describes an ideal type where media is controlled mostly by professionals and participation from the audience is restricted just to interactions with the content the media produce. For example, the comments that viewers can post on a news website or through any other of the new social media ‘participatory’ technologies. According to Carpentier, this perspective homogenizes audiences, favoring media organizations interests, with a prevailing unidirectional perspective of information flow that tries to reduce political expressions. This matches mass media approaches introduced in Section 2.1, which have scarce spaces of participation for audiences, and even less in terms of management and content selection. Therefore, in this case the introduction of new media technologies only enlarges the participatory process in mass media in terms of how members of audiences can comment and interact with media content, but makes almost no advancements in other dimensions. On the maximalist side, Carpentier (2011) lists the opposite qualities of the minimalist ideal type. In this case, participation in content production is not only limited to media professionals, but it rather includes citizens and amateurs who start their own media. Additionally, audiences can participate not only by interacting with content elaborated by media, but also in content production and in the management decisions of media, by suggesting or selecting what topics to include and exclude through some sort of decision process. Moreover, this ideal pole tends toward audience diversity and makes explicit the political aspects of participation in media. In sum, mass media models would fall on the minimalist side of the poles, disregarding the more radical democratic perspectives. Conversely, experiences of media for social transformation tend to claim that, contrary to mass media, they fall into the maximalist participation side, an assertion that I shall assess in chapter 7.2.

Apart from the previous division into two ideal poles, the ‘public sphere’ has been a central concept in media research to inspire research related to audiences, democracy and participation. Habermas defined the concept as “a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every con-

---

6. Foundational texts of this perspectives were written by authors such as Bakunin, Kropotkin and Proudhon.
conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body” (Habermas, Lennox, and Lennox 1974), and employed it to analyze the emergence and decay of the bourgeois public sphere (Habermas 1962–1991). Specifically, Habermas highlighted the role of the public sphere as a way to control and counter-arrest the power of the state in the 19th century, or more generally, as a warning system in a maximalist model of deliberative democracy (Carpentier 2011). However, Habermas stressed how during the 20th century the bourgeois public sphere decayed with the expansion of mass media and growing economic inequalities, which allowed private firms to encourage through it media consumerism to benefit capital accumulation processes, neglecting the role of the political that the public sphere used to have before (Habermas 1962–1991). This pessimistic perspective on mass media was criticized for ignoring the capabilities of citizens to organize the distribution of alternative media content within the structures of mass media (Downey and Fenton 2003). In like manner, critics remarked that Habermas idealized the 19th century bourgeois public sphere, which in fact ignored the oppression of women and resource scarce sectors of the population (Carpentier 2011). This criticism led to improvements of the initial theory, such as the acknowledgment of subordinated social groups conforming counter publics that contest the public sphere (Fraser 1990). This new perspective inspired a diversity of conceptualizations around the term counter-public sphere, which refers to spaces where these counter publics communicate. This concept suggests a broadening of potential participation avenues and shows the interaction between a mass media public sphere and a diversity of counter-public spheres (Downey and Fenton 2003; Fuchs 2010). Indeed, Downey and Fenton (2003) hypothesize that the public-sphere will include more content from the counter-public sphere, given the growth of the latter thanks to the internet and new media.

Despite the claims that new media might contribute to stimulate participation by viewers and reinvigorate the public sphere, the role of ICT and new media in society is contested. On the one hand, there are actors who claim that these new technologies of communication will indeed lead to participatory, democratic and equal societies, opening new channels of expression by eliminating intermediaries, which Morozov (2011) pejoratively named ‘cyberutopians’. Societies where everyone would be able to speak, comment and intervene more than before, thanks to the mediation of ICT disseminated around the world by firms like Google, Facebook, etc. that will lead to societal changes. One of the most prominent examples of such a vision is the common understanding of the ‘Arab Spring’ as a revolution ignited by online social networks such as Twitter, which would not have taken place without them. Although this argument is grandiloquent, because it ignores the existence of social movements and organizations such as Takriz in Tunisia, which has been trying to stimulate change for years, it does stress the importance of new technologies to coordinate action and diffuse information among citizens (Dutta 2013; Pollock 2011). Moyo (2009) makes a similar argument with respect to the elections in Zimbabwe, which were shaped by citizens sharing information in a horizontal way through the use of text messages and weblogs, as an expression of citizen journalism. In general, these groups of authors remark the ‘positive’ effects of ICT in stimulating similar social transformations, such as the emergence of new spaces for a politics of contestation by activists belonging to different subcultures (Kahn and Kellner 2004), or the way in which new political mobilizations can start from internet groups and later turn into active movements on the streets (Harlow 2011), among others.

On the other hand, there are skeptics to the previous grandiose advocates of technology for communication and social change, who mistrust the assumed emancipatory powers of free communications on the internet to arrive to more participatory and democratic societies (Morozov 2011). Morozov de-
fined ‘net-delusion’ as the set of ideological-utopian beliefs about social transformation fostered in and centered on the internet, which ignores the particular local practices and contexts in which the network expands as well as its variations in use. Thus, the expansion of ICT does not necessarily lead to more open, participatory and democratic societies. On the contrary, there are several negative aspects ignored or overlooked by those in the first camp. First, the obvious contradiction of the high concentration in very few technological firms who control these ‘democratization’ tools; for example, Facebook, Gmail, Twitter and other large technological firms mostly in the USA, who do not only spy on what users do, but also sell their content to third parties, as the Snowden revelations have shown (Morozov 2011). This reduced decision space for users about their data and their privacy, could not be further from the ideal of democracy. Second, high-tech firms from countries such as France, Germany, Israel, the United Kingdom and the United States sell internet mass surveillance equipment to other countries under the pretext to fight ‘terrorism’, irrespective of the consequences this might have for human rights and privacy (Morozov 2011; Hopkins and Taylor 2013). Third, the Arab Spring and other mobilizations are not produced by technology per se, but by a longer process initiated by activists and social movements that use the technologies as means, and consequently, these are never just technological revolutions (Pollock 2011; Morozov 2011). As Morozov (2011, p. 305) states “every new article or book about a Twitter revolution is not a triumph of humanity; it is a triumph of Twitter’s marketing department”. Instead, these are the product of social organization, social movements and activists that through their courageous action put their demands into practice, with technology being just one type of media among the ones possible (Morozov 2011). Therefore, without the human actors, these technologies could not have unleashed social change processes.

All in all, I shall take the dimensions suggested by Carpentier about minimalist and maximalist models of participation and discuss them in chapter 7 if the four studied cases offer participation to audiences in content production, selection, and access through new media technologies. Additionally, I will examine up to what extent the new media platforms have contributed to stimulate the participation of viewers and to strengthen the ‘public sphere’ or to conform ‘counter public spheres’, considering the reviewed shortcomings about new media technologies.

Violence

In Figure 2.1, I include violence as one of the issues that media for social transformation have to address. This is an important dimension that is conspicuously absent in research of Western academics. In effect, key literature on the topic usually speaks of the power of the media over society (Curran 2002; Castells 2009), in some cases distinguishing the competition between alternative and mass media and their effects over society (Guedes Bailey, Cammaerts, and Carpentier 2007), but scarcely focusing on the competition among them. This is clearly a bias of these strands of research, which might ignore a dimension not so relevant in the context of Western countries, but definitely one that cannot be neglected in the context of non-Western countries.

To address this research gap, I shall show how the four analyzed cases have suffered different types of violence from incumbents and from preexisting structures. This requires a conceptualization of violence, including but also beyond purely physical aggression, which can be found in the theoretical contributions of Galtung and Bourdieu. For instance, Galtung (1969) offered a pioneering typology that extended the concept of violence beyond the physical, by including ‘structural violence’ as well. This last concept refers to the existence of violence without the presence of an actor directly commit-
ting such an act, but built into the ‘structure’; for example, the unequal distribution of resources within a city that automatically and unfairly causes more suffering in poor neighborhoods than in rich ones. Indeed, the concept of ‘structure’ is a black box for different types of systems, of which in this research I am interested in those that authors named symbolic or cultural. Bourdieu (1977) defined symbolic violence based on the concept of symbolic power, which understands symbolic systems as structuring structures, structured structures and domination instruments. The first dimension refers to systems such as art, religion or language that suggest a particular way for individuals to think; the second dimension covers the inherent specific structure of symbolic systems, while the third describes how specific groups try to legitimize and use their own symbolic structured and structuring structures as universal. Consequently, symbolic violence is defined as the exercise of symbolic power by one group over another, to impose its own view of the world, or ‘discourse’ in the language of this work, undermining the rest. In a similar vein, Galtung (1990) introduced the concept of ‘cultural violence’ to capture how culture or the symbolic, can be used to attack human basic needs, or more generally, to attack life in a legitimized way. In this case, the concept is part of the broader term structural violence, and it refers to the suffering caused by specific symbolic structures, such as religion, ideologies, languages, art, science, etc.

Despite the fact that the extension of the concept of violence is useful to theorize about how different structures cause social suffering, I find the clear-cut distinction between personal and structural violence problematic, because in many cases structural violence might be produced by high-ranking individuals in the structures, although the link might not be easily traced empirically, thus giving the fictitious impression of being impersonal. Another shortcoming is that it employs ‘structure’ in a very broad way, referring to the interactions between different systems (cultural, educational, military, political, etc.), which blurs what specific system might be causing the violence (Farmer et al. 2004). Taking into account these weak points and the empirical data in the context of new media projects in Argentina and Brazil, in this research I shall open up the concept of violence in the following four dimensions: physical; economic; legal; and discursive. The first dimension refers to the use of physical force to damage the experiences through repression by police forces. Although at the ground level this implies direct violence against journalists, it is not easy to trace the origin of the orders, thus this dimension matches the structural violence definition committed by the state. The second dimension considers the economic strategies that incumbents, such as mass media firms, might use to harm the projects of media for social transformation by distorting market prices to their favor (i.e. dumping). Therefore, there is an intention to damage the new cases, which builds on an unequal distribution of resources that has a historical origin, paving the way for resource asymmetries. The third dimension, on the one hand, covers the legal structures that put constraints on, and thus exert legitimized violence against media for social transformation projects, such as the nonexistence of regulations for media ownership or the explicit ban of NGO media. On the other hand, it also considers the capability of actors (state and large media firms) to ignore the demands of existing laws, in detriment of the rights assigned to media for social transformation. The fourth dimension covers the conflicts among different discourses described in chapter 4, in other words, how the different visions on how culture and communication need to be organized lead to discursive violence against those who share a different perspective. Indeed, investigations within the peace research tradition have already stressed that the primacy of an economic approach to communications impairs the full democratization of media (Becker 1982). Thus, this dimension is a specific instance of what Bourdieu called ‘symbolic violence’ or what Galtung named
'cultural violence'. Furthermore, I shall exemplify how this violence is put into practice through the diffusion of stereotypes and defamatory communications. In the first case, I shall quote cases of stereotyping, adopting a perspective from social psychology that highlights the link of stereotypes with power relations, because they can reinforce “[…] one group's or individual's power over another by limiting the options of the stereotyped group” (Fiske 1993, p. 623). In the second case, I shall consider libel or slander, which covers communication that “[…] tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him” (Cohen and Gunther 1987, p. 13). I extend this definition to include the negative portrayal by state or private for-profit mass media firms of the new media for social transformation cases studied in the empirical chapters, and I consider these portrayals as a type of violence from mass media organizations against media for social transformation. Although it is true that the latter might elaborate similar portrayals of mass media, the former have far more capabilities of diffusing such defamatory communications to mass audiences, leaving few spaces of reply for the latter, who also have scarce resources to legally challenge such practices. Therefore, there is an asymmetry in the dissemination of libels, and I shall focus on those of mass media against media for social transformation, which the latter understand as harmful. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that the dissemination of defamatory communications is not a lineal process that immediately affects the attitudes of audiences in a negative way, given the active nature of the latter to challenge or discard the received information (Cohen and Gunther 1987). Therefore, within the scope of this research I cannot categorically affirm or deny the consequences of this violent behavior, though this might inspire further avenues of research in media psychology.

A final point to make is that these different types of violence overlap with the concept of dispositives employed in SKAD. However, the different types of violence not necessarily always emanate from the policy discourses I analyzed in chapter 4. Indeed, I shall mention in the next chapter that the restrictions NGO have been facing in Argentina were a product of the dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s. Nonetheless, in other cases they do coincide; for example, when mass media employ their channels to despise media for social transformation.

Resources

The final dimension to explain from the conceptual framework is ‘resources’, which refers to a resource-view of power that I applied to understand how media for social transformation acquire and mobilize resources to deal with the challenges posed by their respective contexts of operation and incumbents. In this section, I will review different strands of research and their conceptions of power to explain why a resource perspective is suitable. Then, I will introduce the approach I shall apply in chapter 8.

Foucault and Weber offered two different conceptualizations on power. The latter defined it as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (Weber 1978, p. 53), which is an example of a distributed theory of power, where some actors have such resources and can join collectively to increase them in competition with others (Heiskala 2001). In contrast, Foucault viewed power as relational and all-pervasive in society, and not as a resource that some actors have whereas others do not. His work delineates three types of power: sovereign, disciplinary and governmental. The former refers to the power achieved through repression and laws, which he exemplified with the monarchic authority. The second refers to the repeated training in specific practices that becomes incorporated in the subjects. The third and most subtle, refers to how the preferences of actors are shaped by
discourse. Thus actors might think they are free in their decisions, when in fact their choice horizons have been already limited by subtle power influences through discourses. These last two dimensions show how power is not only negative as in the resource approach, but rather positive in shaping human action (Foucault 1980). The latter option is important in research strands in media studies that want to understand how media influence audiences by disseminating messages representing discourses that shape subjects and particularly constrain their bodily and material practices7. In some traditions, it has been argued that audiences are considered to be directly influenced by media, whereas in others, it is argued that audiences can contest and react in different ways to the content they receive (audience research field) (Curran 2002). Notwithstanding, empirically proving these positions is a thorny issue, given the challenges regarding an isolation of all factors outside media that could intervene with the way audiences react to the content they receive. Although I share the perspective that media disseminate discourses that can influence audiences, this stance does not say much about how media organizations were able to accumulate ‘power’ in the first place. Therefore, I shall adopt a resource view of power in synchrony with Weber’s definition, in order to comprehend how media for social transformation acquire and mobilize resources for their operation, irrespective of the potential effects that their content dissemination might cause.

The resource view of power is what really matters for this research, given its interest on how new media experiences can emerge that challenge preexisting mass media structures. Castells (2009) proposed a power typology in the context of his network society framework that tackles part of these issues, because he tried to show the importance of networks regarding the power certain media have8. Accordingly, his perspective understands media as part of networks that are materially conditioned, and that materially condition the messages that flow through them. As a shortcoming, it focuses on the broader mass media picture and its connections with technological, financial and political networks, which do not match all the specificities of the specific media projects for social transformation of non-Western countries I am interested in. Nevertheless, this approach suggests to study the variety of resources that new media experiences are able to mobilize to construct their networks. For this reason, I employ in this research a resource-view of power, because it allows mapping the different strategies of acquisition and mobilization of resources that media experiences have put into practice in the context of Argentina and Brazil. In particular, the analysis was inspired by the resource-based definition of power introduced by (Avelino and Rotmans 2009, p. 550) in the context of interdisciplinary research projects, which defined power as “[…] the ability of actors to mobilize resources to achieve a certain goal […]”. In their definition, the authors defined resources broadly, covering “[…] persons, assets, materials or capital, including human, mental, monetary, artefactual and natural resources” (p. 551). Although I

7. For example see (Carpentier 2011; Thorpe 2008).
8. Castells (2009) defined four types of power emerging due to networks: a) Network power; b) Networking power; c) Networked power; and d) Networking making power. a) Network power refers to how the medium (networks) in which messages flow conditions the type of expressions and the format of the messages, without necessarily determining them. b) Networking power is the ability that some gatekeepers have of allowing certain messages to flow within the network or not. For instance, even though now there are more media, still most read are those in mass media and thus the diversity of what is accessed is not infinite. c) Networked power refers to the influence that certain nodes have over others, which he calls programmers, who have the capacity to define what is relevant. Castells thinks these conform a network by themselves, that aim to produce the programmed, which are the “subordinated subjects of the power-holders in the communication networks”. Finally, d) Network-making power refers to the capability of those actors that can create and program a network, like Rupert Murdoch, Silvio Berlusconi, Larry Page, Sergey Brin, among others. These meta-programmers constitute a network too, aiming to maximize profits and to attract audiences to expand their symbolic capital, which can later be redirected for other ends such as political influence. An extra concept is that of network switching that refers to the contact or interface between different networks, which is controlled by gatekeepers who allow content to pass from one to the other. These gatekeepers exercise network switching power; for example, when a media owner decides to favor one political line over another.
do not apply the approach in a transitions framework, in which the authors introduced the concept, I adopted their broad view of resources as central to understand power issues. In contrast, I introduced some variations in the types of resources based on the empirical data collected during fieldwork. In effect, in chapter 8 I will consider the following eight types of resources: audience; financial; human; knowledge; legal; political; relational; technological & infrastructural.

In sum, this eclectic conceptual framework links structural dimensions of analysis with the specific practices of media for social transformation cases, complementing different theoretical perspectives and concepts. In this way, I shall argue that I avoid the shortcomings of pure discursive perspectives, which simplify the central role of the material contexts of production. Likewise, I address Western biases that overlook dimensions of key importance in order to understand the hurdles media for social transformation face in the context of Argentina and Brazil. In effect, in the next chapter I shall begin by examining the specific contextual factors in both countries, which shape the most relevant actors and policies in the cultural and media sectors.
Chapter 3

Context: Argentina and Brazil

“*In common use almost every word has many shades of meaning, and therefore needs to be interpreted by the context*” (Marshall 1890, p. 37).

This chapter introduces the most relevant discussions and features of cultural policies and media systems in Argentina and Brazil. This is important, because it sets the stage for the structural conditions that the four analyzed media for social transformation are challenging. To understand these more recent debates, in this chapter I will first synthesize relevant demographic, geographical, political and historical facts, which focus mostly on events that took place in the last decades of the 20th century, although some previous inheritances relevant for the research are mentioned as well.

3.1 Demography and Geography

3.2 Argentina and Brazil

There are a number of cultural, demographic and geographic facts about Argentina and Brazil relevant to highlight in this research. As Figure 3.1 and 3.2 show, both are large countries that occupy the 5th and 8th position in terms of total area in km² respectively (Wikipedia 2014c), and for this reason they have a diversity of climates that influences their cultural diversity. For instance the cultural practices in the humid and hot Amazon, like in the city of Manaus, contrast with those in the northeast regions far from the coast that suffer continuous droughts. In the same way, Argentina has different cultural practices in the northwestern cities that have high average temperatures, like Salta, which differ from those of the south with lower average temperatures, like Comodoro Rivadavia. The important point is that these different environmental conditions have influenced particular and varied cultural patterns in each region.

As regards population, in 2014 Brazil approximately had 203 million inhabitants¹, whereas Argentina had only 42 million inhabitants (INDEC 2013). Thus, in comparison, the national population density is also smaller (15 for Argentina vs 24 for Brazil²). Even though both countries have a low population density in comparison with countries of similar size such as India or China (with 421 and

---

¹. The value is a projection of the results of the national census of 2013 obtained on 27/09/2014 from *Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística* (IBGE 2014).
². The data corresponds to the year 2013 and the source was the World Bank (World Bank 2015).
Figure 3.1: Map of Argentina. The numbered squares indicate the cities where I conducted fieldwork: 1) Buenos Aires; 2) Santa Rosa; 3) Córdoba; 4) Resistencia; 5) Bariloche.
Figure 3.2: Map of Brazil. The numbered stars indicate the cities where I conducted fieldwork: 1) São Paulo; 2) Ubatuba; 3) Rio de Janeiro; 4) Belo Horizonte; 5) Brasília; 6) Recife; 7) João Pessoa; 8) Fortaleza; 9) Belém.
145 respectively), in both cases the population is very unevenly distributed with the majority of them living in large urban cities. For instance, the metropolitan region of São Paulo is estimated to have 21 million inhabitants, whereas the metropolitan region of Buenos Aires almost 13 million (Wikipedia 2015a). More broadly, in Brazil the population is concentrated in the southeastern states (Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro) that represent 42% of the population (2%, 10%, 22% and 8% respectively)\(^3\). In Argentina, however, the concentration pattern is even worse, with 46% of the national population living in the province of Buenos Aires, which includes the capital Buenos Aires (INDEC 2013).

### 3.3 History, Economy and Politics

In this subsection, I will briefly introduce relevant historical, economic and political features in Argentina and Brazil, which help to explain the recent discussions in the media system of both countries, and background factors that help to comprehend the positions of the analyzed media for social transformation.

#### 3.3.1 The 19th century

In 1816, Argentina obtained its independence from Spain through a revolution, which led into a ferocious internal struggle between those favoring the concentration of the country’s command in Buenos Aires, the port, versus those who struggled for a federal country. At that time, the frontiers of the country were still not established and there was a continuous fight against indigenous communities inhabiting the south. These tensions were narrated in a classical book by an Argentinean president, ‘Civilization or Barbarism’, referring to the clash between European versus Latin American cultures, clearly in favor of the former and scorning the latter (Sarmiento 1896), which was a position also reflected in national policies, such as the 1853 national constitution that in its Article 25\(^o\) specifically encouraged the immigration of Europeans only. According to Romero, these conflicts could only be resolved around 1880 after a war with Paraguay and the conquest of the territories controlled by indigenous communities, also known as ‘the conquest of the desert’ (Romero 2002, p. 2). On the one hand, the former established the northern geographical limits of the country and Buenos Aires as the capital of a federal nation. This decision contributed to the concentration of productive forces and inhabitants of the city, which at the time was a logical consequence of the country’s economic model based on agricultural products exported from the harbor of Buenos Aires. However, it led to a division between the ‘developed capital’ versus the ‘backwards interior’ of the country, a separation still relevant, because it persisted in time (Sawers 1996). On the other hand, the conquest of the desert expanded and defined the current southern Argentinean borders. But this was done through the oppression of indigenous communities who lived there, limiting their access to politics and disseminating negative stereotypes against their culture (lifestyles, beliefs, languages, etc.) that prevail until today. These two historical patterns are important for this research, because they challenge new media experiences located far from the capital or managed by indigenous communities.

As regards the nation of Brazil, it is the product of the Portuguese colonial project, which established a latifundium economic model based on slave labor to exploit and trade raw materials produced

---

\(^3\) The percentages are also based on estimations of national and state populations based on the 2010 census.
in the colony (Priore and Venancio 2010; Skidmore 1999). The inhabitants of what we now call Brazil did not revolt against their conquerors, as the Spanish colonies did, instead, in 1822 the threat of Napoleon’s invasion of Portugal pushed the monarchy to transfer part of the royal court to Brazil (Priore and Venancio 2010) and to establish Rio de Janeiro as the capital of the so-called Brazilian Empire (1822-1889). During this period, the union of diverse regions toward a national project was advanced; European migration was fostered (mostly to southern and southeastern states) to ‘whiten’ Brazil (Skidmore 1999); and in 1888 slavery was abolished, which unleashed disputes among different groups that contributed to the fall of the Empire and the establishment of the First Republic the following year (Priore and Venancio 2010). It is worth to remark that despite the abolition of slavery, “unwritten color bars” were kept against the social mobility of non-whites (Skidmore 1999, p. 79), in addition to the remaining huge income inequalities linked to skin color, which is another feature haunting Brazil until modern times (Skidmore 1999). Although these ‘color bars’ are also present in Argentina (Adamovsky 2008), in Brazil they are more pronounced, because of the large proportion of Afro-descendants (Skidmore 1999). Argentina implemented a state policy to negate their existence (Ocoró Loango 2010). However, color bars remain against descendants of indigenous communities. Besides this skin color discrimination, Skidmore remarks two other tensions present in Brazilian history that are relevant for this research. First, the geographical division of those living near the modern urban cities of the coast versus those in the small relegated rural towns in the interior of the country, with the northeast and the southeast having been home to more than 60% of the country’s population for over 200 years (Skidmore 1999). Second, the colliding interests between parts of the Brazilian society that strived for the protection of the remaining indigenous population against other groups that had no remorse in destroying them whenever they were in the middle of some resource that could be exploited (Skidmore 1999). Therefore, as in the Argentinean case, there are negative stereotypes about the lifestyles of indigenous communities.

3.3.2 From the Beginning of the 20th Century to the End of Dictatorships

A couple of facts from the complex history of Argentina during the 20th century are of interest for this research. First, the pendulum motion between civil and military governments, which became particularly politically polarized and conflicting after the governments of Juan Domingo Perón from 1946 to 1955. Although himself a general, he arrived to power through democratic elections and introduced several state centered policies to favor resource-scarce sectors of the population, for instance their incorporation to politics, social life and an expansion of their consumption options (Romero 2002). These measures gave the government popular support, however, historians point out that the government took an authoritarian bend and massively used propaganda to indoctrinate the masses in its vision and to convince them of the leadership qualities that Perón and his wife, Eva, had (Romero 2002). A conflict with the church and representatives of the military sector paved the way for a military coup that began a process of ‘deperonization’ in 1955 (Romero 2002), which included a ban of the peronist political party (Perón went into exile) and a strong media and cultural censorship of the previous peronist influence (Romero 2002). Over the following decades, the country experienced even more pendulum changes between military and civil governments. During these years, there were struggles between economic projects to advance industrialization through import substitution 4 (Romero 2002), versus projects basing their economic model on income concentration in large firms and exports. In 1973,

4. Based on dependency theory to surpass ‘development’ problems understood from a Latin American perspective.
Perón returned to power, but he died only one year later and left the government in the hands of his third wife, Isabel de Perón, together with a decaying political situation that led to the most violent military dictatorship of the country's history (Romero 2002). In the context of the global struggle between the USA and the USSR, this military coup occupied power from 1976 to 1983 and left several marks on Argentina. In the economic sphere, it questioned the previous ideas of the need of a welfare state and the development of national markets, imposing instead ideas of economic liberalism and a focus on exports to world markets. Nonetheless, the application of these principles ended up favoring firms close to the military, reinforcing concentration patterns and at the same time, dismantling the capacity of the state to plan, regulate and control the economy (Romero 2002). With those measures, Argentina made a first experiment in ‘neoliberalism’ by liberalizing trade and finance, albeit with increased income inequality (Chudnovsky and López 2007). What is particularly important for the context of this thesis is that political participation was banned, media and civil society censorship was introduced and complemented with the massive use of propaganda to reinforce the discourse and policies of the military (Romero 2002). Anyone who deviated was considered ‘subversive’ and became a target of torture, which led to the tragic death of around 30,000 political dissidents who suffered forced disappearance; in other words, they were killed but there are no traces of their bodies left.

As regards Brazil, the First Republic was overthrown by a military coup in 1930, Getúlio Vargas assumed power and started a process of state centralization, which challenged the previous dominance of oligarchic rule (Priore and Venancio 2010; Skidmore 1999). In particular, this project faced resistance from the elite of the state of São Paulo in a revolt that took place in 1932. Previously irrelevant in Brazilian history, this state increased its influence from the beginning of the 20th century onwards thanks to income from coffee exports reinvested in acquiring manufacturing skills and the exploitation of cheap local and foreign labor (Priore and Venancio 2010). Although Vargas controlled the rebellion, the Paulista elite lost political support at the national level, but still achieved some of its objectives and continued concentrating economic power (Priore and Venancio 2010; Skidmore 1999). During the next years, the political climate became more polarized with an advancing communist threat to the government, which was used as an excuse by Vargas to increase power centralization and his authoritarian image (Skidmore 1999). An example of the latter was the continuous use of propaganda disseminated through radio and cinema to promote his personality cult (Priore and Venancio 2010) and also the stimulation of a national feeling of belonging through the promotion of Brazilian culture, such as samba and carnivals (Skidmore 1999). Due to the pressure of opposing military groups, Vargas finally left power in 1945, only to return once again in 1951, but this time through a democratic election (Priore and Venancio 2010). After World War II, Brazil experienced rapid urbanization, which paved the way for populist policies such as those Vargas introduced during his second term, including 100% increase of the minimum salary (Priore and Venancio 2010). According to Priore and Venancio, from then onwards a schematic way to understand the history of Brazil is as a conflict between two ideal poles: on the one hand, projects that defend a nationalist development with strong state intervention; on the other hand, projects that put the center of development in the hands of Brazilian private firms in association with foreign capital (Priore and Venancio 2010). Obviously Vargas sided with the former and cultivated a populist image to erase the previous dictatorial one he had left (Skidmore 1999), but other groups defended the latter strongly and entered into conflict with Vargas. To avoid another military coup, this and other tensions led him to commit suicide in 1954, to safeguard democracy (Skidmore 1999). Some years later, Julescino Kubitschek assumed the presidency and put forward an economic
development model to stimulate industrialization and set up the required infrastructure together with
the construction of Brasília, the new capital (Skidmore 1999). This model achieved economic growth
at the expense of an increasing inflationary spiral and international debts that opened the door for
interventions by the IMF (Skidmore 1999). During the next governments, this heavy burden only es-
calated with skyrocketing inflation rates that finally contributed to destabilize the political situation
and led to a new military coup in 1964 (Skidmore 1999). This dictatorship lasted 21 years and affected
several aspects of Brazilian life. In the economic sphere, similarly to the Argentinean case, the coup
opened the economy and introduced programs to control inflation rates, which showed some positive
results until 1973, but then, the situation deteriorated, and the government never addressed issues
of income distribution, which was highly unequal between the small proportion of well paid technical
workers and the surplus of poorly paid unskilled ones (Skidmore 1999). Therefore, economic growth
went hand in hand with wealth concentration in few sectors of the population (Priore and Venancio
2010). In the political sphere, every group and individuals opposing the military rule were persecuted,
combated and in some cases tortured, which went hand in hand with censorship in media and culture
(Priore and Venancio 2010). The growing impoverishment of the urban population, violence rates, and
the authoritarian and repressive image Brazil had abroad, were all factors that influenced the military
to begin a slow process of return to democracy during the 1970s, which was finally completed in 1985.

3.3.3 The Return of Democracies and the Neoliberal Decade

In Argentina, the transition to democracy was well-welcomed by civil society and previously banned
political parties; however, it soon became an illusion because of the still remaining influence of the
military and large firms that defied the recently elected government (Romero 2002). A worsening eco-
nomic scenario led to a new government in 1989, which even had to assume power in advance, led
by the ‘peronist’ Carlos Menem. What is important for this research of the two periods in which he
occupied the administration is the economic and political ideology he subscribed to, neoliberalism or
Washington consensus. According to Romero, Menem followed the top-down approach disseminated by
international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and a
network of neoliberal economists who advocated to “reduce state spending to the level of the state’s real
fiscal resources, eliminate state intervention in the economy, and open up the economy to foreign com-
petition—in short, a program of austerity and capitalist restructuring” (p. 286). Evidently, he continued
the job the military had begun by force in 1976, but now under a democratically elected government.
During those years the president introduced several reforms to increase privatizations that he named
“surgery without anesthesia” (p. 288), which led to a recovery in GDP growth and GDP per capita,
but at the same time to an increase in the gap of income distribution. These tendencies are shown in
sections 3.3 and 3.4. The former illustrates the spur of economic growth during the first years of the
decade, together with a worsening of the figure of income distribution measured by the GINI index.
Therefore, the trade and financial liberalization measures fostered by international credit organiza-
tions contributed to economic growth, but also to an increase in social conflict and unemployment rates
(Chudnovsky and López 2007; Romero 2002). By the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st
century, these trends only worsened; in 2001 several internal and external factors converged and led to
the burst of one of the worst economic and political crisis in Argentinean history (Romero 2002), which
is evident in the figures by the abrupt fall of GDP per capita in 2002 and the peak in the GINI index in
2003.
As regards Brazil, the first democratically elected president after the dictatorship died before his inauguration, so the presidency was left in the hands of José Sarney. His period saw a serious economic crisis in 1989 with hyperinflation rates of over 1.000% per year (Priore and Venancio 2010), in addition to other enduring problems of the decade such as the growing disparity between the rich and the poor (Skidmore 1999). Despite these hurdles, one of the most important measures of his government was the new constitution of 1988 that aimed to democratize some of the authoritarian institutions inherited from the dictatorship (Skidmore 1999). The next election was won by Fernando Collor de Mello, an unknown candidate who skyrocketed in popularity thanks to a sly use of the increasing influence that television had in politics (Priore and Venancio 2010), and also thanks to a strong support from the USA because of his promise to implement neoliberal policies (Skidmore 1999). In spite of the good reputation and fame his government enjoyed, it had a short duration because of a worsening economic crisis and an impeachment against him due to corruption scandals (Skidmore 1999). The next two democratic elections were won by Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), who remained in power from 1994 to 2003. This period continued with generically called neoliberal policies, which included: measures to internationalize the economy, privatization of public firms, deregulation of markets, introduction of incentives to attract foreign capital, among others (Priore and Venancio 2010). In terms of GDP growth per capita, there was a considerable increase from 1993 to 1997, but as Figure 3.3 shows, in 1998 GDP per capita experienced a decrease until 2002 due to the impacts of the Asian and Russian financial crisis of previous years. All in all, the main success of the government was to finally control inflation rates, which improved the buying power of the poor, but this did not imply an improvement in terms of income distribution (Skidmore 1999). For instance, the GINI index in Figure 3.4 did not vary much for Brazil during the 1990s, although it shows a slight tendency to decrease. Thus, inequality issues, chronic unemployment rates and increasing debts with the IMF remained unaddressed challenges during Cardoso’s presidencies (Priore and Venancio 2010).

3.3.4 The Post-Neoliberal Decade?

An important point to stress is the political change that has taken place in several countries of Latin America in the beginning of the 21st century. Analysts have hypothesized this period to be a post-neoliberal one (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012), because there have been efforts to turn away from policies imposed by the USA and the so called Washington consensus. Argentina and Brazil are examples of this, because they have recovered national development projects distancing themselves from foreign dependance and took advantage of windows of opportunity in the region to challenge USA hegemony; for instance, the rejection of the initiative to create a free trade area of the Americas (Whitney JR. 2005), and instead founding the “Unión de Naciones Suramericanas” (Union of South American Nations - UNASUR) to defend the political interest of the region and move toward the so desired “patria grande” and Latin American unity (Zibechi 2012, p. 80).

These changes cannot be understood without mentioning the political parties in power. From 2003 until 2015, both countries have been under the command of the same party at the national level, the “Partido dos Trabalhadores” (Worker's Party) in Brazil led by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff (from now onward I shall refer to them as Lula and Dilma respectively) that has a social democratic ideology, and the “Frente para la Victoria” (Front for Victory) or informally Kirchnerism led by Néstor and Cristina Kirchner with a center-left ideology.

As regards Argentina, from 2003 to 2007 Néstor Kirchner was president of the nation, succeeded by
Figure 3.3: GDP per capita in Argentina, Brazil, Latin America and World averages from 1975 to 2013. Source: World Bank Data.

Figure 3.4: GINI index for Argentina and Brazil from 1985 to 2010. Source: World Bank Data.
his wife, Cristina Kirchner, from 2008 to 2015. In these years, several changes took place that are worth remarking. In the economic sphere, the country focused on industrialization policies and at the same time restructured and canceled part of its international debt (Galand 2013). These measures went hand in hand with policies to redistribute income (Galand 2013); for example, the “Asignación Universal por Hijo” (universal child allowance) that has been giving a minimum salary to jobless Argentineans or those in the informal economy, who have a kid under 18 (ANSES 2014). The improvement in the economic and social conditions during 2003-2010 can be appreciated in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, where the GINI achieved its minimum of the series since the beginning of the 21st century, and GDP per capita its peak, with an annual growth rate of 13.57% during the period 2003-2013, higher than the Latin American and world growth rates that were 10.28% and 5.78% respectively. In the political sphere, participation was strengthened, in particular by the youth reversing the apolitization processes of the 1990s (Galand 2013), human rights became a national policy reversing the sad inheritance from the dictatorship, policies were introduced to address disadvantaged positions of indigenous communities and the power of traditional sectors of Argentina was challenged, for instance that of the agroindustrial producers and mass media (Natanson 2014). However, critics of the economic model that allowed government success point out that it has been heavily dependent on exports of raw materials to China, in particular soybean, which are in the control of few firms (82.4% in the hands of seven) (Natanson 2014). At the same time, since 2013 the economic situation in the country has worsened, with increasing inflation rates and issues with foreign credit organizations that endanger the recent income distribution and growth patterns (Natanson 2014). In brief, some issues inherited from previous decades have been addressed, but the increasing economic instability of the last years has also boosted social conflicts around the distribution of resources.

As regards Brazil, in 2003 Lula and a whole generation that had participated against the military coup during the 1960s came to power. His candidature was resisted by businessmen and oligarchs who feared a return to populist measures similar to those of Vargas. In part, this fear emanated from Lula’s figure, who was born in a poor family in the northeast of Brazil that later emigrated to São Paulo. He had a worker’s background and did not obtain a university degree (Love and Baer 2009). This profile connected with the experiences of the majority of the Brazilian population, but of course diverged from the one of previous presidents who were more related to the elitist lifestyle. Still, to defuse the attacks he was receiving, before his election Lula wrote a public letter to the Brazilian people in which he explained his political project, which included exports and the development of national mass markets as one of its main points (Lula da Silva 2010). Thus, despite Lula’s criticism of Cardoso’s government, analysts say he kept the orientation towards international markets that was inherited, but added measures to address income inequality and poverty issues that remained unaddressed (Priore and Venancio 2010). For example, according to the Financial Times “whereas in the past it was said that Brazil must grow in order to distribute wealth, his view was that Brazil must first distribute wealth in order to grow” (Love and Baer 2009, p. 312). In this way, Brazil under Lula did not follow a revolutionary approach as some critics feared, but instead applied reformist measures to reduce the negative effects of globalization (Priore and Venancio 2010), like the so discussed program Bolsa Familia. Figure 3.3 shows that from 2003 to 2011, GDP per capita grew each year except for one, with an annual growth rate of 13.94%. Therefore, economic growth was successful during his two periods in government. At the same time, Figure 3.4 illustrates that during the period under consideration 2003-2009 the GINI index had a continuous downward trend. Hence, Lula was able to put forward a project stimulating economic
growth and social inclusion at the same time. According to the BBC (Cabral 2010), in 2011 he left power as the most popular president in Brazil. He was succeeded by Dilma, who belongs to the same political party, and even though this was supposed to be a government of continuity, the economic situation was not so spectacular as before and several social issues came to the fore. For instance, in 2013 a series of protests that began after an increase in transport fares led to massive riots all across the country claiming for unattended issues related to health, education, corruption, among others (Watts 2013). This context will be relevant for the description of the Brazilian case study.

3.4 Culture and Media

This section introduces two important descriptions for the research. First, it describes the cultural diversity existing in both countries, and at the same time, the large inequalities in terms of consumption, distribution and production of culture. Second, the section details the main transformations in the media system in Argentina and Brazil, focusing on how policies for audiovisual media changed in comparison to the main political events taking place from the mid-20th century onwards. Specifically, it focuses on the last decades that explain the context in which the analyzed case studies have been operating.

3.4.1 Culture

The official national language in each country was an inheritance of the colonial powers that ruled these lands, Spanish in Argentina and Portuguese in Brazil. However, according to the Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger (UNESCO 2014) there are 190 and 18 endangered languages in Brazil and Argentina respectively, spoken by indigenous communities that inhabited the territories before the conquest. Besides, both countries have different sectors of their population that speak the languages of the immigrant settlers, mostly European ones (Italian, French, German, but also Japanese, Arabic, among others). These Spanish and Portuguese colonizers also introduced the catholic religion, but the cultural background of each country is far more diverse than the mere Iberian influence, because it is a product of the mixture and amalgamation, though at different rates, of varied cultures. In Brazil, the three main sources came from: European immigrants, indigenous communities inhabiting the territory and Afro-descendant communities brought by the Portuguese as slaves (Ribeiro 1995). The latter have been the stronger non-European influence that left marks on music, food, religion, among other cultural practices (Skidmore 1999). Comparatively, the African influence was much weaker in Argentina, where the major source of cultural diversity derives from the clash between the European inheritance and the indigenous communities inhabiting the soil. In sum, these different immigration waves contributed to the cultural diversity that both countries have, which is far broader than the Spanish or Portuguese influence alone.

The cultural diversity that characterizes Argentina and Brazil is an important fact for this research, because it is not equally represented in cultural productions or activities distributed through markets in both countries. For instance, despite the large presence of Afro-descendant features in the Brazilian population, black skinned actors are underrepresented in the most nationally viewed cultural product, soap operas (Araújo 2004). Therefore, the ‘whitenization’ policies still continue in a subtle way. The same can be said of indigenous communities, both in Brazil and Argentina, which rarely appear in mass media. Instead, the products of the so-called ‘creative class’ find more acceptance and distribution,
which are aimed toward consumers in larger urban centers. These issues are connected with one of the most drastic characteristics of the creative or cultural (depending on the country) industries in most of Latin American countries, the high level of concentration in few firms, which of course limits the amount of what sort of cultural products or activities are widely diffused. For example, in 2006 a group of researchers arrived at the conclusion that more than 50% of TV, Radio and press markets in several Latin American countries (including Argentina and Brazil) were concentrated in just four firms (Mastrini and Becerra 2006), which of course decide what sort of content to distribute. Besides, there is not only concentration in terms of firm ownership, but also in their geographical location. For instance, in the case of Argentina, Buenos Aires clusters most cultural production and has a higher budget assigned to culture (Villarino and Bercovich 2014). Similarly, most of the cultural production in Brazil comes from the South East region, particularly São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais (MinC 2010). The previously mentioned historical and population facts explain such concentration levels, which are not reversed by free market forces that do not have much incentive to expand their products to regions with fewer inhabitants and lower consumption capacity.

Inequalities are also present in the access or consumption of cultural products and activities. For example, in 2010 the Brazilian Minister of Culture stated that “only 13% of Brazilians go at least once per year to cinema; 92% of Brazilians never entered a museum; 93,4% never went to an art exposition(...)” (Gil and Ferreira 2013, p. 484) and gave further examples that illustrate how the access to cultural products and services is heavily restricted to classes with higher incomes. Similar statistics for cultural consumption show that those families receiving a minimum salary of 830 Reais spent 35 times less on culture than those families with a salary bigger than 6.335 Reais (IBGE 2013c). Besides, cultural resources are concentrated in the richest region of Brazil, the southeast, which in the period 1996-2006 received 80% from the incentive laws to cultural projects operating in the country (IBGE 2013c). In like manner, Argentina shares the same inequalities in terms of cultural production and access, with the former concentrated in the province of Buenos Aires, far from the regions where most of the population with unsatisfied basic needs lives (mostly the north) (Villarino and Bercovich 2014). At the same time, the northwestern and southern regions where indigenous communities live suffer a lack of media and other cultural infrastructure (Villarino and Bercovich 2014), which reinforces the lack of consideration of their particular cultural features. For these reasons, the differences mentioned between Buenos Aires and the ‘interior’ are still maintained and recreated in terms of cultural production and consumption barriers.

3.4.2 Media in Argentina

In 1953, Perón passed the first broadcasting law of the country that declared media to be of ‘public interest’ and not a public service. At that time, the latter would have implied the nationalization of media, something not wanted by the government because of the need to have private investors in the sector. Still, according to Arribá (2009), the law reflected the authoritarian side of the democratically elected government of Perón, which wanted to represent and have direct links with the ‘people’ through media, considered as the central mechanism of interaction and diffusion of ideology. This model also included the restriction of freedom of speech and of the press for the aim of limiting what Perón called the “liberal concept of absolute liberty” (Arribá 2009, p. 75). Besides the ideological regulation, this authoritarian approach to communications unleashed a process of geographic, political and economic concentration in the city of Buenos Aires, where most of the firms related to the sector were established.
with close links to the government (Arribá 2009). Therefore, Arribá defines it as a ‘parastatal’ system, because all firms and their content were strictly linked to governmental objectives, in addition to being regulated (Arribá 2009).

Given this context, the military coup that expelled Perón from power had as one of its main objectives to ban Peronism and to reduce its ideological influence; but in order to achieve this the previous media structure had to be dismantled. To fulfill this objective, a decree was passed in 1958 that was capable of constraining Perón’s political party, but, according to Mastrini (2009) simultaneously it had several other negative consequences for the media system that persisted over time. First, the military government created a broadcasting model characterized by private initiative. Second, it set up a communication model totally dependent on advertising, which would turn out to be quite problematic in the provinces of the interior of Argentina because of the incapacity to achieve profit margins to foster local productions. Third, they lifted the restrictions on foreign capital to enter the communication industries, which allowed US firms associated with local groups to sell content, equipment, and as Bulla (2009) remarks, the myth of the consumer society.

These tendencies were deepened during the dictatorship that began in 1976, which in the global context of the struggle between the USA and the USSR, considered media and culture as strategic arenas against the so called subversive enemy. Under this pretext, the dictatorship advanced measures to censor media; for example, by requiring all firms to send their content to the state to be checked before being published (Postolski and Marino 2009), and also to control media directly by intervening in their management or indirectly through regulation organisms. Given the fact that state advertising was an important source of income for media firms, the military used its redistribution as a strategy to influence what content media could disseminate. In addition, they gave differentiated access to foreign equipment and capital to firms obeying their orders. These measures contributed to generate an hegemonic media discourse, based on disinformation to produce consent in the population for the project the dictatorship was willing to establish (Postolski and Marino 2009). As I remarked in Section 3.3.2, this included dismantling the previous distributionist and import substitution economic model toward a concentrated liberal model based on finance that transferred resources from the popular sectors of the country to national and international concentrated capital (Postolski and Marino 2009). However, this was done under systematic violation of human rights, torture, repression of the alternative press, trade unions and social movements in order to eliminate any sort of opposition to the imposition of its economic and social project (Postolski and Marino 2009). These control measures introduced by force were reified in 1981 through a new broadcasting law, which was oriented toward the aim of ‘national security’ and declared communications to be of public interest, but at the same time, it excluded civil society media (trade unions, cooperatives, political parties, etc.), and only allowed private firms close to the regime to profit from communications (Postolski and Marino 2009). Of course, this discrimination was based on the fear of opening spaces for critical voices to emerge that the government had, which would have challenged their repressive and authoritarian media model, something totally contrary to their supposed liberalism in economic policies (Postolski and Marino 2009). During this whole process, those firms that had close ties with the government clearly obtained economic benefits and advantages in acquiring licenses, as was the case with Clarín, which would become the most important multimedia firm in the country in the following decades (Postolski and Marino 2009). Before the dictatorship collapsed, it also made sure media was passed to the hands of firms with ideological positions still close to them (Postolski and Marino 2009). In sum, the inheritance of the period was a discriminatory law
and eight years during which freedom of speech, freedom of expression and the right to communicate were all repressed, elucidating what the dangerous links between media and military might lead to (Postolski and Marino 2009).

In 1983, the first government after the return of democracy was in a very fragile political and economic situation to advance any change in the media system (Com 2009). However, in 1989 the next government led by Menem did introduce changes, but not toward democratization. On the contrary, he accepted and deepened the inheritance of the centralist, authoritarian and discriminatory media system the military had left behind (Rossi 2009). As was highlighted in the historical review, this was related to the embracement of Menem’s government of the neoliberal discourse, as his following words illustrate: “[…] the Argentinian state, will feel very happy the day that it does not have not even one commercial, industrial or productive firm under its control […]” (Carlos Menem quoted in Baranchuk 2009, p. 235, translated by the author). The media were not exempt of such privatization processes, which created a mass media system that interpellated the population as mere consumers or spectators, limiting political action and participation (Rossi 2009). During his second government, the entrance of foreign capital to media enterprises increased along with the concentration patterns in terms of media ownership (Albornoz, Hernández, and Mastrini 2009). At the same time, media networks obtained legal permission to produce the same content across the country, irrespective of regional differences, thus affecting the expression and diffusion of the country’s cultural diversity. In sum, it was a period in which the private interest was always valued above the public interest (Albornoz, Hernández, and Mastrini 2009).

These structural features of the Argentinean media system and the concentration patterns in few firms were not altered during the following government, and even less by the one that followed the serious economic, social and political crisis that the country experienced in 2001 (Baladrón 2009; García Leiva 2009, p. 310). In 2003, Néstor Kirchner assumed power and promised to introduce transparent rules in the sector, however, not much changed. Instead, the interests of concentrated media networks, such as Clarin, were protected and even promoted by allowing a merger of the two larger networks in the cable TV sector (Cablevision and Multicanal), which allowed Clarín to control most of the market at the national level (Califano 2009). Despite this, there were some small changes, such as the modification of article N° 45 of the law from the dictatorship in 2005, which prohibited co-operatives from having their own media channels (Ginger 2007). Notwithstanding, mass media organizations lobbied against such modifications, and although they could not stop them, several requisites were added that made it quite hard for the only possible competitors, the co-operatives, to start offering their service (Califano 2009).

In sum, from 1985 to 2007 the increasing need of the political class to legitimize their power and projects in mass media led to relations of dependence with private mass media conglomerates (Mastrini 2009), damaging democratic processes in the country. In 2007 and after 22 years of democracy, an authoritarian model still prevailed that only favored powerful and private media groups. As Mastrini et al. (2009) indicated at that time, civil society and social movements had been silenced and excluded from this debate; either because they did not give too much relevance to the topic or because fragmentation among them did not allow them to advocate strongly for a process of media democratization.

Since 2004, several civil society organizations, such as alternative radios, trade unions, universities, social movements, famous national personalities and international organizations, united under the “Coalición por una Radiodifusión Democrática” (Coalition for Democratic Broadcasting), and made
public a list of 21 points that the state should fulfill to democratize communications (Coalición por una Radiodifusión Democrática 2004). This proposal criticized media concentration as a constraint to democracy, and strove for informational and cultural pluralism, considering communications as a fundamental human right (Coalición por una Radiodifusión Democrática 2004). Additionally, it stressed the need to foster community media, national and regional content, and to assure public media were not coopted by ruling parties, among others (Coalición por una Radiodifusión Democrática 2004). Despite their efforts, no political support was given to their claims during that or the following couple of years, partly due to the still weak political position the government had; it had only received 22% of the national votes in the 2003 elections. Thus, it had to keep a ‘friendly’ position toward mass media, in particular the Clarín media group, which had considerably increased its influence. For instance, it became vox populi that no government could resist three negative front pages of the most widely read newspaper they controlled (Tiempo Argentino 2011), pointing to the role this firm had as a political actor (Galand 2013).

In 2009, the scenario changed after the ruling party initiated the discussion about a new media law. Why? The influence Clarín had and its partiality (Repoll 2010) became evident in several events during Kirchner's government, but in particular in a conflict between the national government and agricultural producers. In synthesis, the increasing international prices of soybeans and the growing international demand for them, mostly by China, pushed the government to argue in favor of a movable tax to gather resources. On the contrary, the agricultural producers saw this measure as unfair and started massive protests across the country to stop it (Wikipedia 2014a). This led to a national conflict and a vote in the senate that in the end canceled the tax; however, in the process the most influential mass media network took a biased position in favor of the agricultural sector, strongly opposing the government and elucidating once again the excessive influence of media on politics. This was one of the main reasons that finally convinced the ruling party to start the process for a new media law, which was discussed in several forums across the country, taking as its base the initial 21 points presented by civil society organizations in 2004 (Télam 2014). The Law N° 26.522 was finally passed in 2009 and much celebrated by the ruling party and the new organism that would apply it, the Autoridad Federal de Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual (AFSCA - Federal Authority of Audiovisual Communication Services). For instance, Figure 3.5 shows a poster distributed by the organization in 2013 that transmits several symbolic messages related to the communication discussion that took place. First, it shows the polar tension of democracia vs corporaciones (democracy vs corporations). Second, it tries to highlight the increase of diversity that the law would bring, such as the inclusion of the multicolored flag of indigenous communities in the lower middle part of the add. Third, it suggests new employment opportunities that would spring up by showing a lot of people how to work with diverse media (radio, TV, satellite). Fourth, the last point is also connected to a supposed easy access to technology for new media illustrated by the different equipment in the advertisement. Last but not least, it mentions the slogan the ruling party employed, década ganada (won decade), which refers to the 10 years the political organization led by the Kirchner couple (Néstor and Cristina) had been in power at that time. All these points will be interpellated with the analyzed case studies; what is more, the enforcement of the new law quickly encountered legal barriers and conflicts to be described next.

The sociology of law as discussed by Weber postulates that there are conflicts of interest behind the framing of new laws among social groups who are competing to defend their own interests (Duke 1975), and this case was not an exception. Friction around the new law began before it was passed,
Figure 3.5: The advertisement includes several phrases that characterize the government discourse. From top to bottom and left to right, it says: a) the won decade; b) all voices; c) democracy or corporations; d) + freedom, + democracy, +diversity, +employment, +plurarity.
with the obvious opposition of the Clarín multimedia group that would have had to reduce its size if the project had been legalized. Despite their hostility toward the law, it was passed in 2009, considering communication to be of public interest and having two clear aims: a) to promote new channels all over the country managed by firms, the state and civil society organizations; b) to limit monopolistic tendencies in media ownership, which is an explicit point of article 45° in the law. The conflicts, however, did not stop with its sanction, conversely, they escalated. Why? Because article 45° was immediately questioned by Clarín, who stopped the requirement of the group to reduce its size with an injunction. Second, Clarín also used injunctions to boycott the start of new entrants into the market, the co-operatives, arguing that they would compete unfairly by taking advantage of the reduced taxes they pay. This resistance exposed the leverage the firm had to delay a legal order from taking place through the use of its economic resources, even though the law was widely discussed and debated across the country with high support of civil society. This illustrates the tension between private interests and social interests. However, this situation would not be infinite, but all these legal hurdles were able to delay the final decision over the constitutionality of the law for four years.

The first injunction to be revoked was the one that limited co-operatives to have their own TV channels. Therefore, the legal road was finally open for several co-operatives to advance with the formal process to obtain a TV signal. The first channel under the new law was constituted in the city of Santa Rosa, La Pampa, and shortly, the first indigenous community TV channel was created in the city of Bariloche by members of the Mapuche community. Both are cases analyzed in this research that shed light on the challenges and innovations in the process of fostering new NGO media in the country under the new law. Meanwhile, the AFSCA had among its activities the stimulation of new public and NGO media; thus, started actions to foster their growth in the country. For example, with the coordination of training workshops and tenders for interested organizations to apply for credits and subsidies to set up their TV and radio channels. Nonetheless, there has been a group of so-called alternative and popular media organizations that have not received the same support that the law claims to defend. Most of these organizations are community based, self-managed, with scarce financial resources as a result of the 2001 crisis that transmit critical content, both of the government and parts of the new law, and since then have been ignored from the support or offers the AFSCA provides. To unravel these inconsistencies between a ‘democratic’ new law and this apparent discrimination, I have considered a self-managed community media firm, Barricada TV, in the case studies.

The injunction to article 45° was the most critical one, because it tried to stop the control of monopolistic tendencies that the law wanted to establish. Only at the end of 2013, a final decision was taken by the Supreme Court of Argentina. But given the importance that the debate had in the political agenda, before expressing its judgment, the Supreme Court organized a public audience between the involved parts in the legal battle, the Clarín group vs the state, which clearly elucidated the two different perspectives with several points that are worth highlighting due to their relevance in posterior chapters. On the one hand, Clarín representatives first stated that they had ‘acquired rights’ in terms of licenses, which the state gave to them and even prolonged in 2005. Thus, in their view the law showed an inadmissible erratic conduct of the state. Second, they associated democracy with the freedom to choose what to consume. This hypothesis sustains the argument that audiences prefer to choose their media because they are better, and this does not imply that there is no plurality in terms of offer, but just a clear preference in terms of demand and of ‘taste’. Third, Clarín representatives

5. These points were summarized from the online transmission of the debate that is still available in social networks like YouTube.
stressed that they are a media critical to government, which requires its current operational structure to be economically sustainable and independent. Otherwise, with less structure their freedom of speech would be limited. Last but not least, Clarín representatives argued that the large size of their network is necessary to absorb expensive technological innovations that would be impossible to obtain with less scale. On the other hand, the AFSCA’s president, Martín Sabatella, representing the state exposed counter arguments. First, he replied that the growth of the network into a quasi-monopoly was done in periods in which the state had scarce capacities to control concentration patterns, or even worse, during dictatorships. Thus, from his perspective there was no contradiction for the state to introduce a legislation to correct these distortions that damage the audiovisual market and democracy. Second, he argued that the Clarín network has the dominant position on the TV market. This allows Clarín to set prices and competitiveness conditions, along with predatory pricing strategies (dumping) against cooperatives (La Arena 2010). Third, he rejected that Clarín’s financial sustainability would be affected, because smaller multimedia groups had already been operating sustainable for years. To prove this, he mentioned the statistics of licenses by networks, with Clarín having 237 licenses at that time, while the average licensee only had 1.6. The next multimedia group ‘Grupo uno’ had 49 licenses, followed by the third with 18 and the fourth with 12. Consequently, he stated that media with 24 licenses or less have proven to be sustainable, of course without as much profitability as Clarín previously enjoyed, but since it is an anti-monopoly law, it was still a reasonable limit from their point of view. Fourth, the AFSCA rejected the argument that the government was advancing toward independent media. Instead, its president stated that they wanted to defend democracy and freedom of speech by regulating the audiovisual market, so that no firm can obtain excessive strength. The following fragment of the speech of AFSCA’s president during a public audience illustrates such a position, and he is implicitly making reference to the Clarín media conglomerate:

“If someone wants to own an audiovisual communications firm in Argentina, the limits of the law are enough. But if someone wants to own such a firm for other purposes, like to extort democracy, to define the direction of the country, to manipulate the public opinion, or to set and take out presidents, obviously it is not enough. But it in that case, what they need is a completely different thing, they need to build a political party for elections and win them”

(Centro de Información Judicial 2013, translated by the author).

After these presentations, the Supreme Court voted and finally established the constitutionality of the article N° 45, which limits media concentration. As a popular journalist in Argentina expressed, one of the results of this conflict was that “the debate and the sanction of the audiovisual communication services law has been a very transformative event for society, culture and democracy. With their interests being affected, big businesses showed their real face, barely without the make up hitherto. This was one of the most important aspects for society. We discovered we were informed by media strongly committed to their business interests” (Morales and Berlanga 2012, p. 4, translated by the author).

Nevertheless, the conflicting positions that the two actors in the debate exposed are far from being reconciled. The case studies in Argentina will contribute to illuminate the difficulties that new media blossoming after the law are having.
3.4.3 Media in Brazil

In 1962, telecommunications were legally organized in Brazil through Law No. 4.117, which was oriented to favor private firms (Bolaño 2007). However, the military rule altered the media system into a more authoritarian and centralized one, excluding foreign capital and limiting the property of TVs and radios (Bolaño 2007). These decisions led to a centralized TV model in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro from where content was diffused to the rest of the country, stimulating a nationalist media model that limited the dissemination of local expressions, constraining content diversity (Bolaño 2007). National capital firms were favored and the lack of regulation allowed the concentration of medias not only geographically, but also in terms of ownership in the hands of few rich Brazilian families (Bolaño 2007; Mattos 2005).

A key media conglomerate in the history of Brazilian media favored by the military rule was the Globo Network, which began with the foundation of the newspaper O Globo (The World) in 1925 in the city of Rio de Janeiro (Mattos 2005). In 1965, the firm entered the TV sector with the inauguration of TV Globo, which became one of the most powerful business television networks in the world during the military dictatorship (Lima 2005). Several factors contributed to the rapid growth of its influence (Lima 2005). First, Globo established an implicit alliance with the army that allowed it to enjoy favorable institutional conditions, such as easy access to state funding. In return, they contributed to legitimize governmental policies. Second, Globo achieved a high concentration in terms of audience share; for instance, Skidmore estimates it reached around 80% during the 1970s (Skidmore 1999). Third, Globo used its private investments in the name of public interest and nationalism, which reinforced its economic advantages. These factors contributed to a high degree of media concentration in the hands of the network that allowed it to have direct influence on several political issues in Brazil both during and after the dictatorship. For example, they disseminated contents to diffuse topics of interest to the government and behaviors through their most popular product, soap operas, which had large audience shares (Benevenuto Jr. 2005). Another example is how they intervened and took a clear position in the elections of the mayor of Rio de Janeiro in 1982 or yet how they delayed the coverage of social movements striving for democratic elections during the last years of the dictatorship (Lima 2005). Besides their success in the TV sector, the Globo network remained highly influential in the press sector. By the way, the O Globo newspaper is the second most sold in Brazil and preferred among Class A and B of consumers (Mattos 2005). In addition, it produces several magazines, such as the weekly news Época, a magazine named Pequenas Empresas & Grandes Negócios (small firms & big businesses), several for women, among others (Mattos 2005). These printed media reinforce their influence in the dissemination of content and ideas in the country in addition to what is done through TV. According to Mattos (2005), the firm has aimed to create good quality products, attracting ‘talents’ to produce content, but at the same time concentrating production.

There are several negative consequences to highlight caused by the influence that the Globo network built. For example, Ramos remarked the power of hegemony it has to diffuse and defend the ‘ideology’ of private enterprise above any other in the sectors of radio and TV, despising the conformation of larger alternative projects of NGO media that could challenge this supremacy (Ramos 2005). For Ramos, this condition is essential for media democratization, but the power that such media conglomerates gained, conspires against any initiative that tries to regulate or alter the status quo (Ramos 2005). At the same time, the excessive influence in terms of content diffusion to audiences has allowed the firm to reinforce negative stereotypes against: minority groups and issues related to ethnicity, gender
differences, age groups, quality patterns, political parties, among others (Lima 2005). For instance, it displaced the diversity of cultural community features Brazil has (Benevenuto Jr. 2005). Although Benvenuto thinks that Globo had little interest in developing community content, he suggests that this might have also been the consequence of other factors. First, for financial reasons the firm needs to produce content that is profitable, which constrains what can be produced and what themes can be explored (Benevenuto Jr. 2005). Second, Globo increased its professionalization and the ‘quality’ of its products, which created entry barriers for other producers who would have been able to elaborate community based content, but not with enough ‘quality’ to be included in their programs (Benevenuto Jr. 2005). The third and last factor is related to the advanced technological capabilities that the network has developed (Benevenuto Jr. 2005), which at the same time requires for its update to be financed by its content, diffused to large audiences so as to cover the costs through advertising. Consequently, this case suggests that a for-profit and a high technology oriented approach to content production, without regulation, leads toward positions contrary to the inclusion of cultural diversity, and more broadly, against the democratic process.

As in many other countries in Latin America, Brazil had previous experiences with community radios that diffused contents and ideas challenging the predominant ones (state and private) (Fórum Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação 2007a, p. 10). During the military dictatorship, several community media initiatives operated illegally and were considered a threat to hegemonic ideology (p. 10). These are part of what is known as the ‘popular and alternative communication’ movement (Skidmore 1999; Benevenuto Jr. 2005). After the return of democracy, these communicators and social movements strove for the democratization of communications in Brazil, in particular during the discussions of the 1988 constitution. Despite their efforts, strong resistance from private firms kept the status quo and blocked democratization proposals for the new constitution (Fórum Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação 2006b, p. 20). This negative outcome for the organizations striving for media democratization pushed them to unite and create the Fórum Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação (FNDC - National Forum for Media Democratization) in 1991, which aims to democratize communications in the country by proposing new projects, laws, mobilizations, among others (Fórum Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação 2006a, p. 13). During the 1990s, the movement lost importance during the first term of FHC, in which the strength of the neoliberal discourse reduced the influence of social movements in general (p. 13). Their activities regained dynamism and support during the discussion for a new cable law for Brazil, where they challenged commercial firms, finally including in the law the obligation that private cable operators should include free channels, among them a community channel open to citizens and NGOs (Peruzzo 2001). Although this was an advancement to democratize content and local producers, for analysts like Bolaño (2007) it is far from an industrial audiovisual policy that stimulates a diversity of actors; it even blocked the growth of more community channels. It is worth pointing out that these channels are similar to the new ones stimulated by the new law in Argentina; however, in the latter NGOs can be cable operators and there is no restriction to just one community channel. Contrarily, every legalized channel recognized by the AFSCA has to be included by cable operators. For this reason, I did not cover these channels in Brazil in my research, but rather focused on an example of new media that surpassed the problems of the cable law, illustrating what is missing in Argentina. Furthermore, the FNDC advocated for a legalization of the figure of community radios (Fórum Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação 2006a, p. 13), and has also been active in the discussions around the introduction of digital TV in the country (Fórum
Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação 2006c, p. 33). However, there was little advance during the 1990s to introduce a new law to democratize media, regulating the power of large media groups.

Besides the inheritance of a concentrated and authoritarian media model, another endemic issue that persisted in the Brazilian media system after the dictatorship is the so-called coronelismo eletrônico (electronic colonelism). This concept describes a situation in which a politician has direct or indirect control over media; for instance, by assigning media licenses to those firms who will keep a positive image of him or her (Santos and Caparelli 2005). This practice used by the military to maintain and expand its discourse, was not addressed by new laws once democracy had returned. Research conducted in 2005 showed that 37% of broadcast television generators were controlled by political representatives that had at least been elected in the previous 15 years (Santos and Caparelli 2005). Therefore, the practice was not altered during democracy, since even channels with ‘educational’ aims have been detected to be under the control of politicians of the country (Bolaño 2005). Santos & Caparelli go further and claim that this clientelist practice did not even change with the rise of Lula and the Workers’ Party to power in 2003 (Santos and Caparelli 2005). Taking into account these facts, the idea of free markets for media in Brazil is deceiving, because these ‘electronic colonels’ have already accumulated privileges obtained in previous times that violate the conditions for free competition (Santos and Caparelli 2005). In sum, the inheritances of the dictatorship in the media sector were resilient to democratization processes, as the following assessment of the Brazilian media landscape by a researcher illustrates:

“The end of the military censorship regime led to ultra-liberalism in terms of content, [...] which privileges the interests of a very small group of companies, whose content production capacity is more than enough for their private interests, but obviously limited to the country’s needs concerning its insertion in international markets and to preserve local and national cultures” (Bolaño 2007, p. 104).

The discussions and conflicts around the excessive influence of the Globo network continued and prevailed after the return of democracy. Some critics accuse it of sabotaging the attempt to create a national agency to regulate audiovisual production and cinema (Fórum Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação 2006d, p. 23). Besides, according to the results of a project to map media ownership in Brazil (see Figure 3.66), Globo kept a leading position among national TV networks that diffuse content across the country7, confirming the privileged position that the Globo network has and showing the unequal distribution of media in the hands of few networks. But if market share percentages are taken into account, the current situation is even worse and has not changed much since the dictatorship. During the 2014 World Cup, even the liberal magazine The Economist published an article denouncing the scandalous situation in Brazil, where Globo TV held approximately 50% of market audience shares, a number that is exorbitant even for free market advocates (Economist 2014). For comparison, they cited that in the USA the largest broadcast network, CBS, only has an audience share of 13% of the market. Therefore, high concentration levels and the lack of regulation on what is transmitted has still been a source of tensions, given the misrepresentations of diversity and groups that differ from the elite controlling such media. For example, research showed that even though more than 50% of the Brazilian population is of Afro-descendants or indigenous origin, these groups are scarcely represented

7. The project surveyed 1.511 media controlled either directly by ownership or indirectly through associations by 31 national networks, where Globo is the largest network of this reduced group that control 23% of the surveyed media. The following 6 multimedia networks control 50% of the total, and the remaining 24 networks the remaining 27%.
in mass media (Fórum Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação 2007b, p. 13). Media also promote stereotypes of women, such as through ‘beauty patterns’ to follow or about the reduced spaces where women could succeed in public roles (p. 13).

With the arrival of Lula to power, social movements expected changes in the media sector, but nothing was done to advance toward a new law to democratize media (Fórum Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação 2006d, p. 36). This was a surprise, given that most mass media had a biased and negative image of Lula and his party, even before he came to power, which is explained by researchers as part of a class conflict between the Brazilian elite that owns media networks and the groups supporting the Worker’s Party (Fórum Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação 2007b, p. 6). Despite the several policies introduced to address inequality issues, the concentration of media in private firms remained, but this did not keep other initiatives from dealing with some issues in a precarious way. Indeed, during Lula’s first government, there was a clear conflict of visions between the Ministry of Communication and the Ministry of Culture, because the former was commanded by an ex journalist from Globo that defended the interests of hegemonic firm networks, whereas the latter implemented policies to democratize cultural and communicational practices (Bolaño 2007). In particular the program Cultura Viva (Living Culture), which aimed to decentralize cultural finance and to support community based organizations, began a process of stimulating the adoption and use of digital culture (also named cyberculture) for networking and reinforced free media initiatives in the country, among others, which will be detailed in the next chapter. What is relevant in the scope of this research, is that the Ministry of Culture had a different stance and position than the Ministry of Communication, contributing to discussions and the expansion of the capabilities of the Brazilian population to use ICT for the diffusion, consumption and production of information beyond mass media. This dissemination of ICT implies a new channel in which public opinion is formed, something that researchers clearly detected during the reelection of Lula in 2007, during which he faced a strong opposition of all mass media, but nevertheless emerged victorious (Fórum Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação 2007b, p. 5). According to Rubim (p. 5), this might be related to how popular sectors of Brazil have experienced social, economic, political and cultural changes that opened the door for new ways of
establishing and influencing their worldviews besides what mass media might disseminate.

Nevertheless, the relation with media during Lula’s two terms in power has remained conflicting. For example, in an interview he admitted to have told his wife that “If we want to rule this country, we will not watch TV, we will not read magazines, we will not read newspapers. From then onwards, I have spent half an hour per day conversing with my press advisers, to know which were the news [...] but I did not accept any more to wake up in the morning, turn on the TV and already become contaminated” (Lula da Silva quoted in Sader 2013, p. 14, translated by the author). Such a statement still suggests that the content diffused through mass media is not ‘objective’, which for Lula is a threat to democracy in Brazil, because a “part of media is trying to substitute political parties. That is, the debate that should be done in parliament between parties and society, is being monopolized by the media. It is being made by few columnists in newsrooms, who are all partisans trying to pretend they are impartial” (Lula da Silva quoted in p. 17, translated by the author).

In this context, and after the election of Dilma in 2011, the following year the FNDC and several organizations launched a campaign called “para expressar a liberdade! Uma nova lei para um novo tempo” (to express freedom! a new law for a new time) (Fórum Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação 2013) to put forward a new communications law in Brazil. This included diverse points quite similar to what occurred five years before in Argentina, such as understanding communication as a social right and media democratization as an indispensable process to achieve full democracy (p. 21). The proposal strives for: an increase of social participation in the media, the need to set up limits to concentration patterns, to stimulate national technology and standards, to support community media, to promote content that reflects the cultural and religious diversity in Brazil, among other points (p. 20). But even though in 2011 Dilma promised during her campaign to alter the Brazilian media system, the issue has so far been evaded. Thus, in contrast to the Argentinean case, the sociology of law does not offer much help in the analysis, because after all there has been no new regulatory framework despite the more than 25 years of claims by civil society organizations, spearheaded by the FNDC. Therefore, the current situation can clearly be seen as the superiority of those who benefit from the current order, against the protests and claims from civil society groups, with a ruling party that does not have enough political support to advance the needed changes in the media system.

### 3.5 Concluding Discussion

In this chapter, I have introduced the main contextual factors to explain the state of the media system in Argentina and Brazil. The key ones have been the political changes in both countries, which during the 1970s suffered military dictatorships that left several marks that persisted after the return to democracy. During the 1990s, the expansion of neoliberal policies in the region reduced windows of opportunity to address social and inequality issues, because most decisions were oriented toward the reduction of the state, favoring privatizations and the interests of large private firms. However, since 2003 both countries entered new political trajectories with presidents and political parties in power advocating for a break up with the previous projects, trying instead to expand democratization policies in several areas. These political changes have produced similar vicissitudes in the media systems of both countries. During the 1970s and -80s, they reflected a model based on state intervention to support national development models favoring military dictatorships and allied private media conglomerates. After the return of democracy, the implementation of neoliberal policies deepened the commercial ap-
proach to communications, which led to high concentration patterns in a reduced number of private media groups. As a result, in both countries audiovisual market shares are concentrated in few media networks, like Globo in Brazil and Clarín in Argentina, which consequently have excessive influence in terms of content distribution, neglecting alternative voices and thus challenging the democratic ideal. It is important to point out that these unequal concentration patterns grew out from specific historical processes that despised the diversity of communities and groups advocating for a non state and non private approach to communication. These are important contextual factors, which cannot be omitted, and which delineate the specificities in both of these countries, quite contrary to those in other regions of the world, where state media prevail. Accordingly, the high concentration patterns illustrate the limits that approaches advocating for a free market approach to media have in countries where regulations are missing, hard to enforce or biased in favor of minority elite groups.

In this context, many citizens of Argentina and Brazil expected that the election of presidents challenging neoliberal policies would change their media system toward a more democratic model, however, these changes have neither been so immediate nor without shortcomings. Indeed, despite the policies for social inclusion and reduction of inequality in Brazil, the ruling party has not been able to legally address the high concentration patterns and the lack of representation of its diverse communities. Nonetheless, new cultural policies have strengthened social movements and other collective organizations thanks to the expansion of ICT, internet access and new media, which have, to some degree, challenged mainstream media structures. Conversely, Argentina passed a new audiovisual communication services law, but only almost at the end of the first decade of the 21st century. This project aims to finally democratize media to previously excluded groups, and regulate concentration patterns in terms of media ownership, but not without hurdles. Under those circumstances, both countries have been experiencing different degrees of change in their cultural and media system, which introduced policies that gave windows of opportunity to stimulate and strengthen nonprofit experiences, challenging the predominant commercial approach, and increasingly debating the role that culture and media should play in their relatively young democracies. These national discussions are connected with old and current global ones, which influenced (either in adoption or rejection) the local discourses. This will be the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 4

Culture and Media Policy
Discourses in Argentina and Brazil

“To speak is to do something – something other than to express what one thinks” (Foucault 1972, p. 230)

The objective of this chapter is to describe mainstream and counter policy discourses that link culture, economy and social issues in Argentina and Brazil. I shall show that both countries have a group of policy discourses that consider culture mostly as an economic resource, whereas a second group opposes this bounded definition and instead considers culture as a resource for other types of objectives beyond mere profits. This contrast among policy discourses is relevant for the rest of the thesis, because I shall show how the first group, which is actively advocated by international development organizations and industrialized countries from the ‘Global North’, discriminates against resource-scarce or minority groups, despite its claim to contribute to ‘development’. Conversely, the second group of discourses does not have such international support as the former, but is definitely better tuned to inclusion objectives, tackling the issues that resource scarce groups face in the area of culture and media.

My starting point to detect the different policy discourses in the area of culture in Argentina and Brazil was to follow the key term discussed in international discussions on culture and development, the ‘creative industries’. I shall show that this concept and other closely associated ones, such as ‘creative economy’ and ‘cultural industries’, imply specific policy discourses encouraging the commercialization of cultural sectors (including media), which neglect other types of practices. These discourses were introduced and (re)produced in both countries by different actors, aiming at specific objectives and intended power-effects. As explained in chapter 2, the analysis is based on the application of SKAD, because it suggests different tools and procedures to analyze knowledge production and circulation in different institutional spheres of contemporary societies (Keller 2013). Thus, it is based on a social constructivist perspective that states that our understanding of the world is not completely objective, but is instead mediated by systems of categories that are the product of social construction processes (Keller 2013).

In particular, in this chapter I will apply the suggestions by SKAD to unveil the phenomenal structure of these discourses (Keller 2013), in other words, how they refer to a specific combination of elements to define the structure of how cultural policies (including media) ought to be organized. For instance, I shall make evident the actors that (re)produce the discourses, their objectives, their addresses,
the subject positions they offer, among other dimensions (Keller 2013). These allow to compare the implicit classification schemes that the policy discourses make to fulfill their aims, which together with knowledge on the local situation in each case allows to understand the implicit power-effects of the policy discourses. For unraveling such constructions, I borrowed the coding methodology from grounded theory and applied it to a data corpus, which was built based on information gathered during fieldwork in Argentina and Brazil. The data corpus includes, on the one hand, interviews with key actors that (re)produce such policy discourses, like current and former policy makers, practitioners and academics. On the other hand, it consists of varied types of documents, such as official reports, previous local research articles, press articles, books, laws, etc., which are related to the policy discourses. The analysis of this material consisted in coding and building key dimensions of contrast among discourses, which where first selected based on discussions in the literature about such commercial discourses, and then thoroughly and opened up based on the particular experiences of Argentina and Brazil I will analyze in the first subsection of this chapter. In the second subsection, I will discuss the main differences between the two groups of policy discourses, focusing on tensions between them, which sets the stage for the analysis of other key dimensions of media for social transformation in the next chapters.

4.1 Culture and Media Policy Discourses

Table 4.1 summarizes the main dimensions of the six policy discourses that I shall describe in this section. They are divided into two groups according to their aims. The first four policy discourses share the understanding that culture is predominantly an economic resource that contributes to economic growth. Therefore, they share similar aspects, though with nuances, with the creative industries, the creative economy and the cultural industries policy discourses at the international level that I described in chapter 1. For this reason, I shall call them creative economy policy discourses. Conversely, the remaining two discourses offer a different perspective on cultural policies, which think of them as a resource to prioritize other issues, beyond purely economic objectives. For example, the access to cultural consumption, distribution and production by stressing the contribution of culture to human rights. In that sense, they represent an opposition to the former in many of the dimensions in the table; thus, I shall call them counter policy discourses. By way of introduction, in the next paragraphs I will briefly sketch the main contrasting features of these two groups of policy discourses, that I will then detail with empirical data in the following subsections.

The aim is the first clear dimension of contrast; while the first group puts the central focus on economic growth, the latter stresses its contribution to address social inequality issues. Indeed, these central differences in terms of objectives lead to further variations with respect to the actors (re)producing the policy discourses and its addressess. As regards the former, the main difference among the two groups is that the first one shows different combinations of governments, firms, the ‘creative class’, academics, consultants and international organizations. In contrast, in the second group different organizations from civil society played the prominent role to advance the policies in tandem with national governments. As regards the latter, the first group is mostly aimed at firms (both large and small and medium sized enterprises), including artists and producers, which would make part of what Florida called the ‘creative class’. In contrast, the second group addresses nongovernmental organizations and different types of communities, previously excluded from cultural policies, such as indigenous or Afro-descendant communities.
These differences also explain how the two groups differ in terms of the subject positions they offer. The first group of discourses disseminates knowledge in such a way that those trained in any of the selected cultural sectors can become cultural/creative entrepreneurs, which involves a diffusion of management and commercial practices. Therefore, they assume that the unique way to organize the production of cultural products and services does not differ much from any other type of business. In contrast, the second group encourages different types of skills and knowledge to advance NGO projects, where the aims are not for profit. Consequently, the practices of cultural production depart from the business oriented perspective.

With respect to dispositives, a common one in the creative economy policy discourses has been the creation of observatories, which elaborate statistics to justify the ‘existence’ of a concept that fictitiously embraces a heterogeneity of industrial sectors. Besides, there have been others that depend on each specific policy discourse. For instance, the most important media organization in Brazil, Globo, has been using its channels to disseminate the commercial perspective on culture and communications. Additionally, the construction of creative industries clusters, incubators or massive events have also contributed to the (re)production of this policy discourse, as if it were something ‘natural’. The counter policy discourses relied on new government agencies and specific programs to (re)produce their policy discourses, and in the case of Argentina of a new law.

The dimension related to the protection of knowledge is another axis of variation among policy discourses. The first four share the need to protect knowledge through the use of intellectual property and by standard means: copyrights, patents, trademarks, etc., which resembles the original DCMS definition. However, there is variation among the first four policy discourses on the strictness to include IPR or not, and the level of enforcement of the laws protecting these rights. In contrast, the Brazilian counter policy discourse has been supporting NGOs and communities that have advanced the use of different mechanisms of encouraging knowledge sharing, such as Creative Commons, or free sharing of knowledge. As regards the Argentinean counter policy discourse, it has not defined a position with respect to this point.

An important dimension of contrast among the policy discourses particularly relevant for this research is the different positions that they take with respect to media. Except for the cultural industries policy discourse, the remaining three of the first group do not take into account any of the political and normative discussions on freedom of speech, media democratization and media ownership concentration, which, as I explained in chapter 3, are particularly problematic in the two countries under study. In contrast, the second group directly addresses this issue by supporting the media projects of a diversity of organizations neglected by the first commercial discourses in order to advance media democratization. This is notably the case of the policy discourse in Argentina, which also legislates to regulate what it considers excessive media regulation patterns.

In brief, these two groups of discourses are a good example of the contradictions that I mentioned in the introduction between ‘neoliberal’ policies and the new-left ‘progressive’ governments in Argentina and Brazil. As I shall show in the next subsections, national governments have been supporting both groups of policy discourses, with different emphasis through time. This in part is related to the context in which the policy discourses emerged. In particular, the first group benefits from the capitalist economic system that has been ordering the activities of firms in both countries, in any sector toward
profits for its survival, which, as I explained in Section 3.3.2, has been particularly brutal during the
dictatorships of the 1970s. Thus, an extension to the cultural sector has already been in practice before
a policy was created for them; for instance, cinema, radio, TV, books, etc. Additionally, the ‘neolib-
eral’ policies of the 1990s furthered this position, by questioning any type of state or nongovernmental
organization as ‘non-efficient’ in comparison to private actors based on profits. Therefore, the policy
discourses justify and reinforce an already existing practice. In contrast, the second group has been a
policy innovation after the return of democracy to each country, because it challenges the bias against
NGOs, resource-scarce and different types of communities discriminated by the commercial discourse.
For these reasons, the selection of case studies that I did and the further analysis in the next chapters
focuses on the second group of policy discourses to show what has been kept off the radar.
4.1.1 Culture as an Economic Resource

In chapter 1, I synthesized the policy discourses advanced by the UK and UNCTAD, the creative industries and the creative economy respectively. In both cases, these policy discourses instrumentalize cultural activities towards economic ends, and have been important experiences, directly and indirectly, in shaping the policies for the cultural sectors in Argentina and Brazil. I shall show that these policies want to basically stimulate economic growth, by arguing that the promotion of what they call ‘creative’ or ‘cultural’ sectors is an excellent strategy, because they can generate employment and income through exports and national commerce of cultural goods and services. Therefore, these policies constitute a discourse in which culture is just another economic resource in the more general equation for stimulating economic growth. Although this contribution might be true, I shall show this position is problematic, because it neglects resource-scarce groups from cultural policies, and in particular, it does not tend to question the issues in the media sector existing in both countries. Additionally, I shall remark the different actors, subject positions and other features of this group of discourses in each country, acknowledging the variations with respect to the original one emanating from the UK and UNCTAD.

4.1.1.1 Creative Industries and the Creative Economy in Brazil

The creative industries policy discourse emerged in the UK, considering cultural activities as just another economic sector based on the skill and talent of individuals (creative entrepreneurs), aimed to generate wealth through intellectual property. The policy makers that I interviewed in Brazil agreed that this concept ‘arrived’ to the country in 2004, when UNCTAD organized a high-level panel on creative industries and development in the city of São Paulo (UNCTAD 2004), the Brazilian cultural hub. After that event, UNCTAD received the mandate from representatives of countries all over the world to work on this topic and to promote it internationally. At that time, President Lula showed interest to host an international center in Salvador de Bahia, Brazil, to study creative industries worldwide, but in practice this proposal did not progress and neither did the creative industries policy discourse to the national level during his administrations (2003-2010). Since then, the term employed to name such policy discourse varied, progressively incorporated under the umbrella concept of ‘creative economy’, but still siding with the business orientation of the original DCMS perspective. This is clear in the three types of actors that adopted and advocated the policy discourse, despite its lack of support at the national level: private firms that already considered culture as a business; federations of industries; and local governments of large urban cities.

The Globo network is the most clear example of a private firm adopting the terms ‘creative industries’ and later ‘creative economy’. This is not a surprise, because it matches the commercial model of the organization to operate in media and in other cultural sectors. For example, during 2013 the Globo University (Globo 2014), which is a project of Globo to diffuse knowledge through different types of courses and workshops, organized an event to discuss how to ‘tropicalize’ the creative economy concept, or in other words, to discuss its adaptation to the Brazilian context (Globo 2013). During the event that I witnessed, representatives of Globo made evident their orientation: The aim of the creative economy is to make profits, although not all the invited panelists agreed with such a perspective. The publications of the organization go in the same direction; for instance, their magazine for Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SME) published several articles on the creative economy and how to make money
Table 4.1: Comparison of the main dimensions of contrast among policy discourses in Argentina and Brazil, dividing them into two groups. The first four comprehend culture mostly as an economic resource, while the last two stress the uses of culture to address social issues.
with creative sectors (Adán Gil 2012). Figure 4.1 shows the front cover of the magazine, which has the subtitle “Creative economy: how to earn money with fashion, videogames, design, blogs, music, cinema, gastronomy ...”, which makes evident the commercial orientation of culture they advocate, reinforced by the content of the magazine that tells the stories of diverse ‘creative entrepreneurs’, besides citing the creative ‘gurus’: Florida and his concept of the ‘creative class’, together with John Howkins and his idea of the ‘creative economy’. However, the front cover also implicitly suggests what sector of the economy it is directed to, trained and white skinned sectors of the population, leaving aside most part of the Brazilian population. Given the importance of this media firm in terms of audience reach in Brazil, it is worth pointing out that despite the ‘creative industries’ or ‘creative economy’ were not a policy discourse, this firm has been contributing to the discourse (re)production, such as the diffusion of the subject position of the ‘creative entrepreneur’, who based on his skills and talents can advance and commercialize a product or service in a cultural sector. The way the magazine portraits the sector also makes evident the connection with the concept of ‘creative class’, which distinguishes divides between those that are ‘creative’ and those that are not. Taking into account that this firm is the main opponent to media democratization initiatives in Brazil, is no surprise its adoption of a commercial approach to culture and media, such as the creative industries, because it helps to hide the issue of media ownership concentration. After all, if the purpose of the creative industries is to obtain profits through creative products and services, without caring about the means or competition regulations, the definition precisely matches the activities of the Globo network during decades, legitimizing its business strategy. Indeed, this perspective is clear in the journal of the multimedia firm, O Globo, which was one of the first online newspapers in Brazil to introduce a paid subscription to access its content. This practice is in synchrony with the original definition of the creative industries, because the access to information on the internet is fictitiously limited, making evident their perspective that it is just another commodity, quite contrary to the perspective of the second group of policy discourses that considers it a public good. For these reasons, the medias of this Brazilian conglomerate can be understood as a dispositive to advance an approach striving for the commercialization of culture and media, in synchrony with the international policy discourse emanating from the British experience.

Apart from Globo, the commercial use of culture represented by the creative industries has been attractive to the most influential federations of industries in Brazil. The most clear example is the Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (FIESP - Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo), which groups industrial organizations from the most economically developed state in the country that represents 32.6% of national GDP (IBGE 2013b). The FIESP (2012) has been active in supporting the creative economy by organizing events and conferences to inspire new business in the area, which are discursive practices to (re)produce the creative industries discourse. Similarly, the Federação das Indústrias do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (FIRJAN - Federation of Firms of the State of Rio de Janeiro), has adopted the creative industries, and contributed to the (re)production of the discourse with the elaboration of the first statistical studies of the Brazilian national creative industries. In these reports, they employed the definitions proposed by UNCTAD, and also included new sectors such as biotechnology, and more generally, research & development (SISTEMA FIRJAN 2012). Although the selection of sectors they made might be questionable, the results they found have been replicated in Brazilian mass media, such as Globo (Carneiro and Cavalcanti 2014), which tend to (re)produce the economic rhetoric of the discourse in terms of higher rates of growth of ‘creative industries’ and higher salaries of ‘creatives’. For instance, the following fragments encourage further policies for the sector:
Figure 4.1: Cover from the magazine “Pequenas Empresas & Grandes Negócios” dedicated to the creative economy. The translated subtitle says “Creative economy: how to earn money with fashion, video games, design, blogs, music, cinema, gastronomy ...”. Source: (Adán Gil 2012).
“In 2011, 243,000 firms comprised the core of the creative industries. Based on wages generated by these companies, it is estimated that the creative core generates a gross domestic product equal to R $ 110 billion, or 2.7% of what is produced in Brazil. These results place Brazil among the world’s top creative producers, surpassing Spain, Italy and the Netherlands.

[...] The formal labor market of the creative core consists of 810,000 professionals, representing 1.7% of Brazilian workers.

[...] With regard to compensation, while the average monthly income of Brazilian workers was R $ 1,733 in 2011, creative professionals reached R $ 4,693, almost three times the national level” (SISTEMA FIRJAN 2012, p. 5, translated by the author).

Third, different cities in Brazil adopted at some governmental level the creative industries as a term for cultural policies, among which I consider Rio de Janeiro and Recife. These are good examples to show the limits of the concept, because they are cities known for their problems in terms of poverty and social exclusion. The former is globally known due to the existence of large slums next to wealthy neighborhoods, whereas the latter is one of the most unequal cities of Brazil with a GINI of 0,68 (PNUD 2005). In both cases, the situation is evident for any foreigner, who realizes in the former the atrocious inequalities between the poorer northern part of the city, and the wealthiest south, or in the latter any traveler arriving by airplane easily perceives during the landing that the coast has luxurious skyscrapers similar to those in Miami, but most of the rest of the city is composed by poorer, slum like neighborhoods. In this context, the magazine Época, owned by the Globo network, portrayed in an article that Rio de Janeiro is “giving a lesson to Brazil” on how to reemerge as an economic and cultural center (Mendonça 2013), thanks to the support of the city’s creative sectors, such as architecture, cinema, fashion, music, soap operas, sports, tourism. Nevertheless, the photos and people presented in the article are all part of the elite ‘creative class’ of the city; such as famous actresses or singers. What is worse, it does not make any mention of the diversity of other popular artists or initiatives that exist in the city and in the state of Rio de Janeiro; an omission that suggests their disregard for cultural activities not directed purely at economic profits. This suggests a classification scheme of what type of cultural creativity is ‘relevant’ - for profits - and how the rest does not require much attention. At the policy level, the state of Rio de Janeiro adopted the concept of creative industries with the creation of the incubator Rio Criativo, which aims to support ‘creative entrepreneurs’ by providing the needed financial, marketing, among other business skills (Rio Criativo 2013). This can be understood as a material dispositive to materialize and stimulate the business practices that the policy discourse requires for the cultural sector.

As regards the city of Recife, the town hosts Porto Digital (Digital Harbor), a high tech cluster dedicated to ICT, hosting at least 230 firms and 7,000 workers (British Council 2015). In 2013, Porto Mídia was inaugurated in this cluster, which is an instrument to support the creative economy in the sectors of multimedia, design, music, videogames, cinema and photography. In this place, inhabitants of Recife receive technical training and workshops on these sectors and in entrepreneurship to contribute to their respective markets, which is also a way to (re)produce the policy discourse. However, the objectives of the program do not make any link with the obvious poverty problems in the city. My visit to the events organized by the organization once again shows the pattern present in Rio de Janeiro, the presence of mostly white skinned and well trained sectors of the population, and an ignorance of other local and traditional cultural expressions. To illustrate the features of this project in Recife, I cite...
below notes from my fieldwork notebook, which illustrate my perceptions of the fourth “seminar on the creative economy”, organized by Porto Mídia in 2014:

“The event took place in a house that from the outside seemed old, but from the inside was quite modern, with security guards and air conditioning. I paid 40R (approx. 13 US$) for the event. Around 30 persons were there, just covering half of the available spaces in the room. Those presenting were professionals (designers, architects) and academics studying creative sectors. Additionally, those from the audience who asked questions were students or professionals, well dressed, suggesting that they belonged to the educated class of the city.

The content of the discussions was not new to me, much had to do with the UK experience in the field, and also to the ideal of creating an entrepreneurial hub in the city in creative sectors. The image I received was of a sort of Silicon Valley like zone, but dedicated to creative industries. Therefore, the main concerns were how to create products or services with added value that would be sold in national and international markets, and discussions on the management of these processes and the specificities of creative processes that business models need to deal with, because they are not so easily planned in advance. Although a member of the audience questioned the creative industries concept as putting the economy over art (or more generally culture as I refer to in the research), the consensus of the presenters was on the importance of the economic aspect. The discussions made me realize that here the policy is just a strategy to encourage qualified inhabitants to get an opportunity to work on what they have been trained for, and stop them from migrating to other urban cities in Brazil or abroad. Thus, the dilemma expressed by the ‘creatives’ in the audience was that they either become creative entrepreneurs or otherwise, they would be jobless” (Fieldwork notes, 26/02/2014, Recife, Brazil).

These observations make evident that the promotion of creative industries and creative entrepreneurs can contribute to employment generation, but mostly restricted to the skilled, well-trained sectors of the population. The case of the city of Recife, with its high social contrasts, makes evident that adopting the international version of the creative industries policy discourse gives a very limited version of how they could contribute to a broader understanding of ‘development’. As I stated in chapter 1, the problem is that by design, the policy discourse is aimed to well-trained inhabitants in one of the creative sectors, but neglects all those who do not belong to such ‘elite’ groups, which in the context of Recife, Rio de Janeiro and many other Brazilian cities, covers a large section of the population. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that a strict application of the creative industries policy discourse as emanating from foreign organizations only creates an island of excellence within a sea of poverty, not enlarging access to opportunities, reinforcing social exclusion processes, and making evident the inadequacy of this market only approach to culture to achieve broader ‘development’ goals. However, it is true that the industrial actors that have been willing to adopt the original version of the DCMS of the creative industries were not successful in establishing a national law to easily advance a copy & paste version to defend their interests in the commercialization of culture. As I shall show in the next subsection, there were attempts to adapt it to the local context, which paved the way for the Brazilian creative economy national plan.

Creative Economy Plan in Brazil

After Dilma Rousseff assumed power in 2011, the new Minister of Culture, Ana de Holanda, cre-
ated the Secretaria de Economia Creativa (SEC - Creative Economy Secretary), which had as an aim to “broaden participation of culture in national socioeconomic sustainable development” (Ministério da Cultura 2012, p. 39). This government department introduced the concept of the creative economy into national policies, by elaborating a national plan to encourage the creative economy (Ministério da Cultura 2012), which in several sections acknowledges the influence of UNCTAD and UNESCO on the subject. For instance, the main challenges that the plan proposes to address are similar to the recommendations suggested in UNCTAD’s (2010) report gathering information and data about the creative economy, stimulating creative entrepreneurship, offering training in ‘creative competences’, strengthening the infrastructure for the creation, production, distribution and consumption of creative goods and services, and finally, creating or appropriating legal frameworks for creative sectors (Ministério da Cultura 2012). UNESCO’s influence is evident on the stress over the importance of ‘cultural diversity’, highlighting its relevance for Brazil given the wide variety of languages, indigenous communities, environments, etc., in the country (Ministério da Cultura 2012). Additionally, the plan establishes a selection of creative sectors of interest based on the previous categories offered by UNCTAD and UNESCO1, including television (Ministério da Cultura 2012). What is important to highlight is that the plan is a sort of dispositive, because it became the cornerstone for the expansion of the concept and associated practices to Brazilian states and municipalities.

However, in two important aspects the plan departs from UNCTAD’s original strategy. First, as the following quote shows, it tried to adapt the concept to the Brazilian context by stressing in its organizing principles ‘inclusion’ and ‘sustainability’, trying to connect, at least discursively, to the project of the solidarity economy and to tackle inequality challenges (Ministério da Cultura 2012).

“The Brazilian creative economy will only develop in a consistent way with the national reality if it incorporates in its conceptualization the importance of: the cultural diversity of the country; the perception that sustainability is a factor of local and regional development; innovation as a vector of cultural development of vanguard expressions; and finally, the principle of inclusion as the base for a co-operative and solidarity economy” (p. 33).

Second, the plan has a permeable position toward intellectual property rights, as the following fragment transmits: “It is very restrictive to think that ‘creative sectors’ are only those that generate economic value through the exploitation of intellectual property rights, which is not the unique way to define the value of creative goods and services” (p. 22). This position puts a distance between the strict one from the DCMS on creative industries, and the favorable one, though not strict, of UNCTAD’s reports. Indeed, the co-ordinator of the SEC confirmed this during a personal interview by saying that “for us, copyright is not a necessary condition for a creative economy” (C. Leitão, 09/03/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Fortaleza, Brazil).

Despite the broad original definitions that suggested an interest on guiding the creative economy beyond a pure commercial orientation, by the end of 2013 the practical implementation of the plan had been reduced to the introduction of two policy instruments: the measurement of the creative economy and the promotion of creative entrepreneurs (SEC/MinC 2013). As regards measuring the creative economy, the Ministry of Culture funded eight creative economy observatories in distinct large cities, such as Rio de Janeiro, Brasília and Manaus, among others, with the aim to collect and provide data

---

1. The document defines the following five categories, each with different ‘creative sectors’ within: a) heritage: material and intangible heritage, archives and museums; b) cultural expressions: crafts, popular cultures, indigenous cultures, Afro-Brazilian cultures, visual arts, digital art; c) Entertainment arts: dance, music, circus, theater; d) audiovisual and press: cinema, television and radio, print media; e) cultural and functional creations: fashion, design and architecture.
about the creative sectors in different Brazilian states (SEC/MinC 2013). From a discourse analysis perspective, these observatories can be understood as dispositives to institutionalize the policy discourse, because they create buildings or departments within universities dedicated to measure the ‘creative economy’ as if it were something real. Furthermore, these observatories will contribute to the economic rhetoric of the discourse, by highlighting their contribution to national and regional GDP and employment.

As regards encouraging entrepreneurship, the Ministry of Culture launched public tenders to support incubators for creative entrepreneurs and free training programs in the creative sectors (SEC/MinC 2013). Furthermore, Brazil collaborated with the UK, which through the British Council created the program Transform to “connect artists, arts organizations and governmental bodies from the UK and Brazil with projects that support training for arts professionals and provide opportunities for new talent” (British Council 2014, translated by the author). Additionally, they explain that “[...] through our creative economy projects, we create a network of artists and entrepreneurs capable of promoting sustainable growth in the creative sector” (translated by the author). Among its activities, they coordinated several training workshops across large cities in Brazil, such as Brasilia, Porto Alegre, Salvador, Sao Paulo, Recife and Rio de Janeiro, to diffuse the skills necessary to becoming a creative entrepreneur (British Council 2013). Figure 4.2 shows the advertisements distributed for these events, where the training offers knowledge to creative entrepreneurs for their businesses. For example, one of its aims was to teach how to prepare a business plan by following the ‘Creative Enterprise Toolkit’ developed by Nesta, a UK charity dedicated to stimulating innovation (Mini 2014). This shows, on the one hand, how the Ministry of Culture implemented mechanisms to diffuse knowledge for the Brazilian population to ‘occupy’ the subject position of a ‘creative entrepreneur’, which requires knowledge on business plans, financial organization, marketing, etc. In other words, key knowledge to turn a cultural practice into a business. On the other hand, it makes evident the role of the British Council in propagating the idea of the creative industries and its business oriented version of culture, which in fact is contrary to the ‘inclusion’ and ‘sustainability’ principles declared in the national creative economy plan. Indeed, critics have pointed out the shortcomings of this influence of the British Council, as the following quote from a Brazilian consultant who worked for UNCTAD illustrates: “In Brazil, we started working with other models, but the British Council would just sell theirs. They do every sort of thing here and finance activities as long as they are using their model” (Brazilian UNCTAD’s Consultant, 07/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Sao Paulo, Brazil).

It is important to emphasize what the previous two policy instruments have not taken into account. In relation with the guiding principles of the creative economy plan, there has been no instrument designed to directly address issues of social exclusion, or to foster cultural diversity or sustainability. With respect to media, although the plan speaks about the need of ‘new or appropriate legal frameworks’, it makes no reference to the serious issues of ownership concentration nor the movements of media organizations striving for other types of policies beyond those just focused on for-profit firms. Consequently, these omissions suggest that the creative economy policy discourse in Brazil, despite the efforts for a local adaptation, has kept the emphasis on culture just as an economic resource. Indeed, the phenomenal structure shown in Table 4.1 coincides with the previous creative industries policy discourse, which was heavily influenced by foreign experiences with no adaptations. Several of the interviewees working in civil society organizations shared this interpretation, and assessed the creative economy approach negatively. One of the reasons is that even though the principles orienting
Figure 4.2: The advertisement says: “The training that helps you to plan, develop and communicate your business”. Translated by the author. Source: Transform program, British Council.
the plan might differ from those of the original concepts emanating from international organizations, the language used still acts as a barrier, it draws boundaries for action. For example, concepts such as ‘creative entrepreneur’ or ‘sustainability’ or ‘cultural products and services’ were employed, which, at the local level, generally associated with an approach oriented to the commercialization of culture, and thus, they were received with suspicion by civil society organizations that have been precisely trying to invent new ways of doing things, as the next quote suggests, uttered by an interviewee who works with social entrepreneurship projects in the city of Ubatuba, São Paulo:

“They attempted a synthesis between creative industries and a bit of cultural diversity, but the vocabulary that was adopted always alludes to the market, the basic document says creative economy occurs when culture turns into a product” (social entrepreneur, 29/10/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Ubatuba, Brazil).

Another point important to remark is the conflict that this policy discourse had with one of the pre-existing cultural policies, the Cultura Viva, in terms of the definition of recipients. As I shall show in the next section, the latter explicitly tackles social inclusion by prioritizing resource-scarce groups; conversely, the creative economy plan only speaks of ‘creative entrepreneurs’ or ‘creative workers’, making invisible the asymmetries to take that subject position. This was already delineated during the inaugural speech of the Minister of Culture in Brazil that introduced the creative economy, Ana de Holanda, who expressed in her inaugural address that “to create will be the center of the solar system of our cultural policies and of our daily tasks, because of a very simple reason: there is no art without artists” (Culture e Mercado 2011, translated by the author). Those siding with previous policies understood this statement as a return of the importance of artists to cultural policies, a position they had challenged, understanding artists as those members of the elite ‘creative class’ with more resources (financial, knowledge, relations, etc.) than others, and who, through these advantages, could impose their priorities irrespective of issues of social change. Therefore, the vague language employed to define the addressees, shares the same shortcomings of the original creative industries policy discourse I described in the introduction and in the previous section.

A final contradiction that I want to acknowledge is related to intellectual property rights. Before the introduction of the creative economy plan, the Ministry of Culture had openly advocated for a change in the intellectual property rights framework in Brazil and the use of alternative licenses, such as Creative Commons, which are not opposite to copyrights, but that at least give authors alternative ways of distributing their works. Indeed, the nonprofit organization offers different types of licenses that are supposed to allow users to change the copyright terms “[...] from the default of ‘all rights reserved’ to ‘some rights reserved’” (Creative Commons 2015). Nonetheless, the new Minister of Culture that introduced the creative economy plan stopped these previous policies, which were understood by several civil society organizations as a return of the lobby of industries to support a strict protection of IPRs. Although the latter is not mentioned in the creative economy plan, the decisions and the speeches of the Minister of Culture created such a perception that had a negative impact on the reception of the whole idea of the creative economy.

In sum, the adoption of the creative economy policy discourse at the national level in Brazil tried to make a synthesis of the foreign concept with the local context. However, the policy instruments used to implement the creative economy plan and the language employed in the creative economy document, still put the priority on the economic use of culture. For example, the approach speaks broadly of ‘creative entrepreneurs’ and ‘creative workers’, disregarding community culture, inequality
and poverty challenges that Brazil faces. For these reasons, it is questionable that this approach can become a ‘sustainable socioeconomic development’ option, but just a limited economic policy for ‘creative sectors’.

### 4.1.1.2 Cultural Industries versus Creative Industries in Argentina

In Argentina, the cultural industries and the creative industries have been the names of two of the most influential cultural policies, but used in different levels of government and introduced by opposing political parties.

In the middle of the 1990s, Octavio Getino, a film maker, pioneered the advocacy of the need to study and promote the ‘cultural industries’ of Argentina at the political level. For many of the interviewees, this helped to visualize the economic contribution that professionals working in cultural sectors had, and displaced the prevailing understanding of cultural policies just directed to encourage fine arts. In one of the first reports about Argentinean cultural industries, Getino defined them as those industries “[...] dedicated to produce and sell, with industrial criterias, goods and services specifically to meet and/or promote cultural demands for purposes of economic, ideological and social reproduction” (Getino 2003, p. 22). At that time, the definition covered the following sectors: publishing, audiovisual (TV, cinema videogames), music, advertising, supporting industries of the previous ones (those that build the necessary materials and equipment) and ICT related firms (Getino 2003). Therefore, the definition follows UNESCO’s approach, leaving aside the negative connotation that the culture industry originally had in the work of Adorno & Horkheimer, and focusing on the promotion of circuits of creation-production-distribution-consumption of culture (Getino 2008). It can also be argued that the economic importance given to these cultural sectors shares similar aims with the definition of creative industries (Getino 2008). However, the policy discourse Getino advocated for had two important differences. First, in his works he continuously stressed the importance of cultural industries for national and Latin American integration objectives (Getino 2008, 2003). Second, Getino (2008) recognized the relevance of authors’ rights as a way to protect the products and services of these sectors, but he was also aware of the power imbalances that this international system has, favoring those states and organizations with more economic resources at the expense of poorer ones.

The ideas disseminated by Getino were adopted as policies at the national level and in the capital city, which created governmental agencies dedicated to support the cultural industries in the areas of cultural policies. However, after the economic crisis of 2001, the cultural industries suffered a reduction in consumption, reduced employment, and a concentration of cultural SME mostly in transnational enterprises (Getino 2003). At the same time, the country had a political conflict at the cultural policy level, because the person in charge of the Secretary of Culture stated that culture was not a priority in the context of the economic crisis (Cornejo 2004). Indeed, these led to a couple of years without radical innovations in terms of cultural policies, until 2009 when a new management took charge of the Secretary of Culture. That year, this administration launched the program Mercado de Industrias Culturales Argentinas (Market for Argentinean Cultural Industries - MICA), which had the following aims:

“MICA is the first initiative in Argentina that concentrates in one place the different activities of cultural industries in order to generate business, exchange information and present their production to main worldwide referents. The sectors involved are: performing arts, audiovisual, design, publishing, music and video games. Producers and
**artists** will have the possibility, for four days, to meet major companies in cultural industries around the world and open new business opportunities. **MICA has stands with cultural productions of all provinces and the presence of the whole sector through business chambers, national institutions and SMEs.** A place where producers and artists can meet the main referents and companies of cultural industries in the world, through business rounds, conferences, seminars and presentations of live entertainment. **The event aims to strengthen the internal market and to position Argentine Cultural Industries in the global market, highlighting their quality and competitive prices** (MICA 2013).

This quotation illustrates the main features of the program, which retook and reinforced the original idea of supporting cultural industries that Getino pioneered. MICA’s aim is to encourage the commercialization of cultural sectors in the country by promoting business skills and opportunities for producers and artists. To achieve this, the Ministry of Culture organized five massive events in different provinces of the country, which according to state publicity gathered 2.572 firms of the cultural sectors, organizing 9,873 business rounds (MICA 2013); and the process ended with the largest event in the city of Buenos Aires with 1,700 firms and 4,500 business rounds (MICA 2013). Although these events had different workshops related to specific knowledge of each of the cultural sectors to increase their professionalization and to connect different cultural producers and artists (Hamawi 2013), it is important to remark that for the organizers the most important aspect of these events were the business rounds (Hamawi 2013), as the previous stress on their number suggests. The main reason for this priority is the contribution of such rounds to strengthen the economic side of the cultural sectors, which also makes evident the synchrony between the creative industries and the cultural industries discourses in terms of economic ends. Furthermore, the MICA has become institutionalized, in the sense of Berger & Luckmann (1966), because the ruling party continuously arranged such meetings, and for this reason I shall argue that it has also become a dispositive for reinforcing the cultural industries policy discourse, at least during the administration of Cristina Kirchner. For example, by disseminating knowledge for more artists and producers in the creative sectors to become entrepreneurs (Ministerio de Cultura de Argentina 2015), which I call cultural entrepreneurs to differentiate them from the subject-position of the creative industries. Although they coincide in the methods and aims, I keep this difference because the cultural industries policy discourse aims to promote regional entrepreneurs, trying to address the existing regional imbalances that the remaining three policy discourses neglect.

This goes hand in hand with the activities of the Argentinean National System of Cultural Information, which similarly to the creative industries observatories in Brazil, is dedicated to elaborate statistics about the cultural industries in the country. This helps to disseminate quantitative data that reinforces the economic rhetoric present in most of the material produced by the government about the cultural industries. For example, the following quote shows an extract from a magazine elaborated by the Ministry of Culture:

“For decades, culture was just an activity merely associated to leisure and recreation. Far from this consideration, today culture is considered as an inexhaustible source of entertainment, learning, pleasure, and primarily of value, (both symbolic and economic). Cultural industries generate wealth and employment, and public policies in the matter have managed to strengthen the cultural rights of Argentines. Since 2003, the national cultural GDP grows at an average annual rate of 14.4%, and in 2012 reached 3.8%. Put in relation to other sectors, cultural activities contributed to GDP in 2010 more than the supply of electricity, gas
and water (2.50%), mining (1.21%), and fishing (0.11%). […] Cultural industries also create employment, which has grown in a sustained way during the last years. In 2009, 246,011 jobs were recorded from the cultural sectors, 35% more than in 2004 (the year in which statistics recollection began), demonstrating the vitality and centrality of the area” (Secretaría de Cultura de la Nación Argentina 2013).

Therefore, the previous statement elucidates the similarities of the cultural industries approach with the creative industries or the creative economy, because both express that the commercialization of products and services from cultural sectors can generate economic wealth and employment. Similarly, the addressee of ‘producers and artists’, hides and neglects minority and resource-scarce groups that cannot become professional cultural entrepreneurs. Notwithstanding, MICA kept the cultural industries concern to encourage Latin American integration processes through cultural exchange. Indeed, in 2014 the idea of MICA inspired the creation of the Mercado de Industrias Culturales del Sur (MICSUR - Southern Cultural Industry Market), which is a similar program that encourages the commercialization of culture within several Latin American countries, and also with foreign ones. But by keeping the same language and discursive structure as the MICA, it suffers the same problems of only addressing members of the creative class, neglecting cultural expressions of resource-scarce or minority groups of the countries of the region.

As regards authors’ rights, the following words from the coordinator of the MICA illustrate the government’s position: “In the context of a transition from an analog to a digital way of producing and consuming culture, we have the policy of defending authors’ rights so that they receive a payment for their work” (R. Hamawi, 26/06/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina). This statement shows how the strict protection of authors’ rights is an integral part of the initiative, similar to the the DCMS version of the creative industries, leaving aside the ambiguities that Getino had in his original positioning with respect to cultural industries. According to a representative from the Vía Libre Foundation, which advocates for Creative Commons and open software, “[…]intellectual property is not an issue on the public policy agenda” (member of the Vía Libre Foundation, 05/06/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina), in the sense that there is no questioning of the current status quo. Conversely, well-known musicians and artists have benefited from extensions of their author rights, a reading of the national scene shared by academics such as the following quote shows:

“The government has a rather questionable policy in terms of intellectual property rights. It has ingratiated much with artists, both from the music sector and TV, in extending intellectual property rights, which is contradictory to many of its other social policies” (Argentinean University professor I, 08/05/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).

As regards the media sector, despite its market orientation, the cultural industries policies adopted at the national level acknowledge the problems of media ownership concentration, and also aim to “multiply voices to propitiate content diversity” (Hamawi 2013, p. 15, translated by the author). This shows the synchrony of the cultural industries policy discourse with the national policies of the Kirchner administration for the media sector and its conflict with the largest media group, Clarín. Indeed, during MICA events, the AFSCA, the state organism in charge of applying the new law, has been present to disseminate information about the regulation (AFSCA 2013a). This stance on media is a point of contrast
with the rest of the policy discourses that speak of ‘creative industries’, neglecting the asymmetries in this and other cultural sectors that are a product of how these have changed in history. On the one hand, this suggests that there are spaces for adapting the cultural or creative industries discourses by introducing further regulations limiting the negative effects of a free markets approach. On the other hand, my data still suggests that such regulations are not enough if the historical unequal distribution of resources is not addressed at the same time. Otherwise, a new competitions law, for example in the media sector, might limit the excess advantages of few private firms, but might do nothing to promote a variety of voices that cannot access the resources to compete in markets.

To conclude, it is important to highlight that despite the differences in terms of media ownership and in the promotion of national and regional integration of cultural markets, the cultural industries and the creative industries policy discourses are more similar than what their supporters would like to admit. Indeed, both put the priority on the commercialization of culture, aiming the discourse to well-trained, entrepreneurial sectors of the population, with scarce concerns for social issues. However, Argentinean policy makers at the national level prefer to avoid the term ‘creative industries’, because they interpret it as too broad, loosing the focus the ‘cultural industries’ give. Furthermore, they keep it as a way to proudly reject the introduction and influence of concepts coming from Anglo-Saxon countries, something also evident in the term MICSUR that highlights the word south, implicitly making reference and distinction to the idea of the so called Global North. Nevertheless, it is also true that the MICA events were in part sponsored by the British Council (MICA 2013), and given the other similarities I mentioned in practice, their similarities outweigh their differences, justifying its inclusion in the first group of policy discourses.

Creative Industries in Argentina

In this section, I shall show how the government of the city of Buenos Aires adopted the creative industries policy discourse as a purely industrial policy, undervaluing the potential contribution of cultural policies for social inclusion. In part due to the political orientation of the party in power, but also due to the concentration of cultural industries in the city that favor such an approach. Furthermore, I will show that the city has defended the existing media structure, contrary to attempts to democratize communications at the national level.

The city of Buenos Aires, the largest of Argentina where most cultural industries are concentrated, had a different institutional trajectory with the use of the term ‘creative industries’ and ‘cultural industries’. Until the end of 2007, cultural industries was the term employed, following the work by Getino, but in 2008 a new mayor was elected, Mauricio Macri, who represents a right-wing conservative political party. From then onwards, the city’s government replaced the term ‘cultural industries’ by the new term ‘creative industries’. Additionally, the former Secretary of Cultural Industries was reduced in rank to a National Direction of Creative Industries and Foreign Trade, and taken to depend directly of the Ministry of Economy, instead of the Ministry of Culture. The same change in names took place in the preexisting Observatory of Cultural Industries, which became the Observatory of Creative Industries. These changes are not minor, because they show that cultural activities were even further reoriented based on an economic rationality, following the terminology and the recommendations of the creative economy reports by UNCTAD (2010). Indeed, the following official definition of creative industries makes evident the orientation toward foreign exports that the city government has, making evident their synchrony with the international policy discourse:

86
“They are content industries that use creativity and intellectual capital as primary inputs. They include economic activities that combine creation, production and marketing of goods and services. Creative industries of the city Buenos Aires cover the following sectors: music; publishing; audiovisual (film, video, radio and television); visual and performing arts; design; software, video games and internet; architecture; advertising; libraries, archives and museums” (Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico 2013c).

Although the definition bounds the policies to specific industries, given that the agency depends on the Minister of Economic Development of the city of Buenos Aires, the policy discourse also appears connected with broader innovation policies on clusters and entrepreneurship. As regards the former, the city of Buenos Aires created four clusters related to creative sectors: a technological district dedicated to ICT; a district of audiovisual firms; a district of design firms; and a district for visual and performing arts, with the publicity of the city government highlighting the process of concentration of ‘talent’ à la Florida that they have put forward (Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico 2013a). With respect to entrepreneurship, the city’s government promotes it through workshops, funding and incubators, although not strictly bounded to creative industries. For example, the following quote displays the aim of the two incubators that the city government has implemented:

“New firms, especially those related to the areas of technology, creativity and innovation, are generating much impact on the growth and development of the economy of the countries across the globe. In this context, we work to support the consolidation of ideas and innovative business projects, with high potential, transgressors, generating new jobs, accompanying the economic growth of the city and enabling us to position Buenos Aires among the most innovative and creative cities in the world” (Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico 2013b).

Once again this statement makes evident the economic rhetoric to justify the support of innovative business projects, including those related to ‘creativity’. In both cases, the construction of districts and incubators, as places where ‘creatives’ reside, can be considered as infrastructural dispositives that help to reinforce the policy discourse of the creative industries and the associated idea of a separate ‘class’ of creative people. Furthermore, it exemplifies the subject-position of this discourse, becoming a creative entrepreneur, which parallels the original idea of the creative industries in the UK. Indeed, the city government collaborates with the British Council to promote entrepreneurship; for example, Figure 4.3 shows an advertisement of an award for young creative entrepreneurs from Buenos Aires, whose winners would travel to London to create links with “the most relevant actors of the British creative scene”. Besides making evident the foreign influence in the inspiration of the policy, this advertisement shows how the British Council also operates in reproducing the idea of creative industries in Argentina.

As in the case of Brazil, the UK government funds events to (re)produce the practices of the policy discourse, by training creative entrepreneurs and positioning their country as the role model to follow. As in the previous cases, the elaboration of statistics by the city government is a practice that contributes to the dissemination of the policy discourse. Similarly, the Creative Industries Observatory plays the role of a dispositive, through its continuous production of discursive practices, such as the elaboration of reports and statistics about these industries, highlighting their importance to the city’s GDP, employment and exports (Observatorio de industrias creativas 2012, 2008). For example, in 2011 the Minister of the Economy maintained that: “In terms of employment, creative industries generate about 145,000 jobs in the private sector, representing 9.03% of total employment in the city, outperforming other dynamic sectors as construction, social services, health or retail” (Observatorio de industrias
El British Council junto con el Centro Metropolitano de Diseño de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires reunirá a un grupo internacional de jóvenes emprendedores de diferentes industrias creativas, a través del programa Young Creative Entrepreneur. Los ganadores viajarán a Londres para entrar en contacto con los actores más importantes de la escena creativa británica.
creativas 2012; 2008, p. 7, translated by the author). Therefore, the rhetoric employed to justify the importance of the creative industries is once again related to their contribution to economic growth, following the same strategy initiated by the DCMS and expanded by UNCTAD.

One slight difference in comparison to the national government and the DCMS is that although they do recognize the importance of authors’ rights by covering the topic in all their annual reports on creative industries, the evidence shows that they are also open to other types of licenses, such as Creative Commons. Take the case of the declaration of cultural interest for the city of Buenos Aires of the Global Summit 2013 of Creative Commons, which suggests a departure from a close support of copyrights and all other restricted rights. Therefore, despite the similarities with the DCMS approach, this shows that there are nuances in its implementation, at least in this globally debated point.

Beyond the previous variation, the creative industries policy discourse in the city of Buenos Aires maintains the scarce concern for social issues, which is one of the most serious blindspots of this global policy discourse. This shortcoming is present in the language employed by the programs and its advertisements that always speak of ‘entrepreneurs’, ‘talent’, ‘artists’, but say nothing of the barriers to access those subject positions, which shows a lack of concern for resource-scarce and minority groups. For instance, Figure 4.4 is a leaflet of the event Buenos Aires Creativa (Creative Buenos Aires) that says its aim is to “gather professionals in the area of culture, urbanism and technologies to exchange practices and reflections about the creativity of cities”, all toward ‘inclusion’. At first sight, the advertisement suggests that creativity could contribute to inclusion challenges in the city, but this word game hides the context of the event and who finally participated. The event took place at the Centro Metropolitano de Diseño (CMD - Metropolitan Design Center), which is located in a resource-scarce neighborhood of the city, nearby one of the biggest slums. This building is in fact a project inherited from the previous management, which hosts craft training workshops aimed to resource-scarce sectors of the population, like textile courses to train workers for local firms. However, the CMD is the only place where such an experiment of mixing a creative industry, design, with social aims has been made, and no expansion to other creative sectors has been done by the political party that introduced the creative industries. From my observations at the event, it was evident that most of the speakers and attendees where middle or high income professionals from the country and abroad, with a conspicuous absence of the ‘poor’, who were supposed to be included in the city, but who were only present in some slides. Indeed, this contradiction was already suggested by the advertisement, because it only addressed ‘professionals’. Therefore the event organized to mix creativity and ‘inclusion’ makes evident that the creative industries policies of the city of Buenos Aires are still focused on the ‘creative class’, as Florida defined it, with few concerns to include the resource-scarce groups from the city.

Last but not least, the commercial approach of this policy discourse once again ignores all the debates of media ownership concentration in the country I described in chapter 3, because media are just considered as another industry. Indeed, the city administration tried to introduce its own audiovisual media law, to exempt audiovisual firms in the city from obeying the national law that bounded media concentration patterns; however, the legislative power finally suspended this initiative, for contradicting the national audiovisual media law (Perfil 2014). On the one hand, those defending the position of the government interpreted this attempt by the political party in the city, which opposes the national government, as clear support for the Clarín multimedia firm, which would not have to obey the restrictions imposed on ownership by the national law (Pertot 2013). On the other hand, the politicians of the city government argued it was a law to defend ‘freedom of speech’ and ‘fair competition’, because ac-
Figure 4.4: Leaflet distributed before the event 'Buenos Aires Creativa: ideas for inclusion', which says: “Creative Buenos Aires arrives in August, a space that gathers professionals from the area of culture, urbanism and technologies to exchange and reflect about creative practices for the development of cities. It is an opportunity to live ideas and experiences (local, national and international) put at the service of inclusion”, translated by the author.
cording to the mayor of Buenos Aires: “this industry has much to contribute, it needs a clear regulatory framework for competition between cable, telephone and satellite platforms” (Clarín 2014, translated by the author). Nevertheless, this statement always refers to private firms, thus to the commercial aspect of communications, and the initiative was not discussed at all in open forums, as it happened with the national audiovisual communication services law. In sum, these tensions with the national law show how a political party governing the city, siding with a commercial approach to culture and communication and with scarce concerns for social issues, appropriated the creative industries policy discourse to sustain and legitimize its industrial policies.

To conclude, the previous data shows that these four policy discourses share the same objective; to contribute to economic growth through the commercialization of cultural products and services. For this reason, they use an economic rhetoric that puts at the center the creative/cultural industries and their contribution in terms of employment and GDP. In all cases, the policy discourses offer the subject-position of cultural or creative entrepreneurs, which is an important element, because they need to disseminate knowledge about the business practices that can implement such an economic oriented vision of culture. It is important to remember that economic growth *per se* is the mainstream understanding of what ‘development’ is all about, which is linked to the capitalist economic system operating in both countries, where the logic of profit maximization – at least in principle – is the main signal that guides the actors in the economy for planning and taking decisions in their respective areas of operation. In this context, the orientation of the original criticism of the culture industry is valid (Horkheimer and Adorno 1947), because these policy discourses still contribute to the primacy of economics and of the actors with more economic resources over the cultural sector, reducing the spaces of culture as an independent ‘sphere’ from such economic logic. However, these spaces are not eliminated as Horkheimer & Adorno claimed. Conversely, there are spaces for different types of practices to arise and challenge these discourses, as I shall show with the case studies in the next chapters.

In connection with the national discussions about Latin America in a post-neoliberal period, the expansion of these commercial policy discourses in the area of cultural sectors precisely goes against the positions defended by left-wing, progressive parties that governed during the first decade of the 21st century in Argentina and Brazil. Although it is true that in some cases these discourses have been advocated by conservative parties, such as in the city of Buenos Aires, they have also been present during the PT administration in Brazil and in the version of cultural industries during Kirchner’s governments. One of the main contradictions is that the aseptic language employed neglects all the social inequalities in the region in terms of access to culture and to becoming entrepreneurs. Although those defending these policy discourses argue that ‘anyone’ could become a creative or cultural entrepreneur, in practice, this disregards the state of resource deprivation and negative stereotyping that members of Afro-descendant, indigenous, resource-scarce communities and others suffer. The second important contradiction for this research is that by promoting the commercialization of cultural products and services as their main objective, these policy discourses do not address issues of ownership concentration patterns in the media sector and the consequences this has for the democratic processes in both countries. Thus, they reinforce the problems several actors from civil society have been trying to alter. The contradiction is more evident when considering the next two policy discourses that have been implemented in Argentina and Brazil. These take another perspective with respect to culture and communication by altering the aims and addressees of the policies linking culture, economy and social issues. Therefore, they oppose and challenge the commercial perspectives disseminated by
international organizations and implemented in other governmental agencies.

4.1.2 Culture as a Social Resource

In contrast to the last four policy discourses oriented to economic growth, I shall show the next two policies oppose the latter by considering how cultural activities contribute to other objectives, beyond just economic ones. Particularly, I will introduce the Cultura Viva in Brazil, and in the second part the discourse on communications as a human right in Argentina. These cover a new set of actors, addressees, objectives, among other dimensions, which have inspired organizations and networks thereof to operate in different ways from commercial firms; thus, setting the stage for the specific case studies of the next chapter.

4.1.2.1 Cultura Viva in Brazil

In this section, I will describe a policy discourse initiated in Brazil in 2005 with the creation of the Cultura Viva (Living Culture) program. Although it was introduced at the national level before the expansion of the creative economy described in section 4.1.1.1, it opposes approaches that aim to commercialize culture above other ends as I shall show. Indeed, before president Lula came to power, an analysis of previous cultural policies pointed out that Brazil had to deal with ‘three sad traditions’: absence, authoritarianism and instability (Rubim 2007). Absence, in the sense that the state during several periods did not care much about culture and thus did not intervene; authoritarianism, because the state imposed just one vision at the national level ignoring others, as it happened during military dictatorships; instability refers to the lack of continuity in terms of cultural policies (Rubim 2007), which started to change when Lula became president, because he appointed a renowned Brazilian musician Minister of Culture, Gilberto Gil, who introduced path breaking policies with respect to these three sad traditions. The first change was the introduction of a new concept of culture that expanded previous ones, detailed in the next quote:

“Culture not in the sense of academic or artistic rites of an intellectual class, but in its full anthropological sense. That is to say: culture as the symbolic dimension of the Brazilian social existence; as generator of a set of signs of each community across the nation. Culture as an axis that builds our identities, in a continued way that results from the encounters among multiple representations of feeling, thinking and doing of Brazilians and global cultural diversity. Culture as a realization space of citizenship and as a resource to overcome social exclusion, either by enhancing self-esteem and sense of belonging or due to the potential inscribed in the universe of artistic and cultural expressions with its multiple possibilities of socioeconomic inclusion. Yes, culture also as an economic fact that is able to attract foreign currency to the country, to generate employment and income” (Gil and Ferreira 2013, p. 239, translated by the author).

At a global level, this was not a new cultural concept, because it was already sketched in UNESCO’s world conference of cultural policies in 1982, but its introduction was new to Brazil’s national cultural policy (Gil and Ferreira 2013). What is important to remark is that the Ministry of Culture recognized the importance of culture’s contribution to ‘sustainable development’ (Ministério da Cultura 2005, p. 10) and opened up the concept in three dimensions: as the production of a variety of symbols, as a
right and as a contribution to build citizenship, and as a way to stimulate the economy (Ministério da Cultura 2005). Therefore, it is important to highlight the order of these three priorities, which turn upside down the ones of previous policies during the 1990s that considered culture just as a business\(^2\), also opposing the conceptualization of culture that the creative industries and creative economy policy discourses would later reinforce. At the time of its initiation, the initiative tried to revert previous policies that were mostly fiscal incentives allowing firms to define where cultural investments would go, a problematic structure, because given the profit oriented rationality of firms, they inevitably selected cultural projects that would give them more visibility and larger audiences. Consequently, they had preferences for artists acting in densely populated regions with the capacity to reach large masses, favoring the concentration of cultural investments in the southeastern region of the country (Nunes Saddi 2010), but ignoring the rest of the country and stopping funds from going to cultural projects from minority groups. For these reasons, the Minister of Culture openly expressed his criticism toward such previous mechanisms:

“It is clear that the laws and mechanisms of tax incentives are of utmost importance, but the market is not everything, it will never be. We know very well that in terms of culture, as well as of health and education, we must examine and correct distortions inherent in the logic of the market, which is always, in the last analysis, governed by the law of the strongest” (Gil and Ferreira 2013, p. 230).

This critical stance of Gilberto Gil with respect to previous market oriented cultural policies became a central aspect in the delineation of the Cultura Viva program; for example, its official objective was to “promote access to means of cultural fruition, production and diffusion, as well as to enhance social and cultural energies, aiming at the construction of new co-operative and solidarity values” (Ministério da Cultura 2005, p. 47, translated by the author). I want to highlight two features of this definition. First, the terms ‘co-operative and solidarity values’ in that context implies a connection with the movement of the solidarity economy in Brazil. Indeed, the full name of the program is “Living Culture: National Program of Art, Education, Citizenship and Solidarity Economy” (p. 1, translated by the author). As I will explain in more detail in section 4.1.2.2, this is a movement covering a diversity of formal and informal NGO organizations, operating in different economic sectors and striving for ‘another economy’. However, in contrast to Argentina and its media co-operatives, the Brazilian solidarity economy movement has not been as active in the area of communication and culture and was thus not covered in this research. Nevertheless, the movement has been very influential to the Cultura Viva program through its practices, such as community currencies, solidarity finance, fair trade, among others, aspects that did influence the Brazilian case study I will analyze in the next chapter. Second, the term ‘access’ is another keyword in the objectives of the Cultura Viva program, making evident the concern for the inclusion of different actors in cultural processes. This establishes a distance with the previous group of policy discourses, which do not directly address policies to encourage inclusion of excluded actors. Specifically, the Cultura Viva program was destined for: “Low-income populations; elementary school system students; indigenous, rural and maroon communities; cultural agents, artists, teachers and activists who develop plans to combat social and cultural exclusion” (p. 47, translated by the author). Furthermore, tenders have been aimed at sections of the population with low incomes, living not only in large urban centers, but also in small towns and rural areas (Ministério da Cultura 2005). In addition, they have considered other minorities usually ignored by cultural public policies, such as

\(^2\) The main slogan of the Ministry at that time was “culture is a good business” (Porto 2009, p. 23).
different sexual orientations (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) (Ministério da Cultura 2005, p. 54). Another important fact to mention is that tenders did not consider firms as destinees; conversely, they aimed at strengthening connections between the state and nonprofit organizations, favoring those groups with less resources. This undoubtedly associates cultural policies with the main discourse during Lula’s government, the fight against hunger, poverty and social inequalities in general (Lula da Silva 2006). Therefore, in terms of addressees the program clearly opposed the policy discourses of the creative industries and similar ones, because firms or entrepreneurs were not the central figures, but rather resource-scarce groups that needed more support from the state to initiate and sustain their cultural projects. In synthesis, the program initiated with criticism of existing market mechanisms that had not been fair for all Brazilians and proposes an instrument precisely directed at those who had been excluded, quite opposite to the uncritical perspective of goods and services exchange through markets that the previous policy discourses had, and the creative economy and industries policy discourse would later reinforce.

In this context, the program Cultura Viva implemented different policy instruments to advance its perspective on cultural policies, among which I will describe Pontos de Cultura (Points of Culture) and Cultura Digital (Digital Culture). These have been the most influential, which I consider as dispositives in SKAD’s terminology, for their contribution to (re)produce the policy discourse. As regards the former, it consisted in the state supporting projects run by pre-existing nonprofit organizations, by giving them funds, equipment and the official recognition as a point of culture to help legitimize their cultural activities. In contrast to the creative economy discourses, this support was not restricted to predefined sectors or industries selected by policymakers; instead, it was open to a variety of cultural projects performed by the addressees of the policy; for example, ‘cineclubs’, theater groups, puppeteering, hip-hop, sculpture, design and percussion, free media, amongst others (Ministério da Cultura 2005). A specific example is the NGO “Vídeo nas Aldeias” (Videos in Villages), which trains indigenous community members to be film directors and film their lifestyles, avoiding the stereotypical films that outsiders usually elaborate (Video Nas Aldeias 2009). Another example is given by a diversity of free media projects that the state supported, such as a peripheral cultural agenda in São Paulo, which gives visibility to cultural activities taking place in resource scarce neighborhoods of the city (Agenda Cultural da Periferia 2014). Figure 4.5 shows a leaflet of the agenda, which promotes hip hop, samba and Afro culture, which is important in terms of social inclusion, because as I mentioned in chapter 3, these cultural expressions still suffer from negative stereotypes in Brazil and have little diffusion in mass media, due to the inheritance of negative stereotypes from the slavery period.

According to former policy makers, the Cultura Viva program funded over 2.000 points of culture and supported a diversity of projects, clearly contrasting with the limited number of industries that the previous policy discourses focus on, which, according to the first coordinator of the Cultura Viva program, Célio Turino, “are killing all the spontaneity of cultural groups. Everyone has to think the same” (C. Turino, 05/07/2013, interview with & translated by the author in São Paulo, Brazil). Additionally, the state funded the creation of networks of points of culture and events gathering its members, focused on specific themes, such as those related to indigenous communities or free media (Ministério da Cultura 2005). This support of varied types of networks is important for the research, because it inspired many experiences to follow similar network organizational structures, as the one I will analyze in chapter 5. Furthermore, the funding of free media networks can be interpreted as a challenge to the lack of policy change in the Communication Ministry of Brazil, which did not alter the media structure
favoring large corporations. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the promotion of networks of points of culture also stimulated collective practices of organization and of creativity, that depart from the individualistic perspective the original DCMS definition of creative industries advocates.

As regards the Cultura Digital instrument, it complemented Pontos de Cultura by stimulating the use of digital technologies in the supported nonprofit projects. Although it started out as an experimental initiative, it soon became central to the Ministry’s new cultural policy due to its potential to give resource-scarce actors the tools to register and diffuse their cultural output (Fernandes 2010; Costa 2011; Ministério da Cultura 2005). Specifically, this instrument delivered multimedia equipment to each Ponto de Cultura, which included three PCs to edit videos, a camcorder, equipment to record and edit sounds and broadband access to the internet, all running under free software (Turino 2010). For example, several indigenous communities did online projects, such as the indigenous community Xikrin...
Kateté located in the Brazilian state Belém do Pará (Xikrin 2012), and Afro-descendant communities too, like the Quilombo³ da Fazenda (Quilombo da Fazenda 2013) in Ubatuba, São Paulo, among many others. It is relevant to stress that the selection of free software was not only for financial reasons, but also to take a position with respect to the changes that digital technologies have introduced in knowledge sharing, challenging restricted copyrights. This stance is opposite to the original DCMS definition of the creative industries that advocated copyrights, instead, the Cultura Viva program “develops the exercise of collaborative and more generous intellectual practices” (Ministério da Cultura 2005, p. 26). For this reason, the distribution of such multimedia equipment can be understood as a dispositive to further the perspective of this policy discourse in terms of IPR, and to stimulate collaboration practices coordinated through online networks. Actually, this decision encouraged the growth of a community of free software developers in Brazil that contributed to the needs of points of culture and also introduced a critical view of technology that acknowledges every technology has a design, with its own risks and potentialities. For example, the online network Metareciclagem, which was part of the program, specifically advocated for understanding the working principles of technologies in order to alter them for purposes of social transformation beyond those considered in their original designs (MetaReciclagem 2014).

The diffusion of digital culture practices together with the mainstreaming of digital technologies, free software and other types of licenses, such as Creative Commons, illustrate the opposition of this policy discourse with those emanating from the DCMS and UNCTAD. Most of the interviewees sympathetic to this approach hypothesized that this was a result of the influence of the Minister of Culture at that time, Gilberto Gil, who pioneered the defense of open source approaches to knowledge and culture (LaMonica 2007), as the following quote shows:

“[…] everyone here knows that I am a defender, an advocate, a practitioner, a user, an enthusiast of: free software, tools for establishing virtual and remote networks, digital inclusion programs, accelerating and multiplying exchanges, the most intense, radical and innovative forms of exercise of freedom of thought, expression and creation” (Gil and Ferreira 2013, p. 230, translated by the author).

This desire to introduce a new perspective on IPR brought to the fore old questions, such as what is an original work of art in the digital age? Are all art works and cultural expressions copies or remixes of previous ones? During the administration of Gilberto Gil, the Ministry of Culture took the position that authors’ cultural productions depends on a huge social accumulation of knowledge that influenced their work. Therefore, from this perspective it is incorrect to believe in the existence of ‘genius’ artists, members of a ‘creative class’ à la Florida, when in fact they have been affected by a specific set of material and social conditions. This position was understood by many of the interviewees to be related to Gil’s personal background as a musician belonging to the Tropicalist movement in Brazil, a group of artists that emerged during the late 1960s that based their creative process on the mixture of diverse musical styles to elaborate new ones. Thus, the idea of ‘remix’, without being inhibited by copyrights boundaries, was at the center of his musical career. This background helps to understand the decision to support free software and open licenses, the free flow of information and knowledge, and a project to reform existing copyrights to update them to the digital age, opposing the perspective that culture should be strictly protected under IPR. However, such a perspective is clearly against the interest of firms profiting from the existing IPR system, and of artists that base their careers on their ‘genius’ or

3. Hinterland settlements founded by Afro-Brazilians, most of them who escaped slavery.
'godlike' qualities. Therefore, this feature of the policy discourse establishes a clear opposition with tenets of the creative industries.

A consequence of the Cultura Viva is the questioning of universities ‘universal’ knowledge, as the following statement of the successor to Gil at the Ministry of Culture clearly illustrates:

“The university must face the challenges of informal culture, of traditional knowledge, of the creativity that springs from the streets today and emanates centuries ago from peripheral communities. These are ways of thinking and doing that bring new challenges, which require the production of new concepts, and that serve as a test for the validity of the universal criteria that are the instruments par excellence of formal culture” (Gil and Ferreira 2013, p. 561).

This questioning is in part a product of the diversity of addressees that in many cases practice Amerindian, Afro-descendant and other lifestyles, which have been usually discriminated in the country and absent from the syllabus at universities (Gil and Ferreira 2013). This has posed challenges to the role of universities as the sole place where universal knowledge is generated and disseminated, and it is an issue I will consider during the analysis of the Brazilian media case, because it keeps a similar mistrust towards universities, given the elitist orientation they have in the country.

In sum, the Cultura Viva program initiated a new type of policy discourse in Brazil, which linked culture with social inclusion aims and was directed toward previously excluded actors, challenging mainstream stances of the strict defense of IPRs, and expanding the concept of culture to include other objectives beyond economic ones. These features oppose the previous policies of the 1990s that saw culture mere as a business and left cultural investment decisions mostly in the hands of firms, favoring an elite group of artists. Therefore, it also opposed the creative industries approach to culture that would later reinforce such patterns. It is important to remember that the emergence of this policy discourse has to be understood in the context of the left-wing government in Brazil, which resisted the commercialization policies of previous years associated with ‘neoliberalism’. Indeed, the policy discourse expanded to other countries of Latin America facing similar challenges, such as Argentina and Bolivia. Despite its efforts to democratize cultural policies, the program has faced several challenges, among them a small budget for the Ministry of Culture, bureaucratic issues that limited the capability of the state to deal with nongovernmental organizations (Gil and Ferreira 2013), resistance from groups against such cultural democratization, and the scarce expansion of the economic dimension of culture, though it was one of the three main priorities of the new culture conceptualization. This led to a conflict with the creative economy policy discourse, which took that priority in 2013 at the expense of budget cuts to this program (Turino 2013), and paradoxically within the national administration of the Worker’s Party. However, the influences of the policy discourse had already expanded across the country and Latin America.

My final observation to remark is that, although I do not directly analyze a point of culture as one of my case studies, this policy discourse is important for this research, because it inspired the Brazilian case I inquire about at least on five aspects. First, it put under the spotlight the cultural activities of previously ignored minority groups, such as peripheral communities, indigenous communities, Afro-descendant communities, among others, which have not only been ignored in mass media, but which have also been suffering negative biases. Second, the policy stimulated the use of ICT for the creation
and distribution of cultural products and expressions of these groups, stimulating as well a critical stance on technologies. Third, the inclusion of new types of actors in the production and distribution of knowledge, challenged the role of universities as the only places where ‘universal’ knowledge is elaborated. Fourth, the support of networks and collective organizations inspired other projects to follow similar strategies of association and collaboration. Fifth, the support of Creative Commons and more ‘generous intellectual practices’, inspired organizations across Brazil to depart from the model of closed IPRs, challenging as well the association of ‘genius’ or ‘creative’ qualities to just a reduced elite over the majority of the population. These are all points that connect this discourse with the case I will analyze in detail in the next chapter.

4.1.2.2 NGOs in Law 26.522 of Argentina

In chapter 3, I introduced the Law 26.522, which was passed in Argentina in 2009, also known as the audiovisual communication services law. It is important in this section for two reasons: First, I consider the law as a dispositive to advance the perspective of information as a human right, which differs from the commercialization of culture and media reinforced by the creative industries, where information is just another commodity. Second, the law has paved the way for new types of actors to acquire their media legally, in particular, I will focus on actors of the so-called ‘social and solidarity economy’, ‘alternative media’ and indigenous communities.

The audiovisual communication services law assumes the perspective of a transition to an information society, and in that context aims to regulate the allocation of licenses for the provision of audiovisual communication services (radio and TV). Amongst its objectives, in Article 2° the law claims “[...] to promote diversity, universal access and participation, thus implying equal opportunities for all inhabitants of the nation to access the benefits of audiovisual services provision” (Ley 26.522 2009). Second, the law limits market concentration in audiovisual services, by defining a boundary to the number of licenses that a private provider can have (up to 24) and limiting its service to 35% of the total possible number of subscribers in Article 44°. In Article 2° the law defines these objectives following a particular perspective on communications, which stresses information as a human right, and addresses three types of actors detailed in the next fragments:

“The state considers of public interest the activities carried out by audiovisual communication services, because they are fundamental to the sociocultural development of the population, through which they manifest their inalienable human right to express, receive, impart and investigate information, ideas and opinions. The exploitation of audiovisual communication services may be made by state-run, privately owned for-profit and privately managed nonprofit providers, which must have the capacity to operate and have equal access to all available transmission platforms [...] To this end, audiovisual communication in any media is a social activity of public interest, in which the state must safeguard the right to information, participation, preservation and development of the rule of law and the values of freedom of expression” (Article 2°).

To argument in favor of the regulations included in the law, the text includes references to international declarations and discussions. First, the law argues based on the declaration of human rights, which in its article 19° expresses the right to freedom of opinion and expression, which “[...] includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers” (United Nations 1948). This is the pillar of the discourse of information as part of the struggle for human rights, which in the case of Argentina is particularly connected to the leading role the country has had in the last two decades defending human rights, particularly as a reply to state terrorism during the dirty war of 1976-1983. Thus, the law links the general struggle of democratization, with the specific need of media democratization still concentrated in few private firms. Second, and also connected to the previous imbalances in the media system, the law sides with the protection of freedom of expression, taking the position that the state must assure the right to information, considering communication to be of public interest in order to give equal opportunities to all actors. Thus, the notion of access is not overlooked, as it is the case in the international version of the creative economy and creative industries. Finally, the previous fragment considers three types of actors that could offer audiovisual communication services, among which this research focuses on nonprofit privately managed TV providers. The law justifies the inclusion of this type of actor by citing documents of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and the cultural diversity conventions of UNESCO, which encourage media ownership diversity (WSIS 2003a). It is important to highlight these have been prohibited and ignored actors in Argentina since the dictatorship in the 1970s, but they are also usually ignored in media analysis given their nonprofit orientation, which does not have a space in a political economy understanding of the media system as the one I illustrated in Figure 2.2. Therefore, my research covers actors that are off the radar in the existing media literature in Argentina.

The previous definitions and the references to UNESCO, human rights and freedom of expression discourses already put a distance between this policy discourse and the commercially oriented version of the creative and cultural industries, simply because information is not considered to be just another commodity. This stance is evident with further articles in the law that put quotas on what type of content the media organizations can transmit. For instance, Article 65° requires that non-governmental media distribute at least 70% of national content, out of which 50% needs to be produced by themselves, including a local news channel. Moreover, Article 86° establishes a minimum number of hours that media organizations legalized under the law have to transmit. For the case of TV, media in cities with a number of inhabitants between 100.000 and 600.000 need to transmit 10 hours, whereas in larger cities they need to transmit 14 hours. These measures are important to promote local audiovisual productions in different points of the country, contributing to decentralize the production so far concentrated in the capital city, limiting as well the influence of foreign audiovisual content, specifically from the USA.

Taking into account the previous points, the law can be considered as a dispositive to implement a human rights approach to information, particularly given its aim to democratize communications and to give legal entitlements to nongovernmental organizations previously ignored. Concretely, the material aspect of the dispositive is defined in Article 9° of the law that establishes the Autoridad Federal de Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual (AFSCA - Federal Authority of Audiovisual Communication Services), which is the organization in charge of implementing the objectives of the law. This includes the enforcement of the law by controlling that media firms obey the limits to licenses and by initiating legal actions to punish those who disobey the regulations. Equally important, the AFSCA funds new media organizations to initiate their media projects, distributes funds and organizes training workshops to diffuse the needed knowledge. However, one of the criticism the law received is that it does not legislate the internet, but that it only regulates and stimulates ‘traditional’ media (Centro de Infor-
This observation is important, because it explains why the cases in Argentina put an emphasis on these sort of media that do not base their operations on the internet completely, maybe underestimating that online technologies might be more appropriate in some cases for their objectives, given the resource constraints that media for social transformation have. Conversely, the lack of a new media legislation in Brazil leaves the media system that favors large commercial firms untouched, which explains why the Cultura Viva policy discourse has stimulated free media networks to focus on online means of information dissemination; a strategy to fight against the existing asymmetries. Another difference between the two discourses is that the Brazilian one has challenged the preestablished IPR system, whereas the new law in Argentina does not legislate that point, which is left open to each NGO to decide.

In Argentina, the immediate effect of the law as a dispositive has been that a diversity of non-governmental organizations initiated the process of legally acquiring radio and TV licenses for their media. This broad category includes channels from trade unions, religious organizations, mutual organizations, among others. But taking into account that I selected the case studies based on the existence of conflicts between these actors, three types are relevant for this research: the 'social and solidarity economy', 'alternative media' and 'indigenous communities', because they had pronounced confrontations with private firms and the governments before and after the passing of the law. To set the stage for the analysis of specific case studies in the next Chapter, I will briefly synthesize below the features of these movements and their relation with the new law.

**Social and Solidarity Economy**

In the next Chapter, I shall introduce two cases, one operating in a co-operative and another in an alternative media channel that transmits from a recovered factory managed by workers. In both cases, these channels operate in organizations that belong to the so called 'social and solidarity economy', but they represent different poles of organizations belonging to these movements. To shed light on their differences, it is important to answer the following question: What does the social and solidarity economy refer to? According to academic definitions, it is the group of organizations that is not part of the market based ordering of society nor of the public economy, which includes different sorts of actors such as co-operatives, mutual associations, NGOs generating income through their activities, community and self-help organizations, among others, which are not ‘capitalists’ but just workers trying to survive (Coraggio 2013). Although this definition is problematic, given that the interactions of any of those organizations with firms and the state are undeniable, the point Coraggio makes is that they want to build something different from what the economy based on profits offers, challenging the hierarchic structures of organization in many private firms. Other authors have stressed the importance of “[...] self-management practices of production, trading, consumption, exchanges and services still sparse in the world” (Nunes 2009, p. 53, translated by the author) of the organizations of the movement, operating in heterogeneous economic sectors, such as agriculture, banking, gastronomy, among others. It is important to point out that the name of the movement emerged in academic discussions at the end of 1980s, to describe and stimulate struggles of many social movements and organizations in Latin America against neoliberal policies (Emshoff 2014). Since then, it has expanded and inspired global networks, such as the Réseau Intercontinental de Promotion de l’Économie Sociale Solidaire (RIPESS - International Network for the Promotion of Social Solidarity Economy) that connects social and solidarity economy initiatives and research worldwide. Among the different types of organizations within the
movement, co-operatives tend to be the largest and more resourceful, but it is also important to remark that during the ideological wars between capitalism and communism, they became erroneously associated with the latter, and consequently have been suffering from a negative bias as alternative models of organizing production. Indeed, 2012, the year of co-operatives, was amongst the most ignored news by mass media, even though one billion people practice this business model (Project Censored 2013).

In Argentina the social and solidarity economy is a strong movement, which according to estimates represents around 10% of national GDP and has 25,000 co-operatives (Sosa 2013). In particular, in the cultural sphere there are several cases of organizations that follow a co-operative model or that promote such form of management. For instance, the Centro Cultural de la Cooperación (CCC - Co-operation Cultural Center) that diffuses co-operative practices and cultural performances such as dance, music, theater, among others, together with social science research. Specifically with respect to media, after the new audiovisual communication services law was passed, several co-operatives initiated the process to legalize or create their own TV channels and networks in order to disseminate the values and principles of the sector to balance the lack of coverage of their activities in mass media. Indeed, one of the case studies I analyzed is part of the more than 39 organizations that created a network called TRAMA, which gathers mostly co-operative channels distributed across the country to produce content collectively on a larger scale. Their aim is to elaborate audiovisual material showing stories of the sector previously excluded in mass media, and for this to succeed, many of their members speak of producing mass, popular, high quality content, which also coincides with some of the principles of a ‘cultural industry’ approach. Therefore, these organizations criticize the economic order, but at the same time, they want to employ the contemporary structures and mechanisms to gain more influence for the sector. This paradoxical position can be explained by the organizations hosting these media channels, which usually are locally strong co-operative firms specialized in different economic sectors, like electricity or internet provision in several towns across Argentina. As such, they are on the financially richer side of the spectrum of social and solidarity economy organizations, and thus their way of thinking about financial sustainability models is not so different from that of for-profit media organizations, though with nuances, because in the end co-operative members decide what to do with the profits they generate. In the words of one of TRAMA’s members:

“The end of this co-operative media network is to communicate the interests of the sector, which does not mean it is not going to sell advertising. We will, and we also have to be profitable. But the difference between for-profit firms and us is what we will do with that income. Is it going to be accumulated by an owner or by the board of directors? No. Instead, we are working to respect a cycle, where co-operative members decide what we will do with profits: Either we increase workers salaries or we reinvest in our tools” (TRAMA’s member, 23/05/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).

**Alternative Media**

A second case I shall analyze in the next chapter is also part of the ‘social and solidarity’ economy, because it transmit from a factory that was recovered by its workers, who initiated a self-management process. This is one of the many examples that sprouted in Argentina in the context of the 2001 economic crisis, which replicated the concept of factories recovered by workers (Restakis 2010). However, the members of the media organization classify themselves in their texts and utterances, first and foremost, as part of the ‘alternative media’ movement in Argentina, and I would say only second as
part of the ‘social and solidarity movement’. This includes small scale, and in many cases financially resource-scarce, community radios and TV channels that are already operating or emerging in the country thanks to the law. In contrast to media from larger media co-operatives, they do not have the objective to compete in markets. Instead, they aim to elaborate critical content on their localities, which is ignored by other media who have economic or political stakes. This perspective can be understood by considering the political economy interpretation of the media system I synthesized in Figure 2.2, which considers that private and public media are mostly dependent on advertising by industries and publicity by the state respectively. Contrarily, Barricada TV, and the type of media it represents, claim to break with such chains of influence. For example, TV channels and radios articulated in the Red Nacional de Medios Alternativos (RNMA - National Network of Alternative Media) express that their aim is to:

“[...] generate a different agenda from the one imposed by corporate media and successive administrations in power, thus aiming to democratize speech. Our role is to be a tool to disseminate and nationalize conflicts, working with the working class and other people, with an anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist and anti-patriarchal perspective. Our practice is based on horizontal, collective work and consensus” (RNMA 2014, translated by the author).

Therefore, in contrast to the network of co-operatives I previously mentioned, this network of media is concerned with conflict and the working class, explicitly adopting and disseminating anti-capitalist worldviews and also challenging administrations in power. As I shall show in the next chapters, despite the fact that law entitles them to legally obtain their media, this project has not been as easy as expected.

Indigenous Communities

The inclusion of indigenous communities in the new audiovisual communication services law has to be understood in the context of their still remaining conflicts with the state. For instance, in 2014 the Consejo Plurinacional Indigena (CPI - Indigenous Plurinational Council) of Argentina, which gathers fourteen indigenous communities of the country (Aranda 2014), remarked in an official statement that “[...] the colonial nature of the state insists on making us missing of history and the present. A story that they draw every day as if Argentina were only a country of white Europeans” (Consejo Plurinacional Indigena 2014). This statement illustrates the position of indigenous communities in the country, which argue that the state keeps opposing and repressing them. Indeed, there are many areas of conflict among both type of actors. For example, a central issue in 2013 was the government’s delay in recognizing territories that ancestrally belong to indigenous communities. This is conflictive, because firms (both private and state-owned) are appropriating such lands for raw materials exploitation (soybean production, oil), irrespective of their inhabitants and of the consequences that these industries have for the environment and the Mapuche lifestyle (IWGIA 2014). What is more, several indigenous communities organized demonstrations to strive for collective property rights and against state violence (IWGIA 2014). Moreover, the oppressive conditions that these communities have tolerated during the last century have been scarcely researched. Few books touch these topics and they have mostly been written during the last decades (Moyano, 2007; 2013). What is even worse, there has been a lack of coverage of all the conflictive situations they have faced against the state in mass media. Indeed, they do appear from time to time, but are generally portrayed negatively; for example, the following quote by a
member of the indigenous channel that I will analyze in the next chapters, Wall Kintun TV, illustrates their perceptions about mass media:

“The government and firms never diffuse the struggles of indigenous communities; and when they do, they take a racist position, they report with scorn, they stigmatize and criminalize us. But they never give indigenous communities the opportunity to elaborate their perspective on what is really going on” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina).

It is not difficult to find data that confirms this statement, even from public figures; for instance, in 2014 the governor of the Argentinean province of Neuquén was heavily criticized for stating “100 men and 100 Mapuches work there” (LPO 2014), implying that the Mapuches do not belong to the category of humans. Another recent example was a protest by Mapuches in Bariloche, claiming ownership over a territory where a Yacht Club operates. The conservative newspaper, La Nación, titled the event “a Mapuche group says it owns a Yacht Club”, which is not correct at all, because they were claiming the territory and not the organization built on it (La Nación 2014). But in the article, the journalist only represented the position of the members of the Yacht club, and even worse, associated the Mapuches with aggression, without mentioning anything of the historical and structural state violence these communities have been suffering and resisting since the 19th century.

Given the historical negative bias against indigenous communities in the country, representatives from these groups were part of the discussions for a new audiovisual communication services law, with the hope of obtaining media to better represent their points of view, and to preserve and expand their culture. Their claims were successful, and the new law includes indigenous communities as part of the actors that could request media licenses for the 33% of the radioelectric spectrum assigned to NGOs. In fact, indigenous communities receive a special treatment in the law, which explicitly incorporates them amongst its objectives in Article 3° that expresses to “preserve and promote the identity and values of indigenous communities” (Ley 26.522 2009). Additionally, in Article 37° they are exempt of requirements that commercial firms have to fulfill to acquire the license. Moreover, in Article 9° the law states that audiovisual services have to be expressed in Spanish or in one of the 21 indigenous communities languages, in order to preserve them. As regards funding for their media, Article 152° defines a list of possible sources for radio and TV channels of indigenous communities, such as: national budget allocations, advertising, donations, sale of their content, among others. These measures show a considerable change with respect to the situation before the law was enacted, but as I shall show in the next chapters, in practice they have not been without contradictions nor shortcomings.

4.2 Discussion

In this section, I want to discuss a number of differences between the two groups of policy discourses in order to illustrate tensions that I shall elaborate further with the case studies of the next chapter. First of all, this covers the discussion on who is ‘creative’ and what sectors can be classified as such. Second, I will analyze the implicit notion of entrepreneurship in the first group of policy discourses, shadowing other types of cultural organizations. Third, I will mention the tensions in the conceptualization of sustainability between for-profit and nonprofit projects. In relation to the latter, the fourth point I will discuss touches on different positions with respect to intellectual property rights, which implicitly have
different understandings of the role of culture. Finally, I will close the discussion stressing the political side of the adoption of the different policy discourses, describing the role of international organizations.

Creativity
The selection of the addressees in the first group of policy discourses sides with the idea that only a subset of the population can be 'creative' in the creative or cultural sectors. Indeed, the DCMS definition assumes creativity is an individual quality, associated with talent that ‘artists’ or ‘creative people’ have. This is similar to Florida’s definition of the creative class, where talent is correlated with professional graduate training. This hypothesis that creativity is only a quality limited to a small group of ‘geniuses’ leads to the mythical view of the ‘artist’ or the ‘creative’ as a role in society superior to others. One of the problems of this ‘god’ like perspective is that artists might become excessively influential in politics, advocating for the defense of their interests, specifically authors’ rights, irrespective of social issues in terms of cultural access, such as this quote by a member of the Foundation Vía Libre\(^5\) in Argentina suggests:

“Personalism is usual in politics, and many entertainment figures and entertainment industry representatives sitting in the front row of all presidential speeches are not free. I do not say they are paid for it, although there are reports in some cases. But that pressure implies a tacit, mutual support alliance between the national government and much of the artistic community, which is not free” (member of the Vía Libre Foundation, 05/06/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).

In contrast, the second group of policy discourses challenge this perspective with the inclusion of minority and excluded groups who would not be classified as ‘creative’ by the first. This is best illustrated with the case of Cultura Viva in Brazil that directly challenged the privilege of artists or creatives, as the following quote by Juca Ferreira - the Minister who succeeded Gilberto Gil - illustrates:

“It is a change that clearly contrasts the vision of previous administrations, for which the privileged clientele of the Ministry of Culture were artists. That stance was equivalent to define doctors as privileged clientele of the Ministry of Health, or teachers as privileged clientele of the Ministry of Education” (Gil and Ferreira 2013, p. 460).

Instead, Cultura Viva had as an objective to democratize not only cultural access, but also cultural production to include those sectors of the population that have been systematically neglected in previous cultural policies. This was a way to balance the tension between those who had the access to specialized training in a specific creative discipline with those who did not, which in both countries is correlated to income levels. In other words, the policy discourse tries to balance the economic inequalities that favor those born in rich enough contexts to acquire the needed education and training to work in a creative sector. Thus, this approach questioned the apolitical approach taken by the conceptualization of creativity just associated to talent. Although it might be true that under equal training, some people are better than others, the point here is that the opportunities to access training are not equal at all, and thus policies are needed to encourage disadvantaged sectors of the population. This might be related to the obvious different contexts of Argentina and Brazil, with respect to the UK and other industrialized

---

5. An NGO that encourages debates, diffuses information, contributes to new laws, among other activities, all related to the social impacts of ICT in the country. In particular, it has close relations with the free software movement.
countries where the creative industries policies were first accepted. Although in all these countries there are asymmetries in access to education, in the latter the barriers are much higher, and thus a policy that ignores these issues is scandalously out of context.

Irrespective of the previous point, the premise that ‘creativity’ is just a feature of ‘gifted’ individuals contradicts research on creativity. Indeed, the literature shows that creativity is not a quality restricted to few geniuses working in isolated environments; conversely, it is a set of steps or mental processes that everyone - irrespective of one’s educational level - can learn (Carson 2012). This point is relevant for industrializing countries, where formal education in many cases is restricted to an elite, while the majority of the population are excluded from such training. Therefore, this structural exclusion does not mean that those not considered in formal educational processes cannot be ‘creative’. They still can, but as a second result from creativity research shows, they need an appropriate environment and collective influences on their mental processes (Runco 2007).

The immediate consequence of the previous points is that it casts doubt on the classification of the creative or cultural sectors introduced by the DCMS and UNCTAD. The former delimited a disparate group of sectors, which the latter generalized by defining a creative sector as one that uses ‘creativity’ as primary input. However, this last definition neither made explicit what ‘creativity’ is nor did it specify the conditions required for such feature to be a primary input of a sector. In both cases, creativity is a word used in a vague way to refer to a sort of quality that certain people or sectors may have, but not others. But if one accepts the conclusions from previous research that everyone can be creative, ergo every economic activity can be creative, too: from hairdressers, cashiers, accountants to football players. Thus, this shows that the criteria of UNCTAD to describe creative industries as those sectors that use creativity as a primary input is arbitrary, and definitely not a serious academic concept. Instead, just an empty signifier to be filled with a list of sectors to be adapted according to the political needs of the policy makers employing it.

Entrepreneurship

The subject position that the policy discourses try to create offers additional differences. Those in the first group all try to stimulate creative or cultural entrepreneurs, understood as those who create new for-profit businesses in one of the selected ‘creative sectors’. This is in synchrony with their aims of promoting economic growth and such a strategy can be understood from the connection of the creative industries with the broader knowledge society or innovation discourses. Indeed, the importance of the role of the entrepreneur emerges from Schumpeter’s theory of innovation; he remarked the role of entrepreneurs in the capitalist process (Schumpeter 1939). This concept has been further extended to include entrepreneurship in all economic activities, and in particular in recent years in SMEs. Although this might be true in terms of its contribution to economic growth, its uncritical extension to cultural policies is problematic, because it undermines all activities that do not aim to ‘innovate’ to produce profits. For instance, the cultural expressions of traditional communities. In this way, those discourses that consider culture as an economic resource undermine Afro-descendant communities, indigenous communities and other minorities that might be interested in collective organizations for the diffusion and preservation of their cultural practices, without aiming toward for-profit and innovation aims. At the same time, the focus on for-profit entrepreneurship neglects other types of entrepreneurship that might be more equally useful to alleviate social issues in countries like Brazil or Argentina. Specifically, I will refer to projects that address social issues through culture and media, which in
the English speaking literature tend to be called social entrepreneurship. For instance, the radio La Colifata (Loony) in Argentina, which broadcasts from inside a mental hospital and diffuses the testimonies of internees; this is not only therapeutic for them, but also a useful way to reduce the negative stereotypes that outsiders have of them and the place (Caselli 2014).

**Sustainability**
The different policy discourses side with dissimilar ideas of what is to be considered ‘sustainable’. The ones that strive for a commercialization of culture, associate sustainability with financial profits as a typical firm in any other economic activity. From this perspective, the sale of products and services is the source of sustaining the activities of the creative firm or entrepreneur. However, this understanding of sustainability is in conflict with the one of cultural organizations that are state-funded or not for-profits. For instance, the coordinator of the Cultura Viva program in Brazil expressed the following perspective:

> “What is sustainability? What sustains. From this point of view, which is what sustains a traditional culture or popular culture? The very soul of that culture, and the process of transmission of this culture itself; in a demonstration at a party, in a representation of indigenous peoples, or in street culture and hip hop, this soul and its need for expression” (C. Turino, 05/07/2013, interview with & translated by the author in São Paulo, Brazil)

Although the interviewee used mystical language to make his point, he remarks that cultural activities are not just sustained in time by a cost-benefits analysis and the amount of profits made, but rather through diverse strategies, like activism, experiments with different exchange systems, state support, volunteering, etc. I shall describe these in more detail in the next chapters, which show there is more diversity of resources to sustain cultural activities than just focusing on the sale of cultural products and services. Nevertheless, these organizations are ignored or neglected by those advocating a for-profits based perspective on sustainability, who argue these other experiences are ‘unsustainable’ (financially) or despise many of them for depending on the state. It is important to remark that this conflict of visions on sustainability is related to the national discussions of neoliberal policies, which, as I explained in the introduction, attacked the role of the state, discriminating against any sort of organization receiving its support.

**Intellectual Property Rights**
Given the ‘immaterial’ or symbolic nature of cultural products and services, a central challenge for those who want to make profits out of them, is how to protect these intellectual creations. The perspective launched by the DCMS and followed by UNCTAD is that intellectual property rights are the best mechanism to protect knowledge in cultural and creative sectors. As regards the UK, the position is understandable given thee country’s strategy to increase exports of cultural goods and services. The same can be argued about UNCTAD, whose creative economy reports were elaborated together with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), known for its aim to “lead the development of a balanced and effective international intellectual property system that enables innovation and creativity for the benefit of all” (WIPO 2015). But it is also true, that in contrast to with the DCMS, UNCTAD recognized the existence of alternative types of content protection and distribution in its reports, such as free software and copyleft licenses (UNCTAD and UNDP 2010). In both cases, the argument is that the access to cultural expressions, goods and services has to be charged somehow, so that the author
gets a retribution for his or her work, which is a reasonable position to defend the sources of income of artists; however, it overlooks that in many cases the ones that profit more from strong protection are the commercial firms reproducing the cultural products and services.

As Table 4.1 shows, the policy discourses from Argentina and Brazil show varying positions with respect to this issue. Some have been influenced by the perspectives advanced by the international policy discourse of the creative industries disseminated by the UK, while others have been more ambivalent in this aspect, because of a set of challenges that strict protections of intellectual property rights are facing at the global and national level. There are four issues relevant to review for the posterior analysis of the media cases.

First, the notion of the ‘creator’ or ‘author’ of a creative work assumes an individual is solely responsible for the elaboration of a given cultural product or service. However, there is a perspective that casts doubt on this view, arguing it is an artificial enclosing of knowledge that hides that any cultural product or service is never the unique result of one person, but rather one that builds on the collective work of previous knowledge and experiences, and on all of those that contributed to the training of the one who organized the final product or service (Alperovitz and Daly 2008). An inheritance acknowledged in the famous phrase of Isaac Newton: “If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants”. Therefore, from this perspective it is seen as theft to assign an exclusive right to a person or group in order to exploit a given cultural product or service, because it does not acknowledge the input from others.

Second, a strong defense of intellectual property rights ignores the hurricanes that the internet and digital culture are producing. Indeed, the internet allows content to flow through the net at almost no cost, which eliminates in many of the creative or cultural industries the need to depend on analog platforms and intermediaries, thanks to the free reproduction of digitized content. Therefore, the high speed flow of electronic books, videos, music, news, etc. is challenging the structure of many business models of the creative industries that used intellectual property rights to limit access when analogical platforms reigned. This process affected and reformed the music sector at the beginning of the 21st century, and now it seems to be changing others such as the audiovisual and media sectors.

Third, a strict respect for copyrights creates a tension with the objective of access in cultural policies. This is quite problematic in countries with scarce economic resources, because a strict enforcement might directly contribute to leave most of the population out of the access to culture and information due to their elevated prices in comparison to average incomes. Indeed, according to the World Anti-Piracy Observatory from UNESCO, the existing economic asymmetries in the world are an incentive for the disrespect of copyrights and the growth of piracy activities (UNESCO 2007). At the same time, through authors’ rights creators obtain the privilege to exploit and profit from their work for their whole life, and in the case of Argentina and Brazil, this right is extended 70 years after their death. For some critics, this condition that creators or their relatives have to exploit for such a long period of time is like a right to rent, reinforcing income inequalities, as the next quote by a representative of the Vía Libre foundation illustrates: “In fact there are many discussions about the copyright law as the labor of the artist, but this mixture of labor law and intellectual property law is not possible. The first is a labor law (working conditions, social security, etc.), whereas the second one is a rent seeking right” (member of the Vía Libre Foundation, 05/06/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).

Fourth, although the advocates of the current system of IPR argue it is in favor of the ‘creators’,
critics point out that these arguments ignore the role of copyright collecting societies, which are not exempt from criticism and mistrust, as the following quote from an academic in Argentina reflects:

“The whole issue of intellectual property rights is in crisis. With the internet, how do you protect content? Besides, artists prefer to be known on the internet, then they organize a concert to raise money, and it works because they are already known. Copyright collecting societies actually detain the best part, they are not mainly collecting money for artists, but for firms” (Argentinean University professor II, 15/05/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).

These issues evidence that a strict defense of IPRs collides with policies oriented to balance social differences. Thus, the recommendations by UNCTAD and the DCMS on this aspect, although copied by Argentina and Brazil, because both have systems that defend such intellectual protection, have not always been strictly enforced. When they were, they matched the interests of groups desiring to keep a privilege, such as large firms in Brazil like the Globo network or an elite group of artists in Argentina trying to extend authors' rights.

In the mean time, new experiences have diffused like the use of Creative Commons and copyleft licenses that the points of culture and several solidarity and collaborative economy experiences are using. Still, their reception has not been without criticism. On the one hand, those who defend a copyrights approach think that to liberate content is a synonym of admitting that it has bad quality and is not marketable. On the other hand, critics from social movements consider that the approach does not depart much from copyrights, because it still encourages a parceling of knowledge, admitting authorship without taking into account the debt the creator owes to all those who influenced him. Instead, these last critics advocate for a perspective where culture and information are seen as public goods, and thus ought to flow freely without economic barriers limiting their access and distribution (Belisário and Tarin 2012). However, those who oppose such a 'free culture' approach classify it as utter nonsense, because it does not seem to offer solutions for the financial sustainability of artists (Helprin 2010). How are creators going to be paid for their work? How are their works going to be financed if their products are immediately accessible on the internet for free?

These and other questions are part of ongoing and unresolved global debates about the digitization of creative and cultural industries, where there is a clash between positions that cling to methods of property protection created before the internet, and those that want to update, and in the most extreme cases radically change the existing systems of knowledge protection. The music sector has been an example for the collision of perspectives, because the introduction of the MP3 format and the ease of music distribution through the internet altered old business models based on CDs. Indeed, their sales decreased, but at the same time new business models emerged, where artists increased their popularity thanks to the internet and their profits through more live concerts. I shall show in the next chapters, particularly in the Brazilian case, which is entirely based on ICT, how these discussions have been transferred to journalism as a profession, challenging the accepted business models.

**Politics and International Organizations**
The final point that I want to highlight is that the different policy discourses all refer to culture, but the way they define and employ such resource differs considerably. How to explain these differences? A possible answer was suggested by an academic and ex coordinator of Petrobrás, the Brazilian energy corporation that is the biggest cultural sponsor in the country:
“In Brazil, we need a public policy that takes into account small and medium sized entrepreneurs, not only large and already established industries. However, there are people who think that the creative economy is composed only by large established industries, but this is not due to ignorance. It is a choice. It is politics” (Brazilian University professor I, 25/11/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil).

I agree with the statement, which suggests that the creative economy definition in Brazil is a product of different political projects, and I extend the same conclusion to the rest of the policy discourses considered in the previous section. I argue that these political projects can be divided according to how much importance they give to the issues of social inclusion existing in Argentina and Brazil. A low priority would focus on the policy discourses of the creative industries, creative economy and cultural industries, which put the emphasis on industries and entrepreneurs as the key recipients of their policies. As I showed, this assumes that culture is just another economic sector, producing specific cultural goods and services for national, and at best, international markets, with the main aim to contribute to economic growth through exports and employment. Although it might be true that these measures indirectly help to solve inclusion problems through the generation of employment, these policies are problematic, because they just ignore the need to include actors that for different asymmetries in the access to resources, have little chances of becoming cultural or creative entrepreneurs. Therefore, they contribute to the imbalances in access to cultural production, favoring the ‘creative class’, as Florida would say, but leaving aside all other types of actors, such as indigenous communities, Afro-descendant communities, resource-scarce peripheral communities, among others. Additionally, they just discriminate against those actors performing cultural activities, who do not have any intention of becoming an entrepreneur, although they do want to continue elaborating cultural products, services and expressions.

In contrast, a political decision to give a high priority to social inclusion issues necessarily has to address the actors that have the worst conditions to advance their projects in cultural sectors, and such condition is only fulfilled by the last two policy discourses. These specifically focus on the actors that the former overlook under the tags of ‘entrepreneurs’ and contribute with diverse types of support to their projects. Moreover, these two policy discourses do not consider culture just as another economic resource, although both recognize its economic contribution, the main priority is discursively situated elsewhere. For instance, Cultura Viva highlights the role of culture to produce national symbols and to create a sense of citizenship, whereas the new communication law in Argentina considers information as part of the struggle for human rights, and tries to legally democratize the access to media of minority groups. These are central discursive changes that depart from the commercial perspective, which considers cultural goods and services - and information in the case of the media sector - just to be another commodity to exchange for the sake of profits.

It is worth returning to the international discussions I described in the introduction, because they closely parallel the opposition of the two groups of policy discourses and their specific political orientations. On the one hand, UNCTAD and the UK advocate strategies that side with the perspective that culture is just another commodity, which is a position they have been actively expanding through a diverse set of practices that include: the organization of workshops and conferences, the distribution of reports, the funding of conferences and workshops, the backing consultants from the ‘Global North’ to diffuse the topic abroad; among others. In the end, for local observers who mistrust such positions, like the coordinator of the Cultura Viva program, the perception of these organizations is that “[...]

109
they have complete standardization, uniformity, trying to impose their models” (C. Turino, 05/07/2013, interview with & translated by the author in São Paulo, Brazil). On the other hand, UNESCO advocates the importance of culture as a right and defends the idea of ‘cultural diversity’ and ‘cultural exception’ in terms of trade in cultural products and services, although in far less radical ways than what the MacBride Report in the 1980s aspired to. This position has been disseminated by international conventions, and advocated in each country by groups opposing the commercialization of culture, which delineates the key division among two different ways to think about the link between culture and ‘development’.

I comprehend the main differences of these discourses also in terms of how international actors benefit from each position. The extreme stance of the commercialization of cultural goods and services, strictly protected by IPR, clearly favors those industrialized countries that have ‘attraction’ in terms of cultural products or services or who control considerable elements of global value chains in different cultural sectors, like the USA or the UK. Conversely, the position defended by UNESCO tries to address the economic imbalances by considering the specificities of cultural goods and services, protecting the public dimension of culture and the diversity of expressions in the world from the economic logic that favors most industrialized countries for the expansion of their cultural products and services. But if this division is correct, why were the creative/cultural industries policy discourses adopted in Argentina and Brazil? One part of the answer is that the globalized capitalist economic system shares similarities in terms of the exchange of products and services, and the cultural sector is not an exception. Therefore, a strategy that stimulates entrepreneurial and industrial activities in cultural sectors is a useful resource for politicians to attract votes, by favoring local cultural and creative industries and through the promise to increase jobs and wealth through economic growth. However, it is also important to point out that the adoption of the policy discourses of the creative and cultural industries has been more successful in those large cities that already concentrated a developed group of industries, such as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Buenos Aires. Therefore, the foreign discourse of creative industries was just functional for the prevailing existing economic structures and interests, neglecting local inclusion issues. But I argue that the second part of the answer to the question is definitely political, because although the reinforcement of the industrial policies in urban cities might benefit some sectors of the population of both countries, for those that have been previously excluded from these commercial practices, these are concepts out of context, a recurrent criticism of many ideas imported to South American countries that ignore the local issues (Schwarz 1973; Thomas and Dagnino 2005). Still, this pattern of acritically copying foreign models is as common as soccer in Latin America. Who is to blame? On the one hand, international organizations that disseminate these discourses, such as UNCTAD, or transnationalized national organizations like the British Council, share part of the responsibility. They claim to offer global solutions, when in fact they are pursuing their own missions, trying to expand their influence and interests abroad through the strategy of soft power, understood as the skills to influence others to perform actions through attraction rather than coercion, portraying themselves as a positive good friend, whose virtuous advice and practices ought be followed (Nye 1990). But in practice, the strategies that they advocate in many cases are ignorant and insensible to local conditions and social issues. On the other hand, a large part of the responsibility of the inadequate adoption of such foreign models rests with politicians in the countries of adoption, who use these alien models for their own political objectives and aims, irrespective of the consequences they might have for the local population and their context, which they do know very well indeed.
For these reasons, I argue that these policy discourses are charged with particular political priorities, which cannot be put aside, as international organizations sometimes want recipients to believe when they advocate ‘feasible development options’. Those policy discourses aiming toward industries and entrepreneurs from the ‘creative class’, share an elitist orientation, contrary to others who prioritize access and social justice for marginalized groups to cultural access, production and distribution. Similarly, in the media sector there is an opposition between a perspective defending a commercialization of information and another that considers it a human right, which has been best illustrated with the conflict between the USA and the UK against UNESCO. Despite the fact that the latter position lost support at the international level during the last decades, the two last policy discourses show this position is quite present in Argentina and Brazil, which I shall further illustrate with four case studies in the next chapter. Accordingly, the selection of which dimension to prioritize is in the end a political question, and it is a dimension that cannot be overlooked when analyzing the contemporary political situation in Argentina and Brazil, which as I mentioned in chapter 1, claims to be in a ‘post-neoliberal’ period. Nonetheless, the existence of creative economy policy discourses suggests that policies favoring the commercialization of culture are still present and needed, but it is also true that they are in tension with other new policy perspectives, which are more in synchrony with the ‘progressive’ governments in power.

4.3 Concluding Discussion

In this chapter, I delineated the main policy discourses in the area of culture and media in Argentina and Brazil. On the one hand, I defined a group of ‘creative economy policy discourses’ that consider culture mostly as an economic resource that large industrial firms or creative entrepreneurs ought to exploit, who, based on their specific knowledge of one of the creative sectors, will generate wealth and employment through exports and different property rights mechanisms. These have been influenced to varying degrees by the global policy discourse on creative industries, particularly due to the activities of international organizations, such as UNCTAD and the British Council. Nonetheless, I also stressed that the adoption of these commercially oriented policy discourses was possible, in part due to already present structures stimulating a similar public policy approach. This of course is connected to the capitalist economic system in both countries, and thus, I am not arguing that these policy discourses initiated a commercialization of culture, but I do argue they reinforce it, putting aside alternatives. Indeed, the discourse analysis of the empirical data makes an important contribution, because it does not only coincide with the critics of the creative industries in the UK (Booyens 2012; Galloway and Dunlop 2007; Garnham 2005; Schlesinger 2007), but rather expands and improves the criticism in the context of countries where social inequalities are higher, stressing the more severe gap between the claims of these policy discourses and their implementation in quite different contexts. For example, I showed how the four creative economy policy discourses neither in their aims nor as addressees take resource-scarce sectors of the population or minority groups into account. This neglects the inequality of access to resources (educational, financial, relational, etc.) these groups have, which blocks them from becoming creative or cultural entrepreneurs. Consequently, I interpret that these four policy discourses implicitly support ‘elite’ sectors of the population that have enough of these resources. It might be true that they contribute to ‘development’ in the sense of economic growth through the export of their cultural products and services, but undoubtedly they do in terms of social inclusion and with
respect to cultural diversity. Additionally, these policy discourses, except for the cultural industries in Argentina, just say nothing about the imbalances in the media sector in both countries, where a purely commercial approach to communications still favors a reduced number of media conglomerates, which according to civil society considerably damage the democratic ideal in both countries. Accordingly, these policy discourses might be enough for promoting economic growth, but they blatantly ignore other central concerns of broader definitions of ‘development’ that consider access, democratization, freedom of speech, participation, among others.

As a counterbalance, the second group of policy discourses illustrates a perspective that uses culture to address different types of social inequality issues in both countries. Both in the case of Argentina and Brazil, the considered policy discourses have different aims, actors and addressees than those in the first group. As I argued, this defines different ways of conceptualizing the role of cultural and media policies, leading to different practices that depart from the perspective of the former, where just for profit firms matter. Conversely, Cultura Viva in Brazil and the part of the new audiovisual communication services law in Argentina that supports NGOs have from the start addressed actors that face the toughest conditions to (re)produce their cultural practices. Equally important, in both cases there is a concern about media ownership concentration and thus, both policy discourses aim to create alternative ways for NGOs and diverse types of communities to produce and disseminate content of their perspectives. These and other differences delineate the opposition between the two groups of policy discourses, which reject the claim of those who defend that the creative economy policy discourses can be a fertile approach to embrace ‘just everyone’.

The political economy aspect of these tensions cannot be overlooked. The expansion of the creative industries and the creative economy defending a commercial approach to culture and media coincide with the positions of the UK and the USA against UNESCO and its MacBride Report, making evident the Western bias of such an approach. Indeed, Mansell & Nordenstreng (2006) highlighted that from then onwards such commercial perspectives prevailed at the international level. Nonetheless, the existence of counter-discourses at the national level in Argentina and Brazil prove that at such level the discussion is not closed, and the debates in these two Latin American countries cannot be understood without considering the political change in their governments toward left-wing oriented administrations, which discursively put an emphasis on tackling inequality issues and challenging foreign ‘development’ models. Although their policies have not been without contradictions, because they also promote creative and cultural industries, it is true that the existence of cultural and media policies that depart from a purely commercial perspective would have been unthinkable during the 1990s. This new political context is central to understand the mismatch between what international organizations advocate, and what local NGOs, social movements and diverse types of communities have been striving for in the area of culture and media.

The data also shows that the political dimension is central to understand why, even though the two countries are in a so called ‘post-neoliberal’ period, in some cases the creative economy policy discourses have been adapted with little adaptation, neglecting the counter policy discourses. My hypothesis is that the adoption of a discourse depends on the changing political forces operating in a given territory (not only national figures, but also city mayors and even ministers) and on the associated aims of their development projects. Given that economic growth is the holy grail of mainstream economic policies, the adoption of an approach where culture is an economic resource is reasonable and understandable. Nevertheless, the use of vague economic terminology by fanatics of the creative economy policy dis-

112
courses hides the fact that their ‘development’ projects mute and discriminate all groups that imagine different pathways for society to unfold, conflicts that are particularly visible in the media sector. For these reasons, I totally disagree with UNCTAD’s perspective on the creative economy as a ‘feasible development option’ (UNCTAD and UNDP 2010) and even less with the more restrictive proposal of the DCMS (1998) disseminated by the British Council, which I consider a strategy of soft power. Instead, I argue that countries such as Argentina and Brazil need to reinforce and expand policy discourses, as those in the second group, in addition to caring about the commercial aspects of culture. However, it is true that the existing practices and structures favor a commercial approach to culture and communications. For this reason, the rest of the thesis focuses on analyzing cases that have been inspired by the counter policy discourses in order to understand up to what extent they have been able to challenge the homogenization of practices. Specifically, I will focus on experiences in the media sector, because it is the cultural sector where the tensions between a commercially oriented approach and broader ‘development’ objectives are becoming more evident. To accomplish this objective, the next chapter will analyze the discourses (‘imaginaries’) of four media for social transformation that have been stimulated and sustained, to varying degrees, by the counter policy discourses introduced in this chapter.
Chapter 5

Imaginaries

The previous chapter showed a division among policy discourses in Argentina and Brazil. I identified four variants that resemble the first version of the creative industries approach introduced by the DCMS, which are widespread at the national level and to a lesser extent in some large urban cities. These policy discourses share the view that culture and media should operate on a for-profits basis to contribute to economic wealth, stimulating business practices of cultural and creative entrepreneurs in one of the creative sectors with the aim to commercialize their products or services. Although it can be argued that the material produced also carries an ideological dimension, the prevailing form of these policy discourses is the economic one. Therefore, the organization of the production and distribution process does not differ much from any other industry. This perspective to understand culture as an industrial activity and as an economic resource is an experience to which the average reader is used to; for example, while buying books, CDs/DVDs or the daily printed newspaper, etc. In all these cases, the acquisition of the products and services follows the usual exchange process present during the acquisition of other commodities, and thus I shall not analyze further these cases. At the same time, in chapter 4 I described counter policy discourses that depart from this view: the new audiovisual communication services law in Argentina and the Cultura Viva program in Brazil, which are not so extended nationally and which oppose and challenge, to varying degrees, the structuring pattern of the creative economy policy discourses. These discourses have inspired practices that aim to depart from a commercial approach to culture in general, and media in particular, which in comparison with the former are neglected by the international development agenda. For this reason, in this chapter I will analyze four case studies of media for social transformation that have been stimulated by these counter policy discourses, primarily to show the weaknesses of the creative economy policy discourses, by making evident the existence of cases that oppose their supposed universal approach to culture and media. Additionally, I introduce features of the four case studies of media for social transformation, which are the focus of the rest of this thesis.

In this chapter I shall argue that a necessary but not a sufficient condition for these media for social transformation to challenge a commercial approach to communications is to have an ‘imaginary’ defending such a position. I remind the reader that according to what I defined in chapter 2, the term imaginary refers to the discourses of these specific projects or networks. Therefore, I devote the rest of the chapter to thoroughly analyze the empirical data that illustrates media cases inspired by the counter policy discourses that contrast, to varying degrees, with for-profit private media, and therefore,
the creative economy policy discourses. Specifically, I shall consider three cases in Argentina that shed light on the introduction of the new audiovisual communication services law described in chapter 3. These include diverse types of TV channels, such as a co-operative; a channel emitting from a factory recovered by workers and a channel of an indigenous group, the Mapuches. In Brazil, I examined a project that emerged in 2013 through online social networks, Mídia NINJA, which quickly attracted national and international attention. In contrast to the other three, it offers a different approach in terms of context, technology and practices. In the next section I will synthesize the main dimensions of the imaginaries of these cases, followed by a detailed description and analysis of the specific social and historical contexts that paved the way for their imaginaries and their particular features, ending with a discussion of the main argument of the chapter.

5.1 Synthetic Comparison Among Cases

I employed guidelines from SKAD to compare the imaginaries of the four media for social transformation, in order to detect and contrast specific dimensions among their imaginaries and with the mainstream group of four policy discourses of chapter 4. To achieve this aim, I built a corpus database including all the information gathered during fieldwork and from secondary sources, which was divided according to the level of analysis (policies vs cases), and coded employing Atlas.TI. This allowed obtaining a list of codes of relevant themes in each case, to sketch the phenomenal structure, interpretation schemes and narratives of the imaginaries, in other words, the variety of elements that a discourse designates and combines to define a particular problem, its ways to interpret how media ought to be organized, and storylines joining these elements (Keller 2013). Where appropriate, these were contrasted with each other and with the main dimensions of the policy discourses, and such differences, together with contextual information, led to the interpretations that I will detail in the chapter.

In Table 5.1, I offer a synthesis of the main dimensions that I shall consider in the following sections of this chapter. The first four dimensions give important insights with respect to the historical and social context where these imaginaries emanate from. I shall show how the specific narratives that emanate from particular geographic places under consideration put emphasis on a variety of actors and corresponding aims, which lead to specific interpretation schemes on how media ought to be organized, not necessarily coinciding with those advanced by the creative economy policy discourses. This incompatibility reveals how the claim of universality of the commercial approach to culture and communication inevitably faces the resistance of actors that have historically opposed, similar commercial approaches before for diverse reasons. Furthermore, I shall describe the inspiration these cases drew from the counter policy discourses of chapter 4 and the links with broader discourses, such as co-operativism or indigenous movements. The next three rows of the table synthesize dimensions suggested by SKAD to study the aims, actors and addressees of the discourses, explaining the opposition to the commercial policy discourses, and also the diversity among the four cases of media for social transformation. In effect, along the chapter, I show that these variations are related to the previous historical and social context.

A main point to highlight from the table is that I shall understand the media projects of each case study as a dispositive to (re)produce the practices of the imaginaries. For instance, the Mapuches understand their project as a way to preserve and expand their ancestral worldview, whereas the Brazilian case comprehends the role of their channel in a similar way to expand the ‘collaborative economy’ that
they defend. Accordingly, each case claims to apply different practices from those of mainstream media, where the term ‘collaboration’ tends to be common among cases, though in practice, their connotations differ.

With respect to the rest of the dimensions of the table, they refer to specific features of the imaginaries related to media. For example, I shall introduce briefly the perspectives that each case has on quality patterns and technology, which are aspects that I will analyze in detail in chapter 7 and 6 respectively. Additionally, I will contrast the perspectives adopted by each imaginary in terms of intellectual property rights, which, except for one case, offers a marked contrast with the ones of the creative economy policy discourses. Apart from this, I will explain the opposition that the four cases have to what they frame as mass media practices (private and state), by delineating their different position on communications and detailing what sort of news content they try to provide to their viewers.

5.2 CPEtv, Argentina

The city of La Pampa only has 100,000 inhabitants and is 600 km away from Buenos Aires, the megalopolis where most culture and communication is concentrated in Argentina. In 2012, CPEtv, the first co-operative TV channel after the new audiovisual communication services law, was founded in this city. How was this possible? Given all the stereotypes and structural conditions mentioned in chapter 3, answering this question would not be easy for an average Argentine who would not expect such experience to emerge from a small city from the ‘interior’ of the country. I shall argue that the foundational historical events that led to the emergence of the co-operative is essential to understand how they were able to establish their TV channel, questioning the limits that existed for NGO media at the time. My point is that their successful experience in setting up the co-operative and resisting what they classify as foreign private firms, set the example for similar future challenges, despite the negative horizons that they would face. I will show this, first, by describing the foundation of the co-operative that hosts the TV channel, CPE, and the influence this event had along its history and future initiatives. Second, I will depict the struggle of CPE to overpass the legal limits that inhibited co-operatives from having their own media channels in Argentina, which gives further contextual factors to finally delineate the main features of the imaginary of CPEtv.

5.2.1 CPE’s Foundation

To comprehend CPEtv and the features of its imaginary, it is necessary to understand the foundation of its mother institution, the Cooperativa Popular de Electricidad de Santa Rosa (CPE - Popular Electric Co-operative of Santa Rosa)\(^1\). In 1930, the city of Santa Rosa was part of what the government used to call ‘National Territory’, because the province of La Pampa did not yet exist as such. The territory was scarcely populated, with around 12,000 inhabitants and electricity services were provided by a firm of USA capitals called Compañía Sud Americana de Servicios Públicos S.A. (SUDAM - South American Company of Public Services) (CPEtv 2013c). In the context of an international economic crisis, the SUDAM increased their rates, attaining levels considered oppressive by locals and contrary to the

---

1. For the following summary of historical events I used the archive of the local newspaper, La Arena, and a book about the history of CPE (Lluch and Sánchez 2002). The only disadvantage is the bias toward the position of the co-operative’s vision, given that one founder of the co-operative was part of the management of the newspaper. Nevertheless, it is a good source to reveal how members of the co-operative understand and reconstructed the foundational events of the organization later in time.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>CPETv</th>
<th>Barricada TV</th>
<th>Wall Kintún TV</th>
<th>Midia NINJA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Local narrative of struggle against a private firm established the co-operative</td>
<td>- Operating in the first factory recovered by its workers</td>
<td>- Oppression by the Argentinean state, and subsequent stereotyping against indigenous communities</td>
<td>- Spin-off of the media front of the cultural network Fora do Eixo. Gained prominence during the 2013 Brazilian riots</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>- Santa Rosa (110.000 inhabitants), Argentina</td>
<td>- Buenos Aires (almost 3 million inhabitants), Argentina</td>
<td>- Bariloche (110.000 inhabitants), Argentina</td>
<td>- Network operating in several large cities in Brazil (Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Brasilia, etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other discourses influencing it</td>
<td>- Co-operative movement</td>
<td>- Factories without bosses movement</td>
<td>- Indigenous movement</td>
<td>- Solidarity economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspired by policy discourse</td>
<td>- NGO media in law N° 26.522</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Cultura Viva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aims</td>
<td>- Disseminate co-operative practices and values</td>
<td>- Social transformation by offering counter information against mass media</td>
<td>- Give voice to Mapuche’s struggles and preserve their culture</td>
<td>- To cover social struggles and expressions of cultural, political, economic and environmental transformations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>- Co-operativists</td>
<td>- Activists</td>
<td>- Members of the Mapuche community</td>
<td>- Activists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adresssee</td>
<td>- Inhabitants of Santa Rosa</td>
<td>- Workers and popular class</td>
<td>- Indigenous communities</td>
<td>- Online citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispositives</td>
<td>- Media channel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Media channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>- Similar production practices to private firms</td>
<td>- Workers self-management in audiovisual production</td>
<td>- Not continuous during fieldwork. Aiming toward production in collaboration with members of or related to indigenous communities</td>
<td>- Collaborative practices of reporting through online media. Everyone can be a NINJA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>- Foreign and advanced</td>
<td>- Old and new</td>
<td>- Borrowed and donated equipment, not enough to operate continuously.</td>
<td>- Smartphones, notebooks and social networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP Rights</td>
<td>- Authors’ rights</td>
<td>- Free, Creative Commons</td>
<td>- Not defined</td>
<td>- Free, Creative Commons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position on communications</td>
<td>- Communication as a human right</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Communication as a public service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspective of mass media</td>
<td>- Biased against the co-operative movement</td>
<td>- Biased against workers and social movements</td>
<td>- Undercoverage and biased against Mapuches</td>
<td>- Biased. Not independent in their coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News content</td>
<td>- Plurality of voices</td>
<td>- Politically balanced</td>
<td>- Local, cultural</td>
<td>- Mapuches worldview and struggles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: Main dimensions of contrast among the imaginaries of the four studied media for social transformation. Compiled by the author.
public interest (La Arena 1933b; Lluch and Sánchez 2002, p. 35). A group of citizens considered this an intolerable situation and as a reply organized a co-operative to compete against the private firm in the next tender. Given the social discontent against SUDAM, in 1933 the citizens won the concession for the service, which compromised them to start supplying energy from October 1st, 1935 onwards (La Arena 1933a).

Despite the initial success, the remaining road of the co-operativists until they could actually start offering the service was not easy. One of the first hurdles to address was that the local inhabitants knew little about co-operativism, so they had to actively disseminate co-operative principles and practices by organizing talks to explain the advantages of such a model (La Arena 1935f). This need of disseminating their ideas and practices would later reemerge in contemporary discussions as an argument in favor of having their TV channel. Apart from this, the co-operativists had to deal with growing suspicion of an arrangement between the local government and SUDAM to conspire against them, so that if they failed to provide energy, the contract would once again return to the foreign firm (La Arena 1935b). In effect, the local newspapers published public letters of the actors and articles about the situation; for example, the co-operative denounced to the state extortions of SUDAM (La Arena 1935g), journalists expressed suspicion that SUDAM would remove the cables to distribute energy (La Arena 1935j) and there were fears of possible boycotts of the co-operative service (La Arena 1935c), among others. Nonetheless, the most problematic issue raised by SUDAM in local newspapers was a warning to the city's inhabitants of the 'perceived error' they were about to make, given that the technology the co-operative had was completely improvised and incapable of meeting the city's energy needs (La Arena 1935j). From their point of view, the whole project would fail and produce negative consequences for the population, who would have been the sole and only responsible for such chaos (La Arena 1935j).

How did the co-operative address such challenges? First, they started to raise awareness through public assemblies and newspaper articles on how co-operatives could help to surpass the exploitation they were suffering from a foreign firm by turning electricity into a common good (La Arena 1935e). This conflict between private and social interests was also present in several cities of the country (La Arena 1935c), and the co-operative discourse at the time advanced a nationalist position, which claimed that key services should be in the hands of locals and not in the ones of foreign private firms (Lluch and Sánchez 2002). Second, to address the technological issue the co-operative expected new motors from a provider, but when they found out that these would not arrive on time for October 1st, 1935, they had to find a creative way to deal with this hurdle. The co-operativists decided to use the dynamos of old threshers (La Arena 1935i), which were obtained in September of that year and adapted to supply energy by a local technician surnamed Savioli (La Arena 1935h). The newspaper La Arena gave a lot of importance to the arrival of this improvised technology, which occupied its frontpage stating "Tonight three dynamos and a motor will arrive" (La Arena 1935d, translated by the author), which shows the support of the co-operative initiative and the importance given to technology in their project of independence from SUDAM.

The last day before the transfer of the service to CPE was not exempt of tensions, despite the co-operative had addressed the main barriers to offer the service. According to the local newspaper, the municipality deployed armed forces to protect its own and SUDAM’s buildings, which made them suspect that there would be a last minute hidden arrangement in favor of the private firm (La Arena 1935d). These fears were not fulfilled, but tensions were high. Finally, when the light was cut by SUDAM, only minutes later it returned with the new energy offered by the co-operative (La Arena 1935a).
Up until today, members remember this foundational event that took place on October 1st, 1935 with the phrase ‘Firewood Savioli!’ (O. Nocetti, 14/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina), in allusion to the creativity of the technician who set up the improvised temporary motors. Most importantly, these foundational events became part of the narrative of members of CPE, remembering this was a success of the citizens to self-organize against what they considered foreign forces from Buenos Aires and the USA, defending their public interest over the private interests of few. Under the light of Berger & Luckmann’s (1966) work, the process of the foundation of the organization can be understood as institutionalizing a set of typifications that would later become part of the repertoire of the members of the co-operative when facing similar situations in the future. For instance, the co-operative association of citizens against what they classify as private for-profit foreign firms, or the role that technology played to find a solution to a supposedly irresolvable problem, while facing a more resourceful opponent. These patterns have been at the base of further actions in the 21st century of the members of the co-operative, which I shall describe in the next section.

5.2.2 The Long Road to the Channel

Since its foundation, CPE kept on working as a service co-operative, growing and diversifying its activities, although energy distribution remains its most important activity given that it generates around 60% of their total income (CPE 2013b). It did so in the province of Santa Rosa, which gives an importance to co-operatives not found in others of the country due to its comparative recent creation. Indeed, co-operativists highlighted that the province as such was founded in 1952 by the national administration under Perón, and as co-operatives preceded its political organization, they were recognized in the constitution and kept the control of the energy distribution business in small towns, which allowed them to keep a close interaction with citizens. Accordingly, co-operatives have a prominent role in the institutional life of several cities. Such is the case of CPE, which in 1966 presented to the national state a first project for a TV channel to diffuse co-operative principles in the city and the province, but were rejected by the national authority in charge of distributing licenses (CPEtv 2013b). During the next years this type of project would become even more difficult, because of the dictatorship in Argentina that introduced a broadcasting law prohibiting NGOs from having their own media. This situation endured during the return of democracy in the 1990s, which were particularly tough years for co-operatives, due to the expansion of neoliberal ideas all across the country, advocating for privatization that led co-operativists to conflictive situations with provincial governments and local firms. Despite these constraints, the economic crisis Argentina suffered in 2001 opened new windows of opportunity for the mobilization of co-operatives, which started the long road to obtaining their channel. CPE was a leading case, because as I shall describe in this section, it protested against the restrictions imposed by the preexisting national law, contributing to a broader movement of NGOs striving for media democratization that finally paved the way for having a chance to set up their own TV channel.

In the postcrisis scenario of 2003, inhabitants of Santa Rosa had difficulties to pay for private cable services offered by two local private cableoperators, which were merged and became part of Cablevisión and the Clarín Group, the most powerful media group in Argentina. From then onwards, interviewees have pointed out that most of the content distributed was no longer elaborated in the province, but in other locations of the country where the firm had studios; therefore, restricting the space for local voices, unless they could pay the price to transmit. In this context, the co-operative announced it would soon start to broadcast a couple of air channels for free, which was a clear challenge to the status quo.
that defended the idea of private communications. CPE’s argument was that they were contributing to fulfill the human right to communication of the city’s inhabitants, which even received statements of support from deputys of the province (La Arena 2003j), which clearly resembles the position of the MacBride Report. Despite this idealistic position, the national organism that regulated TV licenses at the time, the Comité Federal de Radiodifusión (COMFER - Federal Broadcasting Committee), stated that such an initiative was illegal, because by law co-operatives could neither have a TV channel nor emit any audiovisual signal. However, it is important to remember that the restriction in the law they were referring to was created during a dictatorship to silence alternative voices. For this reason, the co-operative defied the legal order and set up a date to transmit by air four free TV signals in Santa Rosa, with the intention to extend their service to around forty channels (La Arena 2003h). To gather political support, a couple of days before the start of the transmissions they organized the first national co-operative congress of broadcasting, which gathered representatives of co-operatives all across the country, with the aim to initiate a national discussion on the article N°45 of the law that prohibited NGOs to have audiovisual media (La Arena 2003c). The underlying theme for the congress was ‘for broadcasting without exclusions’ and took place where the first machines that generated electricity in 1930s used to be located (La Arena 2003d), which can be understood as a way to connect this struggle with the one of the foundation of the co-operative against the US firm. During the congress, the president of the national co-operativist alliance, Juan Carlos Fissore, expressed that: “we are not only fighting for a service and economic interests, we are fighting for the right to the freedom of speech, and for the Argentinean identity and culture”, (p. 11, translated by the author), which shows how the co-operative movement distances itself from a for-profit only perspective on media and culture. Indeed, the following quote by the president of the co-operative, Oscar Nocetti, shows their interpretation of the previous situation, and the need to do something about it:

“In 1966, 37 years ago, this co-operative initiated the legal application to COMFER to obtain a TV channel, but it was rejected. Over the last 20 years we have been suffering discrimination on the hands of a law from the dictatorship. The people of Santa Rosa have said ‘It is enough, let’s move forward!’”, (La Arena 2003h, p. 10, translated by the author).

After three days of debate, the event ended with the following statement called ‘Cry of Santa Rosa’, which mentions key aspects of the co-operative movement and its demands for a democratization of communications in the country:

“Under a pluralistic framework, the right to communication and freedom of speech are essential requisites for real democracies. The strengthening of democracy in Argentina requires the democratization of communications. By preventing the access of co-operatives and other nonprofit organizations to provide broadcasting services, the national government violates those human rights in flagrant transgression of the Constitution and international treaties. The cry of Santa Rosa translates the most genuine and legitimate resistance of the people as expressed through the local co-operative, compared to the absurd claim to subordinate the Supreme Law to the dictatorship of the market. On this historic occasion, the Argentine co-operative movement reaffirms the demand for the immediate repeal of article N° 45 of the dictatorship Law N° 22.285, which keeps such an aberrant discrimination” (CPE 2003, p. 15, translated by the author).

Besides expressing the demands of NGOs to the state to uplift the legal shackles toward having their
own media, the cry illustrates a quite different perspective on communication from the one defended by the creative economy policy discourses. They strictly speak of a dictatorship of the market, referring to the problems of high concentration patterns in media ownership that exist in the country, which - as I described in chapter 3 - are a consequence of previous years and alliances between those in the national administration and businessmen. These asymmetries silence the voices of resource-scarce groups, which is a situation far from the ideal of a public-sphere open to everyone discussed in media research; not even close to the ideal of free markets in the media sector as in the creative economy policy discourses, where firms can compete in equal conditions, because since the 1970s NGOs have been legally excluded from having their own media. Contrariwise, this statement shows similar claims to the MacBride Report, though at the national level, illustrating a different perspective - at least discursively - on communications.

For these reasons, and despite the ‘illegality’ of their project, CPE broadcasted free TV air channels to antennas of local inhabitants who had received the equipment from the co-operative (La Arena 2003m). As the president of CPE explained: “We only installed parabolic antennas, took what is free and we also distributed it without charge. We are not doing any business, instead we are only helping many people who cannot afford to pay, because they have been socially and economically marginalized” (La Arena 2003h, p. 10, translated by the author). As with the foundation of CPE, this event was also a popular party, with murgas - expressions of popular culture performed in the streets of Argentina - and neighbors on the streets celebrating their advancement toward what they considered a more just situation. The co-operative offered the service for free and challenged a private firm that charged high prices for the access to such signals (La Arena 2003m). The initiative was supported by the signature of 23,000 neighbors who wanted the project to continue (La Arena 2003m). However, the joyfulness did not last long, because that same week a private association of cable operators organized an event in Santa Rosa, where they made explicit their opposition to the co-operative project. For instance, they expressed that CPE was violating the national law, and claimed that if CPE entered the TV market, they would become a monopoly, given the fact that they had captive markets due to the other services they offered to the local inhabitants, such as electricity or the internet. Additionally, they feared that the co-operative would later charge higher prices for the service than private firms do in other cities (La Arena 2003i). As expected, the co-operativists maintained just the opposite position, and interpreted this as an attack on what they called private ‘monopolies’, or more precisely private firms’ associations that did not want the competition from co-operatives against them (La Arena 2003b). Members of the co-operative understood the situation as a repetition of what happened during its foundation, because once again a co-operative, caring for the city’s inhabitants, was struggling against what they understood as the oppression of a private firm, making excessive profits at the expense of the local population. From my point of view, it is an example of the conflict of interests between a discourse of culture and communications as a business versus another one that puts the priorities on social issues first.

The following days, mutual accusations were commonplace between the co-operativists and the private service providers and COMFER. For instance, the co-operative had to stop the transmission fearing an imminent confiscation of their equipment by personnel of COMFER, which was followed by a public denouncement of the co-operative movement against the lobby of private firms with local and national politicians (La Arena 2003h, 2003f). Even though some days later they retransmitted the signal once again, this time broadcasting just the national public channel (La Arena 2003h), the battle was quickly inclined toward private interests when COMFER finally sent representatives to
Figure 5.1: Mobilization of CPE associates and supporters in favor of their own media, repudiating the legal intervention against their project of free TV access. Source: (La Arena 2003a, p. 10).

CPE to write an affidavit about the illegal situation and to confiscate their TV equipment (La Arena 2003e). Although they were not able to find them, they succeeded in stopping further transmissions. This situation immediately pushed around 300 of CPE’s associates and supporters to mobilize by organizing a ‘symbolic hug’ around the co-operative’s building (see Figure 5.1). The supporters carried the co-operative colored flag and sent a clear political message of the importance they assigned to the TV project and to the need to advance with media democratization (La Arena 2003e, 2003h). As one of the members of the CPE press sector expressed: “When a major event occurs in the co-operative, it generally becomes a topic of discussion in the city very quickly, because it is an institution with a lot of grassroots support. […] particularly when there is an issue against a mega private enterprise” (CPE press sector, 09/09/2013, group interview in Santa Rosa, Argentina). Despite the fact that the battle was lost, according to interviewees it legitimized the importance of the struggle for media democratization in the town, and inspired further actions that contributed to the national movement of media democratization mentioned in chapter 3.

The following days, the expectations of the co-operative members were still high, hoping for an opportunity to legally offer the service (La Arena 2003k, 2003h). However their optimism ended quickly, because the association of private firms finally presented an injunction to stop COMFER and CPE from starting any sort of project, unless they had legal permission (La Arena 2003g). Therefore, the private firms took advantage of the existing legal framework, and exerted on the co-operatives what I call legal violence in my conceptual framework, because such restrictions only left one possible road of action: to start advocating a new law, something that the co-operativists began to do nationally (La Arena 2003l). However, as described in chapter 3, the mobilizations were not enough to unleash immediate change.
Instead, they would have to wait for major shifts in the national political context that took place six years later.

In October 2009, with the sanction of a new national audiovisual communication services law, new windows of opportunity opened for co-operatives to have their own TV channels and offer cable services (Ley 26.522 2009). A key event at that time was the national struggle between the government and the multimedia network Clarín, which legally challenged the new law. This multimedia group owned the largest cable operator in the country, Cablevisión, which controlled the private channels in Santa Rosa and the cable service. In this new context, CPE began the administrative procedures to obtain the license. Nevertheless, the road was bumpy because of two main hurdles. First, as they were the first co-operative to begin the procedure, the administrative requisites took a lot of time, because governmental bureaucracy was also in the learning process of what to do, check and require from co-operatives. Second, the co-operative had to reply and continuously dismantle legal hurdles created by Cablevisión and the Clarín Group, which according to the co-operativists did not want competition in the city and resisted the new law (Colsecor 2011a). This time, the co-operative was able to navigate the turbulent waters and surpass the barriers. In December 2011, CPE became the first cooperative to obtain a license to provide cable service and have their own TV channel in Santa Rosa, CPEtv (Colsecor 2011b). Eight years after their claims began, they were finally able to solve the legal constraints to their TV project, and finally began their transmissions on October 1st, 2012 (El diario de la Pampa 2012). This day was not selected by chance, but rather chosen because it coincides with the day the co-operative started to offer electricity to Santa Rosa in 1935, making explicit the importance of CPE’s history in this struggle.

For these reasons, I argue that to understand CPEtv’s imaginary and how such initiative was able to emerge from a small city in the interior of Argentina, it is necessary to comprehend the links between the foundation of CPE and the struggle to establish their TV channel. Without the history of oppression by private firms and citizens resistance and organization in co-operatives, the city of Santa Rosa would have never been this successful in organizing a co-operative TV channel and fighting for years for the legal opportunities to broadcast, challenging a market oriented perspective on media and communications. The success of the founding fathers of CPE facing a similar conflict has been a strong element for convincing co-operativists to keep on fighting for their channel, despite the difficulties they would face. In other words, it became a narrative to stimulate action, such as the following quote by the co-operative’s president illustrates:

“These foreign companies have a serious problem: they believe that people are stupid. They ignore that residents have a long experience of struggle against monopolies of every stripe. When SUDAM became convinced that the co-operative was a serious enterprise, they offered to lower the price of energy and showed their best smiles to convince us. We, the inhabitants of Santa Rosa, gave them the finger and they had to go. It would not be uncommon for history to repeat itself” (Nocetti 2012, translated by the author).

This statement alludes to the conflict between CPE and SUDAM in the 1930s, who tried to persuade the citizens not to built a co-operative. At the time when the president gave this talk, the local private cable firm was reducing their prices for cable service and improving its image quality to compete with CPEtv. Thus, Nocetti tried to warn citizens of the private firms’ marketing techniques by reminding them of similar ‘tricks’ played by foreign firms on the population before. This text also shows that, despite obtaining their license, the conflicts between those who defend a private approach to commu-
Co-operative principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Co-operative principles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Voluntary and open membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Democratic member control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Member economic participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Autonomy and independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Education, training and information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Co-operation among co-operatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Concern for community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2: Principles from the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA 2014a).

...communication and those who struggle for a human rights approach are far from closed. This clearly relates to the discursive opposition in chapter 4 between creative economy policy discourses and the policy discourse supporting NGO’s media in the new audiovisual communication services law. In the case of Argentina, co-operatives have been one of the many types of actors of civil society initiating the debates and mobilizations to try to alter the unjust media law (Coalición por una Radiodifusión Democrática 2004), and CPEtv is one case of this movement. In sum, the historical context is essential to understand why the following imaginary departs from the basic tenets of the creative economy policy discourses in some dimensions.

5.2.3 Imaginary

In this section, I will analyze the main dimensions of the imaginary of CPEtv, synthesized in Table 5.1, which was not only influenced by the local context and the history of the co-operative, but also by the discourse of the international and national co-operative movement. I shall first sketch some features of the international movement that help to understand CPEtv, because of its principles that characterize co-operatives, and also of the national movement that has a particular view on communication.

As regards the international co-operative movement, its origins date back to the industrial revolution in England, when in 1844 a group of workers suffering from unemployment and poverty conditions founded the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers. These workers had scarce resources but a curious set of principles to organize their work, which quickly succeeded in growing their enterprise and in disseminating the model all across England. In 1895 the success of this experience led to the creation of the International Co-operative Alliance, which had as an objective the global expansion of the co-operative model (ICA 2014b). The Rochdale Pioneers and their principles became the prototype for co-operatives worldwide. Although these have been slightly altered in vocabulary, even the following last version in the table keeps their original orientation:

These co-operative principles put an emphasis on democratic participation, a concern for issues related to the community, co-operation among co-operatives, among others. Of course they represent goals or ideals, which are not necessarily always met, but toward which organizations that want to call themselves co-operatives should be striving for, and such is the case of CPE. It is important to remember that co-operatives in capitalist countries compete in markets and earn profits through their products or services, just as any other private firm, but the main difference lies on how participation takes place in these organizations. In a firm, the owners, although a small subset of the total amount of workers, decide what to do with profits without consulting employees. Conversely, in a co-operative these

2. For more information on the story of the first experience see (Holyoake 1922).
decisions are collectively taken by associates in a more democratic process. This does not mean that
co-operatives are exempt from conflicts, either from those emanating from frictions among personal
relations or among different co-operative departments. Nonetheless, the co-operative model strives for
reducing the hierarchical asymmetries existing in private firms between the owners and workers and
extending the democratic ideals to the economic sphere. Therefore, as CPE and CPEtv follow and dif-
fuse content based on these principles, they are adopting a perspective that differs from the creative
economy policy discourses that do not take into account such principles.

In particular, the 6th principle of co-operation among co-operatives has been central in the struggle
of the national co-operative movement for their own media. After the new law, co-operatives across the
country have started to organize national networks of audiovisual production, to collaborate and diffuse
their practices, besides defending themselves against what they perceive as attacks of private firms.
One of such networks is Usina de Medios (Media Factory) that is connecting co-operatives in radio,
press and TV to produce content, and to which CPEtv belongs. This project questions mainstream
economics, as the coordinator of the program indicated:

“We think that the paradigm of the solidarity economy together with co-operativism offer
the model of a human-scale economy that gives answers to contemporary challenges. Capital-
ism is not left aside, because any type of venture requires capital, tools, machines and labor
force. But the most important difference is that in a human-scale economy, men use money
for human development, and not just for making more money as in capitalism” (Usina de
Medios coordinator, 10/10/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires,
Argentina).

This co-operative discourse keeps a clearly critical stance toward what it calls capitalism, or the con-
centration of resources in the hands of few and in specific geographic regions, which is a perspective
that contrasts with the uncritical view of a market based economy that the creative economy policy
discourses defend. Specifically, the co-operatives oppose the notion that culture and communication
can be considered as just another commodity; for instance, a scheme employed by Usina de Medios
coordinator to interpret the global situation is that “there is a major global dispute over the nature
of communication. Is it a commodity or a human right? We state it is a human right, as the current
government holds” (Usina de Medios coordinator, 10/10/2013, interview with & translated by the au-
thor in Buenos Aires, Argentina). As part of the network, CPEtv shares this perspective of the national
co-operative movement and ideas with the national government in this area, differing from the perspec-
tives of the creative economy policy discourses. This clearly alludes to the tensions between UNESCO
and UNCTAD on their understanding of culture, communication and development. The former sid-
ing more with cultural diversity and considering communication as a human right, whereas the latter
comprehends that trade and economic growth are like silver-bullets to promote ‘development’ in every
sector, irrespective of local contacts.

In this national context, CPE had already been diffusing co-operative principles through an edito-
rial that publishes books of local authors of Santa Rosa and La Pampa (CPE 2013a) and a monthly
magazine elaborated by CPE’s press sector and distributed to the co-operative associates (CPE 2013c).
The creation of their own TV channel, CPEtv, complemented and enhanced the previous two mecha-
nisms they had for diffusing co-operative principles, practices and content. According to the president
of the co-operative who led the political battle in 2003: “For us, they are all part of a co-operative cul-
tural policy, which is a fight against the homogenizing discourse of large corporations. Instead, we want
our own discourse, a regional discourse for our people and associates” (O. Nocetti, 14/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina). There are two important things to highlight in this statement. First, Nocetti expresses their desire to build their own discourse respecting the regional idiosyncrasies, and addresses those supporting co-operativism. Second, he makes explicit their opposition against ‘large corporations’ that in this context refers to the cultural and communication networks concentrated in Buenos Aires, undermining regional productions and co-operativism. It is relevant to observe that this statement is an implicit critique of the tenets of the cultural industries policy discourse in the country, which sides with successful mass market products in demise of other less saleable and more locally relevant cultural products and expressions. Similarly, it is linked with the historical tensions and struggles that CPE had against private firms, as the following quote by its president illustrates: “The co-operative was founded as a reaction to the abuses of a multinational company. It’s in the genes of the co-operative to combat big monopolies” (O. Nocetti, 14/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina). This clearly contrasts with creative economy policy discourses, because co-operatives, since the beginning of the movement - ideally - try to surpass the for-profit only logic, tackling as well issues of social inequality and exclusion processes, as represented in their ideal of a human scale economy.

The co-operative discourse and its different understanding of how an economy ought to work is one of the main reasons why it is so important for co-operativists to diffuse their practices. The following words of the coordinator of CPEtv, a co-operativist trained in journalism, show this:

“Our goal is to change the agenda, so that the priority is not only on governmental decisions, which of course are important, but also on many other things that we believe are equally or even more relevant. Such as getting people to show more solidarity and be participative. This, in the long run, is reflected in the people you elect to represent you, or at least, it ensures that there is not so much passivity from citizens” (CPEtv coordinator, 08/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina).

This statement reveals CPEtv’s goal to disseminate co-operative values and practices of solidarity and participation in their community, which has to be understood in context. During the 1990s, the ideology of neoliberalism expanded all over Latin America, and Argentina was not an exception. Although the term is understood in different ways in each country, some common elements are its strong focus on privatizations, despise of state intervention and encouragement of individualism (Grimson 2007). In particular, the type of individualism advocated by neoliberalism ignores the ‘social’, understood as the capacity of the individual to act collectively for other reasons beyond pure ‘self-interest’ (Domenech 2007, p. 75). This description of neoliberalism matches part of the definition of the creative industries emanating from the UK, which as I referenced in chapter 1, precisely speaks of individual creativity. In contrast, the co-operative movement opposes such associations in the field of media and culture, and instead advocates solidarity, participation and co-operation.

But, if the co-operative already had an editorial and a magazine, why do they need a television channel as well? The following statement explains the concerns that management had during fieldwork:

“Inhabitants of Santa Rosa relate quality of life to the co-operative and they support the organization, but this does not mean they adhere to co-operativism. So that is the task that we have with our media, to communicate that within a classical economy, co-operativism is a form of management with a human face. Something that large private companies do not
In other words, even though the co-operative offers several services in town and enjoys the support of part of the inhabitants, the management thinks the existence of the co-operative and its services are taken for granted, irrespective of its principles. They hypothesized the problem resides in the scarce contact that inhabitants have with content about co-operative ideas, given that most of the content they receive through television, the most used media, comes from the private oriented and individual practices associated with neoliberalism. Therefore, under the lens of SKAD, their project of a TV media channel can be understood as a dispositive to further disseminate the imaginary of co-operativism, reinforcing their associated practices, as the following quote of the channel’s coordinator reveals:

“Co-operative TV channels basically innovate in content, which involves the use of media to diffuse co-operative principles and values. The dissemination of the principles of solidarity, co-operation, sharing, mutual aid, want to give the message that it is important to get involved in matters that have to do with helping others and collaboration. It would already be a success if people collaborated with the campaigns that we spread, but even more if they started taking an active role in third sector organizations” (CPEtv coordinator, 08/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina).

Consequently, the co-operative has to depart from mainstream content that private channels diffuse. As the coordinator further details:

“We do not want to be a mere repeater of canned TV content, instead we want to produce our own high quality material. [...] Relatively speaking, we intend to be a mini Encuentro channel, that is to say, with a cultural and educational profile in our content, far from magazines and soap operas. We want to focus on programming that reflects local lifestyles” (CPEtv coordinator, 08/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina).

There are three relevant points to remark in this statement. First, the co-operative aims to elaborate ‘high quality material’, which refers to the production of audiovisual content respecting the established quality patterns with the required sophisticated technology. As I shall show in chapter 7, the aim of ‘high quality’ might be counterproductive, because it does not break with the quality patterns that mainstream audiovisual firms and training centers have established in the country, neglecting the regional variations in Argentina. Additionally, in chapter 6 I shall detail that the co-operative has acquired advanced foreign technology and costly equipment for fulfilling such aim. On the one hand, this set up has allowed them to elaborate content following a production process that does not differ much from a private commercial channel. On the other hand, the setup has created dependence on foreign providers.

Second, Encuentro (Gathering in English) is a popular Argentinean public TV channel created in 2005, which focuses on educational content about the different provinces of the country, Latin America and the world. University professors that I interviewed remarked that it has been a new actor that promotes through its buying power the production of educational content that private TV channels previously did not demand. Of course, the coverage they can give is limited by the time they have, and within these material constraints, the province of La Pampa is not the most relevant one, because
it is the penultimate one in terms of inhabitants of the 23 provinces that Argentina has. Thus, it is overlooked in their coverage. Nonetheless, the co-operative aspires to copy their model, to fill this gap by focusing in Santa Rosa and the province of La Pampa.

Third, CPEtv wants to focus on local content and lifestyles, which refers to co-operative content, but it also aims to portray the cultural diversity of the city and the province. Once again, this shows the closeness of their initiative with the perspective of cultural diversity from UNESCO. At the same time, together with the editorial, CPEtv wants to recover, save and diffuse local history and practices that would otherwise be ignored or lost. It is important to highlight that this goes against the logic of the cultural industries, which do not give much importance to a city or province with only around 110,000 and 350,000 inhabitants respectively. Evidently, an equation based only on profits disregards such small market, in comparison to the larger millions in other cities and provinces. This might explain why despite the expansion of the idea of cultural industries at the national level and of creative industries in Buenos Aires, neither of these concepts have been of concern for the co-operative. As CPEtv coordinator explains:

“We did not discuss cultural industries in a straightforward manner, and less with that terminology. Maybe those words were not used due to ignorance. But we did discuss on what type of content we wanted to display and how distinct it should be regarding other local productions. Specifically, we focus on having a plurality of voices in news, politically balanced, with no clear editorial line, except for those topics that address specific issues of the co-operative” (CPEtv coordinator, 08/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina).

The first part of the statement illustrates a point I shall show again in the rest of the media for social transformation: their neglect of the concepts of creative or cultural industries policies, but an opposition to the ideas they represent. This gap between the terms employed at the grassroots level with those at the policy level point out that the concepts used in the latter are clearly oriented toward sectors industrially organized in large urban areas, disregarding other types of experiences. Therefore, it reinforces the arguments criticizing the creative economy policy discourses of the previous chapter. Additionally, the last part of the statement defines how CPEtv wants to differentiate from preexisting news channels in the city: one is a state channel, and the other is owned by Clarín. According to co-operative members, the former focuses almost exclusively on issues related to government, whereas the latter, defends the position of private firms. Therefore, they claim to offer a more balanced coverage, stressing of course the position of the co-operative, given their importance in the province of La Pampa.

As regards the protection of their content, the coordinator of CPEtv explained that: “The co-operative owns the content produced entirely by us, whereas in the case of co-productions, with each agreement we consider diverse alternatives. But all our licenses are more traditional, neither Creative Commons nor free licenses” (CPEtv coordinator, 11/09/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina). Neither CPEtv nor CPE’s editorial used alternative licenses for their productions, but rather the protection offered by traditional authors’ rights law. This points to a contradictory aspect in their approach to culture and communication, because if they keep the same protection practices of the firms they criticize, they just repeat a similar operational mode, but on a smaller scale. At the time of fieldwork, this point was still under discussion by the leadership of the national network Usina de Medios, as its coordinator explained: “Creative Commons is one part of our sustainability model, because these licenses allow you to generate a legal platform for co-productions. Otherwise, it is very dif-
The advantages are evident, because such licenses would allow them to share knowledge among the different co-operatives and avoid the issues and costs of standard intellectual property rights. Nevertheless, another perspective registered during fieldwork maintains that those who diffuse content for free, under Creative Commons or other licenses, just do this because they have found no way to sell their content, which is of bad ‘quality’. This statement matches creative economy policy discourses by associating culture with profits, but at the same time, it would imply that all that is not sold is not culture. This preconception is quite extended among established artists, which can be interpreted as a strategy to keep the privileged position they have reached, despising those experimenting with alternative dissemination strategies. Nonetheless, research evidence casts doubts on the fear to content freely distributed online. For instance, research studies on specific cases show that in the film industry the distribution of free content, under particular circumstances, might increase sales (Smith and Telang 2009), whereas in the publishing industry sales are not necessarily reduced by the free distribution of the book in electronic format (Hilton III and Wiley 2010). Despite these potential advantages, in the case of CPEtv and the associated organizations I interviewed, there was not even knowledge about the existence of Creative Commons or other alternatives. Despite the fact that these different licenses might have already been quite useful to issues they were facing to preserve the works of local artists and to organize audiovisual co-productions. Consequently, even though the national network wants to promote such an approach, there is first a need of knowledge transfer to the interior of the country.

In sum, the imaginary of this co-operative emanates from a specific historical context in the province of Santa Rosa, where co-operatives have been central in offering public services. Specifically, the foundational story of CPE set the example on how citizens could organize against foreign private firms that wanted to obtain excessive profits from local inhabitants. Therefore, there has been a tradition for over 80 years of opposing perspectives that put profits above anything else. This has been the motor that inspired the opposition of CPE against the law, which banned them from having their own media, and encouraged it to strive for media democratization. This tension between the for-profit firms that oppose co-operative projects to acquire media, characterize the opposition that the latter have to discourses that put profits above everything else, such as the creative economy policy discourses advocate in the field of culture and media. In this context, the imaginary of CPEtv clearly has dimensions against the commercialization of communications, such as its understanding of communication as a human right and the stimulation of cultural, co-operative and local audiovisual content, which would otherwise be neglected by a commercial orientation to culture and communication. Despite their utopian claims of constructing an economy with a human face, it is also true that the co-operative movement - and CPE in particular - does not exclude practices that resemble those of commercial audiovisual firms. For example, the employment of similar technologies and quality patterns, or as I shall show in chapter 8, the use of advertising and the cost of cable service as a source of income. This paradoxical position is a product of the broader aspects of the co-operative discourses that I discussed, which criticizes the capitalist economic system, but still thinks it can reform it from within. This will contrast with other cases that take more extreme positions, such as the next one.
5.3 Barricada TV, Argentina

In contrast to CPEtv, Barricada TV has a shorter history, though not less influential in terms of paving the way for a particular imaginary challenging those of the creative economy policy discourses. In this subsection, I will first describe the specific context in which Barricada TV emerged. This will help to explain the main features of its imaginary synthesized in Table 5.1. Then, I will describe the imaginary of Barricada TV, and how it departs from the creative economy policy discourses in several dimensions, like in its objectives, actors and addressees. Therefore, I shall show another example that connects culture, media and society, different from the creative economy policy discourses.

5.3.1 Context and History

Barricada TV is considered by its members to be an alternative, popular and community channel, which joins several of the categories I mentioned in Section 2.3, illustrating the challenge to the clear-cut definitions suggested by Western researchers. It is located in the middle of Buenos Aires and started to operate before the passage of the new audiovisual communication services law, due to the social conflicts in the first decade of the 21st century in the country. I shall argue that their particular origin offers insightful contrasts with the creative economy policy discourses and the context and history of the previous co-operative case, which has a longer history and is located far from the capital.

Barricada TV’s founders began to think of such a project during their coverage of social conflicts in Argentina for the TV of the piqueteros3 movement in 2002 (Cardillo 2011). During the next years, they produced roaming coverages of different cultural centers in resource-scarce communities and of particular events; for example, in 2005 they transmitted a mobilization against the visit of G.W. Bush to Argentina, rejecting his plan to set up a free trade area for the Americas, which was finally dropped by that USA administration. In 2007, they realized the need of specific audiovisual training to not only produce counter informative content with respect to mass narratives, but also to have ‘quality’ to be able to reach a mass audience. The following year, after the organization of a training workshop, they adopted the name Barricada TV and started to cover national social conflicts, and, at that time, they focused on discussions about the new audiovisual communication services law for the country, where they represented and advocated for the specific needs of alternative media. In contrast with CPEtv, they lacked resources (financial and infrastructural) to continuously elaborate audiovisual content.

The specific imaginary of Barricada TV has been influenced by the organization where it has been operating since 2009, Industrias Metalúrgicas y Plásticas Argentina (IMPA - Metallurgical and Plastic Industries of Argentina), where they set up a TV studio to produce daily live and deferred programs. What is IMPA? At that time, it was the first factory recovered by its workers (Pérez 2013). The firm had a long history: Like CPE, it was founded as a private factory in 1918 and from 1933 onwards it focused on the production of flat rolled aluminum (La Vaca 2007). In 1948, during Peron’s government, the firm was nationalized and reached its ‘golden era’. From then onwards, its performance decayed, and in 1961 the government relented two of the three production plants, and offered the third to the workers to establish a co-operative (La Vaca 2007). However, even though it theoretically was a co-operative, in practice it kept a stark division between management and employees (Robertazzi et al. 2008), disres-

---

3. This word is a neologism, which refers to street mobilizations that emerged in Argentina during the 1990s and reached their peak after the economic crisis of 2001. These demonstrators, who blocked streets and occupied governmental buildings, faced different conflictive situations with the police and citizens not sharing their views.
and in 1997 it entered a process of arrangement with creditors before declaring its bankruptcy. In 1998, this situation pushed the workers to displace the management and take the co-operative back into their hands (La Vaca 2007), turning it into one of the pioneering cases of the Movimiento Nacional de Empresas Recuperadas (MNER - National Movement of Recovered Enterprises). In 2001, the economic and social crisis pushed several other factories to a similar process, with workers facing the loss of their jobs due to bankruptcy and managers eager to escape with no concern at all for their employees. In that context, IMPA became a model to at least 160 recovered factories (Rohter 2003). IMPA's leadership advised and supported experiences that wanted to switch to such an alternative organizational model (Robertazzi et al. 2008): a factory collectively owned and managed by its workers. The following years were not easy for the enterprise, because they had several conflicts with the state and mass media. The clashes with the former involved legal conflicts and also physical clashes with the police, which exerted violence against members of IMPA in several situations (Barricada TV 2010a). As regards mass media, according to the members of the co-operative, it misinformed more than it informed about what was happening with IMPA and other recovered factories (Barricada TV 2010a) that were constructing the MNER (MNER 2013). Indeed, IMPA decided to support the initiative of Barricada TV, which offered a communication channel more in tune with their struggles and imaginary, to counterbalance the scarce coverage of its positions and the biased ones about its practices. A plausible interpretation of this neglect is that the MNER challenged the status quo, the dominant hierarchical way of organizing firms within a capitalist economy. Therefore, given the close links between private mass media and different industries through advertising, it is not a surprise that such movement has not been welcomed by mainstream commercial journalism that depends on such a model.

Henceforth, Barricada TV operates at IMPA’s factory located in the capital city of the country, Buenos Aires, but covering topics related to workers struggles and consequently influenced by the broader discourse of the MNER. This gives a different departure point with respect to CPEtv, because even though co-operativism and this movement want to alter the capitalist hierarchical structure in firms, the proposed strategies differ. Co-operatives follow essentially similar business practices and respect private property rights, guided by their seven principles and a democratic decision making process. Contrariwise, the MNER eliminated the hierarchies and operated under a logic of collective property from the start. Besides, the conflicts that this movement had in 2001 were far more violent - legally and physically - than the experience in Santa Rosa. Despite these differences, a common point between them is that IMPA and CPE both aim to expand their particular practices and ideals, opposing - though with nuances - the primacy of economics in the fields of communication and culture. For example, Figure 5.2 shows a photo of the entrance to IMPA’s main building, which has a mural with written concepts representing elements of the essential issues that the enterprise fights for. From left to right it reads: Culture, Work, Resistance and Education, which I interpret as a reference to the culture of self management by the working class, the resistance to what they perceive as an exploitative economic and hierarchical model of private firms, and the importance of work and education for all its members (Documentales semillas 2011). The inclusion of culture also refers to the support that IMPA gives to cultural activities in its factory for neighbors, among which Barricada TV is an example. It is worthwhile to remark that the interpretation of these concepts within the context of IMPA constitutes an opposition to the creative economy policy discourses, because they are questioning what they consider an unjust and exploitative economic system, where once again the idea of culture and media organized just for profits is a foreign one, besides neglecting their specific practices. Furthermore, their concept
Figure 5.2: IMPA’s entrance door, where Barricada TV operates. The sign from top to bottom, and left to right says: “IMPA: The factory. Cultural City. Struggle, Work and Culture”. Above each of the four men in the mural, from left to right, it says: “Culture, Work, Resistance and Education”. Source: (Barricada TV 2012e).
of culture aims to embrace the local inhabitants and workers, without creating a separation between those that can be ‘creative’ versus those who cannot.

In sum, Barricada TV emerged in a context marked by the experimentation with new ways of organization by parts of the working class, which tried to look for solutions to the consequences of the Argentinean crisis of 2001. These new practices have suffered from bias and neglect by mass media, which stimulated the emergence of their media organization to cover the ongoing events from their perspective. Therefore, the aims of Barricada TV, their organizational methods and their perspectives on media and culture depart from and oppose those of the creative economy policy discourses, as I shall detail in the next subsection.

5.3.2 The Channel and its Imaginary

Barricada TV’s imaginary can be considered as an example of initiatives of the alternative and popular media movement and as part of the new audiovisual communication services law, which stimulates NGO media I defined in chapter 4. The following online manifesto of the channel details the main features of their imaginary:

“Barricada TV is an audiovisual political action group, with the format of popular news. We are not artists nor is our goal aesthetic. We are primarily political and social activists decided to produce videos as a tool for organization. That’s why Barricada TV is not just a group of people dedicated to film various conflicts and popular experiences, but we are primarily an action group working within a political organization that seeks to carry out a project to transform the reality we live in. Thus, we think that counter information can not be divorced from political intervention in a particular conjuncture. Hence, we seek to contribute to build a counter-hegemonic discourse, to expose disinformation disseminated by mass media, to stimulate mobilizations and debates, to think and question our own way of working, and to win comrades for our struggle” (Barricada TV 2009a, translated by the author).

This paragraph offers key insights about Barricada TV. First, it makes evident that they consider themselves as activists with a political aim of social transformation, a position that is neglected in the creative economy policy discourses. Although they are not part of an organized political party, they do have the orientation to defend workers’ parties, evidently influenced by the context they operate in, a recovered factory. Indeed, the symbol of Barricada TV shown on the left in Figure 5.3 has the typical red star historically associated with socialist or communist ideas, whereas on the right of the photo it shows IMPA’s factory referring to their association with the working class.

Second, they understand mass media as a disinformation tool that hides urgent social issues, and for this reason they promote their channel with the slogan “all the news that you do not see on TV” (Bar-
ricada TV 2009b, translated by the author). Accordingly, the aim of Barricada TV is to act as a counter information source, turning upside down stories that pretend to be ‘objective’ and ‘rational’, but that they understand as just covering one way of interpreting a given event, misrepresenting news related to other sectors of society that do not have access to mass media. This relates to their perspective on journalism, which a member of Barricada TV, Natalia Vinelli, described with the following words:

“Alternative media represent a space where another journalism is possible. A dependent journalism taking sides with a social class with the aim to counter inform against the claim of objectivity that hegemonic media has, trying to naturalize the bourgeoisie perspective as unique and universal” (Vinelli 2011c, p. 31, translated by the author).

These statements show their scheme to understand mass media as an instrument of the ‘bourgeoisie’, or more precisely higher income sectors that distribute information that defends their worldview as if it were ‘natural’. Contrarily, Barricada TV in that context is a media that challenges the content diffused by the former. Therefore, both can be understood as dispositives within the terminology suggested by SKAD; but the objectives, actors and addresses in each case varies. For Barricada TV, the aim is to openly express that their content is subjective, representing workers perspectives on local, national and international news, leaving aside what they consider as the cynical claims of objectivity of mass media. In this sense, this case resembles conceptualizations inspired by Marxism about alternative media introduced in chapter 2, such as radical media. Why? Because they try to capture cases that through critical content defy mass media messages, which they do not consider as objective, but rather as the product of specific economic and class structures that sustain such organizations.

Third, Barricada TV members remark in their manifesto that they are not artists and that they are not going to be limited by aesthetic concerns, which is an important difference to CPEtv, which strives to produce high quality material. As I shall show in chapter 7, this refers to the decision of not following mainstream audiovisual production quality schemes that private media firms employ. By stating that they are not constrained by these schemes, they express that what matters more in their case is to produce and distribute the content that reflects their imaginary, rather than the ways this transmission is accomplished.

Fourth, they claim to be a source of counter-hegemonic discourse that represents the “popular and working class”, stimulating “new values based on solidarity, egalitarianism, commitment to each other, co-operation, socialism” (Barricada TV 2009b, translated by the author). These values are also shared by the co-operative case, but as a difference with CPEtv, Barricada TV has a stronger opposition to mass media - both private and public - that is not pronounced as much in the co-operative movement, particularly against the state, as I shall show in chapter 8. Additionally, solidarity and collaboration in the imaginary of Barricada TV are important because they shape their practices in a distinctive way, such as the following quote of one of its members suggests:

“To fill a grid with 6 hours of own production from the popular field, we are bound to collaborate and share the materials we produce among us. This is a departure point completely different from the one of hegemonic media, whether private or public, that organize their work based on scoops” (Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).

Indeed, most private media have to buy the content they distribute, except for that distributed for free by the state. Conversely, Barricada TV establishes exchanges with other experiences of the ‘alternative,
popular and community’ media field, which refers to their exchange of material among such groups in order to have enough content for a continuous transmission. This allows them to overcome the barriers of buying such material, because they exchange them for free with other organizations, such as independent audiovisual producers, social movements, journalists, trade unions, etc., providing critical content about conflicts not reported in mass media. This suggests a network of collaborating organizations that sustain their activities without depending on advertising or state funding, but on barter like transactions that allow to obtain the needed materials. Otherwise, they fear they would become constrained by the need of financial sources and, consequently, their imaginary would not be so critical (Vinelli 2011c). In effect, this is one of the reasons why they do not want to use direct advertising, as the following quote by one of its members reveals:

“New channels must have their own agenda, not imposed by any power, whether economic or political. [...] along with aesthetics that breaks with machismo, consumerism, stereotypes and the logic of a commercial media system oriented toward advertising sales” (Vinelli 2011a, p. 85, translated by the author).

This statement shows how Barricada TV opposes the functioning of media organizations by advertising or political publicity I sketched in Figure 2.2. Conversely, they want to replace these logics by one of collaboration and solidarity among peers sharing their imaginary. Furthermore, collaboration and solidarity are important for Barricada TV to attract and maintain their human resources. As Vinelli explains: “Without a core of activists capable of putting the collective over the individual, and at the same time, without stimulating participation policies that address different levels of commitment, popular TV would be an eternal dream” (Vinelli 2011c, p. 28, translated by the author). Given the aim of social transformation they have, the initiative is sustained by a group of activists, with different levels of participation, who voluntarily dedicate their time to the project. This is one way of understanding solidarity, which puts a collective project above what they consider the petty interests of private media of just making profits at all costs, which would be the sole and only aim of a media organized following the creative economy policy discourses. Thus, Barricada TV illustrates another type of cases that would oppose the standardization the supporters of the commercially oriented discourses defend.

Barricada TV and CPEtv share similarities in terms of their aims to reach mass audiences. In the words of one of its founders: “Why should we fight to be massive? Because if we defend a project of social transformation and we assume that communication is a strategic tool, then it is essential for us to go beyond the boundaries of the circle of people that share our same opinion” (Vinelli 2011b, p. 224, translated by the author). However, as I shall show in chapter 6, the technologies of content distribution to achieve these aims differ, Barricada TV lacks the financial resources to acquire the costly equipment that CPEtv has, but instead it has been faster to adopt online technologies. Thus, they have a mixture of old and modern technologies, and in particular the online technologies have allowed them a further reach, but not without new constraints to their imaginary.

As regards the international discussion about the differences between the creative versus cultural industries, this was not a conceptual issue neither in Barricada TV nor in the alternative TV movement. However, they do have a negative perspective on cultural industries which is the most disseminated term at the national level in Argentina. According to one of its members:

“We understand that cultural industries do not break with the mainstream communication paradigm, where culture is an industry that produces for markets. On the contrary,
alternative communication completely breaks with it, and we do not think it is an idealistic perspective, after all, the need for a new communication paradigm motivated the change of the audiovisual communication services law” (Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).

This statement supports the divisions highlighted in chapter 4 between the two groups of discourses: those that understand culture and communication mainly as a commodity versus those that resist such a position. In addition, it shows once again that academic discussions to decide whether ‘creative industries’ or ‘cultural industries’ is the right term are irrelevant at the grassroots level. In contrast, the statement suggests that what matters at this level is the inclusion of groups that have been neglected in the conceptualizations of what I named creative economy policy discourses. At the same time, the statement shows how the members of this media for social transformation grasp the contradictions present in national policies, which, on the one hand, introduced a new communication services law striving for media democratization; and on the other, stimulated an industrial approach to culture - including media - that disregards the groups they wanted to include in the former. Indeed, despite the fact that there has been a big change in the communication sector to encourage media logics beyond state funding and private advertising, the cultural policies still support commercial culture through the idea of ‘cultural industries’. Therefore, this initiative, which is interested in helping resource-scarce sectors of society, criticizes the idea of cultural industries (whether in media or in other sectors), because it ignores the different and unequal distribution of cultural capital. As one member of Barricada TV explains:

“The cultural industries policies are characterized by strong state intervention together with stimulus for markets. However, they do not support the alive and dynamic experiences of the popular classes, but that of the middle or upper classes that have a certain level of cultural development and that use state support for individual and creative work, which is not at all collective” (Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).

This quote connects with the criticism of the concept of a ‘creative class’, which assumes that in a creative economy only certain groups of people are ‘creative’ enough to produce ‘culture’. This reinforces a hierarchy of who is to be valued to elaborate products for markets and generate wealth, and who is to be neglected, and in the worst case despised for being uncreative. This confirms my criticism of a commercial approach to culture, which, in contexts of high inequalities in terms of income distribution, overlooks the barriers to access education and specialized training, causing differences to access knowledge to work on varied cultural sectors. Additionally, the last part of the statement highlights the idea of cultural industries relying on the notion of the individual artist, ignoring collective cultural expressions. This is one of the arguments that grassroots experiences employ to reject the ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘individual’ approach of the creative economy policy discourses, undermining the role of collective experiences striving for social transformations. For these reasons, from the standpoint of actors striving for social change toward more egalitarian societies, the commercial approach of the creative economy policy discourses has to be substantially criticized.

A final feature to remark regarding Barricada TV’s imaginary is their view on work organization and property, as one member describes: “We work collaboratively, in community, with roles that keep changing. There is no unique owner of the means of production, instead they are collectively owned” (Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina). This can be understood as the translation of IMPA's practices of workers' self-management.
and collective property to this media organization, which also departs from traditional ways of intellectual property rights, like the ones CPEtv used. Conversely, Barricada TV employs Creative Commons licenses, because of the following two reasons explained by one of its members:

“First, because what matters most to us is that our contents circulate to contest the construction of subjectivities. We want to reach everyone. Second, because we think that knowledge is collective and that culture is a shared common. We only ask for an acknowledgment of our work and that it is not used for profit. In sum, we think that the more you liberate content, the more it flows” (Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).

The last reason in this statement clearly sides with the perspective of collective creativity that I discussed in Section 4.2, opposing the individual perspective defended by the DCMS. Furthermore, the first reason supports the argument that the channel is a sort of dispositive to disseminate the specific imaginary and practices of the organization, since it puts the focus on the ‘construction of subjectivities’, which in the language of SKAD would mean the offering of new subject positions.

In the final analysis, Barricada TV and CPEtv both illustrate how their imaginaries have been shaped by historical processes in a specific geographic location, which leads to producing different types of interpretation schemes, with particular knowledge and varying degrees of opposition to the creative economy policy discourses. Despite the several points these two cases share, there are also differences that are worth insisting on. First, the co-operative movement is an international initiative that also emanated from the UK, which is a paradoxical element it has in common with the creative industries discourse. Conversely, the MNER was autochthonous from Argentina, although it evidently has been influenced by anarchist, Marxist and socialist thought and practice. Therefore, the actors and the type of knowledge they aim to disseminate, differs from the former. Second, they share the same criticism against mass media and coincide in the need to create alternative networks of communication to influence social change, to spread values of collaboration, co-operation and solidarity. But, while the co-operatives have a set of normative principles to follow the aim of slowly changing society, and in general avoiding direct overt conflict, Barricada TV presents another picture. It defends the struggle of factories without the bosses movement, where conflict has been more recent and violent, and thus the urge to transform the prevailing social order is greater. Accordingly, their imaginary has a stronger utopian side. Third, co-operatives by principle accept members of all political orientations, while the alternative channels are clearly oriented toward those parties that defend workers’ positions, opposing the ‘bourgeoisie’. Fourth, both cases aim to reach mass audiences, but with different strategies. The co-operatives want to compete in markets for viewers’ attention and profits to diffuse their own principles and values, whereas Barricada TV uses a different strategy of sustainability relying on a network of collaborators and income not obtained through advertising or propaganda. Last but not least, this difference in terms of the sources of financial income affect the technological and infrastructural conditions of each case, which is an issue I shall detail in chapter 6. Nonetheless, I shall also discuss in chapter 7 that higher technological investment does not necessarily mean that they have been more effective in spreading their imaginary.
This case illustrates a different type of media for social transformation, whose main difference derives from the actors that run this channel, members of the Mapuche indigenous community of Argentina. In this section, I shall first show how the adverse historical conditions that these communities have suffered influenced their demands to have their own media. Nonetheless, I will describe that in contrast to the previous two cases, Wall Kintún TV experienced a serious conflict during the process of setting up its channel that hampered its full operation. Taking into account this hurdle in the second subsection, I shall analyze the main features of the imaginary of this case synthesized in Table 5.1, pointing out how it opposes the creative economy policy discourses.

### 5.4.1 The Mapuches and the Road to the Channel

Alternative media approaches take the existence of a media structure dominated by the state and private firms for granted; notwithstanding, this perspective leaves aside actors that existed before nation states. As I explained in chapter 3, in the 1870s Argentina conducted the so-called ‘conquest of the desert’, which acquired almost the entire lower half of the current territory of the country. Moyano (2013) remarks that for the Argentinean elite of the 19th century this campaign was the apex of the construction of the national project. However, he points out that the indigenous community occupying the territories, the Mapuche, had the role of ‘the wretched of the earth’, a phrase in allusion to Fanon, who described a similar oppression within another context so well (Fanon 2008). Why? Because the expansion implied a brutal attack on the Mapuche, backed by the official version of Argentinean history at that time, which argued that as the Mapuche originated in the Pacific coast and crossed the Andes to settle on the other side of the cordillera (Ministerio de Cultura y Educación 1982), they were ‘foreign’ to the territories claimed by the Argentinean military. Contrarily, for the Mapuche it had always been their land, called Wallmapu, which in the Mapuche language - Mapunzugun - means ‘Mapuche nation’. There they had their own political organization, language, culture, etc. (Moyano 2013), before the existence of Argentina. However, the Mapuche were defeated and their territories were given to army personnel or those close to the government, even though members of the indigenous community still inhabited them. This illustrates how the Mapuche were victims of the expansion of the Argentinean nation-state that continued the European colonial project (Moyano 2013). During the 20th century, the state reinforced the control of the newly acquired territories, and the Mapuche had no other choice than to accept and learn the customs the winners imposed, such as the Spanish language and cultural schemes needed to survive and adapt to the new conditions. Notwithstanding, since the return of democracy to Argentina, there has been an increase of claims from Mapuche communities to recover what they understand as theirs, which has led to conflictive confrontations with the nation-state, but also to advancements, such as the privileged inclusion of indigenous communities in the new audiovisual communication services law I described in Section 4.1.2.2. This new legislation finally paved the way for these communities to obtain their media, which in theory would become tools to counterbalance what they frame as the biased coverage of mass media, both private and public.

In this historical context, the channel Wall Kintun TV is located in the city of Bariloche, in the province of Río Negro, which is an Argentinean city that contrasts a lot with the previous two. Let me set the stage. The city has around 110.000 inhabitants and, given its privileged location next to a lake and at the foot of a mountain, it is one of the most famous touristic attractions for nationals and
foreigners to enjoy the wonderful landscapes and outdoor sports. The official narrative states that the city is an European invention (Moyano 2013); although this statement might hold true for some areas of Bariloche that even copy Swiss architecture, it is definitely not true for all. The Mapuche lived there long before the arrival of the conquerors and the creation of Argentina. In fact, the city’s name is an inheritance of their past, because Bariloche in Mapunzugun means ‘people from behind the mountain’, in reference to the Mapuche, who lived facing the other side of the Andes on the shores of the pacific ocean. There are several Mapuche communities living in the surroundings of the city and in other parts of the province and neighboring ones. However, for most tourists - and even locals - the Mapuche are invisible, until some conflict erupts with the state and private landowners. Considering this neglect, the Lonko (chief in Mapunzugun) of the Buenoleo Mapuche community in Bariloche had the idea to start their own media in order to report about land struggles in the region from their point of view. In this way, they aimed to unveil what they considered biases in the coverage of the ‘white skinned men’ media (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). They originally applied for a radio license, but to their surprise, government officials proposed a TV channel license and promised to provide everything they would need for its operation. Why did this offer take place? It can only be understood in the context of the national struggle at the time between the government and the Clarín Group over the enactment of the new audiovisual media law, which I described in chapter 3. Because, although the law had been issued in 2009, since then it had been legally questioned by the most influential media firm, Clarín, which introduced injunctions to stop its full application. However, these injunctions expired December 7th, 2012, a date called the 7D by the government, which organized campaigns and acts to defend the new law and mobilize against the media conglomerate (Wikipedia 2014b). In this scenario of political tensions, the Buenoleo community received the proposal to set up the TV channel few weeks before the 7D and the whole process was expedited so that they could inaugurate the channel on that day. An interpretation of these events is that the state wanted to show how the new law was democratizing voices, giving loudspeakers to those who had been historically silenced by mass media and the state. Nonetheless, this particular context of confrontation and the need of the government to speed up the project led to the alternative interpretation that the regime was attempting to control the NGO media encouraged by the new law. Indeed, this perspective was supported by errors in the process of accelerating Wall Kintun TV’s project; for example, some weeks prior to the launch of the channel, the Buenoleo community found out that its name had already been chosen by government officials: Wall Kintun TV, which in Mapunzugun means “to look or search around” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). The problem with this is that from the start the community had a reduced level of participation in the process of constructing their own media, thus opposing the ideals of the new law to foster independent NGO media; a situation that would further escalate, as I will describe in the next paragraphs.

On December 7th, the project was inaugurated during one of the events in Bariloche under MICA, the state program promoting the cultural industries policy discourse in the region. The inauguration of the channel was widely disseminated by the local and national government as a success in media democratization and as a way to undermine the criticism the new audiovisual communication services law was receiving from Clarín and other media opposing the national administration. As an illustration, one of the public servants of the government, Pereira Cotaro, working for the Consejo de Desarrollo de las Comunidades Indígenas (CODECI - Council for the Development of Indigenous Communities)
that was involved in setting up the TV channel, stated:

“We believe there is an information deficit in Bariloche, because the only open television channel is part of Clarín and functions with little content of Bariloche and not reflecting the communities surrounding the city. So, our idea is to make a general channel, but with a clear editorial line that makes Mapuche in Bariloche visible, because a large part of the population, or perhaps most, is Mapuche. We also seek to generate an internal reflection in society about where we come from and where do we go” (Terra Argentina 2012, translated by the author).

As this quote illustrates, the aim of the channel at that point was quite similar to the previous two cases: to generate content relevant for local communities in opposition to mass media, which ignored their perspectives. However, the actor disseminating the imaginary of Wall Kintun TV was part of the national administration at that time, something that contrasts with the previous two cases, and something that would quickly change.

At first sight, this inauguration at the end of 2012 was a success. One of the indigenous communities that have been suffering from oppression by the state and mass media firms, would finally start reporting from its perspective through audiovisual media. But this honeymoon would not last long, as one member of Wall Kintun TV described: “The government drove us to do this, and then left us there” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). What happened? In 2013, the spokesperson of the Buenoleo community publicly denounced that the political authorities intervened in the channel, stating that, one year after its inauguration, Wall Kintun TV was still a “TV channel without cameras” and an “opportunistic manipulation of ‘officials hampering the full exercise of our rights’” (Señales 2013, translated by the author).

Which were the reasons for this denouncement? Members of the Buenoleo community recount that: “These people already had everything planned, the name of the channel, the team, even the date for the inauguration! The emblematic 7D ... Thus, they misused the media law for their political conflicts that are foreign to indigenous communities. So, in that rush, they borrowed all the necessary things” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). This testimony shows how members of Wall Kintun TV share the interpretation that they were used by the national administration as part of the national struggle between the state and the Clarín group described in Section 3.4.2. The state wanted to show how the new law was democratizing voices by showing the successful implementation of an indigenous community channel, yet this required technologies and knowledge on how to use them that the Mapuche community certainly did not have. Accordingly, to show results in a few days, the management of the channel and the decision of what would be filmed, were left in the hands of members close to the government and not part of the Buenoleo Mapuche community, which still carried all the legal responsibility for what could happen in the workplace (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). This had some advantages, but also clear disadvantages that would limit the original aims of the media project demanded by the Mapuche. On the one hand, those who took charge would be able to produce content related to the Mapuche quickly, satisfying the need for content that a continuous TV channel has. On the other hand, those in charge had a close connection with the government and thus they would not show the most conflictive issues that the Mapuche have

4. It is worth pointing out that some of those who took charge of the channel were Mapuche but not from the Buenoleo community, and in some cases had already received training in audiovisual media, even though they were partisans of the government.
over territories disputing the state. Additionally, there was limited participation of the members of the Buenoleo community in the project; thus, they felt as outsiders even though the channel was ‘theirs’. In sum, these features are well known in development studies, they characterize a typical top-down approach to project implementation, closely connected with the ruling party, that in this case conspired against the democratization aims of the initiative to express the voice of the indigenous community, which was left in an underdog position.

In 2013, one year after the official inauguration, the public denouncement by the Buenoleo community led to the expulsion of the previous management of the channel. Unfortunately, the management took with them most of what they had brought to the experience, such as equipment, the working team and the contacts and knowledge for operating the channel. This, and in general the delay of the channel to enter into operation, received a lot of coverage in private mass media, which attacked the government and the new law, such as articles in the newspapers Clarín, La Nación and Perfil that belong to the Clarín group (Andrade 2012; Crettaz 2013; Direnzo 2014). In all cases, the aim was to cast doubt on the democratization objectives of the new audiovisual communication services law, which they portrayed just as a way of the government to limit mass media private firms freedom of expression. After the public denouncement, Wall Kintun TV has been receiving support from different state organizations to reverse the problematic foundation so that they could get the needed financial and technical resources to produce content. When I was conducting fieldwork, the Buenoleo community directly assumed the management of the channel, trying to solve the hurdles blocking their project. To conclude, the historical struggles of indigenous communities and the particular facts in the process of setting up their channel delineate a completely different trajectory from the previous two, which once again leads to a peculiar imaginary opposing the creative economy policy discourses in several dimensions, as I shall show in the next section.

5.4.2 The Imaginary

Similarly to the previous cases, the imaginary of Wall Kintun TV is a product of the specific historical conditions that led the actors - in this case the Mapuche - to strive for their own media channel. However, Wall Kintun TV is different compared to the previous two cases, because the conflicts in setting up their TV channel that I described in the previous section stopped them from producing continuous audiovisual content, at least during the time I conducted fieldwork. Consequently, the description of the imaginary of this case substantially more concerns its utopian dimension or vision of how it would operate in the future if they are able to surpass the limits they encountered during fieldwork. To delineate the main characteristics of their imaginary, I focus on statements of the members of the Buenoleo Mapuche community that express what they would like to do with their channel, giving less importance to those uttered by the first management linked to the national government, although I quote some initial content where these different projects are still covered.

The first element to consider is the aim of the channel, which is illustrated by the following statement of one of the members of Wall Kintún TV:

“[...] to empower ourselves through this media and to start building a communication platform to disseminate and have impact. Why? Because until now, only the oppressors have spoken, and only those who have specific interests in the Mapuche territories, only those trying to discredit our legitimate and historical struggle, which is holding on to rights” (Wall Kin-
This quote is linked with the reasons that led them to ask for a channel in the first place: to spread narratives of their realities from their points of view, covering the struggles to recover the territories they argue that the state illegally obtained from them. Furthermore, the expression that only the oppressors have spoken so far, uses the language of anti- and post-colonial struggles worldwide, revealing that they consider obtaining their own media, as a decolonization tool against the biased or total lack of coverage in mass media of their struggles. This aim sharply contrasts with the one of the creative economy policy discourses, which just encourage media for profits, but not the fight against historical processes of oppression. This is an important observation that supports the argument on how such policy discourses cannot fully become an inclusive ‘development’ option.

A second important aspect to point out is that the members of Wall Kintún TV reject the classifications of their media project as an alternative, community, co-operative, popular or radical channel. Instead, one of its members explained that: “We are not a community channel, as they want to label us. Neither is it a state channel nor any other of those labels that they try to put on us. We are a Mapuche channel that has a different philosophy and worldview from the Western one” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). This statement stresses that they are an indigenous channel, which, as I explained in chapter 2, makes evident the limits of the terms employed by Western academics who are missing the point with the specificities of the initiatives by indigenous communities.

The aim of the Buenoleo community of diffusing the Mapuche worldview, together with the actors, addressees of their imaginary and their perspective on technology are present in the following text of the teaser used for the first inauguration of the channel:

“Nature has always communicated with us. We are part of it. Through technology, we were invaded from thousands of kilometers away, by foreign information that we do not need. That was the only way we had been informed, until now. The first indigenous Argentinean channel has arrived to Bariloche, Wall Kintún has arrived, ‘To search around’. Communication from the origins, with a complete schedule, analysis, entertainment, information from our city, from the world, from our town and from the world’s indigenous movements. A unique audiovisual service, a local, intercultural Mapuche channel. A new, broad, diverse, balanced and democratic TV. Wall Kintun TV has arrived for all. We are the first ones, we are not going to be the only ones” (Wall Kintun TV 2012, translated by the author).

The quote employs personal pronouns to refer to the actors that will produce content for the channel, members of the Mapuche community and also of indigenous movements in similar struggles around the country and the world. Additionally, it makes clear that even though the content is going to be focused on indigenous communities, they aim to reach everyone. Apart from the previous point, the statement describes the position that this case has with respect to mass media and technology. Indeed, they acknowledge that they were ‘invaded’ by foreign information, particularly referring to media, such as TV, press and radio, which from their perspective disseminate Western values and ideas in Argentina, emanating from Buenos Aires. This point of view would match the interpretation that I have been stressing of media as dispositives of different types of discourses. From the Mapuches standpoint, the existing media only reinforced the ideas, practices and values of those that have a
Western origin. Conversely, with their channel they aim to inform in a different way, thus suggesting their own media would act as a dispositive, but this time to stimulate the perspective of indigenous communities. However, at the time I conducted fieldwork, they were technologically dependent from other organizations and the state, which borrowed or donated the equipment they had. Furthermore, there were no clear practical guidelines on how to distance themselves from the ‘professional’ patterns of audiovisual production followed by mainstream media; issues that I shall discuss further in chapter 6 and 7 respectively.

As regards the Mapuche worldview, they claim that they respect nature, quite different from the Western industrial civilization. According to Grebe (2005), this is due to the Mapuche cosmovision that believes in the existence of spirits, which guard different types of natural resources (woods, stones, water, etc.) and with whom the Mapuche must enter into a respectful dialog in case they want to use the resources the spirits preserve. Regardless if one shares such a belief or not, it shows a different mediation between humans and nature that departs from the Western approach to knowledge as a tool over nature (Sagasti 2000). More generally, a central objective of Wall Kintun TV’s project is to preserve and disseminate their worldview and practices for future generations, as one member expressed: “Maybe someday in the future, our grandchildren will be enjoying a channel like discovery, but dedicated to indigenous communities. That is the project that we have, let’s see if we can carry it out” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). But which are the specificities of the Mapuche worldview? As Grebe et al. (1972) explain, the Mapuches have a dualistic cosmovision that can be analyzed in different dimensions. Vertically, they believe that the cosmos is made up by seven horizontal platforms, where one is the natural world, two levels are occupied by evil spirits and the remaining four by good spirits, ancestors and gods. Horizontally, they organize their natural level with the cardinal points, but by taking the East as our North, a decision that might be influenced by the place where they emerged, looking to the Pacific and the Andes. They believe that these levels are inhabited by good and bad supernatural and human beings. They also have a circular organization of time and space, which rotates counterclockwise, which influences how their houses (ruka in Mapunzugun) are constructed and the communication patterns they use in rituals and other everyday activities. Thus, their cosmovision, of which I only presented a very synthetic glance, clearly departs from the Western one and has been the cause of conflicts around land disputes, where Western laws and the Mapuche perspective on land collide (Grebe, Pacheco, and Segura 1972). This particular worldview explains their desire to record and disseminate their traditions by themselves through their own perspectives, as a way to preserve their culture and their stories, which are given little attention in mass media, and implicitly neglected in the creative economy policy discourses due to their scarce contribution to economic growth. Evidently, commercial cultural policies do not tackle the needs of these communities to preserve and expand their cultural practices and worldviews. But the Mapuche consider the preservation and dissemination of their practices as urgent, because of the threats of what they call a ‘neoeXtractivist model’ implemented by the national government (Prafil 2013), based on the extraction of natural resources, with negative environmental consequences. In many cases, the Mapuche and other indigenous organizations living in such territories suffer the consequences, which not only threatens their particular worldview, but their lives, as the following quote by one of its members shows: “The Mapuche have their own way of interacting with nature, but if these communities disappear, also a culture will be lost. That is why we reject such policies. We are not struggling for money or just for land, but for life itself” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview...
Consequently, this threat puts the imaginary of the Mapuche in a position of sharp mistrust against initiatives that put profits above anything else, because from their point of view precisely such a perspective is threatening their survival.

As regards participation, the imaginary that Wall Kintun TV members want to implement has specific limits to what sorts of actors will be covered, which is explained in the next quote by one of the members of the channel:

“We are not going to spread much material about the Mapuche who are part of political parties or the Catholic Church, because these contents are Western. Besides, religion is still a colonization force, and political parties have many own interests contrary to the life of the Mapuche people. For example, the pacts the government made with oil and mining firms” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina).

Indeed, the statement reveals how after the conflict with governmental officials during the foundation of the channel, the new Mapuche management has decided to avoid intromissions in national politics. Instead, they want to focus on their own people and its expressions, which the same interviewee described:

“The Mapuche worldview is circular. We understand we are not going to speak in the name of the Mapuche, instead the Mapuche people will speak on the screen. The idea is to record everyone, from children to the elderly and varied Mapuche expressions” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina).

On the one hand, this quote refers to their concept of participation, which mirrors the name of the channel - to look around - and their logo, even though they were not chosen by the Buenoleo community. On the other hand, the emphasis on their circular perspective also stresses their particular worldview. Indeed, Figure 5.4 shows the logo of the channel, whose circle to the left of the name of the experience represents the Mapuche cosmovision of dividing the earth in four cardinal points (Grebe, Pacheco, and Segura 1972), assigning to each quadrant specific qualities of good and evil that exemplify their “dialectic, dualistic, spiritualist” cosmovision (Grebe 1973, p. 28).

Neither the cultural industries nor intellectual property rights were matters of concern for Wall Kintun TV. On the one hand, this has to do with the fact that they are not yet continuously producing, and thus did not discuss strategies to attract funds for sustaining their activities. On the other hand, the initiative resembles Barricada TV more than CPEtv in terms of aims and working practices, because the Mapuche are inclined toward a collective approach to property and knowledge, and in disseminating content about their struggles independent of a commercial ambition. Once again, the creative or cultural industries strategy for culture and communication oriented mostly just for profit, does not match the stated objectives of this grassroots experience.

To conclude, Wall Kintun TV offers an example of a different type of media for social transformation, led by members of an indigenous community, which are often neglected in Western research, given the underrepresentation of these actors in academia. Similarly to the previous two cases, Wall Kintun TV aims to disseminate content about the specific imaginary they believe in, but in contrast, this imaginary wants to preserve and reproduce a worldview and practices previous to the expansion of the
state and of capitalism in the region, whereas CPEtv and Barricada TV work under organizations that struggle for social transformation of the contemporary unequal contexts in which they operate. Therefore, their project is distant from the for-profit aims and practices stimulated by the creative economy policy discourses. Apart from this, a key difference with the previous two cases is that the historical discrimination the Mapuche have suffered in Argentina and their location far from urban centers puts the community in a big disadvantage to gather resources (financial, knowledge, infrastructural, etc.) to set up and sustain their TV channel. Accordingly, despite the new appropriate conditions the new audiovisual communication services law has generated, in this case history has even more weight than in the previous cases, both in terms of explaining the peculiarities of their imaginary and delineating the hurdles they face in practice. I shall return to these points in the next chapter, but first, I will discuss the Brazilian case in the next section, which offers a sharp contrast to the Argentinean cases, given that it is a product of the ‘network society’.

5.5 Fora do Eixo and Mídia NINJA, Brazil

In June 2013, Brazil caught the attention of international media, and not only because of the upcoming football World Cup, but due to the eruption of several riots in its largest cities, such as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. These riots started in São Paulo in order to complain against an increase of the transport fare, but quickly led to other claims against the low quality of health services, difficulties to access education, excessive costs for global events planned in Brazil, corruption, among others (Freitas 2013; Watts 2013; Folha de S. Paulo 2013). These riots led to several clashes between demonstrators and the police, with the former accusing the latter of violence (Watts 2013). During the first days of these events, mass media undermined the groups organizing the protest, particularly the Movimento Passe Livre (Free Pass Movement), which demanded free transport fares for students, and reported the violence of the protests, though in a biased way. For example, on June 12th, 2013, the cover of the newspaper Folha de São Paulo spoke of the violence of the Brazilian demonstrators, who it classified as ‘vandals’, whereas the same frontpage spoke of the Turkish ‘activists’ suffering police repression (Folha de S. Paulo 2013). Similarly, Oglobo covered the “vandals”’ violence (Éboli, Evandro et al. 2013), but said much less about police violence and the causes of the riots. Under those circumstances,
citizens media emerged to cover what mass media ignored or purposefully misrepresented. One of them, Mídia NINJA, quickly attracted a lot of national and even international attention⁵, due to their reporting of street violence, evidencing how mass media ignored the situation and questioning their presumed objectivity. I shall analyze this case in detail, which operates in a different media system and was influenced by the specific political tensions and discussions on cultural policies that took place in Brazil. Thus, the structural conditions define different departure points. Indeed, I shall describe that Mídia NINJA is a spin-off of a network of cultural collectives that emerged and expanded - in part - to the influence of the national policies favoring network organizations and the adoption of ICT. I shall argue that this network, called Fora do Eixo (FDE - Off Axis), is essential to understand this media for social transformation. A second key difference with the other cases is that Mídia NINJA diffuses all of its content online, and in the midst of the protests in Brazil was able to challenge national mass media in ways unthought of in the previous three cases in Argentina. However, this case is not just another media experience based on ICT; contrariwise, Mídia NINJA is part of a network that has been advancing a specific imaginary striving for a more collaborative economy and society. This aim has shaped their practices, in particular those in their media experience, and delineates a peculiar imaginary, which I will synthesize in Table 5.1. For these reasons, I shall first describe the main features of FDE, which then allow me to explain the specific context of emergence of Mídia NINJA. Finally, I will connect these facts with an analysis of the main dimensions of the peculiar imaginary of this media for social transformation, contrasting it with those of the creative economy policy discourses.

5.5.1 History of Fora do Eixo

FDE’s history goes back to an experience created in 2001 in the city of Cuiabá, in the interior of Matto Grosso, a state in the south-west of Brazil. This experience, called Espaço Cubo (Cube Space), was founded by four students of social communication, who wanted to offer a new model in opposition to the ‘conservative business models’ that prevailed in the city (Ferreira 2007). Espaço Cubo operated collectively, which meant that every member lived in a collective house, with shared maintenance costs, food and even clothes among its members. At the time, this was a radical decision due to their lack of resources, but a decision that would later turn out to be productive. Their aim was to organize festivals, events and to support the creative production process of local bands and their circulation to other Brazilian cities, trying to overcome the difficulties of being far from the leading cultural centers in the country (São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro). For achieving this, they introduced two extra innovations. First, they employed Creative Commons to diffuse the productions of the artists they supported, challenging the prevailing copyrights business model. Second, they implemented a complementary currency to finance their activities and to exchange with their partners, which I shall detail in chapter 6. Therefore, the collective lifestyle and their approach to IPR siding with free or open licenses, already sets a clear boundary separating this cultural network from the commercial practices of the creative economy policy discourses, which in the extreme version of the DCMS assume individualism and traditional copyrights to sell cultural products and services.

In December 2005, three other collectives from small cities of the interior of Brazil (Uberlândia in Minas Gerias, Rio Branco in Accre and Londrina in Paraná), joined with Espaço Cubo to create the cultural circuit FDE. Their aims were to stimulate the production, circulation and distribution of

⁵. Indeed, the coverages of Mídia NINJA were reported by The New York Times (Romero, Simon and Neuman, William 2013), The Guardian (Bainbridge 2014), Deutsche Welle (Krieger, Renate and Weise, Christina 2013), among others.
content from the interior of Brazil, which was ignored by the so-called ‘axis’ (São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro). In particular, FDE began its operations in the music sector, benefiting from the technological change in ICT that allowed collaborative and creative commons practices to flourish for distributing artistic productions (Freire Zangrandi 2011). From 2006 to 2008, the network diffused its ideas through cultural events and conferences, but just kept the same number of collectives. From 2008 onwards, the network expanded after the organization of the first FDE congress in Cuiabá. As members of the network pointed out, they officially launched their complementary currency (more details in chapter 6), ‘Cards’ and invited other collectives to join. Given the similar restrictive conditions that cultural collectives in other cities were facing, many found the model of the network attractive and joined. Three years later, FDE was composed of 120 collectives emulating, although with different degrees, the model of Espaço Cubo.

According to Cláudio Prado, an ex policy maker in the area of digital culture of the Ministry of Culture and now contributing with FDE, the network was quite successful because:

“[…] they looked at the problem from the point of view of a band, which needs to gather, to play and to displace from one city to another for their performances. Today bands departing from the northeast cross Brazil entirely and visit other Latin American countries, all with solidarity hosting and solidarity food. Their articulation is digital, but it is something analogical what they constructed that did not exist before” (C. Prado, 17/12/2013, interview with & translated with the author in São Paulo, Brazil).

What is important to highlight from the statement is how an experience departing considerably from the principles of the creative economy policy discourses was able to expand all across the country and address unfulfilled issues in the music sector thanks to its collaborative practices of organization, such as ‘solidarity hosting’ or ‘solidarity food’. As I shall explain in chapter 6, these are all practices that challenge the intermediation of national currency for the exchange of goods and services, by using other ways of establishing the transactions instead, with the aim to address the lack of financial resources. In this way, the network has been able to surpass some of its financial limits, and in the middle, it created a specific imaginary that reinforces these different ‘collaborative’ practices. The following text from a video distributed in 2013 captures some essential elements of the imaginary, which is important to later understand the organization from which Mídia NINJA emerged:

“The strength of indigenous and urban communities derives from their shared knowledge processes that create feedbacks among them and the organic structures of another new possible world.

The collective is making the change, not an individual

Festivals, actions, projects, become fields of free training, where we are all learning and teaching (#vivencias #perursosinfinitos). The city and cognitive environments are formative, the training is free and in flow. Houses become collective homes and a hive of cultural inventions that create and make possible new ways of life. To support this process the economy is reinvented, social currencies, collective cash arise, which promote and sustain methodologies marked by generosity.
From griôs⁶ to hackers, from urban tribes⁷ to ‘povos de terreiro’⁸, from cyber-activists to indigenous communities. The sum of differences approaches and recreates connections; plurality and potency; elaborates narratives; affirms identities, new ways of living are reinvented; what was only thought now has become practice. It has never been as possible. They can call us optimistic. Yes, in fact we are. To change the world, one must believe, work every day in its construction, so that we can advance. Work and life go together, with will, courage, and enough force to make it happen. The new tomorrow already began yesterday” (Fora do Eixo 2013a).

First, the text includes worlds that reveal the utopian bent of the network, in the sense of what I discussed in chapter 2, an imaginary that claims to offer a different type of society. This can be detected, on the basis of the employment of the term ‘another new possible world’, which is the motto of the World Social Forum (Fisher and Ponniah 2003). Its inclusion is not a coincidence, given that the forum began in Brazil and inspired several civil society organizations and social movements to keep on struggling to transform realities they consider to be unjust. Furthermore, during the last paragraph they make another indirect reference to the utopian character of their endeavor, declaring that their construction of their new possible world has already began, and thus, it is a concrete utopia, and not something distant in the future such as Francis Bacon’s ‘New Atlantis’ or Thomas Moro’s ‘Utopia’.

Second, the text introduces key concepts that are part of the discourse of the collaborative economy that they want to put into practice through ICT. For example, the term ‘shared knowledge processes’ is connected to their concept of free training, which does not only refer to the fact that they do not charge, but also to the lack of rigidity in transmitting knowledge. In other words, an attempt to eliminate disciplinary boundaries brought with specialization, which have been central for training Mídia NINJA journalists. Similarly, in the text they mention ‘generosity’ that also points to the free sharing of knowledge, which implicitly is a challenge to the approach of protected, and restricted copyrights of the initial versions of the creative economy policy discourses. As I explained in chapter 4, the perspective of FDE is relevant to allow resource-scarce sectors of the population to access knowledge. Finally, the text refers to several concepts that reveal the importance of ICT in the experience, such as Twitter tags, or the use of the word ‘flow’, which is theoretically related to discussions on cyberculture (Lévy 1999), a neologism that alludes to the new practices that ICT paved the way for, thanks to the easy access and the sharing of diverse types of knowledge.

Third, the text states that the network puts the collective over the individual, which is clearly opposite to the DCMS perspective on the creative industries, where culture is an individual act. Indeed, as I discussed in Section 4.2, the more general subject position of the ‘creative entrepreneur’ suggests an individual person, instead of a collective organization. But, what does FDE mean with ‘collective’? The connotation of the word emanates from the founding of the organization described in the previous section, Espaço Cubo, the first collective of FDE, which from the start operated with its members living in a collective way, changing the relation of humans and property by sharing the same physical space, food, clothes, etc., and thus establishing a collective approach to their creative endeavors. It is

---

6. This neologism is a Brazilian word inspired by the term griot, which refers to West African storytellers who keep the tradition through oral stories. As a difference, in Brazil the concept was broadened to include any person (not only Afro-descendant) who shares stories and traditions of particular Brazilian communities (Grãos de Luz Griô 2012).
7. This alludes to the concept of urban tribe (Maffesoli 1988), as a group with similar worldviews, dressing styles, musical taste, etc., which are in contact with FDE and the cultural activities they promote.
8. This refers to Afro-descendant communities in Brazil and their spaces to preserve African worldviews and religious practices, which are also important in strengthening the social ties in their location (Instituto de Políticas Relacionais 2013).
important to realize that this practice rejects the predominant principles in any bureaucratic cultural organization or firm that is based on the tenets that the creative industries policy discourses assume. The latter assume a hierarchy of control, standardization processes and specific rules and norms that contribute to a system based on individualist practices, aiming at efficiency and profits, and focused on private property (Morais 2013). Conversely, the collective way of living defies the implicit accepted relation between individuality and property, and as I shall later describe, alters the ends of these organizations beyond financial profits. Furthermore, this collective organization encourages group processes of creativity, which my discussions in Section 4.2 illustrated, coinciding with the observations from the sociology of knowledge and research on creativity (Runco 2007; Zerubavel 1997), which claim that creativity is never a purely individual act, but always influenced by the context and the sources the inventors or the creators had contact with. Accordingly, the collective lifestyle of FDE seems to make these results from research more evident, breaking the fictitious barriers of authorship in cultural and media works that are introduced by a commercial approach.

Fourth, this collective ideal led them to question the socially accepted way of economic exchange, which is mentioned in the text when they refer to reinventing the economy. This alludes to the use of different exchange systems for products and services than the national currency, which is an instance of the global increase in community currencies worldwide as a way to address the issues that the scarcity of national or regional currencies generates. In chapter 6, I shall detail these technologies; in particular, how they shaped the reinterpretation of media technologies by Mídia NINJA.

Fifth, the text stresses some of the actors and addressees that are part of the experience by considering a diversity of groups, such as Afro-descendant, cyberactivists, indigenous communities, among others. This broad list considerably departs from the creative economy policy discourses, because it directly addresses actors that the economically oriented perspectives usually neglect. But who are the members of this network? Despite the diversity of those mentioned in the text, those interviewed define themselves to be part of the middle class or the new middle class, thus although they focus a lot of their activities to the excluded sectors in Brazil, not all belong strictly to such a group. The network has members of different ethnic backgrounds (Afro-descendant, indigenous, European, Asian). The majority of their members are young adults up to 35 years old, although it also has older members and collaborators above that age limit. The relatively young average age of FDE’s members might explain why it has been quite successful with digital technologies, because many of its members are digital natives. It is also relevant here to point out that despite the horizontality in discourse, there is definitely a hierarchy in the network, not only in terms of functions, but also in terms of the relevance of the collective houses and the experience that each member has.

An important fact to highlight is that the inclusion of a diversity of addressees reveals the influence on FDE by the ongoing changes in national cultural policies at the time in Brazil. As I explained in Section 3.4.3, the arrival of Lula to power in 2003 made the musician Gilberto Gil Minister of Culture, who stimulated the creation of networks of cultural practices spanning the diversity of previously neglected ethnic and resource-scarce groups in Brazil, trying to counter-balance the preexisting commercially oriented policies. Moreover, Gilberto Gil introduced policies to promote solidarity economy practices, cybertulture and the dissemination of Creative Commons as an alternative way to understand authors’ rights (Ministério da Cultura 2005). Thus, it is reasonable to think that the presence of those features in FDE were influenced by the national policies at the time. Indeed, one of the founders of FDE later

---

9. For example, see the bibliography summarized online about community currencies (Schroeder 2013) or the International Journal of Community Currency Research.
remarked during a television interview that:

“We can state with conviction that what we did is the result of policies of what has happened in Brazil from 2003 onwards. Especially with the new cultural policies of the Ministry of Culture, spearheaded by Gil and Juca Ferreira, which was a fundamental team that produced a turn in cultural policy discussions in Brazil” (Soares 2014, translated by the author).

Additionally, FDE had several connections with the Cultura Viva program I described in chapter 4.1.2.1. First, some of their collective houses from time to time received support by the Cultura Viva program. Second, members and collaborators of FDE are quite active in the Cultura Viva movement, such as the povos de terreiro. Thus, the approach of FDE shares the perspective advanced during Gil’s and Ferreira’s administration at the Ministry of Culture, where they challenged the previous hierarchy of high culture versus popular culture, associating the former with the one that really matters whereas the latter with ‘low quality’. This logic is illustrated by the contrast that members of the network remark between those who state that “we will take culture there” (Fora do Eixo member I, 13/03/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Belém do Pará, Brazil), that is to say, to disseminate ‘high culture’ to unknown places to those who are not supposed to have it. Conversely, FDE claims to reflect another approach, as the same member described: “We identify culture, people, projects and then we relate to them” (Fora do Eixo member I, 13/03/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Belém do Pará, Brazil). In sum, the key point is that the specific imaginary of FDE cannot be understood without comprehending the influences of the national cultural policies at the time, which challenged the creative economy policy discourses as schematized by UNCTAD or the DCMS.

From 2008 to 2011, the network expanded considerably. FDE affirms to have reached 120 collectives, 2000 members, a presence in 10 countries, the organization of 300 festivals, among others (Fora do Eixo 2013d). Between 2011 to 2013 the network expanded even further in terms of the number of collectives, distribution along the country and in diversifying its activities beyond the musical sector. In 2012, they declared to be present in 200 Brazilian cities and also expanded to the main urban centers as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro (Fora do Eixo 2013d). This growth in size also went hand in hand with a diversification of their activities and a complexification of the network. According to one of its founders, Pablo Capilé: “Fora do Eixo works as an incubator” (Soares 2014, translated by the author). That is to say, FDE began with the experience of Espaço Cubo almost a decade ago, and now supports a wide variety of projects and alternative practices departing from the creative economy discourses. Indeed, these projects are organized in four fronts: Universidade (University), Partido (Party), Banco (Bank) and Mídia (Media). The university front is in charge of systematizing and replicating the unique collaborative and other knowledge and practices the network generates. The party front is dedicated to create and experiment with network policies (Morais 2013), beyond adherence to just one political party and to the divisions of the political spectrum between left and right (Corrêa 2013). However, it is also true that this claim to have a dialog with many parties, does not mean they do not have clear preferences. Indeed, in social networks they have clearly supported the PT of Lula and Dilma against the PSDB during the 2014 national election, not without expressing their differences. The bank front organizes the transactions of complementary currencies and coordinates how collectives deal with them. Finally, the media front disseminates cultural expressions and activities of FDE, and precisely within it, the project of Mídia NINJA emerged, as I shall describe in the next subsection.
5.5.2 Toward Mídia NINJA

From 2011 onwards, FDE increased its level of activism and participation in national political debates, beyond issues related to the cultural activities of the network. Thus, they did not only intervene against the changes in cultural policies during Dilma’s first government, but also became more outspoken in struggles for LGBT rights, the legalization of drugs, protection of indigenous people, among others. This expanded politicization is important for the research, because it paved the way for the emergence of their own media, Mídia NINJA, which aimed to cover these political perspectives of the network. I shall show how the emergence of this media for social transformation is linked with the previous media experiences of FDE and the changes at the national level, together with the broader expansion of ICT and the pressure this produced on journalism as a profession. These points shall illustrate the different context of emergence of this case with respect to the previous three Argentinean ones.

A first factor that contributed to the emergence of Mídia NINJA and its particular practices is the previous experience that FDE already had in their media front. This area, which diffuses content of different cultural expressions of the network across the country, pioneered the first streaming coverage of a mobilization called Marcha da Liberdade (March of Freedom) in São Paulo in 2011. This was a protest against violent police repression that took place in a previous march in favor of marijuana legalization, and more broadly to preserve the freedom to demonstrate (Galhardo 2011). Members of FDE loaned equipment, a CPU in a backpack with a camera and a microphone, to transmit what was happening online (Mídia NINJA member I, 11/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil). To their surprise, they had over 5,000 online followers, which showed them that the format of live transmissions of events, without editions or cuts, could be attractive to viewers, which led them to replicate the experience. Specifically, members of FDE thought it could be useful to address the problem of the cultural peripheries in Brazil (those far from the axis São Paulo-Rio de Janeiro I described in Section 3.4.1), as the following quote of the founder of FDE explains:

“The cities’ mass media do not disseminate what is happening in other states, because they hardly disclose what happens in their own cities. The Folha de Estado de Matto Grosso does not diffuse what happens in the state’s culture. It only disseminates what takes place in Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo. Thus, as we had no way of knowing what was going on in Acre, we said ‘No!, we will also have to create our own media” (Soares 2014, translated by the author).

This experience became known as Pôs-TV, because it contrasts with the traditional structured programming grid of a typical TV channel, as one Mídia NINJA member describes: “The basic principles we thought was for a TV after the TV, or Pôs-TV, prioritizing freedom of content and decentralizing production” (Mídia NINJA member I, 11/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil). Pôs-TV quickly became the inspiration for a way of distributing content in a format posterior to the rigid continuous TV grid. FDE members began to use cellphones, notebooks and other cameras to stream conferences, events, interviews, etc., to an online live audience through social networks. This allowed a low cost flow of information within and outside FDE, which implied that the knowledge to make such transmissions was quickly replicated in most nodes of the network. The point I want to highlight is that an initial experiment with streaming led FDE to institutionalize the practice, in the sense of Berger & Luckmann (1966), because FDE members and their audience started to routinize the live transmissions of events through cellphones and notebooks, which became a usual

10. A diversity of videos is accessible from their webpage that links to YouTube (Fora do Eixo 2014b).
practice in every event organized or covered by the network. This practice of audiovisual production opened alternative spaces where content could be recorded and diffused, which would later become central to Mídia NINJA, differing from those of mass media and also of the three previous Argentinean cases.

As regards national policies, after the arrival of Dilma to power, she selected a new Minister of Culture, Ana de Hollanda, who broke with previous policies in the sector during Lula’s administration. As I mentioned in chapter 4.1.1.2, the new administration returned to focus on artists, introduced the creative economy as a national program, gave a strong endorsement to intellectual property rights and cut support to the Cultura Viva program. Thus, Ana de Hollanda reduced the priority that previous policies gave to the funding of resource-scarce, popular cultural expressions and digital culture. These new policies were totally contrary to what the government had done in previous years, which allowed FDE and other digital culture experiences to flourish. Consequently, it is of no surprise that the network became actively involved in political mobilizations to see this new minister resign (Mello Dias 2012). For these reasons, the network started to cover cultural policy discussions and to intervene more actively in broader political debates that affected their interests, which made them understand the importance of media for the dissemination of their perspectives.

The third factor was the massive expansion of ICT and the changes these brought to the practice of journalism as a profession, as the next quote of a Mídia NINJA member shows:

“The crisis in journalism today is a crisis of intermediaries, because there are many more people doing journalism, many more news channels, it is easier to access the internet and social networks, and to get the tools, such as a computer or a cell phone. Today, it is far easier than seven years ago to buy a computer, because interest decreased and there have been governmental policies for poor people to access these tools” (Mídia NINJA member II, 18/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Brasília, Brazil).

Statistics confirm this easiness to use ICT. Indeed, in 2013 Brazil passed the barrier of 100 million internet users (UOL 2013), while in 2008 they had less than 40 million (Teleco 2014). As regards smart phones, in 2013 analysts estimated Brazil was the country ranked fourth in terms of smart phone users, with a total of 70 million (Reuters SP 2013). Finally, social networks in general are quite popular in Latin American countries, and in particular in Brazil; for instance, during 2013 Facebook reached 76 million users (Reuters SP 2013). What is important to remark is that these technologies opened the doors for new channels of communication and sources of information, besides mass media. Apart from a broader access to ICT, the statement also points out the last factor, the crisis in journalism. The expansion of the internet and digital culture that challenged the music sector at the beginning of the 20th century, has recently been affecting established journalism business models as well. One of the main reasons for this is that internet users can read online news without paying or can distribute content by themselves bypassing traditional media organizations. Accordingly, traditional media, like newspapers, have been suffering a reduction in their audiences. Brazil was not an exception to this global tendency, where the crisis in media was understood not only as a product of the introduction of ICT, but also as a consequence of the way journalists were failing to cover the complexities in contemporary societies (Martins Costa 2013a).

11 For the position of Ana de Hollanda, see her different blog posts (Hollanda 2014). For an example of the critics, see (Turino 2013).
In this context, Mídia NINJA was founded at the end of 2012 by members of FDE. The project, although not yet formalized, began with coverages of the World Social Forum 2013 in Tunisia (Diniz 2013) and with the reporting of the trial of murders of two environmental activists in the state of Pará, in the Brazilian Amazon. During that half of the year, the journalism crisis in Brazil intensified, and several journalists were fired from diverse media in São Paulo, with scarce chances of being rehired by media firms. Taking into account that situation, on June 5th, 2013, Bruno Torturra, one of the founders of Mídia NINJA, published an article inviting unemployed journalists to a meeting to join a new experience, Mídia NINJA, explaining the following:

“Is journalism dying? Or the business model of information distribution? Does the craft of catalyzing public dialogue with facts and opinions have its days numbered? Or just an analogical and greedy thought, based on circulation figures and advertising sales? [...] For me one thing is clear: the net will kill the newspaper to save journalism” (Torturra 2013, translated by the author).

This statement is important because it already delineates how Mídia NINJA emerged as one alternative model in the midst of the crisis of mass media firms at the time. As Torturra suggests, they started their project trying to operate beyond the for-profit principles that rule commercial media, thus, opposing as well the creative economy policy discourses. It is important for the reader to remember that this is an example of the broader tensions that new media (online media) have been generating for the established business models of commercial media I mentioned in chapter 2. The tension does not only emanate from the emergence of new ways of journalism, but rather from the threat to business models based on the scarcity of information distributed through print, radio or air TV. Instead, ICT have paved the way for models that break with the previous for-profit logic, giving spaces to new experiences to emerge, such as Midia NINJA.

However, the meeting that the founder of Mídia NINJA had organized never took place, because during that day massive riots began in São Paulo and the rest of the country, violence took place between demonstrators and the police, and it unleashed a national political crisis due to huge protests not seen for years in Brazil (Wikipedia 2015b). During those days, Mídia NINJA, led by Bruno Torturra and other journalists, made several live transmissions of the events that were taking place on the streets. They used live streaming with smartphones to interview the demonstrators and to obtain scoops of police violence, and were one of the few independent media - as they call themselves - covering these events, whereas mass media at first criticized rioters and ignored their positions. Conversely, Mídia NINJA started to cover several mobilizations in the main cities of the country where FDE members lived. These videos went viral in social networks and considerably increased its followers on Facebook and during their live transmissions. What is important to highlight about this case is that this specific context of emergence during June 2013 shot up Mídia NINJA’s popularity, which allowed them to attract the attention of viewers and mass media up to levels that the Argentinean cases never experienced. This put the experience of FDE and Mídia NINJA under the spotlight of mainstream media, although not necessarily in a friendly tone. Contrarily, very soon after their coverages exposing mass media’s biased role, Mídia NINJA received attacks from the incumbents of the sector that pressured the project, an issue I shall analyze in chapter 8. Despite the hurdles it had to endure, this case emerged as a new type of online and collective media for social transformation, operating under a collaborative logic that challenges for-profit media.

To conclude this section, I want to emphasize that the context of emergence of this media for social
transformation differs considerably from the previous three in Argentina. Although Brazil did not have legal advances in terms of media democratization, the cultural policies during Lula’s administration and the posterior political debates, stimulated network organizations, such as FDE, to experiment with ICT, which indirectly led to new cultural and media practices challenging mass media. Therefore, the case of Mídia NINJA gives a good counterbalance to the Argentinean cases, because it is completely based on ICT, but also on new collaborative practices that emanate from the particular context of emergence of FDE. Despite these differences, Mídia NINJA shares a central aspect with the Argentinean cases, a particular imaginary that tries to oppose the for-profit, commercial approach to culture and communication that the creative economy policy discourses represent, as I shall detail in the next section.

5.5.3 The Imaginary

The following months, Mídia NINJA kept on covering diverse conflicts in several cities of the country and expanding its structure of operation. At the time of my fieldwork, the initiative consisted of around 20 FDE members, who are part of the core of the experience, distributed in several FDE houses and collectives across the country. The main base is in Rio de Janeiro, and they also have NINJA operating in São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Belém, among other cities. Besides, Mídia NINJA receives support from a varying number of collaborators, who are academics, citizens and other free media collectives and who contribute with diverse type of materials, such as photos, videos and written articles. Therefore, this media for social transformation is a spin-off network from the FDE network of cultural agents. This is a central feature of this case that offers an operational structure different from the Argentinean cases, which just broadcast from one fixed location. Furthermore, FDE inspired much of the practices and the specific dimensions of the imaginary of this case, which I shall introduce by analyzing the following fragment available on their web page.

“We are Mídia NINJA (Independent Narratives, Journalism and Action), a network of communicators who produce and distribute information in movement and action. We rely on a collaborative logic for content creation and sharing - features of the network society - to make reports, documentaries and investigations in Brazil and worldwide. Our agenda follows social struggles and expressions of cultural, political, economic and environmental transformations.

The internet has changed journalism and we are part of this transformation. We live in a peer to peer (P2P) culture, which allows the direct exchange of information between people, without the presence of old intermediaries. New technologies and applications have enabled the emergence of new spaces for exchanges, where people not only receive, but also produce information. In this new era of networks connected to the streets, multimedia citizens have emerged with the ability to build and share their opinion in virtual environments. These new storytellers make Mídia NINJA” (Mídia NINJA 2014i, translated by the author).

This paragraph emphasizes several key terms that delineate Mídia NINJA’s discourse. For example, in their name they claim that their narratives are ‘independent’, which means that their news are not dependent on those who advertise in their network as in private commercial media, because they neither claim not to finance their coverages through advertising nor directly through state propaganda,
although they have been denounced for the latter (Diniz 2013). This clearly differs from the model in which a standard commercial or public channel operates, putting them close to the definition of ‘independent media’, which I surveyed in Section 2.1. Furthermore, the inclusion of ‘action’ in the acronym name of this experience gives an idea of the actors that establish it, activists, because it refers to their ideal of reporting in the middle of where events are taking place. This type of actors also leads to the specific objective of covering mostly social struggles and different types of transformations that take place in Brazil, but from their perspective, performed in a different way than what mass media journalists do. As one member of the network remarks: “The difference is that we are inside what’s going on, while mass media journalists are not. They are afraid of being hit by stones” (Mídia NINJA III, 13/03/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Belém do Pará, Brazil). For this reason, they do not report at a distance from their interviewees or the situation they are covering, as a ‘professional’ and ‘objective’ journalist in Brazil tends to do. Conversely, in the words of one of its founders: “Mídia NINJA is a sort of public service, because it protects the protestor, who before being a protestor is a citizen. So, by covering demonstrations, we are protecting democracy” (Corrêa 2013, translated by the author). Consequently, they think that by taking a definite stance they give voice to those who have been excluded from mass media and shield them from frequent police violence during riots, covered in chapter 8, contributing with this activity to what they understand as an ongoing democratization process in Brazil. Thus, there is a strong element of activism in this experience, which they understand as the capability to “believe in the agenda that we cover” (Mídia NINJA III, 13/03/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Belém do Pará, Brazil). This implies a specific cut or slice of what to show in the world, on what topics are relevant and which ones are not, departing from the claim to ‘objectivity’ (a point I will develop further in chapter 7).

Coupled with the previous points is the belief that they are a product of the network society, but operating under a collaborative logic, which is related to the discourse of the Cultura Viva policy discourse and its opposition to a purely commercial logic for cultural and media activities. Indeed, in FDE they more broadly speak of the ‘collaborative economy’ as a new synthesis between the ideas of the creative economy and the solidarity economy that inspired Cultura Viva. For example, Pablo Capilé, one of the founders of FDE explains:

“We always discuss the difficulties that the solidarity economy and the creative economy have to enter into dialog. From the creative economy perspective, the solidarity economy is too radical, whereas from the solidarity economy perspective, the creative economy is still too connected to capitalism. In the middle, we want to create a collaborative economy with a narrative that generates a new economy. This narrative gives the possibility to engender new desires in people that will stimulate them to act so that the narrative comes true. Thus, even though you might have the capacity to fund this narrative through a traditional and standardized format, what really matters is to help people to understand that their desire to act differently is being activated by the emergence of that new narrative” (Soares 2014, translated by the author).

This statement elucidates that FDE and Mídia NINJA are offering an imaginary that mixes aspects of the creative and solidarity economy, to produce a new synthesis that they call a collaborative economy. Indeed, in their posts in social networks they have used the following ‘equation’, ‘collaborative economy=creative economy+solidarity economy’, which is more of a slogan than a strict mathematical relation, but still indicates well their aim to mix and challenge the available and opposing discourses.
at the national level in Brazil. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that the founder of the network seems to be speaking about what I call discourse/imaginary when he employs the term ‘narrative’, because he thinks that the new story for action that they are offering is what stimulates the recipients to follow practices that depart and challenge the ones offered by mainstream commercially oriented policy discourses. In the language of SKAD, they are offering new subject positions, such as the collaborative practices I described in the previous section. According to one of the interviewees of the network: “We are creating another culture!” (Fora do Eixo member II, 19/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Brasília, Brazil), which refers to how their collaborative practices are offering new pathways for action beyond the ones given by a commercially oriented approach to culture and media that they heavily criticize. For instance, in the words of Pablo Capilé, one of FDE’s leaders:

“Working eight hours a day and being tortured in order to earn money that you can spend the other eight hours to forget the torture, and then sleep another eight hours. This is a nightmare composed of this schizophrenia of torture and money, you earn money to forget the torture, and that is how you are supposed to live and dream” (Soares 2014, translated by the author).

In like manner, another member of the network explained:

“In order to be happy or successful we are told to follow the sequence of school-university-work-family-dog-car, etc. We are under pressure from our family, friends and media to enter into this life pattern that is supposed to lead to success or happiness. But many people are not happy with it at all” (Fora do Eixo member III, 28/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in João Pessoa, Brazil).

These statements expose a criticism of the subject positions for action and identity construction that the members of FDE have been given in Brazil and that they oppose, because they perceive that they do not lead to the hypothesized levels of ‘happiness’ that they promise. Economic wealth might help, but to reduce it as the sole and only factor as economists tend to do, is at least not enough for those belonging to this network. Contrarily, during the interviews I had with members of FDE, a frequent explanation of their reasons to join FDE was to experience a collective lifestyle dedicating most of their day to cultural activities or management, which would have not been possible for many of them if they had just been subject to ‘market forces’. According to one of the founders of FDE, this in part was possible to the implementation of what they call ‘social technologies’, such as houses for collective living and complementary currencies that allow the exchange of products and services in the network (I shall explain this in detail in chapter 6). He explains:

“In a certain way, we were able to find a solution to give available time to our activists. They have 24h per day and at a very low cost. We began to understand that one of the biggest disputes for the 21st century is time distribution” (translated by the author).

This statement makes evident that the proposal to those who want to join the network is that they will have enough time to focus on a creative endeavor of their interest, while they contribute to the social and collective projects of the network. In theory, this liberates FDE members and takes them to a state of ‘happiness’, which according to them would not be attainable from what they consider as the oppressive market forces that would otherwise push them to boring and monotonous jobs. As one observer of FDE remarked: “I think that the GDH explains a lot more about how Fora do Eixo works..."
than their GDP, where the GDH is their Gross Domestic Happiness” (C. Prado, 17/12/2013, interview with & translated with the author in São Paulo, Brazil). The point the observer has is that members of the network are not necessarily becoming ‘rich’ in terms of financial income. Contrariwise, their lifestyle is quite far from that vision. Nevertheless, according to members of the network, the collective way they live allows them to reach happiness levels far from those that money could give. Although it is difficult to assess the truth of these utterances, given that I did not research psychological well-being, the statement points to the fact that happiness is subjective, relative and related to the meaning patterns that a collective or group creates to understand and act in the context in which they live. Although I have not gone deeper into a scientific analysis of that perspective, it has been a recurrent observation among the members of FDE, and consequently Mídia NINJA, and I hypothesize that it is a big influence for them to pursue such initiative that departs from a commercial approach to culture.

Taking into account this understanding of the collaborative economy and its challenge to the creative economy policy discourses, Mídia NINJA can be understood as the main dispositive of the network to advance their collaborative discourse. Indeed, they sustain that: “Communication is essential for another new possible world” (Mídia NINJA member IV, 19/03/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Belo Horizonte, Brazil), which stresses the importance of having their own media to disseminate the practices of the new economy or new world that they dream about. Finally, this stance points to the utopian feature of their discourse in the sense I described in Section 2.2 of offering a new future perspective understood to be ‘better’ than the current one.

The collaborative imaginary of FDE takes a particular perspective in global media discussions, because Mídia NINJA states that they are part of a new culture that is challenging journalism thanks to the internet that breeds a participatory culture (Jenkins et al. 2009), which breaks with old models of mass communication. From this point of view, information is no longer just formatted by few producers and received passively by audiences; instead, the internet has given new tools for people to start producing and sharing their own content in a peer two peer (P2P) way. FDE grasped this opportunity given by new technologies and built a distributed network across the country, with their own media, which taking into account the experience in cultural sector, led to a new conceptualization of what a journalist is and who can play such role. Specifically, from Mídia NINJA's perspective “everyone can become a NINJA” (Caperuto 2013, translated by the author), that is to say a journalist of their network that contributes to their narrative. Indeed, although the logo of the experience alludes to ninjas, as Figure 5.5 shows, this has nothing to do with covert agents or mercenaries as in feudal Japan. Instead, the anonymous face in the picture matches well the idea that everyone can become part of the network and report in an ‘independent’ way, once the necessary skills of using a smartphone and its videocamera have been acquired. As one member of Mídia NINJA remarks:

“There are dozens of ways of narrating the world, and we are doing just one; with people who have training in media and advertising, but also with people who are lawyers and who like to take pictures, with collaborators, with young people who are passionate about social movements and who want to contribute in some way. In short, with people who have very few connections with traditional journalistic work. We are in fact a network” (Mídia NINJA

12. P2P (peer to peer) became a widely diffused concept with the success of software like Napster to share music encoded in MP3 format. In essence, the software created a network of users connected and exchanging among themselves, without a third party charging for the transactions of the files. During the first years of the 21st century, this challenged the music sector business model of charging for the access to songs. More recently, the same idea has been expanding to any experience where users share in a decentralized way diverse types of information. For further examples, see (P2P Foundation 2012).
Furthermore, this broad perspective of journalism as an activity that everyone can do and not just professionals also influences their perspective on what quality patterns they follow, which challenge the accepted ‘quality’ schemes of professional journalism. Indeed, the following quote by a Mídia NINJA member exemplifies how they challenge the language (what I call quality schemes) of professional journalism and its tendency to just focus on hard facts, irrespective of the context:

“In universities, people learn about the traditional language of journalism, but we are giving it a new meaning and we are learning to report in a different way. We run, listen and feel with the interviewees during our streamings, which is a very strong real time coverage that requires new languages to narrate the situations. How are we going to report the woman that was dragged by a military police car? Shall we only describe the fact or shall we cover it within a national context in which the military police is violent and gruesome? Why was she there? In other words, not only the fact, the hard news, such as ‘Dragged woman there!’, but rather trying to answer: Why was she dragged? What does that show in a general context? What is it representing?” (Mídia NINJA member IV, 19/03/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Belo Horizonte, Brazil).

Such an approach is both a challenge to journalism as a profession and to the copyright system on how news are exchanged. Why? Because the P2P culture reduces intermediaries, and does not necessarily use a monetary exchange among users to obtain what they share. Thus, traditional media business models, such as newspapers, and more generally those cultural sectors that can be digitized, such as the music industry, have been under pressure. Specifically, the first paragraph quoted in this section mentions the concept of ‘old intermediaries’, which in the context of Mídia NINJA alludes to the power of mass media, which defend and practice an opposite commercial model. As mentioned in chapter 4, the most influential media group in Brazil, Globo, has been organizing events about the creative economy with a clear commercial approach, which is opposed to a collaborative economy organized in a P2P way.

With respect to content, Mídia NINJA aims to offer diversified material that mass media does not. For example, one one of NINJA’s members explains: “The dispute is for more voices, and to be able to
receive information of all kinds” (Mídia NINJA member IV, 19/03/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Belo Horizonte, Brazil). Another member further describes: “In our coverages, we highlight themes that do not have much visibility or that have a distorted visibility. We also bring new perspectives of covered themes, for example with the World Cup” (Mídia NINJA member II, 18/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Brasília, Brazil). Apart from this, they oppose the top-down approach mass media use, and instead state that: “We want people to receive information from various sources so that by analyzing them they can build their own reading of events and facts. We call this a mosaic of partialities” (Mídia NINJA member IV, 19/03/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Belo Horizonte, Brazil).

As regards copyrights, ICT and P2P exchanges allow to surpass traditional models, where authors assume an individual right to the creation and a need to be paid for it, surpassing the intermediaries that distribute such creations. Mídia NINJA respects those authors that keep this position and some even collaborate with them signing with their name, but, as they explain in their FAQ:

“Collective authorship is an individual choice, every Mídia NINJA participant, creator and collaborator has the freedom to choose how to present their work, signing it collectively or individually. Nevertheless, we believe that no single production of images or any other content, is the outcome of an individual person, since it is linked to a broader process that goes from the collective conception of a piece to the dissemination of its results by several people” (Mídia NINJA 2014a).

In sum, Mídia NINJA did not emerge out of nowhere during the Brazilian riots of 2013. It is a product of a network of cultural agents that began to operate in small cities of Brazil, which later expanded all across the country and to main urban centers. From the northern Amazon to the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, from the Western state of Acre to the eastern state of Paraíba, in all places it is possible to find an FDE collective diffusing a collaborative economy imaginary that defies the creative economy policy discourses. Mídia NINJA, as a product of this network, challenges commercial mass media practices, and in this sense, shares objectives with the previous Argentinean cases. However, it also has specific characteristics based on the Brazilian context and the peculiarities of FDE and its collective practices, which gave them windows of opportunity to reach and influence - although for a short time - the public opinion and to challenge and criticize mass media coverages in the process.

5.6 Concluding Discussion

This chapter showed the existence of a diversity of experiences in media that departs from a commercial focused approach to communications. These experiences oppose the claim of culture as an economic resource as ‘the way’ to structure culture and communications. Far from what the supporters of creative economy policy discourses would accept, the four cases illustrate different visions and ends for communication experiences. Therefore, one of the main conclusions from this chapter is that the strategies of the creative economy policy discourses are not all embracing ‘development’ as their advocates claim. Contrariwise, the broad terminology that they employ overlooks several experiences, including the ones I examined in this chapter.

A second conclusion is that having an imaginary with features that oppose the commercial ones of the creative economy policy discourses is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for media for
social transformation to succeed with their projects. For instance, the first case, CPE TV, defends the co-operative ideal of a human-faced economy, respecting the seven co-operative principles. Thus, the project aims to diffuse content with this ethical stance to contribute toward a society that would suffer less from economic exploitation. The second case, Barricada TV, illustrates the strand of practices that emerged after the Argentinean crisis in 2001, when workers started to recover factories and disseminate a vision of society where they could own and lead their own firms collectively, reducing the negative effects of ownership concentration and state influence. The aim of this media for social transformation is to counter-inform what they consider to be the biased coverages of commercial mass media, focusing instead on workers and social movements. The third case, Wall Kintún TV, aims to (re)produce the worldview of the Mapuche, besides communicating the struggles that indigenous communities have in the country, which are neglected in mass media. Accordingly, the channel is a tool to combat the continuous violence against their lifestyle since the arrival of the European colonial project to the continent. Finally, Mídia NINJA, influenced by FDE, practices journalism based on the principles of a collaborative economy, where knowledge and property are collective. This case is based on a network of cultural collectives that operates with social technologies and offers new lifestyles to escape what it considers economic exploitation. In sum, these four imaginaries are examples that make evident the diversity of potential approaches to culture and communications beyond those just geared to profits, which leads me to reject the claim of the creative economy policy discourses of embracing all cultural and media projects.

It is important to point out that the diversity of ways to conceptualize culture and communication shows the relevance of interpretations of what the different actors make of their ‘reality’. In the interpretationalist tradition in social sciences, SKAD has been useful to delineate the similarities and differences among the four studied imaginaries of the media for social transformation, which have in common the aim of disseminating discourses with objectives and by actors that do not match the generic term of ‘creative or cultural entrepreneurs’ or ‘industries’ operating mostly for profits of the creative economy policy discourses. The creative economy policy discourses overlook these variations in interpretation, focusing only on the economic dimension that might favor and fulfill the aims of some sectors of the population, but definitely not everyone. Therefore, it ignores the differences that emanate from specific historical and social contexts (Keller, Knoblauch, and Reichertz 2013), which have been described in detail to abstract the main features of the specific imaginaries that each case represents. Accordingly, any claim of universality by policy discourses will face similar challenges of local discourses that have followed different historical trajectories. This is the case in this research, because in none of the four imaginaries a purely commercial objective prevails, though it is true that in some cases, clearly the co-operatives, the boundaries are blurry. Instead, each case offers a different vision or imaginary - some more utopian than others - that aims to give loudspeakers to neglected groups in society, with varied practices that depart from the structure of the creative economy policy discourses. For this reason, the idea that DCMS or UNCTAD disseminated globally of the ‘creative industries’ or ‘creative economy’ as global development options, seems highly problematic in the context of Argentina and Brazil, because although it might be true that the concepts have certain flexibility, it is also evident from the analyzed four cases that the focus on commercial practices becomes a tool to prune the diversity of discourses on culture and communication that exist locally. Indeed, given their focus on commercial culture and media, the creative economy policy discourses do not have enough elasticity to include non-profit experiences, and (un)consciously their supporters despise the inclusion
of such ‘other’ perspectives and visions, unacceptably generating a direct violence against different worldviews. Consequently, the four cases that I studied in this chapter are initiatives that are kept off the radar, either for having ‘too small’ audiences or because they are purposefully underreported by for-profit mass media. For these reasons, the creative economy policy discourses cannot be accepted if the final aim is ‘development’, understood in a broader way than just economic growth, because they do not address the pressing inequality problems that haunt Argentina and Brazil at all, and more general, the whole of Latin America. Conversely, I argue that the counter-discourses I described in chapter 4, which inspired the four cases I analyzed in this chapter to varying degrees, are an indispensable element of the puzzle of a broader notion of ‘development’, or ‘post-development’ to be in synchrony with the discussions at the introduction, which care about minorities and resource-scarce groups that have systematically suffered from structural inequalities in both countries.

Despite the usefulness to apply SKAD to understand the symbolic and power-effect differences among the policy discourses and the four cases studied in this chapter, I experienced that the discourse analysis approach is not enough to thoroughly research the specific barriers that these projects face in practice and the strategies they employ to overcome them. In the process of implementation, these hurdles might alter the aims of their imaginaries, leading to a sort of dialectical relation between the ideal and the resources available to put them into operation, which can lead to unexpected results, not necessarily converging with the aims of the initial projects. This is particularly the case when trying to understand the constraints that the cases face, which as I shall show in the next chapters can be understood as ‘dispositives’ in the language of SKAD. However, such terminology needs to be complemented with other concepts from diverse fields, in order to comprehend how these four cases have been able (or not) to challenge the commercially oriented media and culture discourses in practice, despite the aims to do so discursively as described in this chapter.
Chapter 6

Technologies

“I do not want to live in a world where everything around me is designed in California and made in China by somebody that just makes stuff, because otherwise they will drive the choices we make, they will drive the way we will be creative” (Banzi, Massimo - Arduino creator - quoted in Rochlitz 2015).

In this chapter, I will apply the concepts from Science and Technology Studies (STS) and the philosophy of technology I introduced in Section 2.3 to understand the role of technologies in the media cases. This includes the idea that technologies have a certain ‘script’, a way planned by their designers on how they are supposed to be used and for what purpose (Akrich 1992). The second concept is ‘multistability’, which refers to the existence of multiple ways of using a technology, irrespective of its original design, although this depends on the specific context of use and of the reinterpretation that users make of the ‘script’ (Ihde 2012). I shall argue that unless there is a change of the context of use and a reinterpretation of the roles of technologies, the employment of the available media technologies paves the way for a commercial approach to communications. Although employing the same technology as commercial media might have certain advantages, it contradicts the explicit objectives of challenging for-profit principles of the imaginaries of some of the cases of media for social transformation. Consequently, technologies can act as dispositives stimulating a commercial approach to communications, limiting the potential for change of the imaginaries described in the previous chapter. Considering the two concepts, I shall show that the four media for social transformation cases can be ranked on a scale according to up to what extent the technologies they employ have been reinterpreted to match the objectives of their imaginaries. Conversely, up to what extent the actors of these media cases act following the designs implicit in ‘scripts’ of the media technologies they have acquired. Figure 6.1 shows how I classified the four cases, based on the data analyzed in the rest of the chapter. Despite the differences in the two dimensions between the cases, what they have in common is the role that technologies play either as an element that enhances or blocks their imaginaries. Consequently, these non-human objects do play an important role, because they can interfere in the media projects, much more than what theories focusing only on the symbolic or on the human agency would accept.

Before entering into details of the analysis of each case, it is important to highlight two aspects of the national policies in Argentina and Brazil. As regards the former, although the new audiovisual media law has the aim to democratize voices by supporting more community media, there are implicit limits to what sort of media can be legalized. NGOs can require a license to broadcast an audiovisual signal and also to become cable operators, such as CPÉtv. However, in its implementation the law did
not consider to fund the needed equipment for such media, in particular in the case of TVs which are more expensive than radios. Thus, it leaves the problem to be solved by each petitioner, neglecting that the technological equipment is not produced in the country and is highly costly to import, given the national economic situation with restrictions to imports and currency exchange. Therefore, costs definitely are a barrier to media democratization if such a hurdle is not tackled in another way. Besides, during fieldwork there was almost no nationally funded technological development to address the need of these new channels, although according to practitioners it is something quite feasible to produce low cost equipment to meet the needs of the applicants for new radio and TV licenses. Finally, internet media was not even mentioned in the new law, ignoring the technological changes that are taking place in media platforms. These points indicate that TV channels in Argentina under the new law have been pushed toward one type of technological configuration, which is not necessarily the most appropriate one for the cases with scarce financial resources. I should describe how each of the three cases dealt with this restriction with a different strategy. On the contrary, Brazil did not have a new national audiovisual law, but in contrast was more active in introducing pioneering policies to stimulate digital culture and the creation of independent media networks using ICT. Although high concentration levels in terms of media ownership remain, the expansion of these tools and the corresponding practices fostered the emergence of new media experiences that defy terrestrial and cable TV technological configurations. In other words, the national context and the specific cultural and media policies have undoubtedly been an important factor in influencing the differences in terms of technologies that I will examine in this chapter, but not the only one.

6.1 CPEtv, Argentina

I locate the case of the channel of the co-operative, CPEtv, at the extreme left of Figure 6.1, because this media organization has copied the style of a typical commercial TV channel with little change to the context of use, although striving to produce content under a different imaginary. I shall show in this section that the technologies they have implemented led CPE to a commercial model quite similar to other private media firms, which follows the ‘script’ of operation of such technologies. Indeed, the first decision that CPE took in this direction was becoming a cableoperator according to the requirements...
of the new audiovisual communication services law in Argentina, instead of just offering an air TV signal. CPE’s management selected this option for two reasons. First, they already had a network in Santa Rosa to offer access to the internet that could be used to transmit cable TV as well. Second, this cable model would allow them to charge for the service and obtain resources to fund their own TV community channel. But, this decision initiated a commercial path that departed from the aims of the mobilizations of 2003 that I described in chapter 5, where they just broadcasted signals for free to the population. Figure 6.2 shows a synthesis of the technological configuration that CPEtv built to receive and transmit TV signals, which has three levels with different types of technologies to highlight: the reception of TV signals; the elaboration of their own signal; and the distribution of these signals to clients.

The first level in this system covers the required artifacts to receive other TV signals through satellite, such as ESPN, Fox, national channels, among others. This is an indispensable element to become a cable operator, since CPE has to compete with the other local providers by offering at least the same amount of channels. Thus, they had to pay for the access to the foreign and national TV signals. In terms of costs, this would have not been affordable for the co-operative if they had negotiated alone with the signal providers. However, CPE had the advantage that a co-operative in Córdoba, Cooperativa de Provisión y Comercialización de Servicios Comunitarios de Radiodifusión (COLSECOR - Cooperative of Supply and Marketing of Broadcasting Community Services), precisely offered such service to small private cable operators in the country. Thus, thanks to the 6th co-operative principle, they have been able to collectively bargain for lower costs and download the signals of other TV channels, so as to have another similar to private cable operators. However, this system still needs the installment of expensive antennas and hardware for the satellite reception of the signals and its digitization, which are not produced in Argentina, but in the USA. Therefore, the objective of competition with private firms led them to acquire similar foreign technology, which is a barrier in terms of investment that not every initiative can overcome if they choose to become cable operators. Additionally, it pushes the co-operative toward fundraising to cover their costs, which explains why they charge for their cable service. Consequently, the copy of the cable operator technological ‘script’ of commercial firms, also leads to a commercial model of operations, contradicting their initial project of 2003 to offer free access to audiovisual content to the local population.

The second level of Figure 6.2 comprises CPEtv’s channel, which is located in the main building of CPE in Santa Rosa. From this location, they produce their own TV signal, and there are two features I want to highlight. First, CPEtv has a studio of 43m² to film part of their programs. As Figure 6.3 shows, the studio is modern, has a plasma and does not envy much the design or aesthetics that other leading private channels in terms of audience have in Argentina. Indeed, CPEtv members explained it was designed by a professional from Buenos Aires, which can be understood as a strategy to compete against private firms (I will elaborate this argument further in Section 7.1.2, comparing CPE’s studio with the one of the leading national news program of a private firm). Nonetheless, as the coordinator of the channel explains, the available space is a constraint for more participatory formats of content production:

“The studio affects what kind of program you can produce. Given our reduced space, I can neither produce a program with the participation of people nor use a forum. A larger space, widens the range of possible programs, but it is not an impediment to produce content”

(CPEtv coordinator, 27/09/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa,
Figure 6.2: Technological configuration used by CPEtv to receive, produce and distribute audiovisual signals.
The second point I highlight from CPEtv’s channel relates to the technologies they employ to film and broadcast. Essentially, these consist of: First, the cameras and all the accessories for recording audiovisual signals; second, the editing stations and other notebooks to work with such signals; third, the software and hardware needed to organize the programming, to film in the studio and to edit the audiovisual signals, which are not produced in Argentina. For instance, US technicians arrived in Santa Rosa to transfer the ‘know-how’ on how to operate hardware (CPE 2011), such as the programming server that loads all the content to daily broadcast. As regards software, CPE acquired licenses from foreign firms that developed the software to edit audiovisual signals. In all these cases, what is important to highlight is how the whole set of technologies used is foreign and acquired from firms that operate under a for-profit logic. Additionally, as these technologies are not nationally produced, the cooperative has to spend large amounts of their income to acquire them and to continuously pay for the used licenses. Similarly to the equipment to receive signals, this is a paradoxical situation, because the acquisition of foreign hardware and software produces the escape of the community’s resources abroad, precisely what CPE has been criticizing private firms for in the province, such as the case of the SUDAM in the 1930s and more recently Cablevisión with TV signals (see Section 5.2). Thus, contrary to the founding story of the co-operative where the technology to produce electricity broke the dependence with the foreign ‘oppressing’ firm, in this case the technology only reinforces the dependence between them. The root of this technological dependence is the decision to compete with commercial channels, which led CPE to emulate their technologies. However, the co-operative does not have a position that questions this role of technology as a source of dependence, and thus takes it for granted, without challenging the implicit design or ‘script’, which is tied to the commercial logic of operation of the technology suppliers. This is a hurdle hard to surpass for many organizations that do not have enough financial resources and a general national bottleneck of the new audiovisual communications law, because there has been no governmental research and development in the sector or support for national media technology firms. Accordingly, new NGO channels have to acquire technologies abroad, establishing the dependence with their commercial logic. CPE is one of the exceptions, because of the
income it generates through other services, such as energy distribution. However, many other organizations, as the next two cases illustrate, suffer from this technological constraint in terms of hardware and software access. This shortcoming points to a need of governmental intervention in the sector to stimulate media technology firms, not necessarily to copy the most advanced high tech equipment, but at least to develop appropriate media technologies for these new NGO experiences. Given the specificities of audiovisual hardware production, perhaps the country has more competitive advantages in software development. In fact, there is already a federation of 23 ICT co-operatives (FACTTIC 2014), which claimed to be working on these aspects, although with no known results by the time I finished fieldwork.

In spite of my argument that the dependence on foreign technologies might lead to a commercial business model in NGO media projects, the new experiences in Argentina suggest this business oriented approach does not even work in these new cases. Why? Because if an organization follows the model that CPEtv did, it has to invest a lot of financial resources to acquire the needed equipment, which are costs that need to be recovered somehow. Two strategies are possible for this: first, to obtain income from the costs of the cable service, which in the case of CPEtv cannot be too high given their interest to broaden access as much as possible and cheaper than the local private firm’s service. Furthermore, this option is only accessible to those organizations that have enough financial resources to become cableoperators in the first place, which are few in comparison to the total amount of new NGO media that might emerge with the new law. The second strategy is to use advertising, just like a typical commercial TV channel, but this is also problematic in the cities of the interior of the country, as the following statement by a university professor in Santa Rosa illustrates: “There is no advertising culture. If you ask on the street for sponsors, advertising is seen as if they are doing you a favor, but not as an investment” (Argentinean University professor III, 29/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina). Furthermore, according to interviewees the price of advertising in Santa Rosa is quite low, because advertising in the state TV channel is too cheap. Therefore, NGO media cannot recover easily the initial investments through the main strategy that private channels employ, and only the most resourceful ones can rely on income from the cable service. Thus, the dependence on expensive foreign technology limits the number of new media projects that can emerge with the new law, and even those that can surpass such hurdles face financial difficulties that threaten the elaboration of content about their imaginaries. In this sense, the selection of commercial like technologies leads to a ‘trap’ that CPE and similar organizations are finding hard to escape.

The third and last level of the technological network in Figure 6.2 refers to all those elements that are used to distribute content. In particular, I want to stress how a technological trajectory might explain why CPE differs from other commercial firms that allowed them to start their channel fast, and to point out how they did not adopt social network technologies. As regards the former, CPE built its network to distribute TV signals based on the preexisting network to offer the service to access internet. According to the engineer in charge of telecommunications, the management took “a very brave decision” in 2000 (CPE engineer, 16/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina) that gave the co-operative an advantage, because CPE decided to deploy a coaxial cable network to offer internet, instead of one based on copper twister-pairs. The engineer remarked this network’s design allows to transmit TV signals as well without further investments. Thus, even though in the year 2000 CPE’s management did not have a clear horizon on whether they would have a channel in the future, the decision to construct such a network later paid off, because they
did not need to adapt the network to offer the TV service. On the one hand, this shows a technological trajectory, because a decision taken almost ten years before the beginning of the channel, benefited the organization to quickly set up the distribution of TV signals, something that many new NGO media lack. On the other hand, this previous decision can also be understood as a sort of ‘technological trap’, because the investments in the network stopped CPE from exploring other technologies that might have reduced the dependence with expensive foreign technologies in the transmission of their content. Indeed, despite the role that social networks and online platforms have to diffuse content to mass audiences, even one year after fieldwork CPEtv has scarcely used them to distribute content. According to CPEtv’s management, this might be explained by a general delay that the co-operative has to adopt technologies given the lengthy discussions needed within the administrative and management bodies of CPE. However, I also think that the existence of the previous network limited the space to explore for such other alternatives, something that will contrast with the next cases.

On the whole, although in chapter 5 I described that CPEtv’s imaginary is critical to the commercialization of culture and media, striving instead for a co-operative and participative future with more solidarity, the technologies surveyed in this section suggest that they are quite close to a typical commercial TV channel. In fact, they employ similar foreign technologies and expensive, modern studios to elaborate their content. Furthermore, in the whole description I made, in this case there was no reinterpretation or challenge to the design of these foreign technologies, both hardware and software. Thus, I conclude that the technologies they employ act as a ‘script’ reinforcing the need to acquire funds for their operation directly.

### 6.2 Wall Kintun TV, Argentina

As described in Section 5.4, Wall Kintun TV aims to show the stories and conflicts of the Mapuche from their perspective. However, this case is the most clear example of how even though they might have a very consistent imaginary, the lack of a stabilized network of actors puts a serious limit on how they can achieve their vision in practice. Wall Kintun TV suffers from many limitations, starting with the historical discrimination against the indigenous community, which has scarce financial resources to invest in the needed equipment and physical space to set up a channel, not to talk about the knowledge to run it. Thus, the analysis of this case illustrates both missing connections in their technological configuration and the ones they have. In Figure 6.1, I located Wall Kintun TV after CPEtv, because although the channel tries to depart from and criticizes foreign technology, in practice they have not been able to challenge or reinterpret it, as the next two cases do.

Before describing the conditions recorded during fieldwork, it is worth pointing out once more that the network of media technologies of each case is dynamic. As I explained in chapter 5, Wall Kintun TV started with a lot of support from the state, when a co-operative was formed with members of the indigenous community and outsiders with expertise in management of audiovisual experiences. The latter obtained cameras, PCs, and other hardware for recording. However, after the conflict between the local Buenoleo Mapuche community and the management partisans of the national regime was unleashed, those that participated in that first period took most of the equipment with them, and consequently, during fieldwork Wall Kintun TV was in a weak position in terms of resources. This confirms one of the critics of Actor-Network Theory for media research that tends to focus on a successful stabilized relation of human and non-human objects, but ignores that these networks are dynamic, and as
At the moment of fieldwork, Wall Kintun TV operated in a space ceded by the municipality of Bariloche, which has three rooms of no more than 40 m². This place is far from the city’s downtown prepared for tourists. Although it is just around 15 blocks away from it, it is located in a neighborhood with fewer resources; unpaved roads and informal salesmen on the streets suggest this. This setting contrasts with the location of the other two channels I studied in Argentina, which have their own buildings and which did not depend so evidently on the local government to transmit. Nonetheless, this geographical location is not the main hurdle. As one of the members of Wall Kintun TV publicly denounced after the conflict discussed in chapter 5:

“\textit{What is Wall Kintun TV? A transmitter loaned from the AFSCA, a PC with a playout loaned from AVC Video Cable, and a space provided by the province of Rio Negro in the provincial administrative center. It is a group of people working without a salary, it is a television channel without cameras, without editing machines. It is an empty space}” (Señales 2013).

This testimony exposes the very precarious condition in comparison to the previous case, and also how Wall Kintun TV demands media technologies to operate in a way similar to CPEtv's channel. The only available ones at the time of fieldwork were not even owned by the community channel, such as the equipment to broadcast. This included loans from the AFSCA and the help of one of the local cableoperators, AVC, which incorporates their signal in their cable distribution in Bariloche. However, their competitors, owned by the Clarín multimedia group, do not include the channel in their grid, in clear defiance to the new media law that requires cable operators to include local air channels in their grids. Therefore, the ongoing national conflict between the state and this multimedia firm also negatively impacts new NGO media experiences, which face a barrier to their legal right to be included in the transmissions of every private cableoperator, reducing their potential audience. In stark contrast to CPEtv, Wall Kintun TV lacked the needed essential equipment to produce their own content, such as: cameras, the hardware to organize a programming grid or to appropriately save and store new content. Likewise, they do not even have a studio, where they could improvise and record interviews and programs. Thus, this case illustrates one of the contradictions of the new media law in Argentina, which does open the legal door for NGO media to have their own channels, but offers scarce help for them to acquire the needed equipment to start operating. This is a hurdle that can only be overcome by organizations that can acquire financial resources through other means, but definitely not by those organizations that have been historically excluded and suffering from poverty conditions. Consequently, so far the new political rights for NGO media have not addressed the preexisting economic inequalities, which precisely limit the voices and claims of these excluded sectors of the Argentinean population, which are the ones more missing in media.

These limitations produce a strong gap between the utopia of the channel’s imaginary as a media for all Mapuche and the available means to put it into practice. Did they have other options? If acquiring expensive equipment was never a viable strategy for the community, what about other technologies based on the internet, such as cell phones and streaming? Unfortunately, the geographic location of the experience in a province far from the national urban centers puts infrastructural limits to such a strategy. In Bariloche, internet speed is neither as good nor as cheap as in other urban areas. Accordingly, Wall Kintun TV cannot consider transmitting content online live. Therefore, the utopias of ICT as tools giving voices to everyone everywhere as mentioned in Section 2.3, in practice, seem still far
from the evident limits of the available technological infrastructure and the income restrictions that people and organizations living in many parts of the world still face. Therefore, I agree with critical positions that recognize the importance of ICT, but also warn that these are not enough to solve other types of preexisting issues.

Despite the scarcity of financial resources in comparison with CPEtv, Wall Kintun TV is using different mechanisms to disseminate content. First, they broadcast their signal over the air, but only to those living a few blocks around their building. Second, they also distribute their signal by cable to at least one of the cable operators of the city, which further extends their audience reach, although limited to the number of subscribers to that firm, which has as a maximum limit of approximately 100,000 (the number of inhabitants of Bariloche). Despite this, the TV channel is heavily constrained to capture financial resources. This is not only related to the lack of content produced by the initiative, but also by the fact that the hardware they have to distribute their signal through cable does not offer a very good quality. Under these circumstances, Wall Kintun TV members think they have few chances to attract sponsors for advertising in their channel, which is the only possible strategy that they have to acquire funds through their content. In contrast to CPEtv, they are not cable operators, and the members of the Mapuche community are not financially resourceful due to the historical reasons I explained in chapter 3. Therefore, this situation describes a poverty trap: Without technologies and skills, they can neither produce content nor a good image to attract audiences; without audiences, they cannot attract sponsors to invest in advertising in their channel; without funds, their experience cannot be financially sustained nor can they acquire the needed tools to break the trap. This gloomy scenario has slightly improved after the Wall Kintun TV management made a public denouncement against the state. Indeed, during fieldwork they received the promise of the state to fund their equipment and started to receive training, which even led them to start elaborating and distributing scarce audiovisual content, which I will analyze in the next chapter. Still, by far their TV transmissions mostly repeat content obtained from other sources, and as one member of the channel expressed, the state support so far has not been enough: “Training is essential and is very useful to us. But not so much, if we do not have the equipment to put into practice what we learned during the training” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina).

In contrast to CPEtv, Wall Kintun TV has been using a third mechanism to disseminate its content (text, images and few videos) related to the Mapuche lifestyles and struggles: online social networks. Indeed, this can be considered as an example of the multistability of Facebook, which offers different possibilities of reinterpretation for its use, as in this case, becoming the main platform of content distribution of an indigenous Mapuche media organization. As one member explains: “We have a lot of Facebook followers whose numbers began to grow in September 2013, when we started to upload material on what is happening in the territory with the Mapuches and other indigenous communities” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). Returning to Figure 6.1, I positioned Wall Kintun TV on the right of CPEtv, because of this use of social networks. However, their level of reinterpretation is still quite low, because they are demanding technologies from the state to operate quite similar to those of private commercial channels, without challenging them much in practice, contradicting their imaginary, where they cite that the indigenous communities have been invaded through technology (Section 5.4.2). However, the distance between CPE and Wall Kintun TV in terms of access to technologies is abysmal; while CPEtv has acquired advanced foreign media technologies, Wall Kintun TV has almost none. Paraphrasing
Latour, in this case the lack of technology also does something. Non-human objects such as cameras, cellphones, internet infrastructure, programming grids, etc. are missing and undermine the intention of the members of the Mapuche indigenous community to transmit through audiovisual media their worldviews and their perspective on the conflicts they have in the Argentinean South. Their difficulty to access these technologies is a product of the weak state support, the poor infrastructure in comparison to the one in urban centers, and of course, the financial weaknesses of Mapuche communities, which are an inheritance from a war with the Argentinean state and decades of discrimination against them. These observations agree with Couldry’s (2008) criticism to Actor-Network Theory, because it shows the importance of history and context to understand why there is no operating actor-network. Wall Kintun TV’s imaginary is far from being put completely into practice, because it struggles with long term processes that affect the distribution of resources and the possibilities of networks to arise in the first place.

6.3 Barricada TV, Argentina

In Figure 6.1, I located Barricada TV on the axis where the reinterpretation of technologies is more prominent, which is one of the main differences between this case and the previous two. Indeed, in this subsection I will first argue that the context of production of Barricada TV differs in certain ways, which explains how they apply media technologies for content generation and diffusion differently, even though they still share similar technological methods of content production with commercial media.

The main difference between Barricada TV and CPEtv is the way these channels organize work. Despite the fact that both cases have an imaginary that is critical of an economy just focused on for-profit practices, the latter follows a pattern similar to private firms, establishing a standard salary relation for a given amount of work hours, and keeping a hierarchical organization, though following co-operative principles. Conversely, the former operates through ’militant collective work’, which I interpret as an influence of the practices at IMPA, the leading case of the MNER in Argentina. First, this means that the members of Barricada TV are not hierarchically organized, but instead they rotate roles within their audiovisual content production process. Second, the militant adjective refers to the fact that they are not working for a salary, but rather for a strong support of social change issues they believe in. Therefore, their funding does not come from advertising nor from any other commercial strategy, but from the support of organizations that share their claim to an independent approach to communications or through other income sources that members have, disconnected from the media project. I shall show that this context of production opened different possibilities of using media technologies that CPEtv neglected, although they still share some similarities.

As regards content generation, Barricada TV operates in the fourth floor of IMPA, which supports the channel’s infrastructure. This has helped Barricada TV to bypass the barrier to find a place from where to broadcast. In comparison with CPEtv, this studio is smaller, older and with less modern technologies; for instance, they do not have the equipment to broadcast with HD image quality. Similarly, the studio ties the initiative to the format of producing much of their audiovisual content within that space, and in employing cameras adapted to studio recording. Thus, this implies a certain script (Akrich 1992), which as in the case of CPEtv, shares similarities with commercial audiovisual firms elaborating content within studios, although with nuances in quality patterns that I shall cover in the next chapter. Furthermore, the experience keeps the technological dependence with foreign firms
that supply the audiovisual equipment for recording, such as cameras; but, it can be considered less dependent than CPETv, because their technologies are not so high-tech, and thus, cheaper.

The contrasts of Barricada TV with CPETV are more evident in the different distribution technologies they employ. As one of the members of the channel explains:

“We transmit with the most backward technology, and also with the most ‘modern’. I say this in quotation marks because there are far better available technologies, but we transmit by air TV, which is a totally outdated technology and a big problem. However, we also use internet streaming, which is something still to explore in this country. It has issues that depend on the quality of the bandwidth of the receiver, but also on the amount that we can upload, which is always less than the one for download. Moreover, the services we use are free, but they put intrusive advertising in our signals. A lot of elements that hinder reception”

(Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).

There are two points to remark about this quotation on how distribution technologies mediate Barricada TV’s dissemination of content. First, they use over-the-air broadcasting, which is a cheap and old technology and almost useless in the city of Buenos Aires, because paid TV (cable or satellite) already represents 90% of the market (LAMAC 2014). Thus, even though this technology is one of the cheapest to provide access for media for social transformation, it does not offer them a viable way to reach the ‘mass audiences’ as they claim in their imaginary, because few viewers are willing to go back in time and install an antenna to capture just the signal of Barricada TV. As a result, Barricada TV’s members estimate that very few people watch this signal, which is also geographically restricted in terms of reach. Nonetheless, the members of this and other cases think this could change, because the new audiovisual communication services law requires that cable operators in the country include in their transmissions the signals of every legalized air channel in their locality. In this way, media channels that only transmit through air technology would be able to at least reach the larger TV audiences that use the cable service. However, the most important cable operator in the country, the Clarín group, neither complied with such legal requirements at the moment of fieldwork nor almost two years later. Therefore, this technology has not been very successful so far.

The second point to remark from the last quotation is how Barricada TV is exploring ICT to balance the shortcomings that their broadcasting faces. Specifically, the are using free streaming technologies to diffuse their content live through the internet, which has been an innovation that allowed them to surpass the obvious limits of their air broadcasting technologies. This is something not practiced by the previous two cases, because they have not thought of such alternative, at least while I conducted fieldwork. I understand this practice as a reinterpretation of the online streaming platforms, which were not designed to become the main distribution platform of an alternative channel in Argentina. Indeed, this confirms the ‘multistability’ of technologies, and how their context of use might alter their original commercial designs. Although the member of the channel classifies these technologies as ‘modern’, she is not defending the utopian positions that I reviewed in Section 2.3, which claim that ICT can allow the production, distribution and access of content online almost with no restriction1. Instead, the quotation makes evident the limits to produce, distribute and access content through ICT. Indeed, the member of Barricada TV refers to two types of constraints that they have to face when they stream audiovisual content live. One of the limits is that these technologies demand enough financial resources

1. Of course, this statement refers to countries where there is no censorship to internet access.
to pay for a fast internet bandwidth to upload live audiovisual signals, which is a hurdle for media for social transformation. Equally, the transmission of this signal with good definition requires a paid streaming service, but again this is a big hurdle for these type of media that in general cannot afford such services. In particular the latter, which operate abroad from Argentina and charge in dollars, which is almost impossible to meet for such experiences, given the restrictions for a cross-border transfer of funds existing at the time of fieldwork. Thus, the only option left for Barricada TV is to use a free streaming technology, such as Ustream and to put online videos on YouTube. Notwithstanding, this decision puts them once again into a paradoxical situation, because the opportunity to stream their message for ‘free’, is not completely costless. Contrarily, both providers of the service introduce during the transmissions overlapping advertising over the signal that Barricada TV transmits, which disseminates commercial content to their audiences that has nothing to do with the political orientation or the concerns of social change of Barricada TV. Therefore, this distribution technology includes commercial messages that distort and contradict Barricada TV’s imaginary of not employing commercial practices such as advertising, showing how these technologies not only mediate but also transform the content they distribute. Finally, there is another barrier to take into account in the use of these streaming services that resides on the reception side, because not all internet users have a fast internet connection in Argentina. In fact, statistics elaborated by a US firm on national average download speeds ranked the country n° 109, with just 6.4 Mbs on average, versus 12.7 Mbs of Brazil or 31.9 Mbs of the USA (Infobae 2013). Accordingly, the streaming download speed is limited by the contemporary internet infrastructure in the country, which once again puts boundaries on the cyberutopian positions that romanticize ICT as tools for free communications, but overlooks the hurdles of their implementation.

In contrast to CPEtv, Barricada TV is quite active in the use of other online technological platforms for the distribution of their content. They are present in social networks such as Facebook and Twitter, they have a website updated with news and coverages of their programming and a YouTube video channel. This goes hand in hand with a different approach to technology than the one CPEtv has. In contrast to co-operatives, these alternative media have the objective of reappropriating or adapting ICT that were thought for other purposes in specific socio-historical environments, to match their own counter-information objectives (Caballero 2011). For instance, online social networks or streaming platforms have been produced to capture content from its users, to sell advertising. Thus, they are tools that clearly side with the commercial approach to communications. By using these technologies, cases such as Barricada TV contribute to this logic, as the case with advertising has shown, these technologies do something, they mediate and side with the creative economy policy discourses. But, this non-human ‘agency’ is not unidirectional, because up to a certain degree, it can be questioned, reinterpreted, hacked and employed for other means. For this reason, I position Barricada TV more to the right of Figure 6.1, because they try to reinterpret the ‘scripts’ of online social media, both social networks and streaming platforms, to disseminate a non-commercial perspective. It is true that this activity is not without limits, but my point is that they face fewer barriers than if they had just followed a distribution strategy based on air broadcasting of their studio transmissions. In other words, Barricada TV and other organizations put these media technologies into use for different aims, and in many cases opposite to the one of their designers, as the next case will further illustrate.
6.4 Fora do Eixo and Mídia NINJA, Brazil

I located Mídia NINJA on the right of Figure 6.1, because it is the case that best illustrates Ihde's (2012) concept of ‘multistability’, in reference to how technologies can be reinterpreted depending on their different context of use. In the first subsection, I will describe three organizational technologies, which members of FDE and Mídia NINJA call ‘social technologies’\(^2\), and which set the stage for a different context of use of their media technologies that I will explain in the second subsection. I shall show how these different contexts of use give Mídia NINJA its distinctive features with respect to the other three media projects, allowing it to overcome some of the hurdles for content production beyond commercial principles, but also introducing new challenges.

6.4.1 Fora do Eixo and their ‘Social Technologies’

Up to this point, the technological limits of the previous three cases should be quite clear. Although they challenge what they describe as mass media, they are all to different degrees employing production technologies similar to those of the firms they criticize. Therefore, their space for challenging commercial practices is bounded by the commercial requirements for accessing and maintaining such technologies. In a certain way, the model of the commercial TV channel, ideally composed of a studio, with heavy and costly equipment for recording and editing audiovisual content, ends up playing the role of a limiting ‘script’ for the Argentinean cases, by creating difficult material barriers to the channels and their imaginaries. Conversely, the Brazilian experience of Mídia NINJA is entirely based on ICT. However, the uniqueness of this case does not only rely on these new technologies, which some of the previous cases and many of the creative economy also use, but rather on how and in what context they are employed. Specifically, in this section I will describe two of their ‘social technologies’: their network organization in collective houses and their practices to fund their activities through complementary currencies. These are important because they are key instruments in pushing the members of the organization to experience the utopian collective life their imaginary heralds on a daily basis, challenging the assumptions of creative economy policy discourses on how cultural and media activities ought to be organized.

The first social technology of FDE relevant to understand Mídia NINJA is their organization in collectives. It is worth to remember that FDE was founded by four collectives, emulating the first experience of Espaço Cubo, with members living together in a house or flat, sharing costs, clothes and food. These initial experiences marked the future of the network, and the following two definitions synthesize this foundational practice. According to the dictionary of terms that the network distributes, there are two types of collectives: 1) FDE houses, and 2) FDE points. On the one hand, the houses are defined as:

> Headquarters of local, regional or national articulation points in a certain city. For their sustainability, they apply methodologies and social technologies used in the network, such as collective cash, regular production of local events, solidarity hosting, complementary currencies, among others. Each house operates as a residence, workspace and a space for the exchange of values, methodologies, technologies and experiences of the network without

\(^2\) Due to the intense use of ICT by FDE and Mídia NINJA members, this emic concept can be understood as a word game, in the sense that they call their unconventional ways of organization ‘technologies’ as well. However, these social technologies do not involve the creation of an artifact, but rather the use of existing ones in different ways from the usual ones by variations on how humans employ them.
restrictions. Every house is a campus of the Fora do Eixo University” (Fora do Eixo 2013c, translated by the author).

On the other hand, an FDE Point is defined as a:

“Collective that aims to organize the local creative scene, to identify partners, the public, potential exchanges, artists, communicators and other stakeholders, in order to articulate, execute and stimulate strategic actions for the local cultural scene. The collectives also act in a specific language” (translated by the author).

Which are their similarities and differences? The FDE points refer to those nodes of the network that follow a collective organization, but not necessarily apply all the ‘social technologies’ later created by FDE. For example, not all of their members live in the same house, or not all of them have their own complementary currency. Still, these points play a crucial role to articulate and stimulate the cultural activities in different small cities in Brazil, by focusing on what FDE members call different ‘languages’3. As a difference, the FDE houses thoroughly apply the social technologies with a collaborative logic that characterize the imaginary of the network. One of the main ones is that all the members live together in the same house and work in the same place, following the example of the foundational collective. For instance, the FDE house of São Paulo, where around 20 members of the network from different places of Brazil live and work collectively, sharing their food, clothes and other resources. Additionally, many of these houses host members of the hardcore of FDE, that is to say, those whose main priority in life is to work in the network, following the collective lifestyle (Fora do Eixo 2013c), which also implies that although they have a horizontal and collaborative logic, there seems to be an implicit hierarchy depending on the levels of commitment of each member. According to the members of the network, in 2013 they had at least 200 FDE points distributed across the country, and among them seven houses. Generally speaking, the houses can be understood as the nodes that articulate the work of the regional collectives. Given that the FDE network is working nationally, in part this division was a pragmatic decision to deal with the regional variations that exist in a country the size of Brazil. This variety is reflected in the houses, which have specific features and focus. For instance, the house in Fortaleza (in the northeast) on music and other cultural initiatives to address the enormous social gaps between the rich and poor, whereas the house of Rio de Janeiro specializes on Mídia NINJA, because most of the riots after June 2013 were concentrated there.

There are two important things to remark about this organizational technology. First, it stimulates the creation of networks within FDE, which is a practice that emulates the Cultura Viva program introduced in Section 4.1.2.1. Second, the sharing of basic things such as clothes, food, and housing among its members reinforces the collective lifestyle that the network offers through its imaginary. For these reasons, these organizational technologies act as a dispositive to (re)produce their collaborative practices. However, these are not exempt of challenges, as one member of the network remarks: “We always say that the first challenge of a house is to harmonize the relationships among people, then comes the question of work and the division of labor” (Fora do Eixo member III, 28/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in João Pessoa, Brazil). As another member of the hardcore of the network remarks: “Food brings so much reflection” (Fora do Eixo member II, 19/02/2014, interview

---

3. This word refers to the specific cultural sector they focus on; for instance, one collective might specialize in elaborating audiovisual material, another one might specialize in music, a different collective on environmental issues, and so on and so forth.
with & translated by the author in Brasília, Brazil), because sharing food with different people of different genres and body sizes is definitely a challenge that raises contemplations on how to distribute scarce resources. These collective organizational technologies that FDE uses are definitely not new; for example, in the 1950s the agricultural communities in Israel, the kibbutzim, worked in a similar collective way to practice socialist and Zionist ideals. This involved that everything members of the kibbutz (chaverim) produced belonged to the whole community: Children were brought up collectively, private property was not allowed, salaries were equal, among other features that characterized a collective lifestyle (Spiro 1971). Despite their visions of a better future, these collective experiences were not without tensions or conflict, like the ones that arise whenever an individual challenges majority decisions. These are shortcomings of these collective organizational practices, which might have their advantages in opposing those just oriented for-profits and extreme individualism, but that also have their inevitable tensions, some of which have been at the center of a public controversy that FDE suffered and that I shall acknowledge in Section 8.1.4.

The second group of social technologies that contribute to the (re)production of the imaginary of free culture and of collaborative practices in FDE and Mídia NINJA are their complementary currencies and their collective cash. I shall describe how these introduce a peculiar way of organizing their activities, reinforcing their imaginary by favoring collaboration and the collective lifestyle, and at the same time, paving the way for a particular reinterpretation of ICT.

The first organizational technology belongs to the group of different types of currencies that have been on the rise within social movements and organizations, which have varied names and implementation strategies, such as social currencies, community currencies, complementary currencies, etc. Despite their differences, their main common aim is to alter what they perceive as the oppressive role that standard national currencies have by changing the nature of exchange, favoring and dynamizing trade within specific ‘communities’ or geographic spaces. Among the advantages to use such currencies, research remarks that they are spent on a local territory; thus, promoting local production and reducing the dependence on foreign products and services (Laville and Cattani 2005). As regards FDE, its first collective, Espaço Cubo, introduced the first complementary currency to offer their services in exchange for resources needed for survival. According to one of the founders of this collective, at that time its members did not know about preexisting experiences with other types of currencies, but were rather just inspired by the need to obtain resources for their services, and only later were perfected through exchanges with the solidarity economy movement that pioneered such practices in Brazil. The key feature of this complementary currency is that it allows the emitter to obtain a product or service from the receiver at the moment, based on the promise to pay back with another product or service in the future that is made explicit by the new paper money. Therefore, trust is essential. This practice proved useful for the collective, and for this reason, it was later copied by other points and houses, as a way to exchange their services without using the national currency, the Real. This original experience was later systematized and with the expansion of the network, FDE encourages each collective in the network to develop its own complementary currency, which is something territorial. For example, Figure 6.4 shows the paper money of the collective named Goma from the city of Uberlândia in Minas Gerais, which created the complementary currency called Goma Card. As can be seen in the image, it is simple paper money employed as a means of exchange.

Some of the advantages that the members of FDE assign to their complementary currencies are implicit in the following definition, which refers to the generic name given to the diversity of these
currencies, the Card:

“Complementary currency that organizes the exchange of knowledge, technologies, services and products of Fora do Eixo. It is guided by the principles of the solidarity economy and this system moves the labor market of the collectives involved by encouraging new alternatives for collective sustainability. Its circulation benefits the redistribution of resources within the sphere of the community. Each FDE $ 1.00 equals US $ 1.00” (Fora do Eixo 2013h).

The first point to highlight is that the system establishes a one to one correspondence to the national currency, but is not backed by it. It is just a way of making barter explicit. Thus, the key element for the system to work is the enlargement of the network or circuit of actors who participate in the exchange of products and services. The more actors included in the circuit, the less exchanges they need with the ‘real economy’ based on the Real. According to a collaborator of FDE, this allowed them to create complementary currency circuits in the interior of Brazil that funded artists from small towns with scarce resources to circulate in ways that had been impossible before if they had just depended on financial resources in Brazilian Reais. However, as one member of FDE remarks: “The most difficult part is to create the circuit” (Fora do Eixo member IV, 08/03/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Fortaleza, Brazil), but once that difficulty is overcome, the members claim that they can “do more with less” (Mídia NINJA member I, 11/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), because they can exchange products and services without having the Reais. Thus, they can cover different operational costs or needed equipment, which have been important for Mídia NINJA to operate. As I pointed out before, in such a barter system trust is essential, because those who intervene in transactions have to be trustful enough to fulfill the promise of providing a product or service in the future for receiving a product or service now. According to members of FDE, the network comes into action and acts as a control mechanism (Fora do Eixo member III, 28/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in João Pessoa, Brazil), because if someone breaks a promise, then the entire network will know and the unreliable actor will no longer be part of the system.

The second point to highlight is that complementary currencies allow FDE to (re)produce their collaborative practices, by making explicit a particular way of valuing their products and services and in exchanging them. According to the member of FDE who coordinates the Cards:
“We trade our currency in three ways. First, direct exchanges between objects, irrespective of their value, but dependent on the need for them. Two collectives have even exchanged an air conditioner for a car. Second, we exchange by hour, so we define a value per work hour and charge that, but we use the same value among us, because we believe that there is no type of work more valuable than another. The work of a bricklayer is equal to that of a designer and others. They are worth the same. In this way we do not enter into a slave relationship. Third, we exchange by service, irrespective of how long it lasts” (Fora do Eixo member II, 19/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Brasília, Brazil).

This fragment shows that the transactions of products and services of these collectives do not aim to accumulate national currency, opposing the final aim of creative entrepreneurs from the creative economy policy discourses. Conversely, the members of FDE want to switch as much as possible to such an alternative system of exchange, which is based on the collaboration of the members of the network and trust around the complementary currencies, a position illustrated by the following words from the FDE’s member who coordinates the cards: “People have to understand that we do not want to acquire national currencies. Contrarily, the more activities we can accomplish without their intermediation the better” (Fora do Eixo member II, 19/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Brasília, Brazil).

The system is not without its problems, which generally arise at the interfaces with the national currency, that is to say when they have to acquire products or services from the ‘real economy’ with agents who do not want to be part of their complementary currency system. Thus, they have to acquire Reais somewhere for instance when they need to buy a PC or any other electronic equipment for Mídia NINJA. In contrast to other social currencies, the cards are not backed by the national currency. Therefore, for each printed Card there is no equivalent amount of Reais possessed by the network, but rather it is backed by the number of services they can offer. This has already been problematic, as the founder of FDE, Pablo Capilé, remarks:

“At first we made the mistake of giving too much of our currency, and we had a ‘sub prime’ crisis, because there was much more money on the streets than we could pay back. Then, we approached the solidarity economy movement, we understood backing and we began to regulate the distribution of our currency to avoid inflation and speculative capital” (Soares 2014).

Another disadvantage is caused by the geographic boundedness of the currencies, because there is a variation in the sort of products or services that enter into circulation in each circuit created by each particular complementary currency. For instance, in some cases the network of actors participating in the exchange of products or services could trade medical products with the complementary currency, but in others it was impossible, making evident that they are far from establishing a system independent from the exchange of national currencies. Despite its shortcomings, the employment of complementary currencies helped FDE to (re)produce their collaboration practices, based on the attraction of new agents to the network of exchange and the imaginary of the organization. For this reason, the complementary currency can be understood as a dispositive (Keller 2013), because by depending less on the national currency, it does not only challenge the accumulation of the national currency system, which is the main aim of the commercial policy discourses, but also reinforces the collective lifestyle of the organization.
The second key organizational technology for the (re)production of FDE’s imaginary is what they call collective cash, defined as: “Technology to manage resources collaboratively. It is a way to approximate the members of a collective through the exercise of collaboratively managing financial resources that each member individually generates” (Fora do Eixo 2013c). This definition might seem vague, but it just refers to the fact that the members of FDE houses have - in theory - equal access to use the funds that each collective member generates, including both complementary, international and national currencies. Within this structure, the collective cash is the bank of, on the one hand, national and international currencies, and on the other hand, complementary currencies. These are not owned by anyone in particular of the team, but by everyone at the same time, which, as the following quote by a member of FDE illustrates, requires to build up collaborative practices so that the resources are not misused.

“When we set up a collective cash we share everything. This allows to see in practice how the dynamic of a collective life works. Giving up everything you have is very difficult. But people in the hardcore of Fora do Eixo did so with many things, which is why we speak of free culture” (Universidade Fora do Eixo member, 07/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in São Paulo, Brazil).

The founder of FDE remarked the importance of this organizational technology in the national congress in Brasília: “The collective cash is the special thing of our movement. Not the rest. This is what leads us to a state of permanent utopia” (Capilé, personal communication). This quote refers to the importance of the collective cash to make explicit the collective sharing of resources on a daily basis, because everyone has to think why and how are they going to use them, taking into account the needs of the other members of the collective. Additionally, what one gains becomes part of what all have at their disposal in the collective cash, and thus all gain at the same time, which allows them to surpass the precarity they would face if they only worked individually as creative entrepreneurs. Equally, a wrong use of resources by one member would negatively affect the rest. Therefore, the collective cash is also a dispositive that pushes the members of the organization to experience the collective lifestyle they advocate in their imaginary on a daily basis (see Section 5.5.3), challenging all the basic assumptions of creative economy discourses based on private property, which is one way of organizing cultural activities, but not necessarily the unique and global one. In sum, FDE is a unique organization among the others that host media for social transformation channels, because it has implemented two dispositives, the complementary currencies and the collective cash, which reinforce practices of collaboration challenging the supremacy of individualism, private property and sharp hierarchical patterns of organization. This is important, because as I shall show in the next section, these different contexts of use pave the way for the reinterpretations of technologies present in Mídia NINJA.

6.4.2 Mídia NINJA

The previous two dispositives from FDE that reinforce their collaborative imaginary play an important role in leading to specific reinterpretations of widely available ICT that Mídia NINJA employs, but they are not the only ones. Additionally, FDE defends an active perspective of reinterpretation of technologies, which they call ‘hacking’, defined as: “Lifestyle, tactical behavior. It is to radicalize the use of platforms, tools, objects and technologies. ‘Hacking’ is improvisation and the use of open source to give life to what is stagnant, openly sharing the benefits of usage” (translated by the author). Taking
into account these peculiarities of this case, in this subsection I will explain why I located Mídia NINJA at the right of the gradients in Figure 6.1, also underlining the limits of their peculiar technological configuration.

As regards content production, their technological system is simple and complex at the same time. Simple, because it just requires elements that have become easily accessible in parts of Brazil, like smartphones or webcameras to capture a mobilization, an event, or a conversation among arranged speakers. For instance, Figure 6.5 shows how a Mídia NINJA reporter is covering the speech of a politician live with his smartphone, while he receives comments from the viewers. Based on the concepts proposed by Ihde (2012), what is important to remark from this technological configuration is that the cell phone creates a new embodiment-relation with the Mídia NINJA reporter, by giving the possibility of transmitting an event live and at the same time interacting with the users who comment on the audiovisual signal. This contrasts with the previous human-technology relation in the previous cases, where the use of heavy cameras excluded the possibility of direct viewer participation. At the same time, these technologies are complex, because they depend on the establishment of advanced technological infrastructure and networks, whose limits are evident precisely in those places where they do not work. For example, the Brazilian states in the Amazon that have less developed mobile phone networks, which precludes the use of streaming technologies. Despite these regional chasms, ICT have opened the way for online experiences such as Mídia NINJA to use the new recording devices to capture and distribute information, bypassing the need to acquire costly recording equipment of typical commercial TV channels as in the Argentinean cases.

Apart from the specific use of smartphones as the main artifact to record audiovisual signals, the distinctive feature of Mídia NINJA is how such recording processes are organized. Indeed, the members of the network speak of ‘collaborative coverage’, which according to their definition encompasses:

“[...] the coverage of an event performed by people with skills in different areas of communication and guided by free media principles and open participation. This generates textual, photographic, audiovisual, podcasts and content updates in social networks. It produces a
collaborative and diversified result by allowing everyone to put his gaze on the subject” (Fora do Eixo 2013c, translated by the author).

For instance, in any prearranged event that they want to report about collaboratively, Mídia NINJA invites people from the network and externals to become NINJAs. This involves a premeeting to divide roles; who will take photographs, who will write about the event, who will film and transmit via streaming, who will receive the material and distribute it through social networks, etc. Therefore, they collaboratively cover the event with a team contingent to the specific people having interest in it, and diffuse varied types of materials through social networks, which differs from other media that might also use cellphones for recording news, without challenging their hierarchical, for-profit orientation. Thus, I understand this as a reinterpretation of ICT to cover events, which has its origin in the collective practices that I described in the previous subsection. In other words, if the members of the network live together by sharing their food, clothes and even financial resources, covering the events collectively is just an extension of those practices to their media project. Additionally, the coverages so far have not been done to earn income by distributing their content, that is to say, they do not have the position that information is a commodity. Indeed, those who produce content for the network are either part of FDE or circumstantial collaborators. The former dedicate most of their time to the initiative and are part of the hardcore, given that FDE covers their living costs through complementary currencies and their living space in one of the houses or points of the network. For this reason, they have a big advantage with respect to other media, which need to sustain their living costs through activities beyond the communication sector or earn money from the initiative itself, something usually quite challenging. As regards collaborators, they contribute to the network with material that they would like to distribute to a wider audience, and in general, there is no financial reward for such collaboration. Nonetheless, it is important to stress that the lack of explicit for-profit ends in Mídia NINJA would not be possible without the support of FDE, which covers the costs of its operation. Indeed, Mídia NINJA can be comprehended as a dispositive, as an investment by FDE to disseminate its collaborative imaginary, though hiding that the resources for its operation come from other activities of the network that do depend on state funds and commercial practices of organizing cultural events.

During the first months of the experience, Mídia NINJA began with a similar reinterpretation of different online media technologies to distribute their content, such as Facebook, Twitcasting and YouTube. The key innovation was that they disseminated their content exclusively online. For example, their Facebook page was the main place where they posted photos and descriptions of the reported events, which allowed anyone interested in their coverage to access and comment on their content. Thus, they had a participatory bend, with continuous feedback from those following their sites, which is not present in traditional top-down communication models. Furthermore, an important innovation was to employ the service offered for free by the app called Twitcasting, which allows to stream content from cameras connected to the internet, such as smartphones or notebooks. This became their main tool to report live coverages, surpassing the need to acquire expensive recording and diffusion equipment as in the Argentinean cases. Additionally, Mídia NINJA used YouTube to distribute their own videos and also others they received from collaborators. Similarly, Mídia NINJA and FDE have been active users of Twitter too, using the number of members of the network to push tags of their interest as trending topics and to link the content distributed in the other platforms. In contrast to these four main media of distribution, in 2014 they launched their own web site to distribute news, which according to Mídia NINJA members (Mídia NINJA member IV, 19/03/2014, interview with & translated by
the author in Belo Horizonte, Brazil), has been an advancement with respect to their previous situation of dependence on Facebook, because they were no longer limited by the feed format that must follow one narrative per time. On the contrary, their site allows them to simultaneously publish events in different sections, thus segmenting the topics to report.

Despite the advantages ICT offer, they have their negative side too, which at least puts three constraints to Mídia NINJA. First, there is a certain precarity in their technological configuration; for instance, live streamings frequently experience cuts during transmissions, and the image in many cases is too pixelated or slow, which irritates the viewer. Beyond that, as with the case of Barricada TV, streaming technology has certain prerequisites to operate well, both for the transmission and the reception of the signal, like requiring a fast internet connection for uploading and downloading. Unluckily, this is not equally accessible all across the country, except for the richer states of Brazil, such as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Belo Horizonte that have better online infrastructure than others. As a consequence, by using this technology Mídia NINJA might reinforce content production of those regions where it operates, neglecting those where it does not, although these might be places with more social conflicts to cover, as in the states located in the Amazon region.

A second limit introduced by their technologies is that Mídia NINJA has a strong dependence on social networks, which in the end are the products of private organizations, mostly from the USA, operating under profits and against their collaborative logic. These technological platforms continuously include advertising along with the content that Mídia NINJA distributes through them, similarly to what happened to Barricada TV. Therefore, Mídia NINJA might be distributing content about their collaborative imaginary, but at the same time - and opposed to their aims - the tools they use distribute the commercial practices that Facebook and other social networks need for their financial sustainability. Thus, these media technologies have a ‘script’ that stimulates a commercial approach to culture and communications, whose effect will depend on the viewers receiving such a mixture of imaginaries. Apart from this, Mídia NINJA is subject to the changing policy conditions that such social networks have; for example, whether content is admissible or not. These requirements might collide with the interest of Mídia NINJA to cover social struggles or critical content, which might get censored; for instance, in 2013 Facebook blocked their page after receiving complaints from viewers. Immediately after this censorship, Mídia NINJA protested by posting the following message in the Fora do Eixo Facebook account:

“URGENT! CENSORSHIP! Facebook blocked NINJA’s page! We were denounced due to improper or pornographic content. Facebook is ‘analyzing the case’. But we had no detailed argument or chance of written defense. We believe it may have been the result of complaints from viewers against yesterday’s photos of the anti-priest gay manifestation. Pictures in which there was no pornography, only explicit material of affection and happiness. We ask you to share and pressure Facebook to put it back online. Unfortunately, for now, this is our main platform of our dedicated independent coverage of protests in Brazil” (Fora do Eixo 2013h, 22/06/2013, translated by the author).

Who blocked the page? Were simply users complaining about the content? Was it the government to stop the diffusion of content that would enrage the population? It is hard to know when media platforms do not offer access to such information, such as Facebook in this case. Therefore, this case clearly illustrates that what at first might seem like independence from the high costs needed to acquire technologies for a standard TV channel, in fact ends up being a different, but subtler dependence relation
regarding the conditions, design and practices of these commercial social networks, which coincides with the skeptical position of Morozov (2011) that he named net-delusion. Indeed, in November 2013 this issue was a big topic of discussion in an event organized by Mídia NINJA to gather independent media collectives for discussions (Mídia NINJA 2013a). Basically there were two positions. On the one hand, those that stated that commercial platforms are not a good decision and should be completely abandoned, because they are controlled by private firms, which includes advertising to make profits with their content, besides sharing information with intelligence services of different countries. Accordingly, this position assumes that the ‘script’ of these media platforms reinforce the commercial practices, associated with the creative economy policy discourse, but that they cannot be challenged. On the other hand, a second position coincided with these fears, but rather thinks that what really matters is to have media that grant access to as many people as possible with the least possible costs, assuming viewers will ignore the commercial influence of these platforms, which reveals the possibility of reinterpreting these technologies. Within such a perspective, mainstream social media networks, despite their risks, are still useful, and this second position prevails in Mídia NINJA and FDE. Nevertheless, there have been attempts to escape such a dependence as the development of their own web portal or intentions to use alternative social networks. But, the problem for the latter is that most users still communicate through mainstream platforms like Facebook and Twitter, and ignoring them would just mean to miss many potential viewers.

Apart from this, and supposing the audiences switched to new platforms, it is not so simple to set up alternative online networks of communication, just like it is not so simple to set up an audiovisual channel with own equipment without national R&D efforts. This requires the capabilities to build or alter communication networks, which are concentrated in actors that do not necessarily share the perspectives of media for social transformation. Indeed, FDE has been trying to do so by hiring programmers interested in social movements and free software, which they call hackers, but it has not been an easy task, as the following member explains:

“Today hackers are overvalued in the market, then it is difficult to attract them. When you invite programmers to join a social movement, they reply they are already free software activists who work in private firms earning tons of money, but then they accuse us of being sheepskins for using proprietary software! When in fact what we need is hacktivists to work on building software for social movements” (Fora do Eixo member V, 21/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Brasília, Brazil).

A third constraint is the financial one, because their lack of national currency hinders expanding their content distribution through other media beyond the internet. Although streaming and other online media technologies have been central in this media organization, the lack of financial resources does not allow them to have other media to reach resource-scarce sectors of the Brazilian population. Particularly in the northern states, where inequalities in terms of income and access to technologies are higher, and where the need to cover conflicts and give loudspeakers to the unheard is larger.

In sum, Mídia NINJA is far more than just the application of new media technologies as some techno utopians would understand, but rather a case where the collaborative practices and the hacking perspective to technology lead to a considerable reinterpretation of the available ICT. Thus, this case has taken advantage of the multistability of ICT, because although most have been designed for other purposes than establishing an independent media, the members of this case reinterpreted them towards such an objective, respecting their collaborative practices. This has allowed Mídia NINJA to build an
experience traditional technological designs for commercial TV channels would have never permitted with few resources. Nonetheless, the reinterpretation of technologies also carries constraints, because as I mentioned, the online media platforms they use still transmit advertising, limit and spy on the content produced by its users. Therefore, there are spaces for reinterpretation, but they are limited or more bounded than what the concept of ‘multistability’ might suggest, because in this case the employed technology - social networks or streaming sites - are still under the control of their designers who host the servers. Thus, they can alter the programs and partly intervene in what users’ do with their technological platforms. This situation is quite different from the examples that Ihde (2012, p. 172) gives to illustrate multistability; for instance, how a musical instrument can be used to produce music, by hitting it in a rhythmic way, disregarding the formal way of playing it. The difference is that the artifact or technology is finished and under the control of the users, whereas the social networks are not.

6.5 Concluding Discussion

In this chapter, I stressed the essential role of technologies in shaping the imaginaries of the cases, though not necessarily towards the directions desired by the initiatives. On the one hand, I showed that the different media technologies put limits on the imaginaries of the analyzed cases, either by (re)producing practices that are part of a commercial approach to culture and information or by creating a dependence on the commercial firms producing these technologies. Thus, they can be seen as a dispositive reinforcing such discourses. More precisely, in this chapter I employed the concept of ‘script’ (Akrich 1992) to reveal that the original design of these technologies is the cause of the limits that the four studied media suffer, though to varying degrees. This does not mean that the technology ‘does’ something, but rather that its design - if not questioned - leads to a particular use or interpretation which does not necessarily coincide with the objectives of the imaginaries. In this sense, the experiences cannot be understood as an independent symbolic imaginary floating in the air, because this ignores the ties and interactions with non-human objects that may be limiting the practical implementation of the imaginaries analyzed in chapter 5. For example, the Argentinean cases, to different degrees, employ technologies following the typical commercial TV channel structure, with expensive equipment, a studio and trained human resources. In part, this is a consequence of the new audiovisual media law that gives licenses to this type of channels. However, this requires that the media initiatives get the needed financial resources for such an infrastructure, either from advertising or partners, but as was evident from these cases, this is a big hurdle for new experiences to overcome. Only those that have enough resources (financial and relational) can achieve this objective, as the co-operative case, whereas others with reduced access to such resources simply face insurmountable barriers altering or in the worse cases blocking the implementation of their imaginaries, such as Wall Kintun TV. Consequently, even though the new law in Argentina paved the way for the legal existence of windows of opportunity for new channels to emerge, it did not address the financial and technological barriers that the commercial like TV technological model that they stimulated requires. In the case of Argentina, this points to a big deficit in the new audiovisual communication services law, which implied a technological configuration not appropriate for most NGOs. At the same time, it indicates the need of a policy to develop local and appropriate technologies that match the size and scale of these channels.

On the other hand, I showed that despite the limits that the scripts of the media technologies impose
on the cases, these technologies are open to interpretation, revealing the dimension that Ihde called ‘multistability’. Therefore, some of the cases have been able to counterbalance their lack of resources and own web technologies, by employing the ones available online and transmitting information in innovative ways, departing from the distribution technologies employed by traditional commercial media. This seems to depend on the existence of an imaginary precisely acknowledging the open nature of technologies, rather than a perspective that takes them for granted, closed, stabilized, and unchangeable. For instance, Barricada TV employs a TV model similar to CPEtv, but subverting the hierarchical and commercially implied model of organization depending on advertising. However, this required a specific imaginary that questions such principles of organization, like the influence that the factories without bosses movement had on this media experience. In a similar vein, I showed that the specific collaborative practices of Mídia NINJA (collective organization, complementary currencies and collective cash), together with the ‘hacking’ element in their imaginary, reinterpreted existing ICT to match their objectives and practices. Nonetheless, the analysis of the case that most reappropriated ICT, Mídia NINJA, also makes evident that the ‘script’ introduced by the designers into the technology, does not completely disappear, but might rather coexist and its effects might vary according to the technology and to those using it. Nonetheless, the multistable nature of technologies is important for media for social transformation to take into account, in order to generate strategies to employ the tools offered by commercial firms to advance their non-commercial projects, and in the process, challenge the creative economy policy discourses.

With respect to the conceptual framework, in this chapter I showed how the concept of ‘script’ and the idea of ‘multistability’ of technologies are more precise for the study of the technologies of specific case studies, rather than just saying in a comprehensive manner that these might play the role of ‘dispositives’. Although the latter might be true and a valuable metaphor to highlight in a broad way the technical aspects of social phenomena (Peeters and Charlier 1999), it is a vague concept that does not give recommendations on how to analyze the specific features of the technology under analysis. Indeed, I already remarked in chapter 2 that SKAD only has interest on the meaning patterns, classification schemes, phenomenal structures and narrative structures (Keller 2008b) of dispositives, which is not enough to comprehend how the design of technologies limit the potential action of its users. Therefore, the concept of script is better suited to focus on the main design that a technology is supposed to have that paves the way for particular types of human action, without determining them. However, it says nothing on how the conditions created by it might be challenged or reinterpreted. Accordingly, the idea of multistability from the philosophy of technology points to the spaces of reinterpretation of technologies that users might perform, questioning their original designs (Ihde 2012). This perspective joining ‘script’ with ‘multistability’ advanced by Verbeek (2006) is an important contribution to avoid deterministic or linear readings of the effects of technology. Additionally, it coincides with Coul dry’s (2008) critique of ANT, which, according to him, neglects such processes of reinterpretation once an actor-network becomes stabilized. According to Ihde (2012), the space of reinterpretations is infinite, but my data shows that if the technology is still partly in control of its designers while the users apply it, then the spaces of reinterpretation are bounded, though varied according to the contexts of use. For instance, it is true that Facebook can be reinterpreted and employed for different purposes, but if the aim is to produce news, then the possibilities for presenting them in the network are not infinite. Likewise, Facebook cannot be stopped from changing the conditions of using its platform or of spying and censoring the content that users publish on it. For this reason, I argue that the concepts of script
and the multistability of technologies are complementary to understand how technologies might shape human action, and that the weight of each one does not depend only on the context of use, but also on a dimension in the imaginaries that consider technologies as open works, and not just closed black boxes. Taking into account the boundaries that technologies create to the implementation of the imaginaries of the cases, the next chapter analyzes different dimensions of content production and reception, which shed light on further hurdles and strategies to surpass, employed by the studied media for social transformation.
Chapter 7

Content Production and Reception

Each of the four media cases under analysis has a particular imaginary that aims to produce content that differs and challenges mainstream ones. But, how far have they been able to do so? To answer this question, this chapter sheds light on three main dimensions. In the first section, I shall argue that the content produced by the experiences matches their imaginaries, which spans an analysis of the main types of themes covered by these media. Nonetheless, I shall also argue that the production process of these cases is in some cases limited by the existing ‘quality’ patterns established by the aesthetics of mass and professional media considered as ‘good’, overlooking the rest. Therefore, these mainstream ‘quality’ patterns act as dispositives that have influenced each case to varying degrees. In the second section, I will apply the concept of participation in media research introduced in Section 2.3, to discuss up to what extent do these cases match the ideal of a maximalist model of participation, in contrast to the minimalist models of mass media firms. Opposing the optimistic claims of these organizations, I shall argue that they are still far from fulfilling the extreme ideals of participation due to their imaginaries and material limits of production. Finally, in the third section I will examine data about content reception by audiences, which delineate some limits to the expansion of these new media projects and their potential to democratize the ‘public sphere’ (Downey and Fenton 2003; Fuchs 2010).

The analysis in the three sections is based on interviews and observations from fieldwork conducted in each of the analyzed cases, together with an analysis of the audiovisual outputs of these organizations. A shortcoming of these sources is that not all cases employ the same distribution technologies, or had the same amount of information available in terms of quantities of videos to compare. Although these constraints limit a full comparative analysis, still the gathered material offers insights of the type of audiovisual content produced and its further dissemination.

7.1 Content Production

7.1.1 Imaginaries and Themes

In chapter 5, I argued that media for social transformation could be considered as dispositives of the specific imaginaries that each case represents. Indeed, the actors putting forward the four experiences belong to networks that have their own proposals on how the economy and society at large ought to be changed, addressing what they understand as the problems that for-profit principles above anything else are causing. Nonetheless, the directions of change advanced by each case differ and have distinct
addressees. In this first section, I shall exemplify what sort of audiovisual content the four cases have been elaborating, which are examples of the discursive practices (Keller 2013) of the cases and their addressees. This is important, because it displays the different types of topics they have been covering related to themes in the international development agenda, such as the environment, gender, minority groups, etc., together with more local ones linked to their imaginaries. Furthermore, I will discuss the differences of the discursive practice among the cases, illustrating how some formats have been more comprehensive in covering the topics of interest for the cases. In this way, the section stresses the importance of these media to generate material that, according to their members, would have otherwise received scarce coverage from state or private local media, or more broadly, by principles patterned by the creative economy policy discourses.

7.1.1.1 CPEtv, Argentina

Globally, co-operatives have a hard time to diffuse their principles and practices in mass media; for instance, the International Year of Co-operatives by the United Nations was one of the top 10 most censored news (Project Censored 2013). These challenges are even more pronounced in the interior of Argentina, and for these reasons CPEtv has the aim to overcome the lack of content about co-operative principles and practices. In chapter 5, I explained that CPE wants to influence Santa Rosa’s inhabitants to become more participative and co-operative, and to express greater solidarity so that these attitudes get reflected in people’s daily lives. To achieve such aims, CPEtv has been elaborating and disseminating a diversity of TV programs, which I understand as the discursive practices of their imaginary. Actually, in August 2013 they broadcasted 16 programs to meet these objectives, out of which six were entirely produced by the organization, four were elaborated in collaboration with other local organizations, and independent producers made the remaining six.

Figure 7.1 shows the 16 programs classified according to categories that I defined to capture their main object of concern1. From bottom up, the first category ‘culture’ includes five programs, two dedicated to diffuse content about local culture, where the rest disseminate music not necessarily restricted to the province of La Pampa. The largest number of programs in this category confirms the claim of CPEtv members in Section 5.2.3 that they want to focus on cultural themes. The second category includes two programs about health that diffuse recommendations and advice to citizens. The third category includes two programs dedicated to provincial politics. The co-operativism category refers to two programs related to the movement. Besides, there is a local news program. The rest cover issues of education, historical events of the province and local sports. In the following paragraphs, I will give concrete examples of what themes the discursive practices of content production covered, highlighting those related to the international development agenda and the imaginary of the case. I shall show how the imaginary of CPE is represented in the content elaborated by some of these programs, nonetheless, the audiovisual material that they diffuse is not restricted by it. For instance, they also broadcast programs about health, sports or music concerts in the city. This in part is a consequence of the new audiovisual communication services law in the country, which requires the co-operative to produce 30% of own content and to have at least 10% of local content elaborated by external producers in their emissions (Ley 26.522 2009). The aim of this requisite is to contribute to the growth of local audiovisual

1. To compile this table I employed the information offered by the web page of CPEtv at that time, which gave the title and a short description of every program that they broadcasted. Additionally, I had sample videos of each program from their TV transmissions to cross validate that my classification was correct. Based on this material, I assigned just one category to each of the programs, according to their main object of concern.
producers, but it is also worth to point out that it has a limiting role by introducing content in the channel not necessarily in tune with their imaginary.

The most relevant daily program is the news show, called CPE Noticias, which covers events in the city and the province from a co-operative perspective. These include not only news about co-operatives, but also from other NGOs, such as specific campaigns they organize; for instance, collecting toys for resource-scarce families to celebrate children’s day with their kids or the coverage of citizens’ complaints to the state about the use of public space (CPEtv 2013a). Among the topics covered, there are several related to social transformation, such as gender and environmental issues. The former is an issue of public concern due to the high levels of violence against women in the province, which is the fourth leading cause of criminal charges (El diario de la Pampa 2013). For example, in 2004 a paradigmatic case took place, when a 25-year-old girl ‘disappeared’ after having been forced into prostitution by her husband. This case shocked the province and the country, but was just one of many in which young women fall prey to illegal prostitution networks (Peker 2011). Moreover, there have been continuous struggles in the province to introduce legislation favoring women reproductive and sexual health (Zaikoski 2012), such as the right to an abortion, but there is still resistance by doctors to perform the practice, even in rape cases (El diario de la Pampa 2014). In this context, the social movement Mujeres por la Solidaridad (Women for Solidarity) has been striving for women’s rights and against gender violence. In relation to the research, the social movement has a periodic space in CPEtv to broadcast audiovisual content related to their claims and their members are invited to participate in news to raise awareness of the issues they are advocating; for example, during fieldwork they were filming content about the decriminalization of abortion. According to members of the movement that I interviewed, the importance of CPEtv has been to offer spaces of diffusion that they did not previously have in local media. Conversely, they understand that the local government’s channel defends conservative positions toward gender struggles, whereas the private channel, although more open than the public, has been mostly restricted to news about gender violence, undermining broader struggles for health.
and reproductive women’s rights. A plausible hypothesis to test in future research is whether this
has to do with the for-profit principles guiding private media, which favor content that attracts large
audiences. Indeed, a popular slogan among journalists is that ‘only bad news are good news’, which
implies that news without violence or that just try to prevent harmful behavior or situations might not
be attractive for commercial media, irrespective of the consequences this lack of content could produce.

As regards environmental issues, the CPE news program has been covering issues of concern for
the province of La Pampa that receive little attention in national mass media, showing the importance
of local media for such themes. Take the example of the co-operative giving voice to discussions about
water conflicts with the neighboring province of Mendoza. During the late 1940s, the latter built a
dam that considerably reduced the flow of the Atuel river that flows across both provinces, causing
desertification and the emigration of local inhabitants. According to interviewees, the state favored
this decision as a consequence of the larger political and economic influence that Mendoza has in the
country in comparison with La Pampa (in terms of population and provincial GDP). Despite these
imbalances, there have been continuous popular struggles around this water conflict which are still in
legal dispute, although with scarce results in favor of La Pampa. In this context, CPEtv claims to offer
a new space for NGOs and citizens to claim for more action from the part of the provincial government
to solve the conflict, and to generate further content to raise awareness of the controversy.

Besides the daily news, the program that most clearly represents the aim of CPEtv is called Con
principio emprendedor (with entrepreneurial principles), which according to the coordinator of CPEtv:
“We intend to be a window for all those third sector institutions in Santa Rosa, which are in pursuit
of improving the daily quality of life for all citizens, by disseminating their initiatives” (CPEtv 2012,
translated by the author). In this program they disseminate content on how different co-operatives and
other NGOs in the province operate, they explain their models of organization, their entrepreneurship
in starting the experiences, their context, products and services, among other features. In this way,
they generate and diffuse content of what they understand as the other ‘human faced’ co-operative
economy, which tries to fill the lack of content covering how these organizations operate in the province
and in the country. Thus, from a sociology of knowledge perspective, the content disseminates the
practices of organizations following the co-operative principles and stimulates viewers to take such
subject-position. In particular, let me stress once again that the creative economy policy discourses only
speak of creative or cultural entrepreneurs oriented for profits, in the extreme cases just ‘individuals’,
contrarily, this program highlights the entrepreneurial activities but within the framework of the co-
operative movement, stressing the social contributions of these organizations. For these reasons, this
is one of the programs that most clearly disseminates the specificities of the imaginary that CPEtv
defends.

In the same vein, the program Editorial Voces (voices editorial) is the program of the co-operative’s
editorial that interviews local artists and researchers of the province (or who work there) to diffuse
their projects every week. According to the coordinator of the editorial: “The TV program has led the
publisher to a level of dissemination it did not have before” (Editorial Voces coordinator, 28/08/2013,
interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina). The importance of this state-
ment has to be understood in the context described in Section 3.4. The city of Santa Rosa, although a
provincial capital, is still in the cultural periphery of the country, and every worker in a creative sector
or researcher knows that if they want ‘success’, they have to go to Buenos Aires. However, this causes a
negative consequence in the province due to the drain of human resources. Under these circumstances,
Editorial Voces’ coordinator thinks that the program humbly tries to offset such centrifugal force by encouraging and recovering local cultural expressions, which would otherwise be ignored.

A last program worth to mention is called Todo es Cultura (everything is culture), which according to its producers aims to:

“Give priority to people who are most vulnerable economically, socially, as well as culturally, whose expressions are not valued or are despised by the elite. We take the whole culture of the city and that is why our program is called everything is culture” (Todo es Cultura coordinator, 19/09/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina).

This statement makes visible another center-periphery division, but this time within the city of Santa Rosa. The producers declare that they elaborate content about all cultural expressions, and not just those located near downtown where the ‘elite’ cultural events usually take place. Conversely, they claim to cover cultural events of peripheral neighborhoods within the city that are resource-scarce, suffer negative stereotypes, but still elaborate cultural expressions that are part of the city. The argument they employ resembles my criticism of the creative industries policy discourses in chapter 4 at the national level. Furthermore, it confirms that unless organizations do something to highlight the cultural productions of minority or resource-scarce groups, these are neglected - and in the worst cases despised - by those resourceful sectors that can easily access and profit from the opportunities created by a commercial approach to culture and communication.

In short, CPEtv is a channel oriented to the production and dissemination of content related to co-operatives, the life in Santa Rosa and the province of La Pampa, striving for an expansion of co-operativism. This is achieved by the elaboration of content organized in 16 programs, illustrating an industrial like process of production, and at the same time a large amount of material that contributes to (re)produce their imaginary and to extend co-operative principles and practices.

7.1.1.2 Barricada TV, Argentina

As described in chapter 5, the imaginary of this case aims to counter inform mass media, giving space to left-wing and workers’ perspectives from Argentina, particularly those identified with the MNER. To achieve these aims, during 2014 they broadcasted 21 programs, out of which 13 were elaborated by Barricada TV, while the rest by other nonprofit audiovisual producers of Argentina and other Latin American countries. Similarly to CPEtv, this case offers a varied number of programs, which suggests that they follow an industrial like process of production to keep the audiovisual transmissions going. As in the previous case, I classified these programs according to their main object of concern. Figure 7.2 shows nine categories, with slightly more than half of them falling into the culture and politics class. These are followed by three programs dedicated to news, and finally by six other programs that cover varied themes, such as the economy, recovered factories, history, among others. In a like manner to CPEtv, Barricada TV has a cultural profile, but as a difference, it elaborates more programs dedicated to discuss political issues. This is consistent with the explanation I gave on Section 5.3.2 that this case is more politically oriented than CPEtv, due to its different historical trajectories. In the following paragraphs, I will give concrete examples of what themes the discursive practices of content production...
Figure 7.2: Barricada TV programs classified by the researcher according to their main object of concern.

have covered, highlighting those related to the international development agenda and the imaginary of the case.

The first two categories, ‘culture’ and ‘politics’, delineate the main focus of the program, which is to give voices to actors and themes that have scarce spaces in commercial media. As regards ‘culture’, it includes programs that cover cultural expressions that do not have space in mass media due to their reduced audiences; for instance, they transmit a program about bands from the alternative music scene in Buenos Aires (Barricada TV 2012a) and a program for broadcasting alternative audiovisual productions (Barricada TV 2010b). In this way, they contribute to the diffusion of cultural expressions on which the ‘cultural and creative industries’ do not shed their light, because they are not profitable to be part of mass circuits. Likewise, the ‘culture’ category includes a program that covers the cultural activities that IMPA supports in its neighborhood (Barricada TV 2011c), and a program of interviews analyzing the interconnections between art and politics (Barricada TV 2013a), among others from independent producers. As regards ‘politics’, Barricada TV transmits a program of interviews with politicians, academics and representatives of social organizations involved in issues of social transformation (Barricada TV 2012b). In all cases, they do so from a left-wing point of view, claiming to give voice to actors who are underrepresented in mass media, and thus contributing to a democratization of perspectives. Apart from these, the category includes a program elaborated by Barricada TV’s members that diffuses content discussing issues of other Latin American countries (Barricada TV 2012f). Besides, the channel broadcasts other regional programs covering similar issues. In both cases, the aim is to raise awareness of the potentials of Latin American integration, which is a strong focus less present in CPEtv.

As in the co-operative case, the central emission is a weekly news program called Noticiero Popular (popular news), which is “built from a committed look with workers and the people. With coverages
from Buenos Aires and the country, and interviews with mobilized sectors of society that are made invisible by mainstream media” (Barricada TV 2015b). These interviews are central to Barricada TV’s aim of counter-information, because with marginalized actors they discuss the same themes touched by mass media, but from different and less diffused points of view. For instance, their most viewed video on YouTube is an interview with one of the supporters for changing the national drug law, so that consumers are no longer punished, but instead the effort is focused on dealers (Barricada TV 2011a).

Similarly, interviews with leaders of trade unions during strikes are another example, because they give them space to express their opinion (Barricada TV 2011b), whereas in mass media their presence might be reduced and often with a negative portrayal of their actions. Accordingly, it illustrates the aims of the imaginary of this case that I introduced in chapter 5, and the activist orientation of the members of the channel that strives for social transformation.

A further example worth mentioning is a program about recovered factories, where members of these several experiences in Argentina give interviews, explaining the process they went through, the suffering they resisted during the economic crisis, how they were able to overcome the difficulties and finally recover the factories (Barricada TV 2012e). This discursive practice disseminates audiovisual content of the utopian dimension of the imaginary, in the sense that it gives examples on how the emerging recovered factories illustrate the feasibility of an economy with firms managed by its workers, defending collective work and property. Consequently, the program plays a similar role to the one that CPEtv has to disseminate co-operative entrepreneurial principles, because it offers the subject-position of a workers self-managed initiative, though departing from the practices of co-operatives due to the focus on collective work and property. It is important to recall how this contrasts with the creative economy policy discourses that take private, individual property and the employer-employee hierarchic relations for granted, disseminating the private, for-profit oriented, creative entrepreneur subject-position. Contrarily, these experiences claim to offer a different and more democratic way to organize the workplace, which obviously challenges mainstream organizational practices, and might be one of the main reasons they are neglected in commercial media that follow precisely the opposite principles of organization.

Apart from these, the remaining categories encompass a diversity of themes that illustrate further actors and topics that are scarcely covered in mainstream media. For example, Barricada TV transmits a program about economic issues in Argentina and other countries, but from a heterodox left-wing economic perspective (Barricada TV 2012d). With respect to other underrepresented sectors of society, this case elaborates a program covering issues of people with disabilities (Barricada TV 2012c). Additionally, it broadcasts the first Latin American Islamic channel, Annur TV, based in Buenos Aires (Annur TV 2014), together with other Latin American programs that are retransmitted by the organization.

In sum, Barricada TV does offer a space to diffuse information related to social transformation issues, questioning content transmitted in mass media and giving space to underrepresented actors. Thus, they fulfill the aim to (re)produce their imaginary related to the MNER that challenge the employer-employee relation in private firms, and more generally (re)produce left-wing perspectives. In contrast to CPEtv, the focus of the channel is more oriented toward political issues and social conflicts mostly related to Argentina, and to a lesser extent to other countries. As I explained in Section 5.3.2, the reason for this higher level of political activism might be related to the origin of the project, inspired by the economic, political and social struggles unleashed during the 2002 crisis in Argentina, contrasting with the co-operative movements that have a longer and a less conflictive history with the
state during the last decades.

7.1.1.3 Wall Kintun TV, Argentina

As regards Wall Kintun TV, it is not possible to make a similar analysis as in the previous two cases, because the experience is still not producing content continuously due to the material constraints and the conflicts they suffered, which I explained in chapter 5. Despite these hurdles, the channel broadcasts a signal, but most of its content is either taken from national public audiovisual access data banks or they repeat content from public national channels. Additionally, they neither make their programming grid public nor do they have a list of ordered programs as in the case of CPEtv and Barricada TV. Therefore, this case gives a sharp contrast with the previous two, because despite the existence of a law giving them the right to disseminate their imaginary, the material limits create a large gap between their aims and the possibilities of putting them into practice.

In spite of these difficulties, Wall Kintun TV has started to diffuse videos through Facebook and YouTube, though still scarce (up to January 2015 they had only distributed nine videos on their active YouTube channel and two through Facebook). I shall mention some examples of these videos that illustrate the imaginary of this case, which can be considered experimental implementations of their project. For instance, one video is a transmission done by Wall Kintun TV in 2013 of a conflict between the Mapuche and the provincial government of Chubut. The latter sided with the position of private actors who had organized a mountain bike competition that passed through indigenous community territories, disrespecting a previous legal decision that had banned what the Mapuche perceive as an ‘invasion’. In reply, members of the Mapuche community cut the road and stopped the event from taking place, and the video precisely registered one of the moments of negotiation between the Mapuche and representatives of the provincial government (Wall Kintun TV 2013). The importance of this content is that the Mapuche themselves are elaborating audiovisual material that record these conflicts with private and state actors, explaining their perspective and hopefully acting as a counterbalance to the biased reporting of members of the community in local and national media. A second example is the realization of an interview with a Mapuche leader that was partly subtitled in Spanish during the minutes that they spoke in Mapunzugun (Wall Kintun TV 2014b). This video suggests one of the strategies that the Mapuche will possibly continue to (re)produce their specific worldview: the transmission of audiovisual material in their language, which has been undermined under the supremacy of Spanish at educational and governmental levels. This is important for their aims of preserving their cultural practices, also making evident with the subtitle that they address not only Mapuche, but wider sectors of the population so that they become aware of their cultural specificities. A third example was the diffusion of a video in their Facebook account covering a public event in Bariloche to commemorate the general struggle of indigenous communities on the continent, and in particular those of the Mapuche in the region. In this way, the channel might also contribute to strengthen their collective memory and pride in their identity, reversing the negative stereotypes that mass media frequently disseminate. A final relevant example is the coverage of events and the work of artists and researchers that diffuse content with or related to the Mapuche and other indigenous communities issues (Wall Kintun TV 2014a), because they contribute to (re)produce their imaginary.

Although the magnitude of the recorded material is far less than in the other cases, the four examples I cited reveal how the imaginary of this case has different actors, addressees and aims opposing those of the creative economy policy discourses. On the one hand, someone assessing the project from
a business perspective would definitely conclude that this project makes no sense given its reduced audiences, and thus, its reduced for profits potential. On the other hand, from a perspective that puts cultural diversity and the importance of media democratization first, it is not only logical, but also indispensable to settle the historical debts that the state has with such communities. Despite the hurdles in their implementation, I conclude that these coverages are highly valuable for the Mapuche and other indigenous communities, who strive for a different way society, the economy and nature ought to be organized.

7.1.1.4 Mídia NINJA, Brazil

In contrast to the previous cases, Mídia NINJA does not have a fixed grid with different programs to cover specific themes, instead, they just diffuse streamings of different topics, which give the viewer the impression that their content is chaotic and unstructured. However, this does not mean that everything goes, because the members of the organization have an implicit framing or selection of what topics to report over others, which I shall show that matches the objectives of their imaginary. To reveal such a structure, I coded 1,222 streaming videos available online at Mídia NINJA’s Twitcasting platform3, obtaining the results of Figure 7.3.

From the ten categories of Figure 7.3, almost eight correspond to coverages of diverse types of mobilizations across cities of Brazil, confirming that the experience is fulfilling its aim of reporting

---

3. This distribution technology platform was selected instead of YouTube, because it is the main instrument Mídia NINJA uses to diffuse their live streamings, whereas in the latter they also include the contributions from collaborators and other citizens, without giving information to distinguish one from the other clearly. Contrariwise, the Twitcasting channel has content only produced by them. Thus, it gives information on their implicit frame to focus on topics. As regards the coding process, I followed a similar approach as with CPEtv and Baricada TV, but in this case I defined the codes for each video based on its abstract and tags, instead of for each program. Additionally, in cases of doubt I watched part of the videos to determine their category.
protests in Brazil as explained in Section 5.5.3. Indeed, the category with most videos encompasses citizens’ mobilizations, mainly focusing on those that began in June and continued during July 2013. These were inspired by claims to cut the increase in transports fares, but quickly included many other complaints, such as the need to fight corruption, to improve public health and education, among others. The coverage of Mídia NINJA focused on the demonstrations in large cities, such as Rio de Janeiro (Mídia NINJA 2013b), Belo Horizonte (Mídia NINJA 2014d) and São Paulo (Mídia NINJA 2013e).

The third category with more videos covers strikes, which are a second class of mobilizations reported by this media for social transformation. For instance, the coverage of garbage collectors in Rio de Janeiro, who mobilized for better work conditions (Mídia NINJA 2014d). The streamings gave ample space to rioters to express themselves, to communicate their personal life experience and how they have been affected by the oppressive working conditions, exemplifying the way this media for social transformation covers actors overlooked by mass media who suffer negative stereotypes product of the Brazilian colonial history.

Similarly, Mídia NINJA coverages have focused on mobilizations by different indigenous and peripheral communities. As I explained in chapter 3, the historical denigration of these groups and their lifestyles is still present in Brazil, and Mídia NINJA has been reporting about some of the conflicts that these communities have with the national and regional governments. For instance, they streamed several riots where indigenous communities reclaim their rights in front of the executive and legislative power in Brasília (Mídia NINJA 2013d) and in the Aldeia Maracaná in Rio de Janeiro (Mídia NINJA 2013f). Another example was the coverage of a conflict between the Tenharim indigenous community in Manaus (Amazon) versus non-indigenous inhabitants, who were threatening many of the indigenous communities due to the disappearance of three locals. As one of the NINJA’s remarked: “The population, if not stopped, would have killed the whole indigenous population in the village, it was close to a genocide just as the one that happened 500 years ago, but in 2014!” (Mídia NINJA member IV, 19/03/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Belo Horizonte, Brazil). Thus, Mídia NINJA members interpret that their coverages are contributing to reverse the negative stereotypes about these actors that still remain in Brazilian media and society. Likewise, the fifth category with most watched videos illustrates that Mídia NINJA also covers mobilizations of peripheral communities. For instance, streamings have covered the riots in shopping centers of São Paulo by youth from favelas (slums) who had been discriminated by the security personnel and stopped from getting inside (Mídia NINJA 2014g). At that time, these events were part of national debates too, because they unveiled the persisting high levels of discrimination against resource-scarce sectors of the population, which due to historical processes of unequal distribution tend to coincide with those with an Afro-descendant background. This data illustrates that Mídia NINJA aims to cover these actors’ points of view, trying to reverse the existing bias against them.

Apart from these, there are three other relevant types of mobilizations covered by Mídia NINJA: of social movements, against police violence and large private firms. As regards social movements, Mídia NINJA streams demonstrations of those that have positions close to their imaginary; for instance, the coverage of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (MST - Landless Workers’ Movement), which organized a mobilization to claim an agrarian reform in the country (Mídia NINJA 2014e). As regards the next category, Mídia NINJA has disseminated videos exposing police violence; for instance, the streaming of forced evictions that the police carried out in favelas, like the violence in the favela de Mangueira in Rio de Janeiro (Mídia NINJA 2014e) or citizens’ mobilizations to claim the freedom of
those journalists and activists that were imprisoned during the riots that took place against the World Cup (Mídia NINJA 2014b). These show the police violence to control social mobilizations in Brazil, which as I shall stress in the next chapter, also threaten the projects of journalists of media for social transformation. The last category of mobilizations worth mentioning are those against large private firms, such as mass media or mining companies. Take the example of the coverage that Mídia NINJA elaborated of free media activists that protested in front of Globo’s building in Rio de Janeiro, which were not reported by the multimedia (Mídia NINJA 2013c).

The remaining category related to mobilizations includes topics that have less videos, but that are not less important on the agenda of FDE and Mídia NINJA, like gender issues. Indeed, in 2014 the network organized a Latin American women’s congress that had diverse panels to debate about feminism in the 21st century (Portal Forum 2014). In the same vein, with Mídia NINJA they cover related mobilizations to give space to gender struggles, such as social movements striving for the recognition of LGBT rights (Mídia NINJA 2014f), and for better conditions for prostitutes as workers (Mídia NINJA 2013e). The inclusion of this topic is important because it contributes to raise awareness against the preexisting gender bias on Brazilian TV against women and minority sexual orientations beyond heterosexuals. There are many examples that a foreigner can easily detect on TV; for example, a popular program of Globo led by a man has a tribune of women desperate to obey his orders in exchange for money, or the same channel every year conducts a contest to find the black beauty samba dancer, reinforcing an overly sexualized stereotype of black skinned women (Arraes 2015). The need to reverse these tendencies is an important aim for many Brazilian social movements, because the stigmatization of women in this country goes hand in hand with high levels of daily violence; for example, according to 2013 statistics every ten minutes a women is raped in Brazil (Madeiro 2014). Therefore, this shows how media for social transformation can make a contribution to objectives on the international development agenda, albeit limited by different types of hurdles.

Besides mobilizations, the second category with most Mídia NINJA videos includes transmissions of conferences and debates of votings in the national congress. With regard to the former, it spans videos of collaborators of Mídia NINJA and other free media activists exchanging views and possible roads of action during events (Mídia NINJA 2014c), such as a gathering of Brazilian and other Latin American free media initiatives organized by Mídia NINJA in Rio de Janeiro (Mídia NINJA 2013a). Furthermore, this category encompasses videos of votings in congress of policies that the group considers relevant, like the streaming of the day in which the support to the Cultura Viva initiated during Lula’s administration was finally passed as a national law (Mídia NINJA 2014h). This does not only show their support to the Cultura Viva policy discourse, but also how the network tended towards more involvement in national political debates. Finally, the ‘Others’ category includes diverse material, among which I want to highlight the distribution of videos where they explain how to imitate their production and distribution model with smartphones and online platforms (Mídia NINJA 2013g). This example together with the previous ones, illustrate that Mídia NINJA as a media channel is a dispositive for disseminating the imaginary of Fora do Eixo among its viewers.

In sum, this media experience also offers a new channel of communication to underrepresented actors to express their points of view and demands, with a strong focus on social mobilizations. From the perspective of interviewees of Mídia NINJA, these issues are covered counter-informing the mainstream perspectives in mass media about these actors, which tend to be despised or overlooked for historical reasons but also due to the lack of profits that such coverages might produce for firms oper-
ating under a commercial logic. Therefore, the profile of the channel is closer to Barricada TV and its interest in the political, in contrast to CPETv, which is focused more on broadcasting cultural content related to co-operatives employing commercial practices.

7.1.2 Quality

In this section, I shall point out the relevance of the ‘quality patterns’ of audiovisual productions in constraining the discursive practices of media for social transformation. This dimension, although recognized in some local research (Benevenuto Jr. 2005), has been overlooked in recent calls in the English literature for more theorization about alternative media and media for development (Fuchs 2010; Huesca 1995; Gumucio-Dagron 2011; Pettit, Salazar, and Gumucio Dagron 2009; Thomas 2015). This is understandable, given that the acquisition of resources for operation and of appropriate technologies might be more relevant for the projects to start in the first place. However, I shall argue that once in operation, the media for social transformation face the hurdle of positioning their production in the existing classification schemes that determine what is good in terms of the ‘quality’ of their audiovisual content productions.

Based on research by Bourdieu (1984) on cultural taste in France, I shall adopt the perspective that audiovisual production ‘quality’ patterns are relative. However, given the concentration patterns in terms of knowledge creation and production in few universities and commercial media firms, the accepted schemes of what is ‘good’ are linked to these organizations and not others, setting classification schemes that oppose (and in the worst cases despise) those projects that want to depart from these established positions. Therefore, this idea of ‘quality pattern’ or ‘quality scheme’ matches the notion of the dispositive in SKAD, which I shall argue (re)produces the commercial quality patterns of leading audiovisual production firms to the detriment of alternative practices. It is worth stressing that I use the term in a descriptive way, to what interviewees identify as such. However, it was not within the scope of this research to study thoroughly whether their assumptions about these quality schemes are correct, which would require another type of method focusing on mass media content analysis and survey analysis with a large number of audiovisual producers in both countries. Contrarily, I shall examine the limits from the perspective of the audiovisual producers of media for social transformation.

My analysis was inspired by the relativity of quality links with the discussions about journalism, which I introduced in Section 2.3. Indeed, I shall show that the notion of ‘quality’ is closely linked to the debates on what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ journalism, because mass media firms tend to associate quality with professionalization, involving a particular and specialized training, which is useful for media professionals to generate barriers of entry against others (Carpentier 2011). Conversely, media that want to differ from these firms try to experiment with alternative ways of production not guided by professional standards. In the light of these concepts, in this section I will examine the structure of typical content elaborated by the news programs of each media for social transformation, comparing how ‘professional’ signal elaboration is. In particular, I focused on how the different media for social transformation cover and disseminate news, by selecting highly popular videos that illustrate the way

4. It is worth pointing out that the amount of videos available from each case varied. In some, like CPETv, Barricada TV and Mídia NINJA, I had an excess of videos to select and analyze, whereas in Wall Kintun TV very few. Thus, in the latter I watched and coded all the videos that covered news. As regards the former, this was not a feasible strategy, given that some cases had more than 1.000 videos (Mídia NINJA), which would have been impossible to code and analyze with the available resources for this project. Therefore, for the former I assumed that the ways they transmit news is more or less stable. With this hypothesis, I selected a sample of videos which I watched and took written notes of, and later coded two from each case following the video hermeneutics approach (Raab and Tänzler 2012). Although this has allowed me to build the results of this section, it is worth
they structure their content. I shall show that some cases do not differ much from a commercial media firm – CPEtv – whereas others have tried to break with the association of ‘quality’ with professionalization. The empirical data supporting these different strategies will lead me to discuss how these decisions can challenge the commercial practices promoted by creative economy policy discourses.

### 7.1.2.1 CPEtv, Argentina

The co-operative media is the case that most resembles a private media firm in its production of audiovisual content, this means that they want to show themselves as ‘objective’ professional journalists that elaborate high ‘quality’ material. Let me describe the main elements of a typical transmission of the daily news program of CPEtv⁵. The news program lasts around 48 minutes, it is divided in four blocks of approximately 12 minutes, and in addition it has around 12 minutes of advertising distributed in three cuts, making evident their employment of a commercial strategy. The program starts and ends with a series of images from the city and CPE, which depict public local spaces such as the central plaza, the Don Tomás Lagoon, among others. Thus, it tries to makes explicit their focus on the city and its local concerns. After this, the news program starts with the studio and the two presenters shown in Figure 7.4. The scenario has a desk for the two presenters with the logo of the co-operative. On the left, there is a plasma display and the co-operative’s logo, and in the background there is a map of the world. Both presenters are formally dressed. The man wears a gray suit and a tie, and the woman a dark red dress. They both have notebooks in front of them and follow different strategies to communicate their news that I shall later describe in more detail. On the whole, these observations give the impression of a ‘modern’ and ‘professional’ environment, which does not differ much from what commercial mass media programs in Argentina try to transmit. Take the case of Figure 7.5 that shows the studio of TN Noticias, the news program of the Argentinean largest private mass media firm, Clarín. This image makes evident the qualitative similarities among both settings, though in this case located in the city of Buenos Aires. Therefore, a first impression suggests that CPEtv emulates the aesthetic patterns of private media news channels.

Additionally, the examination of how CPEtv structures the news to be presented in their program reveals a technical complexity in news coverage similar to those present in high-technological mass media channels. Indeed, the video-hermeneutics from Appendix E shows that they present news in at least three ways. First, the main news are summarized with short audiovisual images, one next to the other, illustrating the main points of the day, which requires the preprocessing of the gathered audiovisual material, such as its edition and selection of what to include or not by members of CPEtv. Second, these news are expanded in more detail, which includes the news elaborated by the channel’s personnel, together with those obtained from other national or international sources. In the first case, it generally involves an interview with an actor related to the news, plus the superposition of audiovisual signals of the place where the event took place. For example, the perspective of the leader of an NGO who complains about the lack of progress in negotiations related to water regulation between indicating ways to improve this in future projects. I believe that the most important one is to organize a team to code the different videos separately, and then discuss them. This would not only help to cover more material, but also to cross-check the ways in which the different fragments are coded.

---

5. This description is based on the audiovisual material and the fieldwork notes gathered from CPEtv. In particular, I will describe one video transmission, whose content is explicit in Appendix E. I used video hermeneutics as a method of analysis (Raab and Tänzler 2012), which suggests to record the multimodal properties of audiovisual material, consisting not only of transcribing what is said, but also when, how, and with what background images. This offers a detailed analysis of videos, showing its time structure and the aesthetics employed.
Figure 7.4: CPEtv’s news program and its scenography 07/08/2013. Source: CPEtv Noticias.

Figure 7.5: TN Noticias, the main news program of the Clarín mass media firm in Argentina. Source: TN Noticias online streaming 16/03/2015.
the province of La Pampa and Mendoza (see Appendix E). Thus, members of CPEtv not only have to record audiovisual material related to the news, but also of the surroundings, which needs further edition once back in the studio. The transmission is not live, but recorded approximately one hour before the broadcasting, so that there is time for the edition of the content to transmit, which according to the channel's manager is a consequence of the lack of human resources. As regards the national and international news, the journalists comment over audiovisual images obtained from other media. In these cases, the signal might be of less definition. Third, the news program broadcasts a summary of other news that are not further detailed in the program, which can be of any of the three types (local, national or international). Overall, these data show that CPEtv tries to efficiently control and manage the process of news production in a 'professional' way, but giving priority to local content that the channel's management estimates to represent around 80% of their content.

However, the highly efficient and technical process of news production goes hand in hand with specific 'quality' patterns of news elaboration. Indeed, CPEtv considers a requisite to transmit every program in high definition (HD), which is a feature they remark as an achievement of their service as a way to compete with local private media firms. Nonetheless, it is also one of the reasons why they did not advance towards the diffusion of their videos on social networks during fieldwork. As the co-ordinator of the channel explains:

“We made some tests to upload videos to online platforms, such as YouTube, but that led us to discussions of image quality, on which we place great emphasis. However, if we upload with the quality that we want, the users' internet speed is not enough to play the videos well and it did not convince us” (CPEtv coordinator, 08/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina).

This statement shows an important difference between this and the next cases, because here the requisite of transmitting all content through HD constrained them from using tools to further expand their content through the internet. This self-imposed limit has stopped them from actively using online platforms, which have the potential to augment their co-operative principles and values beyond the city of Santa Rosa. Contrarily, some of the next cases will reverse these priorities, putting content dissemination before any quality criteria. But, why did they keep such restrictions that limit their aim of disseminating their imaginary? The explanation offered by the channel's management in the previous quote suggests that uploading HD videos to the internet would reduce the satisfaction of their clients with the internet service that they provide, eventually loosing some of them. Therefore, this makes evident their commercial interest, just as another private media firm. This conclusion is not a surprise given the imaginary of this case that wants to compete with local private media, however, it puts boundaries to their objectives of differing from private media. Take the case of the professional image that CPEtv wants to transmit, which as I described is not only communicated by the way that journalists dress, but also by the 'modern' studio they use. Indeed, the coordinator of the channel explains:

“We did not only want to distinguish ourselves in terms of technology but also in terms of content and aesthetics. But as there were no designers in the city who worked with the materials we wanted for giving the impression of modernity, we started to work with designers from Buenos Aires” (CPEtv coordinator, 06/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina).

This utterance points out that if they want to look ‘professional’, then they need an appearance similar
to the one Argentinean producers understand as such, which in the case of elaborating the studio is a knowledge only at the reach of designers in the capital city. Additionally, even the Spanish pronunciation that the presenters employ is similar to that of the capital, and not so much to the local accent in Santa Rosa. But if the aim of the co-operative has been to create a new regional TV, representing co-operative values, why is it so similar to mass media firms in terms of aesthetics? An academic at the University of La Pampa offers a plausible explanation:

“TV does not only need to follow the schemes that major channels from Buenos Aires offer. Every place and region has its own peculiarities, and our target is to build another TV that identifies more with our regional specificities. That’s the idea, but it is very difficult to put it forward, mainly because of two problems. First, most people trained in audiovisual arts learned mainstream schemes. Second, audiences are used to those schemes. So you find yourself with the problem that ‘if it looks like audiovisual content coming from Buenos Aires, then it is good, otherwise it is not’” (Argentinean University professor III, 29/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author).

The previous two statements point to the existence of the dispositive that leads to specific audiovisual production patterns in order to elaborate content of ‘good quality’. This dispositive is composed of the actors operating in the most important audiovisual firms (private and state mass media) mostly concentrated in the capital city, and of the most relevant audiovisual training institutes that are clustered in large cities, such as Buenos Aires, Córdoba and La Plata. These centers, particularly the former, are known for training professionals for mass media or audiovisual producers concentrated in the capital and working with commercial models. Thus, the previous two statements suggest that the accepted and acquired knowledge seems to be locked-in with a specific production system, reinforcing aesthetics patterns of production aimed to attract mass audiences, which are useful in mass media, but not necessarily in alternative experiences. Although I do not have quantitative evidence proving this, such as interpretation scheme was usual in most of the interviews I conducted in Argentina. If they are true, from my point of view this constructs a geopolitics of audiovisual knowledge production, where the ‘center’ establishes what is of ‘good quality’, while the ‘peripheries’ are doomed to either emulate the centers or to perish, given that audiences are more used to specific ways of content production. In this context, CPETV has accepted and sided with the existing ‘quality’ classification schemes, which seem to be internalized in its personnel that has been trained in journalism or media studies in mainstream training institutes. But given the concentrations in audiovisual knowledge production in few urban centers, this implies following the patterns of large commercial mass media firms. Consequently, CPETV accepts the quality patterns of private mass media firms, considerably reducing their distance from them, and leaving aside the original project of a more regional TV. Thus, the quality scheme dispositive reduced their potential pathways to experiment with other ways of news production. One could say that this strategy has been useful up to a certain extent, because the co-operative employs the well tested technical model of private media firms, but adding innovations in terms of content. In other words, the same bottle, with different wine. However, the claims of building a different TV not guided by the pressures and standards of commercial media seem to have been left aside, a point in which some of the next cases shall show a big contrast.
7.1.2.2 Barricada TV, Argentina

This case is a first example of a media for social transformation that departs from the ‘quality scheme’ accepted by CPEtv, thus cultivating a different type of aesthetics. In this section, I shall argue that this is a strategy coherent with their opposition to mass media firms, and their aim of implementing an experience beyond for profits aims. I shall analyze such differences by describing the main patterns that appear in the structure of videos of the weekly news program of Barricada TV, Noticiero Popular (popular news), highlighting the similarities and differences in the way it reports news with respect to CPEtv. This will lead to discussing the contrasting notions of ‘quality’ and the divisions between journalists that claim to be objective versus others that defend their subjective points of view.

The news program is broadcasted live once per week, lasting one hour, which already shows a contrast to CPEtv’s news that are broadcasted daily. Although Barricada TV might have more access to information sources located in the national capital, just one program per week might indicate a focus on specific topics that counter inform about what mass media diffuses, and of course, limits the resources for its elaboration. Despite this difference, in both cases viewers know precisely and in advance when to see the program, because they respect the programming grid, something that contrasts with the remaining cases. Let me sketch the main elements of a typical transmission that I detailed in the video-hermeneutics in the Appendix F6. The program begins with the logo of the name of the program Noticiero Popular, and the red star with the name of Barricada TV. Then, although it claims to be a news program, it does not exactly follow the same format as CPEtv summarizing all news of the week. Instead, they usually focus on counterinforming about a trending topic discussed in mass media, both private and public, which coincides with its main objective described in Section 5.3. This is achieved with an interview with someone who holds an underrepresented position of the themes of interest. For instance, a critic to the position of the government with the new audiovisual communication services law (Barricada TV 2011e), or interviews with representatives of left-wing political parties that have reduced space in mass media (Barricada TV 2013b). Despite this difference, it is true that the audiovisual techniques that they employ to segment the news indicate that they employ audiovisual recording and editing techniques similar to CPEtv. For example, the videos show smooth transitions between the takes of different cameras in the studio. Additionally, the audiovisual material they disseminate includes extra data recorded or obtained about the news too, which are simultaneously broadcasted in two panels together with the images of the interview. This, together with the rational organization of time, makes evident the editing job behind the scenes, suggesting a technological sophistication similar to that of any other commercial media channel, which not all of the next cases have.

In spite of these similarities, Barricada TV’s news videos show a number of features worth highlighting that illustrate their different approach to ‘quality’ and journalism. As regards ‘quality’, in Section 5.3 I showed that Barricada TV’s imaginary does not care much about aesthetics, because their aim in the end is to disseminate counter-information, without caring too much about how this is done. Thus, they claim to put their content dissemination aims above aesthetic concerns, which explains why they did not impose themselves limits on what to diffuse or not based on the ‘quality’ of the audiovisual recorded images, as it happened with CPEtv. For instance, Figure 7.6 shows a capture of one of their online streamings that has a resolution far from the one of CPEtv’s HD quality. Nevertheless, this ‘bad quality’ has not been a reason for Barricada TV to stop disseminating the content they produce.

6. The main source of videos was Barricada TV’s YouTube channel. I analyzed a selection of the most viewed videos, following the video hermeneutics method used in the previous case, but I coded only two out of the ones available online.
This is an important point, because it means they challenged the established ‘quality schemes’ that highly technological media firms have established. Instead of classifying themselves as ‘worthless’ for not matching the high-tech standards, they still elaborate and stream the content that they consider important for their objectives of counter-information. Thus, the features of the imaginary helped them to surpass the dispositive that would have blocked them, which suggests, similar to my argument in chapter 6, that the reinterpretations that these cases create of the conditions they face, influence how much they can surpass them.

Apart from this, Barricada TV reporters transmit an image that opposes the notion of ‘professionalization’ and ‘objectivity’ that CPEtv tries to emulate from commercial media channels. The studio of Barricada TV and how the journalists are dressed indicate these differences. For example, Figure 7.6 shows that their studio in IMPA is not only smaller than the one of CPEtv, but also has a less elaborated scenography with just a circular table and chairs for the participants. This indicates that they have no intention of simulating the ‘modern’ standards of private mass media firms. Furthermore, the female journalists’ dress code is informal, sharply in contrast with the formality of the presenters in Figures 7.5 and 7.4. I understand these contrasts as a reflection of their imaginary, which not only rejects aesthetic concerns, but also opposes mass media and focuses on social movements and the working class. Therefore, the way they dress and present news seems to be closer to the living standards of their addressees. A final connection worth pointing out is that these different aesthetics opposing the ‘professionalization’ image that mass media commercial firms try to transmit, goes hand in hand with an opposition to claims of objectivity in their coverages. Indeed, one of the member of Barricada TV claims that: “Objectivity does not exist. In our news it is clear that we inform from our perspective that is not neutral” (Castro 2011, translated by the author). For these reasons, I argue that Barricada TV makes a different connection between ‘quality’ and journalism, opposing what interviewees understand as the ‘professional’ mainstream schemes of commercial media.

Although it can be said that Barricada TV is employing a different aesthetic in its audiovisual productions, this does not mean that they have been completely unaffected by what I called mainstream ‘quality patterns’ in the previous section. Indeed, they still face the hurdle of lack of appropriate knowledge in training centers that matches their needs, as the following quote by a member of Barricada TV details:

“Alternative, popular and community media have been neglected subjects in media and communication universities in the country. However, with the new audiovisual communication services law they are starting to emerge once again, well ... they have realized that these media exist and that they might be interesting” (Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).

The exception to the observation seems to be the same interviewee, who gives a course on alternative, popular and community media at the University of Buenos Aires (Vinelli 2014); but such syllabi are conspicuously absent from other national universities. Why? Media and communication universities focus their training of professionals on mass media, and have undermined the specific technical knowledge and quality classification schemes that are relevant for alternative, popular, community or co-operative media. This adds to a general problem of audiovisual knowledge concentration in the city of Buenos Aires. Although this is not so prominent in the case of Barricada TV, which operates in the capital, it is another difficult hurdle to surpass for organizations far from Buenos Aires, who want to build media collectives.
Once again, the last statement points to the existence of a dispositive: ‘quality patterns’, which classify what type of knowledge is ‘good’ and useful, neglecting the rest. This highlights once again the important connection that Foucault remarked on how knowledge leads to specific power-effects, which is an idea incorporated in SKAD (Keller 2013). If knowledge on how to put forward such media for social transformation is difficult to acquire and the offered one leads to unwanted directions (commercial aesthetics) and practices, then the spaces of operation and growth for cases opposing commercial policy discourses will be considerably limited. The perspective of interviewees of Barricada TV coincides with this interpretation, such as the following quote shows:

“We think that media universities should broaden the training they offer, so that students can think beyond just reaching and working in massive private and commercial media. Instead, they should offer other possible professional developments, where students can articulate political work, community work and journalism” (Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).

In effect, in the language of SKAD this member of Barricada TV points out that the subject-positions offered to students related to communications in universities lead them with high probabilities to work in private media firms, overlooking other type of career choices more related to social issues. It is worth pointing out that although the interviewee does not make a direct reference, this critique matches the conceptual one I made in the previous chapter of the creative industries policy discourses. Such approaches to culture in general, and media in particular, precisely reinforce the idea that only the commercial career choices matter. Conversely, the audiovisual communication services law and the
discourse it includes about NGO media is starting to offer new spaces for different knowledge, though still scarce in the landscape of media training offered in the country.

### 7.1.2.3 Wall Kintun, Argentina

Given the constraints and conflicts that this case has been struggling with, there was very little audiovisual material for analysis, because Wall Kintun TV had not yet organized a news program at the moment of fieldwork. The only available information are sparse videos uploaded online, which show signs of how they are planning to implement their imaginary. Therefore, in this section I shall examine one of these videos to argue that the case is also facing in these initial implementations the limits of mainstream ‘quality patterns’. I remind the reader that the members of Wall Kintun TV want to create a different TV, not influenced by what they call Western ideas. However, in practice this faces limits as well.

I shall refer to a video7 that Wall Kintun TV diffused in April 2014 about an interview with Mapuche werken (messenger in Mapunzugun) (Wall Kintun TV 2014b). I selected this short video of slightly over six minutes, because it captures part of their aim to (re)produce the Mapuche worldview. In effect, the emission begins with the symbol of Wall Kintun TV, the Meli Witran Mapu that represents the Mapuche cosmovision of earth and the four cardinal points (Grebe, Pacheco, and Segura 1972), which appears together with Mapuche background music. The interview took place at the office of the Mapuche Council of the province of Rio Negro, and was conducted by a member of Wall Kintun TV who does not appear in the screen. Instead, the journalist just employs short questions to stimulate the interviewee to express his point of view. During the first minute, the conversation was only in Mapunzugun, with Spanish subtitles (see Figure 7.7). This is important, because the language of the Mapuche is one of the products of their cultural distinctiveness with respect to what they consider the Western influence, and in particular given that the Spanish language is predominant in education and in media in the country. Therefore, the use of Mapunzugun in their media will contribute to preserve and strengthen its use, which also shows how their media channel has the potential to become a dispositive of their imaginary. Nonetheless, the remaining five minutes of the interview were conducted in Spanish, perhaps signifying that they are not yet sure about in what language to transmit in order to attract audiences. The rest of the interview touched several points of concern for the Mapuche. For example, their mistrust of politicians that from their point of view are not doing enough to stop the illegal appropriation of Mapuche lands and the destruction of the environment. As I explained in chapter 5, this is important because it disseminates the perspective of the Mapuche on topics of the national and international development agenda, which are often neglected in mass media. As regards the aesthetics of the video, while the interviewee exposed about these points, it shows images added during their edition that illustrate what the speaker refers to; for example, an image of polluted water or of animals in danger due to environmental degradation. However, the transitions are not very smooth, which suggests that they still lack the technical editing skills that the two previous cases mastered. The video ends with the same Mapuche symbology it had at the beginning.

Although the video is short, it still manifests two important points. First, the introduction of images and of subtitles indicates that Wall Kintun TV members are learning and applying a similar style of edition present in commercial channels, which is not a surprise given that they are receiving training

---

7. For this case, the main source of videos was available on YouTube or diffused through Wall Kintun TV’s Facebook page. Similarly to the previous cases, I analyzed the video employing the video-hermeneutics method. The results are shown in Appendix G.
Figure 7.7: Wall Kintun TV interview with a werken (Mapuche messenger), conducted part in Mapunzugun and subtitled in Spanish, and the rest completely in Spanish. Source: Wall Kintun TV.
from specialists of INCAA, the national audiovisual institute from Buenos Aires (CineramaPlus+ 2013). However, these videos have not been exempt of criticism; for instance, the video received sarcastic comments on Facebook complaining about its amateurish edition, evident in the transitions between the interview and the images. This illustrates once again the existence of the dispositive of accepted ‘quality patterns’ that their content is supposed to match to in order to be considered ‘good’. Indeed, the training they are receiving suggests how their practices are being tainted by those emanating from the capital. Nonetheless, the problem with this practice is that in the end they might not differ too much from the commercial private and Western media they try to oppose. The second point is that Wall Kintun TV has not made explicit their position with respect to professionalization. Given their imaginary and their aim to disseminate the perspectives of the Mapuche that are overlooked or misrepresented in mass media, it would be reasonable for them to adopt a more subjective approach, stressing their perspectives over others. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how they are going to fulfill such dimension of their imaginary, if they just use the skills taught by audiovisual specialists from the capital city that associate quality with professionalization and objectivity. In that direction, it is worth pointing out that members of the AFSCA, which supports the organization through funding, remarked that they had received the demands of the Mapuche to organize audiovisual training workshops, along with others related to Mapuche philosophy and worldview. The aim of mixing these two different types of knowledge is to stimulate a new synthesis between both perspectives, avoiding the direct copy of what I called mainstream commercial schemes; though, the results are still to be seen.

### 7.1.2.4 Mídia NINJA, Brazil

In this section, I shall show that the links between quality, professionalization and objectivity in this case sharply oppose those of commercial media. I understand this strategy as a challenge to the dispositive of mainstream ‘quality patterns’ in Brazil, which reinforces the commercial aesthetic above others. Indeed, Brazilian researchers have described it as the ‘Globo aesthetic pattern’, in reference to the ‘quality’ requirements that Globo has introduced in audiovisual production in the country (Benevenuto Jr. 2005). These generate barriers of entry to community and resource-scarce media in the country, that cannot afford the costs of the needed equipment to film with the sophistication Globo does. Contrariwise, I shall first show how Mídia NINJA broke with these quality schemes by describing and analyzing the main features of their online streamings. Then, I will discuss the connection between this new technological configuration and quality scheme, with their notion of objectivity in journalism, making evident their contrast with commercial mass media.

Mídia NINJA’s streamings are live coverages of the different types of mobilizations I described in Section 7.1.1.4, which have been produced following a process and a quality scheme quite different from mainstream ones. I shall illustrate these differences by highlighting results of the analysis of one video presented in Appendix H, together with the following field notes I elaborated while watching that streaming live:

“Around 250 persons are watching the transmission of the strike of Rio de Janeiro’s garbage collectors live, which is not being covered by other mass media on TV. The NINJA reporter starts making a summary of the mobilizations of the previous days, and starts to

---

8. This video is an example from the whole group that I obtained from Mídia NINJA’s Twitcasting channel elaborated between the end of June 2013 and December 2014. The fieldnotes I quote correspond to the same video I analyzed in Appendix H through the video hermeneutics method.
interview rioters while they await the results of an ongoing negotiation taking place among stakeholders in front of the labor tribunal. The central issue is that garbage collectors think they deserve a better salary for the tough public service they offer, rather than just the US$ 266 per month they get paid currently. Most of the garbage collectors are black skinned, which suggests the skin color association with precarious jobs. There is a delay between the image and the sound. The latter is relatively good, at least I can hear it continuously, although it is not very clear what is being said all the time, whereas the image is really bad, and that ruins the transmission, because for moments I cannot see what is happening, and feel tempted to shut it down. The garbage collectors march despite the rain, which shows their perseverance in their claim, and the difficult situation they are trying to alter. The NINJA reporter makes several interviews, among them with a female garbage collector of around 40 years, who explains her point of view of the situation, and also tells the reporter she has two kids studying at university, illustrating her struggle to give them better life opportunities. I think it is also a way to challenge the negative stereotypes about garbage collectors, like the one claiming that they are all criminals or lazy people. Her testimony contradicts these prejudices; for example, she explains that every day she wakes up at around 5 AM to commute to work. The interview was good to show the woman’s reality. Many online viewers comment they liked the story, and are suggesting an edition and further YouTube diffusion. That seems to be the key to Mídia NINJA’s approach, the live, close interviews with people on the street. Mídia NINJA gives them space to communicate and diffuse their stories with detail and live. Meanwhile, in O Globo they are just broadcasting a dubbed Portuguese version of the film ‘Shall we dance?’, with Richard Gere as protagonist and set in New York. An outrageous gap ... On the one hand, live social mobilizations to address oppressive social conditions, and on the other the most influential mass media just broadcasting a superficial movie, were there are no social problems, just people who want to be ‘happy’ in a completely different context ...” (Field notes written by the author in Fortaleza, Brazil, 08/03/2014).

These personal observations, together with the structure of the full video of almost 90 minutes, reveal the main features of the quality scheme of Mídia NINJA’s streamings. The first point to highlight is that their transmissions - which can last from a few minutes to around four hours - are streamed, in other words, disseminated completely live with no edition. This is a sharp contrast with mainstream quality schemes, and even with those of the previous cases, which in their news coverage try to generate a linear, smooth transition from one image to the other by editing and preprocessing the raw audiovisual images they collect. Accordingly, this practice helps them to bypass the barriers that video edition imposes on any new audiovisual initiative, that is to say, to acquire specific hardware and software, besides complicating the audiovisual production process.

Additionally, thanks to the use of smartphones, Mídia NINJA records content wherever they can, eliminating the costs of setting up a studio and of acquiring costly equipment. Accordingly, they have more freedom to film their material in places where events, mobilizations or meetings are taking place. This simple decision has wide impacts too, because it breaks with the ‘quality patterns’ of a typical commercial TV channel that requires a studio to film their productions, aiming toward the best possible image definition. Therefore, they broke with the barriers that the three Argentinean cases are struggling with. However, the use of these different tools for recording content push them to depart from the established ‘quality patterns’. In effect, as the smartphone is usually kept in the hand of
a Mídia NINJA reporter, the recording of audiovisual signals is more chaotic than with large video-
cameras; thus, the transitions from one shot to another are bumpy. Moreover, the image definition is
poorer than in the previous two cases, as Figure 7.8 shows, which is also a product of the constraints
in terms of uploading and downloading from free streaming servers. As with the case of Barricada
TV, Mídia NINJA does not have enough resources to pay for a good online server, which once again
shows that despite the benefits of not depending on the excessive costs of equipment to transmit as a
typical broadcasting commercial channel, they are still dependent on the barriers imposed by the new
intermediaries that control the online distribution platforms. Furthermore, as I will show in Appendix
H, the audio or video of the transmissions (or both) are cut intermittently, which severely affects the
experience of the viewer, as I remarked in my field notes. In sum, the different media technologies for
content production and distribution has led to a departure from what is considered to be aesthetically
and professionally ‘good’ by mainstream commercial firms.

Despite these limits in terms of low image definition and the bumpy filming, Mídia NINJA has not
decided to block the diffusion of their content as CPEtv did. Contrarily, they just disseminate it, because
they believe that the most important thing is to diffuse the information, rather than restricting it due
to the ways it was produced. This is a strong departure from mainstream ‘quality patterns’, which
has been a source of criticism to the work of Mídia NINJA by journalists in mass media, who argue
that what they do is ‘low quality’ or sometimes worse, not even journalism (Gabeira 2013; Otavio 2013;
Azevedo 2013a). This does not only refer to the bad definition of their images, but also to what they
understand as extremely long raw streamings and their subjective coverages, where reporters clearly
side with one position. I understand this contempt as a strategy by the incumbents to defend their work
against that of challengers, by constructing a barrier, a classification scheme, a border in terms of what is ‘taste’ (Bourdieu 1984), of what is ‘good’ journalism. Contrariwise, Mídia NINJA members are proud of their partiality and claim that their coverages are more genuine than those of mass media, because they do not hide their point of view through an editing process. For instance, one of the founders of the organizations explains:

“Mainstream media firms have to learn that the new objectivity comes from a clear transparency in their thinking positions and how that information is produced. We do not hide anything, we transmit our interviews radically live, and we express very clearly what we think” (Corrêa 2013, translated by the author).

This statement is not an exaggeration, but a fact that is exemplified in Appendix H, which shows the length of the transmissions and the clear position in favor of the garbage collectors that Mídia NINJA adopted. The same pattern is present in the rest of their streamings, where the Mídia NINJA reporters defend the position of marginalized groups (Afro-descendant, indigenous, peripheral), clearly in tune with the aims of their imaginary, but also evidently breaking with the Western journalist claims to ‘objective’. Conversely, Mídia NINJA defends the partial role of their reporters, who are no longer just a ‘passive’ or ‘objective’ observer of a situation, but someone who is actively participating and taking a stance. From their point of view, this is essential to generate trust with their interviewees and to advance the processes of social transformation they side with, something that in their opinion mass media does not achieve; for instance, a Mídia NINJA member describes:

“The main difference is that instead of just covering what’s happening, we are amidst what’s going on, we are talking to the protesters, we are understanding and feeling. We think that it is useless just to talk about what’s going on, if we do not have minimal contact and dialog with the local people. They already know what mass media say, with those reporters covering from their helicopters at a distance. In that case, the person on the ground thinks the journalist is afraid to cover, descend and speak with the protesters, because they are afraid of being stoned or something like that, but we have this facility. Indeed, we have the interest and the thirst to be talking, to be understanding and to be feeling” (Mídia NINJA III, 13/03/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Belém do Pará, Brazil).

Therefore, Mídia NINJA established a connection between their unconventional image quality standards and their view of journalism, defining a different ‘quality pattern’ from the mainstream one. This is an important strategy for media for social transformation to take into account while challenging for profit principles, because it helped to break with the dispositive that would have led them to emulate commercial firms, or in the worst case, to fail to produce content due to their gap in elaborating what the mainstream standards demand. But this perspective cannot be explained just by the use of ICT, after all, the streaming platforms were also present in the case of Barricada TV, but they did not completely break with the commercial studio model of transmission. Although it is true that Barricada TV has been limited by the requisites of the new audiovisual communications law, I highlight that one of the main differences lies in the imaginary of each case. In particular in their context of emergence; in effect, Mídia NINJA is part of FDE, a network of cultural collectives that from its founding day have aimed to challenge the cultural practices concentrated in the largest urban cities. From its beginning, FDE has been experimenting with new aesthetics and collaborative organizational methods that oppose those of mainstream private firms. Therefore, Mídia NINJA can be explained as a continuation
of these practices in the media sector, which is an important contrast with the Argentinean cases that did not have such background.

Despite the employment of such unconventional aesthetics, I shall show in section 7.3 that Mídia NINJA was able to attract the attention of mass audiences more than the other three Argentinean cases. Thus, they are an example of how these different schemes can also become massive. Some may argue that their popularity was not a consequence of their quality pattern, but rather contingent on the content that they covered, which was quite demanded in Brazil at that time. Although that is definitely an important factor, it is also true that many other organizations were producing material about the riots in 2013, but only Mídia NINJA occupied the center of the spotlight. In addition, in most of the national and international coverages about the organization they specifically mentioned their peculiar way of covering online the mobilizations and other events, besides their content. Therefore, I claim that their quality patterns equally matter in a context where many people had lost trust in mass media. However, it is also true that such advantages small media might have to experiment with new aesthetics of reporting might be temporarily. Indeed, interviewees related to Mídia NINJA in Brazil remarked that mass media organizations had started to emulate independent media, by also streamings with their journalists without the official uniforms of their organization, as if they were just part of another free media or citizen media. This points to a competition and dynamics of the aesthetics of news coverage, which could be further research across media in future projects.

7.2 Participation

In chapter 2, I introduced two ideal poles to speak about participation in media (Carpentier 2011). On the one hand, a model that offers minimal participation, because the content is produced only by professionals, and the only space that audiences have for interaction is to comment on the content that the media organization elaborates. Furthermore, in this case media overlook the ‘political’ (Carpentier 2011), in the sense of underrepresenting the antagonist relations of humans beyond those in the political system, which according to Carpentier leads to a focus on homogeneous audiences. On the other hand, the maximalist model of participation considers that content can be produced by amateurs and citizens’, audiences can intervene in media management by selecting what topics to cover, and the ‘political’ is not excluded nor hidden by claims of ‘objectivity’. Therefore, this leads to an heterogeneity of covered audiences. Carpentier claims that the former matches mass media, whereas the latter alternative or citizens’ media, or more generally what I called media for social transformation. However, the classification of each media case according to the dimensions of the minimalist and maximalist models of participation in media that I presented in Table 7.1 suggest that the four cases I analyzed are indeed still far from such practices. I shall argue this is linked to the limits that the news production cycle and its technologies put on them, which at the same time question the hypothesis that media for social transformation can cover heterogeneous audiences.

Along the last chapters, I have shown that CPEtv is the channel that most closely resembles a private commercial one, and the analysis of participation in their experience is not an exception. CPEtv management is restricted to the members of the channel that have been rigorously selected after a tender in the city. At best, it has received and adopted suggestions and guidelines emanating from the administrative council of the co-operative that has over 100 members, and its advisory board that is in charge of management decisions. For instance, the former intervened during the selection of what sort
of audiovisual independent producers select from public tenders, whereas the latter suggests changes in the type of content produced by the co-operative. Nonetheless, there is no place for audiovisual productions of amateurs or citizens in the channel. The feedback that audiences can offer to their content is also restricted in CPEtv. In part, this is a consequence of the technology they use, because as they neglect social media and other online technologies, the co-operative just relies on a top-down technological distribution model, which reduces their possibilities of receiving comments from viewers. The only available channels of communication are a telephone number and an email address, but according to members of the co-operative they had few reactions. I understand this as a shortcoming, because they cannot assess the effects of the efforts they are putting in developing their content. As regards the coverage of political issues, the members of the co-operative and interviewees from other local organizations coincide that CPEtv has contributed to balance the local coverage of these themes. This refers to what locals understood as the preexisting bias of the public channel towards the official political agenda, and the bias of the local private channel that focused on profitable content. Conversely, a member of the local university remarked that: "The co-operative provides another space where you can disseminate contents you cannot disseminate in other channels" (Argentinean University professor III, 29/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Buenos Aires). In that sense, the co-operative is considered to be offering a new space for other voices to communicate and to expand political discussions, though still bounded to the political system, and not so much about social movements or conflicts as the other cases do. However, during fieldwork I witnessed the coverage of a diversity of political positions, including those of private firms opposing the co-operative. I understand this as a strategy to reach a heterogeneous audience - at best the whole city - that differs from the strategy of the three other cases, which do not attempt to cover the positions of those they oppose. This observation is important, because it contradicts Carpentier’s claim that a neglect of the political necessarily leads to a focus on homogeneous audiences. Furthermore, although the leadership of CPEtv
declares that: “The idea is to reflect what happens to common citizens” (CPEtv coordinator, 08/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina), which is a noble thing needed in the context of Santa Rosa, but it is still done using the lens of co-operative journalists. Therefore, there are limited spaces of participation for audiences in content selection or media management. Similarly, without employing more participatory media technologies or organizational methods, the technological configuration employed still puts the decision on what to include or exclude in the hands of the channel’s management. Thus, CPEtv is far from the most participatory approach of citizen media, and for these reasons, I arrive at the conclusion that the co-operative channel operates under a model that tends toward the minimalist pole.

In contrast to CPEtv, Barricada TV is closer to the ideal of the maximalist model of participation in media, for the following three reasons. First, in their web page this organization invites interested viewers to: “[...] join a trench that disputes sense with the mainstream discourse” (Barricada TV 2015a, translated by the author). In this way, interested viewers can co-operate with the experience and participate in their collective media project, without needing previous professional knowledge in media production. Therefore, the case is more open to amateurs and citizens to join in the management of the channel, which contrasts with the formal selection process of audiovisual professionals that CPE implemented, emulating commercial firms. Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that despite this easier access to be part of the media management, there is no other open space for viewers to contribute content without joining the project. Therefore, the selection of the agenda of what topics from mass media they will counter-inform about, is still decided by members within the organization. Second, I showed at the beginning of this chapter how this case covers political issues, adopting a confrontational stance with mass media not present in the co-operative case, including conflictive topics beyond those of institutionalized politics, such as issues related to social movements. Therefore, the ‘political’ is expressed in the different themes that they cover to counter-inform mass media narratives. However, their focus is limited on workers’ or social movements perspectives. It can be argued that they covered heterogeneous groups within them, but they clearly excluded the positions of mass media journalists and firms they oppose. Therefore, it is difficult to affirm that they address a heterogeneous audience, but rather those who share their perspective. Third, a stark difference with the previous case lies in the active use of online social networks by Barricada TV. These online platforms, such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and Ustream, allow this organization to offer a space for audiences to react to and interact with the disseminated content, either with converging or diverging points of view. For example, through comments to their videos on YouTube or to the posts about them on their Facebook channel. Consequently, there are more spaces for participation, but they do not use the whole potential of online media technologies to allow external users to elaborate content. Another shortcoming is that statistics up to November 27th 2014 showed that the top ten most viewed videos had been accessed 39,345 times, but with only 101 comments, which represent 0.25% of the views. This low level of feedback is paradoxical, because despite the opportunity of audiences to provide reactions to the content they watch, the data suggests that the levels of interaction are quite low. In brief, Barricada TV is closer to the maximalist model of participation, but as Table 7.1 shows, not entirely matching the ideal.

As regards Wall Kintun TV, this case too can be located closer to the ideal of the maximalist model of participation than CPEtv, but less than Barricada TV. The main reason for this difference is that the participation in content production is restricted to members of the Mapuche community. In effect,
during fieldwork the channel was in charge just of the Buenoleo community, with not much participation of other Mapuche communities nor from other indigenous communities. Given their hurdles to organize their audiovisual production process, they do not formally invite viewers to join the experience. Therefore, there are scarce spaces for participation in the channel’s management by audiences. The only exception is when audiovisual producers entered into contact with them to diffuse content about the Mapuche and other indigenous communities in the channel. Still, participation in content management was bounded to those who had material related to their topic of interest, and who were willing to disseminate it for free (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). Consequently, spaces for audiences in proposing content to be broadcasted are quite reduced. Similarly to Barricada TV, the channel aims to reach broad audiences, but the exclusive focus on indigenous communities casts doubt on such a claim, rather exposing their focus on members of such groups at the expense of others. With respect to leaving aside claims to ‘objectivity’, I already explained that Wall Kintun TV did not make this explicit statement, though the stance they take of representing the Mapuche perspective can be understood already as taking a subjective point of view that will oppose those against it. Furthermore, they are aiming to unveil the political side of conflicts that the state and private firms have with the community. Thus, in this sense they are closer to the maximalist model of participation. Likewise, Wall Kintun TV employs online media platforms, such as Facebook and YouTube, though not in the same intensity as Barricada TV, and they do not employ streamings either. Thus, the level of use of these participatory technologies is higher than CPEtv but lower than Barricada TV. However, as with the case of Barricada TV, the nine online videos in the last active YouTube channel received 793 visits, but only three comments, which represent 0,37% of the received views. As a result, I classify this case between CPEtv and Barricada TV, though closer to the maximalist model of participation.

Among the four cases, Mídia NINJA goes the furthest in trying to implement a maximalist notion of participation through the use of online media technologies. The first difference with the previous cases is that the reporters of this case make streamings of the mobilizations that they cover with smartphones. This allows them, on the one hand, to receive and react to comments that viewers post on the online platform they use during the reporting. Thus, viewers can interact with journalists live. On the other hand, the format of live transmissions is also more participatory than those of the previous media that only report edited news. Contrariwise, in this case Mídia NINJA cannot control what or how people are going to express themselves, as is usual in other media that filter politically inconvenient expressions. The second difference is that Mídia NINJA receives and diffuses content recorded by citizens not part of the FDE network through its YouTube channel, who use the same streaming practices with smartphones to elaborate videos or that collaborate by writing articles in Mídia NINJA’s web portal (Mídia NINJA member IV, 19/03/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Belo Horizonte, Brazil). In both cases, this implies that the audience can contribute more actively with the production of text and videos than in the previous cases, because part of the process of content production is external to the members of the organization. However, this does not eliminate the filter of Mídia NINJA, who has the final decision on whether to upload or not such material to their distribution channels. Regardless, the point is that at least there is a medium open for receiving the productions of citizens, beyond the material elaborated by the members of the project. This coincides with the observations of Carpentier (2011) that the locus of the production process can be categorized depending up to what extent it is done inside or outside the organization. Among the four cases, Mídia
NINJA is the only one that employs technologies so that part of their content is produced by members not belonging to the organization. As regards the rest of the dimensions in Table 7.1, Mídia NINJA covers political themes in its transmissions, taking a subjective point of view. Furthermore, the social network sites that they employ also give space for viewers to express their points of view and react to their content, both praising and disapproving commentaries. In contrast to Barricada TV and Wall Kintun TV, the diffusion of YouTube videos has a far larger amount of visitors, but in percent the quantity of comments is even lower. For instance, by December 27th 2014 the top ten most viewed had a total of 2,236,830 views, notwithstanding it only received 5,126 comments that represent 0.23% of the total number of visits, which is the lowest percentage of the three considered cases. As shown, these features point out that Mídia NINJA satisfies the conditions to be classified closer to the maximalist pole of participation in media more than the rest of the cases, but it cannot be tagged as fulfilling all the requisites, either.

These four cases and their distance from maximalist participation models sketch the limits of the claims that media for social transformation are a potential solution to solve the minimalist participation models of mass media. I argue that the problem to achieve this ideal can be explained by the imaginaries of each case, and the technologies that they employ in the news production cycle. As regards the latter, the three Argentinean ones follow up, though with nuances, a model of production based on the chain of planning, recording, editing and finally distributing content. In these cases, only members of the organization use the recording equipment, then material limits constrain the coverage of issues, and push to a selection of what to include or exclude. Contrariwise, Mídia NINJA takes advantage of the wide use of smartphones among its members and other citizens, who can record and share different sorts of materials with the media collective. Therefore, the locus of content production is in part external to the hardcore members of the organization, which allows to multiply the possible videotaping sources, bypassing part of the constraints imposed by the technologies employed in the Argentinean cases. This shows that some technologies give more space to participatory processes of news production than others do (Carpentier 2011), which is an observation that coincides with the ideal perspectives on ICT as increasing sources of participation and democratization in societies. Nonetheless, even in the case of Mídia NINJA, which employs the most participatory technologies, the process is not entirely random and peer-driven, because in the end members of the organization always act as gatekeepers of their communication channels, by deciding what is published and what is left out. I argue that this is a product of the selected cases that have particular imaginaries they want to defend. Indeed, the objectives of each of the four analyzed media for social transformation is to elaborate content that addresses what they understand as biases in mass media coverages. Accordingly, from their perspective it is justifiable to limit what type of content or editorial line they shall follow in their coverages, because they want to use the scarce resources they have to focus on specific themes. Additionally, the news production cycle requires the continuous production of new material, rather than just publishing a video or an article once in a while, as the way a writer works in the publishing sector. This requires a certain ‘bureaucratization’ of the production process, and with this I refer to the use of Max Weber’s concept to criticize the proponents of peer-production processes (Kreiss, Finn, and Turner 2011). In the sense that to fulfill the continuous production of material these experiences need a set of institutionalized rules of operation, more or less explicit or stable, depending on the case under analysis, which limits the easy incorporation of outsiders to the experience if they want to keep the speed in publishing news. Therefore, the concept of ‘participation’ as an ideal situation in which everyone and every voice
could be heard in every given topic in a specific media project, seems unattainable in practice, unless
the constraints of the imaginaries are dropped and the news cycle is disregarded. For these reasons,
I claim that the pretense of communication enterprises and projects to be participatory is misleading.
In contrast, I hypothesize that what might be more relevant for future research is to inquire what sort
of representation different voices have in the total sum of projects in a given media space, which could
help to capture up to what extent different points of view are represented. Nonetheless, the existence
of media diversity might assure the existence of a variety of positions, but it does not guarantee that
such content will have adequate diffusion, a point I will discuss in the next section.

7.3 Audiences and Content Reception

What has been the reception of the content produced by the four studied media experiences? This is a
relevant question, because the implicit argument behind the promotion of these media - as advocated
by the MacBride Report (UNESCO 1980), optimistic supporters of ICT and civil society organizations
in both countries - is that they can contribute to pluralize the types of content that viewers can have
access to, helping to democratize communications. In the context of Argentina and Brazil this means
that viewers will go beyond the offer that the most influential commercial media firms have: Clarín and
Globo respectively. I want to remind the reader that these two media groups have the largest amount
of viewers. Indeed, estimates confirm this statement; for example, the state concluded that in 2013
Clarín had 38.78% of open TV, 58.61% of subscription TV and 41.88% of radio market shares (Télam
2013). Likewise, appraisals indicate that in 2014 Globo had around half of the TV prime market share
in Brazil (around 91 million people) (Economist 2014). For these reasons, they are considered as mass
media by media for social transformation as mass media, and it is not an exaggeration to say that they
represent a big portion of the public sphere in both countries. According to the academic literature,
the expansion of new media and in general of those that I included under the name of media for social
transformation, would increase the offer of content, leading to a democratization of the public sphere
directly by introducing new popular media; or for instance, Downey and Fenton (2003) hypothesize that
the public sphere will include more and more content from the counter-public sphere, given the growth
of the latter thanks to the internet and new media. Nevertheless, in this section I shall show that these
statements are excessively optimistic, because although media for social transformation might generate
new and more diversified content covering marginalized actors and themes overlooked by mass media,
this does not mean that such information will be massively accessed or incorporated by mass media
firms. Furthermore, it does not necessarily mean that viewers shall like and access this content, either.
To show these points, in this section I shall adopt the perspective of the audience as masses (J. G.
Webster 1998), in other words, as viewers, to estimate the quantity of accesses to the content elaborated
by the four studied media cases. Unfortunately, I cannot compare all cases systematically, because they
operate with different distribution technologies that are not fully comparable; for instance, CPEtv uses
only cable transmissions, whereas Mídia NINJA online technologies. Therefore, different methods are
needed to make a thorough comparison between the four cases and the two main media firms in each
country. However, this would require different types of data collection methods, such as those used in
audience research or online media, but particularly the former was out of the scope of this research
project, though it would have been more suitable to match my methods of participant observation on
the side of content production. Nonetheless, I shall show statistics that reveal that although the four
analyzed cases of media for social transformation were selected due to their coverage in mass media - and thus they were quite ‘popular’ in comparison to others that remain off the radar - their number of viewers are quite reduced in comparison to those of the largest media groups. Therefore, except for particular crisis situations, they have not been able to continuously influence the content of the public sphere as stated in the literature.

In September 2013, CPEtv had 8,500 cable connections to their service (La Arena 2013) out of an estimated total of 22,000 in Santa Rosa. Thus, in the best of the cases, if we assume that every connected house was watching their news program at 8 PM (the time of the daily news program), they would have an audience of at least 8,500 connections. An extra plausible hypothesis is to consider that on average Argentinean families are made up of 4 members (Rodríguez 2012), which would give the estimate of a potential audience of 34,000 inhabitants, almost 31% of the total population of the city. This generous estimation might be large for the city, but completely insignificant if we consider the total Argentinean population of 40 million. Furthermore, content is transmitted just once, and so far not repeated through other means. Therefore, the circulation of content provided by CPEtv is mostly local and dependent on the transmission time, which is one of the challenges in terms of content reach for this co-operative experience. As regards which content is preferred by audiences, it was neither possible to assess this empirically within the scope of this research nor was this information elaborated by the co-operative. In sum, the content created by CPE might be a large local contribution, but is still irrelevant at the national level, where the co-operatives want to compete against commercial mass media.

As regards Wall Kintun TV, the operational challenges they face imply that they have a low quantity of online videos. Notwithstanding, the changes in management have left traces online, such as the existence of three channels on YouTube. For example, the first one in Table 7.2 was created by the first management, while the second and third one belong to the contemporary administration, but only the third one has remained active. Despite this division, only one video stands out from the rest, the first trailer that announces the creation of Wall Kintun TV (Wall Kintun TV 2012), which on 02/02/2015 had 10,485 views. According to media opposing the national administration, this might be explained by the repetition of this trailer in public media siding with the regime (Crettaz 2012), which attracted viewers online. In contrast, on the same date the statistics for the table were gathered, the rest of the videos on both channels did not surpass 1,000 views. Indeed, the most viewed videos on the third YouTube channel has have an even lower maximum, with only 600 viewers. This fact suggests that the trailer did become ‘popular’ or ‘viral’ due to the political diffusion of the inauguration of Wall Kintun TV during the struggle between the government and Clarín, and its dissemination in mass media siding with the government’s position. Apparently, this would confirm Downey’s and Fenton’s (2003) hypothesis of mass media - in this case public - disseminating content of counter-public spheres into the mainstream. However, I interpret this more as an exception - an outlier - rather than the rule, because as the statistics of the rest of the videos show, the interest in content related to the Mapuche has been quite low online, at least on YouTube. Thus, once the regime lost interest in publicizing the Mapuche channel through their public media, there was scarce interest of viewers to access its content online. This data does not only contradict Downey’s hypothesis, but also the optimistic claims that online media platforms shall offer ‘equal’ conditions to every media. Although it might be true in terms of distribution, from this case it is clear that the access to their content is dependent on other means beyond access to ICT.
### Table 7.2: Number of videos, number of visits of most and least viewed videos in the three YouTube channels associated with Wall Kintun TV. Source: Compiled by the author from YouTube 02/02/2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Channel 1</th>
<th>Channel 2</th>
<th>Channel 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># Videos</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Visits most viewed video</td>
<td>10,485</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Visits least viewed video</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cases of Barricada TV and Mídia NINJA have produced and distributed abundant audiovisual material in online media, employing in part the same distribution platforms, which is the case with Facebook and YouTube. With that data, I shall give more evidence on how the utopian claim of ICT democratizing communications overlooks the high influence that mass media groups still have. Contrariwise, I shall show some cases in terms of video distribution where the access to videos of media for social transformation has surpassed that of commercial mass media firms, and I will give reasons why this might have taken place.

Facebook offers a count of the followers that each ‘page’ has. Although this indicator is not without problems, it can still be considered a proxy of the magnitude that separates the size of the ‘audiences’ of the four studied media organizations with respect to mass media present in the platform. Table 7.3 shows the total number of likes registered by December 19th 2014, which offers relevant points to highlight. First, both Clarín news and Globo have a number of followers far superior to those of the four studied channels in their respective countries. In effect, the followers of the Argentinean cases (Barricada TV and Wall Kintun TV) together only represent 0.09% of the total number Clarín has. Similarly, Mídia NINJA followers represent 8.32% of the total number Globo has. Therefore, even though everyone and every media can create a Facebook channel, this data shows that the two most important mass media conglomerates in Argentina and Brazil still attract far more followers on Facebook than media for social transformation. Second, the media for social transformation differ considerably among themselves, with Mídia NINJA leading in the number of followers, while the other cases together only have 1.3% of NINJA’s total. This can be explained by Mídia NINJA’s operational network structure, which, on the one hand, allows a coverage of diverse topics of national and local interest attracting wider and diverse audiences. On the other hand, Mídia NINJA profits from the same marketing techniques that FDE implements, which basically consists of members of the network posting links to the content that Mídia NINJA generates, unleashing a sort of snowball effect in their social networks that is not present in the two other Argentinean cases. Altogether, these statistics question the utopian and extremely optimistic claims that online platforms put all media producers in the same condition to attract audiences. Although it is true that they equalize the possibilities to distribute content, it is not a coincidence that the leading firms in terms of market share in TV are the ones that have massive numbers of online followers as well. This points out the importance of the differences in the processes of content production that each organization has. The largest mass media firms in each country have radios, TV channels, newspapers, their own web sites, and decades of operation in both countries. For these reasons, it is plausible to think that users of online platforms might also have a longer exposition to such mass media through other distribution technologies, and thus, they also have an interest in following such organizations on Facebook. Conversely, the four analyzed media have far less resources for content production and less means of distributing them. This constrains the diffusion of content to smaller circles, irrespective of the media used. The exception
among the four studied media for social transformation seems to be Mídia NINJA, which has the benefit of operating with a network structure across several parts of Brazil, and the advantage of having captured - at least for some weeks - the attention of a wider national audience during the exceptional circumstances of the Brazilian riots of 2013.

In contrast to the statistics in Table 7.3, those in Table 7.4 are ambivalent, because they do show the strength of mass media but also suggest that there are spaces for media for social transformation to compete with commercial mass media. Indeed, these statistics that I compiled9 from YouTube and Twitcasting, show that through certain new technological platforms, media for social transformation might have chances to disseminate their content with more reach than those of mass media firms within the same platform10. As regards Barricada TV, it has 2,5 times the number of videos that Clarín diffused through YouTube, but the average number of views Clarín videos received is five times higher than the ones of Barricada TV. Consequently, although Barricada TV has more videos, they do not have such a large reception. But it is also true that the popularity of Clarín’s videos is concentrated in few (the 5% most watched represent 71% of the total views), whereas Barricada TV has a less concentrated distribution (the 5% most watched represent 35% of the total views). On the one hand, these numbers show that Barricada TV has been able to attract a more even audience to their videos. On the other hand, they still show that despite the equal access to YouTube and an even larger dissemination of content of Barricada TV on this platform with respect to Clarín, the latter still attracts more viewers.

The data about Mídia NINJA and Globo on YouTube offers a different picture, because the videos of the former have almost 4,5 times the number of views of the latter, although they have less than a third of their number of videos. This suggests that Globo is not very popular on YouTube, and also points to the success of Mídia NINJA to attract huge audiences in the distribution of content through YouTube, which is far larger than what one would expect given their scarce material and financial resources in comparison to Globo. It is clear that some content can attract large audiences, despite the imbalances in terms of its production with respect to mass media. Another contrast between both cases is that Globo has 402 videos, but just 20 explain 85% of the views, whereas the distribution of the 5% most watched Mídia NINJA’s videos (seven) represent 48% of the total views. Similarly to the case of Barricada TV, this shows this media for social transformation has been able to attract a more even number of videos than those of mass media, which tend to be concentrated in few. To conclude, the

---

9. These statistics were elaborated by constructing an Application Programming Interface (API), offered by Kimonolabs, to gather the data from Twitcasting and YouTube (see Appendix D). This allowed to systematically collect data from videos, such as the number of views, number of likes, date published, title, and if available, a summary of the videos.

10. It is worth mentioning that both Clarín and Globo have their own platforms for video distribution that link directly from their respective main web portals. Thus, visitors to their websites do not leave the domain to other platforms, which means that the statistics of Facebook and YouTube underrepresent part of their online audience that never leave their respective websites. For this reason, the statistics of Table 7.4 only illustrate the competition of mass media with two of the studied cases within Facebook and YouTube, but says nothing about other means to access their respective content.
statistics on YouTube offer another picture from the ones in Facebook, making evident that the media for social transformation can employ them to disseminate a large quantity of their videos, attracting in some cases even more viewers than mass media firms on the same platform. However, this seems to be dependent too on the organizational structure of the media and contingent on the types of content covered in relation to broader national events. In effect, the main difference I detect between Barricada TV and Mídia NINJA is that the former has been covering events that were not as massive and shocking for the national public opinion as the 2013 Brazilian riots.

Apart from these statistics, the information available online about Barricada TV and Mídia NINJA's YouTube channel allows an extra comparison about what sort of content the users mainly accessed. This is important, because it gives insights about their preferences, which might not coincide with the imaginaries of the media experiences. Thus, although it does not offer the richness of an ethnographic approach to audience research, it still highlights that audiences are composed by active actors, which select what to watch based on varying criteria (J. G. Webster 1998), many times disregarding the aims of the media that disseminated such contents in the first place.

Table 7.5 shows a list with the titles of the ten most viewed videos of Barricada TV on YouTube, seven of which were part of their popular news show. Most of them were interviews with different actors challenging mass media positions; for example, the second most viewed video records an interview with a member of an organization advocating for a new drug law for the country, which has been a serious national debate given that the previous law pushed the police to punish those who consume drugs, instead of focusing on producers and dealers (For more details see Appendix F where I particularly analyze such a video). Another example is the third most viewed video, which is an interview with an economist discussing a topic of debate in the national agenda: the nationalization of the most relevant oil firm that was previously owned by a Spanish enterprise. In this video, the interviewee defended the decision to nationalize, but still expressed a negative opinion on how it had been implemented by the national government. The rest of the interviews share similar features with these examples, because they connect with themes discussed in the national media agenda, though analyzed from a left-wing or workers’ perspective. In such cases, it can be stated that the audiences did select counter informative content, matching the imaginary of the experience I described in chapter 5. Nevertheless, it is also true that the most viewed video has been a transmission of a rock show titled ‘Crazy eyes - good morning’, which although it might be important for the alternative Argentinean rock scene, in my opinion is far from the imaginary of social transformation Barricada TV advocates. This dissonance with the other videos suggests that audiences not necessarily put the priority on the topics in which the imaginary of this experience lies. It also suggests that the critical content produced by Barricada TV might be part of a reduced counter-public, whereas the musical show connects with the interest of viewers that like

---

Table 7.4: Total number of videos, total number of views, average views per video and number of views of most watched videos over the total, per platform and comparing different experiences. Source: compiled by the author after querying YouTube’s API in November 2014.
Table 7.5: Top ten most viewed Barricada TV videos on YouTube. The table includes the titles of the videos translated to English, the total number of views, the program under which they were produced and the type of video. Source: Compiled by the author from YouTube 27/11/2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Title</th>
<th># Views</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crazy eyes - good morning</td>
<td>6,244</td>
<td>Music</td>
<td>Music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decriminalization of Marijuana for personal consumption: THC interview</td>
<td>4,971</td>
<td>Noticiero Popular</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expropriation of Repsol YPF: Claudio Katz’s opinion</td>
<td>4,461</td>
<td>Noticiero Popular</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good day Montoneros. Firsthand about combatant Peronism</td>
<td>4,397</td>
<td>Noticiero Popular</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juana Azurduy. The war of independence in the Alto Perú</td>
<td>4,267</td>
<td>Dale Fuego</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest against the visit of Alvaro Uribe to Buenos Aires</td>
<td>3,633</td>
<td>Noticiero Popular</td>
<td>Mobilization coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicentenary - Interview with Néstor Kohan (part 1)</td>
<td>3,216</td>
<td>Noticiero Popular</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malvinas according to the Argentina left: Montoneros, PRT and PO/1</td>
<td>2,810</td>
<td>Noticiero Popular</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKA-P in Zanon, what does it represent?</td>
<td>2,589</td>
<td>Noticiero Popular</td>
<td>Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the second and definitive independence of Our America</td>
<td>2,597</td>
<td>Noticiero Popular</td>
<td>Conference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The performance, but not necessarily the political position of the organization. Therefore, it also points out the limits that media for social transformation face to expand their imaginaries beyond those that are already sympathetic to them.

The statistics in Table 7.6 about the top ten most viewed videos of Mídia NINJA’s on YouTube show similar results. In effect, from the list shown, only three are directly related to social mobilizations, while the rest, including the first four most seen videos, has nothing to do with issues of social transformation as reflected in Mídia NINJA’s imaginary. For instance, the most diffused video is related to an issue that took place during the World Cup 2014, when a nurse was fired for laughing about the injury the Brazilian player Neymar suffered. Similarly distant from Mídia NINJA’s concerns, the second most viewed video shows how a dog was abandoned by its owner, whereas the third and fourth one display conflicts among citizens, in a soccer stadium and during a traffic jam respectively. Although these videos might still stress relevant issues in Brazil, such as street violence or violence against pets, the viral response of viewers to these topics departs from the focus that Mídia NINJA has on issues of social mobilizations. The explanation for this is that Mídia NINJA also employs its YouTube channel to disseminate different content that was produced by citizens not part of the hardcore of Mídia NINJA. Contrariwise, their Twitcasting channel is only used to disseminate streamings of mobilizations and other types of events reported by NINJAs. The advantage of this strategy is that it gives a more participatory bend to their experience than the rest, which is achieved by having part of the locus of content production out from the organization and its members. Accordingly, the covered topics can attract the interest of larger audiences, which increases the popularity of the organization. However, they run the risk of becoming popular for disseminating content divergent with their aims of reporting social conflict and mobilizations. This once again suggests that the relation between the objectives that media for social transformation have with their content, and the selection that audiences make of them is not linear, but dependent on the active role of audiences on how content is perceived and valued as important or not.
7.4 Concluding Discussion

The empirical data in this chapter gives insights about the relation between the imaginaries and the types of content produced in each case, taking into account the aesthetics of production. Additionally, the data allows to discuss how participatory these media projects are in practice, and to review statistics about content reception to discuss the contribution of these cases to the national public and counter-public spheres.

In the first section of the chapter, I synthesized data that shows the discursive practices (Keller 2013) of each media channel, which illustrates what type of content each media elaborates. In effect, the empirical data shows that the four cases fulfilled their aim of elaborating content in accordance with their imaginaries, although to different degrees. For instance, CPEtv does represent co-operative principles and values in its daily news and other programs about co-operatives. Likewise, Barricada TV elaborates content related to the recovered factories movement and other left-wing standpoints ignored in mass media. Similarly, Wall Kintun TV has begun to produce content related to the Mapuche indigenous community, but still in an incipient way and far less continuous than the other two channels.

In a similar vein, Mídia NINJA has been successful to cover varied social mobilizations in main urban areas in Brazil. For these reasons, the data I presented suggests that the media channels have become dispositives of the different imaginaries each case has.

Despite the role of the media channels to disseminate the imaginaries of the cases, in this chapter I stressed an important dimension overlooked in research about communication for development that puts boundaries on the projects: quality patterns. In order to analyze this, my analysis was inspired by the observations of Bourdieu (1984) that the ‘taste’ that people have in cultural consumption is relative, and depending on the particular personal and social trajectories of who is being asked. Although this stance definitely calls for ethnographic methods to research consumption patterns of audiences, within the scope of this research I focused on interpreting with such a scheme the statements of audiovisual producers of the media for social transformation, and related ones. This approach, though limited, still revealed that media for social change are inevitably positioned in a social space of content production, where hierarchies of what is of good and bad taste exist, often translated in this case to the discussion on what is good and bad - or not even at all - journalism. These hierarchies are what I metaphorically called ‘quality patterns’, which in both countries are associated with those defined by leading commer-

Table 7.6: Top ten most viewed Mídia NINJA's videos on YouTube. The table includes the titles of the videos translated to English, the total number of views, and the type of coverage. Source: Compiled by the author from YouTube 27/11/2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th># Views</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nurse is fired after &quot;laughing about&quot; Neymar in a hospital in Fortaleza</td>
<td>467,080</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An owner abandons his dog in the middle of an avenue - 24/11/2013</td>
<td>355,000</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent fight between fans of Atlético Paranaense and Vasco paralyze a game in Joinville - 12/08/2013</td>
<td>310,365</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A traffic fight almost ends in a tragedy in the Rio Mar mall parking lot Recife</td>
<td>214,182</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riot policemen receive under arrest warrant for throwing a bomb on a precinct in Rio de Janeiro - 14/08/2013</td>
<td>202,384</td>
<td>Mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazilians provoke Argentines, and fights take place after the goal for the title</td>
<td>187,835</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge humiliates waiter and exchanges insults with a customer in a bakery in RN - 12/29/2013</td>
<td>142,680</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policemen beat teachers in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro - 09/28/2013</td>
<td>127,778</td>
<td>Mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Bloc turn around a car of the Civil Police in São Paulo - 10/07/2013</td>
<td>125,917</td>
<td>Mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A dog is abandoned 'CONTINUED'</td>
<td>103,609</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
cial firms of the largest urban areas. These firms establish what journalism is (high image quality, high technology, professional, objective), despising the experiences that depart from their standards. I argued that the prevailing ‘quality’ patterns or schemes act as a dispositive for commercial practices that the audiovisual producers have to deal with, because they assumed that mass audiences are used to them, and that anything that departs will have to face the contempt of incumbents. The interpretation of ‘quality patterns’ as dispositives stresses that they are not natural, but related to the networks of commercial audiovisual production firms and training institutions (re)producing such practices concentrated in cities, such as Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro. In effect, the cases I analyzed oppose the respective large media groups in each country, Clarín in Argentina and Globo in Brazil, illustrating the theoretical tension that Carpentier (2011) described between mass media and others. The former tend to follow the strategies of claiming that their coverages are ‘objective’ and ‘professional’; whereas journalists working in media for social transformation leave aside such claims, because they want to show situations that are often overlooked by the agenda of mass media, requiring a personal positioning to try to alter the situations that they perceive as unjust. In the cases of countries like Argentina and Brazil, I argue that this is not only a philosophical discussion between ‘objectivism’ and ‘subjectivism’, but a matter of the political economy of media and communications. My interpretation is that mass media firms use their capacity to shape mainstream quality schemes and the claim to carry out ‘objective’ reporting, as strategies to legitimize and strengthen their positions, which in these countries is associated with the wealthier classes, given the origins of the most influential private media conglomerates. Conversely, media for social transformation are evidently reporting relevant topics to stimulate social inclusion and environmental policies neglected by the former. In this context, the creative economy policy discourses by ignoring the latter, clearly favor the former, and for this reason I reject that they can represent ‘feasible development options’.

With respect to the main research question of this thesis, the existence of this dispositive does not mean that media for social transformation are doomed to fall into commercial practices of audiovisual production. Although it is true that it might be the easiest road to follow in case they want to compete for audiences, my data shows it is not the only one. The case of Mídia NINJA clearly illustrates this, because even though they broke almost every rule of what is supposed to be ‘good quality journalism’ (good image quality, linear and clear narrative, objectivity), they were still able to attract large numbers of viewers during the transmission of the 2013 riots in Brazil. One possible interpretation is that what gave them the scoop was the coverage of specific content of those relevant national events in Brazil. For sure, this played a role, but it was not the only factor. From my point of view, an equally important aspect was their innovation to stream the content live, with a subjective coverage of what they saw. Therefore, I argued that they not only had an advantage because of the situation covered, but also due to the new technological means they employed to transmit it, which still had not been adopted by mainstream media firms, and thus did not have a stabilized ‘accepted’ quality pattern.

In this chapter, I also examined the important question of how participatory these cases are, which sheds light on the limits of the concept that has become a buzzword in development research in general, and particularly in media and communication for development. Authors claim that a plurality of media organizations (the different ones I included in the category of media for social transformation) shall definitely increase the levels of audience participation, contributing to the democratization of the ‘public sphere’ (Downey and Fenton 2003; Fuchs 2010). Nonetheless, I showed that this argument needs to be closely examined, because participation can have different degrees. To analyze this, I
employed the ideal poles suggested by Carpentier (2011) and classified the cases according to different dimensions. In synthesis, my data suggests that each case gives voice to underrepresented groups, whose perspectives are disregarded in other media, but in no way do they include a variety of other groups, in particular those opposing them. Therefore, the data rejects the thesis of Carpentier that alternative media have more heterogeneous audiences than mass media. I explained this based on the imaginaries of each case that set discursive boundaries on what shall be considered in each media, thus by definition limiting its potential to reach radical levels of participation. Furthermore, I claimed that the material constraints to fulfill the news production cycle also draw boundaries to the radical ideal of participation, because the need to continuously cover topics with scarce resources implies a selection process, limiting the full implementation of any sort of participatory ideal. The best strategy to enlarge participation seems to be to set part of the locus of content production outside the organization, such as Mídia NINJA and its video production, although this might lead to content elaborated by viewers not always in tune with the imaginary of the case. For these reasons, I claim that whenever a media organization argues it is ‘participatory’, the term has to be looked at with suspicion, because in practice there are many limitations to attain such ideal.

The last point I examined in this chapter was the link between the content disseminated by media for social transformation and their audiences. The data confirms part of the optimistic or cyberutopian claims of the potentials of new media based on ICT, because the new online platforms have clearly lowered the entry barriers to diverse types of organizations to disseminate their content online. The claim that this contributes to the democratization of the online public sphere is based on the fact that online platforms, such as Facebook or YouTube, do not discriminate among corporations, NGOs and individuals who disseminate their content there. All are supposed to have the same opportunities of access. Although this might be true, it still hides the enormous asymmetries that remain in terms of the resources that mass media firms have for content production in comparison with media for social transformation, and also that the former do not necessarily actively use the online platforms for content distribution. Indeed, I showed that Mídia NINJA had more YouTube viewers than Globo, but this ignores the fact that millions of Brazilians still watch Globo from TV, or directly access their videos from their web channels, and not from other USA based online platforms. For these reasons, I agree with Downey and Fenton (2003) that media for social transformation are contributing to create counter-public spheres, but I disagree with their hypothesis that these might feed on the public-sphere controlled by mass media. At least in the context of Argentina and Brazil and the cases that I considered, where the contrast between the policy discourses that each defend seem to limit potential links for deliberation. Contrarily, the data suggests that their best option to challenge a public-sphere to which their access is limited, is to create their own networks and counter-publics, hoping that the situation might change in the future. In effect, it is not a coincidence that the case that most advanced in such direction, Mídia NINJA, had more chances to challenge commercial mass media in Brazil, and attract – though for a short period of time – the attention of unexpectedly large audiences, despite the fact that they are a financially-resource scarce experience in comparison with mass media firms. Last but not least, the new online platforms that have enlarged the capabilities of media for social transformation to disseminate their content also brought new limits and challenges, such as surveillance of their content, and the introduction of commercial advertising, as I highlighted in chapter 6. Therefore, the net-delusion thesis is partly upheld as well (Morozov 2011).

It is safe to say that the challenges in terms of quality patterns and audiences are of general nature
for any media organization, even in Western countries. However, there are two relevant dimensions to discuss that are more important in the context of non-Western countries. First, the emergence of media for social transformation that want to challenge incumbents have to take into account the frictions and even high levels of confrontation, which their projects have to resist to continue operating. This requires resilience against different types of violence. Second, the sustainability of projects under such more demanding contexts requires the acquisition and mobilization of different types of resources, which I shall interpret as a proxy to power imbalances. Both are relevant topics covered in the next chapter that help to understand the potential and limits of media for social transformation to challenge for profits media.
Chapter 8

Resources and Violence

“Oppression is ultimately a matter of definition, and its perception is a product of a worldview. Change the worldview, and what once seemed natural and legitimate becomes an instance of cruelty and sadism” (Nandy 1987, p. 22).

The four media experiences studied in this work, as many others, want to introduce new imaginaries. However, this is not an easy task, and not only due to scarce resources to set up their experience, but equally important for the need of defending their projects against the oppression and violence of incumbents. The first part of the chapter covers the different types of violence that the four cases have been facing, a dimension often overlooked in Western research, which as I argued in chapter 2 is more interested in how media affect society, but not so much in the limits for their operation. The second part complements the first one by employing a resource-view of power to examine the varied types of resources that media for social transformation acquired and mobilized beyond financial resources. Thus, I show how they try to increase their power to put forward their projects.

8.1 Violence

In chapter 2, I cited two influential conceptualizations of violence by Galtung (1969) and Bourdieu (1989). On the one hand, the importance of their concepts is to make explicit the collective suffering that specific symbolic structures generate, beyond just speaking of physical violence. On the other hand, I pointed out that these definitions are broad and not explicit to what sort of structures they refer to (Farmer et al. 2004). Based on those observations, in chapter 2 I introduced a typology of different types of violence that the four analyzed media for social transformation have been suffering: discursive, economic, legal and physical. I shall argue that this improves the previous concepts in research of media for social transformation by explicitly naming the types of violence that hamper the implementation of the projects. In that sense, they can be considered dispositives, because they reward certain patterns of action, and punish those that deviate. However, these dispositives are not necessarily the product of creative economy policy discourses, but rather of others, though still contrary to the media for social transformation projects. Take the case of the repressive behavior of the military police in Brazil, which is more a product of previous decisions taken during dictatorships and inner conflicts within the country, rather than an issue of media or cultural policies.
Table 8.1: Types of violence suffered by each of the analyzed case studies and related organizations. The cross indicates the type of actor that initiated it (state or private firms). Compiled by the author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of violence</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>CPEtv</th>
<th>Barricada TV</th>
<th>Wall Kintun TV</th>
<th>Midia NINJA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violence by</td>
<td>state</td>
<td>private firms</td>
<td>state</td>
<td>private firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discursive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.1.1 Co-operatives and CPEtv, Argentina

In this case, instead of referring specifically to CPEtv, I shall make allusion to the co-operative movement in general, because the types of violence they experienced were previous to obtaining their license under the new law. In particular, I shall describe the economic and legal violence that co-operatives have been fighting against.

The first type is legal violence that had been exercised since 1980 through Article 45° of law 22.285 passed during the Argentinean dictatorship. This article excluded organizations offering public services to obtain an audiovisual channel, such as co-operatives, besides keeping the right of the state to restrict the channels in case they threatened ‘national security’ (Ley 22.285 1980). After the return to democracy in 1983, the legal framework was not altered until 2005, and only few co-operatives tried to bypass these restrictions by operating as private firms, but with internal legal documents that showed the ownership belonged to a co-operative (Hermosa 2013). Although the military dictatorship has been blamed for establishing this violent legal framework against the freedom of speech of co-operatives and other nonprofit organizations, it is also true that 25 years passed until such restrictions were lifted and 29 until a new audiovisual communication services law was introduced. This shows that unjust legal frameworks, established in non democratic periods, can institutionalize an unfair system that is not so easy to change democratically. As explained in chapter 3, a national political conflict and several nationwide debates were needed to alter what co-operatives understand as an oppressive legislation.
Therefore, although the military dictatorship carries the major responsibility, the political parties and leaders that ignored and even reinforced the issue are also responsible, illustrating state legal violence.

Other examples of legal violence are the questionings that CPE and other co-operatives had to withstand from private firms, and more specifically from those related to the Clarín group. For example, CPE had to deal with injunctions presented by the local private cable operator part of the Clarín group, Cablevisión, that argued the co-operative should not get a license because they were already a 'monopoly' in the telephone service (Colsecor 2011a). Although it is true that these firms had the right to present such objections, they were groundless and malicious accusations. In effect, the legal courts sided with the co-operative, and declared the claims of private firms fallacies, since the co-operative had already been competing with another local private firm. Nevertheless, the point to highlight is that firms with far more resources were able to use the legal system in their favor, irrespective of the truth of their allegations, to delay as much as possible the democratization process that the new law initiated. Thus, exerting legal violence against the co-operatives.

The second type of violence suffered by co-operatives has been economic violence, exemplified by the use of dumping practices by the Clarín media conglomerate against them. According to the president of the electric co-operative of the city of Punta Alta in Buenos Aires, Cablevisión charged AR$ 62 compared to the AR$ 68 of the co-operative, but in a nearby city, Cablevisión charged 110$ for the same service (La Arena 2010). This difference in prices led him to affirm that Cablevisión was using unfair competition practices, by offering a service for a very low price to eliminate the competition so as to later increase the cost considerably, given that consumers would have no other option to choose from. Such economic violence is possible given the operation of Cablevisión all across the country as a network, which was built during years and is far from employing fair competition practices. Thus, this unequal distribution of resources allowed such an attack against those who challenged their predominance in the cable and TV market. The point is once again that incumbents can mobilize different types of resources to stop the experiences from challenging them. Apart from this, in the case of Santa Rosa the consequences of economic violence were suffered by the local inhabitants. It is important to underline that the main argument used in 2003 by CPE to strive for their channel was the need to offer the population cheaper access to communications than the private firm, which indeed took place. For example, before the co-operative's channel, in 2012 Cablevisión charged AR$ 140, but after CPEtv started to offer a similar service at AR$ 85, the private firm had to lower costs to AR$ 110 (Nocetti 2012). This confirms the previous economic exploitation of the population that was charged higher prices and that had their right to communications and information limited. The co-operative further argued against another negative consequence of the Clarín group subsidiary in Santa Rosa, the money earned from the service flowed out from the city, whereas with the co-operative it would remain in the local economy (Señales 2012). In this context, it is not surprising that many subscribed to the service offered by CPE during 2013, and by the end of 2014 the co-operative even argues it surpassed the number of Cablevisión subscribers (Amaya, Hernán 2014).

8.1.2 Barricada TV, Argentina

Barricada TV has been streaming continuously since 2009, but despite the passing of the new law, this case still suffered discursive and legal violence. As regards the latter, it was not because of the nonexistence of a legal framework, but rather because of the lack of its full and fast implementation. In effect, in 2012 Barricada TV and other alternative channels created the organization Espacio Abierto de
Televisoras Alternativas, Comunitarias y Populares (EATACP - open space of alternative, community and popular TV channels) to demand full application of the new law. Concretely, they demanded specific tenders for alternative and community TV and radio within the NGO category and a plan to stimulate these media, without conditions from the state (EspacioabiertoTv 2012). The reason they gave for these claims was that the tag of ‘nongovernmental organizations’ is fuzzy; in the words of one member of Barricada TV:

“They put us in the same place with large service co-operatives or big foundations, and therefore they demand the same obligations. For example, to have recruited staff or to declare employees. But it is not possible for us, because we are not governed by the logic of the employer and employee” (Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).

Therefore, the use of a broad tag hides the inherent differences among the actors that can fall within the nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations category; for instance, CPE is an example of a co-operative with far more resources than IMPA and Barricada TV, but it is still less resourceful than other NGOs. Members of Barricada TV remarked it was not just a mere issue of classification, but one with practical consequences, because the tenders that the AFSCA released also had limiting assumptions on who could request a license, as the following utterance illustrates:

“Tenders require that you declare assets, employees, an investment plan, that you have professional operators under labor agreements, among others. Then, I wonder what happens to the radio carried out by activists against mining consequences? Are we going to silence them until they hire an operator under labor agreements?” (Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).

Although it can be argued that these specifications try to avoid informality in the media sector, it is also true that in their design they restrict the possible media firms to those operating under a commercial logic, pushing the rest to becoming illegal. And worse yet, the acquisition of the tenders had a cost of up to AR$ 140,000, which was a prize most alternative and community channels with scarce resources could not pay (Barricada TV 2011d). An argument behind these requisites is to assure that the new media firms will be ‘sustainable’ and that have already substantial financial resources, but once again, these alternative media have another point of view, as the following quote shows:

“We are not organized by a for-profit logic. We do not have an employer nor employees. We are a completely different thing. And it is not true that we are not ‘sustainable’, because since 2009 we have been broadcasting live without state support, without market support” (Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).

These statements illustrate an example that is a mixture of, first legal and second discursive violence, because what members of Barricada TV and similar organizations have been complaining about is an interpretation of the law contrary to their practices. Indeed, the policy instruments that the organization in charge of operationalizing the law introduced implicitly sides with the perspective of the creative economy policy discourses above others, acting as dispositives that shape practices to specific orientations. Accordingly, the practices of workers’ self management were neglected, revealing how
they took sides with the commercial approach to communications. Indeed, four years after the introduction of the new law, the demands of the network of alternative, community and popular TV and radio organizations were still ignored, and remained ‘illegal’, although they did organize three public mobilizations to the AFSCA to complain and reverse this situation (Espacioabiertotv 2013b). From their perspective, this was a “discrimination against those without legalization, authorization or legal recognition, preventing to compete and thus deepening inequalities” (Espacioabiertotv 2013a, translated by the author); which illustrates the suffered violence.

It is important to remark that alternative media organizations, such as Barricada TV, have been critical of the role of government in assigning licenses and in general, of how they implemented the law. Thus, one possible interpretation for the legal violence is that it was on purpose, to limit their critical voices. Another plausible explanation points to the state bureaucracy to deal with new situations, as it happened to CPEtv to obtain its license, although the deferral in this case has been much longer. Whatever the reasons, the effects of this delay from the state implied that these alternative media became ‘illegal’, excluding them from the benefits of the new law, such as the opportunity to compete in tenders. This constrained them, despite the existence of a legal framework to enact such projects. In effect, not until the end of 2014, Barricada TV became the only legalized organization of the EATACP network demanding a full application of the new law (Espacioabiertotv 2014). Its members recognized the importance of this, but they also stressed that many organizations are still missing, and so continued to demand the legalization of the remaining alternative media.

Despite the strenuous relationship with the state to obtain the license, Barricada TV has also suffered discursive violence from private mass media in the form of libel. Specifically, one of the leading political analysts working for the newspaper La Nación, related to the Clarín Group in terms of shares and ideologically, defamed the experience by painting another explanation of the previous events. In one of his articles, the journalist suggested close relationships between AFSCA’s managers and Barricada TV, as if they were part of the government, besides he tagged these and other channels as precarious and as not producing enough own content as the new law requires (Pagni, Carlos 2014). These assertions were denied by Barricada TV, and it is not difficult to confirm their point of view, taking into account the conflicts that the channel had with the AFSCA, the critical position they have in their contents towards the Kirchner government and the amount of content produced (Barricada TV 2014). From their point of view:

“Pagni and La Nación underestimate our task, because they cannot comprehend communication exercised as a right and not just as a commodity. They warn against the presence of our voices, which were always silenced or distorted in the radio spectrum” (translated by the author).

This example once again shows the capacity of mass media to defame alternative media in the context of a competition among discourses on how communication and culture ought to be organized.

### 8.1.3 Wall Kintun TV, Argentina

As described in chapter 5, the Mapuche suffered the political instrumentalization of their request, government officials offered and speeded up the TV channel for the Buenoleo community, but without transferring the knowledge and the management to the community. This top-down and non-participatory approach to the media project initiated a conflict that finally left the channel’s man-
agement in the hands of members of the Buenoleo Mapuche community, but in the middle of it, doubt was casted on the democratization aims of the law. As one member of Wall Kintun TV expressed: “We have been promised many things, but ultimately they had another intention, and not necessarily to disseminate what happens to the Mapuche people. Instead, they just wanted to politicize, it was politics within politics” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2015, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). Similarly, the CPI of Argentina states that:

“The creation of the Mapuche TV channel (Wall Kintun) was grossly manipulated. It never had support or funding from the state. This suggests we have a dead law, unless the government fulfills its obligations to give resources to those voices that have been silenced by mass media for decades” (Consejo Plurinacional Indígena 2014, translated by the author).

These statements are examples of the point of view of indigenous communities with respect to economic violence exerted against Wall Kintun TV, and in general against indigenous communities, because of the lack of resources transferred to them. It is important to contextualize this claim with the historical economic violence that the indigenous communities in Argentina have been suffering. Although the state conquest of indigenous communities might have taken place more than 100 years ago, their consequences in terms of impoverishing and undermining these communities had long term effects and have been also part of their claims brought to the new audiovisual communication services law.

The case has also suffered legal violence, both from the Clarín group and the state. As regards the former, its subsidiary firms do not respect the law yet, given the injunctions that were being debated during fieldwork. Consequently, their cable firm, Cablevisión, has not included Wall Kintun TV’s channel in their programming grid. This can also be understood as a type of legal violence with economic consequences, because by violating the law, Cablevisión excludes Wall Kintun TV from reaching a larger potential audience for the Mapuche, which would be a channel to try to tackle their financial and audience limitations. As regards the state, according to Article 152° of the new law, indigenous radios and TVs would be funded through a transfer from the national budget and other resources (Ley 26.522 2009). Although it is true that some governmental organizations have been transferring resources to Wall Kintun TV, such as the AFSCA or INCAA, the promise to establish a percentage of the national budget for these media has not been fulfilled, which would be a good solution to their resource-scarcity problems. Consequently, this reluctance suggests that the current administration is not willing to establish a transparent mechanism of resource transfer to empower indigenous communities’ media projects. As private mass media journalists have suggested (Crettaz 2012), this might be interpreted as the national administration aiming to ‘control’ the positions of the media they finance. One reason that supports this point of view is that there are strong divergences between many indigenous organizations and the government, because the former oppose the projects of extraction of natural resources that the latter has been advancing, such as the unregulated expansion of industrial agriculture, mining and now oil extraction, through the debated fracking method (Consejo Plurinacional Indígena 2014). In all these cases, few private actors and the state profit from these economic activities, with few concerns about the destruction of the livelihoods of indigenous communities. In the end, these examples point to the tensions within the state between the ideal of the new law to strive for a human rights approach to communications and the political decisions that parties in power have made to acquire economic resources in tandem with national and international private actors.

Last but not least, commercial mass media also exerted discursive violence against Wall Kintun TV; for instance, by remarking in a pejorative way the weaknesses of the project and its appropriation
by political activists (Andrade 2012). This is part of a more general trend of negative stereotyping of indigenous communities projects; for example, a popular journalist working for the Clarín Group expressed:

“I think decrees do not generate audience. This thing of demonopolizing media by creating new media does not mean that these new ones will have audiences. One thing does not bring the other. This stupidity of ‘let’s build the radio of the Wichís’, but, who the hell is going to listen to the radio of Wichís? And what is worse, who is going to put ads on their radios? And how are they going to pay the salaries of operators? This is real life and it is a business like any industry” (Iglesias 2012, translated by the author).

This violent utterance against the existence of media of indigenous communities such as the Wichís, which are indigenous people present in Argentina and Bolivia, reflects two things: on the one hand, the stereotype of urban citizens influenced by Western ways of living that despise indigenous communities’ worldviews and practices, which are seen as ‘barbarian’. This parallels the perspectives that inspired ‘the conquest of the desert’ in 1885 in the first place, and until these days illustrate the power imbalances among the inhabitants influenced by Western ideas versus those part of indigenous communities. On the other hand, the statement shows the conflict between the different discourses on culture and communication. The journalist clearly sides with the creative economy policy discourses, which consider information just as another commodity and thus, only those with enough audiences and profits deserve to have a voice. From this perspective, the indigenous communities just do not matter, because they cannot attract enough sponsors to advertise in their channels and pay for the salaries of their workers. However, this statement not only hides the advantages leading firms obtained during the dictatorship, but also overlooks the historically unequal conditions that indigenous communities suffered and the discourses that strive for a human rights approach to communication.

8.1.4 Mídia NINJA, Brazil

The different national context in which Mídia NINJA operates adds examples of new types of violence suffered by the organization, and also similar ones. As regards the latter, I shall cite examples of the high levels of discursive violence against this organization. With respect to the former, Mídia NINJA members had to face physical violence exerted by police forces. Indeed, According to Reporters Without Borders, during the 2013 riots around 100 journalists suffered violence, mostly from the police (Reporters Without Borders 2014, p. 21). For the same reason, Reporters Without Borders claim that Brazil was the ‘the deadliest country for media personnel’ in the Americas in 2013, because 5 journalists were killed, together with the daily physical dangers they face in day-to-day coverages. Mídia NINJA members have not been exempt of such violence; for instance, the following paragraph describes the account of an arrested Mídia NINJA reporter while he was in a police station in Rio de Janeiro:

“I have just been arrested for contempt. It happened while I was going through Arpoador\(^1\) carrying my camera, where I saw a commotion. I got closer to see what was happening, and the crowd shouted ‘Arrastrão! Arrastrão!’\(^2\). I saw a lot of policemen twisting the arms of

1. A region located in the southern zone of Rio de Janeiro, in the intersection of the beaches of Copacabana and Ipanema.  
2. This term in Portuguese refers to a group of criminals that act together to steal objects in a public space, which is frequent in the beaches of Rio de Janeiro. According to media, the members of these gangs are usually under 18 years old and come from favelas (slums) located nearby (Veja 2013; O Globo 2013).
teenagers and attacking them. I grabbed my camera to register what was happening, took photos and started to film a video, but in less than 10 seconds a first policeman got closer and put his hands on my camera. He said that I could not register that, and thus he would take my equipment. He pushed me backwards, an aggression, twisted my arm, while I said ‘I will not give you my camera! I’m working, I’m a journalist!’. In the end, they asked for my identification, but as I was on the beach, I did not have it. So, they tried once again to grab my camera, I said ‘This equipment is mine!’, and they replied ‘Prison! Contempt!’, and here I am. My great contempt was holding on to my camera ...” (Jornal A Nova Democracia 2014, translated by the author).

The imprisonment of a young Mídia NINJA female reporter of 19 years during her coverage of protests against the World Cup in Belo Horizonte, gives another example of police physical violence. The fragment of her testimony illustrates the aggressions:

“I was led to a police station nearby, where I was taken with three other people. Once there, more aggressions took place: slapping, punching and we were even welcomed with spits. When they identified me as the live narrator, they took my cell phone that was streaming. They tried to unlock the device for further ‘investigation’, but as I did not know the password, because it belonged to another NINJA, I was isolated from the group and placed on a table, where 5 policemen - men and women - beat me up to force me to say the password.

At the time of the beating, one of them hit the left side of my head and I fainted for a while. I woke up due to slaps and shouts of ‘Wake up, bitch!’. I regained consciousness. I was again near the three other detained protesters. We were handcuffed and kept standing for about 2 hours, during which we heard their curses and we received spits on our eyes and further jerks. Besides, I had to endure hoax songs calling me ‘Foxy!’, which were declared in a low voice so that they were not heard by people around” (Magalhães 2014, translated by the author).

These testimonies are just samples of the military police physical violence (including mental as well) against media workers, while they try to report during social mobilizations, which shows the stark contrast between the innovativeness of Mídia NINJA’s organization in using technologies to report social mobilizations and the fragility of its members while they report on the streets. More generally, media for social transformation in countries where there are no legal frameworks for the protection of journalists, or where they are not respected, face these hurdles of the state monopoly over violence or similar attacks from parastatal organizations, while they try to construct counter power networks, which in the worst cases do not even arise due to the violence oppressing such initiatives. Unfortunately, a majority of countries in the world withstands such dangerous conditions (Reporters Without Borders 2014). Therefore, violence cannot be ignored in theories of power in relation to media in non-Western contexts.

In addition to physical violence, Mídia NINJA had to endure discursive violence in the form of libel soon after the events of June 2013, because the experience attracted the attention of mass media journalists who wrote an avalanche of criticism against them. These were not strictly related to the practices or coverage of Mídia NINJA, but to the organization where it emerged from, FDE, and the whole process was unleashed after the publication of two testimonies by ex-members of FDE (Martins Costa 2013b; Rovai 2013), who used the same social network that gave popularity to the experience, 3. In Rio de Janeiro it is advised not to carry documents while on the beach, to avoid problems if you are robbed.
Facebook. Both right-wing media, such as the most read magazine in Brazil, Veja, and the TV channel O Globo, and also left-wing media disseminated a high amount of accusations against the organization. First, Fora do Eixo was accused of not being nonpartisan as they claim, but instead related to the Worker's Party in power and other left-wing ones (Borges 2013; Gabeira 2013; Passa Palavra 2013b; Boaro 2013; Azevedo 2013a; Passa Palavra 2013c). Second, articles remarked that Mídia NINJA was not ‘independent’, because they fund their activity through FDE that obtains funds from tenders and from private firms (Borges 2013; Gabeira 2013; Noblat 2013; Passa Palavra 2013b; Bocchini and Locatelli 2013; Boaro 2013; Otavio 2013; Passa Palavra 2013a; Azevedo 2013a). Third, journalists accused the organization of not being horizontal, but of having a clear structure that in the worst case was described as authoritarian or as a ‘sect’ (Maisonnave 2013; Noblat 2013; Azevedo 2013b; Passa Palavra 2013a). Fourth, other critics attacked one of the founders of the network, Pablo Capilé, who was portrayed as a manipulative ‘guru’ or dictator (Borges 2013; Gabeira 2013; Noblat 2013; Azevedo 2013b; Bocchini and Locatelli 2013). Fifth, authors cast doubt on the complementary currencies that the network uses (Borges 2013), which according to Marxist analysis just hides the exploitation of the workers’ surplus, by not remunerating their jobs (Passa Palavra 2013a). Sixth, articles remark the ‘low quality’ of the coverages of Mídia NINJA, also pointing out that their lack of ‘objectivity’ cannot be considered journalism (Gabeira 2013; Otavio 2013; Azevedo 2013a). Seventh, left-wing antagonists argue that the network is just a new type of capitalist firm that appropriates the symbolic production of precarious creative workers and other social movements for their own benefit (Passa Palavra 2013d, 2013c; Boaro 2013). For instance, they stress that FDE is not organically connected to social struggles, but just covering them as a niche specialization to attract viewers (Passa Palavra 2013a, 2013b). Last but not least, based on the testimonies of some ex-members, authors have made disparate accusations against the network, such as their preference to apply sexist practices or to exploit ‘slave’ work (Noblat 2013; Azevedo 2013b; Passa Palavra 2013a; Bocchini and Locatelli 2013; Boaro 2013), among other negative consequences they associate with the psychological pressure that the network exerts on its members.

Conversely, others remarked the previous pile of allegations disseminated in mass media and social networks as evidence of extremism both of right and left-wing journalists, against a new experience they did not understand (Nassif 2013; Martins Costa 2013b). Understandably, FDE rejects all accusations that they considered libel or biased and diffused various messages of support from several members and collaborators of the network that present opposite perspectives (Fora do Eixo 2013b, 2013g). However, they did admit some mistakes in handling personal relations with ex members, which I guess is something that usually happens in every work place. Nonetheless, the diffusion of this message was only through their web portal, which undoubtedly had less distribution than other mass media that disseminated the negative perspectives of the network. Beyond assessing the truthfulness of the allegations, what is important for this research is the conflict of positions that emerged between incumbents and Mídia NINJA, and the imbalance the latter faced while trying to defend itself against attacks on their reputation.

At least three reasons explain the violence Mídia NINJA suffered from private mass media. First, this case, along with other similar organizations in Brazil, holds negative perceptions of mass media firms and vice versa. It is important to remember the existing tensions described in chapter 3 among media conglomerates in Brazil - with excessive political influence - versus government and the social movements striving for a democratization of communications. These have been conflictive during the last years, similarly to the Argentinean case, but as a difference, so far no legislation has been advanced.
by the government in Brazil to alter the high levels of ownership concentration. This context explains
the opposition and violence between media for social transformation projects and mass media firms,
among which I focused on the aggressions of the latter to the former. However, I do recognize that the
violence is bi-directional, but asymmetrical; for example, Mídia NINJA reporters covered a mobiliza-
tion of organizations striving for media democratization and other citizens to the main building of the
largest media firm, Globo, to denounce what they understood as an unpaid debt the firm had with the
state (Felinto 2013). During this transmission, Mídia NINJA's streaming covered negative portrayals
and aggressive statements against Globo, which exemplify the negative perception and construction
of mass media as enemies that these organizations have, delineating conflicts between them hard to
prevent.

A second important feature of Mídia NINJA that collides with for-profit mass media firms lies in
their organizational models, specifically the collaborative practices this case employs. As one collabor-
ator from Mídia NINJA observes:

“In the last instance, digital culture is the elimination of intermediaries that do not add
value, and that explains the whole fight. If you start to produce a TV, you dare to make inter-
mediations that cut profits from another intermediary, you are in fact challenging the system”

(C. Prado, 17/12/2013, interview with & translated by the author in São Paulo, Brazil).

This quote illustrates the tensions between old media business models and the challenges introduced by
collaborative ones based on ICT. As remarked in chapter 2 and 5, the ‘monopoly’ of the professional jour-
nalist as the only one capable of disseminating news within an organization based for profits through
advertising and audience cultivation, is under pressure from new peer based models, with different
logics of organization and retribution. Mídia NINJA is an example of the latter, where journalists are
trained on the job and do not necessarily have university training in the area; their retribution is not
only based on national currencies, but also on the system of exchanges that the FDE network created;
and finally they report in an explicit subjective way challenging the claims of ‘objectivity’ of mass me-
dia. From my perspective, these tensions between different visions on what journalism is all about are
in the background of the violence mass media firms exert on the experience, and thus are examples of
discursive violence.

The third reason for tensions is related to the attraction of viewers that Mídia NINJA achieved
during the mobilizations that took place in Brazil in June/July 2013, which contributed to question
the role of mass media in contemporary societies. Mídia NINJA attained this thanks to their live
coverage of what was happening on the streets during the riots, which made evident violence between
the military police and demonstrators, whereas mass media kept the usual programming ignoring what
was going on (Diniz 2013). These coverages challenged mass media and decreased their ‘reputation’ in
the face of viewers, who started to follow independent media like Mídia NINJA’s streamings, which had
estimated peaks of 150,000 viewers per day. Furthermore, two leaders of the network appeared in a
very popular national talk show program that interviews national and international renowned figures,
the Roda Viva. This interview gave a lot of public visibility to Mídia NINJA, Fora do Eixo and their
collaborative imaginary, because it was broadcasted in a mass public media and went viral in social
networks4. Therefore, this case gained far more popularity than the Argentinean ones, and directly
challenged, although for few days, the modus operandi of for-profit firms.

4. Among the more than 100 videos in their online YouTube channel, Mídia NINJA’s interview was the first most watched
video by February 27th, 2015 with 282,322 views.
The attacks from mass media are understandable, given the challenge the experience posed to their coverage. Nevertheless, criticism from the left-wing oriented press, which understands FDE and Mídia NINJA as a “new dynamics of capitalist accumulation” (Passa Palavra 2013a, translated by the author), seems at first more paradoxical given that NINJA argues it is on that side. A first explanation of this paradox has to do with a broader schism in the Brazilian left, between those in favor of a ‘solidarity economy’ project that tries to create a new possible world within the existing one, versus the classical Marxist approach of struggle and confrontation with firms and the state for the ‘emancipation’ of workers, who consider the solidarity economy and its practices as functional for ‘capital’ (Martini 2012; Ramos Wellen 2008).

A second explanation is that the left-wing critics have been using old concepts in new situations, which only generate caricatures of what this new activism might be all about (Bentes 2011). According to Bentes, a university professor in Rio de Janeiro who collaborates with Mídia NINJA: “The idea that in order to have ‘rights’, we must be ‘subjected’ in an employer-employee relationship through ‘wage’ is a frankly conservative idea. Instead, the cognitive precariat, the precarious youth from the economies of culture are reinventing labor relations” (translated by the author). This point is important because it once again connects with the discussion of the creative economy policy discourses. As highlighted in the introduction, the ‘autonomous’ creative workers tag hides precarious labour, dependent on unstable projects and social networks, which puts huge pressure on these types of workers. Bentes remarks that this ‘cognitive capitalism’ - a term used by Marxist intellectuals to refer to the knowledge economy - is the cause of such precarious jobs in cultural sectors in Brazil. From her point of view, FDE is not a capitalist firm exploiting these workers, but an organization that is appropriating the tools of other purely commercial firms, to create networks and spaces with other rules that transcend the limits of traditional employer-employee relations and give new opportunities to precarious workers (Bentes 2011). Accordingly, what the ‘old’ Marxists see as new relations of oppression and capitalist accumulation, those siding with FDE interpret them as new opportunities for organization given to precarious labor. It is worth pointing out this has been a similar point of conflict with Barricada TV and the state in Argentina. What matters in both cases is the emergence of new relations of production, mediated by ICT, which break the logic of previous models of news elaboration and remuneration. In a broader sense, these conflicts are not exclusive to these cases of media for social transformation, but they are already present in other sectors, where collaborative or share economy practices have expanded; for example, the opposition to Uber as a threat to the established taxi system or to Airbnb for challenging the regulated hotel sector (Schulz 2015) However, these two cases still operate within a for-profit logic, whereas FDE and Mídia NINJA employ the new opportunities that ICT give to generate other systems of exchange and remuneration.

In sum, the importance of this section is to shed light on the different types of violence that might damage or hinder nongovernmental and nonprofit firms from operating. The attacks that new organizations received are varied, including not only physical or economic violence through unfair competition, but also institutionalized legal ways of aggression or oppression, as with the existence of laws limiting their operation. Additionally, projects that want to advance a human-rights approach to communication might quickly find their perspective attacked and ridiculed by other discourses. The general point is that the asymmetries in resources among new media projects and incumbents, allow the latter to use different types of dispositives to limit the experiences that might challenge their positions. The in-

237
troduction of fair laws and regulations seem to reduce the most extreme cases of physical violence, but that does not mean that others shall not remain in terms of how the new legislations are interpreted and implemented. The empirical data shows that power imbalances do remain, and thus, NGOs and social movements need to keep on mobilizing and protesting to achieve their aims. For this reason, media for social transformation need the acquisition and mobilization of different types of resources against the varied types of violence they have to endure, and to sustain their operations points that I will further detail in the next sub section.

8.2 Resources

In chapter 2, I argued that the focus on power in media research aims to understand how media can influence ‘society’, that is to say, how much power media can have over audiences. This approach is useful in order to comprehend the role of mass media, but it is not enough to understand the lack of power that media for social transformation suffer. Indeed, policy makers and analysts often argue that the most important thing that these organizations have to acquire is financial resources (Carpentier, Lie, and Servaes 2008; Saeed 2009); thus, they would have enough power to sustain their projects. In this section I will partly accept this view, but I will also expand it by employing a resource-based view of power to explain how the acquisition and mobilization of resources by the different media cases allow them to sustain their operations and tackle the different types of violence that hamper their projects. My main argument is that although financial resources are relevant, they are not necessarily the only or the most important ones. Contrariwise, I shall show that the cases that have challenged a for-profit approach to media and culture the most were able to draw and mobilize a diversity of resources through noncommercial means. To show this, my analysis was partly inspired by the interdisciplinary perspective of Avelino & Rotmans (2009), which guided my data collection of different types of resources that media for social transformation have been using to face the conflicts they had. The collected qualitative and quantitative empirical data allowed me to construct nine key categories of resources that have been important, to varying degrees, in the four studied cases.

In Table 8.2, I show the results by building a case-ordered display for the categories (Miles and Huberman 1994), where I synthesize my subjective assessment of the level of intensity (Very much: 3 points, Moderate: 2 points, Few: 1 point, Nothing: 0 points) to which the four cases acquired and mobilized the nine types of resources. It is important to point out that these scales are relative to the data gathered of the four cases, but not strictly compared to mass media, which would have given a more complete picture of the resource asymmetries among mass media and media for social transformation. However, such an approach was out of the scope of this research. Additionally, the numbers reflect orders in terms of qualitative degrees, and not necessarily quantitative differences. Thus, the table has to be interpreted as a device to illustrate that some media for social transformation have been able to acquire and mobilize more resources than others, contradicting the claim that financial ones are the only ones that matter. Therefore, I argue it gives a more complex and fair picture about the variety of resources that media for social transformation can use, which I will detail resource by resource in the next sections.
Table 8.2: Resources acquired by the four media for social transformation. The classification was compiled by the author. The cells correspond to the amount of points that the author assigned to each case (Very much: 3, Moderate: 2, Few: 1, Nothing: 0).
8.2.1 Financial

People say money rules the world, and it certainly is one of the most relevant factors needed to set up any sort of project. However, this evident truth conceals the varieties of sources for currencies and how these can be obtained. In this section, I shall illustrate the different sources the four cases have used, but I did not quantitatively compare these numbers, because such data was not accessible in some cases. Instead, I shall describe the strategies of the organizations to acquire national currency from diverse sources, such as consumers, firms, NGO, other jobs and state. In particular, in Table 8.2 I divided my assessment between the acquisition of funds through sales (advertising and the offer of other services to viewers, such as cable), versus the acquisition of funds beyond advertising, together with the employment of complementary currencies and other systems of exchange to sustain their activities. Thus, the acquisition of national currency is relevant within the capitalist economic system of Argentina and Brazil, but not the only strategy, which is an important fact to take into account for new media for social transformation that want to initiate their projects with scarce funds.

As regards CPE, it has the advantage of being a large firm that offers electricity, access to the internet and other services to the inhabitants of the city of Santa Rosa. Therefore, one of their main sources of income is the sale of products and services, which allowed them to fund the needed investments to set up their TV channel and acquire expensive equipment. Out of the four studied cases, it is the only one that has been using a commercial model to sustain its enterprise. According to the coordinator of the channel, the reason for this was: “We assumed that a local channel would always be deficient, not only at its beginnings, but throughout its history. Therefore, our aim is to keep an insignificant deficit in relation to revenues from the cable service” (CPEtv coordinator, 11/09/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina). This assumption is related to a shared understanding by members of the co-operative and also by officials of public organisms that the advertising market in the province is not enough to cover the costs of local channels. One explanation mentioned by members of CPEtv was that the state channel already offers very cheap advertising spaces, which pushes all other channels to offer similarly cheap ones. A second explanation is that the advertising market is not large enough to cover the investments that CPEtv made. Furthermore, they think that businesses in the city and the province still do not consider advertising as an investment to increase the consumption of their products, and thus the prospects of growth of the advertising market were considered quite low. Irrespective of which one is the most accurate explanation, the point is that even accepting a commercial model based on advertising, the costs of this media experience cannot be completely covered. Consequently, the model based on advertising described in Section 2.1 was not enough for the co-operative, and they had to resort to charge a basic subscription of AR$ 85 (around US$ 15 at that time), even though this decision puts limits to who could access their services, contrary to their initial project of free access to information. In sum, CPEtv obtains the needed financial resources from offering the cable service to viewers, and made the initial investments with funds that the firm originally had from offering products and services to consumers (mostly local inhabitants, but also firms and other local organizations), not differing much from other commercial TV channels. Due to this, I assigned them 3 points in the category of national currency acquired through sales.

Barricada TV strongly opposes the commercialization of communications, thus they neither use advertising nor offer a cable service to gather funds. Accordingly, in terms of financial resources they are relatively poor in comparison with CPEtv. In contrast, their main financial resource are the members of the experience themselves, who fund their own time in the channel by having other jobs beyond this
media project. For this reason, I only assigned them 3 points in the category of acquiring national currency through other sources. However, they also compensate this lack with the support of IMPA and non-financial exchanges with other organizations and social movements; for example, they receive donations of computers and other equipment from NGOs, trade unions and other organizations, which are useful for the channel to operate. Additionally, Barricada TV exchanges audiovisual material with other alternative and popular media of the country and the region to broadcast without being trapped by the logic of buying content. These are examples of practices of the collaborative economy, which allow Barricada TV to operate without a for-profit aim and without state support (Vinelli 2011a).

Wall Kintun TV faces the toughest conditions to access financial resources, as one member of the case explained: “Advertising is difficult to get, because they want a good image definition and a programming grid” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). Although they have a bunch of sponsors, as Wall Kintun TV can offer none of the previous conditions, they are sharply limited. Therefore, the supposed main source of income for sustaining a channel provided by the new law is not within reach for this case, and as if this were not bad enough, the channel does not have a large number of viewers, which raises low interest from potential sponsors. Thus, in this case once again the advertising business model is not feasible for the financial sustainability of the channel. Despite the conflicts that Wall Kintun TV had with some public officials, the most important support they have obtained so far came from different organizations of the national government. For example, INCAA funded audiovisual training of Wall Kintun TV’s members (CineramaPlus+ 2013), and the AFSCA selected a project presented to a tender by Wall Kintun TV (AFSCA 2013b). Nevertheless, at the moment of fieldwork these transfers of resources had not been enough to allow the channel to broadcast continuously. Because of this dependence on state organizations, I assigned them 3 points for acquiring national currency from the state, and 1 point from sales.

In the case of Mídia NINJA, the experience is sustained by the broader activities of the cultural network FDE, which has been able to attract capital from diverse sources, such as public tenders or projects funded by firms, like Vale or Petrobras (Fora do Eixo 2013f, 2013e). Additionally, the network has received support from NGOs and international organizations; for example, the Dutch NGO Hivos (Hivos 2013). Due to this variety of sources, Mídia NINJA enjoys more access to financial resources than other ‘independent’ media in Brazil, and this might explain that even though the case is not commercial per se, it has been criticized of not being as ‘independent’ as they claim to be (Borges 2013). Nevertheless, the amount of resources that the network acquires is in no sense close to those that mass media firms have. Although I cannot prove this with numbers, which were unavailable, my empirical observations of their working conditions already offer a sharp contrast to the ones of mass media. For example, they lacked expensive hardware that any large commercial firm has, they neither had a studio nor helicopters nor sophisticated cameras nor a large number of journalists, etc., which all indicates that the criticism of Mídia NINJA about its acquisition of private and public funds are exaggerated. Taking into account these observations, I assigned Mídia NINJA 3 points for acquiring national currency from the state, and 2 with respect to sales and other sources, such as international NGOs.

Actually, this case departs from the rest in its use of complementary currencies, which as I explained in Section 6.4.1 is a system to make explicit barter within the network and associated firms or partners that want to be part of their circuits of exchange. This mechanism has been central in FDE to fund
the activities of members dedicated 100% to Mídia NINJA, whose living costs are covered from other financial sources that the network generates through competition in tenders or by offering cultural products and services. According to the members of FDE and Mídia NINJA, the advantage of this system is to dissipate the intermediation of national currencies, which would in many cases just stop the transaction from taking place. This is an important difference with respect to other cases, whose members either had monthly salaries for their job, as in CPEtv, or had to look for other employments to fund their media experience, like in Barricada TV. Although this looks like an ingenious solution, quite defended by the members of the network, it is also true that it is not without hurdles. The most evident is that if the circuits of exchange are reduced, it is inevitable that the number of objects to be traded is limited and thus they have to rely on national currencies and the official economy. Additionally, within this system FDE and Mídia NINJA members are not part of the legal economic system of Brazil, and thus become exempt from the respective legal protections. For these reasons, critics have been horrified by such systems of retribution, in contrast to the perceptions of those within the network, who consider the complementary currency as an essential tool for gaining independence and organizing their collaborative imaginary. From my perspective, this practice cannot be considered ‘slave work’ as the critics of the network claimed, because FDE members are volunteers. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that they are in a fragile situation given that still not everything they are constructing can be acquired from these alternative exchange networks. More generally, this system also shows the utopian features of FDE’s imaginary and the hurdles of putting into practice their desire to reinvent the economy. In general, this system shows the gray areas that are emerging with the expansion of new practices of collaboration, fostered by ICT, which are operating outside the established and regulated systems. Given these facts, I assigned 3 points to the community currency resource.

To conclude, media for social transformation like to say that they are ‘independent’, which means not being conditioned either by state funding or advertising by private firms, but a close observation of the operation of the four cases of media for social transformation clearly contradicts such statements. Among the four cases, only Barricada TV has not been using direct funds from firms or the state, but they are clearly dependent on the organizations that give other jobs to the members of the project. The rest have tried to use those resources to acquire others, and this is understandable, given that the initial poverty conditions hamper their media project in terms of financial resources from which they depart, as the case of Wall Kintun TV clearly shows. This contradiction between the nonprofit objective and the dependence on financial resources to operate is inevitable, given that the experiences are embedded in capitalist economic systems, putting boundaries to the claims of being noncommercial. Therefore, the cases might be non-profit but they are not so clearly separated from for profit organizations. However, the description of the different strategies shows that the cases have not only been limiting advertising and own funds, but rather employed creative strategies to overcome the financial scarcities; like FDE and its alternative currency system or Barricada TV and its acquisition of funds from others jobs. These cases give an important lesson to other experiences that might emerge in the future, because they show that there are strategies to overcome the financial shortages they face when starting their operations. Nonetheless, if the state is really interested in expanding and sustaining media for social transformation, it could implement transparent mechanisms for the distribution of resources for new media channels, such as public advertising or funds assigned by law, to surpass the initial investments and the fixed operational costs that limit these type of projects. Otherwise, I am afraid that the democratization of communications will remain a dream that will never come true for
most experiences, but only to those few that already have access to other sources of income, or to other types of resources to exchange them for.

8.2.2 Legal

As the Argentinean cases show, legislation can be both a source for enabling new media experiences, and one that constrains their practices. Focusing on their potential, the law in Argentina paved the way for the legalization of nongovernmental media, reversing the restrictive and repressive effects of the previous one. CPEtv, Barricada TV and Wall Kintun TV have all benefited from the official recognitions of their projects. In addition to having as an aim the democratization of media producers, the law is trying to tackle the high levels of media ownership concentration the country still suffers. Despite these pros, the experiences of the three Argentinean cases also show the hurdles in implementing a new law. One part of the difficulties arose from conflicts with the largest media firm, the Clarín group, whose economic interests would be damaged under the new law. Understandably, it did not only block the application of the law as long as it could to reduce the consequences on its operations, but it also delayed the co-operatives from obtaining a license to compete against them (COOPERAR 2013). Additionally, the state has not always been impartial in the implementation of the law; for example, although Barricada TV classified as an NGO, it took them five years to be officially recognized as a channel, despite the organization of several public mobilizations against such disregard from the AFSCA. In a similar vein, indigenous communities are still complaining that the state has not put in practice article n° 152 that promises public financial resources to their projects (Ley 26.522 2009). These examples suggest that the existence of a law does not directly imply its total fulfillment, given that either private firms or the state can use their resources to delay or undermine its implementation, unfortunately in demise of resource-scarce actors. Thus, the existence of a law is definitely a resource that media for social transformation can employ, but not without limits in countries where its enforcement is not direct. For these reasons, I classified the legal resource of the three Argentinean cases as ‘moderate’.

Despite the hurdles that the Argentinean law faces in its implementation, in comparison with the previous situation in the country, it has undoubtedly been a step forward in the process of media democratization. In contrast, in Brazil the context for nongovernmental and nonprofit media projects to operate is far more repressive, including physical violence besides the larger asymmetries in acquiring economic resources among projects. The only ‘advantage’ of the lack of regulations has been that media experiences could experiment more freely with models that depart from the ones that a law might legislate about. However, I argue that such a tradeoff is in the end negative, if one takes into account the stronger types of violence against media workers in Brazil, which in the worse cases have lost their lives due to the lack of adequate regulations. Therefore, in this case I gave no points to the legal resource.

In sum, all these cases operate in a particular context in Latin America, where in many countries left-wing oriented political parties in government are challenging - though to varying degrees - previous assumed structures of concentrated media ownership. However, the introduction of a legal framework to institutionalize media system changes are not easy to put into practice, because they involve political decisions and risk that not all political parties in power can afford nor advance in a democratic system. The case of Brazil is a clear example, because despite the rhetoric of Lula and then Dilma of their intention to democratize communications, so far none of the projects proposed by civil society organizations could move forward. This was possibly not a consequence of neglect, but of the presidential
assessment of a lack of ‘political power’ to put forward such a project against the political opposition and mainstream private conglomerates, which have quite some political influence through other more conservative parties. Despite these hurdles, I am afraid that without such changes in legal systems and the full implementation of democratization laws, the asymmetries generated in previous decades will remain, at the expense of the voices of marginalized groups in both countries. Likewise, the absence of concern of the creative economy policy discourses on these issues supports my claims that these discourses need to be seriously scrutinized, because their omissions just reinforce the contemporary unjust structures, neglecting the concerns of underrepresented and minority groups.

8.2.3 Human

The people who work in the media experiences are undoubtedly an essential resource, but each case has addressed their attraction in a different way, not only relying on wage relations. This is important to highlight, because the creative economy policy discourses implicitly assume that humans are only guided to participate in cultural and communicational activities based on financial rewards. However, I shall show in this section that this is a limited perspective to understand how the different cases engage people to join and the sort of retribution strategies that they might establish.

In August 2013, CPEtv had ten members who had received professional training from technical institutes or universities in disciplines related to media, journalism and design. Except for three who were already part of the co-operative before the founding of the channel, the rest of CPEtv’s members were selected after a public call. According to the coordinator of the channel, the objective of this selection was to attract young and trained professionals, preferably local, who could adapt themselves to the demands of such a new project in the city. The key point of contrast with the other cases is that CPE hired all the professionals following the collective agreements of journalism and press trade unions. This implies that the experience operates with employer-employee relations, and the assignment of wages as a remuneration for their labor. According to CPE’s leadership, this was important in the province of Santa Rosa, because the professionals of the audiovisual sector had previously been offered precarious jobs only; for this reason, the co-operative members claim that they are contributing to attract and retain young trained professionals. In sum, the engagement of personnel in this case was a mixture of economic incentives plus the desire to contribute to a new audiovisual enterprise, which matches the creative economy policy discourses rhetoric of increasing employment.

As regards Barricada TV, although some of their members had training in communication, learning by doing has been central in this case, because the interest to start the experience was not for-profit aims but the representation of political positions underreported in mass media. Consequently, activism is essentially what keeps on attracting students from universities or citizens to join and collaborate with the experience. In contrast to CPEtv, members of Barricada TV do not receive a salary as remuneration, because there are no profits to distribute. For critics, this is considered an exploitation of the working force, because its members do not receive a compensation for their labor. Conversely, from Barricada TV’s perspective this organizational structure is a way to break with the ties that advertising and publicity generate to commercial channels on what to cover. Therefore, those who join the experience are not looking for financial incentives, but the satisfaction of other desires. For this reason, the members of the channel have to fund their living costs with other jobs, together with the contribution of related organizations that allow them to operate. However, the negative side of this different structure of attraction of human resources implies that their production of content is less ‘industrialized’, and
infrequent in comparison to other adequately funded media; though, for the same reasons, I think it is more creative and far from standardized schemes.

At the time of fieldwork, Wall Kintun TV had a team of four members, three out of whom where members of the Buenoleo Mapuche community. Given the hurdles they faced, none of them was receiving a salary, and as in the previous case they were funding their participation in the project through other jobs or sources external to the project. In contrast to Barricada TV, the inexistence of salaries was not a choice, but a product of the poverty conditions in which they took charge of the project. Similarly to Barricada TV, their participation in the project was explained by the desire of giving a voice to the Mapuche, rather than a for-profit objective. Therefore, their main source of engaging members is the aim to defend and preserve what Mapuche consider their unique and opposing identity to the one of Westerners.

Finally, during fieldwork the case of Mídia NINJA had at least 14 active members distributed in different parts of the country that conformed the hardcore of the group. These are members of FDE who live in collective houses, applying collaborative principles of coexistence, and who continuously contribute content to Mídia NINJA. In some cases, the members had studied communication, but not all of them had finished their degrees before joining. Others had no previous experience with media, but in all cases they learned through the collaborative sharing practices of knowledge that FDE established. As explained in chapter 6, this puts this case apart from the rest, because they institutionalized their own way of training human resources, avoiding dependence on formal university training. Similarly to Barricada TV, the members of Mídia NINJA do not receive a salary for their work, but as a difference they all have their living costs covered, because they are funded with the products and services that FDE offers, transferred in part to the different collectives through their own complementary currencies. This curious system has a clear practical advantage for their media project, because Mídia NINJA's members can completely dedicate themselves to elaborating content. Conversely, it is problematic, because it makes evident that members of the network do not get a salary for their labor, and if they have to help their families, there is no way they can do so within this scheme, reason why some members left the organization. Nonetheless, the point is that those in the organization have not been attracted by financial incentives, but rather by the desire to experiment with the collective practices of FDE.

To conclude, the empirical data suggests that the attraction of human resources is not a linear process just based on the promise of profits. Although it is true that financial incentives are useful in cases where the experiences are organized based on a salary structure as in CPEtv, it is not a comprehensive explanation for all the cases, where other incentives have been in operation beyond purely financial ones. This is an important observation, because it opposes the standardization on how media should operate and attract human resources present in the creative economy policy discourses, making evident that such proposals neglect the diversity of grassroots practices.

8.2.4 Political

This category refers to the capacity of each media for social transformation and the broader organization where they operate to gather ‘political capital’, both at the local and national level, with the aim to legitimize their imaginaries and gather support for their projects. Based on the empirical data, I shall discuss the following three sources of political capital: the capacity to mobilize citizens in favor of their causes; the participation of the leadership of the media for social transformation in mass media
to gather support; the use of ‘historical debts’ to obtain other types of resources for their projects.

CPE offers a good example of the first strategy; for instance, the mobilizations of Santa Rosa’s citizens in 2003 and in 2011 to claim for a change in the audiovisual media law and for its full implementation respectively. These examples that I detailed in chapter 5 implied a political positioning in favor of a human rights approach to communications over the commercial one defended by private firms, and became a symbolic act of the co-operative struggle for the new law, making evident the citizens’ support they had. In this particular case, the backing might be related to the strong connections CPE has been cultivating in Santa Rosa for years, not only due to the offered services, but also thanks to their activities in supporting NGOs, schools, and organizing local events. In a similar vein, Barricada TV together with other alternative media in Argentina have been mobilizing citizens and journalists to complain against the state and the delays in the implementation of the new audiovisual communication services law. However, the mobilizations have not been massive; thus, I assigned them 2 points. As regards Wall Kintun TV, I did not detect the mobilization of citizens in favor of the project previous or during fieldwork, so I did not assign them points. Contrarily, since 2011 Mídia NINJA and FDE have stimulated social mobilizations in Brazil and raised political issues to their viewers through their coverages; for example, they diffused content about the importance of voting a civil framework for the internet in the country, and also disseminated the voting for a law institutionalizing the Cultura Viva program. Both these mobilizations were relevant for the growth of their collaborative economy practices. I estimate that the national reach of their mobilizations have been larger than those of the Argentinean cases, possibly due to their network structure of operation. Accordingly, I assigned them 3 points in this dimension. In sum, the common element in these examples is the raise of a concern and the mobilization of citizens and netizens for their support.

The second strategy refers to the participation of the leadership of these cases in national disputes in mass media. Although Mídia NINJA and FDE claim to be horizontal, only few members have appeared frequently in several mass media coverages; for example; the most named one has been the founder of the network, Pablo Capilé, who was interviewed by journalists of several media to narrate their story, though not necessarily portrayed in a positive way. This case had far more appearances of their leaders in mass media programs; thus, I assigned them 3 points in this resource. However, the participation has been ambivalent; on the one hand, it helped to disseminate knowledge about the network and its collaborative practices. On the other hand, the negative portrayal of its leaders and other members seems to have damaged the reputation of the project. Similarly, the cases of CPEtv and Barricada TV both had leaders that appeared in mass media coverages. As regards the co-operative, during the struggle against private firms and the acquisition of their license its president was visible mostly in local media, and to a lesser extent in national media; for example, he was interviewed by a famous journalist that sides with the government position of media democratization (Morales 2012). Similarly, Natalia Vinelli, a member of Barricada TV, has been present in different channels exposing the practices of alternative media, mainly by defending the law and disseminating their imaginary in the country (Calicchio and Vinelli 2012; Suárez, Mariano 2014). In comparison with the Brazilian case, the participation of these two leaders in mass media was reduced, perhaps because they were not involved directly in a controversy of national scale as Mídia NINJA was in Brazil during 2013. Therefore, I assigned them 2 points. Furthermore, this shows that despite the collective and collaborative ideals and practices that these cases defend, the role of leaders in these processes to attract resources cannot be neglected. With respect to Wall Kintun TV, the leaders of the last management appeared
only during the denouncement of the problems that they had with the state, but then hardly anymore. Thus, I assigned them 1 point.

A final strategy used in the political arena by the Argentinean cases has been the rhetorical device of demanding a compensation for historical debts. The most evident example of this strategy is Wall Kintun TV, as the next quote illustrates: “The state knows the poverty and misery levels into which they have plunged indigenous communities. As a consequence of this situation, it is very difficult for us to buy equipment or cameras, and maintain a salary” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). This statement shows how the Mapuche link the historical attacks of the state against their livelihoods as a cause of their poverty, which from their perspective justifies - somehow - the need of repayments from the state. This situation has been ignored historically, but since the return to democracy representatives of this and other indigenous communities claim that the state has to payback for the committed violence against them, and the contradictory support to this media seems to go in such direction. A similar argument has been used by co-operatives and alternative channels during the mobilizations for a new media law, but in these cases arguing the need to undo the consequences of the institutions set up by the last military dictatorship. In both cases, these strategies to mobilize resources have found certain echoes due to a political context in which human rights are central to the governmental agenda, together with the undoing of the consequences of the state terrorism of the 1970s. However, this strategy has been stronger in Wall Kintun TV and CPEtv than in Barricada TV. Therefore, I assigned 3 points to the former, and 1 to the latter. In the case of Mídia NINJA, I did not detect such strategy.

In brief, these three strategies remark the importance of the political dimension as a resource of media for social transformation to mobilize in exchange for others. I argue that this dimension is another central aspect overlooked by the creative economy policy discourses, which do not question the status quo at all. This bias might emerge from the origin of the discourse, both in the UK and at UNCTAD, which given its claims to universality, depoliticize the intervention they propose, so that it can be transferred with less resistance to other contexts. Nevertheless, I claim that this approach is highly problematic, because, for example, these discourses could have easily operated under the dictatorship scenario of the 1970s, irrespective of the violation of human rights at the time, including the disrespect of the right to information. Contrariwise, this section underscores the importance of the political, and related strategies of media for social transformation to influence national discussions, apart from acquiring financial and other resources for their operation.

### 8.2.5 Relational: Networks

The four cases differ in the set of alliances or networks that they have been able to construct with different types of actors, with whom they exchange resources (not always intermediated by money). The aim of this section is to unveil the intensity and diversity of ties that each case has established, which help to explain the different types of resources that the cases have been able to acquire. I shall argue that the more links the cases have, the more types of other resources they can acquire. This in part has points in common with the concept of 'social capital' (Bourdieu 1986; Lin 1999), which suggests that the types of links that actors form allow them to exchange and obtain resources that they do not directly have. In Figure 8.1, I show my assessment of the intensity and types of the main alliances that each case had, which was based on qualitative information acquired from interviews and material elaborated by the cases collected during fieldwork; for example, their videos and webpages.
These actors were classified into ten categories\(^5\), and the ‘intensity’ represents the relative ‘strength’ of the connection.

It is worth pointing out that these graphics suffer two shortcomings. One of them is that they do not take into account the change in time of the networks. The second one is that they include my personal assessment of the strength of the links, which I added based on my posterior knowledge of the importance of each type of link. For instance, despite Wall Kintun TV had sharp conflicts with the government, it has still been central for their advancement of the project. Thus, I gave the Government category 3 points. The ideal way to solve this issue would have been to acquire data about the interviewees’ own assessment of the intensity of the links, and not just the links. However, I could not gather this information systematically in practice, due to the difficulties or denial of interviewees to provide such direct sensitive data, maybe out of fear of revealing a whole picture of their network. Accordingly, I tried to compensate this lack with the employment of secondary information, which gives a better, though still approximate, picture of the relational networks of each case than if I had just relied on the collected data from interviews.

In CPEtv's spider diagram, the two most recurrent types of alliances have been with co-operatives and NGOs. The former refers to alliances with national and provincial networks, such as TRAMA (the network of co-operatives that aims to create audiovisual content nationally), and an emerging network that CPEtv is leading of audiovisual media co-operatives in the province. Besides, it includes the links that CPE previously had with other co-operatives in the country, such as COLSECOR, which allowed CPE to obtain audiovisual signals for its cable service. These have been key links to collectively strive for a new law and to advance in content production, which is reasonable taking into account the 6th principle of co-operativism: co-operation among co-operatives. As regards NGOs, these links were pre-existing connections that CPE had before setting up their TV channel, for example, with the Chadileuvú foundation, schools, and ten organizations that receive financial donations from CPE (CPEtv 2011). Besides, the co-operative has contacts with other NGOs beyond the city of Santa Rosa that are covered in their programs. In all these cases, these connections paved the way for the further elaboration of content about civil society actors. Equally important have been the links with politicians (I refer to those in politics, but not in government), although these interactions have varied considerably in time and cannot be captured in the static diagram; for instance, they passed from opposition to their project in 2003 to a promotion of their channel six years later. Yet, CPE has interactions with politicians from the city and the province due to different issues concerning their enterprise. Additionally, they received support from politicians of the national government to advance with their communications project. Indeed, the president, Cristina Kirchner, inaugurated the channel through video conference, and they also received a recognition from the senate for their successful and pioneering initiative (DERF 2012). Moreover, CPEtv has close connections with local academics of the University of La Pampa, which are ties that are part of previous contacts and possibly generated by members of CPE that are university professors. With respect to media, the contact or interaction has been reduced to those in the city of Santa Rosa and others related to co-operatives; for example, the local newspaper La Arena.

---

5. The first category, Academics, includes university professors. The second category, Government, refers to policy makers and politicians in the national administration. The third category, Politicians, includes the rest of politicians not part of the national government. The fourth category, Mass media, includes the appearance of those cases in either private or public mass media firms. The fifth category, Worker-owned firms, includes co-operatives and factories recovered by its workers; in other words, actors of the so-called social and solidarity economy. The sixth category, Indigenous communities, comprehends links with different types of organizations of indigenous people. The seventh category covers Social movements. The eighth category includes the links with other media for social transformation. The ninth category estimates the links with firms. Finally, the tenth category considers the relations with NGOs.
Figure 8.1: Spider diagrams of main types of links that each case has with ten different types of actors. The numbers correspond to the assessment of the researcher of the intensity of the links with each type of actor (strong: 3, medium: 2, weak: 1, no connection: 0). Compiled by the author.
contact with firms beyond co-operatives is also important in this case, since CPEtv depends on suppliers to acquire electronic equipment and software for their channel. What is missing in this network is a connection with more radical, alternative channels, indigenous communities and more generally, organized social movements not part of NGOs. Therefore, the pattern of relations shows there are scarce connections with other media for social transformation not part of the co-operative movement. As I highlighted in previous chapters, this shows the difference among the imaginaries of these media, which although they might share an opposition to commercially oriented practices, their differences seem to rule out co-operation among them.

Barricada TV's spider diagram offers a different set of connections with respect to the previous case. First, it has links with left-wing political parties, whose representatives frequently appear in their broadcasting; for example, members of the Workers’ Party and trade unions. Second, Barricada TV has ties with academics who hold different and non-mainstream perspectives on themes covered in mass media, similarly with the other dimensions, these have Marxist or communist perspectives. Third, as part of a network of alternative media, Barricada TV has links with similar experiences across the country (but not co-operative media), with whom they exchange material for broadcasting, besides mobilizing for their interests. Fourth, in their transmissions they frequently interview representatives of diverse social and political movements from the country and neighboring ones; for example, movements in favor of drug legalization, students’ movements, and ex and current members of left-wing social movements. Additionally, the channel reports about recovered factories, which are following similar models to the one IMPA initiated. The case had few appearances in mass media, as mentioned before, it was attacked by private mass media, but was also positively portrayed in public ones that highlighted the importance of alternative media after a publication of a book about them by one of its members (Gomes Diez 2015; Suárez, Mariano 2014). The relation with government organizations has been strenuous and dynamic, but in general confrontational as explained at the beginning of the chapter. In sum, this structure of connections shows a clear link to organizations and movements with a left-wing perspective and concerns of social transformation. In contrast to CPEtv, they lack contacts with foundations. A final point to remark is that despite the similarities with media co-operatives, their different tactics of social change - more connected with left-wing standpoints - might explain why there have been scarce or almost no ties between them.

The main difference to remark of Wall Kintun TV’s spider diagram is the lack of diversity in their connections. The two most important ones have been, first, the support of the Mapuche and other indigenous communities in the country that have been mobilizing for a new media law, and the further backing after the Buenoleo community recovered the channel from the first management. Second, the encouragement from different governmental organizations to put forward the experience, although this relation had its peaks and valleys as previously explained. Additionally, Wall Kintun TV received coverage in varied mass media, with framings both in favor and against the government’s new audiovisual media law project. The former remarked the nature of the experience as an example of the democratization process initiated by the new audiovisual communication services law, whereas the latter challenged such view, underscoring the disastrous conditions in which the case was left by public officials. Furthermore, Wall Kintun TV received the support of a couple of firms, such as the local cable operators who borrowed equipment and broadcast their signal, and a local bus that sponsors the experience. The channel also had some incipient connections with researchers studying communications of indigenous communities. In comparison with the other three cases, this experience had the lowest
number and diversity of connections, although the existing ones still allowed them to acquire resources without paying for them. This scarcity of relations points to another of the weaknesses of the channel; conversely, the more diversified the structure, the easier it would be to exchange different types of resources. This underscores a general problem that new media for social transformation have to address, which is out of the scope of the new law, but in my opinion a strategy of network building that each organization needs to pursue, so as to counterbalance their lack of financial resources.

In comparison with the other three cases, the spider diagram of FDE and Mídia NINJA shows it has the strongest and most diverse types of links. First, this includes different types of social movements covered in their streamings. Second, they receive support from different Brazilian academics who side with the collaborative imaginary they are disseminating. Third, they have connections with politicians; for instance, they have been close to the ex-minister of culture and to senators. Furthermore, according to Pablo Capilé, the founder of FDE, members of the network have been elected as politicians in some regions of Brazil (Soares 2014). Additionally, Mídia NINJA has been establishing connections with other national and international alternative media. Perhaps one of the most relevant has been the creation of a project of media collectives from Latin American, which diffuses regional news (Facción 2014). As regards links with firms, this category also covers those enterprises providing software and hardware, and indirectly those with whom FDE interacts to acquire funds or exchange other products and services. Moreover, there are connections with international NGOs and organizations sharing similar objectives or from whom they receive funding. With respect to mass media, the organization had ambivalent links, one the one hand, they received a lot of coverage during June and July 2013 that in most of the cases attacked their project. On the other hand, those same events allowed the further national and international diffusion of their experience, thus reaching broader audiences. In contrast with the previous three spider diagrams, this one misses links with co-operatives and other types of worker-owned firms beyond cultural collectives, which is paradoxical given that they share a similar aim in terms of the imaginary to challenge a for-profit only orientation in the economy. Once again, this suggests that the alternative projects do not establish links among them so easily, maybe due to tactical differences in terms of reaching their imaginaries. But it is also true that the co-operatives have been less active in Brazil in the media and cultural sector, in comparison with those of Argentina. On the whole, I hypothesize that the diversity of connections present in this case derives from the network structure of FDE in which Mídia NINJA is embedded. This is a resource in itself, because each FDE house and collective has its set of alliances and networks, that when summed all together in common projects add a diversity of partners that would not be possible to achieve for a media case operating in a restricted geographic place. The negative side of this dependence on FDE was that Mídia NINJA was defamed based on the tensions and conflicts that the network caused in the past.

In sum, these spider diagrams show the different structures of types of connections that each case had at the time of data collection, which not only represent part of their imaginary by showing the actors involved, but that are also illustrative to comprehend how they obtained resources beyond just financial ones. Despite their shortcomings, the spider diagrams coincide with the order of Table 8.2. In other words, the cases with more relations are the ones that acquired and mobilized more different types of resources. Although a strict proof of this would need a detail reconstruction of the networks and the flow of resources among its nodes, which was out of the scope of this research, the correlation seems reasonable. Indeed, Mídia NINJA, the case that has been structured as a network, has been the one with a major diversity of resources. Therefore, these results suggest that the cultivation of a
diverse and intense network of contacts is a strategy for media for social transformation to surpass their lack of financial resources, and more broadly, to oppose the practices of the creative economy policy discourses.

8.2.6 Technological and Infrastructural

In Table 8.2, I synthesize the results from chapter 6, which analyze the role of technology and infrastructure in each of the media cases. Their acquisition has been relevant for the cases to operate, although not without putting certain constraints on their practices. In effect, all cases depended on foreign specialized technological firms that produce the media technologies they employ (cameras, cell-phones, notebooks, etc.). As these companies operate under for-profit principles, media for social transformation must acquire the needed financial resources to buy the technologies or find non-financial exchanges with intermediaries. As regards the former, the most illustrative case of the former is CPEtv, which bought high-tech equipment thanks to the income the co-operative generates. Wall Kintun TV is a good example of the latter, because it lacks funds, but was able to acquire some – though not all – of the needed technologies and equipment from donations made by other organizations or the state. Apart from the strategies to access technologies, in Table 8.2 I stress the capacity that specific cases had to reinterpret the use of their available ones, as the case of Barricada TV and Mídia NINJA best illustrate. Following the broad definition of Avelino & Rotmans (2009), this can also be considered as a sort of ‘mental’ resource, because it allowed these cases to offset their financial limits to acquire the latest media technologies that commercial channels use. Instead, such approach led them to use available ones in new ways, disregarding accepted ‘quality patterns’ that would have excluded such new audiovisual production practices under the criteria of not being ‘good’ enough.

The importance of infrastructure as a resource was relative to the technological configuration of each media. In the three Argentinean cases it played an important role, because the channels adopted the model of having a physical space from where to broadcast. On the one hand, two cases acquired this resource from the mother institution that founded the media experience, such as CPE or IMPA, which set aside the needed physical space to build the studios and editing rooms. On the other hand, the resource was obtained through alliances or donations from the state and private firms, such as Wall Kintun TV that got some - but not all - of the needed resources from the state. Conversely, Mídia NINJA did not have a dependence on a fixed physical space to operate, which is a potential experience to emulate by other projects of communication for social change facing similar hurdles. But once again, this requires a change in perceptions on what is of ‘good quality’ and the will to experiment with new technologies of content production and distribution. To conclude, in this case the ranking of Table 8.2 might be misleading, because although CPEtv is the one with more infrastructural resources, this does not mean they employ the best strategy to follow. It might be if the studio based TV channel model is respected, but definitely not if it is left aside.
8.2.7 Knowledge

In this section, I will divide the knowledge resource in two, first, I shall consider the different strategies that media for social transformation have employed to acquire the needed knowledge for audiovisual production. Second, I will examine the institutionalization strategies that two of the cases have employed, which allowed them to replicate their practices and expand their networks.

8.2.7.1 Knowledge of Audiovisual Production

Technologies and infrastructure would be worthless without the acquisition of specific knowledge for audiovisual production, such as editing, reporting and broadcasting. In this sense, each case had different sources and strategies to gather and cultivate such indispensable knowledge. In this section I will describe different approaches and I finally discuss how some of the cases departed from the professional approach advanced by the creative economy policy discourses.

In the case of CPEtv, the acquisition of knowledge was indirectly from formal channels and mediated by the use of their financial resources; for example, the organization hired media professionals with previous training in journalism and audiovisual technical skills offered by main university centers and technical institutes. Additionally, the co-operative hired experienced journalists of the province to train the young new journalists for the channel so as to improve their performance. Furthermore, the needed technical knowledge to handle their advanced hardware was transferred by suppliers and acquired also in the practice and use of the equipment by CPEtv’s technicians. Given that these knowledge sources do not depart much from the training of typical commercial channels, it is not a surprise that their format looks so similar to mass media. At the same time, this case has the least to say with respect to strategies to acquire knowledge opposing the ones of commercial media channels.

Similarly to CPEtv, formal training was part of Barricada TV’s process of knowledge acquisition, because part of its members completed university studies in communications. Conversely, the members of the organization highlighted the significance of a workshop with a group of documentarian activists, which allowed them to acquire specific knowledge more tuned to their interest of covering social conflicts (Cardillo 2011). Furthermore, due to the scarcity of formal training in alternative media at universities, much of the knowledge was acquired through ‘learning by doing’, in other words, through the practice of filming with the tools they had, without fearing the ‘quality schemes’ that they might have crossed in the process. In conclusion, in this case money was not the main intermediary to acquire the needed technical knowledge, but rather ties with groups close to their imaginary who shared their practical knowledge, together with the learning by doing processes that the practice of filming unleashed.

In contrast with the previous two cases, after the public denouncement Wall Kintun TV faced the toughest conditions, because no one from the new team had neither professional nor amateur audiovisual and technical training. Therefore, they lacked the essential knowledge for elaborating content, which would have been quite hard for them to acquire without governmental support. During fieldwork the case was going through a training program organized by INCAA, the national institute of audiovisual arts of Argentina, to transfer the needed audiovisual skills, which was unleashed by the state political need to correct the initial ‘error’ in managing Wall Kintun TV’s channel. This shows that the acquisition of skills in this case is not a product of the Mapuches’ financial wealth, but on the political balance of exchanges between the channel and the government. In more general terms, such
hurdle that this and other indigenous organizations face connects with the historical social deprivation conditions that they have been suffering, which in this case is expressed in the lack of access to the needed knowledge sources. Accordingly, the indigenous communities might have a right to their own media channel, but they lack the means to put it into practice.

In the case of Mídia NINJA the previous types of knowledge sources are also present: formal trained members and learning by doing. Indeed, members of the initiative have finished or studied communication and careers related to audiovisual production. However, the most relevant in this case has been learning by doing. One example is the case of one of the founders of the experience, the reporter Bruno Torturra, who was a columnist and editor of the Brazilian magazine Trip that transferred part of his skills to the younger members of Mídia NINJA during the coverages of the 2013 riots. Furthermore, the media collective is continuously experimenting and learning from new ICT to disseminate their content; for example, streaming platforms and different types of social networks. As the use of these tools is not as stabilized as the aesthetic patterns of traditional TV channels, their experiments in mixing technologies and aesthetics play a central role, which the members of Mídia NINJA adopt or reject depending on the reply from viewers. For this reason, the media initiative, and FDE in general, describe their collective as the “empire of the empirical” (Mídia NINJA member I, 11/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil).

Apart from the previous points, it is worth underscoring an important aspect of Mídia NINJA’s imaginary that I remarked in chapter 5: “everyone can become a NINJA” (Caperuto 2013, translated by the author), which is in sharp contrast with the professional training of journalists employed by commercially oriented firms. In part, this is related to the approach of the FDE University that makes knowledge open to everyone with an interdisciplinary training. As one member of Mídia NINJA remarks:

“In Fora do Eixo we share the view that everyone needs to learn a bit of everything. Today is communication, but if someone asks to learn something related to sustainability, I can teach, and if I cannot, then I will go to learn. Because actually the goal is not to train specialized staff, on the contrary, it is training for life. For us the least important is the product, what matters is the process of learning” (Mídia NINJA member II, 18/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Brasília, Brazil).

This statement opposes the creative economy perspective, which only aims to create ‘creative’ and ‘talented’ specialists to elaborate products for markets. Contrariwise, they have the ideal of opening and distributing their knowledge so that everyone can contribute to their experience. To achieve such ideal, the organization has elaborated and disseminated booklets and banners that contain the instructions to copy their practices; for instance, Figure 8.2 shows one distributed through social networks and web sites during the riots of 2013 to diffuse how citizens could use their smartphones to make live transmissions of events. Moreover, Mídia NINJA organizes workshops to disseminate their knowledge (Mídia NINJA member II, 18/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Brasília, Brazil), which in some cases are transmitted online. From my point of view, these strategies of knowledge dissemination resemble those of the open software movement, in the sense that the knowledge is accessible to everyone who is interested, who can later contribute to the experience. This contrasts with the previous cases, and is one of the organizational differences that might explain why they were more efficient in the replication of their practices.

To conclude, this section illustrates two opposite set of strategies for knowledge acquisition. On the
Transmission Booklet via Twitcasting

1) Download the TwitCasting application on your iPhone (app store) or android (playstore).

2) Log on to your Twitter account.

3) Go to configurations and enable the option “allow background live”, to be able to use other cell phone functions without interrupting the transmission.

4) Press “go live” and transmit live.

5) Then a window will open to tweet a message. Write and send.

6) There is a balloon in the lower left image, which allows the insertion of a caption. Use it for tags.

7) To mute the sound, press mute.

8) To stop the transmission, save the video through the option that appears on the screen.

9) Taking a laptop in a backpack connected to the cell phone increases the battery’s life.

10) Postpay plans have a higher data upload rate in 3G networks. The minimum indicated is 0.3 Kbps (use the speedtest application to test your internet).

Send an email to midianinja@gmail.com informing us of a transmission to disseminate its link.

Figure 8.2: Banner prepared by Mídia NINJA that explains how to stream videos. It was distributed during 2013 through online social networks to stimulate new collaborators of Mídia NINJA. Source: Mídia NINJA and translated by the author.
one hand, those that follow a professional training approach that absorbs knowledge acquired from universities and other technical centers. This is a feasible strategy for the cases with enough financial resources to attract trained human resources, which is a strategy that might contribute to elaborate content ‘competitive’ in comparison with the ‘quality schemes’ that commercial media employ. But, although the content might be alternative, the restrictions of following the accepted ‘quality schemes’ might blur the supposed opposition among them and media for social transformation. On the other hand, Mídia NINJA best illustrates a second strategy that aims to generate specific nonprofessional knowledge of audiovisual production, through its own network of knowledge generation and training. This approach tries to break with the dependence on the established training institutes that repeat the ‘quality schemes’ most valued by commercial firms. For this reason, I argue that it is the best strategy for those cases that actually want to depart from commercial firms. Otherwise, they might end like co-operatives, not differing much from whom they criticize.

8.2.7.2 Institutions for Knowledge Replication

In this section, I shall highlight the institutions for knowledge replication that two (CPETv and Mídia NINJA) out of the four cases have put into practice. I shall employ concepts from Berger & Luckmann to understand the institutionalization process. However, I recognize that my analysis is more descriptive and aimed to identify the resource based on the local perspective of interviewees, rather than on proving some sort of causal relation as it is common in organization studies. In particular, I remind the reader of the concept of institutionalization introduced by Berger & Luckmann (1966), which according to the authors is composed of three processes: habitualization, objectivation and sedimentation. The first concept refers to how actors establish patterned problem-solving behaviors. The second one alludes to how the historical repetition of the habitualized action might become as ‘objective’ for observers or outsiders to the ones who initiated the practice. Finally, the third concept covers the process in which the objectified practices become transmitted to new generations or new members. I shall argue that these concepts are useful to understand how practices are further disseminated beyond their context of origin, providing an important insight on how media for social transformation can proceed to scale up their networks to challenge commercial ones by replicating their stock of knowledge.

The most successful case to replicate the experience was Mídia NINJA, which initially began as an experiment of a journalist in São Paulo with streaming, and after FDE members perceived a good reply from viewers, they quickly started to copy the original practice of operation in other collectives. How did Mídia NINJA do this? I shall argue that this original action became habitualized and objectified thanks to three factors: the practices of knowledge dissemination and replication across the FDE network, the simplicity of the model and the particular imaginary of this case.

As regards the dissemination of knowledge within the cultural network, it is coordinated and organized by the front of FDE called University. It is worth pointing out that the concept of ‘university’ that they employ is completely different from the usual term, where one or more buildings are spaces for professors to transmit their knowledge to students. Contrariwise, FDE shares the critics of Freire (1987) to such an education model, where the person who ‘knows’ transfers the knowledge in a top-down, hierarchical way to students, with few spaces for interaction. In counter position to this ‘banking’ model of education, where students just unreflectively ‘save’ information, Freire advocated a dialogical, libertarian approach, where all learned together and where hierarchies would be abolished so that knowledge

6. For example, see (Tolbert and Zucker 1996).
flows would be bi-directional (Freire 1987). Inspired by these insights, all FDE houses are part of the campus of the university, but also many of the online spaces of interaction, such as chats, groups and video conferences. These are spaces for what they call life experiences, which cover different topics such as communication, free software, network politics, among others. They do not have a fixed curricula either, but a dynamic and personalized one, because people have different interests and want to learn about specific topics. Besides, they reject the idea of ‘professor’ as they rejected the one of illuminated artist. Thus, everyone who is part of the network can teach as a professor of the university, because they understand that anyone has some knowledge that can be shared and replicated. This includes the leadership of the movement, outside collaborators and many young members who are no older than 23 who are also considered to be teachers. This clearly departs from the stereotype of an old, gray haired white skinned professor. Instead, in their university men and women of different ages, sexual orientations, skin colors, religion, etc., contribute to replication of knowledge and the preservation of the collective memory of FDE and its projects.

This conceptualization of the university leads to three types of practices for knowledge habitualization and objectivation: training through the internet; immersions and columns. As regards the former, a member of the network explains how it works:

“We learn with other collectives, because we are always in contact with each other with everything we try to do. For instance, if we ask ‘how do we set up our complementary currency?’, there are booklets we can download, read and then we might even suggest modifications. It works like a free software technology. It is as if we had several free software technologies in the cloud, we put them there and we use them elsewhere. But of course, we adapt them according to each context. The feedback helps to update such software, and all the collectives that are part of the network have access to that” (Fora do Eixo member III, 28/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in João Pessoa, Brazil).

Therefore, members of FDE externalize and materialize their specific knowledge through ICT. With respect to imersões (immersions), they refer to intensive training sessions that take place usually in one of FDE houses (Fora do Eixo 2013c). In essence, FDE brings trainees, either from the network or from outside, to live for a specific period of time (from a few days to months) in one of the houses to acquire specific knowledge; thus, replicating it to new members or preexisting ones who did not have it. The key aspect that differentiates these trainings from a workshop or other more conventional knowledge diffusion practices in firms or universities, is that they give space for learning by doing and living together with the person or group of people who have the knowledge to disseminate, which according to the members of FDE allows a rapid replication of knowledge. For example, the different collectives of a region go to one of the main FDE houses to receive training on diverse topics, including media, as it happened in São Paulo in January 2014 (Fora do Eixo 2014a). This suggests that learning is considered to be an alive process, collective, with a direct interaction among all members part of the experience, breaking the hierarchies usually found in teacher-student environments and not limited to the income that interested students might have. These practices have been used to diffuse knowledge on how a collective house works, how festivals need to be organized, or what matters for this research, how to produce material for Mídia NINJA.

The third practice of knowledge dissemination that FDE employs is called colunas (columns), which are trips that members of the network plan and execute to nearby cities and towns in Brazil or foreign countries (Fora do Eixo 2013c). The aim is also to externalize the specific collaborative knowledge
they have acquired. For example, a member of Mídia NINJA traveled to the FDE collective house in
the city of Amapá, to share his knowledge about collaborative media production. As regards foreign
countries, members of FDE and Mídia NINJA have disseminated their imaginary and practices in an
event of cultural networks that took place in 2013 in the city of Córdoba, Argentina (CBA24n movil
2013). During that event, which I attended, they organized workshops to explain their complementary
currencies and their streaming practices, which were of interest to many of the attendees of the event,
who were mostly part of cultural and media collectives of the country.

In sum, FDE's creation of their own university tackles the problem that the Argentinean cases had
of not being able to create and reproduce knowledge suitable for their practices. Contrarily, the FDE
University is a source that externalizes and objectifies knowledge produced by different members of the
network, giving space for others to internalize such practices. In this way, they have considerably re-
duced the dependence of knowledge training emanating from mainstream universities that go against
their collaborative logic. It is worth pointing out that this institution can be considered a dispositive
to advance the network's imaginary, and has played an important role in replicating the practices of
Mídia NINJA.

The second factor that facilitates the replication of Mídia NINJA practices is the simplicity of their
model. After all, Mídia NINJA and citizens just need smartphones and an access to online social
networks to record videos, elements which have become quite accessible for many Brazilians, although
still not for all. Furthermore, the knowledge to use both of them to stream and distribute content has
been externalized and objectified by Mídia NINJA through infographics as the one showed in Figure
8.2. This set up clearly contrasts with channels that follow the commercial media model, like CPEtv,
which require sophisticated knowledge to manage the high tech equipment, which is more difficult to
replicate easily.

Despite the relevance of these means for the dissemination of practices, their replication by other
people would not be possible without an extra element, the attraction that FDE's and Mídia NINJA's
imaginary generates in parts of the Brazilian youth. I shall argue that the subject position that their
imaginary offers is conducive to the internalization of interested people to join the collaborative prac-
tices they offer. Although critics to the network have accused them of taking advantage of precarious
workers in the creative sectors, such interpretations from outsiders contrast with the perceptions that
members of the network have. For example, one member says:

“If you want to work with culture, the available horizon is to become a producer, that is to
say, to start a business. But if you do not have capital to invest, you are just limited! On the
contrary, within Fora do Eixo’s network you have a field where you can create what you think
and want. Outside you cannot, you end up just dreaming, and you are castrated all time”
(Universidade Fora do Eixo member, 07/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author
in São Paulo, Brazil).

This sense of broader opportunities within the network was shared by several of the interviewees.
Additionally, another typical statement is:

“What really catches the attention is what we are now calling the state of permanent
utopia. This is the possibility of building other ways of doing things, which are out of the
box of what was thought to be the only way of being and doing things, but that in fact was
not. Instead, we are inventing and experimenting with other ways of living, other ways of
communicating, other forms of organizing, other ways of working, and this attracts many people" (Fora do Eixo member III, 28/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in João Pessoa, Brazil).

These statements point to the dissatisfaction with the professional pathways offered by a commercial approach to culture and communication, which generates frustration among parts of the Brazilian youth. Conversely, FDE and Mídia NINJA in the cultural and media sector claim to be offering spaces for experimentation and of collaborative organization for cultural production. Therefore, although it is true that the members of the network do not receive a salary, from their perspective the incentives are on the different lifestyles they are experimenting with, which suggests it is a stimulus for interested members to join and internalize their practices.

In short, the importance of the three previous factors, is that once the knowledge to stream through cell phones was typified and externalized, its propagation across FDE's network through its university and followers of their collaborative imaginary was easy. Consequently, the pioneering practice that began in São Paulo, was quickly objectified and replicated in other cities of Brazil, such as Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, João Pessoa, among others, and even copied by Brazilians abroad, like in Berlin (NINJA Berlim 2015). It is important to realize that this would not have taken place so fast, unless the previous network and the practices of knowledge sharing of FDE had been established.

In the case of CPEtv, three factors contributed to their strategy of institutionalizing their audiovisual experience: the co-operative principles, a historical path of extending their practices within the province of La Pampa, and practices of replication within the co-operative.

First, the co-operative principles of co-operation among co-operatives has been central in the construction of networks between CPEtv and organizations beyond the province, which helps to establish means for the objectivation of practices. For instance, CPEtv is part of the network TRAMA, which in 2012 was composed by at least 39 organizations of the solidarity economy, such as co-operatives, trade unions, SMEs, among others (Trama Audiovisual 2012). This type of alliance between organizations sharing a similar discourse, is not present in the other cases. It is worth pointing out the difference with respect to FDE and Mídia NINJA, because in that case the houses and collectives are all part of the same network, whereas the co-operatives still operate independently from one another. For this reason, I argue that the principles are a sort of mechanism linking co-operatives and paving the way for knowledge replication and transfer across the country. Although there are hurdles in these processes of co-ordination, it does offer a pathway to break with the limits of localism that small scale media face if they just produce content in isolation or small networks.

Second, at the provincial level the central structure for the replication of the experience is a network among co-operatives, where CPE occupies the central node, which also contributes to the habitualization and objectivation of practices. In contrast to the latter, this network has been constructed based on previous collaboration projects that took place in the last decades, where CPE had a leading role to diffuse new practices, like energy provision and other services such as internet. For this reason, it has already been objectified, and locals internalized its operation, such as the provincial representative of AFSCA who observes that: “CPE is like the mother entity, it is a mirror which all other co-operatives in the province of La Pampa look in. When the CPE initiates a successful service, every other co-operative copies their strategy” (AFSCA Bariloche representative, 25/09/2013, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). This suggests the sedimentation of the institution for replicating knowledge and practices, where CPE is a role model for other co-operatives in the province,
which has started to be extended to the cable service and TV channel as well. In effect, in 2012 the AFSCA organized a workshop about co-operative TV at the headquarters of CPE, where many other representatives of co-operatives of the province assisted, with the objective to learn from the experience. Off the record, the aim is to build a network of media co-operatives in the province led by CPE, with the aim to produce and exchange content among its members. The obvious advantage of this initiative is that their capacity of content production and regional coverage would be significantly increased. However, three years since the workshop, the idea is still not operational.

Third, the co-operative is the organization with the longest history among the four cases I studied. As I explained in chapter 5, the management of the co-operative and many of its members (re)produce the narrative of CPE, stimulating an internalization process for the new generations that join in. Indeed, I have argued that CPEtv is a dispositive to strengthen such a process, diffusing practices and co-operative values. For example, during my interviews with different members, and also in the documents of the organization I came across the following motto that illustrates such interest to stimulate internalization processes in new members: “the co-operative was owned by our grandparents and it will be owned by our grandchildren” (CPE 2012, p. 38, translated by the author). From my standpoint, this is an important feature as well, because it contributes to the offering of subject-positions and identity formation of new members, paving the way for the replication of the experience. FDE and Midia NINJA are doing something similar with their offer of a new lifestyle, but the continuation of CPE during decades makes evident that their generational replacement has been successful, though not without hurdles. Thus, the sedimentation of the practices to set up new co-operative TV channels is paved with the histories of past successes.

In sum, in both cases the institution for replicating the practices of the experiences is a resource, which allows to disseminate knowledge on how their media ought to be organized, with actors receptive to internalize such practices. Contrarily, neither Barricada TV nor Wall Kintun TV were able to build a similar institution to expand their experiences to the recovered factories movement and to indigenous communities respectively. From my standpoint, the difference lies in the frequent practices of cooperation that the former had, based on established networks before the media project. It is worth pointing out a difference between the two institutionalization processes. Although Midia NINJA seems to have been more successful to objectify and replicate their practices (that is why I assigned them 3 points and 2 to CPEtv), it is not possible to argue that the institutionalization process is complete as Berger & Luckmann would define it, because the sedimentation phase is still in the making. Indeed, the experience is only 2 years old, and FDE just little over ten, which makes it quite premature to say that their practices have been passed on to new generations, although they have to new members. Contrarily, in the case of CPE the structure of replicating knowledge within generations in the organization and expanding service models to other cities has been in operation for decades. Thus, the latter process of knowledge replication, though not so rapid in the specific media case that I analyzed, seems to be more institutionalized than the former under the light of Berger & Luckmann’ s concepts.

8.2.8 Audience Reach

The four cases want to disseminate and expand their respective imaginaries. Therefore, the potential audience, understood in a bounded way as the number of viewers they reach (J. G. Webster 1998), is a resource that can be used to multiply their experience, or as previously explained, to mobilize supporters. Although it was out of the scope of this research to collect comparable data about the audiences of
each of the four cases, I shall argue that the material conditions of production favor some of the cases over others from the start. My argument is that the location where media for social transformation operate creates certain limits to the type of content to elaborate, and thus, to the number of potential interested viewers they might attract. Why? Because those near highly populated areas or neural zones of national news production have more access to produce content of national interest, and thus reach wider audiences.

On the one hand, the three Argentinean cases show an opposite structure than the Brazilian one in terms of the geographic location of content production. CPEtv, Barricada TV and Wall Kintun TV are all bounded by the limits of the new audiovisual media law, which fosters local content production in specific towns or cities. Therefore, most of the content from CPEtv comes from Santa Rosa, most of the content of Barricada TV stems from Buenos Aires and similarly, the scarce content of Wall Kintun TV emanates from Bariloche and nearby. However, there are differences among these three cases depending on their geographic location. For instance, given that Barricada TV is in Buenos Aires, the capital of the country, they have an easy access to issues related to political, economic and social events that tend to be concentrated there. Therefore, it has an advantage in terms of covering topics that might be of interest for large audiences. Nonetheless, it is also true that during fieldwork the Cablevisión cable operator, part of Clarín, was disobeying the new law, and did not include the channel in its grid. Accordingly, Barricada TV has the potential to reach larger audiences through the cable service in the capital city that has approximately 3 million inhabitants, but in practice, it is still limited due to the national struggle between the state and the Clarín media group. Contrarily, CPEtv operates in a provincial capital city of only 125,000 inhabitants. Accordingly, their audiovisual content might be of interest to local inhabitants of the city and the province, but much less to a wider national audience, except for co-operative content that could match experiences in other provinces. Similarly, Wall Kintun TV’s content distribution through cable and air broadcasting is bounded to the city of Bariloche and its 113,000 inhabitants. The online content can theoretically reach everyone with internet access, but as most of the population of the country is concentrated in the capital, it is safe to say that the contact with indigenous communities’ perspectives and practices is reduced, which might explain the scarce interest for it on the web. In sum, the new audiovisual communication services law might democratize the legal access to media channels, but it cannot address the uneven distribution of inhabitants in the country that sustains the geopolitics of knowledge production. This still gives advantages to those channels situated and producing content about the larger urban areas. For these reasons, I assigned Barricada TV and CPEtv 2 points and just 1 to Wall Kintun TV.

On the other hand, Mídia NINJA operates with a network structure that offers another way to overcome the previous problem of ‘localism’, because the distribution of members in different FDE houses allows NINJA to record videos easily beyond the boundary of just one city. As a result of this, Mídia NINJA members operating in different houses across the country cover varied topics; for instance, in the house in Brasília they focus on issues of national politics, while those NINJAs in the house in Belém in the Amazon focus on topics related to indigenous communities and the environment. In the same way, NINJAs in Belo Horizonte focus on mining themes, which is understandable given that this state specializes in this industry. In like manner, the rest of the houses where NINJAs operate have specific news. For these reasons, the network structure of Mídia NINJA gives them an advantage with respect to the Argentinean cases, because they can cover a larger variety of topics, trying to compensate for the geopolitics of audiovisual knowledge production, which in Brazil is concentrated in Rio de Janeiro and
Table 8.3: Number of Mídia NINJA’s streamings classified by the author based on the city of filming. Out of 1,248 videos, 1,080 offered geographic information to compile the table. Source: Twitcasting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th># videos</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasília</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Luís</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven other cities</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

São Paulo (Ibispina 2010). Therefore, I assigned them 3 points.

Despite this dispersed geographic structure of production, the results of Table 8.3 show that 61% of the streamed videos were recorded in Rio de Janeiro, and 91% were streamed from large urban cities of the richest region in Brazil, the southeast comprising Belo Horizonte, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. For this reason, even though Mídia NINJA might be fulfilling the objective to cover social struggles in the country, it has not been done in a balanced manner. There are at least three reasons for this. First, 82 million Brazilians live in the southeast of the country, which represents 42% of the total population (IBGE 2013a), although just a tenth of the national territory. Second, the technological infrastructure does not allow streaming in all Brazilian states; for example, in the Amazon region where internet access is limited or nonexistent beyond capital cities. Last but not least, the selection of Rio de Janeiro as the main base for Mídia NINJA seems to have been a strategic decision, because it is the most known city abroad and where most of the mobilizations have been taking place. This network structure allowed Mídia NINJA to reach audiences beyond those of just small cities. However, it has been pulled by the centrifugal forces of the largest urban centers, overlooking the coverage of news of those cities and towns far from main national urban centers.

To conclude, these results show the tension between localism and broader national reporting. The points I discussed suggest that the best strategy for media for social transformation is to build a network for content production and dissemination. In the case of Argentina, the existing cases are far from putting into practice such organizational scheme, perhaps except for the co-operatives that are trying to build one. Contrariwise, Mídia NINJA built a structure based on the preexisting network of FDE. Nonetheless, their use of online technologies leads to a focus on large urban centers, overlooking small towns with lack of access to such ICT. In the end, this shows a contradiction between their imaginary and their practice. Thus, the growth of the audience as a resource seems to face a tradeoff with respect to the aims that media for social transformation might establish for themselves.

### 8.3 Concluding Discussion

This chapter covered two aspects that media for social transformation experiences have to tackle: resilience to violence from incumbents and the capacity to acquire and mobilize resources for their continuous operation.

The first section described four types of violence that each case had to withstand to varying degrees to put forward their projects, either initiated by state or private actors. I have interpreted these types of violence as dispositives that limit the emergence of media for social transformation departing from state and commercial media practices. This typology covered direct physical violence to journalists,
structural types of violence such as legal and economic, and discursive violence, where I included the opposition between different discourses, including the use of defamatory stereotypes and libel. Accordingly, media firms in synchrony with the creative economy policy discourses do not just prevail because they are ‘better’, whereas media for social transformation are naturally ‘unfit’, but rather this has been shaped by the existence of different types of violence to hamper the projects of the latter. In the case of Argentina, the private sector incumbents tried to delay and stop the application of the new law, which shows that a blind adherence to market principles and competition, as implied in the creative economy policy discourses, dodges the unfair practices that firms might easily implement. This indicates the need of regulations to reduce the unfair advantages that some actors obtained in previous and nondemocratic periods of the country. Nonetheless, the Argentinean cases also show that to advance such changes in practice is far from simple or linear. In effect, the most resourceful media conglomerate has been able to ignore and oppose new laws that have the support of the democratic process. Likewise, in that context the role of the state was not without problems, because it has not hesitated to use the historical struggles of indigenous communities to its advantage or to delay the legalization of alternative media that were not in synchrony with the project of the national administration. In these politically charged contexts, the only road seems to be the increasing mobilization of civil society media organizations to organize and oppose the different types of violence, hoping to raise awareness and employ emerging windows of opportunity to introduce and perfect appropriate regulatory frameworks.

Although the media democratization law in Argentina is not without hurdles, it is true that it has made a considerable advance to challenge media concentration that is absent in Brazil. Indeed, in the latter the types of violence against journalists are more harmful; for example, the physical violence that journalists frequently suffer from the military police. Accordingly, the country needs some sort of new regulation to address the existing inequalities and violence. Furthermore, in both cases there is still a blind spot to deal with discursive violence. As the data shows, the media for social transformation have far too few resources to respond or to legally defend themselves against libel and stereotypes disseminated through mass media. Therefore, there is a need to discuss some sort of national regulation instrument, within the boundaries of freedom of speech, unethical journalism practices, which damage media organizations in both countries.

A final point to stress is that this typology of violence against media for social transformation is a useful first step to break with the bias in Western media research that overlooks these processes. This neglect is understandable for media research that focuses on experiences in USA and Europe, but it is definitely not appropriate for other contexts. In effect, physical violence by state and other forces against media is still present in many countries of the world, and undoubtedly worse than the cases researched in this thesis. Therefore, the theories that speak of ‘network power’ (Castells 2007, 2009) or ‘media power’ in relation to the influence that the latter can have in society (Curran 2002; Couldry and Curran 2003), are undeniably important to shed light on some aspects of media and power, but they are not enough to grasp the different types of violence that journalists and media have to deal with in non-Western contexts. Furthermore, I showed that the typology is better suited to explain these different types of violence, rather than just saying they are ‘dispositives’ as in the meta-language of SKAD (Keller 2013) or ‘structural violence’ as proposed by Galtung (Galtung 1969). Thus, I followed the advice in the literature to specify the different sources of violence (Farmer et al. 2004), which gives not only more analytical insights but could also pave the way for further actions by civil society to denounce and stop those types of attacks.
The second part of the chapter connects with the first one, but also with previous ones, because it examines the types of resources that each case has been able to acquire and mobilize. I achieved this by adopting a perspective for interdisciplinary projects that defines power as the ability to acquire and mobilize resources (Avelino and Rotmans 2009). This perspective is useful, because it avoids the shortcomings of mainstream discussions on power in media research, which focus on how media affect ‘society’, such as politics and audiences (Couldry and Curran 2003; Curran 2002). Contrarily, a resource-view on power allows to systematize the different types of resources that media for social transformation have acquired to resist the violence that they are subject to. Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that the scheme I employed by Avelino & Rotmans is not without its empirical shortcomings. In effect, their definition of resources is quite broad: “[...] persons, assets, materials or capital, including human, mental, monetary, artefactual and natural resources” (Avelino and Rotmans 2009, p. 551). This implies that the type of resources that one can detect in any given case is varied, which is useful to have a qualitative good overview of the ‘power’ of a given case, as I showed in Table 8.2. However, in practice the same approach creates difficulties when the types of resources are not known in advance and further challenges to measure them. In effect, I could not quantitatively compare the resources, but only make a qualitative assessment based on my perceptions and partial information. This is not an insurmountable hindrance for future projects, but definitely one that might require groups of researchers and more than one round of data collection to assure the quantitative comparison among cases.

The key conclusion from this sections is that the more diverse the types of resources that media for social transformation acquire and mobilize, the greater their possibilities of challenging the incumbents following the creative economy policy discourses. This is important, because I have stressed more resources beyond the financial that are assumed to be the most relevant one in a capitalist economy (Saeed 2009); for instance, relational ones that link to broader discussions about social capital in social sciences (Portes 1998). Although these two are definitely important, based on the empirical data I have claimed that other resources cannot be overlooked to have a better picture of the power of media for social transformation to sustain their projects. As regards financial resources, their acquisition comes from different strategies, among which advertising is just one. In effect, the case of Mídia NINJA illustrates that new organizations can also employ complementary currencies to break with the scarcity of national ones, which points to the need to advance research on these different economic exchange systems. As regards relational resources, the analysis of the structures of the networks of relations that each case has, suggests that the more diverse the networks, the more types of exchanges the cases can establish without necessarily depending on the intermediation of financial resources. Besides these two resources, the systematization covered the importance of human resources, which in some cases were attracted by financial incentives, but in others, by the desire to be part of a project that they believed in. This stresses the importance of imaginaries in offering subject-positions for humans to follow, and to the diversity of them not necessarily restricted to the profit maximizing actor assumed in the creative economy policy discourses. Furthermore, the acquisition of knowledge followed different strategies, from the more formal ones through personnel trained at universities, to more informal ones where knowledge was acquired through ‘amateur’ practices of reporting. Moreover, I stressed the importance of the set up of knowledge institutions by CPE and FDE to expand their imaginary and the scaling up of their experiences, which was not present in the other two cases. What is interesting to remark is that FDE and Mídia NINJA were the most successful to replicate their
practices, and not necessarily with the highest amount of financial resources. In fact, co-operatives in Argentina are by far richer than them, yet have not been fast enough to adopt the use of ICT tools to achieve a similarly quick replication. Another important resource in the cases was the acquisition of technologies and the needed infrastructure to operate them. The cases can be divided according to whether they just passively adopted technologies, or whether they tried to reappropriate them for their respective imaginary, which I considered as a sort of mental resource that helps to reduce the dependence on foreign technologies. In a similar vein, the same interpretation scheme can be useful to acquire infrastructures appropriate for the context of operation of each case. In general terms, this last ‘attitude’ toward technologies is a particularly important strategy for resource-scarce organizations that in my opinion need to grab what they have and start emitting content, implementing the adequate adaptations, but without blocking themselves for not having enough money to acquire the latest and fanciest technologies. Another important resource for each case has been their audience reach, which was in part conditioned by their content dissemination technologies and their location. In addition, I underscored the importance of political resources; for instance, the mobilization of supporters to strive for their positions, or the reference of historical debts to demand government action. To conclude, despite the different types of violence that media organizations might face, the lesson from the second part of the chapter is that there is a variety of strategies to acquire and mobilize resources beyond just financial ones, which need to be accounted in research, and could be considered by other media for social transformation in practice. This empirical part of my contribution could benefit other media experiences by having a more diverse (though possibly not complete) matrix of the different resources to acquire and mobilize in their struggles for a perspective that does not view information just as a mere commodity.
Chapter 9

Conclusions and Policy Advice

In the midst of discussions on how to surpass the impasse in ‘development’ research, this work contributes to stress the essential role that communication plays in social change processes. In particular, it has focused on those visions of the future from nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations in Argentina and Brazil, media for social transformation, which definitely illustrate alternative practices. In this last chapter, I conclude with the main contributions made, both academic and empirical, together with a list of possible policy suggestions and plausible future lines of research.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, many Latin American countries have entered into a ‘post-neoliberal’ period after the election of left-wing administrations, challenging – to varying degrees - the previous predominance of Western policies. Thus, the state once again occupied a central role in policy making, contrary to the tenets of neoliberalism that defended the idea of the private sector managing as many activities as possible. Another essential difference has been the priority assigned to inclusion policies in order to address the consequences of the policies and politics of previous decades. Nonetheless, these discursive changes have faced different types of contradictions in practice. In general, Argentina and Brazil are good examples of these political changes, and in particular, they illustrate the tensions in the area of culture and communication between neoliberal and post-neoliberal policies.

As synthesized in chapter 3, Argentina has been advancing further with a new audiovisual media law passed in 2009 that stimulated the emergence of new NGO media once restricted by a previous law sanctioned during the dictatorship. In contrast, Brazil failed to take legal action to further democratize its media system, but the cultural policies introduced after Lula’s arrival to power, together with an expansion of ICT, have spurred the growth of a diversity of media collectives challenging mainstream narratives. In both countries, these processes paved the way for various media for social transformation that speak of different social change processes, mostly challenging privately owned mass media firms.

In this context, this research contributes with the analysis of four nonprofit and nongovernmental media organizations, which were purposefully selected to illustrate the potentials and challenges of these change processes. In effect, I selected case studies that communicate discourses of overlooked groups in mass media, which had conflicts either with the state or with privately owned mainstream firms, and employed different techniques of content production and distribution. On the one hand, I studied three cases in Argentina that give insights on projects representing different discourses: CPEtv, a co-operative media channel as an example of the co-operative movement; Barricada TV, a channel operating in the leading case of the national movement of recovered factories; Wall Kintun TV, the first
Mapuche indigenous channel representing the struggles of these communities. These cases help to understand the ongoing process of media democratization unleashed by the new law, paying attention to the hurdles the projects face in implementing their imaginaries. These results can inspire new experiences in the country and in others that have introduced similar laws, such as Ecuador or Bolivia. On the other hand, I studied Mídia NINJA in Brazil, which is part of the cultural collective FDE that in contrast to the Argentinean cases has been operating completely with technologies by distributing content through the internet. It massively attracted viewers’ attention thanks to the innovative coverage of the 2013 riots in the country. This case study does not only offer insights into the ways in which the organization operates with online tools, but also into the very specific practices of a collaborative economy they have been able to put forward. Despite their different imaginaries, these four cases share a common denominator: their opposition to a commercial view of communications, predominant in the mass media firms of both countries, and a different noncommercial scheme on how to put forward cultural and communicational activities. The focus on media for social transformation is relevant, because in the process of media democratization most of the discussions in Argentina and Brazil are still centered on the role of private versus public media, overlooking other types of organizations that disseminate discourses different from those defended either by corporations or the state. Accordingly, these cases are an important empirical research contribution to the scarce literature about media that are neither governmental nor for-profit, which can potentially contribute to the strengthening of civil society. At the same time, this particular vision of the future could inspire further ‘critical development research’, which unfortunately is a resource as scarce as water in the academic ‘ecosystem’.

The main academic contribution of this research is a conceptual framework that stresses different dimensions to analyze media for social transformation in the context of Latin America. This is a contribution to the emerging literature on communication for social change, which begs for a more integral way to analyze such media. In synchrony with authors that advance the need of de-Westernizing media research, I have elaborated and applied a conceptual framework that addresses what I understand as some of the biases of the preexisting literature. For example, the excessive focus on critical theory inspired by authors in the Marxist tradition that develop universal models for these media, or the neglect of dimensions such as violence or quality schemes. I have shown that the conceptual framework has offered many insights to answer the main research question of this thesis: How do new nonprofit and nongovernmental audiovisual media projects striving for social transformation in Argentina and Brazil challenge a commercial approach to culture and communication? I have argued that to understand this, at least three levels must be taken into account: the media system, the competition among policy discourses, and the imaginaries and constraints on media for social transformation in their daily practice. Therefore, I assumed that the cases cannot be understood without insights from the structure in which they operate. First of all, this included a political economy approach to the media system in order to reveal the main actors and policy changes in time. Second, I analyzed the competition among mainstream and counter policy discourses that change the media structure. Third, I claimed that the policy discourses connect with media for social transformation through dispositives, in other words, networks of human and material structures that enhance some types of practices and reduce the opportunities of others. Through chapters 6-8 I have claimed, in particular, that dispositives bound in certain dimensions the ideal projects that media for social transformation would like to put forward; however, I also claimed that the studied cases have employed different strategies to challenge these constraints that stimulate commercial practices. I have particularly stressed the following: the role of
technology, the type of content produced, quality schemes, audiences, the role of violence, and last but not least, the different strategies these experiences employ to acquire and mobilize resources.

With respect to SKAD, the application of the tools emanating from this German research program on discourse analysis has offered some good insights into the media for social transformation under study. This originates from an interpretationalist perspective in social science, where knowledge is not ‘natural’ but ‘socially constructed’; thus, privileging meanings of how humans interpret the world and act in it. As I shown in chapter 5, this is the case in each of the studied media for social transformation, that have their own ways of interpreting culture and communication coming from the context they live in, and sketching specific plans of action to change the fact that they diverge from the ones advocated by the creative economy policy discourses. This would not have been possible to detect if I had applied a naturalistic approach - predominant in causal analysis and economics. It would have understood such strategies as ‘irrational’ for disregarding or opposing the accepted predominant market forces of supply and demand. However, this overlooks the process of ‘construction’ of these markets and reduces every feasible experience to the ones that can be measured with the tools of economics, contributing to the utopia – in the pejorative sense - of infinite growth. Nonetheless, it misses the point of the different interpretation schemes that human actors might create, leading to new practices and structures for culture and media. Similarly, my analysis would have been incomplete if I had only followed research strands of critical theory to research ‘alternative’ or ‘radical’ media. These would have been enough in the case of Barricada TV, but not so much for the rest. Accordingly, SKAD was essential to break with mainstream perspectives and also with the idea that media for social transformation can only be understood within the Marxist tradition. Although it is true that concepts from that research strand have a lot to say in order to understand the opposition to commercial media, they fall short of grasping a broader set of interpretation schemes, such as those of indigenous communities that were neither part of the Western Marxist tradition nor of new media social movements. Contrarily, it is true that SKAD also is a Western approach to study discourses and the production and dissemination of knowledge; however, I showed that its broad definition of knowledge and the methods it suggests are adaptable to reveal the meaning patterns that media cases employ in other contexts.

Besides contributing with this broad understanding of what knowledge is, SKAD includes other concepts from Foucauldian discourse analysis, such as dispositives, which were good metaphors to trace how the commercial approach to culture and communication bounds the possible spaces of operation of the initiatives of media for social transformation. Despite these strengths, I highlighted the limits of a broad scheme for the ‘sociology of knowledge’ in this research. In effect, many things can be a ‘discourse’, ‘practices’ emanating from them, and ‘dispositives’ reinforcing those practices. During the analysis I experienced that these concepts can cover very disparate phenomena, but provide few insights into how they specifically operate in particular sectors. Thus, they become a sort of metalinguage, metaphors, but do not further illuminate the situation under research. That is the main reason why I addressed the shortcomings of the ‘dispositive’ by referring to overlapping, but more precise, concepts that shed light on them. This seems to be the path to follow in order to avoid banal analyses that get lost in abstractions and do not add much to transformative social science research. Furthermore, in the thesis I also introduced a change to the employment of SKAD, by dividing the analysis of discourses into levels, according to the institutional area under analysis. Therefore, I employed the term ‘policy discourses’ to those appearing in policy areas and ‘imaginaries’ to refer to the specific discourses of media for social transformation. Although I argued that they are linked through disposi-
itives, I claim that this new tag - though it might not be the perfect one given that ‘imaginaries’ has other meanings in the literature - is still useful to differentiate what type of constellation of statements one is referring to. Finally, throughout chapter 5 I tried to remark the future dimension of many of the imaginaries. This is a feature that has lost importance with respect to the previous conceptualizations of ‘ideology’ in the literature. Notwithstanding, many of the cases made statements about a future way of organizing society and it is safe to say that this is central to processes of social transformation. Thus, I reincorporated the term utopian into the analysis in the sense of offering guidelines for transforming the contexts in which the groups under analysis operate, and without the negative connotation of unattainable.

In the next paragraphs, I shall synthesize the main results of the different levels and dimensions considered in the conceptual framework, remarking the limits to the practices of media for social transformation, and highlighting the ways the cases managed to overcome them.

In chapter 3, I employed a political economy perspective to synthesize the history and main features of the audiovisual media system in Argentina and Brazil, by describing the main actors and regulations and by stressing their variation in time with regard to national politics. In contrast to other regions of the world, in both countries few private media conglomerates have acquired excessive influence in terms of audience share; a situation that has not improved, but rather deteriorated, after the return to democratically elected governments. Particularly, I put the focus on the neglect of civil society organizations and the advance of their different struggles to alter the system in both countries. One of the conclusions of this chapter is to highlight the shortcomings of a predominant emphasis on private media, a tendency emanating from Western researchers and the institutions they are used to. Although this perspective is correct when it comes to criticizing excessive state control in relation to the experience of European countries with authoritarian regimes, such an approach neglects the negative consequences of marked concentration of ownership patterns in a few commercial firms. This situation is particularly evident in the cases of Argentina and Brazil, raising new sorts of questions that cast doubt on the claims of commercial approaches to media, such as the creative economy policy discourses, because they neglect the need of appropriate regulations to stop media concentration patterns that endanger the democratic process.

In chapter 4, I introduced what I called the mainstream policy discourses and counter discourses in the area of culture and media in Argentina and Brazil, which compete to reinforce or change the existing media system. I called them discourses as an analytical device to represent different constellations of statements that represent sets of schemes for action that delineate and understand how culture and media ought to be and by whom and for what purposes they are produced. It is true that this tends to be studied in separate manners in Western literature; however, this did not seem appropriate to me in the countries under study, due to the interconnections between both sectors, such as the increasing importance of media to disseminate cultural expressions. Indeed, the cultural policies in Brazil inspired the collective media case I examined in the thesis. Furthermore, even the President of Argentina, Cristina Kirchner, termed the media democratization change as a ‘cultural battle’. Therefore, the decision to cover both areas seems appropriate to map the discourses in competition that influence the existing media system in both countries.

As I shown in chapter 4, these policy discourses are materialized by different dispositives, and are neither ‘objective’ nor ‘natural’ ways of organizing these sectors, but rather the result of constructions by different types of actors. Indeed, I advanced a division between two groups of policy discourses, one
in favor of a commercial approach to culture and media, and the other questioning the primacy of econo-

mics by first adding other dimensions, but without disregarding the economic one. These discourses
evidently enter into tension concerning the ways they structure the problem of how media and culture
ought to be organized; and thus, the dynamic results of the competition might pave the way for an
alteration of the media system, and might open windows of opportunity for the emergence of media for
social transformation.

I named the first group ‘creative economy’ policy discourses, because despite their nuances, they
share a set of similarities that reinforce the preexisting commercially driven culture and media systems
in Argentina and Brazil. First, the addressees of these discourses are industries and entrepreneurs
within them, whose aim is to generate wealth and employment through the commercialization of cul-
tural products and services that are oriented to exports. Second, they focus on creative and cultural
entrepreneurs as the subject position that people can follow, which assumes that every cultural ex-
pression is a potential product or service to be sold in markets. This not only implies a vision of ‘ent-
trepreneurship’ limited to the commercial sphere, but also a bounded definition of ‘sustainability’ that
can only be achieved through profits, and in extreme cases by a strict control of IPRs. Third, the policy
discourses make the extra assumption that the ‘creatives’ are individuals and talented professionals,
part of a ‘creative class’, linking a peculiar Western notion of individuality with creativity. Last but not
least, the policy discourses overlook the particular challenges that media face in the region, such as
the high concentration of media ownership. As analyzed in chapter 4, this group of policy discourses
might be suitable for middle or high-income sectors of the population with enough resources, but it
definitely overlooks – and in the worst cases discriminates - the vast popular cultural expressions of
marginalized groups. The latter do not have enough resources to set up such for-profit projects or do
donot want to. From the start, the market oriented logic of these public policies thus excludes large part
of the population from potential benefits, who would not classify as ‘creative’. This reinforces a divide
among the population that is particularly harmful for the aim of ‘access’ cultural policies are supposed
to have. It is clearly against the discursive claims of the left-wing parties in power in Argentina and
Brazil since 2003, which - at least rhetorically - make inclusion a priority in their political agendas.

Despite such contradictions, governments have not stopped supporting this perspective, because of
the importance of the cultural/creative industries for economic growth. Instead, they tried to counter-
balance the consequences of what many would classify as ‘neoliberal’ policies by introducing others
aiming to address existing inclusion problems. In effect, the two counter policy discourses that I ex-
amined in chapter 4 offer an important contrast to the creative economy policy discourses. First, their
main objective is not to generate profits, but to give rights to civil society actors (specially marginal-
ized groups) so that they can access, consume and produce culture and communication. Second, they
offer subject positions that go beyond that of the entrepreneur and beyond that of profits only - with
other ways of entrepreneurship and sustainability being relevant. Thus, social entrepreneurship and
collective ways of organization, like the points of culture, play a prominent role. Third, the support for
cultural expressions of minority and resource-scarce groups challenges the idea of the ‘gifted’, ‘god-like’
and ‘genius’ artists and stresses that everyone can be creative - thus challenging existing hierarchies
of what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Fourth, they try to address the problems in the media system in both
countries through different methods. For instance, by promoting the sharing of information in online
networks of cultural and media collectives in Brazil, and through a law aimed at regulating ownership
concentration patterns and stimulating the emergence of new media projects in Argentina.
In order to avoid any simplistic interpretations of this thesis, I shall insist that I am not against the commercialization of culture and communication. This is an untenable position, given the importance of the economy in an increasingly globalized, interconnected capitalist economic system. Nonetheless, what I have severely criticized is the perspective presuming that a commercial approach is the only one that matters as a ‘feasible development option’, neglecting everything else. Apart from that, the existence of cultural industries in both countries is a fact, and no policy maker can leave them outside of their consideration for support. However, in the international development discussions, the latter have had predominance over any other type of alternative to organize cultural and media policies. From my perspective, this shows the Western bias in international organizations, which still takes the experiences of some Western nations as universal and as the only ones that could work and help the rest of the world. I could not disagree more with this perspective, which is so blind to the variations in context around the world. For instance, the expansion of the creative industries and creative economy as it emanated from the UK experience and US theoreticians clearly overlooks the dimension of inclusion and social justice, which is not a priority in those two countries, but which is far more relevant in the political agenda – at least rhetorically - in many Latin American countries. This bias is not only present in international organizations, but also in the research that emanates from ‘leading’ Western research institutes. Indeed, there are almost no articles written in English about the Cultura Viva program, even though it has existed for more than 10 years, nor about the media democratization processes in Argentina, but there are thousands of articles about the creative industries in almost every region of the world. From my perspective, this suggests the standardization of what policies work, overlooking those that depart and contradict the claim of mainstream authors and institutions. I oppose this lack of diversity, and from my humble point of view, the two policy discourses are the tip of the iceberg of a whole set of other policies that could be inspirational for other parts of the world to create their own autochthonous interventions based on other models and not just influenced by the propaganda of those employed in Western countries. In chapter 5, I thoroughly analyzed the imaginaries of four media for social transformation, underscoring their specificities and the influence they received from counter policy discourses. One of the main results of the chapter is that the claim that the creative economy policy discourses are all comprehensive must be rejected. Although their inner structure might be broad enough to cover diverse industries, it is not sufficient to include networks and projects that oppose a for-profit orientation in the area of culture and communication. SKAD helped to elucidate this weakness, because as I shown in chapter 5, each of the imaginaries emanates from a particular context, where history, politics and practices link in specific ways. Therefore, the members of each of the media for social transformation employ different interpretative schemes to conceptualize how culture and media ought to be organized in the struggles to transform the contexts in which they operate. Taking this observation into account, I have argued that the existence of such imaginaries is a necessary condition for cases to challenge a commercial approach to communications. In effect, the four media for social transformation are examples of nonprofit non state, which make evident the practices stimulated by the counter policy discourses opposing the mainstream policy discourses of chapter 4. Here are the examples of the channels operating as part of the following networks of actors: the co-operative movement struggling for a human-faced economy, the network of recovered enterprises by workers striving for a democratization of firms in the economy, the Mapuches and other indigenous communities battling for ancestral ways of organization, FDE and Mídia NINJA's project of expanding a ‘collaborative economy’ beyond their network. In all
cases, there is a challenge to the contemporary economic order and - to varying degrees - to the ways in which society at large is organized. The imaginaries of these constellations of actors have a utopian dimension, offering a different vision on alternative paths to follow. They are partially testing these paths by putting them into practice by means of diverse projects, in particular related to culture and media. Although it is true that the commercialization of culture and media is an important strategy for many entrepreneurs, firms and industries, the cases I studied show that it is not the only one. Contrarily, there is far more variety when it comes to practices to organize cultural and media activities than for-profit ones, and in particular I refer to those of civil society organizations. Accordingly, I argued that the mainstream discourses need to be seriously criticized and rejected as the only way to promote culture and media ‘development’, because of their serious side effects of tools to prune the diversity of practices that exist at the grassroots level. Instead, this begs for the elaboration of more inclusive policy suggestions that take the diversity of experiences of cultural and media networks into account that could be more appropriate for addressing issues in non-Western countries.

The previous conclusion is important for all cultural sectors and I want to emphasize that it is particularly relevant for media for development. As mentioned in the introduction, the increasing process of mediatization suggests that humans are and will be more and more able to access media channels more frequently. This raises the question of the diversity of content that those media are opposed to bring. The position I took in this thesis was to highlight the neglected role of non private and non state media in the context of Latin America, which tends to be overlooked in media research in general. The reasons for this bias are possibly connected to the larger audiences of the mass media, which could be understood as a proxy for their influence and relevance. However, it is also true that the expansion of ICT and new media has initiated a process of concentration in terms of the production of technological platforms, but also of fragmentation in terms of content production, which considerably increases the possibilities of new media projects to emerge and distribute content, albeit with new hurdles. Thus, the political economy model that I described in Figure 2.2, focusing on private and public media, necessarily needs to be updated to include the role of different types of media (alternative, community, co-operative, indigenous, radical, and others), and in particular those that I labeled media for social transformation, because of their contributions to address development challenges. This is important, since the existence of these media projects can be understood as dispositives of the imaginaries of the organizations that are part of broader networks aiming to change and improve the economy and society, helping to disseminate overlooked ideas and practices, challenging those emanating from public (usually associated with the political administration) and private media (guided by for-profit ends), and strengthening civil society and the democratic governance process. In effect, in chapter 7 I illustrated how the practices of content production of the four studied cases go, to different degrees, in that direction. For example, CPEtv has been systematically producing content about the co-operative movement that despite its economic importance in the province had little content elaborated in the province. Likewise, Barricada TV has produced a variety of audiovisual content about enterprises recovered by its workers and left-wing perspectives on society, which have had scarce coverage in other mass media. In a similar vein, Wall Kintun TV has started to disseminate and slowly produce content illustrating the perspectives of the Mapuche indigenous community. Last but not least, Mídia NINJA has been offering a diverse coverage of various collective actors as a way to unleash social change. Beyond the particular objectives of these imaginaries, I stressed the importance of these media to locally cover topics that are
relevant for the international development agenda. For instance, environmental issues, the struggle for gender equality, and the improvement of livelihoods of marginalized groups. Therefore, this data suggests that international development projects should not only consider public and private media for the diffusion of the results of their projects and issues of concern, but also the networks of media for social transformation that exist in each country.

Despite the contribution that media for social transformation are making in terms of disseminating different types of discourses, the empirical data I analyzed contradicts part of the most romantic claims about these types of organizations. In effect, one of the usual dimensions that appears as central in research about communication for social change is the role of participation. However, the discussion in chapter 7 showed that the concept of participation in media research - just as in the general development literature - is not without problems, because it aims toward an ideal hard to fulfill in practice. Indeed, I employed concepts suggested by Carpentier to elaborate a continuum between two poles of minimalist and maximalist participation. However, the criteria to classify the last and broadest notion of participation (audience heterogeneity, audiences participating in media management and content production, inclusion of content elaborated by citizens and amateurs, without overlooking the political) was not achieved in practice by any of the media for social transformation. This is surprising, given that the discussions in communication for social change claim that these media are going to be more participatory, and likewise, that they can contribute to the democratization of the public sphere. Nonetheless, in practice I detected at least two limits that bound such statements. First, the same imaginaries of the cases under study create boundaries that contradict the notion of ‘full’ participation with regard to audience diversity. In effect, many of these media emerge as a critique of overlooked actors in mass media coverage. Accordingly, these media for social transformation focus on those ignored actors and do not cover others that oppose them, which are well represented by mass media. Thus, they have a limited audience. The second factor is that these media are interested in news production which puts them under the pressure of respecting the news cycle and of continuously covering topics in synchrony with the aims of their imaginary. Therefore, they have the pressure to report as efficiently as possible, which requires a bureaucratization of their news production process. This in turn leads to specific editorial lines that prioritize some topics over the diversity that could be covered. In sum, these two factors conspire against the ideal of maximal participation. Indeed, three out of four media for social transformation failed in this dimension. The only one that covered more opposing audiences was CPEtv, which paradoxically is the one that follows a more commercial TV model, siding with a minimalist model of participation. Although participation seems to be an ideal that cannot be reached in practice, for me it is still worth pursuing, because it is true that now more marginalized groups are creating their own media to express, record and disseminate their perspectives in ways they had not done before. In sum, this analysis of participation points to the need of carefully opening up the concept in order to distinguish between the different types existing in practice, which could then inspire practitioners to make adequate changes in order to come closer to this ideal.

The results of chapter 7 about content reception revealed the challenges that media for social transformation face when it comes to reaching their audiences, which partly coincide with what mass media journalists criticize about these organizations. It is safe to say that all these media aim to increase the number of viewers in order to expand their imaginaries and to replicate their practices. Indeed, many of the cases explicitly strive to become ‘massive’, despite their lack of resources in comparison to mass media. However, I have shown that there are several limits that media for social transformation have
to face to attract audiences. Although it was not within the scope of this research to thoroughly conduct audience research, social network statistics served as a proxy to compare the importance of these new media to mainstream mass media in both countries. In chapter 7, I showed that the latter still retain a large number of followers and viewers, and I hypothesized that this might be related to their infrastructure for content production that is superior to that of organizations only operating through online media. This seems to be a tendency; media that have far more resources in terms of TV channels, radios and newspapers, also have larger online audiences. Therefore, resource-scarce media for social transformation indeed have fewer opportunities to reach larger audiences, even though many of them strive toward such an objective. Online media platforms do offer exceptions, such as the case of Mídia NINJA: With some of its online videos on YouTube it attracted more attention than Globo. However, it is also true that these media conglomerates employ their own websites and systems of content dissemination. Therefore, the ‘success’ I measured online is only relative to those platforms of use, and it is definitely insignificant with respect to the millions of viewers that estimates assign to both main mass media groups on other media platforms such as TV. Additionally, I could not detect much continuous flow of content from these media for social transformation towards mass media, except the critical, violent and few exceptions I mentioned in chapter 8. Unfortunately, this suggests that the counter-public spheres these media are generating have so far not really translated into content toward the structures of the public sphere heavily influenced by these mass media. Although it might be true that new technologies are offering new spaces for media for social transformation to transmit content and to connect with viewers, their project of becoming massive by means of such channels alone is more bounded than cyber-utopian statements want to make us believe. Therefore, I claim that the struggle for regulating the radio spectrum and for implementing such laws is an indispensable path to follow, which might level the resource asymmetries between NGO media and others in Argentina and Brazil.

The existence of imaginaries is a necessary condition for the emergence of projects of media for social transformation. This is linked with the function of communication and media to disseminate imaginaries by circulating role models that stimulate their practices. When employing the language of cognitive psychology, this could be understood as a set of schemes for action from the space of all possible ones. Thus, media become channels for the dissemination of diversity of discourses, hoping to reach and unleash new actions through the reinterpretations recipients make of these schemes. Nonetheless, I have also argued that the existence of these imaginaries is not a sufficient condition for the operationalization of the projects as aspired by their members, because in practice producers of content are subject to material constraints from previous historical trajectories of other discourses, in particular of the commercial ones in the countries I studied. Therefore, I claimed that there are diverse types of networks of material and human elements (‘dispositives’) that limit the diversity of potential new discourses. In effect, I have shown the boundaries these dispositives set in the four analyzed cases, but I also described how in some cases they were challenged - to different extents and by means of varied strategies. This is an important point to stress, because it adds empirical and theoretical insight to understand how media for social transformation challenge the creative economy policy discourses. Although the discussion of dispositives is useful to refer to networks of material and human actors constraining the media for social transformation and their imaginaries, I identified this broad concept as a shortcoming of SKAD, because it becomes a sort of meta-language to describe very dissimilar types of processes that lose the specificities each dispositive might have. Therefore, I have argued that a way to address this weakness of the approach advanced by Keller is to complement it
with other concepts from varied research fields that refer to the same process, but that go deeper to open up the specificities they refer to. Specifically, in this research I examined the role of the following four aspects I shall summarize in the next paragraphs: technology, quality schemes, violence, and the distribution of resources, as a proxy to reveal unequal power relations.

In chapter 6, I introduced a first contribution by specifying the idea of ‘dispositive’ in the analysis of media technologies. Indeed, I employed insights from science and technology studies that understand technologies as having ‘scripts’. That is to say, they are not ‘objective’ artifacts, but rather carry the morals and values introduced by their designers. For instance, the high tech cameras, equipment and editing software CPEtv acquired from foreign firms have all been designed to operate within a commercial model of media and communication, prevailing in the context they were produced. In effect, their high costs inevitably lead to such a type of sustainability practices, otherwise it is very hard to cover their operational costs. Therefore, the co-operative movement and other NGOs that could neither obtain nor produce those tools in other ways, became dependent on foreign commercial firms providing the equipment for them. This forced the co-operative case to adopt commercial models of sustainability, although it was originally discursively trying to oppose them! In my opinion this is a paradox the co-operatives are facing, and I interpret it as the result of the ‘script’ of the only available media technologies that they had at the time they started the channel. Beyond this case, audiovisual producers I interviewed agreed that the lack of appropriate technologies for these new channels is a broader and a particularly hard barrier to overcome, but not an impossible one. Indeed, the specificities of ICT are tough to copy and improve for countries lacking national electronics industries. Just like industrializing countries, however, Argentina and Brazil could promote the local production of such equipment, because they do have technical capacities, but the state initiative is still not given. The opportunities to surpass such shortcomings seem even more promising in the area of software, because of the large number of specialized firms in both countries. In effect, at the time I did my fieldwork software co-operatives were already trying to break the dependence on foreign programs by developing a local TV management software to avoid paying for expensive licenses.

The second strategy that some of the media for social transformation have been using is to reinterpret the commercial ICT they had access to, in order to use them in different ways rather than the ones they had originally been designed for. This is an important insight from the philosophy of technology and authors like Ihde, who argue that technologies have ‘multistability’, which describes how the actions they put forward are not as conclusive as the idea of ‘script’ might suggest. Conversely, the users of technologies can vary their application by changing the context and the ends for which they employ them. Indeed, in the past no one in Brazil thought that free streaming platforms and smartphones designed for individual consumers could be used to set up a network of independent media elaborating collaborative coverage as in the case of Mídia NINJA. The key difference lies in the collective and collaborative practices of the network FDE, which paved the way for members of Mídia NINJA to copy a similar approach to journalism. Thus, although it might be true that smartphone designers included cameras in their design, and that programmers of streaming platforms wanted people to disseminate live coverage; they expected individual users or consumers to reveal their interests and personal information, but did not foresee the creation of a collective network employing these tools in a collaborative and noncommercial way.

I argued that this reinterpretation of technologies was stimulated by the ‘hacking’ feature present in the imaginary of FDE and Mídia NINJA, which tries to question and adapt - whenever possible
existing institutions and technologies. This result also suggests that the expansion of commercial practices and ICT is giving some space, though limited, to experiences opposing them. Ihde points out correctly that technology can be reinterpreted in infinite ways; for instance, I can use my smartphone just as a decorative device on my shelf, but if I want to employ it for communication using the existing commercial platforms, then the reinterpretations are bounded. Therefore, I also argued that the reinterpretation of technologies does have limits if the new use does not entirely differ from the original one. This explains why the interviewees of Barricada TV complained about the existence of ‘invasive advertising’ on online commercial platforms, such as Ustream, Facebook or YouTube, which in a certain way distorts the noncommercial message they are trying to spread. Therefore, these new online platforms have an ambivalent effect on the imaginaries of media for social transformation. On the one hand, they do give room for interpretation and dissemination of their content in ways that were impossible with previous media technologies. On the other hand, there is no way for the cases to get rid of the advertising the platforms distribute in exchange for their ‘free’ service and of the commercial logic that they oppose. In the end, the effects of these clashing messages will depend on the viewers on the reception side, that is to say, how they will react to the reception of both critical content and publicity or propaganda. Do they ignore the latter? Or are they somehow affected? These are questions for further inquiries in the field of audience research. Despite these limits, from my point of view the strategy of reinterpretation seems to be the most viable one for media for social transformation lacking resources to acquire media hardware and software more compatible with their imaginaries. Why? Because this approach at least allows them to start disseminating their content, though not in the most perfect conditions they would desire, but keeping a more purist position against commercial practices would just imply that they would not operate at all.

From a theoretical point of view, although I have employed the concept of script emanating from STS, in particular actor-network theory, it is important to remark that the idea of reinterpretation opposes and challenges the former. Indeed, one of the key insights of ANT is that artifacts can be actors, which has provoked broad criticism of the approach, because of what some understand as an unacceptable symmetry between humans and non-humans. In effect, by employing the concept of reinterpretation of technologies I broke the symmetry I consider to be a fictitious one. Although it might be true that technologies have scripts, they are not able to reinterpret other artifacts or humans at their own ‘will’ (well, they might in a future with artificial intelligence, but that was not the case in the situations I analyzed). Therefore, I have argued that the concepts I employed in this chapter better capture, on the one hand, the role of technologies that are overlooked in media research; on the other hand, they avoid the excessive importance STS gives to technologies by putting more weight on the side of human agency and the reinterpretations it can elaborate.

Another important contribution I made in this research is stressing the influence quality schemes have on media for social transformation. This is an overlooked dimension, and sometimes contemporary articles striving for more research on communication for social change in international development do not mention it at all. However, my data suggests it is a relevant dimension that most media producers consider and struggle with. The key insight is that in each country there are mainstream ‘quality schemes’, which refer to the practices of audiovisual production of leading audiovisual firms (private, in the case of Argentina and Brazil) and training institutes. In this research I did not analyze the whole details of these ‘schemes’ that interviewees were referring to, but I did highlight some in the area of news production, such as the requisite of high quality image, the employment of advanced
technologies and the goal of keeping the ideal of objectivity and professionalism. I argued that the aim of this dispositif is to produce a classification of the sort of content that is ‘good’ and worth watching (mainstream commercial schemes), and the sort that is not.

Interviewees pointed out that these quality schemes are a product of the concentration of audiovisual production firms and training institutes in the largest urban areas of Argentina and Brazil (mostly Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro). Accordingly, the ways of covering, speaking and selecting the ‘good’ themes to report about are heavily influenced by the practices emanating from those cities, undermining the rest from other parts of both countries. This points to the link between knowledge and power, because the type of knowledge more widely produced and transmitted is in synchrony with the interests of the most resourceful actors of the media system, disregarding others. For this reason, media for social transformation face the paradox of whether to follow mainstream quality schemes or to innovate in style. The former would allow them to elaborate content the audiences are used to, but that does not necessarily reflect the specificities of their imaginary. The latter would lead them to new ways of reporting more in tune with the type of imaginary they defend, but it would involve the risk of not matching the taste of existing audiences. In chapter 7, I described that both extremes have been employed by the analyzed cases. For instance, the co-operative emulates the aesthetics of private mass media firms, but disseminates co-operative content. Thus, they have been able to locally compete against private firms, quite successfully from their point of view. But from the perspective of outsiders, they are not reaching the goal of creating a real regional TV channel with its own features. This is even more challenging for the indigenous communities, who want to respect their ancestral ways of communication, but this was not yet contemplated in the audiovisual production training they have received. I would also add that they cannot compete against mainstream news firms who have far more resources to cultivate such style. In contrast, Mídia NINJA broke with all the supposed mainstream standards, and still was able to attract the attention of mass audiences, at least for a short period of time. Although the data I gathered does not conclusively reveal which factor had the largest effect, the content or the way it was produced, I suggested it is a combination of both, because in much of the coverage the case received in national, regional and international media part of the news was the innovativeness of the network that had used cellphones and live streamings to subjectively cover what was happening in a collaborative way, far from the professional and ‘good quality schemes’ of mainstream private media. However, it is also possible to think of cases that used innovative aesthetics, but did not attract much attention of mass audiences due to their content.

Nonetheless, Mídia NINJA’s case casts doubt on the argument that media for social transformation can only be successful by following mainstream ‘quality schemes’. There seems to be spaces for challenge, but the data about NINJA suggests two important conditions: specialized own training and the use of new media technologies. As regards the former, Mídia NINJA is the only case that has been able to create its own ‘university’, which can be understood abstractly as a system for replicating their specific knowledge. Thus, they are one step ahead of the three Argentinean cases that - to a different extent - still depend on the standardized knowledge emanating from universities, which keeps them from acquiring professional training, though designed for private commercial media. As I explained in chapter 8, these training practices allowed the case to institutionalize its knowledge, as opposed to ‘professional’ knowledge imparted in universities. This was possible thanks to the network structure of FDE, their collaborative practices and ICT, which stimulated the storage and dissemination of their knowledge.
One of the main differences between Mídia NINJA and the other three cases is that the former has been an active adopter of new media technologies to produce and disseminate content. From my point of view, they seem to have benefited from the pioneering use, of streamings, before the quality standards became more standardized. This points to a short term advantage of these financially resource-scarce media to experiment faster, before mass media firms adopt similar technologies. In effect, interviewees in Brazil commented that mass media journalists were trying to copy their strategies of live coverage, emulating their style. Although the latter might be slower to experiment with new formats due to the bureaucratic process of news production that have, once they do so, they might impose their quality schemes on the new technologies, leaving aside the initial experiments of media for social transformation. Once again, this derives from their major access to resources and opportunities to distribute their content nationally.

In sum, these observations show how knowledge is connected to power-effects. Indeed, the centralized audiovisual knowledge production and training centers reinforce the quality schemes of commercial firms, at the expense of others. Accepting these schemes, as in the case of the co-operatives, seriously reduces the spaces of operation to create regional, autochthonous TV channels. However, the opposition to these schemes is not easy either, because it requires the experimentation with new technologies and patterns of production, together with the establishment of structures to preserve and replicate such knowledge. This is not impossible, however, as the case of Mídia NINJA suggests.

In the first section of chapter 8, I examined four types of violence that media for social transformation have to confront and that are dispositives at the same time. I argued that considering this dimension helps to correct a bias in Western media research that focuses on the power of media in society, but not so much on the needed power struggles between different types of media. Indeed, this perspective is also missing in communication for social change, which focuses more on the power tensions that new media projects can unleash in a ‘community’. Contrarily, the typology I elaborated stresses the varied types of violence that media for social transformation face in non-Western contexts. In part, this is a consequence of my assumption that media might influence the potential lifestyles humans lead; therefore, it is not a surprise that certain types of media are attacked by mass media (both commercial and public), due to the challenge that newcomers present to their discourses. In some countries these attacks are direct and physical, threatening the life of journalists, in others, violence is more indirect (like legal or self-censorship due to the fear of economic retaliation). I am not saying that such attacks do not exist in Western nations, but it is safe to say that their institutional stability seems to make them more the exception than the rule, which might explain why they are overlooked in by Western researchers. Contrarily, ongoing media change processes in other regions, such as Latin American countries, are a living laboratory for such dispositives. Therefore, in chapter 8 I made evident that the emergence and scale up of these alternative experiences might be hampered by incumbents (both private and state actors). In the worst case, this can lead to physical violence against journalists, including death threat and killings, to stop them from disseminating challenging content. However, there are also other mechanisms that have been useful to block media for social transformation, such as attacks toward their economic sustainability and legal constraints. The essential point is that incumbents tend to have more resources than media for social transformation; therefore, they can employ them to their advantage against the projects of the latter. The same is true with respect to what I called discursive violence, which refers to how mass media tend to damage the reputation of challengers, with the intention of reducing their support. Although I did not aim to prove the damage caused by libel and
the dissemination of stereotypes, I hypothesized that the asymmetries in terms of resources among the two types of media tend to make the positions of the former prevail over the latter. Though once again, testing this hypothesis would require further audience research, which was beyond the scope of this research.

A final important aspect to point out is that the types of violence were not only used by the state, which is what authors striving for media commercialization tend to focus on, fearing a state media monopoly, but also by large private media groups, which in the case of Argentina and Brazil have clear monopolistic tendencies by means of reaching large audiences through diverse types of media - to an extent not seen in most Western nations. Therefore, it is not only state control over media that should be feared, but also the excessive ownership concentration patterns that might develop in the hands of private organizations. In any case, whenever these two different logics of operation grow excessively, disrespecting fair competition and regulations, the space for media for social transformation to challenge their practices might become compromised and subject to diverse types of violence. The Argentinean cases show that new laws might help to reduce such dispositives, but fail to get rid of them entirely, unless the historical unequal distribution of resources that has favored state and private mass media firms is somehow rebalanced.

The last contribution of the conceptual framework is to stress the importance of a resource-view of power to understand the potential and weaknesses of media for social transformation in advancing their projects. The perspective I employed departs from the focus that contemporary literature on communication for social change puts on the power relations these media alter within a community, to redirect it to the types of resources needed to operate these organizations in the first place. Thus, my assumption is that the difficulties to access resources are a dispositive, because they indirectly hamper the projects of organizations willing to set up their channels. Therefore, I employed a conceptual framework proposed for interdisciplinary projects, which inspired the construction of a typology of resources that the four cases I analyzed have acquired and mobilized. Although I found the approach useful to unveil the different types of resources, I have also experienced challenges in implementing it. First, it was not easy to gather quantitative information about many of the dimensions. This would have allowed to set up another type of comparison table. Second, I had no access to similar information about mass media, which would have shown in more detail the asymmetries among them and media for social transformation by comparing the imbalances between them. Nonetheless, the typology I built prompted me to complexify the thesis that only financial resources matter for the operation of these organizations. Indeed, the empirical results of the chapter show that those cases that acquired a larger diversity of resources seem to be in a better condition to put into practice and scale up their projects, such as CPEtv and Mídia NINJA. This last perspective clearly surpasses a commercial approach to media and culture that argues that the cases only need money, which of course is partly true. For example, the availability of financial resources was central for CPEtv to acquire everything else. However, the strong statement that only those organizations with enough funds can operate would mean that it was impossible for resource-scarce media for social transformation to exist. Nonetheless, the empirical data clearly disconfirms this, suggesting instead a more varied number of resources that projects could employ to maintain their sustainability, whenever there is not enough state support for their projects. This is an important insight for other media for social transformation that are facing similar challenges, because it can inspire strategies beyond commercial ones, such as advertising, which was not even enough in any of the cases to safeguard financial sustainability. In effect, in chapter 8 I
stressed the importance of relational resources of the cases, which allowed them to acquire others, not necessarily depending on financial intermediation. At the same time, I highlighted the importance of the imaginaries of each case to attract supporters (both audiences and members of the project) without the intermediation of a wage relationship. I agree that this might not be the most suitable strategy to survive in a capitalist economy where most of the activities are intermediated by national currencies; however, it has to be acknowledged that many of these cases are operating - and sustainably - without wages and without employer-employee relations. My data suggests that the imaginary is the only way to explain these practices that diverge from mainstream ones, because they offer local meaning patterns and images of another future that encourages the members of the experiences to experiment and continue their struggle, despite the apparent utopian nature of their projects for outsiders. Among the remaining resources, I claimed that the structures for institutionalizing practices that CPEtv and Mídia NINJA built were essential to replicate their practices, and were missing in the rest of the cases. Particularly in the case of Mídia NINJA, which found a way to copy and disseminate its specific knowledge of audiovisual production. I claim that this is an important observation and strategy for media for social transformation to challenge a commercial perspective. In effect, one of the greatest challenges of these experiences is to scale-up and build networks beyond their initial projects; and precisely the institutionalization of their pioneering practices by subsequent members seems to be a key strategy to challenge commercial practices.

In sum, in a world where the economic dimension of human life has been gaining more and more importance, the spaces for organizations to depart from commercial principles are reduced. Thus, none of the studied cases is clearly separated from for-profit experiences, because through dispositives and exchanges they have to interact with them, and also with the state. Nonetheless, media for social transformation aim toward and experiment with different ways to elaborate information, and do not consider it a mere commodity. The studied cases show two opposite poles with gradients in the middle indicating possible paths to follow. One strategy is to accept many of these commercial practices, but still disseminate alternative content, challenging that of mass media. As I showed with the co-operative case, this is a feasible option. However, it also has the limits of not being radical enough to depart from some practices that create excessive boundaries regarding what these organizations can cover. Having said that, some media for social transformation are deeply questioning broader institutions to advance their projects. Although this might seem utopian, given their scarce resources and size, I have argued that these are valuable experiences, because of their contribution to diversify the space of potential practices that inspires solutions for the problems contemporary economic systems are causing around the world.

9.1 Policy Advice

The findings of this work lead to a number of policy suggestions for the development community and national policies in Argentina and Brazil, which are synthesized in Table 9.1 and detailed below.

9.1.1 Development

What do these cases teach us about international ‘development’? First, it is worth pointing out that the term ‘development’ was scarcely mentioned in the interviews I conducted, except the ones related to the expansion of ideas emanating from international organizations based in Western countries. In
my opinion, this stresses the central problem of the discipline ‘development research’ and practice, because industrialized Western countries still speak of and try to disseminate their models as the best ones, though during the last decades in less violent ways than before. At the same time, the imaginaries of the four media for social transformation illustrate models on how culture, media, and in some cases, society at large ought to be, different from the ones mainstream ‘development’ models propagate. In effect, the co-operatives and workers’ self-managed factories want to reform the economy, the indigenous communities aim to preserve and at best expand their own worldview and institutions beyond Western ones, and FDE and Mídia NINJA illustrate the emergence of networks that similarly are experimenting with different ways of living and exchanging goods and services beyond established patterns. These experiences might be classified by many observers as ‘utopian’ in a pejorative sense, given the obvious supremacy of a capitalist economic model still heavily influenced by Western institutions. Contrarily, from my point of view there are clear examples of alternatives experimenting with varied patterns of living that address - in their own ways - their local quality of life problems, constituting niches that remain mostly off the radar in Western and even national research on development. Therefore, these observations once again point to the historically debated manifold meanings of the concept of ‘development’. As I mentioned in the introduction, it is worth keeping in mind that despite its apparent uniformity, indeed, it spans projects with different objectives and actors, that might get concealed when people just speak of ‘development’, plus any other fancy extra adjective that might be added to it, such as ‘feasible’, ‘green’, ‘inclusive’, ‘sustainable’, among others. Therefore, although ‘development’ might still be useful to tag professionals, practitioners, and others who claim to be working in this field, it needs to be continuously opened up in each context to grasp the diversity of perspectives, many times in conflict with each other; or perhaps just be dropped for other concepts that better delineate the differences. I advocate for this second perspective, particularly because of the diversity of alternatives I detected at the grassroots level.

But if there really are many alternative grassroots experiences advocating and practicing with different institutions for living, why are they off the radar in national and international ‘development research’? As regards the former, I hypothesize that one reason might be that they challenge - to varying degrees - the authority of nation states. The clearest case would be a fulfillment of the most extreme demands of indigenous communities, that, ultimately, want the political autonomy back they had before the Spanish and later Argentinean conquest. Similarly, the case of the FDE network is building parallel networks of exchange that aim to create a semi-autonomous exchange system inde-
pended of national currency and other institutions. Therefore, this suggests a latent conflict of visions between these groups that created media for social transformation and the state as the unique agent monopolizing the power to govern the national territory and diverse types of networks that sustain the specific capitalist economic system. Given the history of Argentina and Brazil during the cold war, in which the state opposed guerrillas and other revolutionary movements that radically challenged existing institutions, it is not a surprise that imaginaries striving for societal change, and co-operative and collective lifestyles, might awake fear in the population originating from previous conflictive and violent periods of national history. Nonetheless, this statement has to be rejected in the four cases I studied, because they are proposing democratic and physically non-violent changes in the existing structures. It is also worth to point out that many of the demands from these networks have a long history (like co-operatives and indigenous communities), but they have intensified their demands thanks to the advancements of communications. Likewise, new networks emerged, such as FDE and Mídia NINJA, which are unthinkable without these new technologies. Thus, I understand the four imaginaries I analyzed and their respective media as examples of the increasing role that communications have in paving the way for new groups and lifestyles to emerge, challenging state and private structures from within. In other words, despite the hurdles that media for social transformation still encounter, today they undoubtedly have more means to (re)produce their imaginaries than 100 years ago.

As regards the lack of international research of these alternatives, a similar argument can be made in connection with the ongoing changes in international geopolitics. The emergence of the BRICS countries and the growth of the Asian Tigers during the last decades, together with the slow decay of influence of the USA and Europe, suggest that the world is in transition – albeit a sluggish one - toward a multipolar world, where influence will be more diversified than in the last century. Therefore, it is safe to hypothesize that the mainstream ideas disseminated from USA and relevant European countries, such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany, will become more challenged and rejected in the future. Indeed, this is already taking place with what analysts call ‘neoliberal’ policies, predominant in Western countries, where austerity, ‘markets’ and private initiative take the lead over anything else. These concepts are being challenged, at least rhetorically, by left-wing political parties in South America and even in the European ‘periphery’. Within this dispute of models of what sort of institutions to follow, it is understandable that international organizations – which are not so international, but rather Western biased – and mainstream research centers, mostly located in the USA and Europe, will defend the ‘institutions’ and neoliberal policies they have been living with during the last decades. Thus, I understand that the neglect of alternatives in mainstream development research is not based on their inexistence or unreality, as orthodox analysts like to point out, but it rather is a reflection of the existing, though decaying, power relations. However, it is becoming more difficult for the main centers to stop the flow of these alternative models thanks to the expansion of global communications. Take the extreme case of the Islamic State, which aims to create a new system of living, quite opposite to many Western institutions, where different types of media (particularly social networks) have played a central role in attracting followers. Even though this is a radical and morally reprehensible case, it still is a good example of how culture and communication shall play a central role in the dissemination and growth of non-Western models. But it is also true that new ways of control are emerging to avoid the expansion of ‘alternatives’. For example, left-wing governments all around the world that tend to receive little or biased coverage in mainstream Western media and research.

The global promotion of the creative economy policy discourses under the umbrella of broader strate-
gies toward a knowledge economy cannot be separated from the previous global scheme. Indeed, the mainstream policy discourse disseminated by UNCTAD, inspired by the UK experience and by the work of Western academics and consultants, clearly takes side with the institutions in Western nations, indirectly claiming their global validity. In particular, they implicitly defend the position that information is just another commodity. Although it is hard to deny that such strategy might contribute to economic growth, it is quite doubtful it will advance broader social and environmental objectives. Contrarily, the original British version seems tailor-made for commercial transnational corporations, and for disseminating the individualistic perspective predominant in Anglo-Saxon countries. Additionally, it is worth to point out that the cultural imperialism thesis might have lost its prominence in academia, but that does not mean that the phenomena it describes have disappeared into thin air. At least for the Americas and many Western European countries, it is safe to say that the influence of US and UK cultural industries is far superior to those of other countries. Indeed, it is more common to listen to music, watch movies and access other products and services from those countries than from others. Therefore, the argument that the cultural imperialism thesis is no longer valid due to 'globalization' and the increasing flows of global communications misses the point, because international structures still favor current and former global powers over others. Accordingly, it is not by chance that English is a sort of lingua franca, and thus, it is understandable that the most powerful media and culture organizations from those countries want to defend their access to and privileges in foreign markets, at the expense of other perspectives. Similarly, national firms sharing similar commercial interests side with this kind of approach, such as Globo in Brazil. In effect, these are the types of actors that would benefit more from the creative economy policy discourses, and even more from the version in which strict intellectual property rights are enforced, particularly given the challenge the internet poses to their preexisting media models.

On the one hand, the commercial approach to culture is particularly problematic in the case of communications, where it would imply that information production ought to depend on its capacity to generate profits, limiting, overlooking and undermining alternatives. This notion of information as a mere commodity favors the existing transnational flow of information, still concentrated in few Western countries. Thus, it does not only leave aside media for social transformation, but also non-Western public media channels. In effect, the recent Ukraine crisis in Europe has been a good example of such imbalances. The reporting of Western nations claimed to have the 'objective' facts of what was going on, while the Russian media were accused of producing 'propaganda'. This is another example that reveals how media are quickly linked to political, and in this case, geopolitical issues. For this reason, it would be unrealistic for leading Western nations to give up a commercial model where they have an advantage to disseminate their perspectives over others, thus the change of the contemporary structure will depend more on global transformations, difficult – if not impossible – to predict. On the other hand, and leaving aside such thorny political issues, if communication is as relevant for the introduction of new practices as I have argued, it is in the interest of Western nations to employ media to raise awareness of the global crisis threatening the survival of humanity on earth. Accordingly, the role of media in 'development' needs to be seriously reconsidered. However, it seems that the fear of a new dispute over the commercial model prevails; otherwise, communication and media would have appeared in the Millenium Development Goals somewhere or would have been discussed in the Sustainable Development Goals - an opportunity that unfortunately seems to have been missed once again. This is a shortcoming that needs to be addressed to disseminate content raising awareness of such
global sustainable goals, in particular by grassroots projects that could definitely contribute to tackle environmental and social concerns. Therefore, there is a need for international organizations to put the role of media for social transformation back on the agenda.

### 9.1.2 National Policies

During the last twelve years, the geopolitical situation has changed significantly both in Argentina and Brazil with respect to the previous excessive influence of the USA, which has also gone hand in hand with a questioning of European and other ‘international’ models. In contrast, more appropriate projects of social transformation and change have started to emerge, and I think that states need to pursue these specific directions, without cutting off a dialog with the other models, but by always putting local and specific geopolitical constraints first in both countries. In other words, to ‘tropicalize’ foreign influences in mixture with local practices. This also requires to further question the role of international organizations and ‘deterritorialized experts’ who transfer ideas and practices in a top-down way from specific contexts in industrialized countries to the rest, repeating a well-known pattern in the development industry. However, these translations abuse the ‘status’ that consultants and academics in think tanks, international organizations or universities of industrialized countries have in comparison with those in industrializing ones. Nonetheless, in many cases these ‘experts’ have little or no knowledge whatsoever of the country in which they are diffusing their idea, with the possible negative consequence of misleading policies, undermining local expertise, and producing collateral effects that resource-scarce sectors of the population generally suffer from. Therefore, there is a need to assess translation processes, and to open more space to a diversity of local specialists, and not just those agreeing without questioning foreign ‘international’ ideas, just in exchange for temporary financial benefits. Otherwise, the imposition of one vision on what sort of communication matters for development will prevail, at the expense of a diversity of models that grassroots and other organizations are experimenting with.

Although the introduction of new local models has not been without hurdles, I think that the consideration of policies to reduce inequalities must remain a priority in Argentina and Brazil, and also in other Latin American countries, because it is still one of the most unequal regions in the world. In particular, this thesis partly examined how both countries have experimented with pioneering cultural and media policies; for instance, Brazil with the Cultura Viva program as a way to address inequalities in the cultural area, and Argentina with its new audiovisual communication services law. Both cases show the central importance of cultural and media policies to reinforce the specific national political projects that emerged in 2003. These initiatives are paving the way for further policies to revalue the diversity of expressions of the multiple communities that make up the two countries: indigenous communities, peripheral communities; different immigrant communities; Afro-descendant communities; among others. Despite these promising policies to reduce inequalities, it is also true that commercial policies for culture and media are still prevalent in both countries, disregarding the efforts of the latter. I have argued that both need to be present at the policy level, but in a more balanced way. Therefore, I think that a possible road to strengthen cultural and media policies so that they can tackle inequality issues is to open up the policy planning process and advance with more participatory techniques of

---

1. The term ‘tropicalization’, or to make something appropriate for the tropics, tends to be used in Brazil to describe a process of adoption and adaption of foreign models and practices. The adaptation part is particularly stressed, since it has historically been omitted in many Latin American countries during the expansion of Western models.
policy design and implementation. This would allow civil society organizations to speak with a clearer voice on what they want, reducing authoritarian top-down models, where only the economically more powerful interest groups and technocrats are heard.

Even though during the last ten years there have been changes to address the bias against resource-scarce groups, there is still a lot of room for improvement. For example, broadening the definitions used in tenders that in many cases just allude to commercial practices; training public officials to understand the discourses of minority communities; comprehending different economic systems of exchange, etc. In short, both countries, which are still relatively young democracies, need to cultivate and institutionalize tolerance to alternative views that challenge both the state and private corporations. Additionally, in chapter 5 I examined four cases that point to the existence of broader and diverse networks of projects striving for different models of societal organization. For example, the social and solidarity economy and the emerging experiences through ICT that can be classified as part of a ‘collaborative economy’. These offer different ways of organizing production, distribution and consumption to address the inequalities generated by the contemporary capitalist economic system. I think these different economic exchange practices deserve further research to understand their contributions to tackle social and environmental challenges, and if positive, further support from the state to stimulate their activities.

After 30 years, both countries have returned to democratic systems; however, I have argued that there are still many steps to take in order to further advance the democratization of other institutions, such as culture and communications. If information is considered as a commons, one way to address the financial hurdles of NGO media would be for states to establish transparent and egalitarian systems of distributing public propaganda, taking into account compensation mechanisms for the historically unequal access to resources some groups suffered. The distribution of such funds could be reviewed by representatives of diverse parties. In this way, the political administration in charge would be prevented from taking control, and such distribution of funds would also pave the way for dissident voices to appear across the country, enriching the diversity of opinions on issues of local and national discussion.

Additionally, given the role that foreign technologies play as a dispositive to further advance commercial principles, states could put into practice policies to produce appropriate local technologies for these media to operate. In this way, the ‘script’ of these technologies would at least match the context of operation of these media, and not translate those of commercial media in the ‘Global North’. I am not naive to think this is something that can be easily done, given the high concentration patterns of technological firms that exist in the world, like in Silicon Valley in the USA and similar regions in other industrialized countries. Yet, this shows that, unless organizations unite against such concentration, the creation of NGO media is highly threatened due to the pervasiveness of technologies oriented toward for-profit principles. At the same time, this local generation of technologies would help to address the problems that contemporary practices of reinterpretation still have. One possibility to explore is the association of civil society actors across Latin American countries facing similar challenges in order to develop appropriate hardware and software for their media initiatives, among other nonprofit projects. In effect, software co-operatives are already advancing in that direction. Definitely, this points to the need of also broadening innovation projects to include not only projects of for-profit firms, but also the ones of co-operatives and other NGOs.

Apart from the stimulation of appropriate media technologies, in chapter 7 I revealed the role that quality patterns have in limiting the spaces of operation of media for social transformation. These exist,
in part, due to the social structure in both countries, but also due to the concentration of audiovisual production firms and training institutes in the largest urban areas, aiming to provide human resources for the private sector. Therefore, one way for the states to start ‘democratizing’ audiovisual production knowledge is funding audiovisual training institutes in different parts of the countries. In such projects, it will not only be important to transfer the practices from the capital to the rest of the territory, but also to support a diversity of regional groups so that they can experiment with appropriate technologies and new aesthetic schemes of audiovisual content production. This would reduce the influence of the quality dispositive of audiovisual production knowledge aimed toward for-profit firms.

The results on violence from chapter 8 point to four ways to reduce such limits to media organizations striving for social transformation. First, the unacceptable physical violence against journalists must stop. Second, competition laws need to be closely enforced and in some cases updated to avoid unfair competition practices. Third, the need to introduce and enforce appropriate media regulation laws to avoid concentration patterns in few firms and to stimulate new media experiences, particularly nonprofit and public ones. Last but not least, the continuous discursive violence that mass media organizations exercise through libel and stereotyping against smaller organizations, individuals and resource-scarce groups, also needs to be addressed somehow. This begs for the discussion of an instrument to assure certain ethics in media reporting, which of course is a subtle issue given the thin line separating freedom of speech, offense and repression. However, the current frameworks seem to favor only the most economically endowed actors to cross such boundaries, while the less resourceful ones remain defenseless against such attacks. Therefore, new measures need to be devised to address such problems, to stop the reputations of the affected from being unfairly damaged in the ever more increasing and connected societies we live in. A potential solution to explore might be to create a national organization, with federal representation, which could receive complaints and decide based on the gathered evidence, whether or not to initiate lawsuits against offenders. I think that an organization of this type could at least try to balance the existing asymmetries.

In addition to these suggestions, I would like to detail specific ones addressing the situation in Argentina and Brazil, below.

9.1.2.1 Argentina

The new audiovisual communication services law has unleashed substantial changes in Argentinean media. However, it still faces several challenges in its implementation; for example, the legal battles with the most concentrated and powerful firm that opposes its application, Clarín, which, so far, has neither met the requirements regarding its downsizing nor regarding the inclusion of NGO and other public media TV channels in their cable services. This puts the whole project of media democratization under threat, and thus requires the continuous pressure of civil society actors to fully implement the new law; a situation that will depend on the context of the national elections in 2015. At the same time, the state has to fulfill the promises it adhered to, by treating all types of media equally, without distinguishing between those closer to their political projects and those opposed to them. Another point is to carefully open up the category ‘non-governmental organizations’ in the law, which in fact is a broad tag that hides the asymmetries of the organizations that match such a definition. Moreover, the law has not taken into account online media, an issue that might require further legislation in the nearby future. Last but not least, the emergence of new media channels is still invisible, perhaps this could be addressed by keeping and distributing a directory of all the new legalized media that are operating in
the country. This would make their existence visible and might raise the interest of potential audiences.

9.1.2.2 Brazil

Brazil urgently needs a new media law, and of course I am not being creative at all in this recommendation, because since 1991 it has been the demand of the FNDC. However, the comparison of the collected empirical data shows the imbalances between both countries: Whereas in Argentina there has been a challenge to concentrated private media firms and an advancement to democratize media production, Brazil still did not touch on this policy area much, apart from the stimulation from cultural policies. This absence of state regulation has been detrimental to new media collectives, which despite their circumstantial attraction of audiences, have been suffering higher and in some cases even deadly levels of violence than similar experiences in Argentina. These situations damage the democratic system in Brazil, because the voices of different minority sectors are ignored, or in the worst of the cases, attacked and ridiculed. This once again is a political question that has reappeared on Dilma’s agenda during her reelection campaign in 2014. The success and hurdles of the Argentinean experience might be useful in the discussion of such a new law in Brazil, because it not only shows that it is essential to change the legal framework to address unequal resource distribution in the media sector, but also that this is not always enough. In a national political scenario where such change is still not possible, the most promising space to challenge concentration of media is to continue promoting digital practices and collectives, which was an essential part of the first years of Lula’s government, but lost importance during Dilma’s governments. Although it is a second best solution, it would still contribute to media democratization by taking into account ongoing technological changes. However, it would still not touch the remaining resource advantages that mass media firms, such as Globo, retain.

9.2 Further Lines of Research

The conceptual framework employed in this thesis can stimulate further lines of research about communications for social change. First, I employed participant observation, which brought attention to the material contexts of production that are often ignored in Latin America’s media research, mostly focusing on content. Although it is true that the former requires far more resources and better access to the cases than the latter, I claim that the efforts are valuable, because the combination of both types of approaches offers deeper insights. In future research projects, these could be extended to other media relevant for social transformation projects, such as the radio. Second, the research showed the fruitful interconnections between media research concepts and those of science and technology and the philosophy of technology, stressing the materiality and mediation of non-human objects in shaping these media experiences, but also the existing spaces for reinterpretation. Additionally, I remarked the role of ‘quality patterns’, which point to the relativity of ‘taste’ and the limits media for social transformation might encounter when trying to produce content in an innovative way. These dimensions could be further studied by comparing different experiences operating with a variety of media technologies and aesthetic patterns of production. Third, another possible future line of research is to compare the role of different media (public, private, NGO) and their role in governance in varied Latin American countries, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay, etc. This is a central political issue in the region, due to the ongoing media change processes. Fourth, the empirical data made evident the existence of a variety of alternative and complementary currency systems, which offer promising ways to address national
currency scarcity. These systems could be further studied with empirical methods from economics to inquire about their pros and cons, and to offer insights for the design and implementation of media systems less constrained by for-profit principles. Fifth, the research stressed the role of discursive violence, in particular the dissemination of defamatory communications and stereotypes against media for social transformation by mass media. The effects of these communications on audiences could be further inquired by designing specific social psychology and media psychology experiments, which depending on their results, might either inspire regulations against such types of violence or not. Last but not least, with the examination of the case studies I stressed the existence and the importance of varied discourses, which I called imaginaries, and the role of communication to advance these different, inter-subjective perceptions of the world. I have argued that these played a very important role in offering ‘subject-positions’ to attract viewers and also members, counter-balancing their lack of resources. This begs the question of how and why some of these imaginaries have been more successful than others, which requires the use of audience research strategies possibly in tandem with psychological research methods to understand what types of viewers access this media and why. On the one hand, this could help to unveil consumption patterns, because it is without doubt that most of the population in Argentina and Brazil would immediately identify the names of the two mainstream media groups; but, very few might have heard of the rest. This raises the question of what sort of factors influence media consumption patterns, particularly with new media technologies that seem to offer a major variety of sources. Is it a habit that persists throughout different media? How does it change over time? What differentiates people who actively search media for social transformation from others? These are not new discussions in communication research in Western countries, but they have not been empirically researched in Latin America thoroughly, and in my opinion offer the potential to go deeper into understanding the role of media for social transformation. On the other hand, such audience research methods could include media experiments to inquire about the social-psychological processes in operation during the interaction between viewers and the media content offered by media for social transformation. These media mediated processes deserve further attention from researchers, because the creation and change of practices through communication could contribute to advance and expand more environmentally friendly lifestyles, which might look utopian from a mainstream perspective, but which could still offer pathways for innovations to address the pressing global problems that humanity is facing in the 21st century. In a similar vein, the analysis of these psychological processes could also shed light on other communication experiences of public concern; for example, far right extremist groups or radical religious organizations, such as the Islamic State or neo-Nazi organizations, who appropriate widely available ICT and use media as a central tool to disseminate and reinforce violent ‘imaginaries’, despite the efforts of states to eradicate such radical and racist behaviors, even in the most ‘developed’ nations.

To conclude, I want to stress that with this thesis I aimed to highlight the role of interpretations and meanings to achieve intelligibility of the diverse types of human and technical organizations one can find in practice. I employed the analytical strategy of studying discourses, which suggests how these constellations of statements lead to different types of strategies of organizing contemporary societies, influencing spaces for action and having power-effects. Accepting this perspective, it is inevitable to revalue the importance of communication and culture for social transformations, because of their theoretical role in disseminating a diversity of such discourses. However, the contemporary excessive tendency of commercializing everything seems to limit diversity just to the space of commercial prac-
tices, damaging democratic processes because of the exclusion of those actors not following such an approach. From my point of view, the four studied examples offer inspiration to surpass such excessive tendencies, because they try to experiment with different ways of producing information beyond the guidance of for-profit principles, albeit with obstacles. At the same time, I think this and similar innovative niche networks can help overcome the impasse of ‘development research’, because these networks of experiences are already proposing innovative new organizational methods and practices to solve pressing social issues. For this reason, I believe they deserve to be studied in more detail, and should not disappear from the radar, obfuscated by false analogies with dangerous and failed past experiences (I mean the usual critique of collective experiences with communist dictatorships) or by the comfortable pessimism of ‘elite’ armchair philosophers and social scientists from the West. Unfortunately, these perspectives still have too much influence on ‘international’ organizations, but do not have a positive affect on the lives of those who suffer the most in the world. This collective pain is caused by the undeniable consequences of ongoing wars, inequalities, and systems bringing out the worst of human biological impulses, where mainstream for profit media do play an important role in reinforcing many of these ominous tendencies. However, this research also suggests the existence of projects of communication for social change contributing to alter these perceived inequalities, which to me seems to be an essential contribution to ongoing processes of human emancipation, departing from business as usual. It is my hope that this work will inspire further research in an age in which critical voices have few spaces for expression and the stimulation of action.
Bibliography


Coalición por una Radiodifusión Democrática. 2004. *21 puntos básicos por el derecho a la comunicación.*


Larsen, Peder Olesen, and Markus von Ins. 2010. “The rate of growth in scientific publication and the decline in coverage provided by Science Citation Index.” *Scientometrics* 84 (3): 575–603.


UNESCO. 1980. Many voices, one world. Towards a new more just and more efficient world information and communication order. UNESCO.


306


Online sources


Coraggio, José Luis. 2013. “Economía social: conceptos y prácticas.”


CPE. 2003., May.

———. 2011. CPEtv realizó pruebas técnicas, June.


313


——. 2013. “Para expressar a liberdade. Um a nova lei, para um novo tempo.”

315


La Arena. 1933a. Hacia la instalación de la usina propia. Santa Rosa, La Pampa., October 23.


———. 1935c. El vecindario y el suministro de energía eléctrica. Santa Rosa, La Pampa., September 27.


———. 1935f. La cooperación. Moderna tendencia social que cambiará la faz de la economía de las naciones. Santa Rosa, La Pampa., July 18.

———. 1935g. La cooperativa de luz se ha dirigido al M. del interior. Santa Rosa, La Pampa., December 8.

———. 1935h. La instalación de los motores provisorios. Santa Rosa, La Pampa., May 9.

———. 1935i. Se trabaja activamente en el lugar donde se instalarán los motores. Santa Rosa, La Pampa., August 24.


———. 2003e. Intentaron decomisar los equipos de TV de la CPE. Santa Rosa, La Pampa., May 17.


———. 2003h. La CPE presentó recurso de amparo. Cinco jueces se excusaron. Santa Rosa, La Pampa., December 4.


———. 2003j. Los diputados apoyan a la CPE. Santa Rosa, La Pampa., April 4.

______. 2003l. Presentan nuevo proyecto de ley de radiodifusión. Santa Rosa, La Pampa., June 25.


320


Morales, Víctor Hugo, and Juan Manuel Berlanga. 2012. ““Hasta que no se concrete la desinversión, la ley estará renga.””


326
Appendices:

Appendix A: Interview Partners in Argentina

Figure 9.1 shows that I conducted a total of 33 interviews in Argentina with four types of actors. I had thirteen interviews with policy makers, including those occupying a position at the time of fieldwork and others related to previous administrations. Moreover, I interviewed eleven different actors related to the cases, but the graphic does not show the quantity of times, which in some cases was more than once. Furthermore, I had interviews with media personnel and others related to mainstream and alternative cultural practices in Argentina not strictly related to the three cases under analysis, which helped to understand the different policy discourses in the country. Finally, the category academics considers the interviews I had with professors that study policies related to culture and communication in the country.
Appendix B: Interviews Partners in Brazil

Figure 9.2 shows that I conducted a total of 27 interviews in Brazil, divided into four categories. Ten interviews were with members of Fora do Eixo and Mídia NINJA distributed in different cities of Brazil. Seven interviews covered policy makers related to creative economy policy discourses in the country, which includes those that were at that time in office and others from previous administrations. Additionally, I interviewed five practitioners in the field of media and culture, who were not working for Mídia NINJA in order to obtain more firsthand information on the delineated policy discourses of chapter 4. Finally, the last two categories in the graphic cover interviews I conducted with academics and consultants, who have knowledge about the policy discourses and in some cases about the case under consideration as well.
Appendix C: Interview Questions

The in-depth interviews were guided by open questions that inquired about several dimensions of interest. The interview guides varied depending on whether the interviewee was a former or current policy-maker/academic from the countries under analysis or practitioners related to the studied cases. Below I include typical questions asked to policy makers, academics and practitioners. It is worth to point out that for each interviewee the guide was adapted to research about specific information about his or her experience and trajectory, which would shed light on the main research question of the project.

Policy Makers and Academics

Policies and Politics
These set of questions aimed to gather information about the different perceptions on the changes in politics at the national or regional level, with respect to the changes in policies in the area of culture and media. It also included comparisons between Argentina and Brazil and within other policy areas.

- What is your opinion about the changes in the promotion of cultural or creative industries/creative economy in country A/B in relation to the national political changes prior and posterior to 2003?

- What do you think about the effects that the use (or not) of the terms cultural or creative industries/creative economy imply?

- What sort of conflicts do you highlight in this policy arena? Which actors are involved?
• Which academics or experiences inspired the design of policies for the area of cultural or creative industries/creative economy?

• What is your opinion about policy/program Y in the country?

• What do you think of the policy Y in country A/B with respect to the policies in country B/A?

• What is the role of actor X in the policy?

• What are the connections of cultural policies with those of the Ministry of ... (Communications, Science and Technology, Economic Development, etc.)?

**Intellectual Property**

• What is the role of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in cultural and media policies?

• What do you think about the inequalities in access to cultural and media expressions?

• What do you think about the promotion of alternatives IPRs schemes that have emerged? For example, Creative Commons.

**Cases**

These set of questions aimed to capture outsiders’ perspectives on the cases under analysis.

• What is your opinion about case X?

• What challenges are they facing?
Practitioners

About the Experience
These questions aimed to inquire about the historical process of creation of the cases

• How and when did the organization begin?
• How has the organization evolved in time?
• How is the experience organized?

Policies and Politics

These questions were similar to the ones asked to policy makers and academics in order to grasp the perceptions of policies on their everyday activities.

• What is your opinion on the changes in the promotion of cultural or creative industries/economy in country A/B in relation to the national political changes prior and posterior to 2003?
• What do you think about the effects that the use (or not) of the terms cultural or creative industries/ creative economy imply?
• What sort of conflicts do you highlight in this policy arena? Which actors are involved?
• What is your opinion about policy/program Y in the country?
• What do you think of the policy Y in country A/B with respect to the policies in country B/A?

Resources

• How many people work in the organization?
• What is their training?
• How do you sustain the operation of the organization?
• Which are the main partners of the organization?

Content

• Could you describe the process of content production of the organization?
• Has the organization innovated in the production process?
• What are the themes that the organization considers more important to cover?

Intellectual property

• Which is the strategy of the organization with respect to IPRs? Why?
• What is the perspective within the organization about the promotion of alternatives IPRs schemes? For example, Creative Commons.

Technology

• What sort of media technologies does the organization employ?
• How has the organization acquired them?
• Has the organization introduced further innovations in them?
• How does the organization experiment and learn from the application of new technologies?

Aesthetics

• What sort of aesthetic production schemes does the organization follow?
• How does the organization deal with mainstream schemes?

Violence

• What sort of conflicts has the organization endured since its creation?
Appendix D: Elaboration of Statistics from Videos List

This annex describes the method employed to collect metadata about online videos generated by the studied media organizations.

**Step 1 - Selection of Sources**

The first step was to select the source or channel from where to obtain statistics and other information about videos. In this research, I collected data from two types of sources: YouTube channel videos and Twitcasting live transmissions. For example, from YouTube I gathered information about the videos from Barricada TV, whereas from Twitcasting I collected information about the content from Mídia NINJA.

**Step 2 - Construction of the List of Web Pages with Videos to Study**

The second step involved obtaining a complete list of web pages of all videos in each channel from the case studies, which were useful to automatize the data extraction process in the following step. The solution to this selection depended on the type of source under analysis. For the case of YouTube, the best way was to consult the API that the site offers, because it easily allows to obtain the total list of videos associated with a channel. In the case of Twitcasting, the technique was easier given that the site names each video of the channels sequentially, thus it was simple to build the list of web pages by taking the first and last video.

**Step 3 - Metadata Collection**

The next step consisted in extracting useful data from the list of web pages with the videos from the case studies. I accomplished this by employing the free service offered by Kimono Labs, an organization whose software allows the user to collect structured information from web pages. The procedure was quite simple to extract data from the webpages that appear in the same structure. For example, in the case of YouTube I extracted the title of the video, its longer description, its duration, the number of viewers, the number of likes and dislikes it received, and its publication date. Likewise, from Twitcasting I gathered information about the title of the video, the number of viewers, its length and when it was streamed.

**Step 4 - Save Information into a Database**

I exported the collected data from Kimono to a local database and modified the format of some variables to access them; for example, those that represent time, like the duration of the videos and the date in which they were published.

**Step 5 - Elaborate Statistics**

Finally, I analyzed the data to build the statistics included in the thesis.
Appendix E: Video from CPEtv, Argentina

To analyze and compare the different styles of news production in each of the four cases, I employed the videohermeneutics method introduced by Raab & Tanzler (2012). In particular, I borrowed and adapted the idea of score that captures different dimensions about the visual and audio data of a video. Specifically, in this research I opened up the former in three dimensions: setting, camera movements and captions, whereas the latter is extended in two dimensions: speech and music. This simple device unveils the patterns of video production of each media organization, and most importantly, allows a comparison among them. The following table shows a fragment of the result of applying the videohermeneutics method to a video elaborated by CPEtv, where I include a description of each dimension plus my comments. I highlight I employed “-” to indicate that there was nothing of interest to remark in a given cell about the dimension under analysis. Similarly, I used the latin word “Idem” to indicate that the content of a given cell is equal to the content of the previous one in time for a given dimension. The video covers the first block of the program CPE Notícias, broadcasted on August 7th, 2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time h:m:s</th>
<th>Visual data</th>
<th>Audio data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>Camera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 a 20</td>
<td>Symbols of the town are shown, such as the central plaza, the main street, the lagoon, satellites of the channel, the statue of an indigenous community leader, and the symbol of CPE noticias.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Two journalists appear on the studio. The man wears a suit and the woman a formal dress, both trying to give a professional impression. Both have laptops and sit in front of a broad table. The studio has a futuristic background, and a big LED TV.</td>
<td>The camera focuses on each journalist separately and then both together.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-36</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

335
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time h:m:s</th>
<th>Visual data</th>
<th>Audio data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>Camera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0:059</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:53</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:19</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time h:m:s</td>
<td>Visual data</td>
<td>Audio data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Setting</strong></td>
<td><strong>Camera</strong></td>
<td><strong>Caption</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Shows a number of images that were collected during the day in order to introduce the news. They presented three local news and a national one.</td>
<td>Fixed on the images.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:37</td>
<td>Returns to studio.</td>
<td>Focused on the female reporter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:07</td>
<td>Shows the footage where they interviewed a priest.</td>
<td>Close up showing the priest, the microphone of CPEtv is seen, but not the reporter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:20</td>
<td>Shows a parish.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:27</td>
<td>Shows people touching a statue of San Cayetano.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:41</td>
<td>Returns to show the priest.</td>
<td>Close up showing the priest, the microphone of CPEtv is seen, but not the reporter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time h:m:s</td>
<td>Visual data</td>
<td>Audio data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:49</td>
<td>Show more images of the preachers, candles, many old people touching the saint and things that they sell.</td>
<td>Setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:31</td>
<td>Exhibits the priest blessing a woman.</td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:34</td>
<td>Returns to show the priest.</td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:51</td>
<td>Shows people from the parish selling diverse objects related to the celebration.</td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:12</td>
<td>Returns to focus on the priest.</td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:20</td>
<td>The images focus on preachers.</td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:48</td>
<td>Returns to focus on the priest.</td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:55</td>
<td>The symbol of the channel reappears to make a transition.</td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The priest explains San Cayetano is one of the most revered saints in Argentina, even more than in Italy.

The priest explains August 7th is the day of San Cayetano.

The priest explains the context where San Cayetano worked and that he was a count who donated his wealth.

Cites "His motto was always providence".

The interviewer asks what believers usually request to San Cayetano, not surprisingly, he answered "work".

Transition music.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time h:m:s</th>
<th>Visual data</th>
<th>Audio data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Setting</strong></td>
<td><strong>Camera</strong></td>
<td><strong>Caption</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:00</td>
<td>Shows an image of young men running, which illustrates a brief news about an athletism event in the city.</td>
<td>Focuses on the image.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:30</td>
<td>Returns to studio.</td>
<td>Focuses on the male journalist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:56</td>
<td>Interview with one of the neighbors gathered at the park Oliver.</td>
<td>Centered on the face of the interviewee. The microphone of CPEtv is seen, but not the reporter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:21</td>
<td>Shows images of what the citizens are doing in the park to protest against the mayor's decision.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:43</td>
<td>Returns to show the male interviewee.</td>
<td>Centered on the face of the interviewee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00</td>
<td>Returns to show the destroyed oval in the park.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

339
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Setting</th>
<th>Camera</th>
<th>Caption</th>
<th>Audio data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11:18</td>
<td>Shows a close-up of a female</td>
<td>Shows a close-up of a female interviewee.</td>
<td>Introduces the female citizen Elina Alonzo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>interviewee.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Porcel.</td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:36</td>
<td>Once again images of people</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>working trying to rearm the oval.</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:43</td>
<td>Shows that citizens are</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>building a message with the</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bricks of the remaining oval.</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:55</td>
<td>Returns to the interviewer</td>
<td>Shows a close-up of a female interviewee.</td>
<td>Introduces the female citizen Elina Alonzo</td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Porcel.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:01</td>
<td>Transition signal of CPE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Background music.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>noticias</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:07</td>
<td>Returns to the studio.</td>
<td>The camera focuses on both journalists.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The female journalist anticipates the first</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>break and the next news to show.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:35</td>
<td>The male journalist writes on a</td>
<td>The camera makes a slow zoom out.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>page, while the female journalist uses her notebook</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The background music level increases as they get closer to the cut.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:44</td>
<td>The video closes with the</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Transition music.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>transition signal of CPE noticias.</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix F: Video from Barricada TV, Argentina

The following table shows a fragment of the result of applying the videohermeneutics method explained in Appendix E to a video elaborated by Barricada TV. The video is part of the program Noticiero Popular that discusses the decriminalization of marijuana for personal use. It was broadcasted on June 22th, 2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Visual data</th>
<th>Audio data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>Camera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>Shows a photo of IMPA's building, which has an antenna at its top, emitting TV radio waves.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0:11</td>
<td>The interviewers are two female journalists from Barricada TV. The interviewee is Sebastián Basalo, director of THC magazine. They sit around a circular table. The background wall has red and black colors and the symbol of Barricada TV.</td>
<td>Films at a distance to cover the three on the studio.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0:16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Makes a close up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:20</td>
<td>Shows images of a mobilization in front of the national congress. Protesters carried several banners, for example saying &quot;Decriminalization NOW&quot;.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:27</td>
<td>Returns to the studio.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>Camera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:34</td>
<td>Shows two panels: on the right, the coverage of protestors in favor of the new law; on the left, the studio.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:45</td>
<td>The image now only focuses on the face of those at the studio.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:55</td>
<td>Focuses on the second female journalist.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:44</td>
<td>Focuses on the interviewee.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:06</td>
<td>Focuses on journalists.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:22</td>
<td>Shows both panels: on the left, the mobilization; on the right, the studio.</td>
<td>Focuses on the interviewee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time h:m:s</td>
<td>Visual data</td>
<td>Audio data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:55</td>
<td></td>
<td>A journalist asks about the studies of the marijuana route that the interviewee elaborated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:28</td>
<td>Returns to the studio.</td>
<td>The interviewee answers back, making an historical connection that stresses that the first drug law was sanctioned during the dictatorship of the 1970s. From his point of view, the intention of the law was not to stop its commercialization, but to implement a sort of social control of young and poor sectors of the population, by imprisoning them if detected with drugs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:44</td>
<td>Shows only images of the mobilization.</td>
<td>The image says “to cultivate is a right!” The mobilization was massive and took place in the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires. The interviewee explains another problem of the current law, which rewards policemen for the number of cases of drug consumers that they collect. The interviewee highlights that the government uses these indicators to show how well they are fighting against drug trafficking; but according to him, these statistics hide that more than 70% of those detentions were of small consumers, 20% are doubtful cases, and just 3% were related to commercialization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:17</td>
<td>Shows just the studio.</td>
<td>The interviewee explains that the new project also received the opposition from those few organizations that offer help to addicts. From his perspective, this can be explained by the business behind such service, because the new law wants to diffuse enough capabilities in hospitals to deal with addicts, which would damage the business interests of those organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:53</td>
<td>Shows both panels: on the left, the mobilization; on the right, the studio.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time h:m:s</td>
<td>Visual data</td>
<td>Audio data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>Camera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:31</td>
<td>Studio.</td>
<td>Returns to show just the studio, and changes focus from interviewee to interviewers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:20</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:38</td>
<td>The same image of the beginning is used: a photo of IMPA's building, which has an antenna at its top emitting TV radio waves.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix G: Video from Wall Kintun TV, Argentina

The following table shows a fragment of the result of applying the videohermeneutics method to a video elaborated by Wall Kintun TV, uploaded to their Facebook account on April 16th, 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time h:m:s</th>
<th>Visual data</th>
<th>Audio data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>Camera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0:13</td>
<td>Shows Wall Kintun TV’s symbol, and a subtitle that says “Voices from the Wall Mapu”.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0:14</td>
<td>The interview takes place in front of a room that belongs to the coordinating office of the parliament of the Mapuche people in the province of Río Negro, Argentina. The camera focuses on the interviewee.</td>
<td>The name of the interviewee, Domingo Collueque, explaining he is a Mapuche leader of the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0:20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0:28</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:05</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:10</td>
<td>Shows the rest of the Mapuche present at the meeting, who are mostly elderly.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

345
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Visual data</th>
<th>Audio data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>Camera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:35</td>
<td>Shows a close-up of the interviewee.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:04</td>
<td>Shows an image of a sewage (it is not explained from where it was taken), but the point was to illustrate the statement about water pollution.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:07</td>
<td>Close-up of Domingo Colhueque.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:40</td>
<td>Shows the name of the interviewee, Domingo Colhueque, explaining he is a Mapuche leader of the region.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time h:m:s</td>
<td>Visual data</td>
<td>Audio data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:17</td>
<td>Shows an image portraying the typical steppe landscape of the province of Río Negro, with several guanacos moving in group.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Close-up of Domingo Collueque.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:39</td>
<td>Shows an image of a tractor pulling down a tree.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:43</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Close-up of Domingo Collueque.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:55</td>
<td>Shows an image of a couple of goats, and after three seconds switches to another image of a bird in an empty and dry landscape.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Close-up of Domingo Collueque.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Visual data</td>
<td>Audio data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:42</td>
<td>Setting: They show an image of a dry field, followed after few second by another one of a small drying lake.</td>
<td>Camera -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:52</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Close-up of Domingo Collueque.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:02</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Shows the name of the interviewee, Domingo Collueque, explaining he is a Mapuche leader of the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:04</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:09</td>
<td>Shows once again the initial Wall Kintun TV's symbol, and the subtitle that says &quot;Voices from the Wall Mapu&quot;.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix H: Video from Mídia NINJA, Brazil

The following table shows a fragment of the result of applying the videohermeneutics method to a video elaborated by Mídia NINJA. In contrast to other videos, in this case there are no captions, because the video was transmitted live without further edition from Rio de Janeiro on March 8th, 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time h:m:s</th>
<th>Visual data</th>
<th>Audio data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0:00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>Camera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0:00</td>
<td>The video starts with the camera pointing to a group of garbage collectors, who have drums and are dancing and singing in front of the public building of the labor court in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Most participants in the protest are Afro-descendants, which suggests the racial division existing in this work.</td>
<td>Moves around the place, with bumps and low image quality definition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:00</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:52</td>
<td>Image and sound frozen.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:53</td>
<td>The image remained frozen.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:07</td>
<td>The image returns and moves in the same setting in front of the public building.</td>
<td>The camera moves around, showing the people in the protest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Visual data</td>
<td>Audio data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:28</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>The Mídia NINJA journalist starts speaking with garbage collectors. First, the journalist asks a man about his opinion on the meetings and the evolution of the negotiation. The interviewee is happy that at least they have started a dialogue after eight continuous days of strike. The interviewee explains how many of them received threats to stop from striking, but he and many others still decided to mobilize. He also tells he works since 18 years as a garbage collector and explains how little they get paid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:44</td>
<td>A second protestor comes close to the Mídia NINJA Journalist to express his point of view. Makes a close-up on the second interviewee.</td>
<td>The second interviewee explains his point of view about the injustices they are suffering. In particular, how they received threatening letters of dismissal. He also elaborates his point of view of the situation and about the problems of the garbage collecting system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21:48</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>The Mídia NINJA journalist gives a summary of what they are covering, mentions how many viewers are following the live transmission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22:49</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>Interviewee n° 2 brings a newspaper article of the day and explains what it says to the Mídia NINJA journalist. This improvised act by the interviewee is evidence of the open characteristic of the transmissions and of the unplanned participation of citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25:00</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>Another protestor asks the Mídia NINJA journalist how they are filming and transmitting. The journalist replies with a brief explanation of their working process and technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Visual data</td>
<td>Audio data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27:00</td>
<td>The journalist moves to the top of the stairs of the labour court's building. This gives another perspective of the protest.</td>
<td>The interviewee n° 3 explains who where the ones that entered into the negotiation and how.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27:32</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>The sound was lost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27:42</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>The sound returns and the Mídia NINJA journalist asks a fourth interviewee the reasons why they are mobilizing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30:50</td>
<td>It captures different points of view, while the journalist moves with the camera.</td>
<td>The Mídia NINJA journalist starts to move and makes once again a summary of the situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32:49</td>
<td>Focuses on another journalist that is streaming with a cellphone.</td>
<td>Both journalists belong to “independent media”, and briefly exchange some points of view of what is going on. The Mídia NINJA journalist remarks the importance of such media to offer a counter narrative to the one diffused by mass media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34:10</td>
<td>Focuses on a sixth interviewee.</td>
<td>A protester comes close to the Mídia NINJA journalist, shows him a banner that says &quot;Brazil! Help to clean Rio de Janeiro&quot;, and he then gives some comments illustrating his point of view.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35:00</td>
<td>The Mídia NINJA journalist moves away from the stairs, and takes a distance of around 30m from the front door of the labour court building. Moves around the place.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37:00</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>The protester with the loudspeaker explains the situation and how the garbage collectors are suffering. He also motivated the protesters to keep on struggling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37:43</td>
<td>The image froze.</td>
<td>The voice of the speaker continues, while the image is frozen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Visual data</td>
<td>Audio data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44:40</td>
<td>The image is intermittent.</td>
<td>Interviewee n° 7 briefly gives his perspective and hopes they will triumph with the mobilization. Another Mídia NINJA journalist took the camera and summarized what was going on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45:38</td>
<td>Same place, moving across the street in front of the labour court.</td>
<td>The Mídia NINJA journalist reads a banner against the Globo network that garbage collectors prepared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46:03</td>
<td>The image is intermittent.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47:30</td>
<td>Same place, moving around.</td>
<td>The Mídia NINJA once again makes a summary of the conflict and on what is going on, while he moves around the place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50:34</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>The sound is silenced, though this time on purpose by the Mídia NINJA journalist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52:02</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>Another Mídia NINJA journalist carries the camera, explains he replaced his colleague and that Mídia NINJAs operate in this collective way, distributed across Brazil. He then diffuses the web pages of garbage collectors in internet and explains these media helped them to get organized, because they did not have a trade union nor were they connected with political parties. Thus, social networks allowed protestors to exchange experiences and mobilize against a situation they consider unfair.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54:30</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>One of the male interviewee explains how they are being exploited, and the other interviewees complain about the large quantity of hours they have to withstand. He also comments that the Globo network is ignoring the issue. The journalist asks the women how do they experience their work, trying to learn about gender differences, but the women just reply that collecting garbage is the same work for both.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time h:m:s</td>
<td>Visual data</td>
<td>Audio data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:00:02</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>The Mídia NINJA journalist explains once again that garbage collectors' salaries are ridiculously low, which pushes them to get other jobs or to ask for money from friends and to employ diverse strategies of survival. But this should not be taking place, given that they are offering a public service for the city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:00:04</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Sound is lost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:00:05</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>The sound returns and the Mídia NINJA journalist moves next to a female garbage collector, who explains his part in the conflict, but it is not clear given that on the background someone is using a loudspeaker that distorts the audio.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:10</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>The interviewee n° 13 details the conflict and gives information about herself, what she studied and her life. She explains the difficult situation they are facing with the low salaries they have, which is contrary to the type of benefits that those in higher positions of the firm or public officials have.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:14:20</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>The Mídia NINJA journalist makes a summary of what the woman says and expresses the sound quality is not good. The woman highlights she started to work with only 5 years old, in order to satisfy basic needs. She then starts to compare and contrast the negative stereotypes against garbage collectors versus her reality of daily effort and struggle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:17:44</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>A male interviewee joins the conversation. The interviewee n° 14 gives more details on the conflict. After this, he announces new information from the meeting that has been taking place, arguing that the authorities are trying to delay a solution for a month, and of course expresses his anger against such suspected intentions. The female complains how the authorities complain about protestors, but she remarks that they do not have any idea of the sort of work garbage collectors daily do nor the time and effort it takes to finish them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Visual data</td>
<td>Audio data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:22:51</td>
<td>The image is intermittent.</td>
<td>The woman keeps on detailing her point of view. Later the man expresses his opinion that the situation has not improved much during the last 25 years, also that the trade union has not been of much help, and that is why they distrust them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:30:54</td>
<td>After hearing a bit more the perspective from the interviewee n° 14, the transmission ends abruptly.</td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix I: Local Terms

The following list summarizes a group of terms that are used in the text, indicating the language in which they were originally expressed and its connotation in the context of use.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrastrão</td>
<td>Brazilian Portuguese</td>
<td>Refers to a group of criminals that act together to steal objects in a public space, which is frequent in the beaches of Rio de Janeiro.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bariloche</td>
<td>Mapuche language</td>
<td>People from behind the mountain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caixa coletivo</td>
<td>Brazilian Portuguese</td>
<td>Organizational technology of FDE to manage financial resources collectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colunas</td>
<td>Brazilian Portuguese</td>
<td>The translation of the term is “columns”, but in the context of this research it refers to trips that members of FDE plan and execute to nearby cities and towns in Brazil or foreign countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griôs</td>
<td>Brazilian Portuguese</td>
<td>This neologism is a Brazilian word inspired by the term griot, which refers to West African storytellers who keep the tradition through oral stories. In contrast, in the Brazil the concept was broadened to include any person (not only Afro-descendants) who shares stories and traditions of particular Brazilian communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quilombo</td>
<td>Brazilian Portuguese</td>
<td>Hinterland settlements founded by Afro-Brazilians, most of them who escaped slavery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kultrún</td>
<td>Mapuche language</td>
<td>A traditional Mapuche musical instrument.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imersões</td>
<td>Brazilian Portuguese</td>
<td>The translation of the term is “immersion”, but in the context of this research it refers to intensive training sessions that take place usually in one of FDE houses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lonko</td>
<td>Mapuche language</td>
<td>Chief of a Mapuche community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapunzugun</td>
<td>Mapuche language</td>
<td>The name of the language of the Mapuche indigenous community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piqueteros</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>This word is an Argentinean neologism that refers to street mobilizations that emerged in Argentina during the 1990s and reached their peak after the economic crisis of 2001. The demonstrators, who blocked streets and occupied governmental buildings, faced different conflictive situations with the police and citizens not sharing their views.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Povos de terreiro</td>
<td>Brazilian Portuguese</td>
<td>This refers to Afro-descendant communities in Brazil and their spaces to preserve African worldviews and religious practices. They are also important for strengthening the social ties in their location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruka</td>
<td>Mapuche language</td>
<td>Houses of the Mapuche built following their worldview.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall Kintun</td>
<td>Mapuche language</td>
<td>To look or search around.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall Mapu</td>
<td>Mapuche language</td>
<td>The territory where the Mapuche lived before the Spanish conquest.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>